The
Vrajajivan Indological Studies
7

THE

SARVA-DARŚANA-SAṂGRAHA

OF

MĀDHAVĀCĀRYA

With English Translation, Transliteration and Indices

COMPILED, EDITED AND TRANSLITERATED
With Introduction
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INTRODUCTION

श्रीगुरुः शरणम्

मङ्गलं श्रीगुरोर्ध्यानं मङ्गलं तत्पदाम्बुजम् ।
मङ्गलं तज्जपो नित्यं मङ्गलं गुणकीर्तनम् ।।

A History of Indian Philosophy is never attempted, as the absence of chronological data, the complete indifference of the ancient Indian towards personal histories, the break in tradition and the biased orthodox colouring of interpretation - which instead of a help often proves a hindrance, are some of the main reasons. The most that is achieved is the grouping of systems by reasons of their similarities, and accounts of contending views based on the desire to prove by this means the superiority of some doctrine or other. The common view of six systems, grouped in pairs, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya and Yoga, and Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta, and treated as *Āstika,* because they accept the *Veda* as authoritative, is certainly not early, though a sketch of these six is found in Siddharṣi's *Upamitibhavaprapañcā-kathā* (A.D.436)[1]. Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya* (A.D. 478)[2] deals with Buddhist views, Nyāya, Sāṁkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Jaiminīya as well as Jain metaphysics, and very shortly with the Cārvāka views, - thus suggesting

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1. *History of Classical Sanskrit Literature*, by M. Krishnamachariar, MLBD, Delhi, 1989, p.430
2. *A History of Indian Logic*, by S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, MLBD, Delhi, 1978, pp. 208-209 (fnt. 4).

that the number six was traditional but not rigidly fixed in significance. In the *Sarvadarśanasiddhānta-saṁgraha*, which is erroneously ascribed to Śaṅkara (A.D. 788 to A.D. 820)[3], we find accounts of the Cārvāka, the Jain system, the Buddhist schools--- Sautrāntikas, Vaibhāṣikas, Mādhyamikas, and Yogācāras -, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā - according to Kumārila and Prabhākara --, Sāṁkhya, Patañjali, Vedavyāsa, that is the *Mahābhārata*, and Vedānta. Later probably is the well-known *Sarvadarśana - saṁgraha* of Mādhavācārya (A.D. 1302)[4], which deals with the systems arranged from the point of view of relative error.

THE *SARVADARŚANA-SAṀGRAHA* OF MĀDHAVĀRYA

MĀDHAVĀCĀRYA

About the year 1330 A.D., the brothers Bukka and Harihara founded the city of Vijayanagar[5] which is also called by poets Vidyānagar.

3. "The Date of Śaṅkarācārya", *Śrī Bhagavatpāda Śaṅkarācārya*, by A. Kuppūsvāmī, Chowkhamba Publication, Varanasi, 1972, p.21

4.a 'Bibliography', *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Karl H. Potter, Vol. I, MLBD, Delhi, 1983, p.311

b. *Ācārya Sāyaṇa aur Mādhava*, by Baladeva Upādhyāya, Varanasi, pp.133-137.

5. Gaṅgādevī, consort of Kampana or Kamparāya- the second son of Bukka I, in her poem '*Madhurāvijaya*' or '*Vīrakamparāyacarita*' writes: '*Tasyāsīdvijayā nāma vijayarjita - sampadaḥ*'.

Mādhavācārya, who became the head of Śṛṅgerī Maṭha in 1329 A.D. under the name of Vidyāraṇya[6], was their minister. He was almost the founder of the kingdom of Vijayanagar. Kings Bukka and Harihara were his favourite disciples whom he was helping with his counsel in the administration. So he was called '*Karnāṭaka-siṁhāsana-sthāpanācārya*[7]'.With the advent of the Empire of Vijayanagar came a revival of Sanskrit literature in South India. At the instance of Bukka, a commission of learned men was constituted under Mādhava Vidyāraṇya and Sāyaṇa to collect, comment and preserve all works bearing on the Vedic religion. It is not surprising therefore, that Sāyaṇa-Mādhava contributed a lot to the Vedic religion during this period. His works on philosophy are well-known for enumeration.

Mādhavācārya was born in the family of Sāyaṇa[8], so he is also known by the name of Sāyaṇa-Mādhava[9]. He was the son of Sāyaṇa and Śrīmatī of Bhāradvāja-gotra. His brother, Sāyaṇa,

6.'Mādhava-Vidyāraṇya Theory' by M.A. Doraisamia Iyengar, *Journal of Indian History*, Vol.XII, p.241; 'Identity of Mādhava and Vidyāraṇya', by P.V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. I, Part 2, BORI, Poona, 1975, pp.778-92; Also see - Introduction to *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*, by E.B. Cowell and A.E. Gough, CSS Vol. X, Varanasi, 1978, pp.vii-viii

7. *History of Classical Sanskrit Literature*, M. Krishnamachariar, p.213

8. He himself says: '*Śrīmatsāyaṇadugdhābdhikaustubhena mahaujasā/ kriyate mādhavāryeṇa sarvadarśanasaṁgraha//*
- *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*, Introductory verse 3

9. Vide, *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*, Introductory verse 4

was minister of kings Bukka I and Harihara II of Vijayanagar. His other brother Bhoganātha was a companion of king Sangama II. All the brothers were Vedic scholars and poets. Mādhavācārya lived 85 years and died about 1387 A.D.[10].

Mādhavācārya was the immediate disciple of Bhāratītīrtha who initiated him in the Smārta order. Vidyātirtha and Śrīkaṇṭha were his *Vidyāguru*. As Mādhavācārya did not mention any name of three in his *Sarvadarśana-Saṁgraha* as his *guru*, and mentioned the name of Sarvajña-viṣṇu, son of Śārṅgapāṇi, instead; it is assumed that either he was different from the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* or Sarvajña-viṣṇu was identical with one of the three. The answer is that Sarvajnā-viṣṇu the second name of Vidyātīrtha[11], as mentioned in the *Puṇyaślokamañjarī* of Sarvajña-sadā-Śivabodha-the 54th Ācārya of Kāmakoṭipiṭha in 1524-1539 A.D.; hence Mādhav-ācārya is the author of the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*.

The reference, '*setuṁ dṛṣṭvā samudrasya-brahmahatyāṁ vyapohati*', to the *Parāśarasmṛti* XII.70, to which Mādhavācārya had written an extensive commentary, seems to support the opinion of Mādhava's authorship of the *Sarvadarśana*-*saṁgraha*. P.V. Kane[12] and R. Thangaswami[13] have also ably summarized the literature and have confirmed the traditional position.

10. *History of Classical Sanskrit Literature*, M. Krishnamachariar, p.213

11.a. *History of Classical Sanskrit Literature*, by M. Krishnamachariar, p.76

b. *Ācārya Sāyaṇa aur Mādhava*, pp.68ff.,166

This is the traditionally accepted view that Mādhavācārya is the author of the SDS. But Professor Anantalal Thakur establishes that the SDS, though attributed to Mādhava, is really the work of Canni Bhaṭṭa (Cinna Bhaṭṭa or Cennu Bhaṭṭa) who lived in Vijayanagar at the court of king Harihara at the latter half of the 14th century[14] Canni Bhaṭṭa was the son of the Sarvajña-viṣṇu[15], the author of a sub-commentary on the *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa*[16]. This Sarvajña-viṣṇu was *Vidyāguru* of Mādhava and Sāyaṇa, as mentioned above, hereby Canni Bhaṭṭa was a younger contemporary of Mādhava and Sāyaṇa in

12. *History of Dharmaśāstra*, by P.V. Kane, Vol. I, part 2, pp.778-92.

13. 'Śrī Vidyāraṇya and His works' (In Sanskrit), by R. Thangaswami, printed as Manuscript, 18pp. : Paper read on the occassion of the *Vidyāraṇya Day*, celebrated on 24.10.1965 under the auspices of the Sanskrit Academy, Madras.

14.(a). R.G. Bhandarkar's Reports of Sanskrit Manuscripts, 1882-83.

(b). *Tarkabhāṣa-prakāśikā* of Cinna Bhaṭṭa, BORI, Poona, 1937, n.1 on page 524

15. cf. '*iti śrīhariharamahārāja-paripālitena sahaja-sarvajñaviṣṇu-devārādhya-tanūjena sarvajñānujena cinnabhaṭṭena viracitāyāṁ tarka-bhaṣā-prakāśekayaṁ pramāṇaparicchedaḥ samāptaḥ Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā*, pp.196,262.

16. *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*, BORI, Poona, 1978, p.458.

his band. In elucidation of Keśava Miśra's *Tarkabhāśa*, he prepared an elaborate commentary called the *Prakāśikā*[17]. He composed also a commentary on the *Tārkikarakṣā-sārasaṁgraha* of Varadarāja, called the *Vivaraṇa*[18], completed by his pupil Rāmeśvara under the title of *Sārasaṁ-grahabhūṣīkā* as he died before finishing it[19]. In the *Vivaraṇa*, at the conclusion of the Anumāna section Canni Bhaṭṭa says: "*anukūla-tarka - sanāthayoranvaya - vyatirekayoravinābhāva - viniścāyakatvaṁ* ***'Sarva-darśana-saṁgrahe'*** *asmābhīru -papāditamiti tata eva avadhātavyam*" = "Positive and negative coexistences indubitably establish invariable concomitance when corroborative arguments come to their aid. This has been established, as the author says, in his own ***Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha***". On the basis of these above-mentioned lines of *Vivaraṇa*, - in which it has been claimed that a work entitled *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha* is also written by Canni Bhaṭṭa, - Prof. Thakur settles the claim of

17. BORI, Ponna, 1937

18. Manuscript, R2923, Govt. Oriental MSS. Library, Madras : Transcript, No. 633, Mithila Institute, Darbhanga.

19. *Vyākhyāyaitāvato granthāt cannibhaṭṭāhvayaḥ sudhīḥ /*
ākāritaḥ surendreṇa vyācikrīṣuḥ svarabhyagāt //
atha rāmeśvarāryeṇa tadantevāsinā satā /
vyākhyā vilikhyate khyātā sārasaṁgraha-bhūṣikā //
Bhūṣikā, MI Transcript, pp. 217
Cf. again,
āsākṣāttvaniruktīyamupādhyāyairūpitā /
śiṣṭā rāmeśvarāryeṇa vijñeyā racitā mayā //
Ibid, p. 573

Canni Bhaṭṭa to the authorship of the extant *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*. He discusses the claim in detail. First and foremost - he compares the three texts, viz. *Prakāśikā*, *Vivaraṇa*, and *Sarvadarśana--saṁgraha*; quotes many common verses, quotations, passages and expressions with nominal variations; and concludes that the vast literature used in the *Prakāśikā* and the *Vivaraṇa* on the one hand evinces the erudition of the author and on the other indirectly supports the claim of Canni Bhaṭṭa to the authorship of the SDS[20].

Prof. K. Kunjunni Raja also assigns Canni Bhaṭṭa to the authorship of the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*, and observes: The attribution of *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha* of Canni Bhaṭṭa to Mādhava may be explained on the ground that the work was written under the patronage of Mādhava and at his instance'[21].

SARVADARŚANA-SAṀGRAHA

Saṁgraha primarily means a collection but here it signifies a compendium or brief exposition in a critical manner as well as in a synthetical character. The compendium that deals with the sixteen[22] philosophical systems current in the

20. Vide : 'Canni Bhaṭṭa and the authorship of the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*', by Anantalal Thakur, *Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vol. 25, 1961, pp.524-38.

21. 'Preface' to SDS, chapter 16 : *Śāṅkaradarśanam*, Eng. Translation by Klaus K. Klostermaier, The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Adyar, 1999, p. vi.

22. Some manuscripts of the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha* have the colophon after *Pātañjaladarśanam* as : '*itaḥ paraṁ sarvadarśana-*

śiromaṇibhūtaṁ śāṅkara-darśanam anyatra likhitam ity atropekṣitam' - 'The system of Śaṅkara, which comes next in succession, and which is the crest-gem of all systems, has been explained by us elsewhere, it is therefore left untouched here'. - whereby doubts as regards the authenticity of the sixteenth chapter, viz. *Śaṅkaradarśanam* have been expressed. A.B. Keith in his book, '*A History of Sanskrit Literature*', London, 1961, on page 500, says that 'The chapter on Vedānta seems not to be part of the original work, but to have been added later'. E.B. Cowell comments, 'This probably refers to the *Pañcadaśī*. A Calcutta Pandit told me that it referred to the *Prameya-vivaraṇa-saṁgraha*', on p. 273n. of his translation. And the editions of the SDS have been published at various places **without** the Śaṅkara System, which are as follows :

1. SDS: Edited by Taranath Tarkavacaspati, Calcutta, 1851.
2. SDS: Edited by Isvara Chandra Vidyasagara, Bibliotheca Indica 21, Calcutta, 1853-58.
3. SDS: Edited by Jivananda Vidyasagara, Calcutta, 1889.
4. SDS: Edited and translated by E.B. Cowell, *Paṇḍita* (Benaras) 9, 1874-75 : 10, 1875-76; n.s. 1, 1876 ; 2, 1877-78.
5. SDS: Translated by E.B. Cowell and A.E. Gough, London, 1892, 1894; Reprinted in India, CSS Vol. X, Varanasi, 1978.
6. SDS: Edited by C.M. Pal, Calcutta, 1894.
7. SDS: Edited and translated into Hindi by Udaya Narain Singh, Bombay, 1906.

But internal as well as external reasons prove that *Śāṅkaradarśanam* is a part of the original work SDS. It is closely and consistently linked up with the preceding chapters. Its language and style are similar to these of the preceding discussions. There are frequent cross-references to former chapters. (Vide: 'Some Notes on the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*', by Hajime Nakamura, WZKSOA (Wien) Vol. 12-13,

fourteenth century in the South of India, is the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*. The work is the first attempt of its kind ever made in Sanskrit to expose all the then extant philosophical systems in India as lucidly and as scholarly as possible. It is an interesting specimen of Indian critical ability. With singular stroke of genius, Mādhavācārya ransacked all possible sources ranging from the *Vedas* down to his contemporaries to make his work as representative as possible. In a language which is both precise

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1968-69, pp. 241-252). Its structure makes eminent sense to crown the polemics against all other systems with a statement on Advaīta Vedānta. Finally, the 5 author described his work SDS in the Maṅgalaśloka as a garland of variegated flowers, keeping in mind that garlands normally contain multiples of 8, does it not make better sense to have 16 (2X8) than 15 chapters ? (Vide: Introduction to *Śāṅkaradarśanam*, Eng. Translation by Klaus K. Klostermaier, Adyar, 1999, pp. 1-2). Consequently, the editions of the SDS have been published at various places **with** the Śāṅkara System, which are as follows :

1. SDS: Edited, with Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Prasthānabheda*, by the Ānandāśrama Pandits, ASS 51, Poona, 1906, 1928, 1977.
2. SDS: Edited; with editor's Sanskrit Commentary, a scholarly introduction, and copies indices; by Vāsudeva Śāstrī Abhyankar, BORI, Poona, 1924, 1951, 1978.
3. SDS: Edited and translated into Hindi, with editor's Hindi commentary, by Umāśaṅkara Śarmā 'Ṛṣi', Varanasi, 1964, 1978.
4. SDS: Chapter 16: *Śāṅkara-darśanam*, with English translation by Klaus K. Klostermaier, the Adyar Library and Research Centre, Adyar, 1999.

and forceful, he reorganized the materials and marshalled into a logical hierarchy to lead ultimately to absolute monism, the *Vedānta* point of view. Hence, the systems here form a gradually ascending scale, - the first, the Cārvāka and Bauddha, being the lowest as the furthest removed from the *Vedānta*, and the last, the Sāṁkhya and Yoga, being the highest as approaching most nearly to it.

The sixteen systems here discussed attracted to their study the noblest minds in India throughout the medieval period of history. We can still catch some faint echo of the din as we read the medieval literature. Thus, the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha* occupies a very significant place in the philosophical literature.

Nevertheless, the work appears to the general reader to be a bit difficult, because its style is terse and sometimes elliptic as the author has tried to condense as much material within a short span as possible. Sometimes the author presents more discussion than description regarding the principles of some more advanced systems as that of the Buddha, Rāmānuja or Śaṅkara; whereby the general reader gets confused, and very soon likes to get out of the discussion. Sometimes refuting some theory he generally offers two is five alternatives and than shows the absurdity of these in such a way that unless a scholar does not understand the purport of the author. In this way the work becomes more difficult than the original texts. But there

are some less known systems which have no such presentation.

However, Mādhācārya is an original thinker. His originality of thoughts is seen throughout the work. His presentation is also very synthetic and integrated as is evident from a close perusal of some of the systems, as for instance, the Buddhist system and the Śaṅkara system. Due to his originality of presentation, his style is very constant throughout the work. It is also remarkable here that Mādhavācārya does not intend to impose any idea of his own upon his readers. He always quotes verses in abundance from all the original works to expose the systems. He often displays some quaint humour as he throws himself for the time into the position of their advocate, and holds, as it were, a temporary brief in behalf of opinions entirely at variance with his own.

The *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha* devotes to the sixteen Indian philosophical systems current in the time of the author. These are as follows: Cārvāka, Bauddha, Ārhata or Jain, Rāmānuja system of Viśiṣ-ṭādvaita, Mādhva system of Dvaita or Purṅaprajña-darśana, Nakulīśa-pāśupata system, Śaiva, Pratyabhijñā system, Raseśvara system, Aulūkya or Vaiśeṣīka, Nyāya system of Akṣ-apāda, Mīmāṁsā system of Jaimini, Vyākaraṇa system of Pāṇini, Sāṁkhya, Yoga system of Patañjali, and Śāṅkara system of Advaita.

The systems are arranged from the Vedānta point of view or the Śāṅkara system of absolute monism,

which is the crest-jewel of all the systems. Among the systems an ascending order based upon a general rule-the less acceptable objects are put in the beginning and the most desirable ones at the end-has been followed. Hence the *Nāstika*[23] systems, the less acceptable views are treated at the very outset and then the turn of *Āstika*[24] systems, the most desirable ones, comes. The *Nāstika* views are of two kinds: *Ādhyakṣikas* those based upon perception, and *Tārkikas* - those based upon reasoning. Nāstika-śiromaṇi or an arch-heretic is cārvāka, a man of low and unrefined taste, a materialist who believes only in perception and in four elements, viz. Earth, water, fire, and air. He rejects the validity even of Inference, the most practical means of valid knowledge. He does not possess any philosophy. He believes in 'eat, drink and be marry'. His view is most censurable, as it is absolutely Materialism. It is, therefore, recorded here at the very outset. In doing so the author has recorded the other extreme of Indian Philosophy. The *Nāstika* systems based upon reasoning are either the Bauddhas holding all existence to be momentary - the *Kṣaṇikavādins*, or the Jainas propounding it to be conditional-the *Syādvādins*. The Bauddhas possess a comparatively gross view while maintaining *ākāśa* to be a

23. The *Nāstika* = "*Na asti*-It is not'" = views are those which neither regard the *Vedas* as infallible nor try to establish their own validity on their authority.

24. The *Āstika* = '*asti iti* = 'It exists' = views are those which regard the Vedas as infallible.

kind of non-existence whereas the Jainas take it to be a positive category. Thus their order of presentation is beyond doubt.

The *Āstika* - views are of two kinds: *Saguṇātma - vādins* - those which hold the Supreme Self endowed with qualities, and *Nirguṇātmavādins* - those which accept attributeless Absolute. *Saguṇā - tmavādins* are again of two kinds: *Tārkikas* - those based upon reasoning and *Śrautas* - those based upon the *Śrutis* alone. *Tārkikas* are more censurable than *Śrautas*; as *tārkika* class is based upon inference supported by argument-*tarka* rather than upon the *Śrutis*, and the *tarka* does not have any fixity or finality. The *Tārkikas* are of two kinds: *Pracchanna-tārkikas* - hidden or indirect rationalists, and *Spaṣṭa-tārkikas* - direct rationalists. The Rāmānuja system of Viśiṣṭādvaita and the Mādhva system of Dvaita are hidden or indirect rationalists, though they are *Śrautas*. But their difference is that while Madhva directly insists on the theory of difference maintaining Dualism, Rāmānuja, though accepting difference at least in treatment, does not stick to it and explains it in terms of qualification of the Supreme Self. This way of hiding himself is censurable; hence Rāmānuja is placed before Madhva.

The direct rationalists - *Spaṣṭatārkikas* are of two kinds: *Bhogasādhanādṛṣṭa-vādins* - those which hold the *Adṛṣṭa* as means of enjoyment and *Utpattisādhanādṛṣṭa-vādins* - those which accept the Adṛṣṭa as means of origin or production. The

former are of two kinds: *Videhamuktivādins* and *Jīvanmuktīvādins*. Again the former are of two kinds: *Ātmabhedavādins* - those which believe in the plurality of *Ātman*, and *Ātmaikyavādins* - those which accept one undivided being or *Ātman*. Again the former are of two kinds: *Karmasāpekṣa-Īśvaravādins* - those which hold Īśvara not to be assisted by the Karmas, and *Karmānapekṣa-Īśvaravādins* - those which accept Īśvara to be assisted by the Karmas. Thus there are various direct rationalist systems, which get their treatment next. Their belief in the *Śrutis* is also of varying nature. The least belief in the *Śrutis* is exhibited by the *Māheśvaras* divided into four groups - Pāśupatas, Śaivas, Pratyabhijñādarśins, and Raseśvaras - who, therefore, get priority over the others. Of these *Māhaśvaras* the Pāśupatas holding Īśvaara not to be assisted by the Karman are treated first because they reproachfully refuse the law of Karman. The Śaivas accept Īśvara to be assisted by the Karmas. The Pratyabhijñādarśins accept One undivided Being or *Ātman* who are accordingly far superior to the two mentioned above. But the *Raseśvaras* who believe in *Jīvanmukti* are far fairer than these.

The *Utpattisādhanādṛṣṭavādins* are of two kinds: Those who do not accept *Śabda* or *Śruti* as a separate source of valid knowledge, and those who accept *Śabda*. The former, the Vaiśeṣikas lose superiority over the latter, the Naiyāyikas. They believe in the *Śrutis* only less.

The *Śrautas* are of two kinds: Vākyārthavedins - the

Mīmāṁsakas, - and *Padārthavedins* - the Vaiyākaraṇas. They, though Vaidīka, believe in Śabda to be the final cause of the Universe and do not show as much subtlety as the Sāṁkhya system which steps further, i.e. to *Prakṛti*. The Mīmāṁsā system, as contrasted with the Pāṇinian system, is based on grammar for its treatment of the Vaidika sentences - injunctions. Hence the former is inferior to the latter - the Pāṇinian system. In fact the Pāṇinīyās are devoted to the supreme sanctity of grammar, as stated in the text:

"āpaḥ pavitraṁ paramaṁ pṛthivyāmapāṁ pavitraṁ paramaṁ ca mantrāḥ/ teṣāṁ ca sāmargyajuṣāṁ pavitraṁ maharṣayo vyākaraṇaṁ nirāhuḥ //"

Nirguṇātmavādins are of two kinds: *Tārkikas* and *Śrautas*. The former are again of two kinds: *Nirīśvaras* - those who do not believe in Īśvara and *Seśvaras* - those who believe in Īśvara. Thus the former are the Sāṁkhyas and the latter Pātañjalas. Their belief in the *Śrutis* is very little. So they are inferior to Śaṅkara who gets priority in treatment.

This ascending order among the 16 systems, arranged in the *Sarvadarśana-Saṁgraha*, may simply be known from the following chart:

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY





Let us now proceed to give a brief analytical evaluation of the contents of these systems. This is well-known to all that Indian Philosophy is more concerned with the problems of metaphysics; ontology and epistemology. Metaphysics is related to the structural analysis of the universe and includes ontology, cosmology and epistemology. Ontology explains the nature of Being and is followed by cosmology. Cosmology deals with the theory of creation. Epistemology comes after ontology. Besides, Indian Philosophy is also concerned with Ethics. In the *Sarvadarśana saṁgraha* all the systems do not equally possess all the aspects. Some lay much stress upon the one or the other. As for instance, the Nyāya system much emphasizes on the epistemological aspect, while the Vaiśiṣika - system on Ontology. The Yoga - system much stresses on its practical side, while the Sāṁkhya - system on theoretical. The contents of the systems are as follows:

1. The Cārvāka System : First and foremost the author salutes to Śiva; but it is utterly abolished by cārvāka, a person who eats up all moral and ethical considerations, or a person who is 'sweet-tongued' = '*cāruvāk*' or an 'arch-heretic' = '*Nāstika-śiromaṇi*', or a Lokāyata, a commoner.

After discussing this, he talks about the metaphysics of the Cārvākas that there are four elements, viz. Earth, water, fire and air. Bodies, senses and objects are the results of the different combinations of elements. Consciousness arises from matter like the intoxicating quality of wine arising from fermented yeast. The soul is nothing but the conscious body. Enjoyment is the only end of human life. Death alone is liberation. There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world; nor do the actions of the four castes, orders etc. produce any real effect. The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves and smearing one's self with ashes, were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness. All the ceremonies are a means of livelihood for Brāhmaṇas.

The epistemological doctrine of the Cārvākas is that Perception = *Pratyakṣa* is the only means of valid knowledge. The validity even of inference is rejected. Inference is said to be a mere leap in the dark. It is scholarly disputed that the basis of inference, *Vyāpti* can not be established by any known source of valid knowledge. Perception does not prove this *Vyāpti*. Nor can it be proved by inference, for inference itself is said to presuppose its validity. Testimony too can not prove it for firstly, testimony itself is not a valid means of knowledge and secondly, if testimony proves *vyāpti*, inference would become dependent on testimony and then none would be able to infer anything by himself. Hence inference can not be regarded as a valid source of knowledge. This refutation of inference is very possibly the original speculation of the author. The *Sarvadarśana saṁgraha* is only the work where such a long or complete

and clear exposition of the Cārvākas' theory is found in the whole history of Sanskrit literature.

2. The Bauddha System : At the very outset the Bauddhas criticize in various ways the doctrine of the Cārvākas that Perception is the only means of valid knowledge. They remark: As *Vyāpti* = Invariable Concomitance is easily cognizable by means of identity - *tādātmya* and causality *tadupatti*, Inference is also a form of evidence, *Pramāṇa*. Again, they mention that *Vyāpti* is established not by *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka* or concomitance and non-concomitance, e.g. 'A is where B is', and 'A is not where B is not', but by Pañcakāraṇī which requires five indications, viz. (1) That an effect is not cognized prior to its effectuation, that (2) The cause being perceived, (3) The effect is perceived, and that after the effect is cognized, (4) There is its non-cognition, (5) When the (material) cause is no longer cognized. Thence, the Bauddhas are divided into four designations, viz. Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Sautrāntika, and Vaibhāṣika, these Buddhists adopt respectively the doctrines of Nihilism, Subjective Idealism, Representationism, and Presentat -ionism or Direct Realism. It is to be borne in mind that four points of view have been laid out, viz. (1) All is momentary, momentary; (2) All is pain, pain; (3) All is like itself alone; and (4) All is void, void. A discussion on Kṣ-aṇikavāda or the doctrine of momentariness follows next and in this connection all the arguments given in support of non-momentary

existence are properly repudiated. This portion is very interesting, because various significant Buddhist terms like *arthakrīyākāritva, krama-akrama*, atiśaya etc. are used. Whereby a learner becomes acquainted with difficult terminology of Buddhism. After denial of *Sāmānya*, a brief description of four Buddhist-schools is presented. Of these *Śūnyavāda* turns all existence, internal as well as external, to be above any expression. *Vijñānavāda* takes it to be explicable but in terms of *Vijñāna*. Accordingly, the self-luminous character of *Buddhi* is established after denying external existence as a reality. The *Sautrāntika* view holds the external things as inferable as contrasted with the Vaibhāṣikas who accept these to be perceptible. After this, *Ālaya-vijñāna* and *Pravṛttivijñāna* are explained along with the four conditions of knowledge, viz.. The data, the suggestion, the medium, and the dominant organ; and the *Skandhas*, viz. Sensational, perceptional, affectional, verbal, and impressionable. The four noble truths = *Āryasatya*, viz. suffering - *duḥkha*, a cause of suffering - *duḥkha-samudaya*, a cessation of suffering - *duḥkha-nirodha*, and a way leading to this cessation of suffering - *duḥkha-nirodha-gāmī-mārga*, are also reviewed. In between, the doctrine of *Pratītyasamutpāda* or Dependent Origination, the foundation of all the teachings of the Buddha is mentioned. At last, the exposition of the *Vaibhāṣika* school and a summary of Buddhism in verses end the chapter. This chapter is very synthetic and integrated as well as original.

3. The Ārhata System : The Gymnosophists or the Jainas criticize the *Kṣaṇikavāda* of the Bauddhas. They say: If no continuing soul is accepted, then even the arrangement of the means for attaining worldly fruit in this life will be useless. But surely this can never be imagined as possible that one should act and another reap the consequences. Therefore, this conviction, "I who previously did the deed, am the person who now reap its consequences" - establishes undoubtedly the existence of a continuing soul, and rejects the momentary existence, i.e. an existence which lasts only an instant, and has no previous or subsequent part. They criticize again in different ways the *Kṣ-aṇikavāda*. The *Arhat* or *Sarvajña* is established next after a long debate with the *Tautātikas*, the *Mīmāṁsakas* and the *Naiyāyikas*, the latter's concept of *Īśvara* as the maker of the universe being criticized. Thence, the way to *Mokṣa* is said to consists to Right faith, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct, the well-known triad called the three gems ṣ *Triratnas*. Right Faith is the undoubted faith in the nature of the seven *Tattvas* like *Jīva*, *ajīva* etc. Right Knowledge is the correct understanding of the nature of these *Tattvas* and Right Conduct is defined as living according to the rules of conduct laid down in the sacred books. In between, the five vows *Pañcamahāvrata*, viz. *ahiṁsā*, *satya*, *asteya*, *brahmacarya* and *aparigraha* are mentioned. The Jaina metaphysics is treated next in which the number of *Tattvas* or predicaments is given as two, five and seven according to the different

points of view. A long discussion on *Bandha*-Bondage and *Mokṣa* - Liberation is done next. Lastly, the Jain logic of expressing anything as conditional existence is established. The Jainas understood the complex nature of reality. The truth of the reality can not be understood unless it is studied in various aspects. Every object can be spoken of both in the affirmative and the negative. Consequently, the Jainas teach us to respect the opinions of others as well. This view is known as *Syādvāda* or *Anekāntavada* or *Saptabhaṅgīnaya* - The system of the seven paralogisms.

4. The Rāmānuja System : Repudiating the Jaina logic of conditional existence and the medium size of the soul, the author establishes the trinity of Reals according to the Rāmānuja system - *Cit* - the soul, *Acit* - the matter or world, and *Īśvara* - the Lord - and on the basis of the principle of organic relation, says that ultimate Reality is one as a unity. *Īśvara* as the creator of the universe is the immanent ground of existence and also the inner Self of all thing in the universe and as such He sustains and controls *Cit* and *Acit*. Hence the system is described as *Viśiṣṭādvaita* which means oneness of the organic unity. Thence, the author criticizes in various ways the Śaṅkara's view of *Māyā* or *Avidyā* = Ignorance or Illusion which is something *positive - bhāvarūpa*; finds defects in an undetermined - unconditionate Reality = *Nirviśeṣ-abrahma*; and thus concludes that creation, according to Rāmānuja, is absolutely real.

After that, the nature of *Cit*, *Acit* and *Īśvara* is discussed. Of these, individual souls, consisting to suncontracted and unlimited pure knowledge, but enveloped in *avidyā*, undergo contraction and expansion of knowledge according to the degree of their merits. Of things which are non-soul, and which are objects of fruition, unconsciousness, and the like, are the properties. Of the Supreme Lord the attributes are subsistence, as the internal controller of both the subjects and the objects of fruition; the boundless glory of illimitable knowledge, dominion, majesty, power, and the like. Then, the worship as consisting of five elements, viz. the access, the preparation, oblation, recitation and devotion, and its result, the salvation are discussed. The first four *sūtras* of the *Brahmasūtras* are then explained. Here, the author thus explains very clearly the Rāmānuja System as found in the authoritative texts of the Ācārya and his disciples.

5. The Pūrṇaprajña System : Ānanda-tīrtha-Pūrṇaprajña or Madhva rejects the Rāmānuja system, because, though like his own views, it teaches the atomic size of the soul, the servitude of the soul, the existence of the Veda without any personal author, dependency upon the *Pañcarātra*, the triad of evidences, the reality of plurality in the universe, and so on, - Yet, in accepting three hypotheses as to reciprocally contradictory divisions etc., it coincides with the views of the Jainas. Showing that the texts, - 'He is Ātman, That art thou' etc., bear a different meaning under a different explanation, he sets

up a new system called 'Dvaitavāda' = 'Dualism'. According to him, Reality is of two kinds: Independent and Dependent. The author thus distinguishes the system from the last one and then proves the existence of difference on the basis of Dualism. Thence, as Madhva follows the *Bhakti* - cult, he talks about three rules of serving *Īśvara*, viz. Stigmatisation - *Aṅkana*, Imposition of names - *Nāmakaraṇa*, and Worship - *Bhajana*. He believes that Mokṣa is attainable only through the grace of *Īśvara* or *Viṣṇu*. After that, it is discussed after the *Śrutis* that *Īśvara* and *Jīva* are two distinct realities, and as such there is nothing like *Mithyātva* or illusory cognition as held by Śaṅkara. Lastly, the first four *sūtras* of *Brahmasūtras* are explained after Madhvācārya. It is noteworthy that this system was started very recently at the time of the author, but considering a large number of its followers, it is included in the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* as a system of philosophy.

6. The Nakulīśa-Pāsupata System: The Nakulīśapāśu -pata, a well-known dualistic-cum-monistic system, propounded by Nakulīśa or Lakulīśa in the first half of the second century A.D. according to the inscriptional evidence of Mathura-pillar and of stone slab of Somanātha, is based upon the five Vedic Mantras of *Taittirīyāraṇyaka*, viz. '*Sadyojātaṁ*'-----, etc., Sāyaṇa in his interpretation in this text agrees that they refer to *Śaivism* in general, both as a religion and as a philosophy. Nakulīśa wrote the '*Pāśupatasūtras*' which have a commentary of Kauṇḍinya namely

'*Pañcārthībhāṣya*'. The *Pāśupata-sūtras* are divided into five chapters which are based on the above-mentioned five Vedic *Mantras*. Here, at the very outset the Pāśupatas disapprove the doctrine of the Vaiṣṇavas known by its technicalities of the servitude of souls and the like, inasmuch as bringing with it the pains of dependence upon another, it can not be a means of cessation of pain and other desired ends. Then the *Guru* is characterized as the knower of nine *gaṇas*, viz. (1) Acquisition - *Lābha*, - knowledge, penance, permanence of the body, constancy, and purity, (2) Impurity - *Mala*, - false conception, demerit, attachment, interestedness, and falling, (3) Expedient - *Upāya*, - use of habitation, pious muttering, meditation, constant recollection of Rudra, and apprehension, (4) Locality - *Deśa*, - the spiritual teachers, a cavern, a special place, the burning-ground, and Rudra, (5) Perseverance - *Avasthā*, - the differenced, the undifferenced, muttering, acceptance, and devotion, (6) Purification - *Viśuddhi*, - the loss of ignorance, of demerit, of attachment, of interestedness, and if falling, (7) Initiation - *Dīkṣākārin*, - the material, the proper time, the rite, the image, and the spiritual guide, (8) Power - *Bala*, devotion to the *Guru*, clearness of intellect, conquest of pleasure and pain, and (9) Functions - *Vṛttis*, - mendicancy, living upon alms, and living upon what chance supplies. *Duḥkhānta* or *Mokṣa* is explained next with all its kinds. *Kārya* or *Paśu* - a dependent entity, it is threefold, sentiency, the insentient, and the sentient; *Kāraṇa* or *Pati* - Brahman or *Īśvara*; *Yoga* - a conjunction of the soul with the

Lord through the intellect; and *Vidhis* - rites or rituals leading to *Dharma* are elucidated in the next place. Lastly, it is stated that *Mokṣa* is attainable by the knowledge of *Īśvara* or the Lord.

7. The Śaiva System : This system is very prevalent in the South of India, especially in the Tamil country. From the fifth to the ninth centuries many great Śaiva saints like Saṁbandar, Appar, and Sundarar flourised in South India whose hymns constitute a magnificently rich devotional literature. The collection of these hymns is called *Tirumurai*. Māṇikkavāsagar (7th cent.) has written his famous *Tiruvāsagam*. Meykaṇḍar, the author of the *Śiva-jñānabodham*, who belongs to the thirteenth century, is regarded as the first systematic expounder of the Śaiva-siddhānta philosophy. His disciple Arulnandi Śivācārya is the author of the famous work *Śivajñānasiddhiyar*. These works are known as the '*Śaivāgamas*' or the '*Śaivasiddhāntas*'. The Śaiva system recognizes eighteen *Agamas*. It has considerable resemblance to the theistic Sāṁkhya. It holds that *Īśvara*, souls and matter are from eternity distinct entities, and the object of philosophy is to disunite the soul from matter and gradually to unite it to *Īśvara*. Śiva is the Supreme Being of the system, and the relation between the three is quaintly expressed by the allegory of a beast, its fetters, and its owner. Paśupati is a well-known name of Śiva, as the creator of all things. At the very outset the Śaivas or the Śaivāgamas reject the

foregoing opinion that 'the Supreme Being is a cause as independent of our actions and the rest' on the ground of its being liable to the imputation of partiality and cruelty. They, on the contrary, hold the opinion that 'the Supreme Being is a cause in dependence on our actions, and the rest', and they maintain that there are three realities, namely, *Pati* - *Īśvara*, *Paśu* - Soul, and *Pāśa* - Bondage. Of these *Pati* means Śiva who is discussed at great length as having the *Mantras, Mantreśvara, Maheśvara, Muktātmans* and *Śivas*. The individual soul which is also known by such synonyms as the non-atomic-*ananu*, the *Kṣetrajña* etc., is the *Paśu*. It is divided into three classes, viz. *Vijñānakala*, *Pralayākala*, and *Sakala*. Hence the six views, as 'it is the same as the body', 'it is cognizable by perception', 'it is non-pervading', 'it is momentary', 'it is only one', and 'it is devoid of action' - are repudiated. At the end the third category, *Pāśa*, Bondage or Matter is discussed, as well as its fourfold division into *Mala, Karma, Māyā*, and *Rodhaśakti* is explained.

8. The Pratyabhijñā System : This system is also known as *Trika* or *spanda* system. As it was prevalent in Kashmir and propounds Idealistic Monism, it is also called as Kāśmīra - Śaivism and *Śivādvaita*. The *Śivasūtras, Vṛtti, Vivṛtti*, Vasugupta's (8th cent.) *Spandakārikā*, Somānanda's *Śivadṛṣṭi* (9th cent.), Utpala's *Pratyabhijñāsūtras* (10th cent.), Abhinavagupta's *Paramārthasāra, Pratyabhijñāv -imarśiṇī* and *Tantrāloka*, and Kṣemarāja's *Śivasūtravimarśiṇī* and *Spandasandoha* - are some

of the most important works of this system. The system claims to be based on the *Śaivāgamas*. Here, Māheṣvaras are dissatisfied with the views set out in the Śaiva system as erroneous in attributing to motiveless and insentient things causality. They therefore seek another system, and proclaim that the construction of the *Jagat* is by the mere will - *icchā* of the Supreme Lord. They pronounce that this Supreme Lord, - who is at once other than and the same with the several cognitions and *cognita*; who is identical with the *Pratyagātman* posited by one's own consciousness, by rational proof, and by revelation; and who possesses independence, - gives manifestation, in the mirror of one's own soul, to all entities as if they were images reflected upon it. Thus looking upon recognition - *pratyabhijña* as a new method for the attainment of ends and of the highest end, available to all men alike, without any the slightest trouble and exertion, such as external and internal worship and the like. These Māheśvaras set forth the system of recognition - *pratyabhijñā*. Thence, the *Maṅgala-śloka* of Abhinavagupta's commentary on the *Pratyabhijñāsutra* is given as a sample to explain the whole system. The two powers, viz. *Jñānaśakti* and *Kriyāśakti* being explained the doctrine of *Ābhāsavāda* implying realistic Idealism is elaborated. It is propounded that the *Jagat* is caused by the mere will - *icchā* of the Lord. The various queries like 'If the *Pratyagātman* be no other than *Parameśvara*, how comes this implication in successive transmigratory

conditions?', 'If the divine nature is essential to the soul, there can be no occasion to seek for the recognition - *pratyabhijñā*', and the like are answered in conclusion.

9. The Raseśvara System : The Māheśvaras insist upon the tenet that the *Jīvanmukti* depends upon the stability of the bodily frame, and therefore celebrate the virtues of mercury as a means of strengthening the system. Mercury is called *Pārada* or *Rasa*, because it is a means of conveyance beyond the series of transmigratory states, or it gives the farther shore of metempsychosis = *Pāra+da*. *Pārada* is called *Rasa*, because it is the exudation - *rasa* of the body of Śiva. Hence Śiva is known as *Raseśvara* and the system also as *Raseśvara*. The threefold division of *Pārada*, namely, *mūrchita*, *mṛta* and *baddha*, is explained next. The usual discussion on the eighteen modes of treating quicksilver is also done at length. After that the body is regarded eternal and in order to turn it into its true nature this interesting medicinal application is enjoined. At the end citing a Vedic text, - 'That is *Rasa*-mercury, having obtained this he becomes beatitude'; - a verse sets forth the identity between mercury - *Rasa* and the Supreme Brahman - *Para-Brahman*.

10. The Aulūkya System : The founder of this system is Kaṇāda who is also known as Kaṇabhuk, Kāśyapa, and Ulūka. This system is also called after him as Kāṇāda or *Aulūkya-*

darśana. The Aulūkya system is the famous Vaiśeṣika system. It is next to Sāṁkhya in origin and is of greater antiquity than the Nyāya. It may be prior to and is certainly not later than Buddhism and Jainism. The word '*Vaiśeṣika*' is derived from '*Viśeṣa*' which means particularity or distinguishing feature or distinction. The Vaiśeṣika philosophy, therefore, is pluralistic realism which emphasizes that diversity is the soul of the universe. The category of *Viśeṣa* is dealt with at length in this system, and is regarded as the essence of things. This system is regarded as conductive to the study of all systems. Its main business is to deal with the categories and to unfold its atomistic pluralism. At the very outset the author establishes that the knowledge of the Supreme Lord is the true means for the end of pain, and knowledge of the Supreme is to be gained by hearing, thinking, and feeling; and then he gives the contents of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, section by section. He mentions that the procedure in this *śāstra* is threefold, viz. enumeration, definition, and analysis. Thence, the six Vaiśeṣika categories of substance - *dravya*, quality-*guṇa*, action-*karma*, generality-*sāmānya*, particularity-*viśeṣa* and inherence or intimate relation - *samavāya* are defined in a distinguished way quite usual with the logicians. After that the queries, viz. production and destruction of duality - *dvitva*, change produced by baking - *pākajopatti*, and disjunction produced by disjunction - *vibhāgajavibhāga*, are resolved. These queries, it may be mentioned, are very worthy resolutions on modern scientific line. Then, the

Vaiśeṣika theory of darkness - *andhakāra* has been explained after denial of other theories of the same, and in this connection *Abhāva*-negation is thoroughly discussed with all its kinds. It is remarkable that *abhāva* is not admitted as a category in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, though references are made to it in the last chapters. The author has very precisely reconciled here the views of the Sūtrakāra and of other later writers.

11. The Akṣapāda System : The founder of this system is Gautama who is also known as Akṣapāda. Hence the system is called after him as the Akṣapāda system. It is also called the Nyāya system or the system which is predominantly intellectual, analytic, logical and epistemological; *Tarkaśāstra* or the science of reasoning; *Hetuvidyā* or the science of causes; *Vādavidyā* or the science of debate; *Ānvīkṣikī* or the science of critical study, and *Pramāṇaśāstra* or the science of logic and epistemology. It is, however, well-known as the Nyāya system. *Nyāya* is a system of atomistic pluralism and logical realism. It is allied to the Vaiśeṣika system which is regarded as '*Samānatantra*' or similar philosophy. Vaiśeṣika develops metaphysics and ontology; Nyāya develops logic and epistemology. Hence, there is practically no difference in the manner of presentation of the present system from the last one. After giving the contents of the Nyāyasūtras, section by section at the very outset, the author presents the definitions of all the sixteen categories, viz. *Pramāṇa, Prameya, Saṁśaya, Prayojana, Dṛṣṭānta, Siddhānta, Avayava, Tarka,*

Nirṇaya, Vāda, Jalpa, Vitaṇḍā, Hetvābhāsa, Chala, Jāti and *Nigrahasthāna*. Then, a long discussion on the nature of *Mokṣa* or *Mukti* is presented, wherein the views of the Mādhyamikas, Vijñānavādins, Jainas, Cārvākas, Sāṁkhyas and Mīmāṁsakas are vehemently criticized, and the Naiyāyika theory of *Mukti*, viz. absolute abolition of pain is established. In the same manner, a long debate on the existence of *Īśvara* is arranged, where *Īśvara* is proved as the creator of the universe after denial of other theories as held by the opponents. And thus the chapter comes to a close.

12. The Jaimini System : The earliest work of this system is the *Mīmāṁsāsūtras* of Jaimini. It is the biggest of all the philosophical *sūtras* and discusses about one thousand topics. Śabarasvāmin has written his great commentary on this work and his commentary has been explained by Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa who differ from each other in certain important respects and form the two principle schools of Mīmāṁsā named after them. Prabhākara's commentary *Bṛhatī* has been commented upon by Śālīkanātha who has also written another treatise *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*. Kumārila's huge work is divided into three parts - *Ślokavārtika, Tantravārtika*, and *Ṭupṭīka*, the first of which has been commented upon by Pārthasārathi Miśra who has also written his *Śāstradīpikā*. Here the contents of the *Mīmāṁsāsūtras* being presented, the parts of the first *adhikaraṇa* or section - 'An enquiry into the nature of *Dharma*' -, viz.

Viṣaya or subject, *Saṁśaya* or doubt, *Pūrva-pakṣa* or *prima facie view*, Uttarapakṣa or opposite view, *Siddhānta* or conclusion, and *Saṅgati* or consistency with the other parts of the work are discussed after the Bhāṭṭa-school and the Prābhākara-school separately. A discussion on the question of impersonal origin - *apauruṣeya* of the Vedas follows next and it is established that Vedas are not of any personal origin. Then, the words are proved eternal-*nitya* and the *Vedas* authoritative - *prāmāṇika*. After that, the author raises a question - 'Whether the validity of knowledge is intrinsic or extrinsic'; mentions four theories, - (i) The Sāṁkhyas hold that both the validity and the invalidity of knowledge are self-evident or intrinsic, (ii) The Naiyāyikas hold that both the validity and the invalidity of knowledge are due to extraneous conditions or are extrinsic, (iii) The Bauddhas hold that knowledge is intrinsically invalid and becomes valid through extraneous conditions, and (iv) The Vedavādins or Mīmāṁsakas maintain that knowledge is intrinsically valid, though its invalidity is due to extraneous conditions; and concludes after a prolonged discussion that the validity of knowledge is intrinsic.

13. The Pāṇini System : The philosophy of grammar or *Śabdādvaita*-Verbal Monism or *Śuddhādvaita* or Pure Monism expounded by Bhartṛhari appears to have had a long course of development as he himself says in his *Vākyapadīya* :

'*Nyāyaprasthānamārgāṅstānabhyasya svaṁ ca darśanam/*
praṇīto guruṇāsmākamayamāgamasaṁgrahaḥ // II.484

It is said that Vyāḍi was the first *ācārya* who established the Pāṇini system as a system of philosophy. At the very outset the author starts the chapter with Patañjali's sentence and its discussion. To clarify, the word *Śabdānuśāsana* is proved to be preferable to the word *Vyākaraṇa*. So it is concluded that the *Śabdānuśāsana* is the direct end of the *Vyākaraṇa,* but its indirect end is the preservation, etc. of the *Veda*. Moreover prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word. Next the word or *Śabda* as Brahman is clearly explained. The *Sphoṭa* - theory is elucidated after repudiating other theories as held by the opponents. Thence, Existence - *Sattā* as the meaning of a word is established - whether it is referred to the Vyāḍi-theory of *Jātivāda* or to the Vājapyāyana-theory of *Vyaktivāda*. Lastly *Śabdādvaita* is established and it is stated that He who is well versed in the Word - Brahman attains to the Supreme Brahman. Therefore final conclusion is that *Vyākaraṇaśāstra* should be studied as being the means for attaining the chief end of man or the *Mokṣa*.

14. The Sāṁkhya System : The Sāṁkhya system is perhaps the most important one, as it has exercised tremendous influence over practically all the different systems. It was formulated at an age when the performances of the Vedic sacrifices were in full swing, for the verse beginning with '*dṛṣṭavadānuśravikaḥ*' in the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā, kārikā* 2, bears testimony to this. The vast literature of this system with its numerous schools is almost lost to us and what has

survived in the *Kārikās* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is only a skeleton of it. So Mādhavācārya gives citations after citations from Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṁkhya - kārikā*. At the very outset, the twenty-five principles - *tattvas* of the system are categorized into four : (1) Primordial materiality - *Mūlaprakṛti* is ungenerated - *avikṛti*; (2) the seven namely, the great one or intellect - *mahat* or *buddhi*, egoity - *ahaṁkāra*, and the five subtle elements - *tanmātra*, are generated products - *vikṛti* as well as generative principles - *prakṛti*, i.e. the seven are modifications of primordial materiality and, hence, are derived; but they also in turn generate subsequent principles and in that sense are creative; (3) sixteen of the principles are simple derived products - *vikṛti*, namely, mind - *manas*, the five sense capacities - *buddhīndriya*, the five action capacities - *Karmendriya*, and the five gross elements - *bhūta*; and (4) Consciousness - *puruṣa* is neither a generating principle - *na prakṛti* nor generated - *na vikṛti*. Then, the three instruments of knowing - *pramāṇa* are discussed: (a) perception - *dṛṣṭa*; (b) inference - *anumāna*, and (c) reliable authority - *āptavacana*. So, all other instruments of knowing can be reduced to one of these three, i.e. other so called separate instruments of knowing as put forth by other schools of Indian thought can be reduced to perception, inference, or reliable authority. Anything that can be known - *prameya* must be demonstrably established *vis-a-vis* one of these three reliable instruments of knowing. The four theories on the relation of cause and the effect are then examined. The Buddhist view that the cause is non-existent but the effects are existent, the Vedānta view that the cause is existent and unitary but the effects are non-existent, and the

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that the existent cause is completely different from the effect are all mistaken views inasmuch as they render the cause and effect relation unintelligible. Only the Sāṁkhya view is correct whereby the basic experiences as effects of satisfaction, frustration, and confusion are traced to their caused constituents *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, thus allowing for a valid inference that there is an ultimate root cause, namely, primordial materiality that is constituted by the three constituents. After establishing *prakṛti* as a separate principle and the independence of *puruṣa*, their mutual relation is described. It is noticeable here that the atheistic Saṁkhya system has been propounded.

15. The Pātañjala System : Here the system of the theistic Sāṁkhya has been discussed. This system follows the so-called Yoga-Śāstra promulgated by Patañjali. First of all the contents of the *Yoga-sūtras* consisting of four chapters are mentioned. From the first chapter, the first *sūtra* is discussed at length and the meaning of the word *atha* is proved as the commencement. The four *anubandhas* of Yoga and a relation between *Yoga* and *Śāstra* be treated. Then, the meaning of *Yoga* as *Samādhi* is explained with its various implications. It is defined as the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle. Afterwards a fourfold division of *samādhi* as *savitarka*, *savicāra*, *sānanda*, and *sāsmita* is concisely brought out. In fact, *Samādhi* is a kind of *bhāvanā* which is the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all other objects, that which is *bhāvya* - to be pondered. *Bhāvya* is of two kinds, being either *Īśvara* or the twenty five

principles. Thence, the five *Kleśas* viz. ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion and tenacity of mundane existence; the two *Karmans*, viz. enjoined and forbidden; the *Vipākas* or the fruits of *Karmans*; and the *Āśayas* or the mental deposits of merit and demerit are explained. Next the means to *Vṛttinirodha*, viz. *abhyāsa* and *Vairāgya*, means to *Samādhi*, viz. *Kriyāyoga* or *Īśvarapraṇidhāna*; and the *mantras* are discussed. It is mentioned later that *Kriyā* or practice of *tapa*, *svādhyāya* etc. is itself *Yoga*, because it is a means for producing *Yoga*, this being an instance of *Śuddhā-sāropā-lakṣaṇā*. Here a long discussion on *Lakṣaṇā* according to *Kāvyaprakāśa* is also given. Next *aṣṭāṅga-yoga* is described. At last, it is stated that by practice of *aṣṭāṅga-yoga*, pursued for a long time with uninterrupted earnestness, the *kleśas* are abolished and through *abhyāsa* and *vairāgya* the devotee attains to the perfections - *siddhis* or *vibhūtis* as well as reaches absolute isolation - *Kaivalya*. Thus we see that, like the *Cikitsāśāstra*, the *Yogaśāstra* consists of four divisions; as those on medicine treat disease, its cause, health, and medicine, so the *Yoga-śāstra* also treats of *Saṁsāra* - phenomenal existence, its cause, *mokṣa* and means to *mokṣa*.

16. The Śāṅkara System : As is well-known the doctrine of *Advaita*, as developed by Śaṅkara, was the earliest of the Vedāntic systems, and in the great efflorescence of philosophic thought in India during the 9th-16th Centuries, various schools of thought arose, mostly as protests against the views held by the *Advaita*-school. There is no doubt that by reason of its metaphysical appeal and the rigid application of logical canons, Śaṅkara's *Advaita-vāda*

exercised the most profound influence on Indian thought and marked him out as the greatest philosophical genius born in this country. His insistence, however, on the sole reality of *abheda* or non-difference and the unreality of *bheda* or difference evoked strong reactions, the foremost of which was the *Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda* of Rāmānuja, whose importance was only second to that of Śaṅkara. Nevertheless, *Advaita-vedānta* has so importance in the eyes not only of scholars but also of those who have been influential in the molding the attitudes of enlightened *Ṛṣis-Ācāryas* toward India's past, that one will frequently find the term *Vedānta* used to indicate **only** *Advaita- Vedānta*. Still, it serves to emphasize the importance that is now attributed to *Advaita* among the *Vedāntas*, and especially that attributed to its most prominent figure, Śaṅkarācārya, a thinker. So, here it is treated as brilliantly as could be possible for Mādhavācārya, and as such, many objections raised by the opponents are answered. In the beginning, author repudiates the doctrine of *Pariṇāmavāda* of Sāṁkhya. He says that unintelligent *Prakṛti* is too poor and too powerless to be the cause of this world. Stones, bricks and mortar can not fashion themselves into a well-designed building without the help of intelligent workmen. If Sāṁkhya tries to solve the difficulty by pointing out that just as unintelligent milk flows for the nourishment of the calf, similarly unintelligent *Prakṛti* works for creation, it is mistaken, for milk flows as there is a living cow and a living calf. *Prakṛti* is regarded as an absolutely independent entity itself it can not be related in any way to the indifferent Puruṣa who

can neither energize not restrain it. Hence Śaṅkara is opposed to *Paniṇāmavāda*, he maintains *Brahmakāraṇavāda* or *Brahmavivarta-vāda* because it takes the world to be only a phenomenal appearance of Brahman. Afterwards the contents of *Vedāntasūtras* are described only here. In course of explaining the points of first *adhikaraṇa*, the opponent's standpoints implying impossibility to make an enquiry into Brahman are fully explained. Then author puts a long reply given by the Śaṅkarites to that question. It is stated that Brahman is only reality, and it has scriptures for its proof. These Scriptures are questioned by the opponents who are fully crushed by Śaṅkara. Thence the different theories on error or *adhyāsa* are examined and lastly, it is proved that *adhyāsa* is *anirvacanīya*. At last, the first four *Brahma-sūtras* are explained according to Śaṅkara.

This brief analytical evaluation of the contents of the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* proves that the author's erudition and presence in almost all the Indian philosophical systems as depicted here are quite unrivalled. The work attests author's mastery and command over the *Pāṇini-sūtras*, the *Śaivāgamas*, the *Vaiṣṇavāgamas*, the *Itihāsa-purāṇas*, the Vedic literature, the Buddhist works, the Jain writings and works on poetics. It also evinces author's judicious mind, power of critical and analytical approach and proper understanding of *Śāstrīya* methods of research. Thus the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* is a piece of research.

The present edition of the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha* compiles the text and its English translation. I have added here English transliteration of the text for the benefit of the English-knowing readers, as well as indices like index of authors and works and index of citations. In this edition I have been entirely depended on the text accepted by DR. Uma Shankar Sharma 'Rishi". The text of each system has been divided into several parts on the basis of the subject - matter they deal with. This is much helpful to a reader seeking any point of discussion in the body of the text. Here English translation follows the most esteemed translation of E.B. Cowell and A.E. Gough.

It is now for the first time that the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha* with its English translation and transliteration altogether is brought to light. It is hoped that it will be received well by all the students and scholars interested in Indian Philosophy.

I am deeply beholden to Mr. Madhusūdana Gupta and Mr. J.L. Gupta who went through a major portion of the proofs for this edition and saved me from several slips and errors. Whether mistakes still remain are to be traced to my lake of expertise for which I crave the reader's indulgence. Finally I record my thanks to proprietors of Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan Delhi, for having brought the work on the time in an attractive way.

श्रीगुरुः शरणम्

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MADAN MOHAN AGRAWAL

CONTENTS

Prologue	1
1. The Cārvāka System	3
2. The Bauddha System	21
3. The Ārhata	68
4. The Rāmānuja System	123
5. The Pūrṇa-Prajña System	169
6. The Nakulīśa Pāśupata System	203
7. The Śaiva Darśana System	221
8. The Pratyabhijña or Recognitive System	250
9. The Raseśvara or Mercurial System	268
10. The Vaiśeṣika or Aulūkya System	284
11. The Akṣapāda or Nyāya System	312
12. The Jaiminīya System	343
13. The Pāṇinīya System	387
14. The Sāṅkhya System	423
15. The Pātañjala or Yoga System	442
16. Sāṅkara Darśanaṃ	523
Appendix I	583
Appendix II	589
Appendix III	593

PROLOGUE

नित्यज्ञानाश्रयं वन्दे निःश्रेयसनिधिं शिवम् ।
येनैव जातं मह्यादि तेनैवेदं सकर्तृकम् ॥

Nityajñānāśrayaṁ vande niḥśreyasanidhiṁ śivam,
Yenaiva jātaṁ mahyādi tenaivedaṁ sakarttṛkam.

I worship Śiva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity; by whom the earth and the rest were produced, in *him* only has this all a maker.

पारं गतं सकलदर्शनसागराणामात्मोचितार्थचरितार्थितसर्वलोकम् ।
श्रीशार्ङ्गपाणितनयं निखिलागमज्ञं सर्वज्ञविष्णुगुरुमन्वहमाश्रयेऽहम् ॥

Pāraṁ gataṁ sakaladaraśanasāgarāṇā-
Mātmocitārthacaritārthitasarvalokam,
Śrīśārṅgapāṇitanayaṁ nikhilāgamajñaṁ
Sarvajñaviṣṇugurumanvahamāśraye'ham.

Daily I follow my Guru Sarvajña–Viṣṇu, who knows all the Āgamas, the son of Śārṅgapāṇi, who has gone to the further shore of the seas of all the systems, and has contented the hearts of all mankind by the proper meaning of the term Soul.

श्रीमत्सायणदुग्धाब्धिकौस्तुभेन महौजसा ।
क्रियते माधवार्येण सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहः ॥

Śrīmatsāyaṇadugdhābdhikaustubhena mahaujasā,
Kriyate mādhavāryeṇa sarvadarśanasaṅgrahaḥ.

The synopsis of all the systems is made by the venerable Mādhava, mighty in power, the *Kaustubha*-jewel of the milk-ocean of the fortunate Sāyaṇa.

पूर्वेषामतिदुस्तराणि सुतरामालोड्य शास्त्राण्यसौ
श्रीमत्सायणमाधवः प्रभुरुपन्यास्यत्सतां प्रीतये ।
दूरोत्सारितमत्सरेण मनसा शृण्वन्तु तत्सज्जना
माल्यं कस्य विचित्रपुष्परचितं प्रीत्यै न संजायते ?

Pūrveṣāmatidustarāṇi sutarāmāloḍya śāstrāṇyasau,
Śrīmatsāyaṇamādhavaḥ prabhurupanyāsyatsatāṁ prītaye.

Dūrotsāritamatsareṇa manasā śṛṇvantu tatsajjanā,
Mālyaṁ kasya vicitrapuṣparacitaṁ prītyai na saṁjāyate ?

Having thoroughly searched the Śāstras of former teachers, very hard to be crossed, the fortunate Sāyaṇa-Mādhava[1] the lord has expounded them for the delight of the good. Let the virtuous listen with a mind from which all envy has been far banished; who finds not delight in a garland strung of various flowers?

❖

1 Dr. A.C. Burnell, in his preface to his edition of the Vaṁśa-Brāhmaṇa, has solved the riddle of the relation of Mādhava and Sāyaṇa. Sāyaṇa is a pure Dravidian name given to a child who is born after all the elder children have died. Mādhava elsewhere calls Sāyaṇa his "younger brother," as an allegorical description of his body, himself being the eternal soul. His use of the term Sāyaṇa-Mādhavaḥ here (not the dual) seems to prove that the two names represent the same person. The body seems meant by the Sāyaṇa of the third śloka. Māyaṇa was the father of Mādhava, and the true reading may be *śrīman-māyaṇa*.

CHAPTER 1

THE CĀRVĀKA SYSTEM

Lokāyatika Concept—Existence

अथ कथं परमेश्वरस्य निःश्रेयसप्रदत्वमभिधीयते ? बृहस्पतिमतानुसारिणा नास्तिकशिरोमणिना चार्वाकेण तस्य दूरोत्सारितत्वात् । दुरुच्छेदं हि चार्वाकस्य चेष्टितम् । प्रायेण सर्वप्राणिनस्तावत्–

Atha kathaṁ parameśvarasya niḥśreyasapradatvamabhidhīyate? Bṛhaspatimatānusāriṇā nāstikaśiromaṇinā cārvākeṇa tasya dūrotsāritatvāt. Durucchedaṁ hi cārvākasya ceṣṭitam. Prāyeṇa sarvaprāṇinastāvat—

(We have said in our preliminary invocation "salutation to Śiva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity,") but how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Cārvāka, the crest-gem of the atheistical school, the follower of the doctrine of Bṛhaspati? The efforts of Cārvāka are indeed hard to be eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current refrain—

1. यावज्जीवं सुखं जीवेन्नास्ति मृत्योरगोचरः ।
भस्मीभूतस्य देहस्य पुनरागमनं कुतः? ॥

Yāvajjīvaṁ sukhaṁ jīvennāsti mṛtyoragocaraḥ,
Bhasmībhūtasya dehasya punarāgamanaṁ kutaḥ?

While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death's searching eye :
When once this frame of ours they burn,
How shall it e'er again return ?

इति लोकगाथाम् अनुरुन्धाना नीतिकामशास्त्रानुसारेण अर्थकामौ एव पुरुषार्थौ मन्यमानाः, पारलौकिकमर्थम् अपह्नुवानाः, चार्वाकमतमनुवर्तमाना एवानुभूयन्ते । अत एव तस्य चार्वाकमतस्य 'लोकायतम्' इत्यन्वर्थम् अपरं नामधेयम् ॥

Iti lokagāthāṃ anurundhānā nītikāmaśāstrānusāreṇa arthakāmau eva puruṣārthau manyamānāḥ, pāralaukika-

martham apahnuvānāḥ, cārvākamatamanuvartamānā evānubhūyante. Ata eva tasya cārvākamatsya 'lokāyatam' ityanvartham aparaṁ nāmadheyam.

The mass of men, in accordance with the Śāstras of policy and enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world, are found to follow only the doctrine of Cārvāka. Hence, another name for that school is Lokāyata—a name well accordant with the things signified[1].

Element-Analysis

तत्र पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि चत्वारि तत्त्वानि । तेभ्य एव देहाकारपरिणतेभ्यः किण्वादिभ्यः मदशक्तिवत् चैतन्यमुपजायते । विनष्टेषु सत्सु स्वयं विनश्यति । तदाहुः—'विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानुविनश्यति, स न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्तीति' (बृह० उप० 2/4/12) तच्चैतन्यविशिष्टदेह एवात्मा । देहातिरिक्ते आत्मनि प्रमाणाभावात् । प्रत्यक्षैकप्रमाणवादितया अनुमानादेः अनङ्गीकारेण प्रामाण्याभावात् ।

Tatra pṛthivyādīni bhūtāni catvāri tattvāni. Tebhya eva dehākārapariṇatebhyaḥ kiṇvādibhyaḥ madaśaktivat caitanyamupajāyate. Vinaṣṭeṣu satsu svayaṁ vinaśyati. Tadāhuḥ—'Vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tānyevānuvinaśyati, sa na pretya saṁjñāstīti' (Bṛha. Upa. 2/4/12) taccaitanyaviśiṣṭadeha evātmā. Dehātirikte ātmani pramāṇābhāvāt. Pratyakṣaikapramāṇavāditayā anumānādeḥ anaṅgīkāreṇa prāmāṇyābhāvāt.

In this school the four elements, earth, etc., are the original principles; from these alone, when transformed into the body, intelligence is produced, just as the inebriating power is developed from the mixing of certain ingredients;[2] and when these are destroyed,

1 "Śaṅkara Bhāskara, and other commentators name the Lokāyatikas, and these appear to be a branch of the sect of Cārvāka" (Colebrooke). Lokāyata may be etymologically analysed as "prevalent in the world" (*loka and āyata*). Laukāyatika occurs in Pāṇini's *ukthagaṇa*.

2 *Kiṇva* is explained as "drug or seed used to produce fermentation in the manufacture of spirits from sugar, bassia, etc." Colebrooke quotes from Śaṅkara : "The faculty of thought results from a modification of the aggregate elements in like manner as sugar with a ferment and other

intelligence at once perishes also. They quote the *Śruti* for this (*Bṛhad Āraṇya. Up.ii.* 4,12), "Springing forth from these elements, itself solid knowledge, it is destroyed when they are destroyed,—after death no intelligence remains."[1] Therefore, the soul is only the body distinguished by the attribute of intelligence, since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body, as such cannot be proved, since this school holds that perception is the only source of knowledge and does not allow inference, etc.

Attainment of Pleasure : A Complex of Pleasure and Grief

अङ्गनाद्यालिङ्गनादिजन्यं सुखमेव पुरुषार्थः । न च 'अस्य दुःखसम्भिन्नतया पुरुषार्थत्वमेव नास्ति' इति मन्तव्यम् । अवर्जनीयतया प्राप्तस्य दुःखस्य परिहारेण सुखमात्रस्यैव भोक्तव्यत्वात् । तद्यथा—मत्स्यार्थी सशल्कान् सकण्टकान् मत्स्यानुपादत्ते । स यावदादेयं तावदादाय निवर्तते । यथा वा धान्यार्थी सपलालानि धान्यानि आहरति, स यावदादेयं तावदादाय निवर्तते । तस्माद् दुःखभयात् नानुकूलवेदनीयं सुखं त्यक्तुमुचितम् ॥

Aṅganādyāliṅganādijanyaṁ sukhameva puruṣārthaḥ. Na ca 'asya duḥkhasambhinnatayā puruṣārthatvameva nāsti' iti mantavyam. Avarjanīyatayā prāptasya duḥkhasya parihāreṇa sukhamātrasyaiva bhoktavyatvāt. Tadyathā—matsyārthī saśalkān sakaṇṭakān matstyānupādatte. Sa yāvadādeyaṁ tāvadādāya nivartate. Yathā vā dhānyārthī sapalālāni dhānyāni āharati, sa yāvadādeyaṁ tāvadādāya nivartate. Tasmād duḥkhabhyāt nānukūlavedanīyaṁ sukhaṁ tyaktumucitam.

The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasures. Nor may you say that such cannot be called the end of man as they are always mixed with some kind of pain, because it is our wisdom to enjoy the pure pleasure as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which inevitably accompanies it; just as the man who desires fish takes the fish with their scales and bones, and having taken as

ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor; and as betel, areca, lime, and extract of catechu chewed together have an exhilarating property not found in those substances severally."

1 Of course Śaṅkara, in his commentary, gives a very different in terpretation, applying it to the cessation of individual existence when the knowledge of the Supreme is once attained. Cf. Śabara's Comm. *Jaimini Sūt.*, i.i.5.

many as he wants, desists; or just as the man who desires rice, takes the rice, straw and all, and having taken as much as he wants, desists. It is not therefore for us, through a fear of pain, to reject the pleasure which our nature instinctively recognises as congenial.

न हि 'मृगाः सन्ति' इति शालयो नोप्यन्ते । न हि 'भिक्षुकाः सन्ति' इति स्थाल्यो नाधिश्रीयन्ते । यदि कश्चिद् भीरुः दृष्टं सुखं त्यजेत्, तर्हि स पशुवत् मूर्खो भवेत् । तदुक्तम्—

Na hi 'mṛgāḥ santi' iti śālayo nopyante. Na hi 'bhikṣukāḥ santi' iti sthālyo nādhiśrīyante. Yadi kaścid bhīruḥ dṛṣṭaṁ sukhaṁ tyajet, tarhi sa paśuvat mūrkho bhavet. Taduktam—

Men do not refrain from sowing rice, because forsooth there are wild animals to devour it; nor do they refuse to set the cooking-pots on the fire, because forsooth there are beggars to pester us for a share of the contents. If any one were so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure, he would indeed be foolish like beast, as has been said by the poet—

2. त्याज्यं सुखं विषयसङ्गमजन्म पुंसां
दुःखोपसृष्टमिति मूर्खविचारणैषा ।
व्रीहीञ्जिहासति सितोत्तमतण्डुलाढ्यान्
को नाम भोस्तुषकणोपहितान्हितार्थी ॥ इति ।

Tyājyaṁ sukhaṁ viṣayasaṅgamajanma puṁsām,
Duḥkhopasṛṣṭamiti mūrkhavicāraṇaiṣā.
Vrīhīñjihāsati sitottamataṇḍulāḍhyān,
Ko nāma bhostuṣakaṇopahitānhitārthī. iti.

The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects,
Is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain,—such is the reasoning of fools ;
The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains,
What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away because covered with husk and dust?[1]

1 I take *kaṇva* as here equal to the Bengali *Kunṛ*. Cf. *Atharva*-V., xi. 3,5. *Aśvāḥ kaṇā gāvas taṇḍulā maśakās tuśāḥ.*

Voids of Vedas and Yajñas

ननु पारलौकिकसुखाभावे बहुवित्तव्ययशरीरायाससाध्येऽग्निहोत्रादौ विद्यावृद्धाः कथं प्रवर्तिष्यन्ते? इति चेत्, तदपि न प्रमाणकोटिं प्रवेष्टुमीष्टे । अनृत-व्याघात-पुनरुक्तदोषैः दूषिततया वैदिकम्मन्यैरेव धूर्तबकैः परस्परं-कर्मकाण्डप्रामाण्यवादिभिः ज्ञानकाण्डस्य, ज्ञानकाण्डप्रामाण्यवादिभिः कर्मकाण्डस्य च-प्रतिक्षिप्तत्वेन, त्रय्या धूर्तप्रलापमात्रत्वेन, अग्निहोत्रादेः जीविकामात्रप्रयोजनत्वात् । तथा च आभाणकः—

Nanu pāralaukikasukhābhāve bahuvittavyayaśarīrāyāsasādhye'gnihotrādau vidyāvṛddhāḥ kathaṁ pravartiṣyante? Iti cet, tadapi na pramāṇakoṭiṁ praveṣṭumīṣṭe. Anṛta-vyāghāta-punaruktadoṣaiḥ dūṣitatayā vaidikammanyaireva dhūrtabakaiḥ parasparam—karmakāṇḍaprāmāṇyavādibhiḥ jñānakāṇḍasya, jñānakāṇḍaprāmāṇyavādibhiḥ karmakāṇḍasya ca—pratikṣiptatvena, trayyā dhūrtapralāpamātratvena, agnihotrādeḥ jīvikāmātraprayojanatvāt. Tathā ca ābhāṇakaḥ—

If you object that if there be no such thing as happiness in a future world, then how should men of experienced wisdom engage in the agnihotra and other sacrifices, which can only be performed with great expenditure of money and bodily fatigue, your objection cannot be accepted as any proof to the contrary, since the agnihotra, etc., are only useful as means of livelihood, for the Veda is tainted by the three faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tautology;[1] then again the impostors who call themselves Vedic pundits are mutually destructive, as the authority of the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* is overthrown by those who maintain that of the *karma-kāṇḍa*, while those who maintain the authority of the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* reject that of the *karma-kāṇḍa*; and lastly, the three Vedas themselves are only the incoherent rhapsodies of knaves, and to this effect runs the popular saying—

3. अग्निहोत्रं त्रयो वेदास्त्रिदण्डं भस्मगुण्ठनम् ।
बुद्धिपौरुषहीनानां जीविकेति बृहस्पतिः ॥ इति ।

Agnihotraṁ trayo vedāstridaṇḍaṁ bhasmaguṇṭhanam,
Buddhipauruṣahīnānāṁ jīviketi bṛhaspatiḥ. iti.

1 See *Nyāya Sūtras*, ii. 57.

The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing oneself with ashes,—

Bṛhaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for those who have no manliness nor sense.

God—Salvation—Soul

अत एव कण्टकादिजन्यं दुःखमेव नरकः । लोकसिद्धो राजा परमेश्वरः । देहच्छेदो मोक्षः । देहात्मवादे च 'स्थूलोऽहं, कृशोऽहं, कृष्णोऽहम्' इत्यादि सामानाधिकरण्योपपत्तिः । 'मम शरीरम्' इति व्यवहारो 'राहोः शिरः' इत्यादिवदौपचारिकः ।

Ata eva kaṇṭakādijanyaṁ duḥkhameva narakaḥ. Lokasiddho rājā parameśvaraḥ. Dehacchedo mokṣaḥ. Dehātmavāde ca 'sthūlo'haṁ, kṛśo'haṁ, kṛṣṇo'haṃ', ityādi sāmānādhikaraṇyopapattiḥ. 'Mama śarīraṃ' iti vyavavahāro 'rāhoḥ śiraḥ' ityādivadaupacārikaḥ.

Hence, it follows that there is no other hell than mundane pain produced by purely mundane causes, as thorns, etc., the only supreme is the earthly monarch whose existence is proved by all the world's eyesight; and the only Liberation is the dissolution of the body. By holding the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body, such phrases as "I am thin", "I am black," etc., are at once intelligible, as the attributes of thinness, etc., and self-consciousness will reside in the same subject (the body); like and the use of the phrase "my body"is metaphorical. "the head of Rāhu" (Rāhu being really all head).

Harmony of Concept

तदेतत्सर्वं समग्राहि–

Tadetatsarvaṁ samagrāhi—

All this has been thus summed up—

4. अङ्गनालिङ्गनाज्जन्यसुखमेव पुमर्थता ।
कण्टकादिव्यथाजन्यं दुःखं निरय उच्यते ॥

Aṅganāliṅganājjanyasukhameva pumarthatā,
Kaṇṭakādivyathājanyaṁ duḥkhaṁ niraya ucyate.

5. लोकसिद्धो भवेद्राजा परेशो नापरः स्मृतः ।
देहस्य नाशो मुक्तिस्तु न ज्ञानान्मुक्तिरिष्यते ॥

Lokasiddho bhavedrājā pareśo nāparaḥ smṛtaḥ,
Dehasya nāśo muktistu na jñānānmuktiriṣyate.

6. अत्र चत्वारि भूतानि भूमिवार्यनलानिलाः ।
चतुर्भ्यः खलु भूतेभ्यश्चैतन्यमुपजायते ॥

Atra catvāri bhūtānī bhūmivāryanalānilāḥ,
Caturbhyaḥ khalu bhūtebhyaścaitanyamupajāyate.

In this school there are four elements, earth, water, fire, and air;

And from these four elements alone is intelligence produced,—

7. किण्वादिभ्यः समेतेभ्यो द्रव्येभ्यो मदशक्तिवत् ।
अहं स्थूलः कृशोऽस्मीति सामानाधिकरण्यतः ॥

Kiṇvādibhyaḥ sametebhyo dravyebhyo madaśaktivat,
Ahaṁ sthūlaḥ kṛśo'smīti sāmānādhikaraṇyataḥ.

Just like the intoxicating power from kiṇva, etc., mixed together;

Since in "I am fat", "I am lean", these attributes[1] abide in the same subject .

8. देहः स्थौल्यादियोगाच्च स एवात्मा न चापरः ।
मम देहोऽयमित्युक्तिः संभवेदौपचारिकी ॥

Dehaḥ sthaulyādiyogācca sa evātmā na cāparaḥ,
Mama deho'yamityuktiḥ saṁbhavedaupacārikī.

And since fatness, etc., reside only in the body,[2] it alone is the soul and no other,

And such phrases as "my body" are only significant metaphorically.

Rebuttal of Surmise Evidence

स्यादेतत् । स्यादेष मनोरथो यद्यनुमानादेः प्रामाण्यं न स्यात् । अस्ति च प्रामाण्यम् । कथमन्यथा धूमोपलम्भानन्तरं धूमध्वजे प्रेक्षावतां प्रवृत्तिरुपपद्येत ? 'नद्यास्तीरे फलानि सन्ति' इति वचनश्रवणसमनन्तरं फलार्थिनां नदीतीरे प्रवृत्तिरिति ?

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1 i.e., personality and fatness, etc.
2 I read *dehe* for *dehaḥ*.

Syādetat. Syādeṣa manoratho yadyanumānādeḥ prāmāṇyaṁ na syāt. Asti ca prāmāṇyam. Kathamanyathā dhūmopalambhā-nantaraṁ dhūmadhvaje prekṣāvatāṁ pravṛttirupapadyeta? 'Nadyāstīre phalāni santi' iti vacanaśravaṇasamanantaraṁ phalārthināṁ nadītīre pravṛttiriti ?

"Be it so," says the opponent; "your wish would be gained if inference, etc., had no force of proof; but then they have this force; else, if they had not, then how, on perceiving smoke, should the thoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to fire; or why, on hearing another say, 'There are fruits on the bank of the river,' do those who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore?"

तदेतन्मनोराज्यविजृम्भणम् । व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मताशालि हि लिङ्गं गमकम् अभ्युपगतमनुमानप्रामाण्यवादिभिः व्याप्तिश्च उभयविधोपाधिविधुरः सम्बन्धः । स च सत्तया चक्षुरादिवन्नाङ्गभावं भजते किं तु ज्ञाततया । कः खलु ज्ञानोपायो भवेत्?

Tadetanmanorājyavijṛmbhaṇam. Vyāptipakṣadharmatāśāli hi liṅgaṁ gamakaṃ abhyupagatamanumānaprāmāṇyavādibhiḥ. vyāptiśca ubhayavidhopādhividhuraḥ sambandhaḥ. Sa ca sattayā, cakṣurādivannāṅgabhāvaṁ bhajate kiṁ tu jñātatayā. Kaḥ khalu jñānopāyo bhavet?

All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy. Those who maintain the authority of inference accept the sign or middle term as the causer of knowledge, which middle term must be found in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the major.[1] Now, this invariable connection must be a relation destitute of any condition accepted or disputed;[2] and this connection does not possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its *existence*, as the eye, etc., are the cause of perception, but by virtue of its being known. What then is the means of this connection's being known ?

Scope Cannot be Reckoned with Appearance

न तावत्प्रत्यक्षम् । तच्च बाह्यमान्तरं वाऽभिमतम् । न प्रथमः । तस्य सम्प्रयुक्तज्ञानजनकत्वेन भवति प्रसरसम्भवेऽपि भूतभविष्यतोस्तदसम्भवेन

1 Literally, "must be an attribute of the subject and have invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*)."

2 For the *sandigdha* and *niścita upādhi* see *Siddhānta Muktāvali*, p.125. The former is accepted only by one party.

सर्वोपसंहारवत्याः व्याप्ते दुर्ज्ञानत्वात् । न च व्याप्तिज्ञानं सामान्यगोचरमिति मन्तव्यम् । व्यक्त्योरविनाभावाभावप्रसङ्गात् । नाऽपि चरमः अन्तःकरणस्य बहिरिन्द्रियतन्त्रत्वेन बाह्येऽर्थे स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । तदुक्तम्–चक्षुराद्युक्तविषयं परतन्त्रं बहिर्मनः (त. वि. 20) । इति ॥

Na tāvatpratyakṣaṃ. Tacca bāhyamāntaraṁ vā'bhimataṃ. Na prathamaḥ. Tasya samprayuktajñajanakatvena bhavati prasarasaṁbhave'pi bhūtabhaviṣyatostadasambhavena sarvopasaṁhāravatyāḥ vyāpte durjñānatvāt. Na ca vyāptijñānaṁ sāmānyagocaramiti mantavyaṃ. Vyaktyoravinābhāvābhāvaprasaṅgāt. Nā'pi caramaḥ antaḥkaraṇasya bahirindriyatantratvena bāhye'rthe svātantryeṇa pravṛttyanupapatteḥ. Taduktaṃ—cakṣurādyuktaviṣayaṁ paratantraṁ bahirmanaḥ (Ta. vi. 20) iti.

We will first show that it is not perception. Now perception is held to be of two kinds, external and internal (i.e. as produced by the external senses, or by the inner sense, mind). The former is not the required means; for although it is possible that the actual contact of the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the particular object thus brought in contact, yet as there can never be such contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal proposition[1] which was to embrace the invariable connection of the middle and major terms in every case becomes impossible to be known. Nor may you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition has the general class as its object, because if so, there might arise a doubt as to the existence of the invariable connection in this particular case[2] (as, for instance, in this particular smoke as implying fire).

Nor is internal perception the means, since you cannot establish that the mind has any power to act independently towards an external object, since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses, as has been said by one of the logicians, "The eye, etc., have their objects as described; but mind eternally is dependent on the others."

1 Literally, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance (as of smoke by fire).

2 The attributes of the class are not always found in every member,—thus idiots are men, though man is a rational animal; and again, this particular smoke might be a sign of a fire in some other place.

Inference Cannot be the Means of Universal Knowledge

नाप्यनुमानं व्याप्तिज्ञानोपायः तत्र तत्रापि एवमित्यनवस्थादौःस्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् । नापि शब्दस्तदुपायः काणादमतानुसारेण अनुमाने एवान्तर्भावात् । अनन्तर्भावे वा वृद्धव्यवहाररूपलिङ्गावगतिसापेक्षतया प्रागुक्तदूषणलङ्घनाजङ्घालत्वात् । धूमधूमध्वजयोरविनाभावोऽस्तीति वचनमात्रे मन्वादिवद्विश्वासाभावाच्च । अनुपदिष्टाविनाभावस्य पुरुषस्यान्तरदर्शनेन अर्थान्तरानुमित्यभावे स्वार्थानुमानकथायाः कथाशेषत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च कैव कथा परानुमानस्य ?

Nāpyanumānaṁ vyāptijñānopāyaḥ tatra tatrāpi evamityanavasthādauḥsthyaprasaṅgāt. Nāpi śabdastadupāyaḥ kāṇādamatānusāreṇa anumāne evāntarbhāvāt. Anantarbhāve vā vṛddhavyavahārarūpaliṅgāvagatisāpekṣataya prāguktadūṣaṇalaṅghanājaṅghālatvāt. Dhūmadhūmadhvajayoravinābhāvo'stīti vacanamātre manvādivadviśvāsābhāvācca. Anupadiṣṭāvinābhāvasya puruṣasyāntaradarśanena arthāntarānumityabhāve svārthānumānakathāyāḥ kathāśeṣatvaprasaṅgācca kaiva kathā parānumānasya?

Nor can *inference* be the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since in the case of this inference we should also require another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would arise the fallacy of an *ad infinitum* retrogression.

Nor can *testimony* be the means thereof, since we may either allege in reply, in accordance with the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of Kaṇāda, that this is included in the topic of inference; or else we may hold that this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier that stopped the progress of inference, since it depends itself on the recognition of a *sign* in the form of the language used in the child's presence by the old man;[1] and, moreover, there is no more reason for our believing on another's word that smoke and fire are invariably connected, than for our receiving the *ipse dixit* of Manu, etc. (which, of course, we Cārvākas reject).

And again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, then in the case of a man to whom the fact of the invariable connection between the middle and major terms had not been pointed out by another person, there could be no inference of one thing (as fire) on seeing

1 See *Sāhitya Darpaṇa* (Ballantyne's trans. p.16), and *Siddhānta Muktāvali*, p.80.

another thing [as smoke]; hence, on your own showing, the whole topic of inference for oneself[1] would have to end in mere idle words.

Knowledge of Similarity is Dwarfin Knowing the Universe

उपमानादिकं तु दूरापास्तम् । तेषां संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धादिबोधकत्वेन अनौपाधिकसम्बन्धबोधकत्वासम्भवात् ।।

Upamānādikaṁ tu dūrāpāstam. Teṣāṁ saṁjñāsaṁjñisambandhādibodhakatvena anaupādhikasambandhabodhakatvāsambhavāt.

Then again comparison,[2] etc., must be utterly rejected as the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since it is impossible that they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned connection (i.e., the universal proposition), because their end is to produce the knowledge of quite another connection, viz., the relation of a name to something so named.

Universal Proposition can Itself Never be Known

किं च–उपाध्यभावोऽपि दुरवगमः । उपाधीनां प्रत्यक्षत्वनियमासम्भवेन प्रत्यक्षाणामभावस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि, अप्रत्यक्षाणामभावस्य अप्रत्यक्षतयाऽनुमानाद्यपेक्षायामुक्तदूषणानतिवृत्तेः । अपि च, 'साधनाव्यापकत्वे सति साध्यसमव्याप्तिः' इति तल्लक्षणं कक्षीकर्त्तव्यम् । तदुक्तम्—

Kiṁ ca—upādhyabhāvo'pi duravagamaḥ. Upādhīnāṁ pratyakṣatvaniyamāsambhavena pratyakṣāṇāmabhāvasya pratyakṣatve'pi, apratakṣāṇāmabhāvasya apratyakṣatayā'numānādyapekṣāyāmuktadūṣaṇānativṛtteḥ. Api ca, 'sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyasamavyāptiḥ' iti tallakṣaṇaṁ kakṣīkarttavyam. Taduktam—

Again, this same absence of a condition,[3] which has been given as

1 The properly logical, as distinguished from the rhetorical, argument.

2 "*Upamāna* or the knowledge of a similarity is the instrument in the production of an inference from similarity. This particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so named." Ballantyne's *Tarka Sangraha*.

3 The *upādhi* is the condition which must be supplied to restrict a too general middle term, as in the inference "the mountain has smoke because

the definition of an invariable connection (i.e., a universal proposition), can itself never be known; since it is impossible to establish that all conditions must be objects of perception; and therefore, although the absence of perceptible things may be itself perceptible, the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself non-perceptible; and thus, since we must here too have recourse to inference, etc., we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already been planted to bar them. Again, we must accept as the definition of the condition, "it is that which is reciprocal or equipollent in extension[1] with the major term though not constantly accompanying the middle." These three distinguishing clauses, "not constantly accompanying the middle term," "constantly accompanying the major term," and "being constantly accompanied by it" (i.e., reciprocal), are needed in the full definition to stop respectively three such fallacious conditions, in the argument to prove the non-eternity of sound, as "being produced," "the nature of a jar," and "the not causing audition;"[2] wherefore the definition holds,—and

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it has fire," if we add wet fuel as the condition of the fire, the middle term will be no longer too general. In the case of a true *vyāpti*, there is, of course, no *upādhi*.

1 Avtrotpeoel (Pr. Anal., ii. 25). We have here our A with distributed predicate.

2 If we omitted the first clause, and only made the *upādhi* "that which constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly accompanied by it," then in the Naiyāyika argument "sound is non-eternal, because it has the nature of sound," "being produced" would serve as a *Mīmāṁsaka upādhi*, to establish the *vyabhicāra* fallacy, as it is reciprocal with "non-eternal;" but the omitted clause excludes it, as an *upādhi* must be consistent with either party's opinions, and, of course, the Naiyāyika maintains that "being produced" always accompanies the class of sound. Similarly, if we defined the *upādhi* as "not constantly accompanying the middle term and constantly accompanied by the major," we might have as an *upādhi* "the nature of a jar," as this is never found with the middle term (the class or nature of sound only residing in sound, and that of a jar only in a jar), while, at the same time, wherever the class of a jar is found there is also found non-eternity. Lastly, if we defined the *upādhi* as "not constantly accompanying the middle term, and constantly accompanying the major," we might have as a *Mīmāṁsaka upādhi* "the not causing audition," i.e., the not being apprehended by the organs of hearing; but this is

again it is established by the śloka of the great Doctor beginning *samāsama*.[1]

9\. अव्याप्तसाधनो यः साध्यसमव्याप्तिरुच्यते स उपाधिः ।
शब्देऽनित्ये साध्ये सकर्तृकत्वं घटत्वमश्रवतां च ॥

Avyāptasādhano yaḥ sādhyasamavyāptirucyate sa upādhiḥ,
Śabde'nitye sādhye sakartṛkatvaṁ ghaṭatvamaśravatāṁ ca.

10\. व्यावर्त्तयितुमुपात्तान्यत्र क्रमतो विशेषणानि त्रीणि ।
तस्मादिदमनवद्यं समासमेत्यादिनोक्तमाचार्य्यैश्च ॥ इति ।

Vyāvarttayitumupāttānyatra kramato viśeṣanāni trīṇi,
Tasmādidamanavadyaṁ samāsametyādinoktamācāryyaiśca.
iti.

In the State When Universality of Proposition is Impossible to Know, the Inference Cannot be Established

तत्र विध्यध्यवसायपूर्वकत्वान्निषेधाध्यवसायस्य उपाधिज्ञाने जाते तदभाव

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excluded, as non-eternity is not always found where this is, either being inaudible and yet eternal.

1 This refers to an obscure śloka of Udayanācārya, "where a reciprocal and a non-reciprocal universal connection (i.e., universal propositions which severally do and do not distribute their predicates) relate to the same argument (as e.g., to prove the existence of smoke), there that non-reciprocating term of the second will be a fallacious middle, which is not invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal of the first." Thus, "the mountain has smoke because it has fire" (here fire and smoke are non-reciprocating, as fire is not found invariably accompanied by smoke though smoke is by fire), or "because it has fire from wet fuel"(smoke and fire from wet fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other); the non-reciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a fallacious inference, because it is also, of course, not invariably accompanied by the special kind of fire, that produced from wet fuel. But this will not be the case where the non-reciprocating term is thus inariably accompanied by the other reciprocal, as "the mountain has fire because it has smoke;" here, though fire and smoke do not reciprocate, yet smoke will be a true middle, because it is invariably accompanied by heat, which is the reciprocal of fire. I wish to add here, once for all, that I own my explanation of this, as well as many another, difficulty in the *Sarva-darśana-Saṅgraha* to my old friend and teacher, Paṇḍit Maheśa Candra Nyāyaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit College.

विशिष्टसम्बन्धरूपव्याप्तिज्ञानं, व्याप्तिज्ञानाधीनं चोपाधिज्ञानमिति परस्पराश्रयवज्र-प्रहारदोषो वज्रलेपायते । तस्मादविनाभावस्य दुर्बोधतया नानुमानाद्यवकाशः ॥

Tatra vidhyadhyavasāyapūrvakatvānniṣedhādhyavasāyasya upādhijñāne jāte tadabhāva viśiṣṭasambandharūpavyāptijñānaṁ, vyāptijñānādhīnaṁ copādhijñānamiti parasparāśrayavajraprahāradoṣo vajralepāyate. Tasmādavinābhāvasya durbodhatayā nānumānādyavakāśaḥ .

But since, the knowledge of the condition must here precede the knowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there is the knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality of the proposition is possible, i.e., a knowledge in the form of such a connection between the middle term and major term as is distinguished by the absence of any such condition; and on the other hand, the knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the invariable connection. Thus, we fasten on our opponents as with adamantine glue the thunder-bolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle. Hence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a proposition it becomes impossible to establish inference, etc.[1].

Presumption Like Fire in Smoke—Habit is the Cause For

धूमादिज्ञानानन्तरमग्न्यादिज्ञाने प्रवृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षमूलतया भ्रान्त्या वा युज्यते । क्वचित्फलप्रतिलम्भस्तु मणिमन्त्रौषधादिवद् यादृच्छिकः । अतस्तत्साध्यम-दृष्टादिकमपि नास्ति । नन्वदृष्टानिष्टौ जगद्वैचित्र्यमाकस्मिकं स्यादिति चेत्—न तद्भद्रम् । स्वभावादेव तदुपपत्तेः । तदुक्तम्—

Dhūmādijñānānantaramagnyādijñāne pravṛttiḥ pratyakṣamūlatayā bhrāntyā vā yujyate. Kvacitphalapratilambhastu maṇimantrauṣadhādivad yādṛcchikaḥ. Atastatsādhyamadṛṣṭādikamapi nāsti. Nanvadṛṣṭāniṣṭau jagadvaicitryamākasmikaṁ syāditi cet—na tadbhadraṃ. Svabhāvādeva tadupapatteḥ. Taduktaṃ—

The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, etc., to the knowledge of fire, etc., can be accounted for by its being based on a former perception or by its being an error; and that in some cases this step is justified by the result, is accidental just like

1 Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P. Hyp. ii. In the chapter on the Buddhist system *infra*, we have an attempt to establish the authority of the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or genus and species.

the coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms, drugs, etc.

From this it follows that fate, etc.,[1] do not exist, since these can only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you thus do not allow adṛṣṭa, the various phenomena of the world become destitute of any cause.

But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things. Thus, it has been said—

11. अग्निरुष्णो जलं शीतं समस्पर्शस्तथानिलः ।
केनेदं चित्रितं तस्मात्स्वभावात्तद्व्यवस्थितिः ॥ इति ।

Agniruṣṇo jalaṁ śītaṁ samasparśastathānilaḥ,
Kenedaṁ citritaṁ tasmātsvabhāvāttadvyavasthitiḥ. iti.

The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn;
By whom came this variety? from their own nature was it born.

Abstract of Cārvākian Concept

तदेतत्सर्वं बृहस्पतिनाप्युक्तम्—

Tadetatsarvaṁ bṛhaspatināpyuktaṃ—

And all this has been also said by Bṛhaspati—

12. न स्वर्गो नापवर्गो वा नैवात्मा पारलौकिकः ।
नैव वर्णाश्रमादीनां क्रियाश्च फलदायिकाः ॥

Na svargo nāpavargo vā naivātmā pāralaukikaḥ,
Naiva varṇāśramādīnāṁ kriyāśca phaladāyikāḥ.

There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world,
Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, etc., produce any real effect.

13. अग्निहोत्रं त्रयो वेदास्त्रिदण्डं भस्मगुण्ठनम् ।
बुद्धिपौरुषहीनानां जीविका धातृनिर्मिता ॥

1 *Adṛṣṭa*, i.e., the merit and demerit in our actions which produce their effects in future births.

Agnihotraṁ trayo vedāstridaṇḍaṁ bhasmaguṇṭhanaṃ,
Buddhipauruṣahīnānāṁ jīvikā dhātṛnirmitā .

The *Agnihotra*, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing one's self with ashes.

Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness.

14. पशुश्चेन्निहतः स्वर्गं ज्योतिष्टोमे गमिष्यति ।
स्वपिता यजमानेन तत्र कस्मान्न हिंस्यते ? ॥

Paśuścennihataḥ svargaṁ jyotiṣṭome gamiṣyati,
Svapitā yajamānena tatra kasmānna hiṁsyate.

If a beast slain in the Jyotiṣṭoma rite will itself go to heaven,

Why then does not the sacrifice forthwith offer his own father?[1]

15. मृतानामपि जन्तूनां श्राद्धं चेत्तृप्तिकारणम् ।
निर्वाणस्य प्रदीपस्य स्नेहः संवर्धयेच्छिखाम् ॥

Mṛtānāmapi jantūnāṁ śrāddhaṁ cettṛptikāraṇaṃ,
Nirvāṇasya pradīpasya snehaḥ saṁvardhayecchikhāṃ.

If the *Śrāddha* produces gratification to beings who are dead,

16. गच्छतामिह जन्तूनां व्यर्थं पाथेयकल्पनम् ।
गेहस्थकृतश्राद्धेन पथि तृप्तिरवारिता ॥

Gacchatāmiha jantūnāṁ vyarthaṁ pātheyakalpanaṃ,
Gehasthakṛtaśrāddhena pathi tṛptiravāritā.

Then here, too, in the case of travellers when they start,

It is needless to give provisions for the journey.

If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the *Śrāddha* here.

17. स्वर्गस्थिता यदा तृप्तिं गच्छेयुस्तत्र दानतः ।
प्रासादस्योपरिस्थानामत्र कस्मान्न दीयते ? ॥

Svargasthitā yadā tṛptiṁ gaccheyustatra dānataḥ,
Prāsādasyoparisthānāmatra kasmānna dīyate .

Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the housetop?

1 This is an old Buddhist retort. See Burnouf, Introd., p. 209.

18. यावज्जीवेत्सुखं जीवेदृणं कृत्वा घृतं पिबेत् ।
भस्मीभूतस्य देहस्य पुनरागमनं कुतः? ॥

Yāvajjīvetsukhaṁ jīvedṛṇaṁ kṛtvā ghṛtaṁ pibet,
Bhasmībhūtsya dehasya punarāgamanaṁ kutaḥ ?

While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt;

When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?

19. यदि गच्छेत्परं लोकं देहादेष विनिर्गतः ।
कस्माद् भूयो न चायाति बन्धुस्नेहसमाकुलः? ॥

Yadi gacchetparaṁ lokaṁ dehādeṣa vinirgataḥ,
Kasmād bhūyo na cāyāti bandhusnehasamākulaḥ?

If he who departs from the body goes to another world,

How is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of his kindred?

20. ततश्च जीवनोपायो ब्राह्मणैर्विहितस्त्विह ।
मृतानां प्रेतकार्याणि न त्वन्यद्विद्यते क्वचित् ॥

Tataśca jīvanopāyo brāhmaṇairvihitastvaha,
Mṛtānāṁ pretakāryāṇi na tvanyadvidyate kvacit.

Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brāhmaṇas have established here.

All these ceremonies for the dead,—there is no other fruit anywhere.

21. त्रयो वेदस्य कर्त्तारो भण्डधूर्तनिशाचराः ।
जर्भरीतुर्फरीत्यादि पण्डितानां वचः स्मृतम् ॥

Trayo vedasya karttāro bhaṇḍadhūrtaniśācarāḥ,
Jarbharīturpharītyādi paṇḍitānāṁ vacaḥ smṛtaṃ.

The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves, and demons.

As the well-known formulae of the paṇdits, *jarphari, turpharī*, etc.[1]

1 Ṛgveda, x. 107. for the Aśvamedha rites, see Wilson's Ṛgveda, Preface, vol. ii.p. xiii.

22. अश्वस्यात्र हि शिश्नं तु पत्नीग्राह्यं प्रकीर्तितम् ।
भण्डैस्तद्वत्परं चैव ग्राह्यजातं प्रकीर्तितम् ।।
मांसानां खादनं तद्वन्निशाचरसमीरितम् ।। इति ।।

Aśvasyātra hi śiśnaṁ tu patnīgrāhyaṁ prakīrtitaṃ,
Bhaṇḍaistadvatparaṁ caiva grāhyajātaṁ prakīrtitaṃ ,
Māṁsānāṁ khādanaṁ tadvanniśācarasamīritaṃ. iti.

And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the *Aśvamedha*.

These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of presents to the priests[1].

While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling demons.

तस्माद्बहूनां प्राणिनामनुग्रहार्थं चार्वाक-मतमाश्रयणीयमिति रमणीयम् ।।

Tasmādbahūnāṁ prāṇināmanugrahārthaṁ cārvāka-matamāśrayaṇīyamiti ramaṇīyaṃ.

Hence, in kindness to the mass of living beings must we fly for refuge to the doctrine of Cārvāka. Such is the pleasant consummation.

E.B.C.

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसङ्ग्रहे चार्वाकदर्शनम् ।।

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1 Or this may mean "and all the various other things to be handled in the rites."

CHAPTER II

THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM

Rebuttal of Cārvākian Concept—An Easy Access to Knowledge of Universality

अत्र बौद्धैरभिधीयते–यदभ्यधायि, 'अविनाभावो दुर्बोध इति' तदसाधीयः । तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिभ्यामविनाभावस्य सुज्ञानत्वात् । तदुक्तम्–

Atra bauddhairabhidhīyate—yadabhyadhāyi, 'avinābhāvo durbodha iti' tadasādhīyaḥ. Tādātmyatadutpattibhyāmavinābhāvasya sujñānatvāt. Taduktaṃ—

At this point the Buddhists remark : As for what you (Cārvākas) laid down as to the difficulty of ascertaining invariable concomitance, your position is unacceptable, in as much as invariable concomitance is easily cognisable by means of identity and causality. It has accordingly been said—

1. कार्यकारणभावाद्वा स्वभावाद्वा नियामकात् ।
अविनाभावनियमोऽदर्शनान्न न दर्शनात् ।। (प्र. वा. 1/33) । इति ।

Kāryakāraṇabhāvādvā svabhāvādvā niyāmakāt,
Avinābhāvaniyamo'darśnānna na darśanāt.

"From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity as a determinant, results a law of invariable concomitance—not through the mere observation of the desired result in similar cases, nor through the non-observation of it in dissimilar cases."[1]

Connotation and Addition may not Lead to Knowledge of Universal Proposition

'अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ अविनाभावनिश्चायकौ' इति पक्षे साध्य-साधनयोरव्यभिचारो दुरवधारणो भवेत् । भूते भविष्यति वर्तमाने चानुपलभ्यमानेऽर्थे व्यभिचारशङ्कया

1 This śloka is quoted in the "Benares Pandit," vol.i.p.89, with a commentary, and the latter part of the second line is there read more correctly, '*darśanān na na darśanāt*'.

अनिवारणात् । ननु तथाविधस्थले तावकेऽपि मते व्यभिचारशङ्का दुस्परिहरा–इति चेत्; मैवं वोचः । विनापि कारणं कार्यमुत्पद्यतामित्येवंविधायाः शङ्काया व्याघातावधिकतया निवृत्तत्वात् । तदेव ह्याशङ्क्येत यस्मिन्नाशङ्क्यमाने व्याघातादयो नावतरेयुः । तदुक्तम्–'व्याघातावधिराशङ्का' । (कुसु. 317) इति ॥

'Anvayavyatirekau avinābhāvaniścāyakau' iti pakṣe sādhya-sādhanayoravyabhicāro duravadhāraṇo bhavet. Bhūte bhaviṣyati vartamāne cānupalabhyamāne'rthe vyabhicāra- śaṅkāyā anivāraṇāt. Nanu tathāvidhasthale tāvake'pi mate vyabhicāraśaṅkā dusparihară—iti cet; maivaṁ vocaḥ. Vināpi kāraṇaṁ kāryamutpadyatāmityevaṁvidhāyāḥ śaṅkāyā vyāghātāvadhikatayā nivṛttatvāt. Tadeva hyāśaṅkyeta yasminnāśaṅkyamāne vyāghātādayo nāvatareyuḥ. Taduktam 'vyāghātāvadhirāśaṅkā' (Kusu. 3/7) iti.

On the hypothesis (of the Naiyāyikas) that it is concomitance and non-concomitance (e.g., A is where B is, A is not where B is not) that determine an invariable connection, the unconditional attendance of the major or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being impossible to exclude all doubt with regard to instances past and future, and present but unperceived. If one (a Naiyāyika) rejoin that uncertainty in regard to such instances is equally inevitable on our system, we reply : Say not so, for such a supposition as that an effect may be produced without any cause would destroy itself by putting a stop to activity of any kind; for such doubts alone are to be entertained, the entertainment of which does not implicate us in practical absurdity and the like, as it has been said, "Doubt terminates where there is a practical absurdity."[1]

Five Causes and Effects—A Relation Owing to Origin of

तस्मात्तदुत्पत्तिनिश्चयेनाविनाभावो निश्चीयते । तदुत्पत्तिनिश्चयश्च कार्यहेत्वोः प्रत्यक्षोपलम्भानुपलम्भपञ्चकनिबन्धनः । कार्यस्योत्पत्तेः प्रागनुपलम्भः, कारणोपलम्भे सति उपलम्भः, उपलब्धस्य पश्चात्कारणानुपलम्भादनुपलम्भः इति पञ्चकारण्या धूमधूमध्वजयोः कार्यकारणभावो निश्चीयते ॥

Tasmāttadutpattiniścayenāvinābhāvo niścīyate. Tadutpattiniścayaśca kāryahetvoḥ pratyakṣopalambhānupalambhapañcakanibandhanaḥ. Kāryasyotpatteḥ prāganupalambhaḥ,

1 *Kusumāñjali*, iii.7.

kāraṇopalambhe sati upalambhaḥ, upalabdhasya paścātkāraṇānupalambhādanupalambhaḥ iti pañcakāraṇyā dhūmadhūmadhvajayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvo niścīyate.

1. By ascertainment of an effectuation, then, of that (viz., of the designate of the middle) is ascertained the invariable concomitance (of the major); and the ascertainment of such effectuation may arise from the well-known series of five causes in the perceptive cognition or non-cognition of cause and effect. That fire and smoke, for instance, stand in the relation of cause and effect is ascertained by five indications, viz., (1) That an effect is not cognised prior to its effectuation, that (2) the cause; being perceived, (3) the effect is perceived, and that after the effect is cognised (4) there is its non-cognition, (5) when the (material) cause is no longer cognised.

An Invariable Concomitance Ascertains by Ascertainment of Identity

तथा तादात्म्यनिश्चयेनाप्यविनाभावो निश्चीयते । 'यदि शिंशपा वृक्षत्वमतिपतेत्,' स्वात्मानमेव जह्यादिति विपक्षे बाधकप्रवृत्तेः । अप्रवृत्ते तु बाधके भूयः सहभावोपलम्भेऽपि व्यभिचारशङ्कायाः को निवारयिता ? शिंशपावृक्षयोश्च तादात्म्यनिश्चयो 'वृक्षोऽयं शिंशपेति' समानाधिकरण्यबलादुपपद्यते । न ह्यत्यन्ताभेदे तत्संभवति । पर्यायत्वेन युगपत्प्रयोगायोगात् । नाप्यत्यन्ताभेदे, गवाश्वयोरनुपलम्भात् । तस्मात्कार्यात्मानौ कारणात्मानौ अनुमापयत इति सिद्धम् ॥

Tathā tādātmyaniścayenāpyavinābhāvo niścīyate. 'Yadi śiṁsapā vṛkṣatvamatipatet; svātmānameva jahyāditi vipakṣe bādhakapravṛtteḥ. Apravṛtte tu bādhake bhūyaḥ sahabhāvopalambhe'pi vyabhicāraśaṅkāyāḥ ko nivārayitā? śiṁśapāvṛkṣayośca tādātmyaniścayo 'vṛkṣo'yaṁ śiṁśapeti' samānādhikaraṇyabalādupapadyate. Na hyatyantābhede tatsaṁbhavati. Paryāyatvena yugapatprayogāyogāt. Nāpyatyantābhede, gavāśvayoranupalam- bhāt. Tasmātkāryātmānau kāraṇātmānau anumāpayata iti siddham.

2. In like manner an invariable concomitance is ascertained by the ascertainment of identity (e.g., a sisu-tree is a tree, or wherever we observe the attributes of a sisu we observe also the attribute arboreity), an absurdity attaching to the contrary opinion, in as much as if a sisu-tree should lose its arboreity it would lose its own self. But, on the other hand, where there exists no absurdity, and where a (mere) concomitance is again and again observed, who can ex-

clude all doubt in the concomitance? An ascertainment or the identity of *sisu* and tree is competent in virtue of the reference to the same object (i.e., predication),—This tree is a *sisu*. For reference to the same object (predication) is not competent where there is no difference whatever (e.g., to say, "A jar is a jar," is no combination of diverse attributes in a common subject), because the two terms cannot, as being synonymous, be simultaneously employed; nor can reference to the same object take place where there is a reciprocal exclusion (of the two terms), in as much as we never find, for instance, horse and cow predicated the one of the other.

It has thus been evinced that an effect or a self-same supposes a cause or a self-same (as invariable concomitants).

Inference Itself is a Kind of Proof

यदि कश्चित्प्रामाण्यमनुमानस्य नाङ्गीकुर्यात्तं प्रति ब्रूयात्–अनुमानं प्रमाणं न भवतीत्येतावन्मात्रमुच्यते, तत्र न किंचन साधनमुपन्यस्यते, उपन्यस्यते वा ? न प्रथमः । अशिरस्कवचनस्योपन्यासे साध्यासिद्धेः ।

Yadi kaścitprāmāṇyamanumānasya nāṅgīkuryāttaṁ prati brūyāt—anumānaṁ pramāṇaṁ na bhavatītyetāvanmātramucyate, tatra na kiṁcana sādhanamupanyasyate, upanyasyate vā? Na prathamaḥ. Aśiraskavacanasyopanyāse sādhyāsiddheḥ.

'एकाकिनी प्रतिज्ञा हि प्रतिज्ञातं न साधयेत्' ।

'Ekākinī pratijñā hi pratijñātaṁ na sādhayet'.

इति न्यायात् । नापि चरमः । अनुमानं प्रमाणं न भवतीति ब्रवाणेन वचनप्रमाणमनभ्युपगच्छता त्वया स्वपरकीयशास्त्रे प्रामाण्येनोपगृहीतस्य वचनस्योपन्यासे मम माता वन्ध्येतिवद् व्याघातापातात् ।।

Iti nyāyāt. Nāpi caramaḥ. Anumānaṁ pramāṇaṁ na bhavatīti bravāṇena vacanapramāṇamanabhyupagacchatā tvayā svaparakīyaśāstre prāmāṇyenopagṛhītasya vacanasyopanyāse mama mātā vandhyetivad vyāghātāpātāt.

किं च प्रमाणतदाभासव्यवस्थापनं तत्समानजातीयत्वादिति वदता भवतैव स्वीकृतं स्वभावानुमानम् । परगता विप्रतिपत्तिस्तु वचनलिङ्गेनेति ब्रुवता कार्यलिङ्गकमनुमानम् । अनुपलब्ध्या कञ्चिदर्थं प्रतिषेधयतानुपलब्धिलिङ्गकमनुमानम् । तथा चोक्तं तथागतैः–

Kiṁ ca pramāṇatadābhāsavyavasthāpanaṁ tatsamānajātīyatvāditi vadatā bhavataiva svīkṛtaṁ svabhāvānumānam. Paragatā vipratipattistu vacanaliṅgeneti bruvatā kāryaliṅgakamanumānam. Anupalabdhyā kañcidartham patiṣedhayatīnupalabdhiliṅgakamanumānam. Tathā coktaṁ tathāgataiḥ—

If a man does not allow that inference is a form of evidence *pramāṇa*, one may reply : You merely assert thus much, that inference is not a form of evidence : do you allege no proof of this, or do you allege any? The former alternative is not allowable according to the maxim that base assertion is no proof of the matter asserted. Nor is the latter alternative any better, for if while you assert that inference is no form of evidence, you produce some truncated argument (to prove, i.e., infer, that it is none), you will be involved in an absurdity, just as if you asserted your own mother to be barren. Besides, when you affirm that the establishment of a form of evidence and of the corresponding fallacious evidence results from their homogeneity, you yourself admit induction by identity. Again, when you affirm that the dissentiency of others is known by the symbolism of words, you yourself allow induction by casuality. When you deny the existence of any object on the ground of its not being perceived, you yourself admit an inference of which non-perception is the middle term. Conformably it has been said by Tathāgata—

2. **प्रमाणान्तरसामान्यस्थितेरन्यधियो गतेः ।**

प्रमाणान्तरसद्भावः प्रतिषेधाच्च कस्यचित् ।। इति ।

Pramāṇāntarasāmānyasthiteranyadhiyo gateḥ,

Pramāṇāntarasadbhāvaḥ pratiṣedhācca kasyacit. iti.

पराक्रान्तं चात्र सूरिभिरिति ग्रन्थभूयस्त्वभयादुपरम्यते ।

Parākrāntaṁ cātra sūribhiriti granthabhūyastvabhayāduparamyate.

"The admission of a form of evidence in general results from its being present to the understanding of others."

"The existence of a form of evidence also follows from its negation by a certain person."

All this has been fully handled by great authorities; and we desist for fear of an undue enlargement of our treatise.

Four Standpoints in Bauddha System

ते च बौद्धाश्चतुर्विधया भावनया परमपुरुषार्थं कथयन्ति । ते च माध्यमिक-योगाचार-सौत्रान्तिक-वैभाषिकसंज्ञाभिः प्रसिद्धा बौद्धा यथाक्रमं सर्वशून्यत्व-बाह्यार्थशून्यत्व-बाह्यार्थानुमेयत्वबाह्यार्थप्रत्यक्षत्ववादानातिष्ठन्ते । यद्यपि भगवान्बुद्धः एक एव बोधयिता तथापि बोद्धव्यानां बुद्धिभेदाच्चातुर्विध्यम् । यथा 'गतोऽस्तमर्कः' इत्युक्ते जारचौरानूचानादयः स्वेष्टानुसारेणाभिसरण-परस्वहरणसदाचरणादिसमयं बुध्यन्ते । सर्वं क्षणिकं क्षणिकं, दुःखं दुःखं, स्वलक्षणं स्वलक्षणं, शून्यं शून्यमिति भावनाचतुष्टयमुपदिष्टं द्रष्टव्यम् ।

Te ca bauddhāścaturvidhayā bhāvanayā paramapuruṣārthaṁ kathayanti. Te ca mādhyamika-yogācāra-sautrāntika-vaibhāṣika-saṁjñābhiḥ prasiddhā bauddhā yathākramaṁ sarvaśūnyatva-bāhyārthaśūnyatva - bāhyārthānumeyatvabāhyārthapratyakṣatva-vādānātiṣṭhante. Yadyapi bhagavānbuddhaḥ eka eva bodhayitā tathāpi boddhavyānāṁ buddhibhedāccāturvidhyaṃ. Yathā 'gato'stamarkaḥ' ityukte jāracaurānūcānādayaḥ sveṣṭānusā-reṇābhisaraṇaparasvaharaṇasadācaraṇādisamayaṁ budhyante. Sarvaṃ kṣaṇikaṁ kṣaṇikaṁ, duḥkhaṁ duḥkhaṁ, svalakṣaṇaṁ svalakṣaṇaṁ, śūnyaṁ sūnyamiti bhāvanācatuṣṭayamupadiṣṭaṁ draṣṭavyaṃ.

These same Bauddhas discuss the highest end of man from four standpoints. Celebrated under the designations of Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika, these Buddhists adopt respectively the doctrines of a universal void (nihilism), an external void (subjective idealism), the inferribility of external objects (representationism), and the perceptibility of external objects (representationism).[1] Though the venerated Buddha be the only one teacher (his disciples) are fourfold in consequence of this diversity of views; just as when one has said, "The sun has set," the adulterer, the thief, the divinity student, and others understand that it is time to set about their assignations, their theft, their religious duties, and so forth, according to their several inclinations.

1 The Bauddhas are thus divided into—
(1) Mādhyamikas or Nihilists.
(2) Yogācāras or Subjective Idealists.
(3) Sautrāntikas or Representationists.
(4) Vaibhāṣikas or Presentationists.

It is to be borne in mind that four points of view have been laid out, viz., (1) All is momentary, momentary; (2) all is pain, pain; (3) all is like itself alone; (4) all is void, void.

Momentary Spirit

तत्र क्षणिकत्वं नीलादिक्षणानां सत्त्वेनानुमातव्यं यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकं, यथा जलधरपटलं, सन्तश्चामी भावा इति । न चायमसिद्धो हेतुः, अर्थक्रियाकारित्वलक्षणस्य सत्त्वस्य नीलादिक्षणानां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् । व्यापकव्यावृत्त्या व्याप्यव्यावृत्तिरिति न्यायेन व्यापकक्रमाक्रमव्यावृत्तौ अक्षणिकात्सत्त्वव्यावृत्तेः सिद्धत्वाच्च । तच्चार्थक्रिया-कारित्वं क्रमाक्रमाभ्यां व्याप्तम् । न च क्रमाक्रमाभ्यामन्यः प्रकारः संभवति ।

Tatra kṣaṇikatvaṁ nīlādikṣaṇānāṁ sattvenānumātavyaṁ—yatsattatkṣanikaṁ, yathā jaladharapaṭalaṁ, santaścāmī bhāvā iti. Na cāyamasiddho hetuḥ, arthakriyākāritvalakṣaṇasya sattvasya nīlādikṣaṇānāṁ pratyakṣasiddhatvāt. Vyāpakavyā-vṛttyā vyāpyavyāvṛttiriti nyāyena vyāpakakramākramavyāvṛttau akṣaṇikātsattvavyāvṛtteḥ siddhatvācca. Taccārthakriyākāritvaṁ kramākramābhyāṁ— vyāptaṃ. Na ca kramākramābhyāmanyaḥ prakāraḥ saṁbhavati.

Of these points of view, the momentariness of fleeting things, blue and so forth (i.e., whatever be their quality), is to be inferred from their existence; thus, whatever is momentary (or fluxional) like a bank of clouds, and all these things are.[1] Nor may any one object

1 Cf. Ferrier's Lectures and Remains, vol.i. p. 119.

"Suppose yourself gazing on a gorgeous sunset. The whole western heavens are glowing with roseate hues, but you are aware that within half an hour all these glorious tints will have faded away into a dull ashen grey. You see them even now melting away before your eyes, although your eyes cannot place before you the conclusion which your reason draws. And what conclusion is that? That conclusion is that you never, even for the shortest time that can be named or conceived, see any abiding colour, any colour which truly is. Within the millionth part of a second the whole glory of the painted heavens has undergone an incalculable series of mutations. One shade is supplanted by another with a rapidity which sets all measurement at defiance, but because the process is one to which no measurement applies,...reason refuses to lay an arrestment on any period of the passing scene, or to declare that it is, because in the very act of being it is not; it has given place to something else. It is a

that the middle term (existence) is unestablished; for an existence consisting of practical efficiency is established by perception to belong to the blue and other momentary things; and the exclusion of existence from that which is not momentary is established, provided that we exclude from it the non-momentry succession and simultaneity, according to the rule that exclusion of the continent is exclusion of the contained. Now this practical efficiency (here identified with existence) is contained under succession and simultaneity, and no medium is possible between succession and non-succession (or simultaneity); there being a manifest absurdity in thinking otherwise, according to the rule—

3. परस्परविरोधे हि न प्रकारान्तरस्थितिः ।
नैकतापि विरुद्धानामुक्तिमात्रविरोधतः ।। (कुसु. 3/8)

Parasparavirodhe hi na prakārāntarasthitiḥ,
Naikatāpi viruddhānāmuktimātravirodhataḥ.(Kasu.3/8)

इति न्यायेन व्याघातस्योद्भटत्वात् ।

Iti nyāyena vyāghātasyodbhaṭatvāt.

"In a reciprocal contradiction there exists no ulterior alternative;"
"Nor is their unity on contradictories, there being a repugnance in the very statement."[1]

तौ च क्रमाक्रमौ स्थायिनः सकाशाद् व्यावर्तमानौ अर्थक्रियामपि व्यावर्तयन्तौ क्षणिकत्वपक्ष एव सत्त्वं व्यवस्थापयतः इति सिद्धम् ।

Tau ca kramākramau sthāyinaḥ saka'ād vyāvartamānau arthakriyāmapi vyāvartayantau kṣaṇikatvapakṣa eva sattvaṁ vyavasthāpayataḥ iti siddhaṃ.

And this succession and simultaneity being excluded from the permanent, and also excluding from the permanent all practical efficiency, determine existence of the alternative of momentariness.—Q.E.D.

Lack of Regularity in Efficiency of Non-Fluxional Objects

नन्वक्षणिकस्य अर्थक्रियाकारित्वं किं न स्यादिति चेत्–तदयुक्तम् । विकल्पासहत्वात् ।

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series of fleeting colours, no one of which is, because each of them continually vanishes in another."

1 Principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria.

तथा हि–वर्तमानार्थक्रियाकरणकालेऽतीतानागतयोः किम् अर्थक्रिययोः स्थायिनः सामर्थ्यमस्ति नो वा । आद्ये तयोरनिराकरणप्रसङ्गः, समर्थस्य क्षेपायोगात् । यद्यदा यत्करणसमर्थं तत्तदा तत्करोत्येव यथा सामग्री स्वकार्यं समर्थश्चायं भाव इति प्रसङ्गानुमानाच्च ।

Nanvakṣaṇikasya arthakriyākāritvaṁ kiṁ na syāditi cet—tadayuktaṃ. Vikalpāsahatvāt. Tathā hi—vartamānārthakriyākaraṇakāle'tītānāgatayoḥ kiṃ arthakriyayoḥ sthāyinaḥ sāmarthyamasti no vā. Ādye tayoranirākaraṇaprasaṅgaḥ, samarthasya kṣepāyogāt. Yadyadā yatkaraṇasamarthaṁ tattadā tatkarotyeva yathā sāmagrī svākāryaṁ samarthaścāyaṁ bhāva iti prasaṅgānumānācca.

Perhaps some one may ask : Why may not practical efficiency reside in the non-fluxional (or permanent)? If so, this is wrong, as obnoxious to the following dilemma, Has your "permanent" a power of post and future practical efficiency during its exertion of present practical efficiency or no? On the former alternative (if it has such power), it cannot evacuate such past and future efficiency, because we cannot deny that it has power, and because we infer the consequence, that which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at that time, as, for instance, a complement of causes, and this entity is thus powerful.

द्वितीये कदापि न कुर्यात् । सामर्थ्यमात्रानुबन्धित्वादर्थक्रियाकारित्वस्य । यद्यदा यन्न करोति तत्तदा तत्रासमर्थं यथा हि शिलाशकलमङ्कुरे । न चैष वर्तमानार्थक्रियाकरणकाले वृत्तवर्तिष्यमाणे अर्थक्रिये करोतीति तद्विपर्ययाच्च ।।

Dvitīye kadāpi na kuryāt. Sāmarthyamātrānubandhitvādarthakriyākāritvasya. Yadyadā yanna karoti tattadā tatrāsamarthaṁ yathā hi śilāśakalamaṅkure. Na Caiṣa vartamānārthakriyākaraṇakāle vṛttavartiṣyamāṇe arthakriye karotīti tadviparyayācca.

On the latter alternative (if the permanent has no such power of past and future agency), it will never do anything, because practical efficiency results from power only; what at any time does not do anything, that at that time is unable to do it, as, for instance, a piece of stone does not produce a germ; and this entity while exerting its present practical efficiency, does not exert its past and future practical efficiency. Such is the contradiction.

Assistance may even not Jetch in Non-Fluxional Efficiency

ननु क्रमवत्सहकारिलाभात् स्थायिनोऽतीतानागतयोः क्रमेण करणमुपपद्यत इति चेत्–तत्रेदं भवान्पृष्टो व्याचष्टाम् । सहकारिणः किं भावस्योपकुर्वन्ति न वा ? न चेन्नापेक्षणीयास्ते । अकिञ्चित्कुर्वतां तेषां तादर्थ्यायोगात् । अथ भावस्तैः सहकारिभिः सहैव कार्यं करोति इति स्वभाव इति चेत्–अङ्ग! तर्हि सहकारिणो न जह्यात् । प्रत्युत पलायमानापि गले पाशेन बद्ध्वा कृत्यं कुर्यात् । स्वभावस्यानपायात् ।

Nanu kramavatsahakārilābhāt sthāyino'tītānāgatayoḥ krameṇa karaṇamupapadyata iti cet—tatredaṁ bhavānpṛṣṭo vyācaṣṭām. Sahakāriṇaḥ kiṁ bhāvasyopakurvanti na vā? Na cennāpekṣaṇīyāste. Akiñcitkurvatāṁ teṣāṁ tādarthyāyogāt. Atha bhāvastaiḥ sahakāribhiḥ sahaiva kāryaṁ karoti iti svabhāva iti cet—aṅga! Tarhi sahakāriṇo na jahyāt. Pratyuta palāyamānāpi gale pāśena baddhvā kṛtyaṁ kuryāt. Svabhāvasyānapāyāt.

उपकारकत्वपक्षे सोऽयमुपकारः किं भावाद्भिद्यते न वा । भेदपक्ष आगन्तुकस्येव तस्य कारणत्वं स्यात् । न भावस्याक्षणिकस्य । आगन्तुकातिशयान्वय-व्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वात्कार्यस्य तदुक्तम्–

Upakārakatvapakṣe so'yamupakāraḥ kiṁ bhāvābbhidyate na vā. Bhedapakṣa āgantukasyeva tasya kāraṇatvaṁ syāt. Na bhāvasyākṣaṇikasya. Āgantukātiśayānvayavyatirekānuvidhāyitvātkāryasya Taduktam—

You will perhaps rejoin : By assuming successive subsidiaries, there is competent to the permanent entity a successive exertion of past and future practical efficiency. If so, we would ask you to explain : Do the subsidiaries assist the entity or not? If they do not, they are not required; for if they do nothing, they can have nothing to do with the successive exertion. If they do assist the thing, is this assistance (or supplementation) other than the thing or not? If it is other than the thing, then this adventitious (assistance) is the cause, and the non-momentary entity is not the cause : for the effect will then follow, by concomitance and non-concomitance the adventitious supplementation. Thus it has been said: –

4. वर्षातपाभ्यां किं व्योम्नश्चर्मण्यस्ति तयोः फलम् ।
चर्मोपमश्चेत्सोऽनित्यः खतुल्यश्चेदसत्फलः ॥ इति ।

Varṣātapābhyāṁ kiṁ vyomnaścarmaṇyasti tayoḥ phalam,
Carmopamaścetso'nityaḥ khatulyaścedasatphalaḥ. iti.

"What have rain and shine to do with the soul? Their effect is on the skin of man;"
"If the soul were like the skin, it would be non-permanent; and if the skin were like the soul, there could be no effect produced upon it."

किं च, सहकारिजन्योऽतिशयः किमतिशयान्तरमारभते न वा ? उभयथाऽपि प्रागुक्तदूषणपाषाणवर्षणप्रसङ्गः । अतिशयान्तरारम्भपक्षे बहुमुखानवस्थादौः स्थ्यमपि स्यात् । अतिशये जनयितव्ये सहकार्यन्तरापेक्षायां तत्परम्परापात इत्येकानवस्थाऽऽस्थेया ।

Kiṁ ca, sahakārijanyo'tiśayaḥ kimatiśayāntaramārabhate na vā? Ubhayathā'pi prāguktadūṣaṇapāṣāṇavarṣaṇaprasaṅgaḥ. Atiśayāntarārambhapakṣe bahumukhānavasthādauḥ sthyamapi syāt. Atiśaye janayitavye sahakāryantarāpekṣāyāṁ tatparamparāpāta ityekānavasthā"stheyā.

तथा सहकारिभिः सलिलपवनादिभिः पदार्थसार्थैराधीयमाने बीजस्यातिशये बीजमुत्पादकमभ्युपेयम् । अपरथा तदभावेऽप्यतिशयः प्रादुर्भवेत् ।

Tathā sahakāribhiḥ salilapavanādibhiḥ padārthasārthairādhīyamāne bījasyātiśaye bījamutpādakamabhyupeyam. Aparathā tadabhāve'pyatiśayaḥ prādurbhavet.

Additament Embarrasses When it Becomes Excessive

बीजं चातिशयमादधानं, सहकारिसापेक्षमेवाधत्ते । अन्यथा सर्वदोपकारापत्तौ अङ्कुरस्यापि सदोदयः प्रसज्येत तस्मादतिशयार्थमपेक्ष्यमाणैः सहकारिभिः अतिशयान्तरमाधेयं बीजे । तस्मिन्नप्युपकारे पूर्वन्यायेन सहकारिसापेक्षस्य बीजस्य जनकत्वे सहकारिसम्पाद्यबीजगतातिशयानवस्था प्रथमा व्यवस्थिता ।

Bījaṁ cātiśayamādadhānaṁ, sahakārisāpekṣamevādhatte. Anyathā sarvadopakārāpattau aṅkurasyāpi sadodayaḥ prasajyeta tasmādatiśayārthamapekṣyamāṇaiḥ sahakāribhiḥ atiśayāntaramādheyaṁ bīje. Tasminnapyupakāre pūrvanyāyena sahakārisāpekṣasya bījasya janakatve sahakārisampādyabījagatātiśayānavasthā prathamā vyavasthitā.

Perhaps you will say : The entity produces its effect, *together with* its subsidiaries. Well, then (we reply), let the entity not give up its subsidiaries, but rather tie them lest they fly with a rope round their neck, and so produce the effect which it has to produce, and without forfeiting its own proper nature. Besides (we continue),

does the additament (or supplementation) constituted by the subsidiaries give rise to another additament or not? In either case the afore-mentioned objections will come down upon you like a shower of stones. On the alternative that the additament takes on another additament, you will be embarrassed by a many-sided regress *in infinitum*. If when the additament is to be generated another auxiliary (or additament) be required, there will ensue an endless series of such additaments : this must be confessed to be one infinite regress. For example, let a seed be granted to be productive when an additament is given, consisting of a complement of objects such as water, wind, and the like, as subsidiaries; otherwise an additament would be manifested without subsidiaries. Now, the seed in taking on the additament takes it on with the need of (ulterior) subsidiaries; otherwise, as there would always be subsidiaries, it would follow that a germ would always be arising from the seed. We shall now have to add to the seed another supplementation by subsidiaries themselves requiring an additament. If when this additament is given, the seed be productive only on condition of subsidiaries as before, there will be established an infinite regression of additaments to (or supplementations of) the seed, to be afforded by the subsidiaries.

Second Kind of Infinitum

अथोपकारः कार्यार्थमपेक्ष्यमाणोऽपि बीजादिनिरपेक्षं कार्यं जनयति तत्सापेक्षं वा । प्रथमे बीजादेरहेतुत्वमापतेत् । द्वितीयेऽपेक्ष्यमाणेन बीजादिनोपकारेऽतिशय आधेयः। एवं तत्र तत्रापीति बीजादिजन्यातिशयनिष्ठातिशयपरम्परापात इति द्वितीयानवस्था स्थिरा भवेत् ।

Athopakāraḥ kāryārthamapekṣyamāṇo'pi bījādinirapekṣaṁ kāryaṁ janayati tatsāpekṣaṁ vā. Prathame bījāderahetutvamāpatet. Dvitīye'pekṣyamāṇena bījādinopakāre'tiśaya ādheyaḥ Evaṁ tatra tatrāpīti bījādijanyātiśayaniṣṭhātiśayaparamparāpāta iti dvitīyānavasthā sthirā bhavet.

Again, we ask, does the supplementation required for the production of the effect produce its effect independently of the seed and the like, or does it require the seed and the like? On the first alternative (if the supplementation works independently), it would ensue that the seed is in no way a cause. On the second (if the supplementation require the seed), the seed, or whatever it may be that

is thus required, must take on a supplementation or additament, and thus there will be over and over again an endless series of additaments added to the additament constituted by the seed; and thus a second infinite regression is firmly set up.

Third Kind of Infinitum

एवमपेक्ष्यमाणेनोपकारेण बीजादौ धर्मिण्युपकारान्तरमाधेयम्—इत्युपकाराधेयबीजाश्रयातिशयपरम्परापात इति तृतीयानवस्था दुरवस्था स्यात् ।

Evamapekṣyamāṇenopakāreṇa bījādau dharmiṇyupakārāntaramādheyaṃ—Ityupakārādheyabījāśrayātiśayaparāmparāpāta iti tṛtīyānavasthā duravasthā syāt.

In like manner the subsidiary which is required will add another, subsidiary to the seed, or whatever it may be that is the subject of the additions, and thus there will be an endless succession of additaments added to the additaments to the seed which is supplemented by the subsidiaries; and so a third infinite regression will add to your embarrassment.

The Efficiency of Permanent Object cannot be Proved by its Regularity

अथ भावादभिन्नोऽतिशयः सहकारिभिराधीयत इत्यभ्युपगम्येत, तर्हि प्राचीनो भावोऽनतिशयात्मा निवृत्तोऽन्यश्चातिशयात्मा कुर्वद्रूपादिपदवेदनीयो जायत इति फलितं ममापि मनोरथद्रुमेण । तस्मात्क्रमेण अक्षणिकस्य अर्थक्रिया दुर्घटा ।

Atha bhāvādabhinno'tiśayaḥ sahakāribhirādhīyata ityabhyupagamyeta, tarhi prācīno bhāvo'natiśayātmā nivṛtto'nyaścātiśayātmā kurvadrūpādipadavedanīyo jāyata iti phalitaṁ mamāpi manorathadrumeṇa. Tasmātkrameṇa akṣaṇikasya arthakriyā durghaṭā.

Now (or the other grand alternative), let it be granted that a supplementation identical with the entity (the seed, or whatever it may be) is taken on. If so, the former entity, that *minus* the supplementation, is no more, and a new entity identical with the supplementation, and designated (in the technology of Buddhism) *kurvad rūpa* (or effect-producing object), comes into being : and thus the tree of my desires (my doctrine of a universal flux) has borne its fruit.

Practical Efficiently of Permanent Object is Inadmissible Simultaneously

नाप्यक्रमेण घटते । विकल्पासहत्वात् । तथाहि—युगपत्सकलकार्यकरणसमर्थः स्वभावस्तदुत्तरकालमनुवर्तते न वा? प्रथमे तत्कालवत्कालान्तरेऽपि तावत्कार्यकरणमापतेत् । द्वितीये स्थायित्ववृत्याशा मूषिकभक्षितबीजादौ अङ्कुरादिजननप्रार्थनामनुहरेत् ।

Nāpyakrameṇa ghaṭate. Vikalpāsahatvāt. Tathāhi—Yugapatsakalakāryakaraṇasamarthaḥ svabhāvastaduttarakālamanuvartate na vā? Prathame tatkālavatkālāntare'pi tāvatkāryakaraṇamāpatet. Dvitīye sthāyitvavṛttyāśā mūṣikabhakṣitabījādau aṅkurādijanana-prārthanāmanuharet.

Practical efficiency, therefore, in the non-momentary is inadmissible. Nor is practical efficiency possible apart from succession in time; for such a possibility is redargued by the following dilemma. Is this (permanent) entity (which you contend for) able to produce all its effects simultaneously, or does it continue to exist after production of effects? On the former alternative, it will result that the entity will produce its effects just as much at one time as at another; on the second alternative, the expectation of its permanency is as reasonable as expecting seed eaten by a mouse to germinate.

यद्विरुद्धधर्माध्यस्तं तन्नाना, यथा शीतोष्णे । विरुद्धधर्माध्यस्तश्चायमिति जलधरे प्रतिबन्धसिद्धिः । न चायमसिद्धो हेतुः । स्थायिनि कालभेदेन सामर्थ्यासामर्थ्ययोः प्रसङ्गतद्विपर्ययसिद्धत्वात् । तत्रासामर्थ्यसाधकौ प्रसङ्गतद्विपर्ययौ प्रागुक्तौ ।

Yadviruddhadharmādhyastaṁ tannānā, yathā śītoṣṇe. Viruddhadharmādhyastaścāyamiti jaladhare pratibandhasiddhiḥ. Na cāyamasiddho hetuḥ. Sthāyini kālabhedena sāmarthyāsāmarthyayoḥ prasaṅgatadviparyayasiddhatvāt. Tatrāsāmarthyasādhakau prasaṅgatadviparyayau prāguktau.

That to which contrary determinations are attributed is diverse, as heat and cold; but this thing is determined by contrary attributions. Such is the argumentation applied to the cloud (to prove that it has not a permanent but a fluxional existence). Nor is the middle term disallowable, for possession and privation of power and impotence are allowed in regard to the permanent (which you assert) at different times. The concomitance and non-concomitance already described (viz.,That which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at that time, and What at any time does not do anything, that at that time is unable to do it) are affirmed (by us) to prove the existence of such power. The negative rule is :

सामर्थ्यसाधकावभिधीयेते । यद्यदा यज्जननासमर्थं तत्तदा तन्न करोति यथा शिलाशकलमङ्कुरम् असमर्थश्चायं वर्तमानार्थक्रियाकरणकालेऽतीतानागतयोरर्थक्रिययोरिति प्रसङ्गः । यद्यदा यत्करोति तत्तदा तत्र समर्थं यथा सामग्री स्वकार्ये । करोति चायमतीतानागतकाले तत्कालवर्तिन्यावर्थक्रिये भाव इति प्रसङ्गव्यत्ययो विपर्ययः ।

Sāmarthyasādhakāvabhidhīyete. Yadyadā yajjananāsamarthaṁ tattadā tanna karoti yathā śilāśakalamaṅkuraṃ asamarthaścāyaṁ vartamānārthakriyākaraṇakāle'tītānāgatayorarthakriyayoriti prasaṅgaḥ. Yadyadā yatkaroti tattadā tatra samarthaṁ yathā sāmagrī svakārye. Karoti cāyamatītānāgatakāle tatkālavartinyāvarthakriye bhāva iti prasaṅgavyatyayo viparyayaḥ.

What at any time is unable to produce anything, that at that time does not produce it, as a piece of stone, for example, does not produce a germ; and this entity (the seed, or whatever it may be), while exerting a present practical efficiency, is incapable of past and future practical efficiencies. The contradiction violating this rule is : What at any time does anything, that at that time is able to do that thing, as a complement of causes is able to produce its effect; and this (permanent) entity exerts at time past and time future the practical efficiencies proper to those times.

तस्माद्विपक्षे क्रमयौगपद्यव्यावृत्त्या, व्यापकानुपलम्भेन अधिगतव्यतिरेकव्याप्तिक, प्रसङ्गतद्विपर्ययबलाद् गृहीतान्वयव्याप्तिकं च सत्त्वं क्षणिकत्वपक्ष. एव व्यवस्थास्यतीति सिद्धम् । तदुक्तं ज्ञानश्रिया—

Tasmādvipakṣe kramayaugapadyavyāvṛttyā, vyāpakānupalambhena adhigatavyatirekavyāptika, prasaṅgatadviparyayabalād gṛhītānvayavyāptikaṁ ca sattvaṁ kṣaṇikatvapakṣa eva vyavasthāsyatīti siddhaṃ. Taduktaṁ jñānaśriyā—

(To recapitulate.) Existence is restricted to the momentary; there being observed in regard to existence a negative rule, that in regard to permanent succession and simultaneity being excluded, existence which contains succession and simultaneity is not congnisable; and there being observed in regard to existence of a positive rule, in

virtue of a concomitance observed (viz.,that the existent is accompanied or "pervaded" by the momentary), and in virtue of a non-concomitance observed (viz., that the non-momentary is accompanied or "pervaded" by the non-existent). Therefore, it has been said by Jñāna-śrī—

5. यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकं यथा जलधरः सन्तश्च भावा अमी
 सत्ता शक्तिरिहार्थकर्मणि मितेः सिद्धेषु सिद्धा न सा ।
नाप्येकैव विधान्यथा परकृतेनापि क्रियादिर्भवेद्
 द्वेधापि क्षणभङ्गसङ्गतिरतः साध्ये च विश्राम्यति ॥

Yatsattatkṣaṇikaṁ yathā jaladharaḥ santaśca bhāvā amī,
Sattā śaktirihārthakarmaṇi miteḥ siddheṣu siddhā na sā.
Nāpyekaiva vidhānyathā parakṛtenāpi kriyādirbhaved,
Dvedhāpi kṣaṇabhaṅgasaṅgatirataḥ sādhye ca viśrāmyati.

"What is momentary, as a cloud, and as these existent things;"

"The power of existence is relative to practical efficiency, and belongs to the ideal; but this power exists not as eternal in things eternal (either, etc.);"

"Nor is there only one form, otherwise one thing could do the work of another;"

"For two reasons, therefore (viz., succession and simultaneity), a momentary flux is congruous and remains true in regard to that which we have to prove."

Rebuttal of Common Concept

न च कणभक्षाक्षचरणादिपक्षकक्षीकारणे सत्तासामान्ययोगित्वमेव सत्त्वमिति मन्तव्यम् । सामान्यविशेषसमवायानामसत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

Na ca kaṇabhakṣākṣacaraṇādipakṣakakṣīkāraṇe sattāsāmānyayogitvameva sattvamiti mantavyam. Sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānāmasattvaprasaṅgāt.

Nor is it to be held, in acceptance of the hypothesis of the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas, that existence is a participation in the universal form of existence; for were this the case, universality, particularity, and co-inhesion (which do not participate in the universal) could have no existence.

न च तत्र स्वरूपसत्तानिबन्धनः सद्व्यवहारः । प्रयोजकगौरवापत्तेः । अनुगतत्वाननुगतत्वविकल्पपराहतेश्च । सर्षपमहीधरादिषु विलक्षणेषु क्षणेष्वनुगतस्याकारस्य मणिषु सूत्रवद्, भूतगणेषु गुणवच्चाप्रतिभासनाच्च ।

किं च सामान्यं सर्वगतं स्वाश्रयसर्वगतं वा ? प्रथमे सर्ववस्तुसङ्करप्रसङ्गः। अपसिद्धान्तापत्तिश्च । यतः प्रोक्तं प्रशस्तपादेन–'स्वविषयसर्वगतमिति'।

Na ca tatra svarūpasattānibandhanaḥ sadvyavahāraḥ. Prayojakagauravāpatteḥ. Anugatatvānanugatatvavikalpaparāhateśca. Sarṣapamahīdharādiṣu vilakṣaṇeṣu kṣaṇeṣvanugatasyākārasya maṇiṣu sūtravad, bhūtagaṇeṣu guṇavaccāpratibhāsanācca.

Kiṁ ca sāmānyaṁ sarvagataṁ svāśrayasarvagataṁ vā? Prathame sarvavastusaṅkaraprasaṅgaḥ. Apasiddhāntāpattiśca. Yataḥ proktaṁ praśastapādena—'śvaviṣayasarvagatamiti'.

Nor is the ascription of existence to universality, particularity, and co-inhesion dependent on any *sui generis* existence of their own; for such an hypothesis is operose, requiring too many *sui generis* existences. Moreover, the existence of any universal is disproved by a dilemma regarding the presence or non-presence (of the one in the many); and there is not presented to us any one form running through all the diverse momentary things, mustard—secds, mountains, and so forth, like the string running through the gems strung upon it.

Moreover (we would ask), is the universal omnipresent or present everywhere in its subjicible subjects? If it is everywhere, all things in the universe will be confounded together (chaos will be eternal), and you will be involved in a tenet you reject, since Praśasta-pāda has said, "Present in all its subjects".

किं च विद्यमाने घटे वर्तमानं सामान्यमन्यत्र जायमानेन सम्बध्यमानं तस्मादागच्छत्सम्बध्यते अनागच्छद्वा ? आद्ये द्रव्यत्वापत्तिः । द्वितीये सम्बन्धानुपपत्तिः।

Kiṁ ca vidyamāne ghaṭe vartamānaṁ sāmānyamanyatra jāyamānena sambadhyamānaṁ tasmādāgacchatsambadhyate anāgacchadvā? Ādye dravyatvāpattiḥ. Dvitīye sambandhānupapattiḥ.

Again (if the universal is present only in its proper subjects), does the universal (the nature of a jar) residing in an already existing jar, on being attached to another jar now in making, come from the

one to attach itself to the other, or not come from it? On the first alternative (if it comes), the universal must be a substance (for substances alone underlie qualities and motions); whereas, if it does not come, it cannot attach itself to the new jar.

किं च विनष्टे घटे सामान्यमवतिष्ठते, विनश्यति, स्थानान्तरं गच्छति वा? प्रथमे निराधारत्वापत्तिः । द्वितीये नित्यत्ववाचोयुक्त्ययुक्तिः । तृतीये द्रव्यत्वप्रसक्ति :- इत्यादि दूषणग्रहग्रस्तत्वात्सामान्यमप्रामाणिकम् । तदुक्तम् -

Kiṁ ca vinaṣṭe ghaṭe sāmānyamavatiṣṭhate, vinaśyati, sthānāntaraṁ gacchati vā? Prathame nirādhāratvāpattiḥ. Dvitīye nityatvavācoyuktyayuktiḥ. Tṛtīye dravyatvaprasaktiḥ—ityādi dūṣaṇagrahagrastatvātsāmānyamaprāmāṇikaṃ., Taduktaṃ—

Again (we ask), when the jar ceases to exist, does the universal outlast it or cease to exist, or go to another place? On the first supposition it will exist without a subject to inhere in; on the second, it will be improper to call it eternal (as you do); on the third, it will follow that it is a substance (or base of qualities and motions). Destroyed as it is by the malign influence of these and the like objections, the universal is unauthenticated.

Conformably it has been said—

6. अन्यत्र वर्तमानस्य ततोऽन्यस्थानजन्मनि ।
तस्मादचलतः स्थानाद् वृत्तिरित्यतियुक्तता ॥

Anyatra vartamānasya tato'nyasthānajanmani,
Tasmādacalataḥ sthānād vṛttirityatiyuktatā.

"Great is the dexterity of that which, existing in one place, engages without moving from that place in producing itself in another place."

7. यत्रासौ वर्तते भावस्तेन सम्बध्यते न तु ।
तद्देशिनं च व्याप्नोति किमप्येतन्महाद्भुतम् ॥

Yatrāsau vartate bhāvastena sambadhyate na tu,
Taddeśinaṁ ca vyāpnoti kimapyetanmahādbhutaṃ.

"This entity (universality) is not connected with that wherein it resides, and yet pervades that which occupies that place : great is this miracle."

8. न याति न च तत्रासीदस्ति पश्चान्न चांशवत् ।
जहाति पूर्वं नाधारमहो व्यसनसन्ततिः ॥ इति ।

Na yāti na ca tatrāsīdasti paścānna cāṁśavat,
Jahāti pūrvaṁ nādhāramaho vyasanasantatiḥ. iti.

"It goes not away, nor was it there, nor is it subsequently divided, it quits not its former repository : what a series of difficulties!"

अनुवृत्तप्रत्ययः किमालम्बन इति चेत्–अङ्ग, अन्यापोहालम्बन एवेति सन्तोष्टव्यमायुष्मता, इत्यलमतिप्रसङ्गेन ।

Anuvṛttapratyayaḥ kimālambana iti cet—aṅga, anyāpohālambana eveti santoṣṭavyamāyuṣmatā, ityalamatiprasaṅgena.

If you ask : On what does the assurance that the one exists in the many rest? You must be satisfied with the reply that we concede it to repose on difference from that which is different (or exclusion of heterogeneity). We dismiss further prolixity.

Perception of Grief and the Characteristics of Elements

सर्वस्य संसारस्य दुःखात्मकत्वं सर्वतीर्थङ्करसम्मतम् । अन्यथा तन्निविवृत्सूनां तेषां तन्निवृत्त्युपाये प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । तस्मात्सर्वं दुःखं दुःखमिति भावनीयम् ।

Sarvasya saṁsārasya duḥkhātmakatvaṁ sarvatīrthaṅkarasammataṃ. Anyathā tannivivṛtsūnāṁ teṣāṁ tannivṛttyupāye pravṛttyanupapatteḥ. Tasmātsarvaṁ duḥkhaṁ duḥkhamiti bhāvanīyaṃ.

That all transmigratory existence is identical with pain is the common verdict of all the founders of institutes, else they would not be found desirous to put a stop to it and engaging in the method for bringing it to an end. We must, therefore, bear in mind that all is pain, and pain alone.

ननु किंवदिति पृष्टे दृष्टान्तः कथनीय इति चेत्–मैवम् । स्वलक्षणानां क्षणानां क्षणिकतया सालक्षण्याभावादेतेन सदृशमपरमिति वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । ततः स्वलक्षणं स्वलक्षणमिति भावनीयम् ।

Nanu kiṁvaditi pṛṣṭe dṛṣṭāntaḥ kathanīya iti cet—maivaṃ. Svalakṣaṇānāṁ kṣaṇānāṁ kṣaṇikatayā sālakṣaṇyābhāvādetena sadṛśamaparamiti vaktumaśakyatvāt. Tataḥ svalakṣaṇaṁ svalakṣaṇamiti bhāvanīyaṃ.

If you object : When it is asked, like what? You must quote an instance,—we reply : Not so, for momentary objects self-characterised being momentary, have no common characters, and

therefore, it is impossible to say that this is like that. We must therefore hold that all is like itself alone, like itself alone.

Concept of Void

एवं शून्यं शून्यमित्यपि भावनीयम् । स्वप्ने जागरणे च न मया दृष्टमिदं रजतादीति विशिष्टनिषेधस्योपलम्भात् । यदि दृष्टं सत्तदा तिद्विशिष्टस्य दर्शनस्येदन्ताया अधिष्ठानस्य च तस्मिन्नध्यस्तस्य रजतत्वादेस्तत्संबन्धस्य च समवायादेः सत्त्वं स्यात् । न चैतदिष्टं कस्यचिद्वादिनः । न चार्धजरतीयमुचितम् । न हि कुक्कुट्या एको भागः पाकांयापरो भागः प्रसवाय कल्प्यतामिति कल्प्यते।

Evaṁ śūnyaṁ śūnyamityapi bhāvanīyaṃ. Svapne jāgaraṇe ca na mayā dṛṣṭamidaṁ rajatādīti viśiṣṭaniṣedhasyopalambhāt. Yadi dṛṣṭaṁ sattadā tidviśiṣṭasya darśanasyedantāyā adhiṣṭhānasya ca tasminnadhyastasya rajatatvādestatsaṁbandhasya ca samavāyādeḥ sattvaṁ syāt. Na caitadiṣṭaṁ kasyacidvādinaḥ. Na cārdhajaratīyamucitaṃ. Na hi kukkuṭyā eko bhāgaḥ pākāyāparo bhāgaḥ prasavāya kalpyatāmiti kalpyate.

In like manner we must hold that all is void, and void alone. For we are conscious of a determinate negation. This silver or the like has not been seen by me in sleeping or waking. If what is seen were (really) existent, then reality would pertain to the corresponding act of vision, to the (nacre, etc.), which is the basis of its particular nature (or hocceity), to the silver, etc., illusorily superposed upon that basis, to the connection between them, to the co-inherence, and so forth : a supposition not entertained by any disputant. Nor is a semi-effect existence admissible. No one imagines that one-half of a fowl may be set apart for cooking, and the other half for laying eggs.

तस्मादध्यस्ताधिष्ठान-तत्सम्बन्ध-दर्शन-दृष्टॄणां मध्य एकस्यानेकस्य वा असत्त्वे निषेधविषयत्वेन सर्वस्यासत्त्वं बलादापतेदिति भगवतोपदिष्टे 'माध्यमिकाः' तावदुत्तमप्रज्ञा इत्थमचीकथन्–भिक्षुपादप्रसारणन्यायेन, क्षणभङ्गाद्यभिधानमुखेन, स्थायित्वानुकूलवेदनीयत्वानुगतत्व-सर्वसत्यत्व भ्रमव्यावर्तनेन सर्वशून्यतायामेव पर्यवसानम् ।

Tasmādadhyastādhiṣṭhāna - tatsambandha - darśana - dṛṣṭṛṇāṁ madhya ekasyānekasya vā asattve niṣedhaviṣayatvena sarvasyāsattvaṁ balādāpatediti bhagavatopadiṣṭe 'mādhyamikāḥ' tāvaduttamaprajñā itthamacīkathan—bhikṣupādaprasāraṇanyāyena, kṣaṇabhaṅgādyabhidhānamukhena, sthāyitvānukūlavedanīyatvānugatatva-sarvasatyatva-bhramavyāvartanena sarvaśūnyatāyāmeva paryavasānaṃ.

The venerated Buddha, then, having taught that of the illusorily superposed (silver, etc.), the basis (nacre, etc.), the connection between them, the act of vision, and the *videns,* if one or more be unreal it will perforce ensue that all are unreal, all being equally objects of the negation: the Mādhyamikas excellently wise explain as follows, viz., that the doctrine of Buddha terminates in that of a total void that the doctrine of Buddha terminates in that of a hold void (universal baselessness or nihilism) by a slow progression like the intrusive steps of a mendicant, through the position of a momentary flux, and through the (gradual) negation of the illusory assurances of pleasurable sensibility, of universality, and of reality.

अतस्तत्त्वं सदसदुभयानुभयात्मकचतुष्कोटिविनिर्मुक्तं शून्यमेव । तथा हि–यदि घटादेः सत्त्वं स्वभावस्तर्हि कारकव्यापारवैयर्थ्यम् ।

Atastattvaṁ sadasadubhayānubhayātmakacatuṣkoṭivinirmuktaṁ sūnyameva. Tathā hi—yadi ghaṭādeḥ sattvaṁ svabhāvastarhi kārakavyāpāravaiyarthyaṃ.

The ultimate principle, then, is a void emancipated from four alternatives, viz., from reality, from unreality, from both (reality and unreality), and from neither (reality nor unreality). To exemplify this : If real existence were the nature of a water-pot and the like, the activity of its maker (the potter) would be superfluous.

असत्त्वं स्वभाव इति पक्षे प्राचीन एव दोषः प्रादुःष्यात् । यथोक्तम्

Asattvaṁ svabhāva iti pakṣe prācīna eva doṣaḥ prāduḥṣyāt. Yathoktaṃ—

If non-existence be its nature the same objection will accrue; as it is said—

9. न सतः कारणापेक्षा व्योमादेरिव युज्यते ।
कार्यस्यासम्भवी हेतुः खपुष्पादेरिवासतः ।। इति ।

Na sataḥ kāraṇāpekṣā vyomāderiva yujyate,
Kāryasyāsambhavī hetuḥ khapuṣpāderivāsataḥ. iti.

"Necessity of a cause befits not the existent, ether and the like, for instance;"

"No cause is efficacious of a non-existent effect, flowers of the sky and the like, for instance."

विरोधादितरो पक्षावनुपपन्नौ । तदुक्तं भगवता लङ्कावतारे–

Virodhāditaro pakṣāvanupapannau. Taduktaṁ bhagavatā laṅkāvatāre—

The two remaining alternatives, as self-contradictory, are inadmissible. It has accordingly been laid down by the venerated Buddha in the Alaṅkārāvatāra[1]—

10. बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानानां स्वभावो नावधार्यते ।
अतो निरभिलप्यास्ते निःस्वभावाश्च दर्शिताः ॥ इति ।

Buddhyā vivicyamānānāṁ svabhāvo nāvadhāryate,
Ato nirabhilapyāste niḥsvabhāvāśca darśitāḥ. iti.

"Of things discriminated by intellect, no nature is ascertained;"[2]
"Those things are therefore shown to be inexplicable and natureless."

11. इदं वस्तु बलायातं यद्वदन्ति विपश्चितः ।
यथा यथार्थाश्चिन्त्यन्ते विशीर्यन्ते तथा तथा ॥ इति च ।
न क्वचिदपि पक्षे व्यवतिष्ठत इत्यर्थः ।

Idaṁ vastu balāyātaṁ yadvadanti vipaścitaḥ,
Yathā yathārthāścintyante viśīryante tathā tathā. iti ca.
Na kvacidapi pakṣe vyavatiṣṭhata ityarthaḥ.

And again—

"This matter perforce results, which the wise declare,
No sooner are objects thought than they are dissipated."

दृष्टार्थव्यवहारश्च स्वप्नव्यवहारवत्संवृत्या संगच्छते । अत एवोक्तम्–

Dṛṣṭārthavyavahāraśca svapnavyavahāravatsaṁvṛtyā saṅgacchate. Ata evoktam—

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1 Query, Laṅkāvatāra?

2 Cf. Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic, p. 213. "If every completed object of cognition must consist of object plus the subject, the object without the subject must be incomplete, that is, inchoate—that is, no possible object of knowledge at all. This is the distressing predicament to which matter is reduced by the tactics of speculation; and this predicament is described not unaptly by calling it a *flux*—or, as we have depicted it elsewhere, perhaps more philosophically, as a never-ending redemption of nonsenses into sense, and a never-ending relapse of sense into nonsense."

That is to say, the object are not determined by any one of the four alternatives. Hence, it is that it has been said—

12. परिव्राट्-कामुक-शुनामेकस्यां प्रमदातनौ ।
कुणपः कामिनी भक्ष्य इति तिस्रो विकल्पनाः ॥ इति ।

Parivrāṭ-kāmuka-śunāmekasyāṁ pramadātanau,
Kuṇapaḥ kāminī bhakṣya iti tisro vikalpanāḥ. iti.

"A religious mendicant, an amorous man, and a dog have three views of a woman's person, respectively that it is a carcass, that it is a mistress, and that it is a prey."

तदेवं भावनाचतुष्टयवशान्निखिलवासनानिवृत्तौ परनिर्वाणं शून्यरूपं सेत्स्यतीति वयं कृतार्थाः, नास्माकमुपदेश्यं किंचिदस्तीति ।

शिष्यस्तावद्योगश्चाचारश्चेति द्वयं करणीयम् तत्राप्राप्तस्यार्थस्य प्राप्तये पर्यनुयोगो योगः । गुरूक्तस्यार्थस्याङ्गीकरणमाचारः । गुरूक्तस्याङ्गीकरणादुत्तमाः, पर्यनुयोगस्याकरणादधमाश्च । अतस्तेषां माध्यमिका इति प्रसिद्धिः ।

Tadevaṁ bhāvanācatuṣṭayavaśānnikhilavāsanānirvṛttau paranirvāṇaṁ śūnyarūpaṁ setsyatīti vayaṁ kṛtārthāḥ, nāsmākamupadeśyaṁ kiṁcidastīti.

Śiṣyastāvadyogaścācāraśceti dvayaṁ karaṇīyaṃ tatrāprāptasyārthasya prāptaye paryanuyogo yogaḥ. Guruktasyārthasyāṅgīkaraṇamācāraḥ. Gurūktasyāṅgikaraṇāduttamāḥ, paryanuyogasyākaraṇādadhamāśca. Atasteṣāṁ mādhyamikā iti prasiddhiḥ.

In consequence, then, of these four points of view, when all ideas are come to an end, final extinction, which is a void, will result. Accordingly we have overtaken our end, and there is nothing to be taught to us. There consequently remain only two duties to the student—interrogation and acceptance. Of these, interrogation is the putting of questions in order to attain knowledge not yet attained. Acceptance is assent to the matters stated by the sacred teacher. These (Bauddha nihilists) are excellent in assenting to that which the religious teacher enounces, and defective in interrogation, whence their conventional designation of Mādhyamikas (or mediocre).

Yogācāra or Scientific Approach

गुरूक्तं भावनाचतुष्टयं बाह्यार्थस्य शून्यत्वं चाङ्गीकृत्यान्तरस्य शून्यत्वं चाङ्गीकृतं कथमिति पर्यनुयोगस्य करणात् केषाञ्चिद्योगाचारप्रथा । एषा हि तेषां परिभाषा–

स्वयंवेदनं तावदङ्गीकार्यम् । अन्यथा जगदान्ध्यं प्रसज्येत । तत्कीर्तितं धर्मकीर्तिना–अप्रत्यक्षोपलम्भस्य नार्थदृष्टिः प्रसिध्यति । इति ।

Guruktaṁ bhāvanācatuṣṭayaṁ bāhyārthasya śūnyatvaṁ cāṅgīkṛtyāntarasya śūnyatvaṁ cāṅgīkṛtaṁ kāthamiti paryanuyogasya karaṇāt keṣañcidyogācāraprathā. Eṣā hi teṣāṁ paribhāṣā—svayaṁvedanaṁ tāvadaṅgīkāryaṃ. Anyathā jagadāndhyaṁ prasajyeta. Tatkīrtitaṁ dharmakīrtinā—Apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasidhyati. iti.

Certain other Buddhists are styled Yogācāras, because while they accept the four points of view proclaimed by the spiritual guide, and the void of external things, they make the interrogation : Why has a void of the internal (or baselessness of mental phenomena) been admitted? For their technology is as follows :– Self-subsistent cognition must be allowed, or it will follow that the whole universe is blind. It has conformably been proclaimed by Dharmakīrti : "To one who disallows perception the vision of objects is not competent."

Rebuttal of External Percipibile

बाह्यं ग्राह्यं नोपपद्यत एव । विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । अर्थो ज्ञानग्राह्यो भवन्नुत्पन्नो भवति अनुत्पन्नो वा ? न पूर्वः, उत्पन्नस्य स्थित्यभावात् । नापरः, अनुत्पन्नस्यासत्त्वात् । अथ मन्येथाः—'अतीत एवार्थो ज्ञानग्राह्यस्तज्जनकत्वादिति' तदपि बालभाषितम् । वर्तमानतावभासविरोधात् । इन्द्रियादेरपि ज्ञानजनकत्वेन ग्राह्यत्वप्रसंगाच्च ।

Bāhyaṁ grāhyaṁ nopapadyata eva. Vikalpānupapatteḥ. Artho jñānagrāhyo bhavannutpanno bhavati anutpanno vā? Na pūrvaḥ, utpannasya sthityabhāvāt. Nāparaḥ, anutpannasyāsattvāt. Atha manyethāḥ—'atīta evārtho jñānagrāhyastajjanakatvāditi' tadapi bālabhāṣitaṃ. Vartamānatāvabhāsavirodhāt. Indriyāderapi jñānajanakatvena grāhyatvaprasaṁgācca.

An external *percipibile* is not admissible in consequence of the following dilemma. Does the object cognitively apprehensible arise from an entity or not? It does not result from an entity, for that which is generated has no permanence. Nor is it non-resultant, for what has not come into being is non-existent. Or (we may proceed) do you hold that a past object is cognitively apprehensible, as begetting cognition? If so, this is childish nonsense, because it conflicts with the apparent *presentness* of the object, and because on

such a supposition the sense organs (and other imperceptible things) might be apprehended.

किं च, ग्राह्यः किं परमाणुरूपोऽर्थोऽवयविरूपों वा । न चरमः कृत्स्नैकदेशविकल्पादिना तन्निराकरणात् । न प्रथमः अतीन्द्रियत्वात् । षट्केन युगपद्योगस्य बाधकत्वाच्च । यथोक्तम्–

Kiṁ ca, grāhyaḥ kiṁ paramāṇurūpo'rtho'vayavirūpo vā. Na caramaḥ kṛtsnaikadeśavikalpādinā tannirākaraṇāt. Na prathamaḥ atīndriyatvāt. Ṣaṭkena yugapadyogasya bādhakatvācca. Yathoktaṃ—

Further (we ask), Is the *percipibile* a simple atom or a complex body? The latter it cannot be, this alternative being ejected by the dilemma as to whether part or whole is perceived. The former alternative is equally impossible, an atom being supersensible, and it not being able to combine simultaneously with six others; as it has been said–

13. षट्केन युगपद्योगात्परमाणोः षडंशता ।
तेषामप्येकदेशत्वे पिण्डः स्यादणुमात्रकः ।। इति ।

Ṣaṭkena yugapadyogātparamāṇoḥ ṣaḍaṁśatā,
Teṣāmapyekadeśatve piṇḍaḥ syādaṇumātrakaḥ. iti.

"If an atom could simultaneously combine with six, it would have six surfaces;"
"And each of these being taken separately, there would be a body of atomic dimension."

Intellect

तस्मात्स्वव्यतिरिक्तग्राह्यविरहात्तदात्मिका बुद्धिः स्वयमेव स्वात्मरूपप्रकाशिका प्रकाशवदिति सिद्धम् । तदुक्तम्–

Tasmātsvavyatiriktagrāhyavirahāttadātmikā buddhiḥ svayameva svātmarūpaprakāśikā prakāśavaditi siddhaṃ. Taduktaṃ—

Intellect, therefore, as having no other *percipibile* but itself, is shown to be itself its own *percipibile*, self-subsistent, luminous with its own light, like light. Therefore it has been said–

14. नान्योऽनुभाव्यो बुद्ध्यास्ति तस्या नानुभवोऽपरः ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकवैधुर्यात्स्वयं सैव प्रकाशते ।। इति ।

Nānyo'nubhāvyo buddhyāsti tasyā nānubhavo'paraḥ,
Grāhyagrāhakavaidhuryātsvayaṁ saiva prakāśate. iti.

"There is naught to be objectified by intellect; there is no cognition ulterior thereto;"

"There being no distinction between percept and percipient, intellect shines forth of itself alone."

ग्राह्यग्राहकयोरभेदश्चानुमातव्यः । यद्वेद्यते येन वेदनेन, तत्ततो न भिद्यते यथा ज्ञानेनात्मा । वेद्यन्ते तैश्च नीलादयः ।

Grāhyagrāhakayorabhedaścānumātavyaḥ. Yadvedyate yena vedanena, tattato na bhidyate yathā jñānenātmā. Vedyante taiśca nīlādayaḥ.

The identity of percipient and percept is inferrible, thus : That which is cognised by any cognition is not other than that cognition, as soul, for instance, is not other than cognition of soul; and blue and other momentary objects are cognised by cognitions. For if there were a difference (between percept and percipient), the object could not now have any connection with the cognition.

भेदे हि सति अधुना अनेनार्थस्य सम्बन्धित्वं स्यात् । तादात्म्यस्य नियमहेतोरभावात् । तदुत्पत्तेरनियामकत्वात् । यश्चायं ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तीनां पृथगवभासः स एकस्मिंश्चन्द्रमसि द्वित्वावभास इव भ्रमः । अत्राप्यनादिरविच्छिन्नप्रवाहा भेदवासनैव निमित्तम् । यथोक्तम्—

Bhede hi sati adhunā anenārthasya sambandhitvaṁ syāt. Tādātmyasya niyamahetorabhāvāt. Tadutpatteraniyāmakatvāt. Yaścāyaṁ grāhyagrāhakasaṁvittīnāṁ pṛthagavabhāsaḥ sa ekasminścandramasi dvitvāvabhāsa iva bhramaḥ. Atrāpyanādiravicchinnapravāhā bhedavāsanaiva nimittam. Yathoktam—

There being no identity to determine a constancy of connection, and nothing to determine the rise of such a connection. As for the appearance of an interval between the object and subject consciousnesses, this is an illusion, like the appearance of two moons when there is only one. The cause of this illusion is ideation of difference in a stream without beginning and without interruption; as it has been said—

15. सहोपलम्भनियमादभेदो नीलतद्धियोः ।
भेदश्च भ्रान्तिविज्ञानैर्दृश्येतेन्दाविवाद्वये ।। इति ।।

Sahopalambhaniyamādabhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ,
Bhedaśca bhrāntivijñānairdṛśyetendāvivādvaye. iti.

"As invariably cognised together, the blue object and the cognition there of are identical;"

"And the difference should be accounted for by illusory cognitions, as in the example of the single moon."

16. अविभागोऽपि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यासितदर्शनैः ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदवानिव लभ्यते ।। इति च ।।

Avibhāgo'pi buddhyātmā viparyāsitadarśanaiḥ,
Grāhyagrāhakasaṁvittibhedavāniva labhyate. iti ca.

And again—

"Though there is no division, the soul or intellect, by reason of illusory perceptions,"

"Appears to possess a duality of cognitions, of percepts and of percipient."

न च रसवीर्यविपाकादि समानमाशामोदकोपार्जितमोदकानां स्यादिति वेदितव्यम् । वस्तुतो वेद्य-वेदकाकारविधुराया अपि बुद्धेः व्यवहर्तृपरिज्ञानानुरोधेन विभिन्नग्राह्यग्राहकाकाररूपवत्तया तिमिराद्युपहताक्ष्णा केशोण्डुकनाडीज्ञानभेदवत् अनाद्युपप्लववासनासामर्थ्यात् व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः पर्यनुयोगायोगात् । यथोक्तम्—

Na ca rasavīryavipākādi samānamāśāmodakopārjitamodakānāṁ syāditi veditavyam. Vastuto vedya-vedakākāravidhurāyā api buddheḥ vyavahartṛparijñānānurodhena vibhinnagrāhyagrāhakākārarūpavattayā timirādyupahatākṣṇā keśoṇḍukanāḍījñānabhedavat anādyupaplavavāsanāsāmarthyāt vyavasthopapatteḥ paryanuyogāyogāt. Yathoktam—

Nor must it be supposed that (on this hypothesis) the juice, the energy, and the digestion derivable from an imaginary and an actual sweetmeat will be the same; for it cannot be questioned that though the intellect be in strictness exempt from the modes of object and subject, yet there is competent to it a practical distinction in virtue of the succession of illusory ideas without beginning, by reason of its possessing diverse modes percept and percipient, conformably to its illusory supposition of practical agency, just as to those whose eyes are dim with some morbid affection a hair and another minute object may appear either diverse or identical; as it has been said—

17. अवेद्यवेदकाकारा यथा भ्रान्तैर्निरीक्ष्यते ।
विभक्तलक्षणग्राह्यग्राहकाकारविप्लवा ॥

Avedyavedakākārā yathā bhrāntairnirīkṣyate,
Vibhaktalakṣaṇagrāhyagrāhakākāraviplavā.

"As the intellect, not having object and subject modes, appears, by reason of illusory cognitions,"
"Illuded with the diverse forms of perception percept and percipient."

18. तथा कृतव्यवस्थेयं केशादिज्ञानभेदवत् ।
यदा तदा न संचोद्या ग्राह्यग्राहकलक्षणा ॥ इति ।

Tathā kṛtavyavastheyaṁ keśādijñābhedavat,
Yadā tadā na saṁcodyā grāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇā. iti.

"So when the intellect has posited a diversity, as in the example of the differences of the cognition of a hair and the like,"
"Then it is not to be doubted that it is characterised as percipient and percept."

तस्माद् बुद्धिरेवानादिवासनावशात् अनेकाकारावभासत–इति सिद्धम् । ततश्च प्रागुक्त-भावना-प्रचय-बलात् निखिल वासनोच्छेद-विगलित-विविध-विषयाकारोपप्लव-विशुद्ध-विज्ञानोदयो महोदय इति ।

Tasmād buddhirevānādivāsanāvaśat anekākārāvabhāsata–iti siddham. Tataśca prāgukta-bhāvanā-pracaya-balāt nikhila vāsanoccheda-vigalita-vividha-viṣayākāropaplava-viśuddha-vijñānodayo mahodaya iti.

Thus, it has been evinced that intellect, as affected by beginningless ideation, manifests itself under diverse forms.

When, therefore, by constancy of reflection (on the four points of view) aforesaid, all ideation has been interrupted, there arises knowledge purged from the illusions which take the form of objects, such illusions being now melted away; and this is technically called *Mahodaya* (the grand exaltation, emancipation).

External Objects are Proof in Themselves

अन्ये तु मन्यन्ते–यथोक्तं 'बाह्यं वस्तुजातं नास्तीति' तदयुक्तम् । प्रमाणाभावात् । न च सहोपलम्भनियमः प्रमाणमिति वक्तव्यम् । वेद्यवेदकयोरभेदसाधकत्वेनाभिमतस्य तस्याप्रयोजकत्वेद सन्दिग्धविपक्षव्यावृत्तिकत्वात् ।

Anye tu manyante—Yathoktaṁ 'bāhyaṁ vastujātaṁ nāstīti' tadayuktam. Pramāṇābhāvāt. Na ca sahopalambhaniyamaḥ pramāṇamiti vaktavyam. Vedyavedakayorabhedasādhakatvenābhimatasya tasyāprayojakatveda sandigdhavipakṣavyāvṛtikatvāt.

Others again (the Sautrāntikas) hold that the position that there is no external world is untenable, as wanting evidence. Nor (they contend) can it be maintained that invariability of simultaneous cognition is an evidence, for this simultaneous cognition which you accept as proof of the identity of subject and object is indecisive, being found in dubious and in contrary instances.

ननु भेदे सहोपलम्भनियमात्मकं साधनं न स्यादितिचेन्न । ज्ञानस्यान्तर्मुखतया, ज्ञेयस्य बहिर्मुखतया च भेदेन प्रतिभासमानत्वात् । एकदेशत्वैककालत्वलक्षणसहत्व-नियमासम्भवाच्च ।

Nanu bhede sahopalambhaniyamātmakaṁ sādhanaṁ na syāditicenna. Jñānasyāntarmukhatayā, jñeyasya bahirmukhatayā ca bhedena pratibhāsamānatvāt. Ekadeśatvaikakālatva-lakṣaṇasahatva-niyamāsambhavācca.

If you rejoin (they proceed) : Let there be a proof of this identity, and let this proof be invariability of simultaneous cognition,—we refuse this, because in as much as cognition must ultimately have some object, it is manifested in duality, and because such invariability of simultaneity as to time and place is impossible.

किं च नीलाद्यर्थस्य ज्ञानाकारत्वेऽहमिति प्रतिभासः स्यात् । न तु 'इदमिति' प्रतिपत्तिः । प्रत्यायादव्यतिरेकात् । अथोच्यते–ज्ञानस्वरूपोऽपि नीलाकारो भ्रान्त्या बहिर्वत् भेदेन प्रतिभासत इति, न च तत्राहमुल्लेख इति । तथोक्तम्–

Kiṁ ca nīlādyarthasya jñānākāratve'hamiti pratibhāsaḥ syāt. Na tu 'idamiti' pratipattiḥ. Pratyāyādavyatirekāt. Athocyate—jñānasvarūpo'pi nīlākāro bhrāntyā bahirvat bhedena pratibhāsata iti, na ca tatrāhamullekha iti. Tathoktam—

Moreover (they continue), if the object, blue or whatever it be, were only a form of cognition, it should be presented as *Ego*, not as *Hoc aliquid*, because the cognition and the object would be identical. Perhaps you will say : A blue form consisting of cognition is illusorily presented as external and as other than self, and consequently the Ego is not suggested; and so it has been said—

19. परिच्छेदान्तराद्योऽयं भागो बहिरिव स्थितः ।
ज्ञानस्याभेदिनो भेदप्रतिभासोऽप्युपप्लवः ।। इति ।

Paricchedāntarādyo'yaṁ bhāgo bahiriva sthitaḥ,
Jñānasyābhedino bhedapratibhāso'pyupaplavaḥ. iti.

"This side of knowledge which appears external to the other portion,"
"This appearance of duality in the unity of cognition is an illusion."

20. यदन्तर्ज्ञेयतत्त्वं तद्बहिर्वदवभासते । इति च ।

Yadantarjñeyatattvaṁ tadvahirvadavabhāsate. iti ca.

And again–
"The principle to be known as internal also manifests itself as if it were external."

तदयुक्तम् । बाह्यार्थाभावे तद्व्युत्पत्तिरहिततया बहिर्वदित्युपमानोक्तेरयुक्तेः । न हि वसुमित्रो वन्ध्यापुत्रवदवभासत इति प्रेक्षावानाचक्षीत । भेदप्रतिभासस्य भ्रान्तत्वेऽभेदप्रतिभासस्य प्रामाण्यं, तत्प्रामाण्ये च भेदप्रतिभासस्य भ्रान्तत्वमिति परस्पराश्रयप्रसंगाच्च । अविसंवादान्नीलतादिकमेव संविदाना बाह्यमेवोपाददते, जगत्युपेक्षन्ते चान्तरमिति व्यवस्थादर्शनाच्च ।

Tadayuktam. Bāhyārthābhāve tadvyutpattirahitatayā bahirvadityupamānokterayukteḥ. Na hi vasumitro vandhyāputravadavabhāsata iti prekṣāvānācakṣīta. Bheda pratibhāsasya bhrāntatve'bhedapratibhāsasya prāmāṇyaṁ, tatprāmāṇye ca bhedapratibhāsasya bhrāntatvamiti parasparāśrayaprasaṁgācca. Avisaṁvādānnīlatādikameva saṁvidānā bāhyamevopādadate, jagatyupekṣante cāntaramiti vyavasthādarśanācca.

To this we reply (say the Sautrāntikas) : This is untenable, for if there be no external objects, there being no genesis of such, the comparison "as if they were external" is illegitimate. No man in his senses would say, "Vasumitra looks like the son of a childless mother."Again, if the manifestation of identity be proved by the illusoriness of the presentment of duality, and the presentment of duality be proved illusory by the manifestation of identity, you are involved in a logical circle. Without controversy we observe that cognitions take external things, blue or whatever they may be, as their objects, and do not take merely internal modifications as

such, and we see that men in their everyday life overlook their internal states.

Entity of External objects—Conclusion

एवं चायमभेदसाधको हेतुर्गोमयपायसीयन्यायवत् आभासतां भजेत् । अतो बहिर्वदिति वदता बाह्यं ग्राह्यमेवेति भावनीयमिति भवदीय एव बाणो भवन्तं प्रहरेत् ।

Evaṁ cāyamabhedasādhako heturgomayapāyasīyanyāyavat ābhāsatāṁ bhajet. Ato bahirvaditi vadatā bāhyaṁ grāhyameveti bhāvanīyamiti bhavadīya eva bāṇo bhavantaṁ praharet.

Thus, this argument which you adduce to prove that there is difference between subject and object, turns out a mere absurdity, like milky food made of cow-dung. When then you say "as if it were external," you must already suppose an external *percipibile,* and your own arrow will return upon you and wound you.

Externity of an Object is not Proof but Inference

ननु ज्ञानाद्भिन्नकालस्यार्थस्य ग्राह्यत्वमनुपपन्नमिति चेत्–तदनुपपन्नम् । इन्द्रियसन्निकृष्टस्य विषयस्योत्पाद्ये ज्ञाने स्वाकारसमर्पकतया समर्पितेन चाकारेण तस्यार्थस्यानुमेयतोपपत्तेः । अत एव पर्यनुयोगपरिहारौ समग्राहिषाताम्–

Nanu jñānādbhinnakālasyārthasya grāhyatvamanupapannamiti cet–tadanupapannam. Indriyasannikṛṣṭasya viṣayasyotpādye jñāne svākārasamarpakatayā samarpitena cākāreṇa tasyārthasyānumeyatopapatteḥ. Ata eva paryanuyogaparihārau samagrāhiṣātām—

If any one object that the externality of an object synchronous with the cognition is inadmissible, we (Sautrāntikas) reply that this objection is inadmissible, inasmuch as the object in juxtaposition to the sensory imposes its form upon the cognition then in production, and the object is inferrible from the form thus imposed. The interrogation and response on this point have been thus summarised–

21. भिन्नकालं कथं ग्राह्यमिति चेद् ग्राह्यतां विदुः ।
हेतुत्वमेव च व्यक्तेर्ज्ञानाकारार्पणक्षमम् ।। इति ।

Bhinnakālaṁ kathaṁ grāhyamiti ced grāhyatāṁ viduḥ,
Hetutvameva ca vyakterjñānākārārpaṇakṣamam. iti.

"If it be asked, How can there be a past *percipibile*? They recognise perceptibility,"

"And a competent inferribility of the individual thing is its imposition of its form."

तथा च यथा पुष्ट्या भोजनमनुमीयते, यथा च भाषया देशः, यथा वा सम्भ्रमेण स्नेहः, तथा ज्ञानाकारेण ज्ञेयमनुमेयम् । तदुक्तम्–

Tathā ca yathā puṣṭyā bhojanamanumīyate, yathā ca bhāṣayā deśaḥ, yathā vā sambhrameṇa snehaḥ, tathā jñānākāreṇa jñeyamanumeyam. Taduktam—

To exemplify. As nourishment is inferred from a thriving look, as nationality is inferred from language, and as affection is inferred from flurried movements, so from the form of knowledge a knowable may be inferred. Therefore, it has been said—

22. अर्थेन घटयत्येनां न हि मुक्त्वार्थरूपताम् ।
तस्मात्प्रमेयाधिगतेः प्रमाणं मेयरूपता ॥ इति ॥

Arthena ghaṭayatyenāṁ na hi muktvārtharūpatām,
Tasmātprameyādhigateḥ pramāṇaṁ meyarūpatā. iti.

"With half (of itself) the object moulds (the cognition) without losing the nature of a half;"

"The evidence, therefore, of the recognition of a knowable is the nature of the knowable."

न हि वित्तिसत्तैव तद्वेदना युक्ता । तस्याः सर्वत्राविशेषात् । तां तु सारूप्यमाविशत् सरूपयितुं घटयेदिति च । तथा बाह्यार्थसद्भावे प्रयोगः–ये यस्मिन्सत्यपि कादाचित्कास्ते सर्वे तदतिरिक्तसापेक्षाः । यथा–अविवक्षति अजिगमिषति मयि वचनगमनप्रतिभासा विवक्षु-जिगमिषु-पुरुषान्तरसन्तानसापेक्षाः। तथा च विवादाध्यासिताः प्रवृत्तिप्रत्ययाः सत्यप्यालयविज्ञाने कदाचिदेव नीलाद्युल्लेखिन ॥ इति ॥

Na hi vittisattaiva tadvedanā yuktā. Tasyāḥ sarvatrāviśeṣāt. Tāṁ tu sārūpyamāviśat sarūpayituṁ ghaṭayediti ca. Tathā bāhyārthasadbhāve prayogaḥ—ye yasminsatyapī kādācitkāste sarve tadatiriktasāpekṣāḥ. Yathā–avivakṣati ajigamiṣati mayi vacanagamanapratibhāsā vivakṣu-jigamiṣu-puruṣāntarasantāna-sāpekṣāḥ. Tathā ca vivādādhyāsitāḥ pravṛttipratyayāḥ satyapyālayavijñāne kadācideva nīlādyullekhina. iti.

For consciousness of the cognition cannot be the being of the

cognition, for this consciousness is everywhere alike, and if indifference were to attach itself to this, it would reduce all things to indifference. Accordingly the formal argument for the existence of external things : Those things which while a thing exists appear only at times, all depend upon something else than that thing; as, for instance, if I do not wish to speak or to walk, presentments of speaking or walking must suppose others desirous of speaking or walking; and in like manner the presentments of activity under discussion, while there exists the recognition of a subject of them, are only at times manifested as blue and so forth.

तत्रालयविज्ञानं नामाहमास्पदं विज्ञानम् । नीलाद्युल्लेखि च विज्ञानं प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानम् । यथोक्तम्–

Tatrālayavijñānaṁ nāmāhamāspadaṁ vijñānam. Nīlādyullekhi ca vijñānaṁ pravṛttivijñānam. Yathoktam—

Of these, the recognition of a subject is the presentation of the Ego, the manifestation as blue and so forth is a presentment of activity, as it has been said—

23. तत्स्यादालयविज्ञानं यद्भवेदहमास्पदम् ।
तत्स्यात्प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानं यन्नीलादिकमुल्लिखेत् ॥ इति ।

Tatsyādālayavijñānaṁ yadbhavedahamāspadam,
Tatsyātpravṛttivijñānaṁ yannīlādikamullikhet. iti.

"That is a recognition of a subject which is conversant about the Ego :"

"That is a presentment of activity which manifests blue and the rest."

तस्मादालयविज्ञानसन्तानातिरिक्तः कादाचित्कप्रवृत्तिविज्ञानहेतुर्बाह्योऽर्थो ग्राह्य एव, न वासनापरिपाकप्रत्ययकादाचित्कत्वात् कदाचिदुत्पाद इति वेदितव्यम् ।

Tasmādālayavijñānasantānātiriktaḥ kādācitkapravṛttivijñānaheturbāhyo'rtho grāhya eva, na vāsanāparipākapratyayakādācitkatvāt kadācidutpāda iti veditavyam.

Over the above, therefore, the complement of subject recognitions, let it be understood that there is an external object world perceptible, which is the cause of presentments of activity; and that this external world does not rise into being only from time to time on occasion of presentments resulting from ideation.

Critic Analysis of the Scientific Approach

विज्ञानवादिनये हि वासना नाम एकसन्तानवर्तिनामालय-विज्ञानानां तत्तत्प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानजननशक्तिः । तस्याश्च स्वकार्योत्पादं प्रत्याभिमुख्यं परिपाकः । तस्य च प्रत्ययः कारणं स्वसन्तानवर्तिपूर्वक्षणः कक्षीक्रियते । सन्तानान्तर-निबन्धनत्वानङ्गीकारात् ।

Vijñānavādinaye hi vāsanā nāma ekasantānavartināmālaya-vijñānānāṁ tattatpravṛttivijñānajananaśaktiḥ. Tasyāśca svakāryotpādaṁ pratyābhimukhyaṁ paripākaḥ. Tasya ca pratyayaḥ kāraṇaṁ svasantānavartipūrvakṣaṇaḥ kakṣīkriyate. Santānāntaranibandhanatvānaṅgīkārāt.

ततश्च प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानजनकालयविज्ञानवर्तिवासनापरिपाकं प्रति सर्वेऽप्यालयविज्ञान-वर्तिनः क्षणाः समर्था एवेति वक्तव्यम् । न चेदेकोऽपि न समर्थः स्यात् । आलयविज्ञानसन्तानवर्तित्वाविशेषात् । सर्वे समर्था इति पक्षे कालक्षेपानुपपत्तिः । ततश्च कादाचित्कत्वनिर्वाहाय शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धविषयाः सुखादिविषयाः षडपि प्रत्ययाश्चतुरः प्रत्ययान् प्रतीत्योत्पाद्यन्त इति चतुरेणानिच्छताप्यच्छमतिना स्वानुभवमनाच्छाद्य परिच्छेत्तव्यम् ।

Tataśca pravṛttivijñānajanakālayavijñānavartivāsanā-paripākaṁ prati sarve'pyālayavijñānavartinaḥ kṣaṇāḥ samarthā eveti vaktavyam. Na cedeko'pi na samarthaḥ syāt. Ālayavijñānasantānavartitvāviśeṣāt. Sarve samarthā iti pakṣe kālakṣepānupapattiḥ. Tataśca kādācitkatvanirvāhāya śabdasparśarūparasagandhaviṣayāḥ sukhādiviṣayāḥ ṣaḍapi pratyayāścaturaḥ pratyayān pratītyotpādyanta iti catureṇānicchatāpyacchamatinā svānubhavamanācchādya paricchettavyam.

According to the view of the Sensationalists *(Vijñānavādins)*, ideation is a power of generating such and such sensations (or presentments of activity) in subject recognitions which exist as a single stream. The maturescence of this power is its readiness to produce its effect; of this the result is a presentment (or sensation); the antecedent momentary object (sensation) in the mental train is accepted as the cause, no other mental train being admitted to exercise such causality. It must therefore be stated that all momentary objects (fleeting sensations) in the subject-consciousness are alike able to bring about that maturescence of ideation in the subject-consciousness, which maturescence is productive of presentments

of activity. If any one (of these fleeting sensations) had not this power, none would possess it, all existing alike in the stream of subject-recognitions. On the supposition that they all have this power, the effects cannot be diversified, and therefore any intelligent man, however unwilling, if he has a clear understanding, must decide, without putting out of sight the testimony of his consciousness, that to account for the occasional nature (of sense percepts) the six cognitions of sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, of pleasure, and so forth, are produced on occasion of four conditions.

Four Conditions of Knowledge

ते चत्वारः प्रत्ययाः प्रसिद्धा आलम्बन-समनन्तर-सहकार्यधिपतिरूपाः । तत्र ज्ञानपदवेदनीयस्य नीलाद्यवभासस्य चित्तस्य नीलादालम्बनप्रत्ययान्नीलाकारता भवति । समनन्तरप्रत्ययात् प्राचीनज्ञानोद्बोधरूपता । सहकारिप्रत्ययात् आलोकात् स्पष्टता । चक्षुषोऽधिपतिप्रत्ययाद्विषयग्रहणप्रतिनियमः ॥

Te catvāraḥ pratyayāḥ prasiddhā ālambana-samanantara-sahakāryadhipatirūpāḥ. Tatra jñānapadavedanīyasya nīlādyavabhāsasya cittasya nīlādālambanapratyayānnīlākāratā bhavati. Samanantarapratyayāt prācīnajñānodvodharūpatā. Sahakāripratyayāt ālokāt spaṣṭatā. Cakṣuṣo'dhipatipratyayādviṣayagrahaṇapratiniyamaḥ.

उदितस्य ज्ञानस्य रसादिसाधारण्ये प्राप्ते नियामकं चक्षुरधिपतिर्भवितुमर्हति । लोके नियामकस्याधिपतित्वोपलम्भात् । एवं चित्तचैत्तात्मकानां सुखादीनां चत्वारि कारणानि द्रष्टव्यानि ॥

Uditasya jñānasya rasādisādhāraṇye prāpte niyāmakaṁ cakṣuradhipatirbhavitumarhati. Loke niyāmakasyādhipatitvopalambhāt. Evaṁ cittacaittātmakānāṁ sukhādīnāṁ catvāri kāraṇāni draṣṭavyāni.

These four conditions are known as (1) the data, (2) the suggestion, (3) the medium, and (4) the dominant (organ). Of these, the form of blue or the like arises from the condition of blue data in the understanding in which there is a manifestation of blue or the like, which manifestation is styled a cognition. The resuscitation of forms or cognitions arises from suggestion as a condition. The restriction to the apprehension of this or that object arises from the medium, light, for instance, as a condition, and from the domi-

nant, the eye, for example, as another condition. The eye, as determinant of one particular cognition (form) where taste, etc., might have been equally cognised, is able to become dominant; for in everyday life he who determines is regarded as dominant. We must thus recognise four causes of pleasure and the rest which constitute the understanding and its modifications.

Feelings and its Five Kinds of Decline

सोऽयं चित्तचैत्तात्मकः स्कन्धः पञ्चविधो रूप-विज्ञान-वेदना-संज्ञा-संस्कारसंज्ञकः। तत्र रूप्यन्त एभिर्विषया इति रूप्यन्त इति च व्युत्पत्त्या सविषयाणीन्द्रियाणी रूपस्कन्धः । आलयविज्ञान-प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानप्रवाहो विज्ञानस्कन्धः । प्रागुक्तस्कन्ध-द्वयसम्बन्धजन्यः सुखदुःखादिप्रत्ययप्रवाहो वेदनास्कन्धः । गौरित्यादि-शब्दोल्लेखिसंवित्प्रवाहः संज्ञास्कन्धः । वेदनास्कन्ध-निबन्धना रागद्वेषादयः क्लेशाः उपक्लेशाश्च मदमानादयो धर्माधर्मौ च संस्कारस्कन्धः ॥

So'yaṁ cittacaittātmakaḥ skandhaḥ pañcavidho rūpa-vijñāna-vedanā-saṁjñā-saṁskārasaṁjñakaḥ. Tatra rūpyanta ebhirviṣayā iti rūpyanta iti ca vyutpattyā saviṣayāṇīndriyāṇī rūpaskandhaḥ. Ālayavijñāna-pravṛttivijñānapravāho vijñānaskandhaḥ. Prāguktaskandha-dvayasambandhajanyaḥ sukhaduḥkhādipratyayapravāho vedanāskandhaḥ. Gaurityādiśabdollekhisaṁvitpravāhaḥ saṁjñāskandhaḥ. Vedanāskandha-nibandhanā rāgadveṣādayaḥ kleśāḥ upakleśāśca madamānādayo dharmādharmau ca saṁskāraskandhaḥ.

So also the universe, which consists of mind and its modifications, is of five kinds, entitled (1) the sensational, (2) the perceptional, (3) the affectional, (4) the verbal, and (5) the impressional. Of these, the sensible world *(rūpa-skandha)* is the sense organs and their objects according to the etymology, viz., that objects are discriminated *(rūpyante)* by these. The perceptional world is the stream of subject-recognitions and of presentments of activity. The affectional world is the stream of feelings of pleasure and pain generated by the two aforesaid worlds. The verbal (or symbolical) world is the stream of cognitions conversant about words—the words "cow," and so forth. The impressional world is the miseries, as desire, aversion, etc., caused by the affectional world, the lesser miseries, as conceit, pride, etc., and merit and demerit.

Four Prime Truth-Suffering, its Cause, Cessation and the Way to Cessation

तदिदं सर्वं दुःखं दुःखायतनं दुःखसाधनं चेति भावयित्वा तन्निरोधोपायं तत्त्वज्ञानं संपादयेत् । अत एवोक्तम्–दुःखसमुदायनिरोधमार्गाश्चत्वार आर्यबुद्धस्याभिमतानि तत्त्वानि । तत्र दुःखं प्रसिद्धम् ॥

Tadidaṁ sarvaṁ duḥkhaṁ duḥkhāyatanaṁ duḥkhasādhanaṁ ceti bhāvayitvā tannirodhopāyaṁ tattvajñānaṁ saṁpādayet. Ata evoktaṃ–duḥkhasamudāyanirodhamārgāścatvāra āryabuddha-syābhimatāni tattvāni. Tatra duḥkhaṁ prasiddhaṃ.

Reflecting, therefore, that this universe is pain, an abode of pain, and an instrument of pain, a man should acquire a knowledge of the principles, the method of suppressing this pain. Hence, it has been said—

> "The principles sanctioned by Buddha are to the saint the four methods of suppressing the aggregate of pain."[1]

समुदायो दुःखकारणम् । तद् द्विविधं–प्रत्ययोपनिबन्धनो हेतूपनिबन्धनश्च । तत्र प्रत्ययोपनिबन्धनस्य संग्राहकं सूत्रम्—'इदं प्रत्ययफलम्' इति । इदं कार्यं ये अन्ये हेतवः प्रत्ययन्ति गच्छन्ति, तेषामवमानानां हेतूनां भावः प्रत्ययत्वं कारणसमवायः, तन्मात्रस्य फलं, न चेतनस्य कस्यचिदिति सूत्रार्थः ।

Samudāyo duḥkhakāraṇaṃ. Tad dvividhaṁ–pratyayopanibandhano hetūpanibandhanaśca. Tatra pratyayopanibandhanasya saṁgrāhakaṁ sūtraṃ–'idaṁ pratyayaphalaṃ' iti. Idaṁ kāryaṁ ye anye hetavaḥ pratyayanti gacchanti, teṣāmavamānānāṁ hetūnāṁ bhāvaḥ pratyayatvaṁ kāraṇasamavāyaḥ, tanmātrasya phalaṁ, na cetanasya kasyaciditi sūtrārthaḥ.

In these words the sense of pain is known to every one; the "aggregate" means the cause of pain. This aggregate is twofold, as (1) determined by concurrence; or (2) determined by causation. Of these, there is an aphorism comprising the aggregate determined by concurrence, "which other causes resort to this effect;" the condition of these causes thus proceeding is concurrence; the concurrence of causes is the result of this only, and not of any conscious being,—such is the meaning of the aphorism.

यथा बीजहेतुरङ्कुरो धातूनां षण्णां समवायाज्जायते । तत्र पृथिवीधातुरङ्कुरस्य

1 Cf. Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 520.—Should we read *samudāya*?

काठिन्यं गन्धं च जनयति । अब्धातुः स्नेहं रसं च जनयति । तेजोधातू रूपमौष्ण्यं च । वायुधातुः स्पर्शनं चलनं च । आकाशधातुरवकाशं शब्दं च । ऋतुधातुर्यथायोगं पृथिव्यादिकम् ।

Yathā bījaheturaṅkuro dhātūnāṁ ṣaṇṇāṁ samavāyājjāyate. Tatra pṛthivīdhāturaṅkurasya kāṭhinyaṁ gandhaṁ ca janayati. Abdhātuḥ snehaṁ rasaṁ ca janayati. Tejodhātū rūpamauṣṇyaṁ ca. Vāyudhātuḥ sparśanaṁ calanaṁ ca. Ākāśadhāturavakāśaṁ śabdaṁ ca. Ṛtudhāturyathāyogaṁ pṛthivyādikam.

To exemplify this, A germ, caused by a seed, is generated by the concurrence of six elements. Of these, earth as an element produces hardness and smell in the germ; water as an element produces viscidity and moisture; light as an element produces colour and warmth; air as an element produces touch and motion; either as an element produces expansion and sound; the season as an element produces a fitting soil, etc.

Nature of Causal Relation Between the Cause and Effect

हेतुपनिबन्धनस्य च संग्राहकं सूत्रम्—'उत्पादाद्वा तथागतानामनुत्पादाद्वा स्थितैवैषां धर्माणां धर्मता धर्मस्थितिता धर्मनियामकता च प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादानुलोमता ।' तथागतानां बुद्धानां मते धर्माणां कार्यकारणरूपाणां या धर्मता कार्यकारणभावरूपा, एषा उत्पादादनुत्पादाद्वा स्थिता । यस्मिन्सति यदुत्पद्यते, यस्मिन्नसति यन्नोत्पद्यते तत्तस्य कारणस्य कार्यम्–इति । 'धर्मता' इत्यस्य विवरणं धर्मस्थितितेत्यादि । धर्मस्य कार्यस्य कारणानतिक्रमेण स्थितिः । स्वार्थिकः तल् प्रत्ययः, धर्मस्य कारणस्य कार्यं प्रति नियामकता ।

Hetupanibandhanasya ca saṁgrāhakaṁ sūtram—'utpādādvā tathāgatānāmanutpādādvā sthitaivaiṣāṁ dharmāṇāṁ dharmatā dharmasthititā dharmaniyāmakatā ca pratītyasamutpādānulomatā.' Tathāgatānāṁ buddhānāṁ mate dharmāṇāṁ kāryakāraṇarūpāṇāṁ yā dharmatā kāryakāraṇabhāvarūpā, eṣā utpādādanutpādādvā sthitā. Yasminsati yadutpadyate, yasminnasati yannotpadyate tattasya kāraṇasya kāryam–iti. 'Dharmatā' ityasya vivaraṇaṁ dharmasthititetyādi. Dharmasya kāryasya kāraṇānatikrameṇa sthitiḥ. Svārthikaḥ tal pratyayaḥ, dharmasya kāraṇasya kāryaṁ prati niyāmakatā.

The aphorism comprising the aggregate determined by causation is: "With the Tathāgatas the nature of these conditions is fixed by

production, or by non-production; there is continuance as a condition, and determination by a condition, and conformity of the production to the cause;" that is to say, according to the doctrine of the Tathāgata Buddhas, the nature of these conditions, that is, the causal relation between the cause and effect, results from production or from non-production. That which comes into being, provided that something exists, is the effect of that as its cause; such is the explanation of the nature (or causal relation). Continuance as a condition is where the effect is not found without its cause.

नन्वयं कार्यकारणभावश्चेतनमन्तरेण न संभवतीत्यत उक्तम्–प्रतीत्येति । कारणे सति तत्प्रतीत्य प्राप्य समुत्पादेऽनुलोमता = अनुसारिता या, सैव धर्मतोत्पादादनुत्पादाद्वा धर्माणां स्थिता । न चात्र कश्चिच्चेतनोऽधिष्ठातोपलभ्यत–इति सूत्रार्थः ॥

Nanvayaṁ kāryakāraṇabhāvaścetanamantareṇa na saṁbhavatītyata uktam–pratītyeti. Kāraṇe sati tatpratītya prāpya samutpāde'nulomatā=anusāritā yā, saiva dharmatotpādādanutpādādvā dharmāṇāṁ sthitā. Na cātra kaściccetano'dhiṣṭhātopalabhyata–iti sūtrārthaḥ.

The (abstract) affix *tal* (in the word *sthititā*) has the sense of the concrete. Determination by a condition is the determination of the effect by the cause. Here some one might interpose the remark that the relation of cause and effect cannot exist apart from some conscious agent. For this reason it is added that there existing a cause, conformity of the genesis to that cause is the nature which is fixed in conditions (that is, in causes and effects); and in all this no intelligent designer is observed.[1]

प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादस्य हेतुपनिबन्धनो यथा–बीजादङ्कुरः, अङ्कुरात्काण्डं, काण्डान्नालः, नालाद् गर्भ, ततः शूकं, ततः पुष्पं, ततः फलम् । न चात्र बाह्ये

1 Cf. G.H. Lewe's *History of Philosophy*, vol.i.p. 85. "We not only see that the architect's plan determined the arrangement of materials in the house, but we see why it must have done so, because the materials have no spontaneous tendency to group themselves into houses : that not being a recognised property of bricks, mortar, wood, and glass. But what we know of organic materials is that they have this spontaneous tendency to arrange themselves in definite forms; precisely as we see chemical substances arranging themselves in definite forms without the intervention of any extra-chemical agency."

समुदाये कारणं बीजादि कार्यमङ्कुरादि वा चेतयते–'अहमङ्कुरं निर्वर्तयामि, अहं बीजेन निर्वर्तितः' इति । एवमाध्यात्मिकेष्वपि कारणद्वयमवगन्तव्यम् । 'पुरः स्थिते प्रमेयाब्धौ ग्रन्थविस्तरभीरुभिः' इति न्याये नोपरम्यते ।

Pratītyasamutpādasya hetupanibandhano yathā– bījādaṅkuraḥ, aṅkurātkāṇḍaṁ, kāṇḍānnālaḥ, nālād garbha, tataḥ śūkaṁ, tataḥ puṣpaṁ, tataḥ phalam. Na cātra bāhye samudāye kāraṇaṁ bījādi kāryamaṅkurādi vā cetayate—'ahamaṅkuraṁ nirvartayāmi, ahaṁ bījena nirvartitaḥ' iti. Evamādyātmikeṣvapi kāraṇadvayamavagantavyam. 'Puraḥ sthite prameyābdhau granthavistarabhīrubhiḥ iti nyāye noparamyate.

To illustrate this, the causal determination of a genesis to be gone through is as follows :—From the seed the germ, from the germ the stalk,from the stalk the hollow stem, from the hollow stem the bud, from the bud the spicules, from the spicules the blossom, from the blossom the fruit. In this external aggregate neiter the cause, the seed and the rest, nor the effect, the germ and the rest, has any consciousness of bringing a germ into being, or of being brought into being by the seed. In like manner in mental facts two causes are to be recognised. There is a whole ocean of scientific matter before us, but we desist, apprehensive of making our treatise unduly prolix.

Nature of Pure Cognition Suppression of fear

तदुभयनिरोधः । तदनन्तरं विमलज्ञानोदयो वा मुक्तिः । तन्निरोधोपायो मार्गः । स च तत्त्वज्ञानम् । तच्च प्राचीनभावनाबलाद्भवतीति परमं रहस्यम् । सूत्रस्यान्तं पृच्छतां कथितं–'भवन्तश्च सूत्रस्यान्तं पृष्टवन्तः, सौत्रान्तिका भवन्तु' इति । भगवताऽभिहिततया सौत्रान्तिक संज्ञा संजातेति ॥

Tadubhayanirodhaḥ. Tadanantaraṁ vimalajñānodayo vā muktiḥ. Tannirodhopāyo mārgaḥ. Sa ca tattvajñānam. Tacca prācīnabhāvanābalādbhavatīti paramaṁ rahasyam. Sūtrasyāntaṁ pṛcchatāṁ kathitaṁ—'bhavantaśca sūtrasyāntaṁ pṛṣṭavantaḥ, sautrāntikā bhavantu' iti. Bhagavatā'bhihitatayā sautrāntikasaṁjñā saṁjāteti.

Emancipation is the suppression of these two causal aggregates, or the rise of pure cognition subsequent to such suppression. The method (path, road) is the mode of suppressing them. And this method is the knowledge of the principles, and this knowledge

accrues from former ideas. Such is the highest mystery. The name Sautrāntika arose from the fact that the venerated Buddha said to certain of his disciples who asked what was the ultimate purport (*anta*) of the aphorism (*sūtra*), "As you have inquired the final purport of the aphorism, be Sautrāntikas."

Doctrine of Inferrible Sensibles

केचन बौद्धाः—बाह्येषु गन्धादिष्वान्तरेषु रूपादिस्कन्धेषु सत्स्वपि, तत्रानास्थामुत्पादयितुं सर्वं शून्यमिति प्राथमिकान्विनेयान् अचकथद्भगवान्, द्वितीयांस्तु विज्ञानमात्रग्रहाविष्टान्विज्ञानमेवैकं सदिति, तृतीयानुभयं सत्यमित्यास्थितान्विज्ञेयमनुमेयमिति, सेयं विरुद्धा भाषेति वर्णयन्तः–वैभाषिकाख्यया ख्याताः ।

Kecana bauddhāḥ—bāhyeṣu gandhādiṣvāntareṣu rūpādiskandheṣu satsvapi, tatrānāsthāmutpādayituṁ sarvaṁ śūnyamiti prāthamikānvineyān acakathadbhagavān, dvitīyāṁstu vijñānamātragrahaviṣṭānvijñānamevaikaṁ saditi, tṛtīyānubhayaṁ satyamityāsthitānvijñeyamanumeyamiti, seyaṁ viruddhā bhāṣeti varṇayantaḥ–vaibhāṣikākhyayā khyātāḥ.

Certain Bauddhas, though there exist the external world, consisting of odours, etc., and the internal, consisting of colour, etc., in order to produce unbelief in these, declared the universe to be a void. These the venerated Buddha styled Prāthamika (primary) disciples. A second school, attached to the apprehension of sensations only, maintain that sensation is the only reality. A third school, who contend that both are true (the internal and the external), and maintain that sensible objects are inferrible. Others hold all this to be absurd language (*viruddhā bhāṣā*) and are known under the designation of Vaibhāṣikas.

एषा हि तेषां परिभाषा समुन्मिषति । विज्ञेयानुमेयत्ववादे प्रात्यक्षिकस्य कस्यचिदप्यर्थस्याभावेन, व्याप्तिसंवेदनस्थानाभावेन अनुमानप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिः सकललोकानुभवविरोधश्च ।

Eṣā hi teṣāṁ paribhāṣā samunmiṣati. Vijñeyānumeyatvavāde prātyakṣikasya kasyacidapyarthasyābhāvena, vyāptisaṁvedanasthānābhāvena anumānapravṛttyanupapattiḥ sakalalokānubhavavirodhaśca.

Their technical language springs up as follows : —According to the doctrine of inferrible sensibles, there being no perceptible object, and consequently no object from which a universal rule can be at-

tained, it will be impossible that any illation should take place, and therefore, a contradiction will emerge to the consciousness of all mankind.

ततश्चार्थो द्विविधः–ग्राह्योऽध्यवसेयश्च । तत्र ग्रहणं निर्विकल्पकरूपं प्रमाणम् । कल्पनापोढत्वात् । अध्यवसायः सविकल्पकरूपोऽप्रमाणम् । कल्पनाज्ञानत्वात् । तदुक्तम्–

Tataścārtho dvividhaḥ–grāhyo'dhyavaseyaśca. Tatra grahaṇaṁ nirvikalpakarūpaṁ pramāṇaṁ. Kalpanāpoḍhatvāt. Adhyavasāyaḥ savikalpakarūpo'pramāṇam. Kalpanājñānatvāt. Taduktam—

Objects, therefore, are of two kinds, sensible and cogitable. Of these apprehension is a non-discriminative instrument of knowledge as other than mere representation; cognition which is discriminative is not a form of evidence, as being a merely ideal cognition.

Therefore, it has been said–

24. कल्पनापोढमभ्रान्तं प्रत्यक्षं निर्विकल्पकम् ।
विकल्पो वस्तुनिर्भासादसंवादादुपप्लवः ॥ इति ।

Kalpanāpoḍhamabhrāntaṁ pratyakṣaṁ nirvikalpakam,
Vikalpo vastunirbhāsādasaṁvādādupaplavaḥ. iti.

25. ग्राह्यं वस्तु प्रमाणं हि ग्रहणं यदितोऽन्यथा ।
न तद्वस्तु न तन्मानं शब्दलिङ्गेन्द्रियादिजम् ॥ इति च ।

Grāhyaṁ vastu pramāṇaṁ hi grahaṇaṁ yadito'nyathā,
Na tadvastu na tanmānaṁ śabdaliṅgendriyādijam. iti ca.

"Apprehension, exempt from ideality and not illusory, is non-discriminative. Discrimination, as resulting from the appearances of things, is without controversy an illusion."

"The perceptible evidence of things is perception : if it were aught else,"

"There could neither be things, nor evidence of things derived from verbal communication, inference, or sense."

ननु सविकल्पकस्याप्रामाण्ये कथं ततः प्रवृत्तस्यार्थप्राप्तिः संवादश्चोपपद्येयातामिति चेत्–न तद् भद्रम् । मणिप्रभाविषयमणिविकल्पन्यायेन पारंपर्येणार्थप्रतिलम्भसंभवेन तदुपपत्तेः । अवशिष्टं सौत्रान्तिकप्रस्तावे प्रपञ्चितमिति नेह प्रतन्यते ।

Nanu savikalpakasyāprāmāṇye kathaṁ tataḥ pravṛttasyārthaprāptiḥ saṁvādaścopapadyeyātāmiti cet–na tad bhadram. Maṇiprabhāviṣayamaṇivikalpanyāyena pāraṁparyeṇārthapratilambhasaṁbhavena tadupapatteḥ. Aviśiṣṭaṁ sautrāntikaprastāve prapañcitamiti neha pratanyate.

Here some one may say : If discriminative cognition be unauthentic, how is the apprehension of real objects by one energising thereon and the universal consentiency of mankind to be accounted for? Let it be replied : This question does not concern us, for these may be accounted for by the possibility of an indirect apprehension of objects, just as if we suppose the light of a gem to be a gem (we may yet handle the gem, because it underlies the light, while if we were to take nacre for silver, we could not lay hold of any silver). The rest has been fully discussed in describing the Sautrāntikas (cf.p. 27), and therefore need not here be further detailed.

Element is Absolute but Ways are Different

न च विनेयाशयानुरोधेनोपदेशभेदः साम्प्रदायिको न भवतीति भणितव्यम् । यतो भणितं बोधिचित्तविवरणे–

Na ca vineyāśayānurodhenopadeśabhedaḥ sāmpradāyiko na bhavatīti bhaṇitavyam. Yato bhaṇitaṁ bodhicittavivaraṇe–

It should not be contended that a diversity of instruction according to the disciples' modes of thought is not traditional (or orthodox); for it is said in the gloss on the Bodhacitta—

26. देशना लोकनाथानां सत्त्वाशयवशानुगाः ।
भिद्यन्ते बहुधा लोक उपायैर्बहुभिः पुनः ॥

Deśanā lokanāthānāṁ sattvāśayavaśānugāḥ,
Bhidyante bahudhā loka upāyairbahubhiḥ punaḥ.

"The instructions of the leader of mankind (Buddha) accommodating themselves to the character and disposition (of those who are to be taught),"

"Are said to be diverse in many ways, according to a plurality of methods."

27. गम्भीरोत्तानभेदेन क्वचिच्चोभयलक्षणा ।
भिन्ना हि देशनाभिन्ना शून्यताद्वयलक्षणा ॥ इति ।

Gambhīrottānabhedena kvaciccobhayalakṣaṇā,
Bhinnā hi deśanābhinnā śūnyatādvayalakṣaṇā. iti.

"For as deep or superficial, and sometimes both deep and superficial,"

"Instructions are diverse, and diverse is the doctrine of a universal void which is a negation of duality."

द्वादशायतनपूजा श्रेयस्करीति बौद्धनये प्रसिद्धम्–

Dvādaśāyatanapūjā śreyaskarīti bauddhanaye prasiddham–

It is well known in Buddhist doctrine that the worship of the twelve inner seat *(āyatana)* is conducive to felicity.

28. अर्थानुपार्ज्य बहुशो द्वादशायतनानि वै ।
परितः पूजनीयानि किमन्यैरिह पूजितैः ॥

Arthānupārjya bahuśo dvādaśāyatanāni vai,
Paritaḥ pūjanīyāni kimanyairiha pūjitaiḥ.

"After acquiring wealth in abundance, the twelve inner seats;"

"Are to be thoroughly reverenced; what use of reverencing aught else below?"

29. ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि पञ्चैव तथा कर्मेन्द्रियाणि च ।
मनोबुद्धिरिति प्रोक्तं द्वादशायतनं बुधैः ॥ इति ॥

Jñānendriyāṇi pañcaiva tathā karmendriyāṇi ca,
Manobuddhiriti proktaṁ dvādaśāyatanaṁ budhaiḥ. iti

"The five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action,"

"The common sensory and the intellect have been described by the wise as the twelve inner seats."

विवेकविलासे बौद्धमतमित्थमभ्यधायि–

Vivekavilāse bauddhamatamitthamabhyadhāyi–

The system of the Buddhists is described as follows in the *Viveka-vilāsa* :—

30. बौद्धानां सुगतो देवो विश्वं च क्षणभंगुरम् ।
आर्यसत्याख्यया तत्त्वचतुष्टयमिदं क्रमात् ॥

Bauddhānāṁ sugato devo viśvaṁ ca kṣaṇabhaṅguram,
Āryasatyākhyayā tattvacatuṣṭayamidaṁ kramāt.

"Of the Bauddhas Sugata (Buddha) is the deity, and the universe is momentarily fluxional;" —

"The following four principles in order are to be known by the name of the noble truths" :—

31. दुःखमायतनं चैव ततः समुदयो मतः ।
मार्गश्चेत्यस्य च व्याख्या क्रमेण श्रूयतामतः ॥

Duḥkhamāyatanaṁ caiva tataḥ samudayo mataḥ,
Mārgaścetyasya ca vyākhyā krameṇa śrūyatāmataḥ.

"Pain, the inner seats, and from them an aggregate is held.[1]"

"And the path (method); of all this let the explication be heard in order."

32. दुखं संसारिणः स्कन्धास्ते च पञ्च प्रकीर्तिताः ।
विज्ञानं वेदना संज्ञा संस्कारो रूपमेव च ॥

Duḥkhaṁ saṁsāriṇaḥ skandhāste ca pañca prakīrtitāḥ,
Vijñānaṁ vedanā saṁjñā saṁskāro rūpameva ca.

"Pain and the *skandhas* of the embodied one, which are declared to be five,"—

"Sensation, consciousness, name, impression, and form."

33. पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि शब्दाद्या विषयाः पञ्च मानसम् ।
धर्मायतनमेतानि द्वादशायतानि तु ॥

Pañcendriyāṇi śabdādyā viṣayāḥ pañca mānasam,
Dharmāyatanametāni dvādaśāyatāni tu.

"The five organs of sense, the five objects of sense, sound and the rest, the common sensory,"

"And (the intellect) the abode of merit,—these are the twelve inner seats."

34. रागादीनां गणो यस्मात्समुदेति नृणां हृदि ।
आत्मात्मीयस्वभावाख्यः स स्यात्समुदयः पुनः ॥

Rāgādīnāṁ gaṇo yasmātsamudeti nṛṇāṁ hṛdi,
Ātmātmīyasvabhāvākhyaḥ sa syātsamudayaḥ punaḥ.

"This should be the complement of desire and so forth, when it arises in the heart of man."

"Under the name of soul's own nature, it should be the aggregate."

35. क्षणिकाः सर्वसंस्कारा इति या वासना स्थिरा ।
स मार्ग इति विज्ञेयः स च मोक्षोऽभिधीयते ॥

1 These are not the usual four 'sublime truths;' cf. p.30.

Kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasaṁskārā iti yā vāsanā sthirā,
Sa mārga iti vijñeyaḥ sa ca mokṣo'bhidhīyate.

"The fixed idea that all impressions are momentary,"

"This is to be known as the path, and is also styled emancipation."

Sects of Bauddhas

36. प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च प्रमाणद्वितयं तथा ।
चतुष्प्रस्थानिका बौद्धाः ख्याता वैभाषिकादयः ॥

Pratyakṣamanumānaṁ ca pramāṇadvitayaṁ tathā,
Catuṣprasthānikā bauddhāḥ khyātā vaibhāṣikādayaḥ.

"Furthermore, there are two instruments of science, perception and inference."

"The Bauddhas are well known to be divided into four sects, the Vaibhāṣikas and the rest."

37. अर्थो ज्ञानान्वितो वैभाषिकेण बहु मन्यते ।
सौत्रान्तिकेन प्रत्यक्षग्राह्योऽर्थो न बहिर्मतः ॥

Artho jñānānvito vaibhāṣikeṇa bahu manyate,
Sautrāntikena pratyakṣagrāhyo'rtho na bahirmataḥ.

"The Vaibhāṣika highly esteems as object concomitant to the cognition;"

"The Sautrāntika allows no external object apprehensible by perception;"

38. आकारसहिता बुद्धिर्योगाचारस्य संमता ।
केवलां संविदं स्वस्थां मन्यन्ते मध्यमाः पुनः ॥

Ākārasahitā buddhiryogācārasya saṁmatā,
Kevalāṁ saṁvidaṁ svasthāṁ manyante madhyamāḥ punaḥ.

"The Yogācāra admits only intellect accompanied with forms;"

"The Mādhyamikas hold mere consciousness self-subsistent."

39. रागादिज्ञानसंतानवासनोच्छेदसम्भवा ।
चतुर्णामपि बौद्धानां मुक्तिरेषा प्रकीर्तिता ॥

Rāgādijñānasaṁtānavāsanocchedasambhavā,
Caturṇāmapi bauddhānāṁ muktireṣā prakīrtitā.

"All the four (sects of) Bauddhas proclaim the same emancipation,"

"Arising from the extirpation of desire, etc., the stream of cognitions and impressions."

40. कृत्तिः कमण्डलुमौण्ड्यं चीरं पूर्वाह्णभोजनम् ।
सङ्घो रक्ताम्बरत्वं च शिश्रिये बौद्धभिक्षुभिः ॥

Kṛttiḥ kamaṇḍalumauṇḍyaṁ cīraṁ pūrvāhṇabhojanam,
Saṅgho raktāmbaratvaṁ ca śiśriye bauddhabhikṣubhiḥ.

"The skin garment, the water-pot, the tonsure, the rags, the single meal in the forenoon,"

"The congregation, and the red vesture, are adopted by the Bauddha mendicants."[1]

A.E.G.

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे बौद्धदर्शनम् ॥

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1 Mādhava probably derived most of his knowledge of Buddhist doctrines from Brahmanical works; consequently some of his explanations (as, e.g., that of *samudāya* or *samudaya*, etc.) seem to be at variance with those given in Buddhist works.

CHAPTER III

THE ĀRHATA SYSTEM

Rebuttal of Momentary Spirit (Concept)

तदित्थं मुक्तकच्छानां मतमसहमाना विवसना: कथंचित्स्थायित्वमास्थाय क्षणिकत्वपक्षं प्रतिक्षिपन्ति । यद्यात्मा कश्चिन्नास्थीयेत स्थायी, तदैहलौकिकपारलौकिकफलसाधनसम्पादनं विफलं भवेत् ।

Taditthaṁ muktakacchānāṁ matamasahamānā vivasanāḥ kathaṁcitsthāyitvamāsthāya kṣaṇikatvapakṣaṁ pratikṣipanti. Yadyātmā kaścinnāsthīyeta sthāyī, tadaihalaukikapāralaukikaphalasādhanasampādanaṁ viphalaṁ bhavet.

The Gymnosophists[1] (Jainas), rejecting these opinions of the Muktakacchas,[2] and maintaining continued existence to a certain extent, overthrow the doctrine of the momentariness of everything. (They say) : If no continuing soul is accepted, then even the arrangement of the means for attaining worldly fruit in this life will be useless.

न ह्येतत्सम्भवत्यन्य: करोत्यन्यो भुङ्क्त इति । तस्माद्योऽहं प्राक् कर्म अकरवं सोऽहं सम्प्रति तत्फलं भुञ्ज इति पूर्वापरकालानुयायिन: स्थायिनस्तस्य स्पष्टप्रमाणावसिततया पूर्वापरभागविकलकालकलावस्थितिलक्षणक्षणिकता परीक्षकैरर्हद्भिर्न परिग्रहार्हा ॥

Na hyetatsambhavatyanyaḥ karotyanyo bhuṅkta iti. Tasmādyo'haṁ prāk karma akaravaṁ so'haṁ samprati tatphalaṁ bhuñja iti pūrvāparakālānuyāyinaḥ sthāyinastasya spaṣṭapramāṇāvasitatayā pūrvāparabhāgavikalakālakalāvasthitilakṣaṇakṣaṇikatā parīkṣakairarhadbhirna parigrahārhā.

But surely this can never be imagined as possible–that one should act and another reap the consequences ! Therefore as this conviction,"I who previously did the deed, am the person who now reap

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1 *Vivasanas*, "without garments."

2 "The Buddhists are also called Muktakacchas, alluding to a peculiarity of dress, apparently a habit of wearing the hem of the lower garment untucked."—*Colebrooke*

its consequences," establishes undoubtedly the existence of a continuing soul, which remains constant through the previous and the subsequent period, the discriminating Jaina Ārhats reject as untenable the doctrine of momentary existence, i.e., an existence which lasts only an instant, and has no previous or subsequent part.

Buddha's Approach Affirming Momentary Concept

अथ मन्येथा:–

Atha manyethāḥ—

प्रमाणवत्त्वादायात: प्रवाह: केन वार्यते ?

Pramāṇavattvādāyātaḥ pravāhaḥ kena vāryate ?

इति न्यायेन 'यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकम्' इत्यादिना प्रमाणेन क्षणिकताया: प्रमिततया, तदनुसारेण समानसंतानवर्तिनामेव प्राचीन: प्रत्यय: कर्मकर्त्ता, तदुत्तर: प्रत्यय: फलभोक्ता ।

Iti nyāyena 'yatsattatkṣaṇikaṃ' ityādinā pramāṇena kṣaṇikatāyāḥ pramitatayā, tadanusāreṇa samānasaṁtānavartināmeva prācīnaḥ pratyayaḥ karmakarttā, taduttaraḥ pratyayaḥ phalabhoktā.

But the opponent may maintain, "The unbroken stream (of momentary sensations) has been fairly proved by argument, so who can prevent it ? In this way, since our tenet has been demonstrated by the argument, 'whatever is, is momentary, etc.,' it follows that in each parallel line of successive experiences the previous consciousness is the agent and the subsequent one reaps the fruit.

न चातिप्रसङ्ग: । कार्यकारणभावस्य नियामकत्वात् । यथा मधुररसभावितानामाम्रबीजानां परिकर्षितायां भूमावुप्तानामङ्कुरकाण्डस्कन्धशाखापल्लवादिषु तद्द्वारा परम्परया फले माधुर्यनियम: । यथा वा लाक्षारसावसिक्तानां कार्पासबीजादीनामङ्कुरादिपारम्पर्येण कार्पासादौ रक्तिमनियम: ।

Na cātiprasaṅgaḥ. Kāryakāraṇabhāvasya niyāmakatvāt. Yathā madurarasabhāvitānāmābhrabījānāṁ parikarṣitāyāṁ bhūmāvuptānāmaṅkurakāṇḍaskandhaśākhāpallavādiṣu taddvārā paramparayā phale mādhuryaniyamaḥ. Yathā vā lākṣārasāvasiktānāṁ kārpāsabījādīnāmaṅkurādipāramparyeṇa kārpāsādau raktimaniyamaḥ.

Nor may you object that, 'if this were true, effects might extend beyond all bounds'–(i.e., A might act, and B receive the punish-

ment)—because there is an essentially controlling relation in the very nature of cause and effect. Thus, we see that when mango seeds, after being steeped in sweet juices, are planted in prepared soil, there is a definite certainty that sweetness will be found in the shoot, the stalk, the stem, the branches, the peduncle, etc., and so on by an unbroken series to the fruit itself; or again, when cotton seeds have been sprinkled with lac juice, there will be a similar certainty of finding, through the same series of shoot, etc., an ultimate redness in the cotton.

यथोक्तम्—

Yathoktaṃ—

As it has been said—

1. यस्मिन्नेव हि संताने आहिता कर्मवासना ।
फलं तत्रैव बध्नाति कार्पासे रक्तता यथा ॥

Yasminneva hi saṁtāne hi saṁtāne āhitā karmavāsanā,
Phalaṁ tatraiva badhnāti kārpāse raktatā yathā.

"In whatever series of successive states the original impression of the action was produced,"

"There verily accrues the result, just like the redness produced in cotton."

2. कुसुमे बीजपूरादेर्यल्लाक्षाद्यवसिच्यते ।
शक्तिराधीयते तत्र काचित्तां किं न पश्यसि ? ॥ इति ।

Kusume bījapūrāderyallākṣādyavasicyate,
Śaktirādhīyate tatra kācittāṁ kiṁ na paśyasi ? iti.

"When lac juice, etc., are poured on the flower of the citron, etc".

"A certain capacity is produced in it,—do you not see it?"

Rebuttal of Ibid Concept by Jainism

तदपि काशकुशावलम्बनकल्पम् । विकल्पासहत्वात् । जलधरादौ दृष्टान्ते क्षणिकत्वमनेन प्रमाणेन प्रमितं, प्रमाणान्तरेण वा । नाद्यः । भवदभिमतस्य क्षणिकत्वस्य क्वचिदप्यदृष्टचरत्वेन दृष्टान्तासिद्धावस्यानुमानस्यानुत्थानात् । न द्वितीयः। तेनैव न्यायेन सर्वत्र क्षणिकत्वसिद्धौ सत्त्वानुमानवैफल्यापत्तेः। अर्थक्रियाकारित्वं सत्त्वमित्यङ्गीकारे मिथ्यासर्पदंशादेरप्यर्थक्रियाकारित्वेन सत्त्वापादनाच्च । अत एवोक्तम्–उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सदिति ।

Tadapi kāśakuśāvalambanakalpaṃ. Vikalpāsahatvāt. Jaladharādau dṛṣṭānte kṣaṇikatvamanena pramāṇena pramitaṁ, pramāṇāntareṇa vā. Nādyaḥ. Bhavadabhimatasya kṣaṇikatvasya kvacidapyadṛṣṭacaratvena dṛṣṭāntāsiddhāvasyānumānasyānutthānāt. Na dvitīyaḥ. Tenaiva nyāyena sarvatra kṣaṇikatvasiddhau sattvānumānavaiphalyāpatteḥ. Arthakriyākāritvaṁ sattvamityaṅgīkāre mithyāsarpadanśāderapyarthakriyākāritvena sattvāpādanācca. Ata evoktaṃ—utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṁ saditi.

But all this is only a drowning man's catching at a straw, for it is overthrown by the following dilemma :—

In the example of the "cloud,"etc. (supra, p.15), was your favourite "momentariness" proved by this very proof or by some other? It could not be the former, because your alleged momentariness is not always directly visible in the cloud, and consequently, as your example is not an ascertained fact, your supposed inference falls to the ground. Nor can it be the latter—because you might always prove your doctrine of momentariness by this new proof (if you had it), and consequently your argument regarding all existence ("whatever is, is momentary,"etc.) would become needless. If you take as your definition of "existence", "that which produces an effect," this will not hold, as it would include even the bite of a snake imagined in the rope, since that undoubtedly produces the effect (of fear). Hence, it has been said that the definition of an existence is "that which possesses an origin, an end, and an (intermediate) duration."

Second Measure / Approach for Rebuttal of the Concept

अथोच्यते–सामर्थ्यासामर्थ्यलक्षणविरुद्धधर्माध्यासात्तत्सिद्धिरिति, तदसाधु । स्याद्वादिनामनेकान्ततावादस्येष्टतया विरोधासिद्धेः । यदुक्तं कार्पासादिदृष्टान्त इति, तदुक्तिमात्रम् । युक्तेरनुक्तेः । तत्रापि निरन्वयनाशस्यानङ्गीकाराच्च ।

Athocyate–sāmathryāsāmarthyalakṣaṇaviruddhadharmādhyāsāttsiddhiriti, tadasādhu. Syādvādināmanekāntatāvāda- syeṣṭatayā virodhāsiddheḥ. Yaduktaṁ kārpāsādidṛṣṭānta iti, taduktimātraṃ. Yukteranukteḥ. Tatrāpi niranvayanāśasyānaṅgīkārācca.

As for what was said (in p.16) that "the momentariness of objects

is proved by the fact that the contrary assumption leads to contradictory attributes of capacity and want of capacity existing contemporaneously," that also is wrong—for the alleged contradiction is not proved, as the holders of the Syādvāda[1] doctrine (vide infra) willingly admit the indeterminateness of the action of causes. As for what was said of the example of the cotton, that is only mere words, since no proof is given, and we do not accept even in that instance a separate destruction (at each moment).

न च संतानिव्यतिरेकेण संतानः प्रमाणपदवीमुपारोढुमर्हति । तदुक्तम्—

Na ca santānivyatirekeṇa saṁtānaḥ pramāṇapadavīmupārodhumarhati. Taduktam—

And again, your supposed continued series cannot be demonstrated without some subject to give it coherence, as has been said—

3. सजातीयाः क्रमोत्पन्नाः प्रत्यासन्नाः परस्परम् ।
व्यक्तयस्तासु संतानः स चैक इति गीयते ॥ इति ॥

Sajātīyāḥ kramotpannāḥ pratyāsannāḥ parasparam,
Vyaktayastāsu saṁtānaḥ sa caika iti gīyate. iti.

"In individual things which are of the same class or successively produced or in mutual contact, there may be a continued series; and this series is held to be one (throughout all)".

न च कार्यकारणभावनियमोऽतिप्रसङ्गं भङ्क्तुमर्हति । तथा ह्युपाध्याय बुद्ध्यनुभूतस्य शिष्यबुद्धिः स्मरेत्तदुपचितकर्मफलमनुभवेद्वा ॥

Na ca kāryakāraṇabhāvaniyamo'tiprasaṅgaṁ bhaṅktumarhati. Tathā hyupādhyāya buddhyanubhūtasya śiṣyabuddhiḥ smarettadupacitakarmaphalamanubhavedvā.

Nor is our objection obviated by your supposed definite relation between causes and effects. For even on your own admission it would follow that something experienced by the teacher's mind might be remembered by that of the pupil whom he had formed, or the latter might experience the fruits of merit which the former had acquired; and thus, we should have the twofold fault that the thing-done passed away without result, and that the fruit of the thing not done was enjoyed.

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1 In p. 26, line 3, read Syādvādinām.

तथा च कृतप्रणाशाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गः। तदुक्तं सिद्धसेनवाक्यकारेण–

Tathā ca kṛtapraṇāśākṛtābhyāgamaprasaṅgaḥ. Taduktaṁ siddhasenavākyakāreṇa—

This has been said by the author of the Siddhasenāvākya—

4. कृतप्रणाशाकृतकर्मभोगभवप्रमोक्षस्मृतिभङ्गदोषान् ।
उपेक्ष्य साक्षात्क्षणभङ्गमिच्छन्नहो महासाहसिकः परोऽसौ ॥
(वी. स्तु. 15) इति

Kṛtapraṇāśākṛtakarmabhogabhavapramokṣasmṛtibhaṅgadoṣān,
Upekṣya sākṣātkṣaṇabhaṅgamicchannaho mahāsāhasikaḥ paro'sau. (Vī. Stu.15)

"The loss of the thing done,—the enjoyment of the fruit of a thing not done,—the dissolution of all existence,—and the abolition of memory,—bold indeed is the Buddhist antagonist, when, in the teeth of these four objections, he seeks to establish his doctrine of momentary destruction!"

Dearth of "Acceptable-Costumer" Sentiments in Momentary Concept

किं च क्षणिकत्व-पक्षे ज्ञानकाले ज्ञेयस्यासत्त्वेन, ज्ञेयकाले ज्ञानस्यासत्त्वेन च ग्राह्यग्राहकभावानुपपत्तौ सकललोकयात्रास्तमियात् । न च समसमयवर्तिता शङ्कनीया । सव्येतरविषाणवत्कार्यकारणभावासम्भवेनाग्राह्यस्यालम्बनप्रत्ययत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

Kiṁ ca kṣaṇikatva-pakṣe jñānakāle jñeyasyāsattvena, jñeyakāle jñānasyāsattvena ca grāhyagrāhakabhāvānupapattau sakalalokayātrāstamiyāt. Na ca samasamayavartitā śaṅkanīyā. Savyetaraviṣāṇavatkāryakāraṇabhāvāsaṁbhavenāgrāhyasyālambanapratyayatvānupapatteḥ.

Moreover, (on your supposition of momentary existence), as at the time of the perception (the second moment), the object (of the first moment) does not exist, and similarly at the time of the object's existence the perception does not exist, there can be no such things as a perceiver and a thing perceived, and consequently the whole course of the world would come to an end. Nor may you suppose that the object and the perception are simultaneous, because this would imply that, like the two horns of an animal, they did not stand in the relation of cause and effect (as this relation necessarily involves succession), and consequently the *Ālambana,* or the ob-

ject's data (supra, p.29), would be abolished as one of four concurrent causes (*pratyaya*).[1]

Materialisation of Knowledge and the Evils

अथ भिन्नकालस्यापि तस्याकारार्पकत्वेन ग्राह्यत्वम्–तदप्यपेशलम् । क्षणिकस्य ज्ञानस्याकारार्पकताश्रयताया दुर्वचत्वेन साकारज्ञानवादप्रत्यादेशात् ।

Atha bhinnakālasyāpi tasyākārārpakatvena grāhyatvam–tadapyapeśalam. Ksaṇikasya jñānasyākārārpakatāśrayatāyā durvacatvena sākārajñānavādapratyādeśāt.

If you say that "the object may still be perceived, inasmuch as it will impress its form on the perception, even though the one may have existed in a different moment from the other," this too will not hold. For if you maintain that the knowledge acquired by perception has a certain form impressed upon it, you are met by the impossibility of explaining how a momentary perception can possess the power of impressing a form; and if you say that it has no form impressed upon it, you are equally met by the fact that, if we are to avoid incongruity, there must be some definite condition to determine the perception and knowledge in each several case.

निराकारज्ञानवादेऽपि योग्यतावशेन प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थायाः स्थितत्वात् । तथा हि प्रत्यक्षेण विषयाकाररहितमेव ज्ञानं प्रतिपुरुषमहमहमिकया घटादिग्राहकमनुभूयते, न तु दर्पणादिवत्प्रतिबिम्बाक्रान्तम् ।

Nirākārajñānavāde'pi yogyatāvaśena pratikarmavyavasthāyāḥ sthitatvāt. Tathā hi pratyakṣeṇa viṣayākārarahitameva jñānaṁ pratipuruṣamahamahamikayā ghaṭādigrāhakamanubhūyate, na tu darpaṇādivatpratibiṃbākrāntam.

Thus, by perception the abstract consciousness, which before existed uninfluenced by the external object, becomes modified under the form of a jar, etc., with a definit reference to each man's personality (i.e., I see the jar), and it is not merely the passive recipient of a reflection like a mirror.

विषयाकारधारित्वे च ज्ञानस्यार्थे दूरनिकटादिव्यवहाराय जलाञ्जलिर्वितीर्येत । न चेदमिष्टापादानमेष्टव्यम् । दवीयान्महीधरो नेदीयान्दीर्घो बाहुरिति व्यवहारस्य निराबाधं जागरूकत्वात् । न चाकाराधायकस्य तस्य दवीयस्त्वादिशालितया तथा व्यवहार इति कथनीयम् । दर्पणादौ तथानुपलम्भात् ।

1 I propose to read in p. 26, line 5, infra, *grāhyasya* for *agrāhyasya*.

Viṣayākāradhāritve ca jñānasyārthe dūranikaṭādivyavahārāya jalāñjalirvitīryeta. Na cedamiṣṭāpādānameṣṭavyam. Davīyānmahīdharo nedīyāndīrgho bāhuriti vyavahārasya nirābādhaṁ jāgarūkatvāt. Na cākārādhāyakasya tasya davīyastvādiśālitayā tathā vyavahāra iti kathanīyam. Darpaṇādau tathānupalambhāt.

Moreover, if the perception only reproduced the form of the object, there would be an end of using such words as "far", "near", etc., of the objects.[1] Nor can you accept this conclusion, "as exactly in accordance with your own views", because, in spite of all our logic, the stubborn fact remains that we do use such phrases as "the mountain is nearer" or "further", "long" or "large".

किं चार्थादुपजायमानं ज्ञानं यथा तस्य नीलाकारतामनुकरोति तथा यदि जडतामपि, तर्हि अर्थवत्तदपि जडं स्यात् । तथा च वृद्धिमिष्टवतो मूलमपि ते नष्टं स्यादिति महत्कष्टमापन्नम् ।

Kiṁ cārthādupajāyamānaṁ jñānaṁ yathā tasya nīlākāratāmanukaroti tathā yadi jaḍatāmapi, tarhi arthavattadapi jaḍaṁ syāt. Tathā ca vṛddhimiṣṭavato mūlamapi te naṣṭaṁ syāditi mahatkaṣṭamāpannam.

Nor may you say that "it is the object (which supplies the form) that really possesses these qualities of being 'further', etc., and they are applied by a fashion of speech to the perception (though not really belonging to it") – because we do not find that this is the case in a mirror (i.e., it does not become a far reflection because it represents a far object.) And again, as the perception produced by an object follows it in assuming the form of blue, so too, if the object be insentient, it ought equally to assume its form and so become itself insentient. And thus, according to the proverb, "wishing to grow, you have destroyed your root," and your cause has fallen into hopeless difficulties.

अथैतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षया ज्ञानं जडतां नानुकरोति–इति ब्रूषे, हन्त, तर्हि तस्या ग्रहणं न स्यादित्येकमनुसंधित्सतोऽपरं प्रच्यवत इति न्यायापातः ।

Athaitaddoṣaparijihīrṣayā jñānaṁ jaḍatāṁ nānukaroti—iti brūṣe, hanta, tarhi tasyā grahaṇaṁ na syādityekamanusaṁdhitsato'paraṁ pracyavata iti nyāyāpātaḥ.

If, in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that "the per-

1 As these terms necessarily relate to the perceiver.

ception does not follow the object in being insentient," then there would be no perception that the object is insentient,[1] and so, it is a case of the proverb, "While he looks for one thing which he has lost, another drops."

ननु मा भूज्जडताया ग्रहणम् । किं नश्छिन्नम्? तदग्रहणेऽपि नीलाकारग्रहणे तयोर्भेदोऽनेकान्तो वा भवेत् । नीलाकारग्रहणे चागृहीता जडता कथं तस्य स्वरूपं स्यात्? अपरथा गृहीतस्य स्तम्भस्यागृहीतं त्रैलोक्यमपि रूपं भवेत् । तदेतत् प्रमेयजातं प्रभाचन्द्रप्रभृतिभिरर्हन्मतानुसारिभिः प्रमेयकमलमार्तण्डादौ प्रबन्धे प्रपञ्चितमिति ग्रन्थभूयस्त्वभयान्नोपन्यस्तम् ।

Nanu mā bhūjjaḍatāyā grahaṇam. Kiṁ naśchinnam ? Tadagrahaṇe'pi nīlākāragrahaṇe tayorbhedo'nekānto vā bhaūet. Nīlākāragrahaṇe cāgṛhītā jaḍatā kathaṁ tasya svarūpaṁ syāt? Aparathā gṛhītasya stambhasyāgṛhītaṁ trailokyamapi rūpaṁ bhavet. Tadetat prameyajātaṁ prabhācandraprabṛtibhirarhanmatānusāribhiḥ prameyakamalamārtaṇḍādau prabhandhe prapañcitamiti granthabūyastvabhayānnopanyastam.

"But what harm will it be if there is no perception of a thing's being insentient?" (We reply), that if its being insentient is not perceived, while its blue form is perceived, the two may be quite distinct (and as different from each other as a jar and cloth), or it may be a case of "indeterminateness" (so that the two may be only occasionally found together, as smoke with fire). And again, if insentience is not perceived contemporaneously with the blue form, how could there then be conformity between them (so that both the blue and the insentience should together constitute the character of the thing?) We might just as well maintain that, on perceiving a post, the unperceived universe entered into it as also constituting its character.[2] All this collection of topics for proof has been discussed at full length by the Jaina authors, Pratāpacandra and others, in the *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa,* etc., and is here omitted for fear of swelling the book too much.

1 I correct the reading *tasyāgrahaṇam* to *tasyā grahaṇam* (*tasyā* being *jaḍatāyāḥ*).

2 i.e., if you say that the *avayava* may be not seen though the *avayavin* is seen, then I may say that the post is the *avayavin*, and the unperceived three worlds its *avayava*.

Arthat Concept—Its Easy Understanding, Its Scope

तस्मात्पुरुषार्थाभिलाषुकैः पुरुषैः सौगती गतिर्नानुगन्तव्या, अपि तु आर्हती एवार्हणीया । अर्हत्स्वरूपं च हेमचन्द्रसूरिभिराप्तनिश्चयालङ्कारे निरटङ्कि —

Tasmātpuruṣārthābhilāṣukaiḥ puruṣaiḥ saugatī gatirnānugantavyā, api tu ārhatī evārhaṇīyā. Arhatsvarūpaṁ ca hemacandrasūribhirāptaniścayālaṅkāre niraṭaṅki—

Therefore, those who wish for the summum bonum of man must not accept the doctrine of Buddha, but rather honour only the Ārhata doctrine. The Ārhat's nature has been thus described by Arhaccandrasūrī,[1] in his *Āptaniścayālaṅkāra.*

5. सर्वज्ञो जितरागादिदोषस्त्रैलोक्यपूजितः ।
यथास्थितार्थवादी च देवोऽर्हन्परमेश्वरः ।। इति ।

Śarvajño jitarāgādidoṣastrilokyapūjitaḥ,
Yathāsthitārthavādī ca devo'rhanparameśvaraḥ. iti.

"The divine Ārhat is the supreme lord, the omniscient one, who has overcome all faults, desire, etc.,—adored by the three worlds, the declarer of things as they are."

Illusions Creeping in the Hearts of Rivals about Arhat Concept

ननु न कश्चित्पुरुषविशेषः सर्वज्ञपदवेदनीयः प्रमाणपद्धतिमध्यास्ते । तत्सद्भावग्राहकस्य प्रमाणपञ्चकस्य तत्रानुपलम्भात् । तथा चोक्तं तौतातितैः:-

Nanu na kaścitpuruṣaviśeṣaḥ sarvajñapadavedanīyaḥ pramāṇapaddhatimadhyāste. Tatsadbhāvagrāhakasya pramāṇapañcakasya tatrānupalambhāt. Tathā coktaṁ tautātitaiḥ—

But may it not be objected that no such omniscient soul can enter the path of proof, since none of the five affirmative proofs can be found to apply, as has been declared by Tautātita (Bhaṭṭa Kumārila[2])?

1 I read *Arhatsvarūpaṃ Arhaccandra* in p.27, line 3, infra.

2 The following passage occurs in some part of Kumārila's writings in an argument against the Jainas. It is curious that in the *Śaṅkara-digvijaya,* chap, iv., it is mentioned that Kumārila had a little relenting towards the Jainas at the end of his life. He repented of having so cruelly persecuted them, and acknowledged that there was some truth in their teaching. *Jainagurumukhāt kaścid vidyāleśo jātaḥ.*

6. सर्वज्ञो दृश्यते तावन्नेदानीमस्मदादिभिः ।
दृष्टो न चैकदेशोऽस्ति लिङ्गं वा योऽनुमापयेत् ।।

Sarvajño dṛśyate tāvannedānīmasmadādibhiḥ,
Dṛṣṭo na caikadeśo'sti liṅgaṁ vā yo'numāpayet.

"No omniscient being is seen by the sense here in this world by ourselves or others; nor is there any part of him seen which might help us as a sign to infer his existence."

7. न चागमविधिः कश्चिन्नित्यसर्वज्ञबोधकः ।
न च तत्रार्थवादानां तात्पर्यमपि कल्प्यते ।।

Na cāgamavidhiḥ kaścinnityasarvajñabodhakaḥ,
Na ca tatrārthavādānāṁ tātparyamapi kalpyate.

"Nor is there any injunction (*vidhi*) of scripture which reveals an eternal omniscient one, nor can the meaning of the explanatory passages (*arthavāda*) be applied here."

8. न चान्यार्थप्रधानैस्तैस्तदस्तित्वं विधीयते ।
न चानुवदितुं शक्यः पूर्वमन्यैरबोधितः ।।

Na cānyārthapradhānaistaistadastitvaṁ vidhīyate,
Na cānuvadituṁ śakyaḥ pūrvamanyairabodhitaḥ.

"His existence is not declared by those passages which refer to quite other topics; and it cannot be contained in any emphatic repetitions (anuvāda), as it had never been mentioned elsewhere before."

9. अनादेरागमस्यार्थो न च सर्वज्ञ आदिमान् ।
कृत्रिमेण त्वसत्येन स कथं प्रतिपाद्यते ।।

Anāderāgagamasyārtho na ca sarvajña ādimān,
Kṛtrimeṇa tvasatyena sa kathaṁ pratipādyate.

"An omniscient being who had a beginning can never be the subject of the eternal Veda; and how can he be established by a made and spurious Veda?"

10. अथ तद्वचनेनैव सर्वज्ञोऽज्ञैः प्रतीयते ।
प्रकल्प्येत कथं सिद्धिरन्योन्याश्रययोस्तयोः ।।

Atha tadvacanenaiva sarvajño'jñaiḥ pratīyate,
Prakalpyeta kathaṁ siddhiranyonyāśrayayostayoḥ.

"Do you say that this omniscient one is accepted on his own word? How can you establish either when they thus both depend on reciprocal support?".

11. सर्वज्ञोक्ततया वाक्यं सत्यं तेन तदस्तिता ।
कथं तदुभयं सिध्येत्सिद्धमूलान्तरादृते ।।

Sarvajñoktatayā vākyaṁ satyaṁ tena tadastitā,
Kathaṁ tadubhayaṁ sidhyetsiddhamūlāntarādṛte.

"(If you say,) 'The saying is true because it was uttered by one omniscient, and this proves the Arhat's existence;' how can either point be established without some previously established foundation?"

12. असर्वज्ञप्रणीतात्तु वचनान्मूलवर्जितात् ।
सर्वज्ञमवगच्छन्तः स्ववाक्यात्किं न जानते ?

Asarvajñapraṇītāttu vacanānmūlavarjitāt,
Sarvajñamavagacchantaḥ svavākyātkiṁ na jānate ?

"But they who accept a (supposed) omniscient on the baseless word of a parviscient know nothing of the meaning of a real omniscient's words."

13. सर्वज्ञसदृशं कञ्चिद्यदि पश्येम सम्प्रति ।
उपमानेन सर्वज्ञं जानीयाम ततो वयम् ।।

Śarvajñasadṛśaṁ kañcidyadi paśyema samprati,
Upamānena sarvajñaṁ jānīyāma tato vayaṃ.

"And again, if we now could see anything like an omniscient being, we might have chance of recognising him by the (well-known fourth) proof, comparison *(upamāna)*."

14. उपदेशोऽपि बुद्धस्य धर्माधर्मादिगोचरः ।
अन्यथा नोपपद्येत सार्वज्ञ्यं यदि नाभवत् ।।

Upadeśo'pi buddhasya dharmādharmādigocaraḥ,
Anyathā nopapadyeta sārvajñyaṁ yadi nābhavat.

"And the teaching of Buddha (as well as that of Jina), which embraces virtue, vice, etc., would not be established as authoritative, if there were not in him the attribute of omniscience,[1] and so on."

1 Kumārila tries to prove that no such being can exist, as his existence

15. एवमर्थापत्तिरपि प्रमाणं नात्र युज्यते ।
उपदेशस्य सत्यत्वं यतो नाध्यक्षमीक्ष्यते ।। इत्यादि ।।

Evamarthāpattirapi pramāṇaṁ nātra yujyate,
Upadeśasya satyatvaṁ yato nādhyakṣamīkṣyate. ityādi.

As the veracity of teaching does not observe as controller, the connotative too will not stand as true here.

Resolution or Satisfication to the Illusion Caught Rivals (Critics) of Arhats Concept

अत्र प्रतिविधीयते । यदभ्यधायि 'तत्सद्भावग्राहकस्य प्रमाणपञ्चकस्य तत्रानुपलम्भात्' इति तदयुक्तम् । तत्सद्भावावेदकस्यानुमानादेः सद्भावात् । तथा हि कश्चिदात्मा सकलपदार्थसाक्षात्कारी, तद्ग्रहणस्वभावत्वे सति प्रक्षीणप्रतिबन्धप्रत्ययत्वात् । यद्यद्ग्रहणस्वभावत्वे सति प्रक्षीणप्रतिबन्धप्रत्ययं, तत्तत्साक्षात्कारि; यथा–अपगततिमिरादिप्रतिबन्धं लोचनविज्ञानं रूपसाक्षात्कारि ।

Atra pratividhīyate. Yadabhyadhāyi 'tatsadbhāvagrāhakasya pramāṇapañcakasya tatrānupalambhāt' iti tadayuktam. Tatsadbhāvāvedakasyānumānādeḥ sadbhāvāt. Tathā hi kaścidātmā sakalapadārthasākṣātkārī, tadgrahaṇasvabhāvatve sati prakṣīṇapratibandhapratyayatvāt. Yadyadgrahaṇasvabhāvatve sati prakṣīṇapratibandhapratyayaṁ, tattatsākṣātkāri; yathā–apagatatimirādipratibandhaṁ locanavijñānaṁ rūpasākṣātkāri.

We reply as follow :—As for the supposed contradiction of an Arhat's existence, derived from the failure of the five affirmative proofs,—this is untenable, because there are proofs, as inference, etc., which do establish[1] his existence. Thus, any soul will become omniscient when, (its natural capacity for grasping all objects remaining the same), the hindrances to such knowledge are done

is not established by any one of the five recognised proofs—the sixth, *abhāra*, being negative, is, of course, not applicable. I understand the last śloka as showing the inapplicability of "presumption" or *arthāpatti*. A Jaina would say, "If the Arhat were not omniscient, his words would not be true and authoritative, but we see that they are, therefore, he is omniscient." He answers by retorting that the same argument might be used to Buddha by a Buddhist; and as the Jaina himself would disallow it in that case, it cannot be convincing in his own.

1 In p.29, line 2. read *tatsadbhāvāvedakasya* for *tatsadbbhrādekasya*.

away. Whatever thing has a natural capacity for knowing any object, will, when its hindrances to such knowledge are done away, actually know it, just as the sense of vision cognises form, directly the hindrances of darkness etc., are removed.

तदग्रहणस्वभावत्वे सति प्रक्षीणप्रतिबन्धप्रत्ययश्च कश्चिदात्मा । तस्मात्सकलपदार्थसाक्षात्कारीति । न तावदशेषार्थग्रहणस्वभावत्वमात्मनोऽसिद्धम् ।

Tadagrahaṇasvabhāvatve sati prakṣīṇapratibandhapratyayaśca kaśidātmā. Tasmātsakalapadārthasākṣātkārīti. Na tāvadaśeṣārthagrahaṇasvabhāvatvamātmano'siddhaṃ.

Now there is such a soul, which has its hindrances done away, its natural capacity for grasping all things remaining unchanged; therefore, there is an omniscient being. Nor is the assertion unestablished that the soul has a natural capacity for grasping all things; for otherwise the Mīmāṁsist could not maintain that a knowledge of all possible cases can be produced by the authoritative injunction of a text,[1]—nor could there otherwise be the knowledge of universal propositions, such as that in our favourite argument.

चोदनाबलान्निखिलार्थज्ञानोत्पत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या, सर्वमनेकान्तात्मकं सत्त्वादिति व्याप्तिज्ञानोत्पत्तेश्च । 'चोदना हि भूतं भवन्तं भविष्यन्तं' सूक्ष्मं व्यवहितं विप्रकृष्टमित्येवंजातीयकमर्थमवगमयति' (मी. सू. 1.1.2शाबरभाष्य) इत्येवंजातीयकैरध्वरमीमांसाऽगुरुभिर्विधिप्रतिषेधविचारणानिबन्धनं सकलार्थविषयज्ञानं प्रतिपद्यमानैः सकलार्थग्रहणस्वभावकत्वमात्मनोऽभ्युपगतम् ।

Codanābalānnikhilārthajñānotpattyanyathānupapattyā, sarvamanekāntātmakaṁ sattvāditi vyāptijñānotpatteśca. 'Codanā hi bhūtaṁ bhavantaṁ bhaviṣyantaṁ' sūkṣmaṁ vyavahitaṁ viprakṛṣṭamityevaṁjātīyakamarthamavagamayati' (Mī. Su. 1.1.2 Śābarabhāṣya) ityevaṁjātīyakairadhvaramīmāṁsāgurubhirvidhipratiṣedhavicāraṇānibandhanaṁ sakalārthaviṣayajñāṁ pratipadyamānaiḥ sakalārthagrahaṇasvabhāvakatvamātmano'bhyupagataṃ.

"All things are indeterminate from the very fact of their existence" (and, of course, a follower of the Nyāya will grant that universal propositions can be known, though he will dispute the truth of this particular one).

1 In p. 29, line 9, for *nikhilārthajñanāt notpatty*, I propose to read *nikhilārthajñānotpattya*.

Now, it is clear that the teachers of the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā accept the thesis that the soul has a natural capacity for grasping all things; since, they allow that a knowledge embracing all things can be produced by the discussion of injunctions and prohibitions,as is said (by Śābara in his commentary on the Sūtras,i.1.2), "A precept makes known the past, the present, the future, the minute, the obstructed, the distant, etc."

न चाखिलार्थप्रतिबन्धकावरणप्रक्षयानुपपत्तिः । सम्यग्दर्शनादित्रयलक्षणस्यावरण–प्रक्षयहेतुभूतस्य सामग्रीविशेषस्य प्रतीतत्वात् । अनया मुद्रयापि क्षुद्रोपद्रवा विद्राव्याः ।

Na cākhilārthapratibandhakāvaraṇaprakṣayānupapattiḥ. Samyagdarśanāditrayalakṣaṇasyāvaraṇaprakṣayahetubhūtasya sāmagrīviśeṣasya pratītatvāt. Anayā mudrayāpi kṣudropadravā vidrāvyāḥ.

Nor can you say that, "it is impossible to destroy the obstructions which hinder the soul's knowing all things," because we (Jainas) are convinced that there are certain special means to destroy these obstructions, viz., the three ("gems"), right intuition, etc. By this charm also, all inferior assaults of arguments can be put to flight.

Repport to the Questionnaries from Naiyāyikas

नन्वावरणप्रक्षयवशादशेषविषयं विज्ञानं विशुद्धं मुख्यप्रत्यक्षं प्रभवतीत्युक्तं, तदयुक्तम् । तस्य सर्वज्ञस्यानादिमुक्तत्वेनावरणस्यैवासम्भवादिति चेत्–तन्न । अनादिमुक्तत्वस्यैवासिद्धेः । न सर्वज्ञोऽनादिमुक्तः । मुक्तत्वादितरमुक्तवत् । बद्धापेक्षया हि मुक्तव्यपदेशः । तद्रहिते चास्याप्यभावः स्यादाकाशवत् ।

Nanvāvaraṇaprakṣayavaśādaśeṣaviṣayaṁ vijñānaṁ viśuddhaṁ mukhyapratyakṣaṁ prabhavatītyuktaṁ, tadayuktaṃ. Tasya sarvajñasyānādimuktatvenāvaraṇasyaivāsaṁbhavāditi cet–tanna. Anādimuktatvasyaivāsiddheḥ. Na sarvajño'nādimuktaḥ. Muktatvāditaramuktavat. Baddhāpekṣayā hi muktavyapade- śaḥ. Tadrahite cāsyāpyabhāvaḥ syādākāśavat.

But the Naiyāyika may interpose, "You talk of the pure intelligence, which, after all hindrances are done away, sees all objects, having sense-perception at its height; but this is irrelevant, because there can be no hindrance to the omniscient, as from all eternity he has been always liberated." We reply that there is no proof of your eternally liberated being. There cannot be an omniscient who is

eternally "liberated," from the very fact of his being "liberated," like other liberated persons,—since the use of the term "liberated" necessarily implies the having been previously bound; and if the latter is absent, the former must be too, as is seen in the case of the either.

नन्वनादेः क्षित्यादिकार्यपरम्परायाः कर्तृत्वेन तत्सिद्धिः । तथा हि–क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वाद् घटवद् । तदप्यसमीचीनम् । कार्यत्वस्यैवासिद्धेः । न च सावयवत्वेन तत्साधनमित्यभिधातव्यम् । यस्मादिदं विकल्पजालमवतरति ।

Nanvanādeḥ kṣityādikāryaparamparāyāḥ kartṛtvena tatsiddhiḥ. Tathā hi–kṣityādikaṁ sakartṛkaṁ kāryatvād ghaṭavad. Tadapyasamīcīnaṃ. Kāryatvasyaivāsiddheḥ. Na ca sāvayavatvena tatsādhanamityabhidhātavyaṃ. Yasmādidaṁ vikalpajālamavatarati.

"But is not this being's existence definitely proved by his being the maker of that eternal series of effects, the earth, etc.? According to the well-known argument, 'the earth, etc., must have had a maker, because they have the nature of effects, as a jar.'" This argument, however, will not hold, because you cannot prove that they have the nature of effects. You cannot establish this from the fact of their being composed of parts, because this supposition falls upon the horns of a dilemma. Does this "being composed of parts" mean (1) the being in contact with the parts; or (2) "the being in intimate relation to the parts; or (3) the being produced from parts;" or (4) the being a substance in intimate relation; or (5) the being the object of an idea involving the notion of parts?

Five Options of Organism—Structure and their Rebuttal

सावयवत्वं किमवयवसंयोगित्वम्, अवयवसमवायित्वम्, अवयवजन्यत्वम्, समवेतद्रव्यत्वम्, सावयवबुद्धिविषयत्वं वा ?

न प्रथमः । आकाशादौ अनैकान्त्यात् । न द्वितीयः । सामान्यादौ व्यभिचारात् । न तृतीयः । साध्याविशिष्टत्वात् ।

न चतुर्थः । विकल्पयुगलार्गलग्रहगलत्वात् । समवायसम्बन्धमात्रवद् द्रव्यत्वं समवेतद्रव्यत्वमन्यत्र समवेतद्रव्यत्वं वा विवक्षितं हेतूक्रियते ?

Sāvayavatvaṁ kimavayavasaṁyogitvaṃ, avayavasamavāyitvaṃ, avayavajanyatvaṃ, samavetadravyatvaṃ, sāvayavabuddhiviṣayatvaṁ vā ?

Na prathamaḥ. Ākāśādau anaikāntyāt. Na dvitīyaḥ. Sāmānyādau vyabhicārāt. Na tṛtīyaḥ. Sādhyāviśiṣṭatvāt. Na caturthaḥ. Vikalpayugalārgalagrahagalatvāt. Samavāyasambandhamātravad dravyatvaṁ samavetadravyatvaṃanyatra samavetadravyatvaṁ vā vivakṣitaṁ hetūkriyate ?

Not the first, because it would apply too widely, as it would include either (since this, though not itself composed of parts, is in contact with the parts of other things;) nor the second, because it would similarly include genus, etc. (as this resides in a substance by intimate relation, and yet itself is not composed of parts;) nor the third, because this involves a term ("produced") just as much disputed as the one directly in question;[1] nor the fourth, because its neck is caught in the pillory of the following alternative.

आद्ये गगनादौ व्यभिचारः । तस्यापि गुणादिसमवायवत्वद्रव्यत्वयोः सम्भवात् । द्वितीये साध्याविशिष्टता । अन्यशब्दार्थेषु समवायकारणभूतेष्ववयवेषु समवायस्य साधनीयत्वात् । अभ्युपगम्यैतदभाणि । वस्तुतस्तु समवाय एव न समस्ति । प्रमाणाभावात् ।

Ādye gaganādau vyabhicāraḥ. Tasyāpi guṇādisamavāyavatvadravyatvayoḥ sambhavāt. Dvitīye sādhyāviśiṣṭatā. Anyaśabdārtheṣu samavāyakāraṇabhūteṣvavayaveṣu samavāyasya sādhanīyatvāt. Abhyupagamyaitadabhāṇi. Vastutastu samavāya eva na samasti. Pramāṇābhāvāt.

Do you mean by your phrase used above that it is to be a substance, and to have something else in intimate relation to itself, —or do you mean that it must have intimate relation to something else, in order to be valid for your argument? If you say the former, it will equally apply to ether, since this is a substance, and has its qualities resident in it by intimate relation; if you say the latter, your new position involves as much dispute as the original point, since you would have to prove the existence of intimate relation in the parts, or the so-called "intimate causes," which you mean by "something else." We use these terms in compliance with your terminology; but, of course, from out point of view, we do not allow such a thing as "intimate relation," as there is no proof of its existence.

1 *Janya* is included in *Kārya* and equally disputed.

नापि पञ्चमः । आत्मादिनानैकान्त्यात् । तस्य सावयवबुद्धिविषयत्वेऽपि कार्यत्वाभावात् । न च निरवयवत्वेऽप्यस्य सावयवार्थसम्बन्धेन सावयवबुद्धि-विषयत्वमौपचारिकमित्येष्टव्यम् । निरवयवत्वे व्यापित्वविरोधात्परमाणुवत् ।

Nāpi pañcamaḥ. Ātmādinānaikāntyāt. Tasya sāvayavabuddhiviṣayatve'pi kāryatvābhāvāt. Na ca niravayavatve'pyasya sāvayavārthasambandhena sāvayava-buddhiviṣayatvamaupacārikamityeṣṭavyaṃ. Niravayavatve vyāpitvavirodhātparamāṇuvat.

Nor can the fifth alternative be allowed, because this would reach too far, as it would include soul etc., since soul can be the object of an idea involving the notion of parts, and yet it is acknowledged to be not an effect.[1] Nor can you maintain that the soul may still be indiscerptible in itself, but by reason of its connection with something possessing parts may itself become metaphorically the object of an idea involving the notion of parts, because there is a mutual contradiction in the idea of that which has no parts and that which is all-pervading, just as the atom (which is indiscerptible but not all-pervading).

Objection on the Concept of Taking God as 'Kartā' (doer)

किं च, किमेकः कर्त्ता साध्यते, किं वाऽनेके? प्रथमे प्रासादादौ व्यभिचारः । स्थपत्यादीनां बहूनां पुरुषाणां तत्र कर्तृत्वोपलम्भात् । द्वितीये बहूनां विश्वनिर्मातृत्वे तेषु मिथो वैमत्यसम्भावनाया अनिवार्यत्वादेकैकस्य वस्तुनोऽन्यान्यरूपतया सर्वमसमञ्जसमापद्येत । सर्वेषां सामर्थ्यसाम्येनैकेनैव सकलजगदुत्पत्तिसिद्धौ इतरवैयर्थ्यं च ।

Kiṁ ca, kimekaḥ karttā sādhyate, kiṁ vā'neke ? Prathame prāsādādau vyabhicāraḥ. Sthapatyādīnāṁ bahūnāṁ puruṣāṇāṁ tatra kartṛtvopalambhāt. Dvitīye bahūnāṁ viśvanirmātṛtve teṣu mitho vaimatyasambhāvanāyā anivāryatvādekaikasya vastuno'nyānyarūpatayā sarvamasamaijasamāpadyeta. Sarveṣāṁ sāmarthyasāmyenaikenaiva sakalajagadutpatti- siddhau itaravaiyarthyaṁ ca.

1 Thus, "I am possessed of a body" (*aham Śarīrī*), "my hand," etc., are all sentences in which a predicate involving the notion of parts is applied to the soul "I".

And, moreover, is there only one maker? Or, again, is he independent ?

In the former case your position will apply too far, as it will extend erroneously to palaces, etc., where we see for ourselves the work of many different men, as carpenters, etc., and (in the second case) if all the world were produced by this one maker, all other agents would be superfluous. As it has been said in the *Vītarāgastuti*, or "Praise of Jina" –

तदुक्तं वीतरागस्तुतौ–

Taduktaṁ vītarāgastutau—

16. कर्त्तास्ति कश्चिज्जगत: स चैक:
स सर्वग: स स्ववश: स नित्य: ।
इमा: कुहेवाकविडम्बना: स्यु-
स्तेषां न येषामनुशासकस्त्वम् ॥ (वी. स्तु. 6) इति ॥

Karttāsti kaścijjagataḥ sa caikaḥ,
Sa sarvagaḥ sa svavaśaḥ sa nityaḥ,
Imāḥ kuhevākaviḍambanāḥ syu-
Steṣāṁ na yeṣāmanuśāsakastvaṃ. (Vī. Stu.6). iti

"There is one eternal maker for the world, all-pervading, independent, and true; they have none of these inextricable delusions, whose teacher art thou."

अन्यत्रापि–

Anyatrāpi—

17. कर्त्ता न तावदिह कोऽपि यथेच्छया वा
दृष्टोऽन्यथा कटकृतावपि तत्प्रसङ्ग: ।
कार्यं किमत्रभवतापि च तक्षकाद्यै-
राहत्य च त्रिभुवनं पुरुष: करोति ॥ इति ॥

Karttā na tāvadiha ko'pi yathecchayā vā,
Dṛṣṭo'nyathā kaṭakṛtāvapi tatprasaṅgaḥ,
Kāryaṁ kimatrabhavatāpi ca takṣakādyai-
Rāhatya ca tribhuvanaṁ puruṣaḥ karoti. iti.

And again –

"There is here no maker acting by his own free will, else his influence would extend to the making of a mat. What would be the use of yourself or all the artisans, if Īśwara fabricated the three worlds ?"

Axiom (Achievement) of Omniscient

तस्मात्प्रागुक्तकारणत्रितयबलादावरणप्रक्षये सार्वज्ञ्यं युक्तम् । न चास्योपदेष्ट्रन्तराभावात् सम्यग्दर्शनादित्रितयानुपपत्तिरिति भणनीयम् । पूर्वसर्वज्ञप्रणीतागमप्रभवत्वादमुष्य अशेषार्थज्ञानस्य । न चान्योन्याश्रयादिदोष: । आगमसर्वज्ञपरम्पराया बीजांकुरवदनादित्वाङ्गीकारादित्यलम् ।

Tasmātprāguktakāraṇatritayabalādāvaraṇaprakṣaye sārvajñyaṁ yuktaṃ. Na cāsyopadeṣṭṛntarābhāvāt samyagdarśanāditritayānupapattiriti bhaṇanīyaṃ. Pūrvasarvajñapraṇītāgamaprabhavatvādamuṣya aśeṣārthajñānasya. Na cānyonyāśrayādidoṣaḥ. Āgamasarvajñaparamparāyā bījāṁkuravadanāditvāṅgīkārādityalaṃ.

Therefore, it is right to hold, as we do, that omniscience is produced when the hindrances are removed by the three means before alluded to.

Nor need the objection be made that "right intuition,"etc., are impossible, as there is no other teacher to go to, – because this universal knowledge can be produced by the inspired works of former omniscient Jinas. Nor is our doctrine liable to the imputation of such faults as *Anyonyāśrayatā*,[1] etc., because we accept an eternal succession of revealed doctrines and omniscient teachers, like the endless series of seed springing from shoot and shoot from seed. So much for this preliminary discussion.

Elucidation of Tri-Gems Balanced System (Concept)

रत्नत्रयपदवेदनीयतया प्रसिद्धं सम्यग्दर्शनादित्रितयमर्हत्प्रवचनसंग्रहपरे परमागमसारे प्ररूपितम्–'सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि मोक्षमार्ग' इति (त. सू. 1/1) । विवृतं च योगदेवेन–'येन रूपेण जीवाद्यर्थो व्यवस्थितस्तेन रूपेण अर्हता प्रतिपादिते तत्त्वार्थे विपरीताभिनिवेशरहितत्वाद्यपरपर्यायं श्रद्धानं सम्यग्दर्शनम्' । तथा च तत्त्वार्थसूत्रे–तत्त्वार्थ(र्थे) श्रद्धानं सम्यग्दर्शनमिति ।

1 Reasoning in a circle. I suppose the etc. includes the *Anavasthādoṣa* or reasoning ad infinitum. He accepts the supposed fault, and holds that it is actually borne out in a case before everybody's eyes.

Ratnatrayapadavedanīyatayā prasiddhaṁ samyagdarśanāditritayamarhatpravacanasaṅgrahapare paramāgamasāre prarūpitaṁ—'Samyagdarśanajñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārga' iti (Ta. Sū. 1/1). Vivṛtaṁ ca yogadeven—'yena rūpeṇa jīvādyartho vyasthitastena rūpeṇa arhatā pratipādite tattvārthe viparītābhiniveśarahitatvādyaparaparyāyaṁ śraddhānaṁ samyagdarśanaṁ'. Tathā ca tattvārthasūtraṁ—tattvārthaṁ (thre) śraddhānaṁ samyagdarśanamiti.

The well-known triad called the three gems, right intuition, etc., are thus described in the *Paramāgamasāra* (which is devoted to the exposition of the doctrines of the Arhats)—"Right intuition, right knowledge, right conduct are the path of liberation." This has been thus explained by Yogadeva:—

(a) When the meaning of the predicaments, the soul, etc., has been declared by an Arhat in exact accordance with their reality, absolute faith in the teaching, i.e., the entire absence of any contrary idea, is "right intuition." And to this effect runs the *Tattvārtha-sūtra,* "Faith in the predicaments[1] is right 'intuition.'" Or, as another definition gives it; "Acquiescence in the predicaments declared by a Jina is called "right faith;" it is produced either by natural character or by the guru's instruction."

अन्यदपि—

Anyadapi—

18. रुचिर्जिनोक्ततत्त्वेषु सम्यक्श्रद्धानमुच्यते ।
जायते तन्निसर्गेण गुरोरधिगमेन वा ।। इति ।।

Rucirjinoktatattveṣu samyakśraddhānamucyate,
Jāyate tannisargeṇa guroradhigamena vā. iti.

परोपदेशनिरपेक्षमात्मस्वरूपं निसर्गः । व्याख्यानादिरूपपरोपदेशजनितं ज्ञानमधिगमः ।

Paropadeśanirapekṣamātmasvarūpaṁ nisargaḥ. Vyākhyānādirūpaparopadeśajanitaṁ jñānamadhigamaḥ.

"Natural character" means the soul's own nature, independent of another's teaching; "instruction" is the knowledge produced by the teaching of another in the form of explanation, etc."

[1] In p.31, line 5, infra, read *tattvārthe* for *tattvārthaṃ*.

Balanced Knowledge and its Five Features

येन स्वभावेन जीवादयः पदार्था व्यवस्थितास्तेन स्वभावेन मोहसंशयरहितत्वेनावगमः सम्यग्ज्ञानम् यथोक्तम्—

Yena svabhāvena jīvādayaḥ padārthā vyavasthitāstena svābhāvena mohasaṁśayarahitatvenāvagamaḥ samyagjñānaṁ yathoktaṃ—

(b) "Right knowledge" is a knowledge of the predicaments, soul, etc., according to their real nature, undisturbed by any illusion or doubt; as it has been said—

19. यथावस्थिततत्त्वानां संक्षेपाद्विस्तरेण वा ।
योऽवबोधस्तमत्राहुः सम्यग्ज्ञानं मनीषिणः ।।

Yathāvasthitatattvānāṁ saṁkṣepādvistareṇa vā,
Yo'vabodhastamatrāhuḥ samyagjñānaṁ manīṣiṇaḥ.

"That knowledge, which embraces concisely or in detail the predicaments as they actually are, is called 'right knowledge' by the wise."

तज्ज्ञानं पञ्चविधं मतिश्रुतावधिमनःपर्यायकेवलभेदेन । तदुक्तम्—मतिश्रुतावधि-मनःपर्याय-केवलानि ज्ञानमिति । अस्यार्थः—ज्ञानावरणश्रयोपशमे सति इन्द्रियमनसी पुरस्कृत्य व्यापृतः सन्यथार्थं मनुते सा मतिः । ज्ञानावरणक्षयोपशमे सति मतिजनितं स्पष्टं ज्ञानं श्रुतम् । सम्यग्दर्शनादिगुणजनितश्रयोप-शमनिमित्तमवच्छिन्नविषयं ज्ञानमवधिः । ईर्ष्यान्तरायज्ञानावरणक्षयोपशमे सति परमनोगतस्यार्थस्य स्फुटं परिच्छेदं ज्ञानं मनःपर्यायः । तपः क्रियाविशेषान्यदर्थं सेवन्ते तपस्विनः तज्ज्ञानमन्यज्ञानासंसृष्टं केवलम् ।

Tajjñānaṁ pañcavidhaṁ matiśrutāvadhimanaḥparyāyakevala-bhedena. Taduktaṃ–matiśrutāvadhimanaḥparyāya kevalāni jñānamiti. Asyārthaḥ–jñānāvaraṇakṣayopaśame sati indriyamanasī puraskṛtya vyāpṛtaḥ sanyathārthaṁ manute sa matiḥ. Jñānāvaraṇakṣayopaśame sati matijanitaṁ spaṣṭaṁ jñānaṁ śrutaṃ. Samyagdarśanādiguṇajanitaśrayopaśamanimittamavacchinnaviṣayaṁ jñānamavadhiḥ. Īrṣyāntarāyajñānāvaraṇakṣayopaśame sati paramanogatasyārthasya sphuṭaṁ paricchedaṁ jñānaṁ manaḥparyāyaḥ. Tapaḥ kriyāviśeṣānyadarthaṁ sevante tapasvinaḥ tajjñānamanyajñānāsaṁsṛṣṭaṁ kevalaṃ.

This knowledge is fivefold as divided into mati, śruta, avadhi,

manas-paryāya, and kevala; as it has been said, "Mati, śruta, avadhi, manas-paryāya, and kevala, these are knowledge." The meaning of this is as follows :—

1. Mati is that by which one cognises an object through the operation of the senses and the mind, all obstructions of knowledge being abolished.
2. Śruta is the clear knowledge produced by mati, all the obstructions of knowledge being abolished.
3. Avadhi is the kinowledge of special objects caused by the abolition of hindrances, which is effected by "right intuition," etc.[1]
4. Manas-paryāya is the clear definite knowledge of another's thoughts produced by the abolition of all the obstructions of knowledge caused by the veil of envy.
5. Kevala is that pure unalloyed knowledge for the sake of which ascetics practise various kinds of penance.

तत्राद्यं परोक्षं, प्रत्यक्षमन्यत् । तदुक्तम्–

Tatrādyaṁ parokṣaṁ, pratyakṣamanyat. Taduktam—

20. विज्ञानं त्वपराभासि प्रमाणं बाधवर्जितम् –
प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च द्विधा ज्ञेयं विनिश्चयात् ।। इति ।।

अन्तर्गणिकभेदस्तु सविस्तरः तत्रैवागमेऽवगन्तव्यः ।

Vijñānaṁ tvaparābhāsi pramāṇaṁ bādhavarjitam,
Pratyakṣaṁ ca parokṣaṁ ca dvidhā jñeyaṁ viniścayāt. iti.

Antargaṇikabhedastu savistaraḥ tatraivāgame'vagantavyaḥ.

The first of these (mati) is not self-cognised, the other four are. Thus, it has been said—

"True knowledge is a proof which nothing can overthrow, and which manifests itself as well as its object; it is both supersensuous and itself an object of cognition, as the object is determined in two ways."

But the full account of the further minute divisions must be got from the authoritative treatise above-mentioned.

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1 I read in p. 32, line 9, *Samyagdarśanādi* for *asamyagdarśanādi*; but the old text may mean "caused by the abolition of hindrances produced by the qualities, wrong intuition," etc.

Balanced Character and Five Great Sacrifices (Mahāvratas)

संसरणकर्मोच्छित्तावुद्यतस्य श्रद्दधानस्य ज्ञानवतः पापगमनकारणक्रियानिवृत्तिः सम्यक्चारित्रम् । तदेतत्सप्रपञ्चमुक्तमर्हता–

Saṁsaraṇakarmocchittāvudyatasya śraddadhānasya jñānavataḥ pāpagamanakāraṇakriyānivṛttiḥ samyakcāritram. Tadetatsaprapañcamuktamarhatā—

(a) "Right conduct"is the abstaining from all actions tending to evil courses by one who possesses faith and knowledge, and who is diligent in cutting off the series of actions and their effects which constitutes mundane existence. This has been explained at length by the Arhat—

21. सर्वथावद्ययोगानां त्यागश्चारित्रमुच्यते ।
कीर्तितं तदहिंसादिव्रतभेदेन पञ्चधा ।
अहिंसासूनृतास्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहाः ।।

Sarvathāvadyayogānāṁ tyāgaścāritramucyate,
Kīrtitaṁ tadahiṁsādivratabhedena pañcadhā,
Ahiṁsāsūnṛtāsteyabrahmacaryāparigrahāḥ.

"Right conduct is described as the entire relinquishment of blamable impulses; this has been subjected to a fivefold division, as the 'five vows,' ahiṁsā, sūnṛita, asteya, brahmacaryā, and aparigraha."[1]

22. न यत्प्रमादयोगेन जीवितव्यपरोपणम् ।
चराणां स्थावराणां च तदहिंसाव्रतं मतम् ।।

Na yatpramādayogena jīvitavyaparopaṇam,
Carāṇāṁ sthāvarāṇāṁ ca tadahiṁsāvrataṁ matam.

"The 'vow' of ahiṁsā is the avoidance of injuring life by any act of thoughtlessness in any movable or immovable thing."

23. प्रियं पथ्यं वचस्तथ्यं सूनृतं व्रतमुच्यते ।
तत्तथ्यमपि नो तथ्यमप्रियं चाहितं च यत् ।।

Priyaṁ pathyaṁ vacastathyaṁ sūnṛtaṁ vratamucyate,
Tattathyamapi no tathyamapriyaṁ cāhitaṁ ca yat.

---

1 Cf. the five *yamas* in the *Yogasūtras*, ii.30. Hemachandra (*Abhidhā 81*) calls them *yamas*.

"A kind, salutary, and truthful speech is called the 'vow' of *sūnṛta*. That truthful speech is not truthful, which is unkind to others and prejudicial."

24. अनादानमदत्तस्यास्तेयव्रतमुदीरितम् ।
बाह्याः प्राणाः नृणामर्थो हरता तं हता हि ते ॥

Anādānamadattasyāsteyavratamudīritam,
Bāhyāḥ prāṇāḥ nṛṇāmartho haratā taṁ hatā hi te.

"The not taking what is not given is declared to be the 'vow' of *asteya*; the external life is a man's property, and, when it is killed, it is killed by some one who seizes it."

25. दिव्यौदरिककामानां कृतानुमतकारितैः ।
मनोवाक्कायतस्त्यागो ब्रह्माष्टादशधा मतम् ॥

Divyaudarikakāmānāṁ kṛtānumatakāritaiḥ,
Manovākkāyatastyāgo brahmāṣṭādaśadhā matam.

"The 'vow' of brahmacaryā (chastity) is eighteenfold, viz., the abandonment of all desires,[1] heavenly or earthly, in thought, word, and deed, and whether by one's own action or by one's consent, or by one's causing another to act."

26. सर्वभावेषु मूर्च्छायास्त्यागः स्यादपरिग्रहः ।
यदसत्स्वपि जायेत मूर्च्छया चित्तविप्लवः ॥

Sarvabhāveṣu mūrcchāyāstyāgaḥ syādaparigrahaḥ,
Yadasatsvapi jāyeta mūrcchayā cittaviplavaḥ.

"The 'vow' of *aparigraha* is the renouncing of all delusive interest in everything that exists not; since bewilderment of thought may arise from a delusive interest even in the unreal."

Every Sacrifice (Vrat) with its Five Emotional Features

27. भावनाभिर्भावितानि पञ्चभिः पञ्चधा क्रमात् ।
महाव्रतानि लोकस्य साधयन्त्यव्ययं पदम् ॥ इति ।

Bhāvanābhirbhāvitāni pañcabhiḥ pañcadhā kramāt,
Mahāvratāni lokasya sādhayantyavyayaṁ padam. iti.

"When carried out by the five states of mind in a fivefold order, these great 'vows' of the world produce the eternal abode."

---

1 I read *kāmānāṃ* for *kāmāaṇāṃ* in p. 33, line 7(2x3x3=18).

भावनापञ्चकप्रपञ्चनं च निरूपितम्—

Bhāvanāpañcakaprapañcanaṁ ca nirūpitam—

The full account of the five states of mind (bhāvanā) has been given in the following passage (of which we only quote one śloka)

28. हास्यलोभभयक्रोधप्रत्याख्यानैर्निरन्तरम् ।
आलोच्य भाषणेनापि भावयेत्सूनृतं व्रतम् ॥

Hāsyalobhabhayakrodhapratyākhyānairnirantaram,
Ālocya bhāṣaṇenāpi bhāvayetsūnṛtaṁ vratam.

"Let him carry out the 'vow' of *sūnṛta* uninterruptedly by the abstinence from laughter, greed, fear, and anger, and by the deliberate avoidance of speech,"[1]—and so forth.

इत्यादिना । एतानि सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि मिलितानि मोक्षकारणं न प्रत्येकम् । यथा रसायनम्, तथा चात्र ज्ञानश्रद्धानाचरणानि सम्भूय फलं साधयन्ति, न प्रत्येकम् ।

Ityādinā. Etāni samyagdarśanajñānacāritrāṇi militāni mokṣakāraṇaṁ na pratyekam. Yathā rasāyanam, tathā cātra jñānaśraddhānācaraṇāni sambhūya phalaṁ sādhayanti, na pratyekam.

These three, right intuition, right knowledge, and right conduct, when united, produce liberation, but not severally; just as, in the case of an elixir, it is the knowledge of what it is, faith in its virtues, and the actual application of the medicine,[2] united, which produce the elixir's effect, but not severally.

Two Elements (Points) in Jain Tattvamīmāṁsā (Analytical Approach)

अत्र संक्षेपतस्तावज्जीवाजीवाख्ये द्वे तत्त्वे स्तः । तत्र बोधात्मको जीवः । अबोधात्मस्त्वजीवः । तदुक्तं पद्मनन्दिना ।

Atra saṁkṣepatastāvajjīvājīvākhye dve tattve staḥ. Tatra bodhātmako jīvaḥ. Abodhātmastvajīvaḥ. Taduktaṁ padmanandinā.

---

1 For *abhāṣaṇa*, see Hemach. 16.

2 I propose in p. 33, line 17, *raśāyanajñānaśraddhāvacāraṇāni* for *rasāyana jīvanaṃ śraddhānāvaraṇāni*. For *avacāraṇa*, see Suśruta, vol.ii. p.157, etc. If *anāvaraṇa* be the true reading, I suppose it must mean "the absence of obstructions."

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Here we may say concisely that the tattvas or predicaments are two, Jīva and ajīva; the soul, Jīva, is pure intelligence; the non-soul, ajīva, is pure non-intelligence. Padmanandin has thus said—

29. चिदचिद् द्वे परे तत्त्वे विवेकस्तद्विवेचनम् ।
उपादेयमुपादेयं हेयं हेयं च कुर्वतः ॥

Cidacid dve pare tattve vivekastadvivecanaṃ,
Upādeyamupādeyaṁ heyaṁ heyaṁ ca kurvataḥ.

"The two highest predicaments are 'soul' and 'non-soul;' 'discrimination' is the power of discriminating these two, in one who pursues what is to do be pursued, and rejects what is to be rejected. The affection, etc., of the agent are to be rejected; these are objects for the nondiscriminating; the supreme light (of knowledge) is alone to be pursued, which is defined as *upayoga*."

30. हेयं हि कर्तृरागादि तत्कार्यमविवेकिता ।
उपादेयं परं ज्योतिरुपयोगैकलक्षणम् ॥ इति ।

Heyaṁ hi kartṛrāgādi tatkāryamavivekitā,
Upādeyaṁ paraṁ jyotirupayogaikalakṣaṇaṃ. iti.

Upayoga (or "the true employment of the soul's activities") takes place when the vision of true knowledge recognises the manifestation of the soul's innate nature; but as long as the soul, by the bond of pradeśa and the mutual interpenetration of form which it produces (between the soul and the body), considers itself as identified with its actions (and the body which they produce), knowledge should rather be defined as "the cause of its recognising that it is other than these."[1]

सहजचिद्रूपपरिणतिं स्वीकुर्वाणे ज्ञानदर्शने उपयोगः । स परस्परप्रदेशानां प्रदेशबन्धात्कर्मणैकीभूतस्यात्मनोऽन्योन्यत्वप्रतिपत्तिकारणं भवति ।

Sahajacidrūpapariṇatiṁ svīkurvāṇe jñānadarśane upayogaḥ. Sa parasparapradeśānāṁ pradeśabandhātkarmaṇaikībhūtasyātmano'nyonyatvapratipattikāraṇaṁ bhavati.

सकलजीवसाधारणं चैतन्यम् उपशमक्षयक्षयोपशमवशात् औपशमिकक्षयात्मकक्षायौपशमिकभावेन कर्मोदयवशात्कलुषान्याकारेण च परिणतजीवपर्यायविवक्षायां

1 This is a hard passage, but some light is thrown on it by the scholiast to Hemachandra, *Abhidh*.79.

जीवस्वरूपं भवति । यदवोचद्वाचकाचार्यः—'औपशमिकक्षायिकौ भावौ मिश्रश्च जीवस्य स्वतत्त्वमौदयिकपारिणामिकौ च' (त. सू. 2/1) इति ।

Sakalajīvasādhāraṇaṁ caitanyam upaśamakṣayakṣayopaśamavaśāt aupaśamikakṣayātmakakṣāyaupaśamikabhāvena karmodayavaśātkaluṣānyākāreṇa ca pariṇatajīvaparyāyavivakṣāyāṁ jīvasvarūpaṁ bhavati. Yadavocadvācakācāryaḥ—'Aupaśamikakṣāyikau bhāvau miśraśca jīvasya svatattvamaudayikapāriṇāmikau ca'. (Ta. Sū. 2/1) iti.

अनुदयप्राप्तिरूपे कर्मण उपशमे सति जीवस्योत्पद्यमानोभाव औपशमिकः । यथा पङ्के कलुषतां कुर्वति कतकादिद्रव्यसम्बन्धादधःपतिते जलस्य स्वच्छता । (आर्हततत्त्वानुसन्धानवशाद् रागादिपङ्कक्षालनेन निर्मलतापादकः क्षायिको भावः।) कर्मणः क्षये सति जायमानो भावः क्षायिकः । यथा पङ्कात्पृथग्भूतस्य निर्मलस्य स्फाटिकादिभाजनान्तर्गतस्य जलस्य स्वच्छता । यथा मोक्षः ।

Anudayaprāptirūpe karmaṇa upaśame sati jīvasyotpadyamānobhāva aupaśamikaḥ. Yathā paṅke kaluṣatāṁ kurvati katakātidravyasambandhādadhaḥ patite jalasya svacchatā. (Ārhatatattvānusandhānavaśād rāgādipaṅkakṣālanena nirmalatāpādakaṁ kṣāyiko bhāvaḥ.) Karmaṇaḥ kṣaye sati jāyamāno bhāvaḥ kṣāyikaḥ. Yathā paṅkātpṛthagbhūtasya nirmalasya sphāṭikādibhājanāntargatasya jalasya svacchatā. Yathā mokṣaḥ.

उभयात्मा भावो मिश्रः । यथा जलास्यार्धस्वच्छता । कर्मोदये सति भवन्भाव औदयिकः । कर्मोपशमाद्यनपेक्षः सहजो भावश्चेतनत्वादिः पारिणामिकः । तदेतद्यथासम्भवं भव्यस्याभव्यस्य वा जीवस्य स्वरूपमिति सूत्रार्थः ।

Ubhayātmā bhāvo miśraḥ. Yathā jalāsyārdhasvacchatā. Karmodaye sati bhavanbhāva audayikaḥ. Karmopaśamādyanapekṣaḥ sahajo bhāvaścetanatvādiḥ pāriṇāmikaḥ. Tadetadyathāsambhavaṁ bhavyasyābhavyasya vā jīvasya svarūpamiti sūtrārthaḥ.

Intelligence (caitanya) is common to all souls, and is the real nature of the soul viewed as *pariṇata* (i.e., as it is in itself); but by the influence of upaśamakṣaya and kṣayopaśama it appears in the "mixed" form as possessing both,[1] or again, by the influence of

1 Or this may mean "by the influence of *upaśama-kṣaya* or *kṣayopaśama*, it appears characterised by one or the other."

actions as they arise, it assumes the appearance of foulness, etc.[1] As has been said by Vācakācārya [in a sūtra]—

"The *Aupaśamika*, the *Kṣāyika*, and the 'mixed' states are the nature of the soul, and also the *audayika* and the *Pāriṇāmika*."

1. The *aupaśamika* state of the soul arises when all the effects of past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise [to affect the future], as when water becomes temporarily pure through the defiling mud sinking to the bottom by the influence of the clearing nut-plant.[2] etc.

2. The *Kṣāyika* state arises when there is the absolute abolition of actions and their effects, as in final liberation.

3. The "mixed" (miśra) state combines both these, as when water is partly pure.

4. The *Audayika* state is when actions arise (exerting an inherent influence on the future). The *Pāriṇāmika* state is the soul's innate condition, as pure intelligence, etc., and disregarding its apparent states, as (1), (2), (3), (4).[3] This nature, in one of the above-described varieties, is the character of every soul whether happy or unhappy. This is the meaning of the sūtra quoted above.

तदुक्तं स्वरूपसम्बोधने–

Taduktaṁ svarūpasambodhane—

This has been explained in the Svarūpa-sambodhana—

31. ज्ञानाद् भिन्नो न नाभिन्नो भिन्नाभिन्नः कथंचन ।
ज्ञानं पूर्वापरीभूतं सोऽयमात्मेति कीर्तितः ॥ इति ।

Jñānād bhinno na nābhinno bhinnābhinnaḥ kathaṁcana,
Jñānaṁ pūrvāparībhūtaṁ so'yamātmeti kīrtitaḥ. iti.

"Not different from knowledge, and yet not identical with it,—in some way both different and the same,—knowledge is its first and last; such is the soul described to be."

---

1 I read in p. 34, line 7, *kaluśādyākāreṇa*. The *upaśamakṣaya* and *kṣayopaśama* seem to correspond to the *aupaśamika* and *kṣāyika* states about to be described.

2 Strychnos potatorum.

3 Just as in the *Sāṅkhya philosophy,* the soul is not really bound though it seems to itself to be so.

ननु भेदाभेदयोः परस्परपरिहारेण अवस्थानादन्यतरस्यैव वास्तवत्वादुभयात्मकत्वमयुक्तमिति चेत्–तदयुक्तम् । बाधे प्रमाणाभावात् । अनुपलम्भो हि बाधकं प्रमाणम् । न सोऽस्ति । समस्तेषु वस्तुष्वनेकान्तात्मकत्वस्य स्याद्वादिनो मते सुप्रसिद्धत्वादित्यलम् ।

Nanu bhedābhedayoḥ parasparaparihāreṇa avasthānādanyatarasyaiva vāstavatvādubhayātmakatvamayuktamiti cet–tadayuktaṃ. Bādhe pramāṇābhāvāt. Anupalambho hi bādhakaṁ pramāṇaṃ. Na so'sti. Samasteṣu vastuṣvanekāntātmakatvasya syādvādino mate suprasiddhatvādityalaṃ.

If you say that, "as difference and identity are mutually exclusive, we must have one or the other in the case of the soul, and its being equally both is absurd", we reply, that there is no evidence to support you when you characterise it as absurd. Only a valid non-perception[1] can thus preclude a suggestion as absurd; but this is not found in the present case, since (in the opinion of us, the advocates of the Syādvāda) it is perfectly notorious that all things present a mingled nature of many contradictory attributes.

Second Approach—Five Elements

अपरे पुनर्जीवाजीवयोरपरं प्रपञ्चमाचक्षते जीवाकाशधर्माधर्मपुद्गलास्तिकायभेदात् । एतेषु पञ्चसु तत्त्वेषु कालत्रयसम्बन्धितया अस्तीति स्थितिव्यपदेशः । अनेकप्रदेशत्वेन शरीरवत्कायव्यपदेशः ।

Apare punarjīvājīvayoraparaṁ prapañcamācakṣate jīvākāśadharmādharmapudgalāstikāyabhedāt. Eteṣu pañcasu tattveṣu kālatrayasambandhitayā astīti sthitivyapadeśaḥ. Anekapradeśatvena śarīravatkāyavyapadeśaḥ.

Others lay down a different set of tattvas from the two mentioned above, jīva and ajīva; they hold that there are five astikāyas or categories, Jīva, ākāśa, dharma, adharma, and pudgala. To all these five we can apply the idea of "existence" (asti),[2] as connected with the three divisions of time, and we can similarly apply the idea of "body"(kāya),[3] from their occupying several parts of space.

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1 A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen, and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, such as the eye, light, etc.

2 I read in p. 35, line 5, *stīti* for *sthiti*.

3 Hence, the term here used for "category"—the *astikāya*.

तत्र जीवा द्विविधाः, संसारिणो मुक्ताश्च । भवाद्भवान्तरप्राप्तिमन्तः संसारिणः । ते च द्विविधाः–समनस्का, अमनस्काश्च । तत्र संज्ञिनः समनस्काः । शिक्षाक्रियाऽऽलापग्रहणरूपा संज्ञा । तद्विधुरास्त्वमनस्काः । ते चामनस्का द्विविधाः, त्रसस्थावरभेदात् । तत्र द्वीन्द्रियादयः शङ्खगण्डोलकप्रभृतयः चतुर्विधास्त्रसाः । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुवनस्पतयः स्थावराः ।

Tatra jīvā dvividhāḥ, saṁsāriṇo muktāśca. Bhavādbhavāntaraprāptimantaḥ saṁsāriṇaḥ. Te ca dvividhāḥ—samanaskā, amanaskāśca. Tatra saṁjñinaḥ samanaskāḥ. śikṣākriyā"lāpagrahaṇarūpā saṁjñā. Tadvidhurāstvamanaskāḥ. Te cāmanaskā dvividhā, trasasthāvarabhedāt. Tatra dvīndriyādayaḥ śaṅkhagaṇḍolakaprabhṛtayaḥ caturvidhās-trasāḥ. Pṛthivyaptejovāyuvanaspatayaḥ sthāvarāḥ.

The jīvas (souls) are divided into two, the "mundane"and the "released." The "mundane" pass from birth to birth; and these are also divided into two, as those possessing an internal sense (samanaska), and those destitute of it (amanaska). The former possesses saṁjñā, i.e., the power of apprehension, talking, acting, and receiving instruction; the latter are those without this power. These latter are also divided into two, as "locomotive"(trasa), or "immovable"(sthāvara).

The "locomotive"are those possessing at least two senses (touch and taste), as shell fish, worms, etc., and are thus of four kinds (as possessing two, three, four, or five senses); the "immovable"are earth, water, fire, air, and trees[1].

तत्र मार्गगतधूलिः पृथिवी । इष्टकादिः पृथिवीकायः । पृथिवी कायत्वेन येन गृहीता सः पृथिवीकायिकः । पृथिवीं कायत्वेन यो ग्रहीष्यति स पृथिवीजीवः । एवमबादिष्वपि भेदचतुष्टयं योज्यम् । तत्र पृथिव्यादि कायत्वेन गृहीतवन्तो ग्रहीष्यन्तश्च स्थावरा गृह्यन्ते न पृथिव्यादिपृथिवीकायादयः । तेषामजीवत्वात् । ते च स्थावराः स्पर्शनैकेन्द्रियाः । भवान्तरप्राप्तिविधुरा मुक्ताः ।

Tatra mārgagatadhūliḥ pṛthivī. Iṣṭakādiḥ pṛthivīkāyaḥ. Pṛthivī kāyatvena yena gṛhītā saḥpṛthivīkāyikaḥ. Pṛthivīṁ kāyatvena yo grahīṣyati saḥ pṛthivījīvaḥ. Evamabādiṣvapi bhedacatuṣṭayaṁ

1 These (by Hemach. *Abhidh.* 21), possess only one sense—touch. In p.35, line 10, I read *śaṅkhagaṇḍolakaprabhṛtayas trasāś caturvidhāḥ pṛthivyaptejo.*

yojyaṃ. Tatra pṛthivyādi kāyatvena gṛhītavanto grahīṣyantaśca sthāvarā gṛhyante na pṛthivyadipṛthivīkāyādayaḥ. Teṣāmajīvatvāt. Te ca sthāvarāḥ sparśanaikendriyāḥ. Bhavāntaraprāptividhurā muktāḥ.

But here a distinction must be made. The dust of the road is properly "earth," but bricks, etc.. are aggregated "bodies of earth,"and that soul by whom this body is appropriated becomes "earthen-bodied,"and that soul which will hereafter appropriate it is the "earth-soul." The same four divisions must also be applied to the others, water, etc. Now, the Souls which have appropriated or will appropriate the earth, etc., as their bodies, are reckoned as "immovable;" but earth, etc., and the "bodies of earth,"etc., are not so reckoned, because they are inanimate.[1] These other immovable things, and such as only possess the one sense of touch, are considered as "released,"since they are incapable of passing into any other state of existence.

धर्माधर्माकाशास्तिकायाः ते एकत्वशालिनो निष्क्रियाश्च द्रव्यस्य देशान्तरप्राप्तिहेतवः । तत्र धर्माधर्मौ प्रसिद्धौ । आलोकेनावच्छिन्ने नभसि लोकाकाशपदवेदनीये तयोः सर्वत्रावस्थितिः । गतिस्थित्युपग्रहो धर्माधर्मयोरुपकारः । अतएव धर्मास्तिकायः प्रवृत्त्यनुमेयः । अधर्मास्तिकायः स्थित्यनुमेयः । अन्यवस्तुप्रदेशमध्येऽन्यस्य वस्तुनः प्रवेशोऽवगाहः । तदाकाशकृत्यम् ।

Dharmādharmākāśāstikāyāḥ te ekatvaśālino niṣkriyāśca dravyasya deśāntaraprāptihetavaḥ. Tatra dharmādharmau prasiddhau. Ālokenāvacchinne nabhasi lokākāśapadavedanīye tayoḥ sarvatrāvasthitiḥ. Gatisthityupagraho dharmādharmayorupakāraḥ. Ataeva dharmāstikāyaḥ pravṛttyanumeyaḥ. Adharmāstikāyaḥ sthityanumeyaḥ. Anyavastupradeśamadhye'nyasya vastunaḥ praveśo'vagāhaḥ. Tatākāśakṛtyaṃ.

Dharma, adharma, and ākāśa are singular categories (and not generic), and they have not the attribute of "action," but they are causes of a substance's change of place.

Dharma, "merit," and adharma, "demerit," are well known. They assist souls in progressing or remaining stationary in the univer-

1 In p.35, line 16, I read *teṣāṁ ajīvatvāt* for *teṣāṃ jivatvāt*. If we keep the old reading we must translate it, "because the former only are animate."

sally extended[1] sky (or ether) characterised by light, and also called Lokākāśa; hence the presence of the category "merit" is to be inferred from progress, that of "demerit" from stationariness. The effect of ākāśa is seen when one thing enters into the space previously occupied by another.

स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णवन्तः पुद्गलाः (त. सू. 5/24) । ते च द्विविधाः—अणवः स्कन्धाश्च । भोक्तुमशक्या अणवः । द्व्यणुकादयः स्कन्धाः । तत्र द्व्यणुकादिस्कन्धभेदात् अण्वादिरुत्पद्यते । अण्वादिसङ्घाताद् द्व्यणुकादिरुत्पद्यते । क्वचिद् भेदसङ्घाताभ्यां स्कन्धोत्पत्तिः (त. सू. 5/26) । अतएव पूरयन्ति गलन्तीति पुद्गलाः ।

Sparśarasagandhavarṇavantaḥ pudgalāḥ (Ta. Sū. 5/24). Te ca dvividhāḥ aṇavaḥ skandhāśca. Bhoktumaśakyā aṇavaḥ. Dvyaṇukādayaḥ skandhāḥ. Tatra dvyaṇukādiskandhabhedāt aṇvādirutpadyate. Aṇvādisaṅghātād dvyaṇukādirutpadyate. Kvacid bhedasaṅghātābhyāṁ skandhotpattiḥ (Ta. Sū. 5/26). Ataeva pūrayanti galantīti pudgalāḥ.

Pudgala, "body," possesses touch, taste, and colour. Bodies are of two kinds, atomic and compound. Atoms cannot be enjoyed;[2] the compounds are the binary and other combinations. Atoms are produced by the separation of these binary and other compounds, while these arise from the conjunction of atoms. Compounds sometimes arise from separation and conjunction (combined); hence they are called pudgalas, because they "fill" (pūr), and "dissolve"(gal).

Time is also a Matter

कालस्यानेकप्रदेशत्वाभावेन अस्तिकायत्वाभावेऽपि द्रव्यत्वमस्ति । तल्लक्षणयोगात् । तदुक्तं–गुणपर्यायवद् द्रव्यम् (त. सू. 5/38) । इति । द्रव्याश्रया निर्गुणा गुणाः (त.सू. 5/39) । यथा जीवस्य ज्ञानत्वादिधर्मरूपाः, पुद्गलस्य रूपत्वादिसामान्यस्वभावाः । धर्माधर्माकाशकालानां यथासम्भवं गतिस्थित्यवगाहवर्तनाहेतुत्वादिसामान्यानि गुणाः ।

1 In p.35, line 3 from bottom, I read *sarvatrāvasthite* for *sarvatrāvasthiti*. In the preceding line I read *ālokenāvacchinne* for *ālokenāvicchinne*.

2 Cf. *Siddhānta-muktāvali*, p. 27. The *viṣaya* is *upabhoga-sādhanaṃ*, but it begins with the *dvyaṇuka*. This category takes up the forms of *sthāvara* which were excluded from jīva.

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Kālasyānekapradeśatvābhāvena astikāyatvābhāve'pi dravyatvamasti. Tallakṣaṇayogāt. Taduktam—guṇaparyāyavad dravyaṁ (Ta. Sū. 5/38) iti. Dravyāśrayā nirguṇā guṇā (Ta. Sū. 5/39). Yathā jīvasya jñānatvādidharmarūpāḥ, pudgalasya rūpatvādisāmānyasvabhāvāḥ. Dharmādharmākāśakālānāṁ yathāsambhavaṁ gatisthityavagāhavartanāhetutvādisāmānyāni guṇāḥ.

Although "time" is not properly an *astikāya*, because it does not occupy many separate parts of space (as mentioned in the definition), still it is a dravya (or tattva), as the definition will hold; "substance" (dravya) possesses "qualities and action."[1] Qualities reside in substance but do not themselves possess qualities, as the general qualities, knowledge, etc., of the jīva, form, etc., of the body, and the power of causing progress, stationariness, and motion into a place previously occupied, in the case respectively of "merit,""demerit," and ākāśa.

तस्य द्रव्यस्योक्तरूपेण भवनं पर्यायः । उत्पादस्तद्भावः परिणामः पर्याय इति पर्यायाः। यथा जीवस्य घटादिज्ञानसुखक्लेशादयः । पुद्गलस्य मृत्पिण्डघटादयः । धर्मादीनां गत्यादिविशेषाः । अतएव षड् द्रव्याणीति प्रसिद्धिः ।

Tasya dravyasyoktarūpeṇa bhavanaṁ paryāyaḥ. Utpādastadbhāvaḥ pariṇāmaḥ paryāya iti paryāyāḥ. Yathā jīvasya ghaṭādijñānasukhakleśādayaḥ. Pudgalasya mṛtpiṇḍaghaṭādayaḥ. Dharmādīnāṁ gatyādiviśeṣāḥ. Ataeva ṣaḍ dravyāṇīti prasiddhiḥ.

"Action" (paryāya) has thus been defined; the actions (paryāyāḥ) of a substance are, as has been said, its existence, its production, its being what it is, its development, its course of the end, as, e.g., in the jīva, the knowledge of objects, as of a jar, etc. happiness, pain, etc., in the pudgala, the lump of clay, the jar, etc. in merit and demerit, the special functions of progress, etc.Thus there are six substances or tattvas (i.e., the five above mentioned and "time").

1 It is an interesting illustration how thoroughly Mādhava for the time throws himself into the Jaina system which he is analysing, when we see that he gives the Jaina terminology for this definition of dravya,—cf. *Vaiśeṣ. Sūtra*, i.i,15. *Paryāya* is explained as *karman* in Hemach. *Anek. Paryāya*, in p.36, line 11 (infra, p. 53, line 9), seems used in a different sense from that which it bears elsewhere. I have taken it doubtingly as in Hemach. *Abhidh* 1503, *paryāyo'nukramaḥ kramaḥ*.

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Seven Elements—A Third Approach

केचन सप्त तत्त्वानीति वर्णयन्ति । तदाह–जीवाजीवास्रवबन्धसम्वर-निर्जरमोक्षास्तत्त्वानि (त. सू. 1/4) इति । तत्र जीवाजीवौ निरूपितौ । आस्रवो निरूप्यते–औदारिकादिकायादिचलनद्वारेण आत्मनश्चलनं योगपदवेदनीयमास्रवः । यथा सलिलावगाहि द्वारं जलाद्यास्रवणकारणत्वादास्रव इति निगद्यते, तथा योगप्रणाडिकया कर्मास्रवतीति स योग आस्रवः ।

Kecana sapta tattvānīti varṇayanti. Tadāha—Jīvājīvāsravabandhasamvaranirjaramokṣāstattvāni (Ta. Sū. 1/4) iti. Tatra jīvājīvau nirūpitau. Āsravo nirūpyate—Audārikādikāyādicalanadvāreṇa ātmanaścalanaṁ yogapadavedanīyamāsravaḥ. Yathā salilāvagāhi dvāraṁ jalādyāsravaṇakāraṇatvādāsrava iti nigadyate, tathā yogapraṇāḍikayā karmāsravatīti sa yoga āsravaḥ.

Others rockon the tattvas as seven, as has been said—

"The tattvas are *jīva, ajīva, āsrava, bandha, samvara, nirjarā,* and *mokṣa.*" *jīva* and *ajīva* have been already described. *Āsrava* is described as the movement of the soul called yoga,[1] through its participation in the movement of its various bodies, *audārika*, etc. As a door opening into the water is called *āsrava*, because it causes the stream to descend through it,[2] so this yoga is called *āsrava*, because by it as by a pipe actions and their consequences flow in upon the soul.

यथार्द्रं वस्त्रं समन्ताद्वातानीतं रेणुजातमुपादत्ते, तथा कषायजलार्द्र आत्मा योगानीतं कर्म सर्वप्रदेशैर्गृह्णाति । यथा वा निष्टप्तायःपिण्डो जले क्षिप्तोऽम्भः समन्ताद् गृह्णाति, तथा कषायोष्णो जीवो योगानीतं कर्म समन्तादादत्ते । कषति = हिनस्ति आत्मानं कुगतिप्रापणादिति कषायः, क्रोधो मानो माया लोभश्च ।

Yathārdraṁ vastraṁ samantādvātānītaṁ reṇujātamupādatte, tathā kaṣāyajalārdra ātmā yogānītaṁ karma sarvapradeśairgṛhṇāti. Yathā vā niṣṭaptāyaḥpiṇḍo jale kṣipto'mbhaḥ samantād gṛhṇāti, tathā kaṣāyoṣṇo jīvo yogānītaṁ karma samantādādatte. Kaṣati=hinasti ātmānaṁ kugatiprāpaṇāditi kaṣāyaḥ:, krodho māno māyā lobhaśca.

Or, as a wet garment collects the dust brought to it from every side

1 Yoga seems to be here the natural impulse of the soul to act.
2 In line 18, read *āsravaṇakāraṇatvād*.

by the wind, so the soul, wet with previous sins, collects, by its manifold points of contact with the body, the actions which are brought to it by yoga. Or as, when water is thrown on a heated lump of iron, the iron absorbs the water altogether, so the *jīva*, heated by previous sins, receives from every side the actions which are brought by yoga. *Kaṣāya* ("sin," "defilement") is so called because it "hurts" (*kaṣ*) the soul by leading it into evil states; it comprises anger, pride, delusion, and lust.

सः द्विविधः शुभाशुभभेदात् । अत्राहिंसादिः शुभः काययोगः । सत्यंमितहितभाषणादिः शुभो वाग्योगः । अर्हत्सिद्धाचार्योपाध्यायसाधुनामधे-यपञ्चपरमेष्ठिभक्तितपोरुचिश्रुतविनयादिः शुभो मनोयोगः । एतद्विपरीतस्त्वशुभः त्रिविधो योगः ।

Saḥ dvividhaḥ śubhāśubhabhedāt. Atrāhiṁsādiḥ śubhaḥ kāyayogaḥ. Satyaṁmitahitabhāṣaṇādiḥ śubho vāgyogaḥ. Arhatsiddhācāryopādhyāyasādhunāmadheyapañcaparameṣṭhi-bhaktitaporuciśrutavinayādiḥ śubho manoyogaḥ. Etadviparīta-stvaśubhaḥ trividho yogaḥ.

Āsrava is twofold, as good or evil. Thus, abstaining from doing injury is a good yoga of the body; speaking what is true, measured, and profitable is a good yoga of the speech.

तदेतदास्रवभेदजातं, 'कायवाङ्मनःकर्मयोगः । स आस्रवः । शुभः पुण्यस्य । अशुभः पापस्य' (त. सू. 6/1-4) इत्यादिना सूत्रसन्दर्भेण ससंरम्भमभाणि ।

Tadetadāsravabhedajātaṁ, 'kāyavāṅmanaḥkarmayogaḥ. Sa āsravaḥ. Śubhaḥ puṇyasya. Aśubhaḥ pāpasya' (Ta. Sū. 6/1-4) ityādinā sūtrasandarbheṇa sasaṁrambhamabhāṇi.

These various sub-divisions of *āsrava* have been described at length in several *Sūtras*. "*Āsrava* is the impulse to action with body, speech, or mind, and it is good or evil as it produces merit or demerit," etc.

अपरे त्वेवं मेनिरे–आस्रवयति पुरुषं विषयेष्विन्द्रियप्रवृत्तिरास्रवः । इन्द्रियद्वारा हि पौरुषं ज्योतिः विषयान्स्पृशद् रूपादिज्ञानरूपेण परिणमत इति ।

Apare tvevaṁ menire—Āsravayati puruṣaṁ viṣayeṣvindriyapravṛttirāsravaḥ. Indriyadvārā hi pauruṣaṁ jyotiḥ viṣayānspṛśad rūpādijñānarūpeṇa pariṇamata iti.

Others, however, explain it thus:—"*Āsrava* is the action of the senses which impels the soul towards external objects; the light of

the soul, coming in contact with external by objects means of the senses, becomes developed as the knowledge of form, etc."[1]

Explanatory View of the Bandh (Binding)

मिथ्यादर्शनाविरतिप्रमादकषायवशाद्योगवशाच्चात्मा सूक्ष्मैकक्षेत्रावगाहिनामनन्तप्रदेशानां पुद्गलानां कर्मबन्धयोग्यानामादानमुपश्लेषणं यत्करोति स बन्धः । तदुक्तं– सकषायत्वाज्जीवः कर्मभावयोग्यान्पुद्गलानादत्ते स बन्धः । (त. सू. 8/2) इति ।

Mithyādarśanāviratipramādakaṣāyavaśādyogavaśāccātmā sūkṣmaikakṣetrāvagāhināmanantapradeśānāṁ pudgalānāṁ karmabandhayogyānāmādānamupaśleṣaṇaṁ yatkaroti sa bandhaḥ. Taduktaṁ—sakaṣāyatvājjīvaḥ karmabhāvayogyānpudgalānādatte sa bandhaḥ (Ta. Sū. 8/2). iti.

Bandha, "bondage, is when the soul, by the influence of "false intuition,"non-indifference,"carelessness," and "sin (*kaṣāya*), and also by the force of yoga, assumes various bodies occupying many parts of space, which enter into its own subtile body, and which are suited to the bond of its previous actions. As has been said–

Reasons for the Ties and Bindings

तत्र कषायग्रहणं सर्वबन्धहेतूपलक्षणार्थम् । बन्धहेतून्पपाठ वाचकाचार्यः मिथ्यादर्शनाविरतिप्रमादकषाययोगा बन्धहेतवः (त. सू. 8/1) इति ।

Tatra kaṣāyagrahaṇaṁ sarvabandhahetūpalakṣaṇārtham. Bandhahetūnpapāṭha vācakācāryaḥ mithyādarśanāviratipramādakaṣāyayogā bandhahetavaḥ (Ta. Sū. 8/1) iti.

"Through the influence of sin the individual soul assumes bodies suitable to its past actions, this is, 'bondage.'"

In this quotation the word "sin" (*kaṣāya*) is used to include the other three causes of bondage as well as that properly so termed. Vācakācārya has thus enumerated the causes of bondage : "The causes of bondage are false intuition, non-indifference, carelessness, and sin."

मिथ्यादर्शनः द्विविधं–मिथ्याकर्मोदयात्परोपदेशानपेक्षं तत्त्वाश्रद्धानं नैसर्गिकमेकम् । अपरं परोपदेशजम् । पृथिव्यादिषट्कोपादानं षडिन्द्रियासंयमनं चाविरतिः ।

1 The *jñāna* is one, but it becomes apparently manifold by its connection with the senses and external objects.

पञ्चसमितित्रिगुप्तिष्वनुत्साहः प्रमादः । कषायः क्रोधादिः । तत्र कषायान्ताः स्थित्यनुभवबन्धहेतवः प्रकृतिप्रदेशबन्धहेतुर्योग इति विभागः ।

Mithyādarśanaṁ dvividhaṁ—mithyākarmodayātparopadeśānapekṣaṁ tattvāśraddhānaṁ naisargikamekam. Aparaṁ paropadeśajam. Pṛthivyādiṣaṭkopādānaṁ ṣaḍindriyāsaṁyamanaṁ cāviratiḥ. Pañcasamititriguptiṣvanutsāhaḥ pramādaḥ. Kaṣāyaḥ krodhādiḥ. Tatra kaṣāyāntāḥ sthityanubhavabandhahetavaḥ prakṛtipradeśabandhaheturyoga iti vibhāgaḥ.

(a) "False intuition" is twofold,—either innate from one's natural character, as when one disbelieves Jaina doctrines from the influence of former evil actions, irrespectively of another's teaching,—or derived, when learned by another's teaching.

(b) "Non-indifference" is the non-restraint of the five sense, and the internal organ from the set of six, earth, etc.

(c) "Carelessness" (pramāda) is a want of effort to practise the five kinds of samiti, gupti, etc.

(d) "Sin" consists of anger, etc. Here we must make the distinction that the four things, false intuition, etc., cause those kinds of bondage called *sthiti* and *anubhāva*; yoga (or ásrava) causes those kinds called *prakṛti* and *pradeśa*.

Species of Binding Liability

बन्धश्चतुर्विध इत्युक्तं, प्रकृतिस्थित्यनुभवप्रदेशास्तद्विधयः (त. सू. 8/3) इति । यथा निम्बगुडादेस्तिक्तत्वमधुरत्वादिस्वभाव एवमावरणीयस्य ज्ञानदर्शनावरणत्वम् आदित्यप्रभाच्छादकाम्भोधरवत्प्रदीपप्रभातिरोधायककुम्भवच्च । सदसद्वेदनीयस्य सुखदुःखोत्पादकत्वमसिधारामधुलेहनवत् ।

Bandhaścaturvidha ityuktaṁ, prakṛtisthityanubhavapradeśāstadvidhayaḥ (Ta. Sū. 8/3) iti. Yathā nimbaguḍādestiktatvamadhuratvādisvabhāva evamāvaraṇīyasya jñānadarśanāvaraṇatvam ādityaprabhācchādakāmbhodharavatpradīpaprabhātirodhāyakakumbhavacca. Sadasadvedanīyasya sukhaduḥkhotpādakatvamasidhārāmadhulehanavat.

दर्शने मोहनीयस्य तत्त्वार्थाश्रद्धानकारित्वं दुर्जनसङ्गवत् । चारित्रे मोहनीयस्यासंयमहेतुत्वं मद्यमदवत् । आयुषो देहबन्धनकर्तृकं जलवत् । नाम्नो विचित्रनामकारित्वं चित्रिकवत् । गोत्रस्योच्चनीचकारित्वं कुम्भकारवत् । दानादीनां विघ्ननिदानत्वमन्तरायस्य स्वभावः कोषाध्यक्षवत् ।

Darśane mohanīyasya tattvārthāśraddhānakāritvaṁ durjanasaṅgavat. Cāritre mohanīyasyāsaṁyamahetutvaṁ madyamadavat. Āyuṣo dehabandhanakartṛkaṁ jalavat. Nāmno vicitranāmakāritvaṁ citrikavat. Gotrasyoccanīcakāritvaṁ kumbhakāravat. Dānādīnāṁ vighnanidānatvamantarāyasya svabhāvaḥ koṣādhyakṣavat.

"Bondage" is fourfold, as has been said : "*Prakṛti*, *sthiti*, *anubhāva*, and *pradeśa* are its four kinds."

1. *Prakṛti* means "the natural qualities," as bitterness or sweetness in the vimba plant or molasses. This may be subdivided into eight *mūla-prakṛtis*.[1]

Thus obstructions (*āvaraṇa*)[2] cloud the knowledge and intuition, as a cloud obscures the sun or a shade the lamp. This is (a) *jñānāvaraṇa*, or (b) *darśanāvaraṇa*, (c) An object recognised as simultaneously existing or non-existing produces mingled pleasure and pain, as licking honey from a sword's edge,—this is vedanīya, (d) A delusion (mohanīya) in intuition produces want of faith in the Jaina categories, like association with the wicked; delusion in conduct produces want of self-restraint, like intoxication, (e) Āyus produces the bond of body, like a snare,[3] (f) Nāman, or "the name," produces various individual appellations, as a painter paints his different pictures, (g) Gotra produces the idea of noble and ignoble, as the potter fashions his pots, (h) *Antarāya* produces obstacles to liberality, etc., as the treasurer hinders the king by considerations of economy.

Thus is the *Prakṛti-bandha* eightfold, being denominated as the eight *mūla-prakṛtis*, with sub-divisions according to the different actions of the various subject-matter.

सोऽयं प्रकृतिबन्धोऽष्टविधो द्रव्यकर्मावान्तरभेदमूलप्रकृतिवेदनीयः । तथावोचदुमास्वातिवाचकाचार्यः — आद्योज्ञानदर्शनावरणवेदनीयमोहनीयायुर्नामगोत्रान्तरायाः (त. सू. 8/4) इति ।

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1 These are also called the eight *karmans* in Govindānanda's gloss, *Ved. Sūt.*, ii. 2,33.

2 The Calcutta MS. reads *ādaraṇīyasya* for *āvaraṇīyasya*, in p.37, last line. But *āvaraṇīya* may be used for *āvaraṇa* (*Pāṇ*. iii. 4,68). Cf. *Yoga Sūt.*, ii.52, where Vyāsa's Comm. has *āvaraṇiya*.

3 Jālavat ? The printed text has *jalavat*.

तद्भेदं च समगृह्णात्पञ्च-नव-द्व्यष्टाविंशति-चतुर्द्विचत्वारिंशद्-द्वि-पञ्चभेदा यथाक्रमम् (त. सू. 8/5) इति । एतच्च सर्वं विद्यानन्दादिभिर्विवृतमिति विस्तरभयान्न प्रस्तूयते ।

So'yaṁ prakṛtibandho'ṣṭavidho dravyakarmāvāntarabhedamūlaprakṛtivedanīyaḥ. Tathāvocadumāsvātivācakācāryaḥ— ādyojñānadarśanāvaraṇavedanīyamohanīyāyurnāmagotrāntarāyāḥ (Ta. Sū. 8/4) iti.

Tadbhedaṁ ca samagṛhṇātpañca-nava-dvyaṣṭāviṁśati-caturdvicatvāriṁśad-dvi-pañcabhedā yathākramaṃ (Ta. Sū. 8/5) iti. Etacca sarvaṁ vidyānandādibhirvivṛtamiti vistarabhayānna prastūyate.

And thus has Umāsvāti Vācakācārya[1] declared : "The first kind of bandha consists of obstructions of the knowledge and the intuition, *vedanīya, mohanīya, āyus, nāman, gotra,* and *antarāya*" and he has also reckoned up the respective sub-divisions of each as five, nine, twenty-eight, four, two, forty, two, and fifteen. All this has been explained at full length in the Vidyānanda and other works, and here is omitted through fear of prolixity.

यथाऽजागोमहिष्यादिक्षीराणामेतावन्तमनेहसं माधुर्यस्वभावादप्रच्युतिस्तथा ज्ञानावरणादीनां मूलप्रकृतीनामादितस्तिसृणामन्तरायस्य च त्रिंशत्सागरोपमकोटिकोट्यः परा स्थितिः (त. सू. 8/14) इत्याद्युक्तकाला दुर्दान्तवत्स्वीयस्वभावादप्रच्युतिः स्थितिः ।

Yathā'jāgomahiṣyādikṣīrāṇāmetāvantamanehasaṁ mādhuryasvabhāvādapracyutistathā jnānāvaraṇādīnāṁ mūlaprakṛtīnāmāditastisṛṇāmantarāyasya ca triṁśatsāgaropamakoṭikoṭyaḥ parā sthitiḥ (Ta. Sū. 8/14). Ityādyuktakālā durdāntavatsvīyasvabhāvādapracyutiḥ sthitiḥ.

यथाऽजागोमहिष्यादिक्षीराणां तीव्रमन्दादिभावेन स्वकार्यकरणे सामर्थ्यविशेषोऽनुभावः तथा कर्मपुद्गलानां स्वकार्यकरणे सामर्थ्यविशेषोऽनुभावः । कर्मभावपरिणत–पुद्गलस्कन्धानामनन्तानन्त–प्रदेशानामात्मप्रदेशानुप्रवेशः प्रदेशबन्धः ।

Yathā'jāgomahiṣyādikṣīrānāṁ tīvramandādibhāvena svakāryakaraṇe sāmarthyaviśeṣo'nubhāvaḥ tathā karmapudgalānāṁ svakāryakaraṇe sāmarthyaviśeṣo'nubhāvaḥ. Karmabhāvapari-

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1 Umāsvāmi ?

ṇata-pudgalaskandhānāmanantānanta-pradeśānāmātmapradeśānupraveśaḥ pradeśabandhaḥ.

2. *Sthiti*. As the milk of the goat, cow, buffalo, etc., have continued unswerving from their sweet nature for so long a period, so the first three *múla-prakṛtis*, *jnānāvaraṇa* etc., and the last, *antarāya*, have not swerved from their respective natures even through the period described in the words, "*sthiti* lasts beyond crores of crores of periods of time measured by thirty *sāgaropamas*."[1] This continuance is *sthiti*.

3. *Anubhāva*. As in the milk of goats, cows, buffaloes, etc., there exists, by its rich or poor nature, a special capacity for producing[2] its several effects, so in the different material bodies produced by our actions there exists a special capacity (*anubhāva*) for producing their respective effects.

4. *Pradeśa*. The *bandha* called *pradeśa* is the entrance into the different parts of the soul by the masses, made up of an endless number of parts, of the various bodies which are developed by the consequences of actions.

An Element namely, Saṁvara and Nirjarā

आस्रवनिरोधः संवरः । येनात्मनि प्रविशत्कर्म प्रतिषिध्यते स गुप्तिसमित्यादिः संवरः । संचारकारणयोगादात्मनो गोपनं गुप्तिः । सा त्रिविधा— कायवाङ्मनोनिग्रहभेदात् । प्राणिपीडापरिहारेण सम्यगयनं समितिः । सेर्याभाषादिभिः पञ्चधा । प्रपञ्चितं च हेमचन्द्राचार्यैः—

Āsravanirodhaḥ saṁvaraḥ. Yenātmani praviśatkarma pratiṣidhyate sa guptisamityādiḥ saṁvaraḥ. Sañcārakāraṇayogādātmano gopanaṁ guptiḥ. Sā trividhā—Kāyavāṅmmanonigrahabhedāt. Prāṇipīḍāparihāreṇa samyagayanaṁ samitiḥ. Seryābhāṣādibhiḥ pañcadhā. Prapañcitaṁ ca hemacandrācāryaiḥ :—

Saṁvara is the stopping of *āsrava*—that by which the influence of past actions (*karman*) is stopped from entering into the soul. It is

1 For the *sāgaropama*, see Wilson's Essays, vol.i, p.309. In p.38, line 16, I read *ityādyuktakālād ūrdhvaṃ api* for the abscure *ityādyuktaṃ kāladurddhānavat*. I also read at the end of the line *pracyutiḥ sthitiḥ* for *pracyutisthitiḥ*.

2 In p. 38, line 18, read *svakāryakaraṇe*.

divided into *gupti, samiti*, etc. *Gupti* is the withdrawal of the soul from that "impulse" (yoga) which causes mundane existence,—it is threefold, as relating to body, speech or mind. *Samiti* is the acting so as to avoid injury to all living beings. This is divided into five kinds, as *īryā*,[1] *bhāṣā* etc. as has been explained by Hemachandra.

32. लोकातिवाहिते मार्गे चुम्बिते भास्वदंशुभिः ।
जन्तुरक्षार्थमालोक्य गतिरीर्या मता सताम् ॥

Lokātivāhite mārge cumbite bhāsvadaṁśubhih,
Janturakṣārthamālokya gatirīryā matā satāṃ.

"In a public highway, kissed by the sun's rays, to walk circumspectly so as to avoid injuring living beings, this the good call *īryā*."

33. अनवद्यमृतं सर्वजनीनं मितभाषणम् ।
प्रिया वाचंयमानां सा भाषासमितिरुच्यते ॥

Anavadyamṛtaṁ sarvajanīnaṁ mitabhāṣaṇaṃ,
Priyā vācaṁyamānāṁ sā bhāṣāsamitirucyate.

"Let him practise[2] a measured utterance in his intercourse with all people; this is called *bhāṣā-samiti* dear to the restrainers of speech."

34. द्विचत्वारिंशता भिक्षादोषैर्नित्यमदूषितम् ।
मुनिर्यदन्नमादत्ते सैषणासमितिर्मता ॥

Dvicatvāriṁśatā bhikṣādoṣairnityamadūṣitaṃ,
Muniryadannamādatte saiṣaṇāsamitirmatā.

"The food which the sage takes, ever free from the forty-two faults which may accrue to alms, is called the *eṣaṇā-samiti*."[3]

35. आसनादीनि संवीक्ष्य प्रतिलङ्घ्य च यत्नता ।
गृह्णीयान्निक्षिपेद् ध्यायेत्सादानसमितिः स्मृतः ॥

Āsanādīni saṁvīkṣya pratilaṅghya ca yatnatā,
Gṛhṇīyānnikṣiped dhyāyetsādānasamitiḥ smṛtaḥ.

"Carefully looking as it and carefuly seating himself upon it, let him take a seat, etc., set it down, and meditate,— this is called the *ādāna-samiti*."

1 In p. 39, line 2 and line 5, for *īrṣyā* read *īryā*, —a bad misreading.
2 In p. 39, line 6, I read *āpadyetā* for *āpadyatā*.
3 In p. 39, line 9, for *seṣaṇā* read *saiṣaṇā*.

36. कफमूत्रमलप्रायैर्निर्जन्तुजगतीतले ।
यत्नाद्यदुत्सृजेत्साधुः सोत्सर्गसमितिर्भवेत् ॥

Kaphamūtramalaprāyairnirjantujagatītale,
Yatnādyadutsṛjetsādhuḥ sotsargasamitirbhavet.

"That the good man should carefully perform his bodily evacuations in a spot free from all living creatures,[1]— this is the *utsarga-samiti*."[2]

अतएव– *Ataeva*

आस्रवः स्रोतसो द्वारं संवृणोतीति संवरः ।

Āsravaḥ srotaso dvāraṁ saṁvṛṇotīti saṁvaraḥ ।

इति निराहुः । तदक्तमभियुक्तैः —

Iti nirāhuḥ. Tadaktamabhiyuktaiḥ—

Hence *saṁvara* has been etymologically analysed as that which closes (*saṁ+vṛṇoti*) the door of the stream of *āsrava*,[3] as has been said by the learned.

37. आस्रवो भवहेतुः स्यात्संवरो मोक्षकारणम् ।
इतीयमार्हती सृष्टिरन्यदस्याः प्रपञ्चनम् ॥

Āsravo bhavahetuḥ syātsaṁvaro mokṣakāraṇam,
Itīyamārhatī sṛṣṭiranyadasyāḥ prapañcanam.

"*Āsrava* is the cause of mundane existence, *saṁvara* is the cause of liberation;[4] this is the Ārhat doctrine in a handful; all else is only the amplification of this."

Nirjarā : An Explanation

अर्जितस्य कर्मणस्तपःप्रभृतिभिर्निर्जरणं निर्जराख्यं तत्त्वम् । चिरकालप्रवृत्त-कषायकलापं पुण्यं सुखदुःखे च देहेन जरयति नाशयति । केशोल्लुञ्चनादिकं तप

1 In p. 39, line 12, join *nirjantu* and *jagatītale*.

2 Mādhava omits the remaining divisions of *saṁvara*. Wilson Essays, vol.i, p.311, gives them as *pariṣahā*, "endurance," as of a vow; *yati-dharma*, "the ten duties of an ascetic, patience, gentleness," etc.; *bhāvanā*, "conviction," such as that worldly existences are not eternal, etc.; *cāritra*, "virtuous observance."

3 In p.39, line 14, read *āsravasrotaso*.

4 For *moha*, in line 16, read *mokṣa*.

उच्यते । सा निर्जरा द्विविधा यथाकालौपक्रमिकभेदात् । तत्र प्रथमा यस्मिन्काले यत्कर्म फलप्रदत्वेनाभिमतं तस्मिन्नेव काले फलदानाद् भवन्ती निर्जरा कामादिपाकजेति च जेगीयते । यत्कर्म तपोबलात्स्वकामनयोदयावलिं प्रवेश्य प्रपद्यते सौपक्रमिकनिर्जरा । यदाह–

Arjitasya karmaṇastapaḥ prabhṛtibhirnirjaraṇaṁ nirjarākhyaṁ tattvaṃ. Cirakālapravṛttakaṣāyakalāpaṁ puṇyaṁ sukhaduḥkhe ca dehena jarayati nāśayati. Keśolluñcanādikaṁ tapa ucyate. Sā nirjarā dvividhā yathākālaupakramikabhedāt. Tatra prathamā yasminkāle yatkarma phalapradatvenābhimataṁ tasminneva kāle phaladānād bhavantī nirjarā kāmādipākajeti ca jegīyate. Yatkarma tapobalātsvakāmanayodayāvaliṁ praveśya prapadyate saupakramikanirjarā. Yadāha—

Nirjarā is the causing the fruit of past actions to decay by self-mortification, etc.; it destroys by the body the merit and demerit of all the previously performed actions, and the resulting happiness and misery; "self-mortification" means the plucking out of the hair, etc.

38. संसारबीजभूतानां कर्मणां जरणादिह ।
निर्जरा सम्मता द्वेधा सकामाकामनिर्जरा ॥

Saṁsārabījabhūtānāṁ karmaṇāṁ jaraṇādiha,
Nirjarā sammatā dvedhā sakāmākāmanirjarā.

39. स्मृता सकामा यमिनामकामा त्वन्यदेहिनाम् ॥ इति ॥

Smṛtā sakāmā yaminămakāmā tvanyadehināṃ. iti.

This *nirjarā* is twofold,[1] "temporary" (*yathākāla*) and ancillary (*aupakramaṇika*). It is "termporary" as when a desire is dormant in consequence of the action having produced its fruit, and at that particular time, from this completion of the object aimed at, *nirjarā* arises, being caused by the consumption of the desire, etc. But when, by the force of asceticism, the sage turns all actions into means for attaining his end (liberation), this is the *nirjarā* of actions. Thus, it has been said : "From the decaying of the actions which are the seeds of mundane existence, *nirjarā* arises, which is twofold, *sakāmā* and *akāmā*. That called *sakāmā* belongs to ascetice, the *akāmā* to other embodied spirits."[2]

1 In p. 39, line 2 *infra*, I read *yathākāla-* for *yathā kāla-*.

2 This passage is very difficult and not improbably corrupt, and my

Views on Salvation (Salvation Approach)

मिथ्यादर्शनादीनां बन्धहेतुनां निरोधेऽभिनवकर्माभावान्निर्जराहेतुसन्निधानेनार्जितस्य कर्मणो निरसनादात्यन्तिककर्ममोक्षणं मोक्षः । तदाह–बन्धहेत्वभावनिर्जराभ्यां कृत्स्नकर्मविप्रमोक्षणं मोक्षः (त. सू. 10/2) इति । तदनन्तरमूर्ध्वं गच्छत्यालोकान्तात् । (त. सू. 10/5)

Mithyadarśanādīnāṁ bandhahetunāṁ nirodhe'bhinavakarmābhāvānnirjarāhetusannidhānenārjitasya karmaṇo nirasanādātyantikakarmamokṣaṇaṁ mokṣaḥ. Tadāha—bandhahetvabhāvanirjarābhyāṁ kṛtsnakarmavipramokṣaṇaṁ mokṣaḥ (Ta. Sū. 10/2) iti. Tadanantaramūrdhvaṁ gacchatyālokāntāt. (Ta. Sū. 10/5).

Mokṣa. Since at the moment of its attainment there is an entire absence of all future actions, as all the causes of bondage (false perception, etc.) are stopped,[1] and since all past actions are abolished in the presence of the causes of *nirjarā*, there arises the absolute release from all actions, – this is *mokṣa*; as it has been said : "*Mokṣa* is the absolute release from all actions by the decay (*nirjarā*) of the causes of bondage and of existence."

यथा हस्तदण्डादिभ्रमिप्रेरितं कुलालचक्रमुपरतेऽपि तस्मिंस्तद्बलादेवासंस्कारक्षये भ्रमति, तथा भवस्थेनात्मनापवर्गप्राप्तये बहुशो यत्कृतं प्रणिधानं मुक्तस्य तदभावेऽपि पूर्वसंस्कारादालोकान्तं गमनमुपपद्यते । यथा वा मृत्तिकालेपकृतगौरवमलाबुद्रव्यं जलेऽधः पतति, पुनरपेतमृत्तिकाबन्धमूर्ध्वं गच्छति, तथा कर्मरहित आत्मा असङ्गत्वादूर्ध्वं गच्छति । बन्धच्छेदादेरण्डबीजवच्चोर्ध्वं गतिस्वभावाच्चाग्निशिखावत् ।

Yathā hastadaṇḍādibhramipreritaṁ kulālacakramuparate'pi tasmiṁstadbalādevāsaṁskārakṣaye bhramati, tathā bhavasthenātmanāpavargaprāptaye bahuśo yatkṛtaṁ praṇidhānaṁ muktasya tadabhāve'pi pūrvasaṁskārādālokāntaṁ gamanamupapadyate. Yathā vā mṛttikālepakṛtagauravamalābudravyaṁ jale'dhaḥ patati, punarapetamṛttikābandhamūrdhvaṁ gacchati, tathā karmarahita ātmā asaṅgatvādūrdhvaṁ gacchati. Bandhacchedāderaṇḍabījavaccordhvaṁ gatisvabhāvāccāgniśikhāvat.

interpretation of it is only conjectural. The ordinary *nirjarā* is when an action attains its end (like the lulling of a passion by the gratification), this lull is temporary. That *nirjarā* is "ancillary" which is rendered by asceticism a means to the attainment of the highest good. The former is *akāmā*, "desireless," because at the moment the desire is satisfied and so dormant; the latter is *sakāmā* because the ascetic conquers the lower desire under the overpowering influence of the higher desire for liberation.

1 I read *nirodhe* for *nirodhaḥ* in p.40, line 6; cf, p. 37, line 13. The causes of bondage produce the assumption of bodies in which future actions are to be performed.

Then the soul rises upward to the end of the world. As a potter's wheel, whirled by the stick and hands, moves on even after these have stopped, until the impulse is exhausted, so the previous repeated contemplations of the embodied soul for the attainment of *mokṣa* exert their influence even after they have ceased, and bear the soul onward to the end of the world; or, as the gourd, encased with clay, sinks in the water, but rises to the surface when freed from its encumbrances, so the soul, delivered from works, rises upward by its isolation,[1] from the bursting of its bonds like the elastic seeds of the castor-oil plant, or by its own native tendency like the flame.

अन्योन्यं प्रदेशानुप्रवेशे सत्यविभागेनावस्थानं बन्धः । परस्परप्राप्तिमात्रं सङ्गः । तदुक्तं, पूर्वप्रयोगादसङ्गत्वाद्बन्धच्छेदात्तथा गतिपरिणामाच्च (त. सू. 10/6) । आविद्धकुलालचक्रवद्व्यपगतलेपालाबुवदेरण्डबीजवदग्निशिखावच्च (त. सू. 10/7) इति । अत एव पठन्ति–

Anyonyaṁ pradeśānupraveśe satyavibhāgenāvasthānaṁ bandhaḥ. Parasparaprāptimātraṁ saṅgaḥ. Taduktaṁ, pūrvaprayogādasaṅgatvādbandhacchedāttathā gatipariṇāmācca (Ta. Sū. 10/6). Āviddhakulālacakravadvyapagatalepālābuvaderaṇḍabījavadagniśikhāvacca. (Ta. Śū. 10/7) iti. Ata eva paṭhanti—

"Bondage" is the condition of being unseparated, with mutual interpenetration of parts (between the soul and the body); *saṅga* is merely mutual contact. This has been declared as follow :—

"(Liberation) is unhindered, from the continuance of former impulses, from the absence of *saṅga*, from the cutting of all bonds, and from the natural development of the soul's own powers of motion, like the potter's wheel, the gourd with its clay removed, the seed of the castor-oil plant, or the flame of fire."

1 Literally "absence of *saṅga*".

Hence, they recite a śloka:—

40. गत्वा गत्वा निवर्तन्ते चन्द्रसूर्यादयो ग्रहाः ।
अद्यापि न निवर्तन्ते त्वलोकाकाशमागताः । (प. न.) इति ॥

Gatvā gatvā nivartante candrasūryādayo grahāḥ,
Adyāpi na nivartante tvalokākāśamāgatāḥ.
(Pa. Na.) iti ।

"However often they go away, the planets return, the sun, moon, and the rest;"
"But never to this day have returned any who have gone to Ālokākāśa."

Others hold mokṣa to be the abiding in the highest regions, the soul being absorbed in bliss, with its knowledge unhindered and itself untainted by any pain or impression thereof.

अन्ये तु गतसमस्तक्लेशतद्वासनस्यानावरणज्ञानस्य सुखैकतानस्यात्मनं उपरिदेशावस्थाने मुक्तिरित्यास्थिषत । एवमुक्तानि सुखदुःखसाधनाभ्यां पुण्यपापाभ्यां सहितानि नव पदार्थान्केचनाङ्गीचक्रुः । तदुक्तं सिद्धान्ते जीवाजीवौ पुण्यपापयुतावास्रवः संवरो निर्जरणं बन्धो मोक्षश्च नव तत्त्वानीति । संग्रहे प्रवृत्ता वयमुपरताः स्मः ।

Anye tu gatasamastakleśatadvāsanasyānāvaraṇajñānasya sukhaikatānasyātmana uparideśāvasthāne muktirityāsthiṣata. Evamuktāni sukhaduḥkhasādhanābhyāṁ puṇyapāpābhyāṁ sahitāni nava padārthānkecanāṅgīcakruḥ. Taduktaṁ siddhānte jīvājīvau puṇyapāpayutāvāsravaḥ saṁvaro nirjaraṇaṁ bandho mokṣaśca nava tattvānīti. Saṅgrahe pravṛttā vayamuparatāḥ smaḥ.

Others hold nine *tattvas*, adding "merit" and "demerit" to the foregoing seven,—these two being the cause of pleasure and pain. This has been declared in the *Siddhānta*, *"Jīva, ajīva, puṇya, pāpa, āsrava, saṁvara, nirjaraṇa, bandha*, and *mokṣa*, are the nine *tattvas*." As our object is only a summary, we desist here.

Jainees Jurisprudence 'Saptabhangīnaya'

अत्र सर्वत्र सप्तभङ्गिनयाख्यं न्यायमवतारयन्ति जैनाः । स्यादस्ति, स्यान्नास्ति, स्यादस्ति च नास्ति च, स्यादवक्तव्यः, स्यादस्ति चावक्तव्यः, स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यः, स्यादस्ति च नास्ति चावक्तव्यः इति ।

तत्सर्वमनन्तवीर्यः प्रत्यपीपदत्—

Atra sarvatra saptabhaṅginayākhyaṁ nyāyamavatārayanti jaināḥ. Syādasti, syānnāsti, syādast ca nāsti ca, syādavaktavyaḥ, syādasti cāvaktavyaḥ, syānnāsti cāvaktavyaḥ, syādasti ca nāsti cāvaktavyaḥ, iti.

Tatsarvamanantavīryaḥ pratyapīpadat—

Here the Jainas everywhere introduce their favourite logic called the *sapta-bhaṅgī-naya*,[1] or the system of the seven paralogisms, "may be, it is", "may be, it is not", "may be, it is and is not", "may be, it is not predicable", "may be, it is, and yet not predicable", "may be, it is not, and not predicable", "may be, it is and it is not, and not predicable."

All this Anantavīrya has thus laid down:—

41. तद्विधानविवक्षायां स्यादस्तीति गतिर्भवेत् ।
स्यान्नास्तीति प्रयोगः स्यात्तन्निषेधे विवक्षिते ॥

Tadvidhānavivakṣāyāṁ syādastīti gatirbhavet,
Syānnāstīti prayogaḥ syāttanniṣedhe vivakṣite.

"When you wish to establish a thing, the proper course is to say may be, it is; when you wish to deny it, may be, it is not."

42. क्रमेणोभयवाञ्छायां प्रयोगः समुदायभाक् ।
युगपत्तद्विवक्षायां स्यादवाच्यमशक्तितः ॥

Kramenobhayavāñchāyāṁ prayogaḥ samudāyabhāk,
Yugapattadvivakṣāyāṁ syādavācyamaśaktitaḥ.

"When you desire to establish each in turn, let your procedure likewise embrace both; when you wish to establish both at once, let it be declared 'indescribable' from the impossibility to describe it."

43. आद्यावाच्यविवक्षायां पञ्चमो भङ्ग इष्यते ।
अन्त्यावाच्यविवक्षायां षष्ठभङ्गसमुद्भवः ॥

Ādyāvācyavivakṣāyāṁ pañcamo bhaṅga iṣyate,
Antyāvācyavivakṣāyāṁ ṣaṣṭhabhaṅgasamudbhavaḥ.

"The fifth process is enjoined when you wish to establish the first as well as its indescribableness; when the second as well as its indescribableness, the occasion for the sixth process arises."

1 In p.41, line 7, read *saptabhaṅgīnaya*, see Ved. S. Gloss., ii 2, 23.

44. समुच्चयेन युक्तश्च सप्तमो भङ्ग उच्यते ।। इति ।

Samuccayena yuktaśca saptamo bhaṅga ucyate. iti.

"The seventh is required when all three characters are to be employed simultaneously."

स्याच्छन्दः खल्वयं निपातस्तिङन्तप्रतिरूपकोऽनेकान्तद्योतकः । यथोक्तम्–

Syācchandaḥ khalvayaṁ nipātastiṅantapratirūpako'nekānta-dyotakaḥ. Yathoktam—

45. वाक्येष्वनेकान्तद्योती गम्यं प्रति विशेषणम् ।
स्यान्निपातोऽर्थयोगित्वात्तिङन्तप्रतिरूपकः ।। इति ।

Vākyeṣvanekāntadyoto gamyaṁ prati viśeṣaṇam,
Syānnipāto'rthayogitvāttiṅntapratirūpakaḥ. iti.

Syāt, "may be," is here an indeclinable particle in the form of a part of a verb, used to convey the idea of indeterminateness; as it has been said:–

"This particle *syāt* is in the form of a verb, but, from its being connected with the sense, it denotes indeterminateness in sentences, and has a qualifying effect on the implied meaning."

यदि पुनरेकान्तद्योतकः स्याच्छब्दोऽयं स्यात्तदा स्यादस्तीति वाक्ये स्यात्पदमनर्थकं स्यात् । अनेकान्तद्योतकत्वे तु स्यादस्ति कथंचिदस्तीति स्यात्पदात्कथंचिदित्ययमर्थो लभ्यत इति नानर्थक्यम् । तदाह–

Yadi punarekāntadyotakaḥ syācchabdo'yaṁ syāttadā syādastīti vākye syātpadamanarthakaṁ syāt. Anekāntadyotakatve tu syādasti kathaṁcidastīti syātpadātkathaṁcidityayamartho labhyata iti nānarthakyam. Tadāh—

If, again, the word *syāt* denoted determinateness, then it would be needless in the phrase, "may be, it is;" but since it really denotes indeterminateness, "may be, it is," means "it is somehow"; *syāt*, "may be," conveys the meaning of "somehow" *kathaṁcit*; and so it is not really useless. As one has said–

46. स्याद्वादः सर्वथैकान्तत्यागात्किंवृत्तचिद्विधेः ।
सप्तभङ्गिनयापेक्षो हेयादेयविशेषकृत् ।। इति ।

Syādvādaḥ Sarvathaikāntatyāgātkiṁvṛttacidvidheḥ,
Saptabhaṅginayāpekṣo heyādeyaviśeṣakṛt. iti.

"The doctrine of the *syādvāda* arises from our everywhere reject-

ing the idea of the absolute;[1] it depends on the *saptabhaṅgīnaya*, and it lays down the distinction between what is to be avoided and to be accepted."

यदि वस्त्वस्त्येकान्ततः सर्वथा सर्वदा सर्वत्र सर्वात्मनाऽस्तीति नोपादित्साजिहासाभ्यां क्वचित्कदाचित्केनचित्प्रवर्तेत निवर्तेत वा । प्राप्ताप्रापणीयत्वादहेयहानानुपपत्तेश्च । अनेकान्तपक्षे तु कथञ्चित्क्वचित्केनचित्सत्त्वेन हानोपादाने प्रेक्षावतामुपपद्येते ।

Yadi vastvastyekāntataḥ sarvathā sarvadā sarvatra sarvātmanā'stīti nopāditsājihāsābhyāṁ kvacitkadācitkenacit-pravarteta nivarteta vā. Prāptāprāpaṇīyatvādahevahānā-nupapatteśca. Anekāntapakṣe tu kathañcitkvacitkenacitsattvena hānopādāne prekṣāvatāmupapadyete.

If a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always, everywhere, and with everybody, and no one at any time or place would ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as it would be absurd to treat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided. But if it be relative (or indefinite), the wise will concede that at certain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it.

किं च वस्तुनः सत्त्वं स्वभावः, असत्त्वं वा इत्यादि प्रष्टव्यम् । न तावदस्तित्वं वस्तुनः स्वभाव इति समस्ति । घटोऽस्तीत्यनयोः पर्यायतया युगपत्प्रयोगायोगात् । नास्तीति प्रयोगविरोधाच्च । एवमन्यत्रापि योज्यम् । यथोक्तम्–

Kiṁ ca vastunaḥ sattvaṁ svabhāvaḥ, asattvaṁ vā ityādi praṣṭavyam. Na tāvadastittvaṁ vastunaḥ svabhāva iti samasti. Ghaṭo'stītyanayoḥ paryāyatayā yugapatprayogāyogāt. Nāstīti prayogavirodhācca. Evamanyatrāpi yojyam. Yathoktam—

Moreover, suppose that the question to be asked is this : "Is being or non-being the real nature of the thing?" The real nature of the thing cannot be being, for then you could not properly use the phrase.

47. घटोऽस्तीति न वक्तव्यं सन्नेव हि यतो घटः ।
नास्तीत्यपि न वक्तव्यं विरोधात्सदसत् वयोः ।। इत्यादि ।।

1 I cannot understand the words at the end of the first line, *kiṁ vṛtatadvidheḥ*, and therefore leaves them untranslated.

Ghato'stīti na vaktavyaṁ sanneva hi yato ghaṭaḥ,
Nāstītyapi na vaktavyaṁ virodhātsadasattvayoḥ. iti.

"It is a pot" (*ghaṭo'sti*), as the two words "is" and "pot" would be tautological; nor ought you to say, "It is not a pot," as the words thus used would imply a direct contradiction; and the same argument is to be used in other questions.[1] As it has been declared—

"It is not be said 'It is a pot,' since the word 'pot' implies 'is';"

"Nor may you say 'it is not a pot,' for existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive," etc.

तस्मादित्थं वक्तव्यम्–सदसत्सदसदनिर्वचनीयवादभेदेन प्रतिवादिनश्चतुर्विधाः । पुनरप्यनिर्वचनीयमतेन मिश्रितानि सदसदादिमतानीति त्रिविधाः । तान्प्रति किं वस्त्वस्तीत्यादि पर्यनुयोगे 'कथञ्चित्तदस्ति' इत्यादि प्रतिवचनसम्भवेन ते वादिनः सर्वे निर्विण्णाः सन्तस्तूष्णीमासत इति सम्पूर्णार्थविनिश्चायिनः स्याद्वादमङ्गीकुर्वतस्तत्र तत्र विजय इति सर्वमुपपन्नम् । यदवोचदाचार्यः स्याद्वादमञ्जर्याम्—

Tasmādittham vaktavyaṁ—Sadasatsadasadanirvacanīyavādabhedena prativādinaścaturvidhāḥ. Punarapyanirvacanīyamatena miśritāni sadasadādimatānīti trividhāḥ. Tānprati kiṁ vastvastītyādi paryanuyoge 'kathañcittadasti' ityādi prativacanasambhavena te vādinaḥ sarve nirviṇṇāḥ santastūṣṇīmāsata iti sampūrṇārthaviniścāyinaḥ syādvādamaṅgīkurvatastatra tatra vijaya iti sarvamupapannaṃ. Yadavocadācāryaḥ syādvādamañjaryāṃ—

The whole is thus to be summed up. Four classes of our opponents severally hold the doctrine of existence, non-existence, existence and non-existence successively, and the doctrine that everything is inexplicable (*anirvacanīyatā*);[2] three other classes hold one or other of the three first theories combined with the fourth.[3] Now, when they meet us with the scornful questions, "Does the thing exist?" etc., we have an answer always possible, "It exists in a certain way," etc., and our opponents are all abashed to silence, and victory accrues to the holder of the *Syādvāda*, wich ascertains the entire meaning of all things. Thus said, the teacher in the *Syādvāda-mañjarī*—

1 Thus, Govindānanda applies it (*Vid. Sūt.*, ii. 2, 33) to "may be it is one," "may be it is many," etc.

2 This is Śrīharṣa's tenet in the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya*.

3 In p.42, line 17, for *matenāmiśritāni* read *matena miśritāni*.

48. अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तु गोचरः सर्वसंविदाम् ।
एकदेशविशिष्टोऽर्थो नयस्य विषयो मतः ॥

Anekāntātmakaṁ vastu gocaraḥ sarvasaṁvidāṃ,
Ekadeśāviśiṣṭo'rtho nayasya viṣayo mataḥ.

"A thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the object only of the omniscient; a thing partly determined is held to be the true object of scientific investigation."[1]

49. न्यायानामेकनिष्ठानां प्रवृत्तौ श्रुतवर्त्मनि ।
सम्पूर्णार्थविनिश्चायि स्याद्वस्तु श्रुतमुच्यते ॥ इति ॥

Nyāyānāmekaniṣṭhānāṁ pravṛttāu śrutavatrmani,
Sampurṇārthaviniścāyi syādvastu śrutamucyate. iti.

"When our reasonings based on one point proceed in the revealed way, it is called the revealed *Syād-vāda*, which ascertains the entire meaning of all things."

50. अन्योन्यपक्षप्रतिपक्षभावाद् यथा परे मत्सरिणः प्रवादाः ।
नयानशेषा नविशेषमिच्छन् न पक्षपाती समयस्तथार्हतः ॥

Anyonyapakṣapratipakṣabhāvād yathā pare matsariṇaḥ pravādāḥ,
Nayānaśeṣā naviśeṣamicchan na pakṣapātī samayastathārhataḥ.

"All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual propositions and counter-propositions; it is only the doctrine of the Arhat which with no partiality equally favours all sects."

(हेमचन्द्रकृत द्वितीयद्वात्रिंशिका वी. स्तु. श्लोक 30)

(Hemacandrakṛta dvitīyadvātriṁśikā Vī. Stu. śloka 30)

Collection Compilation of Jainism

जिनदत्तसूरिणा जैनं मतमित्थमुक्तम् —

Jinadattasūriṇā jainaṁ matamithamuktaṃ—

The Jaina doctrine has thus been summed up by Jinadatta Sūri—

1 In p.43, line 2, for na *yasya* read *nayasya*.

51. बलभोगोपभोगानामुभयोर्दानलाभयो: ।
अन्तरायस्तथा निद्रा भीरज्ञानं जुगुप्सितम् ॥

Balabhogopabhogānāmubhayordānalābhayoḥ,
Antarāyastathā nidrā bhirajñānaṁ jugupsitaṃ.

52. हिंसा रत्यरती रागद्वेषावविरति: स्मर: ।
शोको मिथ्यात्वमेतेऽष्टादश दोषा न यस्य स: ॥

Hiṁsā ratyaratī rāgadveṣāvaviratiḥ smaraḥ,
Śoko mithyātvamete'ṣṭādaśa doṣā na yasya saḥ.

"The hindrances belonging to vigour, enjoyment, sensual pleasure, giving and receiving,—sleep, fear, ignorance, aversion, laughter, liking, disliking, love, hatred, want of indifference, desire, sorrow, deceit, these are the eighteen 'faults' (doṣa) according to our system.[1]

53. जिनो देवो गुरु: सम्यक्तत्त्वज्ञानोपदेशक: ।
ज्ञानदर्शनचारित्राण्यपवर्गस्य वर्तनी ॥

Jino devo guruḥ samyaktattvajñānopadeśakaḥ,
Jñānadarśanacāritrāṇyapavargasya vartanī.

The divine Jina is our Guru, who declares the true knowledge of the tattvas. The path[2] of emancipation consists of knowledge, intuition, and conduct.

54. स्याद्वादस्य प्रमाणे द्वे प्रत्यक्षमनुमापि च ।
नित्यानित्यात्मकं सर्वं नव तत्त्वानि सप्त वा ॥

Syādvādasya pramāṇe dve pratyakṣamanumāpi ca,
Nityānityātmakaṁ sarvaṁ nava tattvāni sapta vā.

There are two means of proof (*pramāṇa*) in the *Syād-vāda* doctrine,—sense-perception and inference. All consists of the eternal and the non-eternal; there are nine or seven *tattvas*.

1 This list is badly printed in the Calcutta edition. It is really identical with that given in Hemachandra's Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi, 72,73; but we must correct the readings to *antarāyāsā, rāgadveshāv aviratiḥ smaraḥ*, and *hāso* for *hiṁsā*. The order of the eighteen *doṣas* in the Calcutta edition is given by Hemachandra as 4,5; 1,2,3,10,11,12; 7,9,17,16,18; 8,6, 15,13,14.

2 In p.43, line 13, for *vartini* read *vartiniḥ*.

55. जीवाजीवौ पुण्यपापे चास्रव: संवरोऽपि च ।
बन्धो निर्जरणं मुक्तिरेषां व्याख्याऽधुनोच्यते ॥

Jivājīvau puṇyapāpe cāsravaḥ saṁvaro'pi ca,
Bandho nirjaraṇaṁ muktireṣāṁ vyākhyā'dhunocyate.

The *jīva*, the *ajīva*, merit and demerit, *āsrava*, *saṁvara*, *bandha*, *nirjarā, mukti*,—we will not explain each.

56. चेतनालक्षणो जीव: स्यादजीवस्तदन्यक: ।
सत्कर्मपुद्गला पुण्यं पापं तस्य विपर्यय: ॥

Cetanālakṣaṇo jīvaḥ syādajīvastadanyakaḥ,
Satkarmapudgalā puṇyaṁ pāpaṁ tasya viparyayaḥ.

Jīva is defined as intelligence; *ajīva* is all other than it; merit means bodies which arise from good actions, demerit the opposite;

57. आस्रव: स्रोतसो द्वारं संवृणोतीति संवर: ।
प्रवेश: कर्मणां बन्धो निर्जरस्तद्वियोजनम् ॥

Āsravaḥ srotaso dvāraṁ saṁvṛṇotīti saṁvaraḥ,
Praveśaḥ karmaṇāṁ bandho nirjarastadviyojanam.

58. अष्टकर्मक्षयान्मोक्षोऽथान्तर्भावश्च कैश्चन ।
पुण्यस्य संवरे पापस्यास्रवे क्रियते पुन: ॥

Aṣṭakarmakṣayānmokṣo'thāntarbhāvaśca kaiścana,
Puṇyasya saṁvare pāpasyāsrave kriyate punaḥ.

Āsrava is the bondage of actions,[1] *nirjarā* is the unloosing thereof; mokṣa arises from the destruction of the eight forms of *karman* or "action." But by some teachers "merit" is included in *saṁvara*,[2] and "demerit" in *āsrava*.

59. लब्धानन्तचतुष्कस्य लोकागूढस्य चात्मन: ।
क्षीणाष्टकर्मणो मुक्तिर्निव्यावृत्तिर्जिनोदिता ॥

Labdhānantacatuṣkasya lokāgūḍhasya cātmanaḥ,
Kṣīṇāṣṭakarmaṇo muktirnivyāvṛttirjinoditā.

"Of the soul which has attained the four infinite things[3] and is hid-

1 This seems corrupt—a line is probably lost.

2 In last line, for *saṁsrave* read *saṁvare*.

3 Does this mean the knowledge of the world, the soul, the liberated and liberation? These are called *ananta*. See Weber's *Bhagavatī*, pp. 250, 261-266.

den from the world, and whose eight actions are abolished, absolute liberation is declared by Jina.

60. सरोजहरणा भैक्षभुजो लुञ्चितमूर्धजाः ।
श्वेताम्बराः क्षमाशीला निःसङ्गा जैनसाधवः ॥

Sarojaharaṇā bhaikṣabhujo luñcitamūrdhajāḥ,
Śvetāmbarāḥ kṣamāśīlā niḥsaṅgā jainasādhavaḥ.

The Śvetāmbaras are the destroyers of all defilement, they live by alms,[1] they pluck out their hair, they practise patience, they avoid all association, and are called the Jaina Sādhus.

61. लुञ्चिताः पिच्छिकाहस्ताः पाणिपात्रा दिगम्बराः ।
ऊर्ध्वाशिनो गृहे दातुर्द्वितीयाः स्युर्जिनर्षयः ॥

Luñcitāḥ picchikāhastāḥ pāṇipātrā digambarāḥ,
Ūrdhvāśino gṛhe dāturdvitīyāḥ syurjinarṣayaḥ.

The Digambaras pluck out their hair, they carry peacock's tail in their hands, they drink from their hands, and they eat upright in the giver's house,—these are the second class of the Jaina Ṛṣis.

62. भुङ्क्ते न केवली न स्त्री मोक्षमेति दिगम्बरः ।
प्राहुरेषामयं भेदो महाञ्श्वेताम्बरैः सह ॥ इति ॥

Bhuṅkte na kevalī na strī mokṣameti digambaraḥ,
Prāhureṣāmayaṁ bhedo mahāñśvetāmbaraiḥ saha. iti.

"A woman attains not the highest knowledge, she enters not Mukti,—so say the Digambaras; but there is a great division on this point between them and the Śvetāmbaras."[2]

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे आर्हतदर्शनम् ॥

❖

1 *Sarajoharaṇāh* is explained by the *rajoharaṇadhārin* (= *vratin*) of Halāyudha, ii. 189.

2 Cf. Wilson, Essays, I. 340. For *strīṃ* read *strī*.

CHAPTER IV

THE RĀMĀNUJA SYSTEM

Rebuttal of Multiform

तदेतदार्हतमतं प्रामाणिकगर्हणमर्हति । न ह्येकस्मिन्वस्तुनि परमार्थे सति परमार्थसतां युगपत्सदसत्त्वादिधर्माणां समावेशः सम्भवति । न च सदसत्त्वयोः परस्परविरुद्धयोः समुच्चयासम्भवे विकल्पः किं न स्यादिति वदितव्यम् । क्रिया हि विकल्प्यते न वस्त्विति न्यायात् ।

Tadetadārhatamataṁ prāmāṇikagarhaṇamarhati. Na hyekasminvastuni paramārthe sati paramārthasatāṁ yugapatsadasattvādidharmāṇāṁ samāveśaḥ sambhavati. Na ca sadasattvayoḥ parasparaviruddhayoḥ samuccayāsambhave vikalpaḥ kiṁ na syāditi vaditavyam. Kriyā hi vikalpyate na vastviti nyāyāt.

This doctrine of the Ārhatas deserves a rational condemnation, for whereas there is only one thing really existent, the simultaneous co-existence of existence, non-existence and other modes in a plurality of really existing things is an impossibility. Nor should any one say : Granting the impossibility of the co-existence of existence and non-existence, which are reciprocally contradictory, why should there not be an alternation between existence and non-existence? There being the rule that it is action, not *Ens*, that alternates.

न च 'अनेकान्तं जगत्सर्वं हेरम्बनरसिंहवत्' इति दृष्टान्तावष्टम्भवशादेष्टव्यम् । एकस्मिन्देशे गजत्वं सिंहत्वं वाऽपरस्मिन्नरत्वमिति देशभेदेन विरोधाभावेन । तस्यैकस्मिन्देश एव सत्त्वासत्त्वादिनाऽनेकान्तत्वाभिधाने दृष्टान्तानुपपत्तेः । ननु द्रव्यात्मना सत्त्वं पर्यायात्मना तदभाव इत्युभयमप्युपपन्नमिति चेत्, मैवम्—कालभेदेन हि कस्यचित्सत्त्वमसत्त्वं च स्वभाव इति न कश्चिद्दोषः ।

Na ca 'anekāntaṁ jagatsarvaṁ herambanarasiṁhavat' iti dṛṣṭāntāvaṣṭambhavaśādeṣṭavyam. Ekasmindeśe gajatvaṁ siṁhatvaṁ vā'parasminnaratvamiti deśabhedena virodhābhāvena. Tasyaikasmindeśa eva sattvāsattvādinā'nekānta-

ttvābhidhāne dṛṣṭāntānupapatteḥ. Nanu dravyātmanā sattvaṁ paryāyātmanā tadabhāva ityubhayamapyupapannamiti cet, maivaṃ—Kālabhedena hi kasyacitsattvamasattvaṁ ca svabhāva iti na kaściddoṣaḥ.

Nor let it be supposed that the whole universe is multiform, in reliance upon the examples of the elephant-headed Gaṇeśa and of the incarnation of Viṣṇu as half man, half lion; for the elephantine and the leonine nature existing in one part, and the human in another, and consequently there being no contradiction, those parts being different, these examples are inapplicable to the maintenance of a nature multiform as both existent and non-existent in one and the same part (or place). Again, if any one urge : Let there be existence in one form, and non-existence in another and thus both will be compatible; we rejoin : Not so, for if you had said that at different times existence and non-existence may be the nature of anything, then indeed there would have been no vice in your procedure.

न चैकस्य ह्रस्वत्वदीर्घत्ववदनेकान्तत्वं जगतः स्यादिति वाच्यम् । प्रतियोगिभेदेन विरोधाभावात् । तस्मात्प्रमाणाभावाद्युगपत्सत्त्वासत्त्वे परस्परविरुद्धे नैकस्मिन्वस्तुनि वक्तुं युक्ते । एवमन्यासामपि भङ्गीनां भङ्गोऽवगन्तव्यः ।

Na caikasya hrasvatvadīrghatvavadanekāntatvaṁ jagataḥ syāditi vācyam. Pratiyogibhedena virodhābhāvāt. Tasmātpramāṇābhāvādyugapatsattvāsattve parasparaviruddhe naikasminvastuni vaktuṁ yukte. Evamanyāsāmapi bhaṅgīnāṁ bhaṅgo'vagantavyaḥ.

Nor is it to be contended : Let the multiformity of the universe be like the length and shortness which pertain to the same thing (in different relations); for in these (in this length and shortness) there is no contrariety, in as much as they are contrasted with different objects. Therefore, for want of evidence, existence and non-existence as reciprocally contradictory cannot reside at the same time in the same thing. In a like manner may be understood the refutation of the other *bhaṅgas* (Ārhata tenets).

Doctrine of the Seven Bhaṅgas is Void

किं च, सर्वस्यास्य मूलभूतः सप्तभङ्गिनयः स्वयमेकान्तोऽनेकान्तो वा । आद्ये सर्वमनेकान्तमिति प्रतिज्ञाव्याघातः । द्वितीये विवक्षितार्थासिद्धिः । अनेकान्तत्वेनासाधकत्वात् । तथा चेयमुभयतः पाशा रज्जुः स्याद्वादिनः स्यात् ।

Kiṁ ca, sarvasyāsya mūlabhūtaḥ saptabhaṅginayaḥ svayamekānto'nekānto vā. Ādye sarvamanekāntamiti pratijñāvyāghātaḥ. Dvitīye vivakṣitārthāsiddhih. Anekāntatvenāsādhakatvāt. Tathā ceyamubhayataḥ pāśā rañjuḥ syādvādinaḥ syāt.

Again, we ask, is this doctrine of the seven *bhaṅgas*, which lies at the base of all this, itself uniform (as excluding one contradictory), or multiform (as conciliating contradictories). If it is uniform, there will emerge a contradiction to your thesis that all things are multiform; if it is multiform, you have not proved what you wished to prove, a multiform statement (as both existent and non-existent) proving nothing.[1] In either case, there is rope for a noose for the neck of the Syād-vādin.

अपि च, नवत्वसप्तवादिनिर्धारणस्य फलस्य तन्निर्धारयितुः प्रमातुश्च तत्करणस्य प्रमाणस्य प्रमेयस्य च नवत्वादेरनियमे साधु समर्थितात्मयेनस्तीर्थंकरत्वं देवानांप्रियेणार्हतमतप्रवर्तकेन ।

Api ca, navatvasaptavādinirdhāraṇasya phalasya tannirdhārayituḥ pramātuśca tatkaraṇasya pramāṇasya prameyasya ca navatvāderaniyame sādhu samarthitātmayenastīrthaṁkaratvaṁ devānāṁpriyeṇārhatamatapravartakena.

An admirable author of institutes has the founder of the Ārhata system, dear to the gods (uninquiring pietist), proved himself to be, when he has not ascertained whether his result is the settling of nine or of seven principles, nor the investigator who settles them, nor his organon, the modes of evidence, nor the matter to be evidenced, whether it be ninefold or not!

1 Cf. "The argument in defence of the Maxim of Contradiction is that it is a postulate employed in all the particular statements as to matters of daily experience that a man understands and acts upon when heard from his neighbours; a postulate such that, if you deny it, no speech is either significant or trustworthy to inform and guide those who hear it. You may cite innumerable examples both of speech and action in the detail of life, which the Herakleitean must go through like other persons, and when, if he proceeded upon his own theory, he could neither give nor receive information by speech, nor ground any action upon the beliefs which he declares to co-exist in his own mind. Accordingly the Herakleitean Kratylus (so Aristotle says) renounced the use of affirmative speech, and simply pointed with his finger."—Grote's Aristotle, vol.ii, pp. 297, 298.

Rebuttal of the Plea Regarding Extension of Soul

तथा जीवस्य देहानुरूपपरिमाणत्वाङ्गीकारे योगबलादनेकदेहपरिग्राहकयोगिशरीरेषु प्रतिशरीरं जीवविच्छेदः प्रसज्येत । मनुजशरीरपरिमाणो जीवो मतङ्गजदेहं कृत्स्नं प्रवेष्टुं न प्रभवेत् । किं च गजादि शरीरं परित्यज्य पिपीलिकाशरीरं विशतः प्राचीनशरीरसन्निवेशविनाशोऽपि प्राप्नुयात् । न च यथा प्रदीपप्रभाविशेषः प्रपाप्रासादाद्युदरवर्तिसंकोचविकाशवांस्तथा जीवोऽपि मनुजमतङ्गजादिशरीरेषु स्यादित्येषितव्यम् । प्रदीपवदेव सविकारत्वेनानित्यत्वप्राप्तौ कृतप्रणाशाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् ।

Tathā jīvasya dehānurūpaparimāṇatvāṅgīkāre yogabalādaneka-dehaparigrāhakayogiśarīreṣu pratiśarīraṁ jīvavicchedaḥ prasajyeta. Manujaśarīraparimāṇo jīvo mataṅgajadehaṁ kṛtsnaṁ praveṣṭuṁ na prabhavet. Kiṁ ca gajādi śarīraṁ parityajya pipīlikāśarīraṁ viśataḥ prācīnaśarīrasanniveśavināśo'pi prāpnuyāt. Na ca yathā pradīpaprabhāviśeṣaḥ prapāprāsā-dādyudaravartisaṅkocavikāśavāṁstathā jīvo'pi manujamata-ṅgajādiśarīreṣu syādityeṣitavyam. Pradīpavadeva savikāratvenā-nityatvaprāptau kṛtapraṇāśākṛtābhyāgamaprasaṅgāt.

In like manner if it be admitted that the soul has (as the Ārhatas say), an extension equal to that of the body, it will follow that in the case of the souls of ascetics, who by the efficacy of asceticism assume a plurality of bodies, there is a differentiation of the soul for each of those bodies. A soul of the size of a human body would not (in the course of its transmigrations) be able to occupy the whole body of an elephant; and again, when it laid aside its elephantine body to enter into that of an ant, it would lose its capacity of filling its former frame. And it cannot be supposed that the soul resides successively in the human, elephantine, and other bodies, like the light of a lamp which is capable of contraction and expansion, according as it occupies the interior of a little station on the roadside in which travellers are supplied with water, or the interior of a stately mansion; for it would follow (from such a supposition) that the soul being susceptible of modifications and consequently non-eternal, there would be a loss of merits and a fruition of a good and evil unmerited.

एवं प्रधानमल्लनिबर्हणन्यायेन जीवपदार्थदूषणाभिधानदिशाऽन्यत्रापि दूषणमुत्प्रेक्षणीयम् । तस्मान्नित्यनिर्दोषश्रुतिविरुद्धत्वादिदमुपादेयं न भवति । तदुक्तं

भगवता व्यासेन–नैकस्मिन्नसम्भवात् (ब्र. सू. 2/2/31) इति । रामानुजेन च जैनमतनिराकरणपरत्वेन तदिदं सूत्रं व्याकारि ।

Evaṁ pradhānamallanibarhaṇanyāyena jīvapadārthadūṣaṇā-bhidhānadiśā'nyatrāpi dūṣaṇamutprekṣaṇīyam. Tasmānnitya-nirdoṣaśrutiviruddhatvādidamupādeyaṁ na bhavati. Taduktaṁ bhagavatā vyāsena—Naikasminnasambhavāt (Bra. Sū. 2/2/31) iti. Rāmānujena ca jainamatanirākaraṇaparatvena tadidaṁ sūtraṁ vyākāri.

As if then we had thrown their best wrestler, the redargution of the rest of their categories may be anticipated from this exposition of the manner in which their treatment of the soul has been vitiated. Their doctrine, therefore, as repugnant to the eternal, infallible revelation, cannot be adopted. The venerated Vyāsa accordingly propounded the aphorism (ii.2,33), "Nay, because it is impossible in one;" and this same aphorism has been analysed by Rāmānuja with the express purpose of shutting out the doctrine of the Jainas.

Triad Categories in Ramanuja's System

एष हि तस्य सिद्धान्तः–चिदचिदीश्वरभेदेने भोक्तृ-भोग्य-नियामकभेदेन च व्यवस्थितास्त्रयः पदार्था इति । तदुक्तम्–

Eṣa hi tasya siddhāntaḥ—cidacidīśvarabhedene bhoktṛ-bhogya-niyāmakabhedena ca vyavasthitāstrayaḥ padārthā iti. Taduktam—

The tenets of Rāmānuja are as follows :—Three categories are established, as soul, not-soul, and Lord; or as subject, object, and supreme disposer. Thus, it has been said—

1. ईश्वरश्चिदचिच्चेति पदार्थत्रितयं हरिः ।
 ईश्वरश्चिदिति प्रोक्तो जीवो दृश्यमचित्पुनः ॥ इति ॥

Īsvaraścidacicceti padārthatritayaṁ hariḥ,
Īśvaraściditi prokto jīvo dṛśyamacitpunaḥ. iti.

"Lord, soul, and not-soul are the triad of principles: Hari (Viṣṇu),"

"Is Lord; individual spirits are souls; and the visible world is not-soul."

Presumption of Adveta-Vedānta

अपरे पुनरशेषविशेषप्रत्यनीकं चिन्मात्रं ब्रह्मैव परमार्थः । तच्च

नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावमपि 'तत्त्वमसि' (छा. उ. 6/8/7) इत्यादिसामानाधिकरण्याधिगतजीवैक्यं बध्यते मुच्यते च ।

Apare punaraśeṣaviśeṣapratyanīkaṁ cinmātra brahmaiva paramārthaḥ. Tacca nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvamapi 'tattvamasi' (Chā. U. 6/8/7) ityādisāmānādhikaraṇyādhigata-jīvaikyaṁ badhyate mucyate ca.

Others, again (the followers of Śaṅkarācārya), maintain that pure intelligence, exempt from all differences, the absolute, alone is really existent; and that this absolute whose essence is eternal, pure, intelligent, and free, the identity of which with the individuated spirit is learnt from the "reference to the same object" (predication), "That art thou," undergoes bondage and emancipation.

तदतिरिक्तनानाविधभोक्तृभोक्तव्यादिभेदप्रपञ्चः सर्वोऽपि तस्मिन्नविद्यया परिकल्पितः, 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (छा. उ. 6/2/1) इत्यादिवचननिचयप्रामाण्यात्—इति ब्रुवाणाः, 'तरति शोकमात्मवित्' (छा. उ. 7/1/3) इत्यादिश्रुतिशिरःशतवशेन निर्विशेषब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविद्ययाऽनाद्यविद्यानिवृत्तिमङ्गीकुर्वाणाः 'मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति' (काठ. उ. 2/1) इति भेदनिन्दाश्रवणेन पारमार्थिकं भेदं निराचक्षाणाः, विचक्षणम्मन्याः तमिमं विभागं न सहन्ते ।

Tadatiriktanānāvidhabhoktṛbhoktavyādibhedaprapañcaḥ sarvo'-pi tasminnavidyayā parikalpitaḥ, 'sadeva somyedamagra āsīdekamevādvitīyam' (Chā. U. 6/2/1) ityādivacananicaya-prāmāṇyāt—iti bruvāṇāḥ, 'Tarati śokamātmavit' (Chā. U. 7/1/3) ityādiśrutiśiraḥśatavaśena nirviśeṣabrahmātmaikatvavidyayā'-nādyavidyānivṛttimaṅgīkurvāṇāḥ, 'mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyumāpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati' (Kāṭha. U. 2/1) iti bhedanindāśravaṇena pāramārthikaṁ bhedaṁ nirācakṣāṇāḥ, vicakṣaṇammanyāḥ tamimaṁ vibhāgaṁ na sahante.

The universe of differences (or conditions) such as that of subject and object, is all illusorily imagined by illusion as in that (one reality), as is attested by a number of texts : Existent only, fair sir, was this in the beginning. One only without a second, and so forth. Maintaining this, and acknowledging a suppression of this beginningless illusion by knowledge of the unity (and identity) of individuated spirits and the undifferenced absolute, in conformity with

hundreds of texts from the Upaniṣads, such as He that knows spirit passes beyond sorrow; rejecting also any real plurality of things, in conformity with the text condemnatory of duality, viz., Death after death he undergoes who looks upon this as manifold; and thinking themselves very wise, the Śāṅkaras will not tolerate this division (viz., the distribution of things into soul, not-soul, and Lord).

Counterposition to Opinion of Śāṅkara Vedāntin

तत्रायं समाधिरमिधीयते । भवेदेतदेवं यद्यविद्यायां प्रमाणं विद्येत । नन्विदमनादि भावरूपं ज्ञाननिवर्त्यमज्ञानम् 'अहमज्ञो मामन्यं च न जानामि' इति प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणसिद्धम् । तदुक्तम् —

Tatrāyaṁ samādhiramidhīyate. Bhavedetadevaṁ yadyavidyā-yāṁ pramāṇaṁ vidyeta. Nanvidamanādi bhāvarūpaṁ jñānanirvartyamajñānam 'ahamajño māmanyaṁ ca na jānāmi' iti pratyakṣapramāṇasiddham. Taduktam—

To all this the following counterposition is laid down—This might be all well enough if there were any proof of such illusion. But there is no such ignorance (or illusion), an unbeginning entity, suppressible by knowledge, testified in the perceptions, I am ignorant, I know not myself and other things. Thus, it has been said (to explain the views of the Śāṅkara)—

2. अनादि भावरूपं यद्विज्ञानेन विलीयते ।
तदज्ञानमिति प्राज्ञा लक्षणं सम्प्रचक्षते ॥ (चित्सुखी 1/9) इति ।

Anādi bhāvarūpaṁ yadvijñānena vilīyate,
Tadajñānamiti prājñā lakṣaṇaṁ sampracakṣate.
(Citsukhī 1/9) iti.

"Entitative from everlasting, which is dissolved by knowledge",
"Such is illusion. This definition the wise enunciate."

न चैतज्ज्ञानाभावविषयमित्याशङ्कनीयम् । को ह्येवं ब्रूयात्प्रभाकरकरावलम्बी भट्टदत्तहस्तो वा ? नाद्यः-

Na caitajjñānābhāvaviṣayamityāśaṅkanīyam. Ko hyevaṁ brūyā-tprabhākarakarāvalambī bhaṭṭadattahasto vā? Nādyaḥ—

This perception (they would further contend) is not conversant about the absence of knowledge. For who can maintain this, and to whom? One who leans on the arm of Prabhākara, or one to whom Kumārilabhaṭṭa gives his hand? Not the former, for in the words—

3. स्वरूपपररूपाभ्यां नित्यं सदसदात्मके ।
वस्तुनि ज्ञायते किञ्चित्कैश्चिद्रूपं कदाचन ॥

Svarūpapararūpābhyāṁ nityaṁ sadasadātmake,
Vastuni jñāyate kiñcitkaiścidrūpaṁ kadācana.

"By means of its own and of another's form, eternal in the existent and non-existent",

"Thing is recognised something by some at certain times."

4. भावान्तरमभावो हि कयाचित्तु व्यपेक्षया ।
भावान्तरादभावोऽन्यो न कश्चिदनिरूपणात् ॥

इति वदता भावव्यतिरिक्तस्याभावस्यानभ्युपगमात् ।

Bhāvāntaramabhāvo hi kayācittu vyapekṣayā,
Bhāvāntaramabhavo'nyo na kaścidanirūpaṇāt.
Iti vadatā bhāvavyatiriktasyābhāvasyānabhyupagamāt ।

"Non-entity is but another entity by some kind of relation. Non-entity is but another entity, naught else, for naught else is observed."

न द्वितीयः । अभावस्य षष्ठप्रमाणगोचरत्वेन ज्ञानस्य नित्यानुमेयत्वेन च तदभावस्य प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वानुपपत्तेः । यदि पुनः प्रत्यक्षाभाववादी कश्चिदेवमाचक्षक्षीत, तं प्रत्याचक्षीत–अहमज्ञ इत्यस्मिन्ननुभवेऽहमित्यात्मनोऽभाव- धर्मितया ज्ञानस्य प्रतियोगितया चावगतिरस्ति न वा ? अस्ति चेत्, विरोधादेव न ज्ञानानुभवः । न चेत्, धर्मिप्रतियोगिज्ञानसापेक्षो ज्ञानाभावानुभवः सुतरां न सम्भवति । तस्याज्ञानस्य भावरूपत्वे प्रागुक्तदूषणाभावात् अयमनुभवो भावरूपाज्ञानगोचर एवाभ्युपगन्तव्य इति ।

Na dvitīyaḥ. Abhāvasya ṣaṣṭhapramāṇagocaratvena jñānasya nityānumeyatvena ca tadabhāvasya pratyakṣaviṣayatvānupapatteḥ. Yadi punaḥ pratyakṣābhāvavādī kaścidevamācakṣakṣīta taṁ pratyācakṣīta—Ahamajña ityasminnanubhave'hamityātmano'bhāvadharmitayā jñānasya pratiyogitayā cāvagatirasti na vā? Asti cet, virodhādeva na jñānānubhavaḥ. Na cet, dharmipratiyogijñānasāpekṣo jñānābhāvānubhavaḥ sutarāṁ na sambhavati. Tasyājñānasya bhāvarūpatve prāguktadūṣaṇābhāvāt ayamanubhavo bhāvarūpājñānagocara evābhyupagantavya iti.

They deny any non-entity ulterior to entity. Non-entity being cognisable by the sixth instrument of knowledge *(anupalabdhi)*, and

knowledge being always an object of inference, the absence of knowledge cannot be an object of perception. If, again, any one who maintains non-entity to be perceptible should employ the above argument (from the perceptions, I am ignorant, I know not myself, and other things); it may be replied : "Is there, or is there not, in the consciousness, I am ignorant, an apprehension of self as characterised by an absence and of knowledge as the thing absent or non-existent? If there is such apprehension, consciousness of the absence of knowledge will be impossible, as involving a contradiction. If there is not, consciousness of the absence of knowledge, which consciousness presupposes a knowledge of the subject and of the thing absent, will not readily become possible. In as much (the Śaṅkaras continue) as the foregoing difficulties do not occur if ignorance (or illusion) be entitative, this consciousness (I am ignorant, I know not myself, and other things) must be admitted to be conversant about an entitative ignorance.

Rebuttal of Opinion by Rāmānujaṁ

तदेतद्गगनरोमन्थायितम् । भावरूपस्याज्ञानस्य ज्ञानाभावेन समानयोगक्षेमत्वात् । तथाहि–विषयत्वेनाश्रयत्वेन चाज्ञानस्य व्यावर्तकतया प्रत्यगर्थः प्रतिपन्नो न वा ? प्रतिपन्नश्चेत्, स्वरूपज्ञाननिवर्त्यं तदज्ञानमिति तस्मिन्प्रतिपन्ने कथङ्कारमवतिष्ठते ? अप्रतिपन्नश्चेत्, व्यावर्तकाश्रयविषयशून्यमज्ञानं कथमनुभूयेत ?

Tadetadgaganaromanthāyitam. Bhāvarūpasyājñānasya jnānābhāvena samānayogakṣematvāt. Tathāhi—viṣayatvenāśrayatvena cājñānasya vyāvartakatayā pratyagarthaḥ pratipanno na vā? Pratipannaścet, svarūpajñānanivartyaṁ tadajñānamiti tasminpratipanne kathaṅkāramavatiṣṭhate? Apratipannaścet, vyāvartakāśrayaviṣayaśūnyamajñānaṁ kathamanubhūyeta?

All this (the Rāmānuja replies) is about as profitable as it would be for a ruminant animal to ruminate upon ether; for an entitative ignorance is not more supposable than an absence of knowledge. For (we would ask), is any self-conscious principle presented as an object and as a subject (or ignorance) as distinct from cognition? If it is presented, how, since ignorance of a thing is terminable by knowledge of its essence, can the ignorance continue? If none such is presented, how we can be conscious of an ignorance which has no subject and no object ?

अथ विशदः स्वरूपावभास एवाज्ञानविरोधी, नाज्ञानेन सह भासत इत्याश्रयविषयज्ञाने सत्यपि नाज्ञानानुभवविरोध इति–हन्त, तर्हि ज्ञानाभावेऽपि समानमेतदन्यत्राभिनिवेशात् । तस्मादुभयाभ्युपगतज्ञानाभाव एव 'अहमज्ञो मामन्यं च न जानामि' इत्यनुभवगोचर इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् ।

Atha viśadaḥ svarūpāvabhāsa evājñānavirodhī, nājñānena saha bhāsata ityāśrayaviṣayajñāne satyapi nājñānānubhavavirodha iti—hanta, tarhi jñānābhāve'pi samānametadanyatrābhiniveśāt. Tasmādubhayābhyupagatajñānābhāva eva 'ahamajño māmanyaṁ ca na jānāmi' ityanubhavagocara ityabhyupagantavyam.

If you say : A pure manifestation of the spiritual essence is revealed only by the cognition opposed to ignorance (or illusion), and thus, there is no absurdity in the consciousness of ignorance accompanied with a consciousness of its subject and object; then we rejoin :—Unfortunately for you, this (consciousness of subject) must arise equally in the absence of knowledge (for such we define illusion to be), notwithstanding your assertion to the contrary. It must, therefore, be acknowledged that the cognition, I am ignorant, I know not myself and other things, is conversant about an absence of cognition allowed by us both.

Not Inference but Right Knowledge Removes the Illusion Out

अस्तु तर्ह्यनुमानं मानं विवादास्पदं प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तस्वविषयावरणस्वनिवर्त्य-स्वदेशगत-वस्त्वन्तर-पूर्वकम् अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वादन्धकारे प्रथमोत्पन्नप्रदीपप्रभावत् इति ।

Astu tarhyanumānaṁ mānaṁ vivādāspadaṁ pramāṇajñānaṁ svaprāgabhāvyatiriktasvaviṣayāvaraṇasvanivartya-svadeśagata-vastvantara-pūrvakaṃ aprakāśitārthaprakāśakatvādandhakāre prathamotpannapradīpaprabhāvat iti.

Well then (the Śāṅkaras may contend), let the form of congnition evidentiary of illusion, which is under disputation, be inference, as follows :—Right knowledge must have had for its antecedent another entity (sc. illusion), an entity different from mere prior non-existence of knowledge, which envelops the objects of knowledge, which is terminable by knowledge, which occupies the place of knowledge, in as much as it (the right knowledge) illuminates an object not before illuminated, like the light of a lamp springing up for the first time in the darkness.

तदपि न क्षोदक्षमम् । अज्ञानेऽप्यनभिमताज्ञानान्तरसाधनेऽपसिद्धान्तापातात् । तदसाधनेऽनैकान्तिकत्वात् । दृष्टान्तस्य साधनविकलत्वाच्च । न हि प्रदीपप्रभाया अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वं सम्भवति । ज्ञानस्यैव प्रकाशकत्वात् । सत्यपि प्रदीपे ज्ञानेन विषयप्रकाशसम्भवात् । प्रदीपप्रभायास्तु चक्षुरिन्द्रियस्य ज्ञानं समुत्पादयतो विरोधिसन्तमसनिरसनद्वारेणोपकारकत्वमात्रमेवेत्यलमति विस्तरेण ।

Tadapi na kṣodakṣamam. Ajñāne'pyanabhimatājñānāntarasādhane'pasiddhāntāpātāt. Tadasādhane'naikāntikatvāt. Dṛṣṭāntasya sādhanavikalatvācca. Na hi pradīpaprabhāyā aprakāśitārthaprakaśakatvaṁ sambhavati. Jñānasyaiva prakāśakatvāt. Satyapi pradīpe jñānena viṣayaprakāśasambhavāt. Pradīpaprabhāyāstu cakṣurindriyasya jñānaṁ samutpādayato virodhisantamaṁsanirasanadvāreṇopakārakatvamātramevetyalamati vistareṇa.

This argument (we reply) will not stand grinding (in the dialectic mill); for to prove the (antecedent) illusion, you will require an ulterior illusion which you do not admit, and a violation of your own tenets will ensue, while if you do not so prove it, it may or may not exist; and, moreover, the example is incompatible with the argument, for it cannot be the lamp that illumines the hitherto unillumined object, since, it is knowledge only that illumines; and an illumination of objects may be effected by knowledge even without the lamp, while the light of the lamp is only ancillary to the visual organ which effectuates the cognition, ancillary mediately through the dispulsion of the obstruent darkness. We dismiss further prolixity.

Counterposition of Prcedeni Inference

प्रतिप्रयोगश्च विवादाध्यासितमज्ञानं न ज्ञानमात्रब्रह्माश्रितम्; अज्ञानत्वात्, शुक्तिकाद्यज्ञानवदिति । ननु शुक्तिकाद्यज्ञानस्याश्रयस्य प्रत्यगर्थस्य ज्ञानमात्रस्वभावत्वमेव इति चेत्, मैवं शङ्किष्ठाः । अनुभूतिर्हि स्वसद्भावेनैव कस्यचिद्वस्तुनो व्यवहारानुगुणत्वापादनस्वभावो ज्ञानावगतिसंविदाद्यपरनामा सकर्मकोऽनुभवितुरात्मनो धर्मविशेषः । अनुभवितुरात्मत्वमात्मवृत्तिगुणविशेषस्य ज्ञानत्वमित्याश्रयणात् ।

Pratiprayogaśca vivādādhyāsitamajñānaṁ na jñānamātrabrahmaśritam; ajñānatvāt, śuktikādyajñānavaditi. Nanu śuktikādyajñānasyāśrayasya pratyagarthasya jñānamātrasva-

bhāvatvameva iti cet, maivaṁ śaṅkiṣṭaḥ. Anubhūtirhi svasadbhāvenaiva kasyacidvastuno vyavahārānuguṇatvāpādanasvabhāvo jñānāvagatisaṁvidādyaparanāmā sakarmako'nubhaviturātmano dharmaviśeṣaḥ. Anubhaviturātmattvamātmavṛttiguṇaviśeṣasya jñānatvamityāśrayaṇāt.

The counterposition (of the Rāmānujas) is as follows :—The illusion under dispute does not reside in Brahman, who is pure knowledge, because it is an illusion, like the illusion about nacre, etc. If any one ask: Has not the self-conscious entity that underlies the illusion about nacre, etc., knowledge only for its nature ? They reply: Do not start such difficulties; for we suppose that consciousness by its bare existence has the nature of creating conformity to the usage about (i.e., the name and notion of) some object; and such consciousness, also called knowledge, apprehension, comprehension, intelligence, etc., constitutes the soul, or knowledge, of that which acts and knows.

ननु ज्ञानरूपस्यात्मनः कथं ज्ञानगुणकत्वमिति चेत्, तदसारम् । यथा हि मणिद्युमणिप्रभृति तेजोद्रव्यं प्रभावद्रूपेणावतिष्ठमानं प्रभारूपगुणाश्रयः । स्वाश्रयादन्यत्रापि वर्तमानत्वेन रूपवत्त्वेन च प्रभा द्रव्यरूपाऽपि तच्छेषत्वनिबन्धनगुणव्यवहारा । एवमयमात्मा स्वप्रकाशचिद्रूप एव चैतन्यगुणः ।

Nanu jñānarūpasyātmanaḥ kathaṁ jñānaguṇakatvamiti cet, tadasāraṃ. Yathā hi maṇidyumaṇiprabhṛti tejodravyaṁ prabhāvadrūpeṇāvatiṣṭhamānaṁ prabhārūpaguṇāśrayaḥ. Svāśrayādanyatrāpi vartamānatvena rūpavattvena ca prabhā dravyarūpā'pi tacchesatvanibandhanaguṇavyavahārā. Evamayamātmā svaprakāśacidrūpa eva caitanyaguṇaḥ.

If any one ask : How can the soul, if it consists of cognition, have cognition as a quality? they reply: This question is futile; for as a gem, the sun, and other luminous things, existing in the form of light, are substances in which light as a quality inheres—for light, as existing elsewhere than in its usual receptacle, and as being a mode of things though a substance, is still styled and accounted a quality derived from determination by that substance,—so this soul, while it exists as a self luminous intelligence, has also intelligence as its quality.

तथा च श्रुतिः–स यथा सैन्धवघनोऽनन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नो रसघन एवैवं वा अरेऽयमात्मानन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघन एव (बृ. उ. 4/5/13) । अत्रायं

पुरुषः स्वयंज्योतिर्भवति (बृ. उ. 4/3/9) । न विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते । (बृ. उ. 4/3/30) । अथ यो वेदेदं जिघ्राणीति स आत्मा (छा. 8/12/4) । योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुषः (बृ. उ. 4/3/7) । एष हि द्रष्टा स्प्रष्टा श्रोता घ्राता रसयिता मन्ता बोद्धा कर्ता विज्ञानात्मा पुरुषः (प्रश्नो. 4/9) । इत्यादिका ।

Tathā ca śrutiḥ—Sa yathā saindhavaghano'nantaro'bāhyaḥ kṛtsno rasaghana evaivaṁ vā are'yamātmānantaro'bāhyaḥ kṛtsnaḥ prajñānaghana eva (Bṛ. U. 4/5/13). Atrāyaṁ puruṣaḥ svayaṁjyotirbhavati (Bṛ. U. 4/3/9). Na vijñāturvijñāterviparilopo vidyate. (Bṛ. U. 4/3/30). Atha yo vededaṁ jighrāṇīti sa ātmā (Cā. 8/12/4). Yo'yaṁ vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu hṛdyantarjyotiḥ puruṣaḥ. (Bṛ. U. 4/3/7). Eṣa hi draṣṭā spraṣṭā śrotā ghrātā rasayitā mantā boddhā kartā vijñānātmā puruṣaḥ (Praśno. 4/9). Ityādikā.

Accordingly the Vedic texts: A lump of salt is always within and without one entire mass of taste, so also this soul is within and without an entire mass of knowledge ; Herein this person is itself a light; Of the knowledge of that which knows there is no suspension; He who knows, smells this; and so also, This is the soul which, consisting of knowledge, is the light within the heart; For this person is the seer, the hearer, the taster, the smeller, the thinker, the understander, the doer; The person is knowledge, and the like texts.

No Evidence in Vedas as Regards Cosmical Illusion

न च 'अनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः' (छा. 8/3/2) इति श्रुतिरविद्यायां प्रमाणमित्याश्रयितुं शक्यम् । ऋतेतरविषयो ह्यनृतशब्दः । ऋतशब्दश्च कर्मवचनः । 'ऋतं पिबन्तौ' (का. 3/1) । इति वचनात् ऋतं कर्म फलाभिसन्धिरहितं, परमपुरुषाराधनवेषं तत्प्राप्तिफलम् । अत्र तद्व्यतिरिक्तं सांसारिकाल्पफलं कर्मानृतं ब्रह्मप्राप्तिविरोधि । 'य एतं ब्रह्मलोकं न विन्दन्ति अनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढ़ाः' (छा. 8/3/2) इति वचनात् ।

Na ca 'anṛtena hi pratyūḍhāḥ' (Chā. 8/3/2) iti śrutiravidyāyāṁ pramāṇamityāśrayituṁ śakyaṃ. Ṛtetaraviṣayo hyanṛtaśabdaḥ. Ṛtaśabdaśca karmavacanaḥ. 'Ṛtaṁ pibantau' (Kā. 3/1). Iti vacanāt ṛtaṁ karma phalābhisandhirahitaṁ, paramapuruṣārādhanaveṣaṁ tatprāptiphalaṃ. Atra tadvyatiriktaṁ sāṁsārikālpaphalaṁ karmānṛtaṁ brahmaprāptivirodhi. 'Ya

etaṁ brahmalokaṁ na vindanti anṛtena hi pratyūḍhāḥ' (Chā. 8/3/2) iti vacanāt.

It is not to be supposed that the Veda also affords evidence of the existence of the cosmical illusion, in the text. Enveloped in untruth (*anṛta*); for the word untruth (*anṛta*) denotes that which is other than truth (*ṛta*). The word *ṛita* has a passive sense, as appears from the words, Drinking *ṛta*. *Ṛta* means works done without desire of fruit; having as its reward the attainment of the bliss of the Supreme Spirit through his propitiation. In the text in question, untruth (*anṛta*) designates the scanty fruit enjoyed during transmigratory existence as opposed to that (which results from propitiation of the Supreme Spirit), which temporal fruit is obstructive to the attainment of supreme existence (*brahman*); the entire text (when the context is supplied) being : They who find not this supreme sphere (*brahma-loka*) are enveloped in untruth.

'मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात्' (श्वे. उ. 4/10) इत्यादौ मायाशब्दो विचित्रार्थसर्गकरत्रिगुणात्मकप्रकृत्यभिधायको नानिर्वचनीयाज्ञानवचनः ।

'Māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt' (Śve. U. 4/10) ityādau māyāśabdo vicitrārthasargakaratriguṇātmakaprakṛtyabhidhāyako nānirvacanīyājñānavacanaḥ.

In such texts, again as Let him know illusion (*māyā*) to be the primary emanative cause (*prakṛti*), the term (*māyā*) designates the emanative cause, consisting of the three "cords" (*guṇa*), and creative of the diversified universe. It does not designate the inexplicable illusion (for which the Śaṅkaras contend).

5. **तेन मायासहस्रं तच्छम्बरस्याशुगामिना ।**
बालस्य रक्षता देहमेकैकांशेन सूदितम् ॥ (वि. पु. 1/19/20)

Tena māyāsahasraṁ tacchambarasyāśugāminā,
Bālasya rakṣatā dehamekaikāṁśena sūditaṃ.
(Vi. Pu. 1/19/20)

इत्यादौ विचित्रार्थसर्गसमर्थस्य पारमार्थिकस्यैवासुराद्यस्त्रविशेषस्यैव मायाशब्दाभिधेयत्वोपालम्भात् । अतो न कदाचिदपि श्रुत्याऽनिर्वचनीयाज्ञानप्रतिपादनम् ।

Ityādau vicitrārthasargasamarthasya pāramārthikasyaivāsurādyastraviśeṣasyaiva māyāśabdābhidheyatvopālambhāt. Ato na kadācidapi śrutyā'nirvacanīyājñānapratipādanaṃ.

In such passages as, By him the defender of the body of the child, moving rapidly, the thousands illusions (*māyā*) of the barbarian were swooped upon as by a hawk, we observe that the word "illusion" (*māyā*) designates the really existent weapon of a Titan, capable of projective diversified creation. The Veda, then, never sets out an inexplicable illusion.

Illiusion has no Existence Even After Application

नाप्यैक्योपदेशान्यथानुपपत्त्या तत्त्वंपदयोः सविशेषब्रह्माभिधायित्वेन विरुद्धयोर्जीवपरयोः स्वरूपैक्यस्य प्रतिपत्तुमशक्यतयाऽर्थापत्तेरनुदयदोषदूषितत्वात् ।

Nāpyaikyopadeśānyathānupapattyā tattvaṁpadayoḥ saviśeṣabrahmābhidhāyitvena viruddhayorjīvaparayoḥ svarūpaikyasya pratipattumaśakyatayā'rthāpatteranudayadoṣadūṣitatvāt.

Nor (is the cosmical illusion to be inferred from the "grand text," That art thou), inasmuch as the words, That art thou, being incompetent to teach unity, and indicating a conditionate Supreme Spirit, we cannot understand by them the essential unity of the mutually exclusive supreme and individual spirits; for such a supposition (as that they are identical) would violate the law of excluded middle.

तथा हि–तत्पदं निरस्तसमस्तदोषम् अनवधिकातिशयासङ्ख्येयकल्याणगुणास्पदं जगदुदयविभवलयलीलं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयति । 'तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' (छा.6/2/3) इत्यादिषु तस्यैव प्रकृतत्वात् । तत्समानाधिकरणं त्वंपदं चाचिद्विशिष्टजीवशरीरकं ब्रह्माचष्टे । प्रकारद्वयविशिष्टैकवस्तुपरत्वात् सामानाधिकरण्यस्य ।

Tathā hi—tatpadaṁ nirastasamastadoṣaṁ anavadhikātiśayāsaṅkhyeyakalyāṇaguṇāspadaṁ jagadudayavibhavalayalīlaṁ brahma pratipādayati. 'Tadaikṣata bahu syāṁ prajāyeya' (Chā. 6//2/3) ityādiṣu tasyaiva prakṛtatvāt. Tatsamānādhikaraṇaṁ tvaṁpadaṁ cācidviśiṣṭajīvaśarīrakaṁ brahmācaṣṭe. Prakāradvayaviśiṣṭaikavastuparatvāt sāmānādhikaraṇyasya.

To explain this. The term that denotes the Supreme Spirit exempt from all imperfections, of illimitable excellence, a repository of innumerable auspicious attributes, to whom the emanation, sustentation, retractation of the universe is a pastime;[1] such being the

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1 Cf. the dictum of Herakleitus : Making worlds is Zeus's pastime; and that of Plato (Laws, Book vii. p. 803) Man is made to be the plaything of God.

Supreme Spirit, spoken of in such texts as, That desired, let me be many, let me bring forth. Perhaps the word Thou, referring to the same object (as the word That), denotes the Supreme Spirit characterised by consciousness, having all individual spirits as his body; for a "reference to the same object" designates one thing determined by two modes.

Advaita-Vādins as Plea-Implication of the Words "That Art Thou"

ननु 'सोऽयं देवदत्त' इतिवत् तत्त्वमिति पदयोर्विरुद्धभागत्यागलक्षणया निर्विशेषस्वरूपमात्मैक्यं सामानाधिकरण्यार्थः किं न स्यात् । यथा सोऽयमित्यत्र देशान्तरकालान्तरसम्बन्धी पुरुषः प्रतीयते । इदंशब्देन च संनिहितदेश-वर्तमानकालान्तरसम्बन्धी । तयोः सामानाधिकरण्येनैक्यमवगम्यते । तत्रैकस्य युगपद्विरुद्धदेशकालप्रतीतिर्न सम्भवतीति द्वयोरपि पदयोः स्वरूपपरत्वे स्वरूपस्य चैक्यं प्रतिपत्तुं शक्यम् । एवमत्रापि किंचिज्ज्ञत्वसर्वज्ञत्वादि-विरुद्धांश-प्रहाणेनाखण्डस्वरूपं लक्ष्यत इति चेत्–

Nanu 'So'yaṁ devadatta' itivat tattvamiti padayorviruddhabhāgatyāgalakṣaṇayā nirviśeṣasvarūpamātmaikyaṁ sāmānādhikaraṇyārthaḥ kiṁ na syāt. Yathā so'yamityatra deśāntarakālāntarasambandhī puruṣaḥ pratīyate. Idaṁśabdena ca saṁnihitadeśavartamānakālāntarasambandhī. Tayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyenaikyamavagamyate. Tatraikasya yugapadviruddhadeśakālapratītirna sambhavatīti dvayorapi padayoḥ svarūpaparatve svarūpasya caikyaṁ pratipattuṁ śakyaṃ. Evamatrāpi kiṁcijjñatvasarvajñatvādi-viruddhāṁśaprahāṇenākhaṇḍasvarūpaṁ lakṣyata iti cet—

Here, perhaps, an Advaita-vādin may reply : Why may not the purport of the reference to the same object in the words, That are you, be undifferenced essence, the unity of souls, these words (That and you) having a (reciprocally) implicate power by abandonment of opposite portions of their meaning; as is the case in the phrase, This is that Devadatta. In the words, This is that Devadatta, we understand by the word That, a person in relation to a different time and place, and by the word This, a person in relation to the present time and place. That both are one and the same is understood by the form of predication ("reference to the same object"). Now, as one and the same thing cannot at the same time be known as in different times and places, the two words (This and That) must refer to the essence (and not to the accidents of time and place), and unity of essence can be understood. Similarly in the text, That art thou, there is implicated an indivisible essence by abandonment of the contradictory portions (of the denotation), viz., finite cognition (which belongs to the individual soul or Thou), and infinite cognition (which belongs to the real or unindividual soul).

Rejoinder to be Raised by Ramanuja

विषमोऽयमुपन्यासः । दृष्टान्तेऽपि विरोधवैधुर्येण लक्षणागन्धासम्भवात् । एकस्य तावद् भूतवर्तमानकालद्वयसम्बन्धो न विरुद्धः । देशान्तरस्थितिर्भूता संनिहितदेशस्थितिर्वर्तत इति देशभेदसम्बन्धविरोधश्च कालभेदेन परिहरणीयः । लक्षणापक्षेऽप्येकस्यैव पदस्य लक्षकत्वाश्रयणेन विरोधपरिहारे पदद्वयस्य लाक्षणिकत्वस्वीकारो न संगच्छते ।

Viṣamo'yamupanyāsaḥ. Dṛṣṭānte'pi virodhavaidhuryeṇa lakṣaṇāgandhāsambhavāt. Ekasya tāvad bhūtavartamānakāladvayasambandho na viruddhaḥ. Deśāntarasthitirbhūtā saṁnihitadeśasthitirvartata iti deśabhedasambandhavirodhaśca kālabhedena pariharaṇīyaḥ. Lakṣaṇāpakṣe'pyekasyaiva padasya lakṣakatvāśrayaṇena virodhaparihāre padadvayasya lākṣaṇikatvasvīkāro na saṅgacchate.

This suggestion (the Rāmānuja's reply) is unsatisfactory, for there is no opposition (between This and That) in the example, (This is that Devadatta), and consequently not the smallest particle of "implication" (*lakṣaṇā,* both This and That being used in their denotative capacity). The connection of one object with two times past and present involves no contradiction. And any contradiction supposed to arise from relation to different places may be avoided by a supposed difference of time, the existence in the distant place being past, and the existence in the near being present.

इतरथैकस्य वस्तुनः तत्तेदन्ताविशिष्टत्वावगाहनेन प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः प्रामाण्यानङ्गीकारे स्थायित्वासिद्धौ क्षणभङ्गवादी बौद्धो विजयेत ।

Itarathaikasya vastunaḥ tattedantāviśiṣṭatvāvagāhanena pratyabhijñāyāḥ prāmāṇyānaṅgīkāre sthāyitvāsiddhau kṣaṇabhaṅgavādī bauddhau vijayeta.

Even if we concede to you the "implication," the (supposed) contradiction being avoidable by supposing one term (either That or

Thou) to be implicative, it is unnecessry to admit that both words are implicative. Otherwise (if we admit that both words are implicative), if it be granted that the one thing may be recognised, with the concomitant assurance that it differs as this and as that, permanence in things will be inadmissible, and the Buddhist assertor of a momentary flux of things will be triumphant.

Itiśrutyantarāt

एवमत्रापि जीवपरमात्मनोः शरीरात्मभावेन तादात्म्यं न विरुद्धमिति प्रतिपादितम् । जीवात्मा हि ब्रह्मणः शरीरतया प्रकारत्वाद् ब्रह्मात्मकः । 'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरो यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा शरीरम्' (बृ. 3/7/22) इतिश्रुत्यन्तरात् ।

Evamatrāpi jīvaparamātmanoḥ śarīrātmabhāvena tādātmyaṁ na viruddhamiti pratipāditam. Jīvātmā hi brahmaṇaḥ śarīratayā prakāratvād brahmātmakaḥ. 'Ya ātmani tiṣṭhannā- tmano'ntaro yamātmā na veda yasyātmā śarīram' (Bṛ. 3/7/22) itiśrutyantarāt.

We have, therefore (the Rāmānuja's continue), laid it down in this question that there is no contradiction in the identity of the individual and the Supreme Spirit, the individual spirits being the body and the Supreme Spirit the soul. For the individual spirit as the body, and therefore a form, of the Supreme Spirit, is identical with the Supreme Spirit, according to another text, Who abiding in the soul, is the controller of the soul, who knows the soul, of whom soul is the body.

All Words are Designatory of the Supreme Spirit

अत्यल्पमिदमुच्यते । सर्वे शब्दाः परमात्मन एव वाचकाः । न च पर्यायत्वम् । द्वारभेदसम्भवात् । तथा हि जीवस्य शरीरतया प्रकारभूतानि देवमनुष्यादिसंस्थानानीव सर्वाणि वस्तूनीति ब्रह्मात्मकानि तानि सर्वाणि । अतः-

Atyalpamidamucyate. Sarve śabdāḥ paramātmana eva vācakāḥ. Na ca paryāyatvam. Dvārabhedasambhavāt. Tathā hi jīvasya śarīratayā prakārabhūtāni devamanuṣyādisaṁsthānānīva sarvāṇi vastūnīti brahmātmakāni tāni sarvāṇi. Ataḥ—

Your statement of the matter, therefore, is too narrow. All words are designatory of the Supreme Spirit. They are not all synonymous, a variety of media being possible; thus as all organised

bodies, divine, human, etc., are forms of individual spirits, so all things (are the body of Supreme Spirit), all things are identical with Supreme Spirit. Hence—

6. देवो मनुष्यो यक्षो वा पिशाचोरगराक्षसाः ।
पक्षी वृक्षो लता काष्ठं शिला तृणं घटः पटः ॥

Devo manuṣyo yakṣo vā piśācoragarākṣasāḥ,
Pakṣī vṛkṣo latā kāṣṭhaṁ śilā tṛṇaṁ ghaṭaḥ paṭaḥ.

God, man, yakṣa, piśāca, serpent, rākṣasa, bird, tree, creeper, wood, stone, grass, jar, cloth,—

इत्यादयः सर्वे शब्दाः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययोगेनाभिधायकतया प्रसिद्धा लोके, तद्वाच्यतया प्रतीयमानतत्तत्संस्थानवद्वस्तुमुखेन तदभिमानिजीवतदन्तर्यामिपरमात्मपर्यन्तसङ्घातस्य वाचकाः । देवादिशब्दानां परमात्मपर्यन्तत्वमुक्तं तत्त्वमुक्तावल्यां चतुर्थसरे-

Ityādayaḥ sarve śabdāḥ prakṛtipratyayayogenābhidhāyakatayā prasiddhā loke, tadvācyatayā pratīyamānatattatsaṁsthānavadvastumukhena tadabhimānijīvatadantaryāmiparamātmaparyantasaṅghātasya vācakāḥ. Devādiśabdānāṁ paramātmaparyantatvamuktaṁ tattvamuktāvalyāṁ caturthasare—

These and all other words, be they what they may, which are current among mankind as denotative by means of their base and its suffixes, as denoting those things, in denoting things of this or that apparent constitution, really denote the individual souls which assumed to them such body, and the whole complexus of things terminating in the Supreme Spirit ruling within. That God and all other words whatsoever ultimately denote the Supreme Spirit is stated in the *Tattvamuktāvalī* and in the Caturantara—

7. जीवं देवादिशब्दो वदति तदपृथक्सिद्धभावाभिधाना-
न्निष्कर्षाभावयुक्ताद्बहुरिह च दृढो लोकवेदप्रयोगः ।
आत्मासम्बन्धकाले स्थितिरनवगता देवमर्त्यादिमूर्ते-
र्जीवात्मानुप्रवेशाज्जगति विभुरपि व्याकरोन्नामरूपे ॥
(तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापः 4/82) इति ।

Jīvaṁ devādiśabdo vadati tadapṛthaksiddhabhāvābhidhānā-
Nniṣkarṣābhāvayuktādvahuriha ca dṛḍho lokavedaprayogaḥ,
Ātmāsambandhakāle sthitiranavagatā devamartyādimūrte-
Rjīvātmānupraveśājjagati vibhurapi vyākaronnāmarūpe.
(Tattvamuktākalāpaḥ 4/32) iti.

"God, and all other words, designate the soul, none else than That, called the established entity,"
"Of this there is much significant and undoubted exemplification in common speech and in the Veda;"
"Existence when dissociated from spirit is unknown; in the form of gods, mortals, and the rest,"
"When pervading the individual spirit, the infinite has made a diversity of names and forms in the world."

अनेन देवादिशब्दानां शरीरविशिष्टजीवपर्यन्तत्वं प्रतिपाद्य, 'संस्थानैक्याद्यभावे' (त. मु. क. 4/83) इत्यादिना शरीरलक्षणं दर्शयित्वा, 'शब्दैस्तन्वंशरूपप्रभृति:' (4/84) इत्यादिना विश्वस्येश्वरापृथक्सिद्धत्वमुपपाद्य, 'निष्कर्षाकूत' (4/85) इत्यादिना पद्येन सर्वेषां शब्दानां परमात्मपर्यन्तत्वं प्रतिपादितं, तत्सर्वं तत एवावधार्यम् । अयमेवार्थ: समर्थितो वेदार्थसंग्रहे नामरूपश्रुतिव्याकरणसमये रामानुजेन ।

Anena devādiśabdānāṁ śarīraviśiṣṭajīvaparyantatvaṁ pratipādya, 'saṁsthānaikyādyabhāve' (Ta. Mu. Ka. 4/83) ityādinā śarīralakṣaṇaṁ darśayitvā, 'śabdaistanvaṁśarūpapra-bhṛtiḥ' (4/84) ityādinā viśvasyeśvarāpṛthaksiddhatvamupapā-dya, 'niṣkarṣākūta' (4/85) ityādinā padyena sarveṣāṁ śabdānāṁ paramātmaparyantatvaṁ pratipāditaṁ, tatsarvaṁ tata evāvadhāryam. Ayamevārthaḥ samarthito vedārthasaṅgrahe nāmarūpaśrutivyākaraṇasamaye rāmānujena.

In these words, the author, setting forth that all words, God, and the rest, designate the body, and showing in the words, "No unity in systems," etc., the characteristic of body, and showing in the words, "By words which are subsitute for the essence of things," etc., that it is established that nothing is different from the universal Lord, lays down in the verses, Significant of the essence, etc., that all words ultimately designate the Supreme Spirit. All this may be ascertained from that work. The same matter has been enforced by Rāmānuja in the *Vedārtha-saṅgraha*, when analysing the Vedic text about names and forms.

No Evidence of Undetermined Reality

किं च सर्वप्रमाणस्य सविशेषविषयतया निर्विशेषवस्तुनि न किमपि प्रमाणं समस्ति । निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्षेऽपि सविशेषमेव वस्तु प्रतीयते । अन्यथा सविकल्पके सोऽयमिति पूर्वप्रतिपन्नप्रकारविशिष्टप्रतीत्यनुपपत्तेः ।

Kiṁ ca sarvapramāṇasya saviśeṣaviṣayatayā nirviśeṣavastuni na kimapi pramāṇaṁ samasti. Nirvikalpakapratyakṣe'pi saviśeṣameva vastu pratīyate. Anyathā savikalpake so'yamiti pūrvapratipannaprakāraviśiṣṭapratītyanupapatteḥ.

Moreover, every form of evidence having some determinate object, there can be no evidence of an undetermined (unconditionate) reality. Even in non-discriminative perception it is a determinate (or conditioned) thing that is cognised.

That Art Thou is not Sublative of Illusory Universe

किं च तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यं प्रपञ्चस्य बाधकम् । भ्रान्तिमूलकत्वात्, भ्रान्तिप्रयुक्तरज्जुसर्पवाक्यवत् । नापि ब्रह्मात्मैक्यज्ञानं विवर्तकम् । तत्र प्रमाणाभावस्य प्रागेवोपपादनात् ।

Kiṁ ca tattvamasyādivākyaṁ prapañcasya bādhakam. Bhrāntimūlakatvāt, bhrāntiprayuktarajjusarpavākyavat. Nāpi brahmātmaikyajñānaṁ vivartakam. Tatra pramāṇābhāvasya prāgevopapādanāt.

Else in discriminative perception there could not be shown to be a cognition characterised by an already presented form. Again, that text, That art thou, is not sublative of the universe as rooted in illusion, like a sentence declaratory that what was illusorily presented, as a snake is a piece of rope; nor does knowledge of the unity of the absolute and the soul bring (this illusory universe) to an end; for we have already demonstrated that there is no proof of these positions.

न च प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यत्वप्रतिष्ठापनपक्ष एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञाव्याकोप: ।

Na ca prapañcasya satyatvapratiṣṭhāpanapakṣa ekavijñānena sarvavijñānapratijñāvyākopaḥ.

Nor is there an absurdity (as the Śaṅkaras would say), on the hypothesis enunciatory of the reality of the universe, in affirming that by a cognition of one there is a cognition of all things.

प्रकृति-पुरुष-महदहङ्कार-तन्मात्र-भूतेन्द्रिय-चतुर्दशभुवनात्मकब्रह्माण्ड-तदन्तर्वर्ति-देव तिर्यङ्-मनुष्य-स्थावरादि-सर्वप्रकार-संस्थान-संस्थितं कार्यमपि सर्वं ब्रह्मैवेति कारणभूतब्रह्मात्मज्ञानादेवसर्वविज्ञानं भवतीत्येकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानस्योपपन्नतर-त्वात् । अपि च ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्य मिथ्यात्वे सर्वस्यासत्त्वादेव एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञा बाध्येत ।

Prakṛti-puruṣa-mahadahaṁkāra-tanmātra—bhūtendriya-caturdaśabhuvanātmakabrahmāṇḍa-tadantarvarti-deva-tiryaṅ-manuṣya-sthāvarādi—sarvaṁprakāra-saṁsthāna-saṁsthitaṁ kāryamapi sarvaṁ brahmaiveti kāraṇabhūtabrahmātmajñānādevasarvavijñānaṁ bhavatītyekavijñānena sarvavijñānasyopapannataratvāt. Api ca brahmavyatiriktasya sarvasya mithyātve sarvasyāsattvādeva ekavijñānena sarvavijñānapratijñā bādhyeta.

It is easily evinced that the mundane egg, consisting of the primary cause (*prakṛti*), intellect, self-position, the rudimentary elements, the gross elements, the organs (of sense and of action), and the fourteen worlds, and the gods, animals, men, immovable things, and so forth, that exist within it, constituting a complex of all forms, is all an effect, and that from the single cognition of absolute spirit as its (emanative) cause, when we recognise that all this is absolute spirit (there being a tautology between cause and effect), there arises cognition of all things, and thus by cognition of one cognition of all. Besides, if all else than absolute spirit were unreal, then all being non-existent, it would follow that by one cognition all cognition would be sublated.

नामरूपविभागानर्हसूक्ष्मदशावत्प्रकृतिपुरुषशरीरं ब्रह्म कारणावस्थम् । जगतस्तदापत्तिरेव प्रलयः । नामरूपविभागविभक्तस्थूलचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं ब्रह्मकार्यावस्थम् ब्रह्मणस्तथाविधस्थूलभावश्च सृष्टिरित्यभिधीयते । एवं च कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वमपि आरम्भणाधिकरणे प्रतिपादितमुपपन्नतरं भवति ।

Nāmarūpavibhāgānarhasūkṣmadaśāvatprakṛtipuruṣaśarīraṁ brahma kāraṇāvasthaṃ. Jagatastadāpattireva pralayaḥ. Nāmarūpavibhāgavibhaktasthūlacidacidvastuśarīraṁ brahmakāryāvasthaṃ brahmaṇastathāvidhasthūlabhāvaśca sṛṣṭirityabhidhīyate. Evaṁ ca kāryakāraṇayorananyatvamapi ārambhaṇādhikaraṇe pratipāditamupapannataraṁ bhavati.

It is laid down (by the Rāmānujas) that retractation into the universe *(pralaya)* is when the universe, the body whereof consists of souls and the originant *(prakṛti)*, returns to its imperceptible state, unsusceptible of divison by names and forms, existing as absolute spirit the emanative cause; and that creation (or emanation) is the gross or perceptible condition of absolute spirit, the body whereof is soul and not soul divided by diversity of names and forms, in the condition of the (emanative) effect of absolute spirit.

Identity of Cause and Effect is Explicable

निर्गुणवादाश्च प्राकृतहेयगुणनिषेधविषयतया व्यवस्थिताः । नानात्वनिषेधवादाश्चैकस्यैव ब्रह्मणः शरीरतया प्रकारभूतं सर्वं चेतनाचेतनात्मकं वस्त्विति सर्वस्यात्मतया सर्वप्रकारं ब्रह्मैवावस्थितमिति सर्वात्मकब्रह्मपृथग्भूतवस्तुसद्भावनिषेधपरत्वाभ्युपगमेन प्रतिपादिताः ।

Nirguṇavādāśca prākṛtaheyaguṇaniśedhaviṣayatayā vyavasthitāḥ. Nānātvaniṣedhavādāścaikasyaiva brahmaṇaḥ śarīratayā prakārabhūtaṁ sarvaṁ cetanācetanātmakaṁ vastviti sarvasyātmatayā sarvaprakāraṁ brahmaivāvasthitamiti sarvātmakabrahmapṛthagbhūtavastusadbhāvaniṣedhaparatvābhyupagamena pratipāditāḥ.

In this way the identity of cause and effect laid down in the aphorism (of Vyāsa) treating of origination, is easily explicable. The statements that the Supreme Spirits void of attributes are intended (it is shown) to deny thereof phenomenal qualities which are to be escaped from by those that desire emancipation. The texts which deny plurality are explained as allowed to be employed for the denial of the real existence of things apart from the Supreme Spirit, which is identical with all things, it being Supreme Spirit which subsists under all forms as the soul of all, all things sentient and unsentient being forms as being the body of absolute Spirit.[1]

Essence X-ray on Concept of Ramanuja

किमत्र तत्त्वं भेदोऽभेद उभयात्मकं वा ? सर्वं तत्त्वम् । तत्र सर्वशरीरतया सर्वप्रकारं ब्रह्मैवावस्थितमित्यभेदोऽभ्युपेयते । एकमेव ब्रह्म नानाभूतचिदचित्प्रकारात् नानात्वेनावस्थितमिति भेदाभेदौ । चिदचिदीश्वराणां स्वरूपस्वभाववैलक्षण्यादसङ्कराच्च भेदः ।

Kimatra tattvaṁ bhedo'bheda ubhayātmakaṁ vā? Sarvaṁ tattvaṃ. Tatra sarvaśarīratayā sarvaprakāraṁ brahmaivāvasthitamityabhedo'bhyupeyate. Ekameva brahma nānābhūtacidacitprakārāt nānātvenāvasthitamiti bhedābhedau. Cidacidīśvarāṇāṁ svarūpasvabhāvavailakṣaṇyādasaṅkarācca bhedaḥ.

What is the principle here involved, pluralism or monism, or a universe both one and more than one ? Of these alternatives monism is admitted in saying that Supreme Spirit alone subsists in all

1 "Whose body nature is, and God the soul." —Pope

forms as all is its body; both unity and plurality are admitted in saying that one only Supreme Spirit subsists under a plurality of forms diverse as soul; and not soul and plurality is admitted in saying that the essential natures of soul, not-soul, and the Lord, are diferent, and not to be confounded.

Soul, Not Soul and the Lord Undergo Contraction and Expansion of Knowledge

तत्र चिद्रूपाणां जीवात्मनामसंकुचितापरिच्छिन्न-निर्मलज्ञानरूपाणाम् अनादिकर्म-रूपाविद्यावेष्टितानां तत्तत्कर्मानुरूपज्ञानसङ्कोचविकाशौ भोग्यभूताचित्सं-सर्गस्तदनुगुणसुख-दुःखोपभोगद्वयरूपा भोक्तृता भगवत्प्रतिपत्तिर्भगवत्पदप्राप्ति-रित्यादयः स्वभावाः ।

Tatra cidrūpāṇāṁ jīvātmanāmasaṁkucitāparicchinna-nirmala-jñānarūpāṇāṃ anādikarmarūpāvidyāveṣṭitānāṁ tattatkarmānu-rūpajñānasaṅkocavikāśau bhogyabhūtācitsaṁsargastadanugu-ṇasukha-duḥkhopabhogadvayarūpā bhoktṛtā bhagavatprati-pattirbhagavatpadaprāptirityādayaḥ svabhāvāḥ.

Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, or souls, consisting of uncontracted and unlimited pure knowledge, but enveloped in illusion, that is, in works from all eternity, undergo contraction and expansion of knowledge according to the degrees of their merits. Soul experiences fruition, and after reaping pleasures and pains proportionate to merits and demerits, there ensues knowledge of the Lord, or attainment of the sphere of the Lord.

अचिद्वस्तूनां तु भोग्यभूतानामचेतनत्वमपुरुषार्थत्वं विकारास्पदत्वमित्यादयः ।

Acidvastūnāṁ tu bhogyabhūtānāmacetanatvamapuruṣārthat-vaṁ vikārāspadatvamityādayaḥ.

Of things which are not-soul, and which are objects of fruition (or experience of pleasure and pain), unconsciousness, unconduciveness to the end of man, susceptibility of modification, and the like, are the properties.

परस्येश्वरस्य भोक्तृ-भोग्ययोरन्तर्यामिरूपेणावस्थानमपरिच्छेद्यज्ञानैश्वर्यवीर्यशक्ति-तेजःप्रभृत्यनवधिकातिशयासंख्येय-कल्याणगुणगणता स्वसंकल्पप्रवृत्तस्वेतरसम-स्तचिदचिद्वस्तुजातता स्वाभिमतस्वानुरूपैकरूपदिव्यरूपनिरतिशयविविधानन्तभूषण-तेत्यादयः ।

Parasyeśvarasya bhoktṛ-bhogyayorantaryāmirūpeṇāvasthāna-maparicchedyajñānaiśvaryavīryaśakti-tejaḥprabhṛtyanavadhikā-tiśayāsaṁkhyeya-kalyāṇa guṇagaṇatā svasaṁkalpapravṛttasvetara-samastacidacidvastujātatā svābhimatasvānurūpaikarūpadivyarū-paniratisayavividhānantabhūṣaṇatetyādayaḥ.

Of the Supreme Lord the attributes are subsistence, as the internal controller (or animator) of both the subjects and the objects of fruition; the boundless glory of illimitable knowledge, dominion, majesty, power, brightness, and the like, the countless multitude of auspicious qualities; the generation at will of all things other than himself, whether spiritual or non-spiritual; various and infinite adornment with unsurpassable excellence, singular, uniform, and divine.

वेङ्कटनाथेन त्वित्थं निरटङ्कि पदार्थविभागः—

Veṅkaṭanāthena tvitthaṁ niraṭaṅki padārthavibhāgaḥ—

Veṅkaṭanātha has given the following distribution of things :—

8. द्रव्याद्रव्यप्रभेदान्मितमुभयविधं तद्विदस्तत्त्वमाहुः
द्रव्यं द्वेधा विभक्तं जडमजडमिति प्राच्यमव्यक्तकालौ ।
अन्त्यं प्रत्यक्पराक्च प्रथममुभयथा तत्र जीवेशभेदा-
न्नित्या भूतिर्मतिश्चेत्यपरमिह जडामादिमां केचिदाहुः ॥ (त. मु. 1/6)

Dravyādravyaprabhedānmitamubhayavidhaṁ tadvidastattvamāhuḥ
Dravyaṁ dvedhā vibhaktaṁ jaḍamajaḍamiti prācyamavyaktakālau,
Antyaṁ pratyakparākca prathamamubhayathā tatra jīveśabhedā-
Nnitya bhūtirmatiścetyaparamiha jaḍāmādimāṁ kecidāhuḥ. (*Ta. Mu. 1/6*)

"Those who know it have declared the principle to be twofold substance and non-substance;"

"Substance is dichotomised as unsentient and sentient; the former being the unevolved *(avyakta)*, and time."

"The latter is the 'near' *(pratyak)* and the 'distant' *(parāk)*; the 'near being twofold, as either soul or the lord;"

"The 'distant' is eternal glory and intelligence; the other principle some have called the unsentient primary."

Of these –

"Substance undergoes a plurality of conditions; the originant is possessed of goodness and the other cords;

9. तत्र द्रव्यं दशावत्प्रकृतिरिह गुणैः सत्त्वपूर्वैरुपेता
कालोऽब्दाद्याकृतिः स्यादणुरवगतिमाञ्जीव ईशोऽन्य आत्मा ।
सम्प्रोक्ता नित्यभूतिस्त्रिगुणसमधिका सत्त्वयुक्ता तथैव
ज्ञातुर्ज्ञेयावभासो मतिरिति कथितं सङ्ग्रहाद् द्रव्यलक्ष्म ॥
(त. मु. 1/7) इत्यादिना ।

Tatra dravyaṁ daśāvatprakṛtiriha gunaiḥ sattvapūrvairupetā,
Kālo'bdādyākṛtiḥ syādaṇuravagatimāñjīva īśo'nya ātmā.
Samproktā nityabhūtistriguṇasamadhikā sattvayuktā tathaiva,
Jñāturjñeyāvabhāso matiriti kathitaṁ saṅgagrahād dravyalakṣma. (Ta. Mu. 1/7)

"Time has the form of years, etc.; soul is atomic and cognisant; the other spirit is the Lord;"

"Eternal bliss has been declared as transcending the three cords (or modes of phenomenal existence), and also as characterised by goodness;"

"The cognisable manifestation of the cognisant is intelligence; thus are the characteristics of substance summarily recounted."

Souls are Different from Supreme Spirit

तत्र चिच्छब्दवाच्या जीवात्मानः परमात्मनः सकाशाद् भिन्ना नित्याश्च । तथा च श्रुतिः–'द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया' (मु. 3/1/1, श्वे. 4/6) इत्यादिका । अत एवोक्तं 'नानात्मानो व्यवस्थातः' (वैशे. सू. 3/2/20) । इति तन्नित्यत्वमपि श्रुतिप्रसिद्धम्–

Tatra cicchabdavācyā jīvātmānaḥ paramātmanaḥ sakāśād bhinnā nityāśca. Tathā ca śrutiḥ—'dvā suparṇā sayujā' sakhāyā' (Mu. 3/1/1, Śve. 4/6) ityādikā. Ata evoktaṁ 'nānātmāno vyavasthātaḥ; (Vaiśe. Sū. 3/2/20) iti tannityatvamapi śrutiprasiddhaṃ—

Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirit, called souls, are different from the Supreme Spirit and eternal. Thus, the text : Two birds, companions, friends, etc. (Ṛg-Veda, I. 164, 20). Accordingly, it is stated (in the aphorisms of Kaṇāda, iii. 2. 20),

Souls are diverse by reason of diversity of conditions. The eternity of souls is often spoken of in revelation –

10. न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चिन्नायं भूत्वा भविता वा न भूयः ।
अजो नित्यः शाश्वतोऽयं पुराणो न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे ॥
(गीता 2/20) इति ।

Na jāyate mriyate vā vipaścinnāyaṁ bhūtvā bhavitā vā na bhūyaḥ,
Ajo nityaḥ śāśvato'yaṁ purāṇo na hanyate hanyamāne śarīre.
(Gitā 2/20) iti.

"The soul is neither born, nor dies, nor having been shall it again cease to be;"

"Unborn, unchanging, eternal, this ancient of days is not killed when the body is killed."

अपरथा कृतप्रणाशाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गः । अत एवोक्तम्–'वीतराग-जन्मादर्शनात्' (न्या. सू. 3/1/25) इति । तदणुत्वमपि श्रुतिप्रसिद्धम्–

Aparathā. kṛtapraṇāśākṛtābhyāgamaprasaṅgaḥ. Ata evoktaṃ—'vītarāga janmādarśanāt' (Nyā. Sū. 3/1/25) iti. Tadaṇutvamapi śrutiprasiddhaṃ—

Otherwise (were the soul not eternal) there would follow a failure of requital and a fruition (of pleasures and pains) unmerited. It has accordingly been said (in the aphorisms of Gautama, iii. 25) : Because no birth is seen of one who is devoid of desire. That the soul is atomic is well known from revelation –

11. बालाग्रशतभागस्य शतधा कल्पितस्य च ।
भागो जीवः स विज्ञेयः स चानन्त्याय कल्पते ॥ (श्वे. 5/9) इति ।

Bālāgraśatabhāgasya śatadhā kalpitasya ca,
Bhāgo jīvaḥ sa vijñeyaḥ sa cānantyāya kalpate.
(Śve. 5/9) iti.

"If the hundredth part of a hair be imagined to be divided a hundred times,"

"The soul may be supposed a part of that, and yet it is capable of infinity."

'आराग्रमात्रः पुरुषः' (श्वे. 5/8), 'अणुरात्मा चेतसा वेदितव्यः' (मुण्ड. 3/1/9) इति च ।

'Ārāgramātraḥ puruṣaḥ' (Śve. 5/8), 'Aṇurātmā cetasā veditavyaḥ' (Muṇḍa. 3/1/9) iti ca.

And again—

> "Soul is of the size of the extremity of the spoke of a wheel.
> Spirit is to be recognised by the intelligence as atomic."

Classification of Unsentient World

अचिच्छब्दवाच्यं दृश्यं जडं जगत्त्रिविधं भोग्य-भोगोपकरण-भोगायतन-भेदात् ।

Acicchabdavācyaṁ dṛśyaṁ jaḍaṁ jagattrividhaṁ bhogya-bhogopakaraṇa-bhogāyatana-bhedāt.

The visible, unsentient world, designated by the term not-soul, is divided into three, as the object, the instrument, or the site of fruition.

Classification of Deity

तस्य जगतः कर्तोपादानं चेश्वरपदार्थः पुरुषोत्तमो वासुदेवादिपदवेदनीयः । तदप्युक्तम्–

Tasya jagataḥ kartopādānaṁ ceśvarapadārthaḥ puruṣottamo vāsudevādipadavedanīyaḥ. Tadapyuktam—

Of this world the efficient and substantial cause is the Deity, known under the names Puruṣottama (best of spirits), Vāsudeva (a patronymic of Kṛṣṇa), and the like.

12. वासुदेवः परं ब्रह्म कल्याणगुणसंयुतः ।
भुवनानामुपादानं कर्त्ता जीवनियामकः ॥ इति ।

Vāsudevaḥ paraṁ brahma kalyāṇaguṇasaṁyutaḥ,
Bhuvanānāmupādānaṁ kartā jīvaniyāmakaḥ. iti.

"Vāsudeva is the supreme absolute spirit, endowed with auspicious attributes,"

"The substantial cause, the efficient of the worlds, the animator of spirits."

स एव वासुदेवः परमकारुणिको भक्तवत्सलः परमपुरुषस्तदुपासकानुगुणतत्तत्फलप्रदानाय स्वलीलावशादर्चा-विभव-व्यूह-सूक्ष्मान्तर्यामिभेदेन पञ्चधावतिष्ठते ।

Sa eva vāsudevaḥ paramakāruṇiko bhaktavatsalaḥ paramapuruṣastadupāsakānuguṇatattatphalapradānāya svalīlāvaśādarcā-vibhava-vyūha-sūkṣmāntaryāmibhedena pañcadhāvatiṣṭhate.

This same Vāsudeva, infinitely compassionate, tender to those devoted to him, the Supreme Spirit, with the purpose of bestowing various rewards apportioned to the deserts of his votaries in consequence of pastime, exists under five modes, distinguished as "adoration" *(arcā)*, "emanation" *(vibhava)*, "manifestation" (*vyūha*), "the subtile" (*sūkṣma*), and the "internal controller."

तत्रार्चा नाम प्रतिमादयः । रामाद्यवतारो विभवः । व्यूहश्चतुर्विधो वासुदेवसङ्कर्षणप्रद्युम्नानिरुद्धसंज्ञकः । सूक्ष्मं सम्पूर्णषड्गुणं वासुदेवाख्यं परं ब्रह्म । गुणा अपहतपाप्मत्वादयः । 'सोऽपहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोको विजिघत्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः' (छा. 8/7/3) इति श्रुतेः । अन्तर्यामी सकलजीवनियामकः 'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मानमन्तरो यमयति' (बृ. मा. 3/7/22) इति श्रुतेः ।

Tatrārcā nāma pratimādayaḥ. Rāmādyavatāro vibhavaḥ. Vyūhaścaturvidho vāsudevasaṅkarṣaṇapradyumnāniruddha-saṁjñakaḥ. Sūkṣmaṁ sampūrṇaṣaḍguṇaṁ vāsudevākhyaṁ paraṁ brahma. Guṇā apahatapāpmatvādayaḥ. 'So'pahatapāpmā vijaro vimṛtyurviśoko vijighatso'pipāsaḥ satyakāmaḥ satyasaṅkalpaḥ' (Chā. 8/7/3) iti śruteḥ. Antaryāmī sakalajīvaniyāmakaḥ 'ya ātmani tiṣṭhannātmānamantaro yamayati' (Bṛ. Mā. 3/7/22) iti śruteḥ.

(1) "Adoration" is images, and so forth. (2) "Emanation" is his incarnation, as Rāma, and so forth. (3) His "manifestation" is fourfold, as Vāsudeva, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. (4) "The subtile" is the entire Supreme Spirit, with six attributes, called Vāsudeva. His attributes are exemption from sin, and the rest. That he is exempt from sin is attested in the Vedic text : Passionless, deathless, without sorrow, without hunger, desiring truth, true in purpose. (5) The "internal controller", the actuator of all spirits, according to the text: Who abiding in the soul, rules the soul within.

तत्र पूर्वपूर्वमूर्त्त्युपासनया पुरुषार्थपरिपन्थिदुरितनिचयक्षये सत्युत्तरोत्तरमूर्त्त्युपास्त्यधिकारः । तदुक्तम्–

Tatra pūrvapūrvamūrttyupāsanayā puruṣārthaparipanthiduritanicayakṣaye satyuttarottaramūrttyupāstyadhikāraḥ. Taduktam—

When by worshipping each former embodiment a mass of sins

inimical to the end of the soul (i.e., emancipation) have been destroyed, the votary becomes entitled to practise the worship of each latter embodiment. It has, therefore, been said—

13. वासुदेवः स्वभक्तेषु वात्सल्यात्तत्तदीहितम् ।
अधिकार्यानुगुण्येन प्रयच्छति फलं बहु ॥

Vāsudevaḥ svabhakteṣu vātsalyāttattadīhitam,
Adhikāryānuguṇyena prayacchati phalaṁ bahu.

"Vāsudeva, in his tenderness to his votaries, gives, as desired by each,"

"According to the merits of his qualified worshippers, large recompense.

14. तदर्थं लीलया स्वीयाः पञ्चमूर्तीः करोति वै ।
प्रतिमादिकमर्चा स्यादवतारास्तु वैभवाः ॥

Tadarthaṁ līlayā svīyāḥ pañcamūrtīḥ karoti vai,
Pratimādikamarcā syādavatārāstu vaibhavāḥ.

"For that end, in pastime, he makes to himself his five embodiments;"

"Images and the like are 'adoration;' his incarnations are 'emanations'."

15. सङ्कर्षणो वासुदेवः प्रद्युम्नश्चानिरुद्धकः ।
व्यूहश्चतुर्विधो ज्ञेयः सूक्ष्मं सम्पूर्णषड्गुणम् ॥

Saṅkarṣaṇo vāsudevaḥ pradyumnaścāniruddhakaḥ,
Vyūhaścaturvidho jñeyaḥ sūkṣmaṁ sampūrṇaṣaḍguṇam.

"As Saṅkarṣṇa, Vāsudeva, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, his manifestation is to be known to be fourfold; 'the subtile' is the entire six attributes."

16. तदेव वासुदेवाख्यं परं ब्रह्म निगद्यते ।
अन्तर्यामी जीवसंस्थो जीवप्रेरक ईरितः ॥

Tadeva vāsudevākhyaṁ paraṁ brahma nigadyate,
Antaryāmī jīvasaṁstho jīvapreraka īritaḥ.

"That self-same called Vāsudeva is styled the Supreme Spirit;"

"The internal controller is declared as residing in the soul, the actuator of the soul."

17. य आत्मनीति वेदान्तवाक्यजालैर्निरूपितः ।
अर्चोपासनया क्षिप्ते कल्मषेऽधिकृतो भवेत् ॥

Ya ātmanīti vedāntavākyajālairnirūpitaḥ,
Arcopāsanayā kṣipte kalmaṣe'dhikṛto bhavet.

"Described in a multitude of texts of the Upaniṣads, such as 'Who abiding in the soul'"

"By the worship of 'adoration,' a man casting off his defilement becomes a qualified votary."

18. विभवोपासने पश्चाद् व्यहोपास्तौ ततः परम् ।
सूक्ष्मे तदनु शक्तः स्यादन्तर्यामिणमीक्षितुम् ॥ इति ।

Vibhavopāsane paścād vyahopāstau tataḥ param,
Sūkṣme tadanu śaktaḥ syādantaryāmiṇamīkṣitum. iti.

"By the subsequent worship of 'emanation,' he becomes qualified for the worship of 'manifestation;' next;"

"By the worship thereafter of 'the subtile,' he becomes able to behold the 'internal controller."

Five Elements of Worship and Salvation

तदुपासनं च पञ्चविधमभिगमनमुपादानमिज्या स्वाध्यायो योग इति श्रीपञ्चरात्रेऽभिहितम् । तत्राभिगमनं नाम देवतास्थानमार्गस्य सम्मार्जनोपलेपनादि । उपादानं गन्धपुष्पादिपूजासाधनसम्पादनम् । इज्या नाम देवतापूजनम् । स्वाध्यायो नाम अर्थानुसन्धानपूर्वको मन्त्रजपो वैष्णवसूक्तस्तोत्रपाठो नामसंकीर्त्तनं तत्त्वप्रतिपादकशास्त्राभ्यासश्च । योगो नाम देवतानुसंधानम् ।

Tadupāsanaṁ ca pañcavidhamabhigamanamupādānamijyā svādhyāyo yoga iti śrīpañcarātre'bhihitam. Tatrābhigamanaṁ nāma devatāsthānamārgasya sammārjanopalepanādi. Upādānaṁ gandhapuṣpādipūjāsādhanasampādanam. Ijyā nāma devatāpūjanam. Svādhyāyo nāma arthānusandhānapūr- vako mantrajapo vaiṣṇavasūktastotrapātho nāmasaṁkīrttanaṁ tattvapratipādakaśāstrābhyāsaśca. Yogo nāma devatānusaṁdhānam.

The worship of the Deity is described in the Pañcarātra as consisting of five elements, viz., (1) the access, (2) the preparation, (3) oblation, (4) recitation, (5) devotion. Of these, access is the sweeping, smearing, and so forth, of the way to the temple. The preparation is the provision of perfumes, flowers, and the like

appliances of worship. Oblation is worship of the deities. Recitation is the muttered ejaculation of sacred texts, with attention to what they mean, the rehearsal of hymns and lauds of Viṣṇu, the commemoration of his names, and study of institutes which set forth the truth. Devotion is meditation on the Deity.

एवमुपासनाकर्मसमुच्चितेन विज्ञानेन द्रष्टृदर्शने नष्टे भगवद्भक्तस्य तन्निष्ठिस्य भक्तवत्सलः परमकारुणिकः पुरुषोत्तमः स्वयाथात्म्यानुभवानुगुणनिरवधिकानन्दरूपं पुनरावृत्तिरहितं स्वपदं प्रयच्छति । तथा च स्मृतिः–

Evamupāsanākarmasamucchitena vijñānena draṣṭṛdarśane naṣṭe bhagavadbhaktasya tanniṣṭhisya bhaktavatsalaḥ paramakāruṇikaḥ puruṣottamaḥ svayāthātmyānubhavānuguṇaniravadhikānandarūpaṁ punarāvṛttirahitaṁ svapadaṁ prayacchati. Tathā ca smṛtiḥ—

When the vision of the visible world has been brought to a close by knowledge accumulated by the merit of such worship, the infinitely compassionate Supreme Spirit, tender to his votaries, bestows upon the votary devoted to his lord and absorbed in his lord, his own sphere infinite and endless, marked by consciousness of being like him, from which there is no future return (to the sorrows of transmigratory existence). So the traditionary text—

19. मामुपेत्य पुनर्जन्म दुःखालयमशाश्वतम् ।
नाप्नुवन्ति महात्मानः संसिद्धिं परमां गताः ॥ (गीता. 8/15) इति ।

Māmupetya punarjanma duḥkhālayamaśāśvatam,
Nāpnuvanti mahātmānaḥ saṁsiddhiṁ paramāṁ gatāḥ.
Gītā 8/15) iti.

"When they have come to me, the high-souled no longer undergo future birth, a receptacle of pain, transitory, having attained to the supreme consummation."

20. स्वभक्तं वासुदेवोऽपि संप्राप्यानन्दमक्षयम् ।
पुनरावृत्तिरहितं स्वीयं धाम प्रयच्छति ॥ इति च ।

Svabhaktaṁ vāsudevo'pi saṁprāpyānandamakṣayam,
Punarāvṛttirahitaṁ svīyaṁ dhāma prayacchati. iti ca.

"Vāsudeva, having found his votary, bestows upon him his own mansion, blissful, undecaying, from whence there is no more return."

Vedanta Theosophy—First Aphorism

तदेतत्सर्वं हृदि निधाय महोपनिषन्मतावलम्बनेन भगवद्बोधायनाचार्यकृतां ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्तिं विस्तीर्णामालक्ष्य रामानुजः शारीरकमीमांसा-भाष्यमकार्षीत् । तत्र 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' (ब्र. सू. 1/1/1) इति प्रथमसूत्रस्यायमर्थः–अत्राथशब्दः पूर्ववृत्तकर्माधिगमनानन्तर्यार्थः । तदुक्तं वृत्तिकारेण–वृत्तात्कर्माधिगमादनन्तरं ब्रह्म विविदिषतीति ।

Tadetatsarvaṁ hṛdi nidhāya mahopaniṣanmatāvalambanena bhagavadbodhāyanācāryakṛtāṁ brahmasūtravṛttiṁ vistīrṇāmālakṣya rāmānujaḥ śārīrakamīmāṁsā-bhāṣyamakārṣīt. Tatra 'athāto brahmajijñāsā' (Bra. Sū. 1/1/1) iti prathamasūtrasyāyamarthaḥ—atrāthaśabdaḥ pūrvavṛttakarmādhigamanānantaryārthaḥ. Taduktaṁ vṛttikāreṇa— vṛttātkarmādhigamādanantaraṁ brahma vividiṣatīti.

After laying up all this in his heart, leaning upon the teaching of the great Upaniṣad, and finding the gloss on the Vedānta aphorisms by the venerated, Bodhāyanacārya too prolix, Rāmānuja composed a commentary on the Śārīrakamīmāṁsā (or Vedānta theosophy). In this, the sense of the first aphorism, "Then hence the absolute must be desired to be known," is given as follows :—The word then in this aphorism means, after understanding the hitherto-current sacred rites. Thus, the glossator writes : "After learning the sacred rites," he desires to know the absolute.

अतः शब्दो हेत्वर्थः । अधीतसाङ्गवेदस्याधिगततदर्थस्य विनश्वरफलात्कर्मणो विरक्तवाद् हेतोः स्थिरमोक्षाभिलाषुकस्य तदुपायभूतब्रह्मजिज्ञासा भवति । ब्रह्मशब्देन स्वभावतो निरस्तसमस्तदोषानवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणः पुरुषोत्तमोऽभिधीयते ।

Ataḥ śabdo hetvarthaḥ. Adhītasāṅgavedasyādhigatatadarthasya vinaśvaraphalātkarmaṇo viraktavād hetoḥ sthiramokṣābhilāṣukasya tadupāyabhūtabrahmajijñāsā bhavati. Brahmaśabdena svabhāvato nirastasamastadoṣānavadhikātiśayāsaṁkhyeyakalyāṇaguṇaḥ puruṣottamo'bhidhīyate.

The word *hence* states the reason, viz., because one who has read the Veda and its appendages and understands its meaning is averse from sacred rites, their recompense being perishable. The wish to know the absolute springs up in one who longs for permanent liberation, as being the means of such liberation. By the word

absolute is designated the Supreme Spirit, from whom are essentially excluded all imperfections, who is of illimitable excellence, and of innumerable auspicious attributes.

एवं च कर्मज्ञानस्य तदनुष्ठानस्य च वैराग्योत्पादनद्वारा चित्तकल्मषापनयद्वारा च ब्रह्मज्ञानं प्रति साधनत्वेन तयोः कार्यकारणत्वेन पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोरेकशास्त्रत्वम् । अत एव वृत्तिकाराः-'एकमेवेदं शास्त्रं जैमिनीयेन षोडशलक्षणेन' इत्याहुः ।

Evaṁ ca karmajñānasya tadanuṣṭhānasya ca vairāgyotpādanadvārā cittakalmaṣāpanayadvārā ca brahmajñānaṁ prati sādhanatvena tayoḥ kāryakāraṇatvena pūrvottara mīmāṁsayorekaśāstratvam. Ata eva vṛttikārāḥ—'ekamevedaṁ śāstraṁ jaiminīyena ṣoḍaśalakṣaṇena' ityāhuḥ.

Since, then the knowledge of sacred rites and the performance of those rites is mediately through engendering dispassionateness, and through putting away the defilement of the understanding, an instrument of the knowledge of the absolute; and knowledge of sacred rites and knowledge of the absolute being consequently cause and effect, the former and the latter Mīmāṁsā constitute one system of institutes. On this account, the glossator has described this system as one with the sixteenfold system of Jaimīni.

Knowledge together with Works is Efficacious of Emancipation

कर्मफलस्य क्षयित्वं ब्रह्मज्ञानफलस्य चाक्षयित्वं 'परीक्ष्य लोकात्कर्मचितान्तान्ब्राह्मणो निर्वेदमायान्नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन' (मु. 1/2/12) इत्यादिश्रुतिभिरनुमानार्थापत्त्युपबृंहिताभिः प्रत्यपादि । एकैकानिन्दया कर्मविशिष्टस्य ज्ञानस्य मोक्षसाधनत्वं दर्शयति श्रुतिः-

Karmaphalasya kṣayitvaṁ brahmajñānaphalasya cākṣayitvaṁ 'parīkṣya lokātkarmacitāntānbrāhmaṇo nirvedamāyānnāstyakṛtaḥ kṛtena' (Mu. 1/2/12) ityādiśrutibhiranumānārthāpattyupabṛṁhitābhiḥ pratyapādi. Ekaikānindayā karmaviśiṣṭasya jñānasya mokṣasādhanatvaṁ darśayati śrutiḥ—

That the fruit of sacred rites is perishable, and that of the knowledge of the absolute imperishable, has been laid down in virtue of Vedic texts, such as : Scanning the spheres gained by rites, let him become passionless; Not wrought by the rite performed, accompanied with inference and disjunctive reasoning. Revelation, by censuring each when unaccompanied by the other shows that it is knowledge together with works that is efficacious of emancipation, in the words :

21. अन्धं तमः प्रविशन्ति येऽविद्यामुपासते ।
ततो भूय इव ते तमो य उ विद्यायां रताः ॥
(बृ. 4/4/10 तथा ई. 9)

Andhaṁ tamaḥ praviśanti ye'vidyāmupāsate,
Tato bhūya iva te tamo ya u vidyāyāṁ ratāḥ.
(Bṛ. 4/4/10 and *I. 9)*

"Blind darkness they enter who prefer illusion, and a greater darkness still do they enter who delight in knowledge only."

22. विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह ।
अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययाऽमृतमश्नुते ॥ (ई. 11) इत्यादि ।

Vidyāṁ cāvidyāṁ ca yastadvedobhayaṁ saha,
Avidyayā mṛtyuṁ tīrtvā vidyayā'mṛtamaśnute.
(Ī. 11) itāyadi

Knowledge and illusion, he who knows these both, he passing beyond death together with illusion, tastes immortality by knowledge?

तदुक्तं पाञ्चरात्ररहस्ये—

Taduktaṁ Pāñcarātrarahasye—

Conformably, it is said in the *Pañcarātra-rahasya*—

23. स एव करुणासिन्धुर्भगवान्भक्तवत्सलः ।
उपासकानुरोधेन भजते मूर्तिपञ्चकम् ॥

Sa eva karuṇāsindhurbhagavānbhaktavatsalaḥ,
Upāsakānurodhena bhajate mūrtipañcakam.

"That ocean of compassion, the Lord, tender to his votaries,"
"For his worshipper's sake takes five embodiments upon him."

24. तदर्चाविभवव्यूहसूक्ष्मान्तर्यामिसंज्ञकम् ।
यदाश्रित्यैव चिद्वर्गस्तत्तज्ज्ञेयं प्रपद्यते ॥

Tadarcāvibhavavyūhasūkṣmāntaryāmisaṁjñakam,
Yadāśrityaiva cidvargastattajjñeyaṁ prapadyate.

"These are styled Adoration, Emanation, Manifestation, the Subtile, the Internal Controller,"
"Resorting whereto souls attain to successive stages of knowledge."

25. पूर्वपूर्वोदितोपास्तिविशेषक्षीणकल्मषः ।
उत्तरोत्तरमूर्तीनामुपास्त्यधिकृतो भवेत् ॥

Pūrvapūrvoditopāstiviśeṣakṣīṇakalmaṣaḥ,
Uttarottaramūrtīnāmupāstyadhikṛto bhavet.

"As a man's sins are worn away by each successive worship,"
"He becomes qualified for the worship of each next embodiment."

26. एवं ह्यहरहः श्रौतस्मार्तधर्मानुसारतः ।
उक्तोपासनया पुंसां वासुदेवः प्रसीदति ॥

Evaṁ hyaharahaḥ śrautasmārtadharmānusārataḥ,
Uktopāsanayā puṁsāṁ vāsudevaḥ prasīdati.

"Thus day by day, according to religion, revealed and traditional,"
"By the aforesaid worship Vāsudeva becomes propitious to mankind."

27. प्रसन्नात्मा हरिर्भक्त्या निदिध्यासनरूपया ।
अविद्यां कर्मसङ्घातरूपां सद्यो निवर्तयेत् ॥

Prasannātmā harirbhaktyā nididhyāsanarūpayā,
Avidyāṁ karmasaṅghātarūpāṁ sadyo nivartayet.

"Hari, when propitiated by devotion in the form of meditation,"
"At once brings to a close that illusion which is the aggregate of works."

28. ततः स्वाभाविकाः पुंसां ते संसारतिरोहिताः ।
आविर्भवन्ति कल्याणाः सर्वज्ञत्वादयो गुणाः ॥

Tataḥ svābhāvikāḥ puṁsāṁ te saṁsāratirohitāḥ,
Āvirbhavanti kalyāṇāḥ sarvajñatvādayo guṇāḥ.

"Then in souls the essential attributes, from which transmigration has vanished,"
"Are manifested, auspicious, omniscience, and the rest."

29. एवं गुणाः समानाः स्युर्मुक्तानामीश्वरस्य च ।
सर्वकर्तृत्वमेवैकं तेभ्यो देवे विशिष्यते ॥

Evaṁ guṇāḥ samānāḥ syurmuktānāmīśvarasya ca,
Sarvakartṛtvamevaikaṁ tebhyo deve viśiṣyate.

"These qualities are common to the emancipated spirits and the Lord,"
"Universal efficiency alone among them is peculiar to the Deity."

30. मुक्तास्तु शेषिणि ब्रह्मण्यशेषे शेषरूपिणः ।
सर्वानश्नुवते कामान्सह तेन विपश्चिता ॥ इति ।

Muktāstu śeṣiṇi brahmaṇyaśeṣe śeṣarūpiṇaḥ,
Sarvānaśnuvate kāmānsaha tena vipaścitā. iti.

"Emancipated spirits are ulterior to the infinite absolute, which is unsusceptible of aught ulterior;"
"They enjoy all beatitudes together with that Spirit."

Interpretation on Curiosity to Emancipation (Knowledge)

तस्मात्तापत्रयातुरैरमृतत्वाय पुरुषोत्तमादिपदवेदनीयं ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमित्युक्तं भवति । 'प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थप्राधान्येन सह ब्रूत इतः सनोऽन्यत्र' इति वचनबलादिच्छाया इष्यमाणप्रधानत्वादिष्यमाणं ज्ञानमिह विधेयम् । तच्च ध्यानोपासनादिशब्दवाच्यं वेदनं न तु वाक्यजन्यमापातज्ञानम् । पदसन्दर्भश्राविणो व्युत्पन्नस्य विधानमन्तरेणापि प्राप्तत्वात् ।

Tasmāttāpatrayāturairamṛtatvāya puruṣottamādipadavedanīyaṁ brahma jijñāsitavyamityuktaṁ bhavati. 'Prakṛtipratyayau pratyayārthaprādhānyena saha brūta itaḥ sano'nyatra' iti vacanabalādicchāyā iṣyamāṇapradhānatvādiṣyamāṇaṁ jnānamiha vidheyam. Tacca dhyānopāsanādiśabdavācyaṁ vedanaṁ na tu vākyajanyamāpātajñānam. Padasandarbhaśrāviṇo vyutpannasya vidhānamantareṇāpi prāptatvāt.

It is therefore stated that those who suffer the three kinds of pain must, for the attainment of immortality, investigate the absolute spirit known under such appellations as the Highest Being. According to the maxim : The base and the suffix convey the meaning conjointly, and of these, the meaning of the suffix takes the lead, the notion of desire is predominant (in the word *jijñāsitavya*), and desired knowledge is the predicate (in the aphorism, Then hence the absolute must be desired to be known). Knowledge is cognition designated by such terms as meditation, devotion; not the merely superficial knowledge derived from verbal communication, such being competent to any one who hears a number of words and un-

derstands the force of each, even without any predication; in conformity with such Vedic texts as:

'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः' (बृ. 2/4/5), 'आत्मेत्येवोपासीत' (बृ. 1/4/7) 'विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत' (बृ. 4/4/21), 'अनुविद्य विजानाति' (छा. 8/7/1) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः ।

'Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ' (Bṛ. 2/4/5), 'Ātmetyevopāsīta' (Bṛ. 1/4/7) 'Vijñāya prajñāṁ kurvīta' (Bṛ. 4/4/21), 'Anuvidya vijānāti' (Chā. 8/7/1) ityādiśrutibhyaḥ.

Self indeed it is that is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to be pondered; He should meditate that it is self alone; Having known, let him acquire excellent wisdom; He should know that which is beyond knowledge.

अत्र 'श्रोतव्यः' इत्यनुवादः । अध्ययनविधिना साङ्गस्य स्वाध्यायस्य ग्रहणेऽधीतवेदस्य पुरुषस्य प्रयोजनवदर्थदर्शनात्तन्निर्णयाय स्वरसत एव श्रवणे प्रवर्तमानतया तस्य प्राप्तत्वात् ।

Atra 'śrotavyaḥ' ityanuvādaḥ. Adhyayanavidhinā sāṅgasya svādhyāyasya grahaṇe'dhītavedasya puruṣasya prayojanavadarthadarśanāttannirṇayāya svarasata eva śravaṇe pravartamānatayā tasya prāptatvāt.

In these texts "to be heard" is explanatory, hearing being understood (but not enounced) in the text about sacred study (viz., *ṣaḍaṅgena vedo'dhyeyo iñeyaśca,* the Veda, with its six appendages,is to be studied and known); so that a man who has studied the Veda must of his own accord, in acquiring the Veda and its appendages, engage in "hearing," in order to ascertain the sense by examining it and the occasion of its enouncement.

मन्तव्य इति चानुवादः। श्रवणप्रतिष्ठार्थत्वेन मननस्यापि प्राप्तत्वात् । अप्राप्ते शास्त्रमर्थवदिति न्यायात् । ध्यानं च तलधारावदविच्छिन्नस्मृतिसन्तानरूपम् । 'ध्रुवा स्मृतिः स्मृतिप्रतिलम्भे सर्वग्रन्थीनां विप्रमोक्ष' इति ध्रुवायाः स्मृतिरेव मोक्षोपायत्वश्रवणात् । सा च स्मृतिर्दर्शनसमा नाकारा ।

Mantavya iti cānuvādaḥ. śravaṇapratiṣṭhārthatvena mananasyāpi prāptatvāt. Aprāpte śāstramarthavaditi nyāyāt. Dhyānaṁ ca taladhārāvadavicchinnasmṛtisantānarūpam. 'Dhruvā smṛtiḥ smṛtipratilambhe sarvagranthīnāṁ vipramokṣa' iti dhruvāyāḥ smṛtireva mokṣopāyatvaśravaṇāt. Sā ca smṛtirdarśanasamā nākārā.

The term "to be thought" (or "to be inferred") is also explanatory, cogitation (or inference) being understood as the complementary meaning of hearing, according to the aphorism : Before its signification is attained the system is significant.

31. भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ।
क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन्दृष्टे परावरे ॥

(मु. 2/2/8)

Bhidyate hṛdayagranthiśichadyante sarvasaṁśayāḥ,
Kṣīyante cāsya karmāṇi tasmindṛṣṭe parāvare.

इत्यनेनैकवाक्यत्वात् । तथा च 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः' (बृ. 2/4/5) इत्यनेनास्या दर्शनरूपता विधीयते । भवति च भावनाप्रकर्षात्स्मृतेर्दर्शनरूपत्वम् । वाक्यकारेणैतत्सर्वं प्रपञ्चितं 'वेदनमुपासनं स्यात्' इत्यादिना ।

Ityanenaikavākyatvāt. Tathā ca 'Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ' (Bṛ. 2/4/5) ityanenāsyā darśanarūpatā vidhīyate. Bhavati ca bhāvanāprakarṣātsmṛterdarśanarūpatvaṃ. Vākyakāreṇaitat-sarvaṁ prapañcitaṁ 'Vedanamupāsanaṁ syāt' ityādinā.

Meditation is a reminiscence consisting of an unbroken succession of reminiscences like a stream of oil, it being revealed in the text, in continuity of reminiscence there is a solution of all knots,—that it is unintermittent reminiscence that is the means of emancipation. And this reminiscence is tantamount to intuition.

"Cut is his heart's knot, solved are all his doubts,"
"And exhausted are all his works, when he has seen the Highest and Lowest,"

Because he becomes one with that Supreme. So also in the words, Self indeed is to be seen, it is predicated of this reminiscence that it is an intuition. Reminiscence becomes intuitional through the vivacity of the representations. The author of the Vākya has treated of all this in detail in the passage beginning Cognition is meditation.

तदेव ध्यानं विशिनष्टि श्रुतिः-

Tadeva dhyānaṁ viśinaṣṭi śrutiḥ—

The characters of this meditation are laid out in the text :

32. नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन ।
यमेवैव वृणुते तेन लभ्यस्तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनूं स्वाम् ॥
(कठ. 2/23)

Nāyamātmā pravacanena labhyo na medhayā na bahunā śrutena,
Yamevaiva vṛṇute tena labhyastasyaiṣa ātmā vivṛṇute tanūṁ svāṃ.
(Kaṭha. 2/23)

This soul is not attainable by exposition, nor by wisdom, nor by much learning; Whom God chooses by him God may be attained. To him this self unfolds its own nature.

प्रियतम एव हि वरणीयो भवति । यथाऽयं प्रियतम आत्मानं प्राप्नोति, तथा स्वयमेव भगवान् प्रयतम इति भगवतैवाभिहितम्–

Priyatama eva hi varaṇīyo bhavati. Yathā'yaṁ priyatama ātmānaṁ prāpnoti, tathā svayameva bhagavān prayatama iti bhagavataivābhihitaṃ—

For it is that which is dearest which is choiceworthy, and as the soul finds itself most dear, so the Lord is of Himself most dear, as was declared by the Lord Himself–

33. तेषां सततयुक्तानां भजतां प्रीतिपूर्वकम् ।
ददामि बुद्धियोगं तं येन मामुपयान्ति ते ॥
(गीता 10/10) इति ।

Teṣāṁ satatayuktānāṁ bhajatāṁ prītipūrvakaṃ,
Dadāmi buddhiyogaṁ taṁ yena māmupayānti te.
(Gītā. 10/10) iti.

"To them always devoted, who worship me with love,"
"I give the devotion of understanding whereby they come to me."

पुरुषः स परः पार्थ भक्त्या लभ्यस्त्वनन्यया ।
(गीता 8/22) इति च ।

Puruṣaḥ sa paraḥ pārtha bhaktyā labhyastvananyayā.
(Gītā 8/22) iti ca.

And again—

"That Supreme Spirit, Arjuna, is attainable by faith unwavering."

Devotion is a Kind of Cognition Free from Desires

भक्तिस्तु निरतिशयानन्दप्रियानन्यप्रयोजन–सकलेतरवैतृष्ण्यवज्ज्ञानविशेष एव । तत्सिद्धिश्च विवेकादिभ्यो भवतीति वाक्यकारेणोक्तं–तल्लब्धिर्विवेक-विमोकाभ्यासाक्रियाकल्याणानवसादानुद्धर्षेभ्यः सम्भवान्निर्वचनाच्चेति ।

Bhaktistu niratiśayānandapriyānanyaprayojana—sakaletara-vaitṛṣṇyavajjñānaviśeṣa eva. Tatsiddhiśca vivekādibhyo bhavatīti vākyakārenoktaṁ — tallabdhirvivekavimokābhyāsākriyākalyāṇā-navasādānuddharṣebhyaḥ sambhavānnirvacanācceti.

But devotion (or faith) is a kind of cognition which admits no other motive than the illimitable beatitude, and is free from all other desires; and the attainment of this devotion is by discrimination and other means. As is said by the author of the Vākya : Attainment there of results from discrimination *(viveka)*, exemption *(vimoka)* practice *(abhyāsa)*, observance *(kriyā)*, excellence *(kalyāṇa)*, freedom from despondency *(anavasāda)*, satisfaction *(anuddharṣa)*, according to the equivalence (of the definition), and the explication (of these terms).

तत्र विवेको नामादुष्टादन्नात्सत्त्वशुद्धिः । अत्र निर्वचनम्–'आहारशुद्धेः सत्त्वशुद्धिः सत्त्वशुद्ध्या ध्रुवास्मृतिः' इति । विमोकः कामानभिष्वङ्गः । शान्त उपासीतेति निर्वचनम् ।

Tatra viveko nāmāduṣṭādannātsattvaśuddhiḥ. Atra nirvacanaṃ—'Āhāraśuddheḥ sattvaśuddhiḥ sattvaśuddhyā dhruvāsmṛtiḥ' iti. Vimokaḥ kāmānabhiṣvaṅgaḥ. Śānta upāsīteti nirvacanaṃ.

Of these means, discrimination is purity of nature, resultant from eating undefiled food, and the explication (of discrimination) is from purity of diet, purity of understanding and by purity of understanding the unintermitent reminiscence. Exemption is non-attachment to sensuous desires; the explication being, let the quietist meditate.

पुनः पुनः संशीलनमभ्यासः । निर्वचनं च स्मार्तमुदाहृतं भाष्यकारेण–'सदा तद्भावभावितः' (गीता 8/6) इति । श्रौतस्मार्तकर्मानुष्ठानं शक्तितः क्रिया ।

'क्रियावानेष ब्रह्मविदां वरिष्ठः' इति निर्वचनम् । सत्यार्जवदयादानादीनि कल्याणानि । 'सत्येन लभ्यत' इत्यादि निर्वचनम् । दैन्यविपर्ययोऽनवसादः । 'नायमात्मा बलहीनेन लभ्यः' (मु. 3/2/4) इति निर्वचनम् । तद्विपर्ययजा तुष्टरुद्धर्षः । तद्विपर्ययोऽनुद्धर्षः । 'शान्तो दान्त' इति निर्वचनम् ।

Punaḥ punaḥ saṁśīlanamabhyāsaḥ. Nirvacanaṁ ca smārtamudāhṛtaṁ bhāṣyakāreṇa—'Sadā tadbhāvabhāvitaḥ' (Gītā 8/6) iti. Śrautasmārtakarmānuṣṭhānaṁ śaktitaḥ kriyā. 'Kriyāvāneṣa brahmavidāṁ variṣṭhaḥ' iti nirvacanam. Satyārjavadayādānādīni kalyāṇāni. 'Satyena labhyata' ityādi nirvacanam. Dainyaviparyayo'navasādaḥ. 'Nāyamātmā balahīnena labhyaḥ' (Mu. 3/2/4) iti nirvacanam. Tadviparyayajā tuṣṭaruddharṣaḥ. Tadviparyayo'nuddharṣaḥ. 'Śānto dānta' iti nirvacanam.

Practice is reiteration; and of this a traditionary explication is quoted (from the Bhagavad-gītā) by (Rāmānuja) the author of the commentary : For ever modified by the modes thereof. Observance is the performance of rites enjoined in revelation and tradition according to one's ability; the explication being (the Vedic text). He who has performed rites is the best of those that know the supreme. The excellences are veracity, integrity, clemency, charity (almsgiving), and the like; the explication being, It is attained by veracity. Freedom from despondency is the contrary of dejection; the explication being, This soul is not attained by the faint-hearted. Satisfaction is the contentment which arises from the contrary of dejection; the explication being, Quiescent, self-subdued.

तदेवमेवंविधनियमविशेषसमासादित-पुरुषोत्तम-प्रसाद-विध्वस्त-तमःस्वान्तस्य अनन्यप्रयोजनानवरतनिरतिशय-प्रिय-विशदात्मप्रत्ययावभासतापन्नध्यानरूपया भक्त्या पुरुषोत्तमपदं लभ्यत इति सिद्धम् । तदुक्तं यामुनेन-उभयपरिकर्मित-स्वान्तस्यैकान्तिकात्यन्तिकभक्तियोगो लभ्य इति । ज्ञानकर्मयोगसंस्कृतान्तः करणस्येत्यर्थः ।

Tadevamevaṁvidhaniyamaviśeṣasamāsādita-puruṣottama-prasāda-vidhvasta-tamaḥsvāntasya ananyaprayojanānavaratani-ratiśaya -priya-viśadātmapratyayāvabhāsatāpannadhyānarūpayā bhaktyā puruṣottamapadaṁ labhyata iti siddham. Taduktaṁ yāmunena- ubhayaparikarmitasvāntasyaikāntikātyantikabhakti-yogo labhya iti. Jñānakarmayogasaṁskṛtāntaḥ karaṇa-syetyarthaḥ.

It has thus been shown that by the devotion of one in whom the darkness has been dispelled by the grace of the Supreme Spirit, propitiated by certain rites and observances, which devotion is meditation transformed into a presentative manifestation of soul, without ulterior move, as incessantly and illimitably desired, the sphere of the Supreme Spirit *(Vaikuṇṭha)* is attained. Thus, Yāmuna says : Attainable by the final and absolute devotion of faith in one internally purified by both (works and knowledge); that is, in one whose internal organ is rectified by the devotion of works and knowledge.

Characteristic of Brahma—Second Aphorism

किं पुनर्ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमित्यपेक्षायां लक्षणमुक्तम्-'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' (ब्रह्मसूत्रम् 1/1/2) इति । जन्मादीति सृष्टिस्थितिप्रलयम् । तद्गुणसंविज्ञानो बहुव्रीहिः । अस्याचिन्त्यविविधविचित्ररचनस्य नियतदेशकालभोगब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तक्षेत्रज्ञमिश्रस्य जगतो, यतो=यस्मात् सर्वेश्वरात् निखिलहेयप्रत्यनीकस्वरूपात् सत्यसंकल्पाद्यनवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणात् सर्वज्ञात्सर्वशक्तेः पुंसः सृष्टिस्थितिप्रलयाः प्रवर्तन्त इति सूत्रार्थः ।

Kiṁ punarbrahma jijñāsitavyamityapekṣāyāṁ lakṣaṇamuktam—'Janmādyasya yataḥ' (Brahmasūtram 1/1/2) iti. Janmādīti sṛṣṭisthitipralayam. Tadguṇasaṁvijñāno bahuvrīhiḥ. Asyācintyavividhavicitraracanasya niyatadeśakālabhogabramā-distambaparyantakṣetrajñamiśrasya jagato, yato=yasmāt sarveśvarāt nikhilaheyapratyanīkasvarūpāt satyasaṅkalpādya-navadhikātiśayāsaṅkhyeyakalyāṇaguṇāt sarvajñātsarvaśakteḥ puṁsaḥ sṛṣṭisthitipralayāḥ pravartanta iti sūtrārthaḥ.

In anticipation of the inquiry, But what absolute is to be desired to be known? The definition is given (in the second aphorism). From which the genesis, and so forth of this. The genesis, and so forth, the creation (emanation), sustentation, and retractation (of the universe). The purport of the aphorism is that the emanation, sustentation, and retractation of this universe, inconceivably multiform in its structure, and interspersed with souls, from Brahmā to a tuft of grass, of determinate place, time, and fruition , is from this same universal Lord, whose essence is contrary to all qualities which should be escaped from, of illimitable excellences, such as indefeasible volition, and of innumerable auspicious attributes, omniscient, and omnipotent.

Proof of an Absolute of this Nature—Third aphorism

इत्थंभूते ब्रह्मणि किं प्रमाणमिति जिज्ञासायां शास्त्रमेव प्रमाणमित्युक्तम्–'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्' (ब्र. सू. 1/1/3) इति । शास्त्रं योनिः कारणं प्रमाणं यस्य तस्य तच्छास्त्रयोनि । तस्यभावः तत्त्वं तस्मात् । ब्रह्मज्ञानकारणत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य तद्योनित्वं ब्रह्मणः इत्यर्थः ।

Itthaṁbhūte brahmaṇi kiṁ pramāṇamiti jijñāsāyāṁ śāstrameva pramāṇamityuktam—'śāstrayonitvāt' (Bra. Sū. 1/1/3) iti. Śāstraṁ yoniḥ kāraṇaṁ pramāṇaṁ yasya tasya tacchāstrayoni. Tasyabhāvaḥ tattvaṁ tasmāt. Brahmajñānakāraṇatvācchāstrasya tadyonitvaṁ brahmaṇaḥ ityarthaḥ.

In anticipation of the further inquiry, What proof is there of an absolute of this nature? It is stated that the system of institutes itself is the evidence (in the third aphorism) : Because it has its source from the system. To have its source from the system is to be that whereof the cause or evidence is the system. The system, then, is the source (or evidence) of the absolute, as being the cause of knowing the self, which is the cause of knowing the absolute.

न च ब्रह्मणः प्रमाणान्तरगम्यत्वं शङ्कितुं शक्यम् । अतीन्द्रियत्वेन प्रत्यक्षस्य तत्र प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । नापि महार्णवादिकं सकर्तृकं, कार्यत्वाद्, घटवदित्यनुमानम् । तस्य पूतिकूष्माण्डायमानत्वात् । तल्लक्षणं ब्रह्म 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि' (तै. 2/1/1) इत्यादि वाक्यं प्रतिपादयतीति स्थितम् ।

Na ca brahmaṇaḥ pramāṇāntaragamyatvaṁ śaṅkituṁ śakyam. Atīndriyatvena pratyakṣasya tatra pravṛttyanupapattteḥ. Nāpi mahārṇavādikaṁ sakartṛkaṁ, kāryatvād, ghaṭavadityanumānam. Tasya pūtikūṣmāṇḍāyamānatvāt. Tallakṣaṇaṁ brahma 'yato vā imāni bhūtāni' (Tai. 2/1/1) ityādi vākyaṁ pratipādayatīti sthitam.

Nor is the suspicion possible that the absolute may be reached by some other form of evidence. For perception can have no conversancy about the absolute since, it is supersensible. Nor can inference, for the illation, the ocean, and the rest, must have a maker, because it is an effect like a water-pot, is worth about as much as a rotten pumpkin. It is evinced that it is such texts as, Whence also these elements, that prove the existence of the absolute thus described.

Co-ordination of Śāstras—Fourth Aphorism

यद्यपि ब्रह्म प्रमाणान्तरगोचरतां नावतरति तथापि प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिपररत्वाभावे सिद्धरूपं ब्रह्म न शास्त्रं प्रतिपादयितुं प्रभवतीत्येतत्पर्यनुयोगपरिहारायोक्तम्–'तत्तु समन्वयात्' (ब्र. सू. 1/1/4) इति । तुशब्दः प्रसक्ताशङ्काव्यावृत्त्यर्थः । तच्छास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वं ब्रह्मणः सम्भवत्येव । कुतः? समन्वयात् । परमपुरुषार्थभूतस्यैव ब्रह्मणोऽभिधेयतयान्वयादित्यर्थः ।

Yadyapi brahma pramāṇāntaragocaratāṁ nāvatarati tathāpi pravṛttinivṛttipararatvābhāve siddharūpaṁ brahma na śāstraṁ pratipādayituṁ prabhavatītyetatparyanuyogaparihārāyoktam—'tattu samanvayāt' (Bra. Sū. 1/1/4) iti. Tuśabdaḥ prasaktāśaṅkāvyāvṛttyarthaḥ. Tacchāstrapramāṇakatvaṁ brahmaṇaḥ sambhavatyeva. Kutaḥ? Samanvayāt. Paramapuruṣārthabhūtasyaiva brahmaṇo'bhidheyatayānvayādityarthaḥ.

Though the absolute (it may be objected) be unsusceptible of any other kind of proof, the system, did it not refer to activity and cessation of activity, could not posit the absolute aforesaid. To avoid by anticipation any queries on this point, it is stated (in the fourth aphorism) : But that is from the construction. This is intended to exclude the doubt anticipated. The evidence, then, of the system is the only evidence that can be given of the absolute. Why? Because of the construction, that is, because the absolute; that is, the highest end for man, is construed as the subject (of the first aphorism, viz., Then thence the absolute is to be desired to be known).

न च प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योरन्यतरविरहिणः प्रयोजनशून्यत्वम् । स्वरूपपरेष्वपि 'पुत्रस्ते जातो', 'नायं सर्पः' इत्यादिषु हर्षप्राप्तिभयनिवृत्तिरूपप्रयोजनवत्त्वं दृष्टमेवेति न किञ्चिदनुपपन्नम् । दिङ्मात्रमिह प्रदर्शितम् । विस्तरस्त्वाकरादेवावगन्तव्य इति विस्तारभीरुणोदास्यत इति सर्वमनाकुलम् ।

Na ca pravṛttinivṛttyoranyataravirahiṇaḥ prayojanaśūnyatvam. Svarūpapareṣvapi 'putraste jāto'. 'Nāyaṁ sarpaḥ' ityādiṣu harṣaprāptibhayanivṛttirūpaprayojanavattvaṁ dṛṣṭameveti na kiñcidanupapannam. Diṅmātramiha pradarśitam. Vistarastvākarādevāvagantavya iti vistārabhīruṇodāsyata iti sarvamanākulam.

Moreover, a sentence which has nothing to do either with activity or with cessation of activity is not therefore void of purpose, for we observe that sentences merely declaratory of the nature of

things, such as, A son is born to you, This is not a snake, convey a purpose, viz., the cessation of joy or of fear. Thus, there is nothing unaccounted for. We have here given only a general indication. The details may be learnt from the original (viz., Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya on the Vedānta aphorisms); we therefore decline a further treatment, apprehensive of prolixity; and thus all is clear.[1]

A.E.G.

॥ इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे रामानुजदर्शनम् ॥

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1 For further details respecting Rāmānuja and his stystem, see Wilson's Works, vol.i. pp.34-46; and Banerjea's Dialogues, ix. The *Tattva-muktāvalī* was printed in the *Pandit* for September, 1871; but the lines quoted in p.73 are not found there.

CHAPTER V

THE SYSTEM OF PŪRṆAPRAJÑA

Contrast Between Ramānuja System and that of Dvaitavāda

तदेतद्रामानुजमतं जीवाणुत्व-दासत्व-वेदापौरुषेयत्व-सिद्धार्थबोधकत्व-स्वत:प्रमाणत्व-प्रमाणत्रित्व-पञ्चरात्रोपजीव्यत्व-प्रपञ्चभेदसप्यत्वादिसाम्येऽपि परस्परविरुद्धभेदादिपक्षत्रयकक्षीकारेण क्षपणकपक्षनिक्षिप्तमिप्युपेक्षमाण: 'स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि' (छा. 6/8/7) इत्यादिवेदान्तवाक्यजातस्य भङ्ग्यन्तरेणार्थान्तरपरत्वमुपपाद्य ब्रह्ममीमांसाविवरणव्याजेन आनन्दतीर्थ: प्रस्थानान्तरमास्थिषत ।

Tadetadrāmānujamataṁ jīvāṇutva-dāsatva-vedāpauruṣeyatva-siddhārthabodhakatva-svataḥpramāṇatva-pramāṇatritva- pañcarātropajīvyatva-prapañcabhedasapyatvādisāmye'pi paraspara-viruddhabhedādipakṣatrayakakṣīkāreṇa kṣapaṇakapakṣanikṣiptamipyupekṣamāṇaḥ 'sa ātmā tattvamasi' (Chā. 6/8/7) ityādi-veāntavākyajātasya bhaṅgyantareṇārthāntaraparatvamu-papādya brahmamīmāṁsāvivaraṇavyājena ānandatīrthaḥ prasthānāntaramāsthiṣata.

Ānanda-tīrtha (Pūrṇa-prajña, or Madhva) rejected this same Rāmānuja system, because, though like his own views, it teaches the atomic size of the soul, the servitude of the soul, the existence of the Veda without any personal author, the authenticity of the Veda, the self-evidence of the instruments of knowledge, the triad of evidences, dependency upon the Pañca-rātra, the reality of plurality in the universe, and so forth,—yet, in accepting three hypotheses as to reciprocally contradictory divisions, etc., it coincides with the tenets of the Jainas. Showing that He is soul, That art thou, and a number of other texts of the Upaniṣads bear a different import under a different explanation, he set up a new system under the guise of a new explication of the Brahma-Mīmāṁsā or (or Vedānta).

Dichotomy-Features

तन्मते हि द्विविधं तत्त्वं स्वतन्त्रपरतन्त्रभेदात् । तदुक्तं तत्त्वविवेके–

Tanmate hi dvividhaṁ tattvaṁ svatantraparatantrabhedāt. Taduktaṁ Tattvaviveke—

For in his doctrine, ultimate principles are dichotomised into independent and dependent; as it is stated in the *Tattvaviveka* :—

1. स्वतन्त्रं परतन्त्रं च द्विविधं तत्त्वमिष्यते ।
स्वतन्त्रो भगवान्विष्णुर्निर्दोषोऽशेषसद्गुणः ॥ इति ॥

Svatantraṁ paratantraṁ ca dvividhaṁ tattvamiṣyate,
Svatantro bhagavānviṣṇurnirdoṣo'śeṣasadguṇaḥ. iti.

"Independent and dependent, two principles are received;"

"The independent is Viṣṇu the Lord, exempt from imperfections, and of inexhaustible excellences."

ननु सजातीय-विजातीय-स्वगत-नानात्वशून्यं ब्रह्म तत्त्वमिति प्रतिपादकेषु वेदान्तेषु जागरूकेषु कथमशेषसद्गुणत्वं कथ्यत इति चेत्, मैवम् । भेदप्रमापकबहुप्रमाणविरोधेन तेषां तत्र प्रामाण्यानुपपत्तेः । तथा हि, प्रत्यक्षं तावदिदमस्माद्भिन्नम् इति नीलपीतादेर्भेदमध्यक्षयति ।

Nanu sajātīya-vijātīya-svagata-nānātvaśūnyaṁ brahma tattvamiti pratipādakeṣu vedānteṣu jāgarūkeṣu kathamaśeṣasadguṇatvaṁ kathyata iti cet, maivam. Bhedapramāpakabahupramāṇavirodhena teṣāṁ tatra prāmāṇyānupapatteḥ. Tathā hi, pratyakṣaṁ tādadidamasmādbhinnam iti nīlapītāderbhedamadhyakṣayati.

Here it will be urged (by the advaita-vādins) : Why predicate of the absolute these inexhaustible excellences in the teeth of the Upanishads, which lay down that the absolute principle is void of homogeneity and heterogeneity, and of all plurality in itself ? To this be it replied : Not so, for these texts of the Upaniṣads, as contradictory of many proofs positive of duality, cannot afford proof of universal unity; perception, for example, in the consciousness. This is different from that, pronounces a difference between things, blue and yellow, and so forth.

Cognition of Thing and its Opposite is Necessary for Contrast

अथ मन्येथाः–किं प्रत्यक्षं भेदमेवावगाहते किं वा धर्मिप्रतियोगिघटितम् ? न प्रथमः, धर्मिप्रतियोगिप्रतिपत्तिमन्तरेण तत्सापेक्षस्य भेदस्याशक्याध्यवसायात् । द्वितीयेऽपि धर्मिप्रतियोगिग्रहणपुरःसरं भेदग्रहणमथवा युगपत्तत्सर्वग्रहणम् ?

Atha manyethāḥ—kiṁ pratyakṣaṁ bhedamevāvagāhate kiṁ vā dharmipratiyogighaṭitam ? Na prathamaḥ, dharmipratiyogipratipattimantareṇa tatsāpekṣasya bhedasyāśakyādhyavasāyāt.

Dvitīye'pi dharmipratiyogigrahaṇapuraḥsaraṁ bhedagrahaṇamathavā yugapattatsarvagrahaṇam ?

The opponent will rejoin : Do you hold that perception is cognisant of a perceptional difference, or of a difference constituted by the thing and its opposite? The former alternative will not hold: for without a cognition of the thing and its opposite, the recognition of the difference,which presupposes such a cognition, will be impossible.

न पूर्वः, बुद्धेर्विरम्य व्यापाराभावात् । अन्योन्याश्रयप्रसङ्गाच्च । नापि चरमः, कार्यकारणबुद्ध्योर्यौगपद्याभावात् । धर्मिप्रतीतिर्हि भेदप्रत्ययस्य कारणम् । एवं प्रतियोगिप्रतीतिरपि । सन्निहितेऽपि धर्मिणि व्यवहितप्रतियोगिज्ञानमन्तरेण भेदस्याज्ञातत्वेनान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां कार्यकारणभावावगमात् । तस्मान्न भेदप्रत्यक्षं सुप्रसरमिति चेत् ।

Na pūrvaḥ, buddherviramya vyāpārābhāvāt. Anyonyāśrayaprasaṅgācca. Nāpi caramaḥ, kāryakāraṇabuddhyoyaugapadyābhāvāt. Dharmipratītirhi bhedapratyayasya kāraṇam. Evaṁ pratiyogipratītirapi. Sannihite'pi dharmiṇi vyavahitapratiyogijñānamantareṇa bhedasyājñātatvenānvayavyatirekābhyāṁ kāryakāraṇabhāvāvagamāt. Tasmānna bhedapratyakṣaṁ suprasaramiti cet.

On the latter alternative it must be asked, Is the apprehension of the difference preceded by an apprehension of the thing and its contrary, or are all the three (the thing, its contrary, and the contrariety) simultaneously apprehended? It cannot be thus preceded, for the operation of the intellect is without delay (or without successive steps), and there would also result a logical seesaw (apprehension of the difference presupposing apprehension of the thing and its contrary, and apprehension of the thing and its contrary presupposing apprehension of the difference).

Nor can there be a simultaneous apprehension (of the thing, its contrary, and the difference); for cognitions related as cause and effect cannot be simultaneous, and the cognition of the thing is the cause of the recognition of the difference; the causal relation between the two being, recognised by a concomitance and non-concomitance (mutual exclusion), the difference not being cognised even when the thing is present, without a cognition of its absent contrary. The perception of difference, therefore (the opponent concludes), is not easily admissible.

Tangible Feature and form Establishes Contrast

किं वस्तुस्वरूपभेदवादिनं प्रति इमानि दूषणानि उद्घुष्यन्ते, किं वा धर्मभेदवादिनं प्रति ? प्रथमे चोरापराधान्माण्डव्यनिग्रहन्यायापातः । भवदभिधीयमानदूषणानां तदविषयत्वात् ।

ननु वस्तुस्वरूपस्यैव भेदत्वे प्रतियोगिसापेक्षत्वं न घटते घटवत् । प्रतियोगिसापेक्ष एव सर्वत्र भेदः प्रथत इति चेन्न । प्रथमं सर्वतो विलक्षणतया वस्तुस्वरूपे ज्ञायमाने प्रतियोग्यपेक्षया विशिष्टव्यवहारोपपत्तेः ।

तथा हि–परिमाणघटितं वस्तुस्वरूपं प्रथममवगम्यते । पश्चात्प्रतियोगिविशेषापेक्षया ह्रस्वं दीर्घमिति तदेव विशिष्य व्यवहारभाजनं भवति ।

Kiṁ vastusvarūpabhedavādinaṁ prati imāni dūṣaṇāni udghuṣyante, kiṁ vā dharmabhedavādinaṁ prati? Prathame corāparādhānmāṇḍavyanigrahanyāyāpātaḥ. Bhavadabhidhīyamānadūṣaṇānāṁ tadaviṣayatvāt.

Nanu vastusvarūpasyaiva bhedatve pratiyogisāpekṣatvaṁ na ghaṭate ghaṭavat. Pratiyogisāpekṣa eva sarvatra bhedaḥ prathata iti cenna. Prathamaṁ sarvato vilakṣaṇatayā vastusvarūpe jñāyamāne pratiyogyapekṣayā viśiṣṭavyavahāropapatteḥ.

Tathā hi—parimāṇaghaṭitaṁ vastusvarūpaṁ prathamamavagamyate. Paścātpratiyogiviśeṣāpekṣayā hrasvaṁ dīrghamiti tadeva viśiṣya vyavahārabhājanaṁ bhavati.

To this let the reply be as follow :—Are these objections proclaimed against one who maintains a difference identical with the things themselves, or against one who maintains a difference between things as the subjects of attributes? In the former case, you will be, as the saying runs, punishing a respectable Brāhmaṇa for the offence of a thief, the objections you adduce being irrelevant. If it be urged that if it is the essence of the thing that is the difference, then it will no longer require a contrary counterpart; but if difference presuppose a contrary counterpart, it will exist everywhere; this statement must be disallowed, for a while the essence of a thing is first known as different from everything else, the determinate usage (name and notion) may be shown to depend upon a contrary counterpart; for example the essence of a thing so far as constituted by its dimensions is first cognised, and afterwards it

becomes the object of some determinate judgment, as long or short in relation to some particular counterpart (or contrasted object).

तदुक्तं विष्णुतत्त्वनिर्णये–'न च विशेषणविशेष्यतया भेदसिद्धिः । विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्च भेदापेक्षः । धर्मिप्रतियोग्यपेक्षया भेदसिद्धिः । भेदापेक्ष च धर्मिप्रतियोगित्वमित्यन्योन्याश्रयतया भेदस्यायुक्तिः । पदार्थस्वरूपत्वाद् भेदस्य'–इत्यादिना ।

Taduktaṁ viṣṇutattvanirṇaye—'na ca viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatayā bhedasiddhiḥ. Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaśca bhedāpekṣaḥ. Dharmi-pratiyogyapekṣayā bhedasiddhiḥ. Bhedāpekṣa ca dharmi-pratiyogitvamityanyonyāśrayatayā bhedasyāyuktiḥ. Padārtha-svarūpatvād bhedasya'—ityādinā.

Accordingly, it is said in the *Viṣṇutattva-nirṇaya*: "Difference is not proved to exist by the relation of determinant and determinate; for this relation of determinant and determinate (or predicate and subject) presuppose differences; and if difference were proved to depend upon the thing and its counterpart, and the thing and its counterpart to presuppose difference, difference as involving a logical circle could not be accounted for; but difference is itself a real predicament (or ultimate entity)."

अत एव गवार्थिनो गवयदर्शनान्न प्रवर्तन्ते, गो शब्दं च न स्मरन्ति । न च नीरक्षीरादौ स्वरूपे गृह्यमाणे भेदप्रतिभासोऽपि स्यादिति भणनीयम् । समानाभिहारादिप्रतिबन्धकबलाद् भेदभानव्यवहाराभावोपपत्तिः ।

Ata eva gavārthino gavayadarśanānna pravartante, go śabdaṁ ca na smaranti. Na ca nīrakṣīrādau svarūpe gṛhyamāṇe bhedapratibhāso'pi syāditi bhaṇanīyam. Samānābhihārā-dipratibandhakabalād bhedabhānavyavahārābhāvopapattiḥ.

For this reason (viz., because different is a thing) it is that men in quest of a cow do not act (as if they had found her) when they see a gayal, and do not recall the word cow. Nor let it be objected that (if difference be a real entity and as such perceived) on seeing a mixture of milk and water, there would be a presentation of difference; for the absence of any manifestation of, and judgment about, the difference, may be accounted for by the force of (the same) obstructives (as hinder the perception of other things), viz., aggregation of similars and the rest.

तदुक्तम्-

Taduktam—

2. अतिदूरात्सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।
सौक्ष्म्याद् व्यवधानादभिभवात्समानाभिहाराच्च ।।
(सांख्यकारिका, 7) । इति ।।

Atidūrātsāmīpyādindrayaghātānmano'navasthānāt.
Saukṣmyād vyavadhānādabhibhavātsamānābhihārācca.
(Sāṅkhyakārikā 7) iti.

Thus, it has been said (in the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*,v.vii.)—

"From too great remoteness, from too great nearness, from defect in the organs, from instability of the common sensory",
"From subtilty, from interposition, from being over-powered, and from aggregation of similars."

अतिदूरात्=गिरिशिखरवर्तिपर्वतादौ, अतिसामीप्यात्=लोचनाञ्जनादौ, इन्द्रियघातात्=विद्युदादौ, मनोऽनवस्थानात्=कामाद्युपप्लुतमनस्कस्य स्फीतालोकवर्तिनि घटादौ, सौक्ष्म्यात्=परमाण्वादौ, व्यवधानात्=कुड्यान्तर्हिते, अभिभवात्=दिवा प्रदीपप्रभादौ, समानाभिहारात्=नीरक्षीरादौ यथावत् ग्रहणं नास्तीत्यर्थः ।

Atidūrāt=Giriśikharavartiparvatādau, Atisāmīpyāt=Locanāñjanādau, Indriyaghātāt=Vidyudādau, Mano'navasthānāt= Kāmādyupaplutamanaskasya sphītālokavartini ghaṭādau, Saukṣmyāt= paramāṇvādau, vyavadhānāt=kuḍyāntarhite, Abhibhavāt=Divā pradīpaprabhādau, Samānābhihārāt=Nīrakṣīrādau yathāvat grahaṇaṁ nāstītyarthaḥ.

There is no perception respectively of a tree and the like on the peak of a mountain, because of its too great remoteness; of collyrium applied to the eyes, and so forth, because of too great proximity; of lightning and the like, because of a defect in the organs; of a jar or the like in broad daylight, by one whose common sensory is bewildered by lust and other passions, because of instability of the common sensory; of an atom and the like, because of their subtility; of things behind a wall, and so forth, because of interposition; of the light of a lamp and the like, in the day-time, because of its being overpowered; of milk and water, because of the aggregation of similars.

Difference in Attributes Establishes the Difference

भवतु वा धर्मभेदवादस्तथापि न कश्चिद्दोषः । धर्मिप्रतियोगिग्रहणे सति पश्चात्तद्घटितभेदग्रहणोपपत्तेः । न च परस्पराश्रयप्रसङ्गः । पराननपेक्ष्य प्रभेदशालिनो वस्तुनो ग्रहणे सति धर्मभेदमानसम्भवात् । न च धर्मभेदवादे तस्य तस्य भेदस्य भेदान्तरभेद्यत्वेनानवस्था दुरवस्था स्यादित्यास्थेयम् । भेदान्तरप्रसक्तौ मूलाभावात् । भेदभेदिनौ भिन्नाविति व्यवहारादर्शनात् ।

Bhavatu vā dharmabhedavādastathāpi na kaściddoṣaḥ. Dharmipratiyogigrahaṇe sati paścāttadghaṭitabhedagrahaṇopapatteḥ. Na ca parasparāśrayaprasaṅgaḥ. Parānanapekṣya prabhedaśālino vastuno grahaṇe sati dharmabhedamānasambhavāt. Na ca dharmabhedavāde tasya tasya bhedasya bhedāntarabhedyatvenānavasthā duravasthā syādityāstheyam. Bhedāntaraprasaktau mūlābhāvāt. Bhedabhedinau bhinnāviti vyavahārādarśanāt.

Or let the hypothesis of difference in qualities be granted, and no harm is done; for given the apprehension of a subject of attributes and of its contrary, the presentation of difference in their modes is possible. Nor let it be supposed that on the hypothesis of difference in the modes of things, as each difference must be different from some ulterior difference, there will result an embarrassing progression to infinity, there being no occasion for the occurrence of the said ulterior difference, inasmuch as we do not observe that men think and say that two things are different as differenced from different.

न चैकभेदबलेनान्यभेदानुमानम् । दृष्टान्तभेदाविघातेनोत्थाने दोषाभावात् । सोऽयं पिण्याकयाचनार्थं गतस्य खारिका-तैलदातृत्वाभ्युपगम इव । दृष्टान्तभेदविमर्दे त्वनुत्थानमेव । न हि वरविघाताय कन्योद्वाहः । तस्मान्मूलक्षयाभावादनवस्था न दोषाय।

Na caikabhedabalenānyabhedānumānam. Dṛṣṭāntabhedāvighātenotthāne doṣābhāvāt. So'yaṁ piṇyākayācanārthaṁ gatasya khārikā-tailadātṛtvābhyupagama iva. Dṛṣṭāntabhedavimarde tvanutthānameva. Na hi varavighātāya kanyodvāhaḥ. Tasmānmūlakṣayābhāvādanavasthā na doṣāya.

Nor can an ulterior difference be inferred from the first difference, for there being no difference to serve as the example in such inference, there cannot but be a non-occurrence of inference. And thus, it must be allowed that in raising the objection you have begged for a little oil-cake, and have had to give us gallons of oil. If there be

no difference for the example, the inference cannot emerge. The bride is not married for the destruction of the bridegroom. There being, then, no fundamental difficulty, this infinite progression presents no trouble.

Ascertainment of Difference by Inference

अनुमानेनापि भेदोऽवसीयते । परमेश्वरो जीवाद् भिन्नः । तं प्रति सेव्यत्वात् । यो यं प्रति सेव्यः स तस्माद् भिन्नः । यथा भृत्याद्राजा ।

Anumānenāpi bhedo'vasīyate. Parameśvaro jīvād bhinnaḥ. Taṁ prati sevyatvāt. Yo yaṁ prati sevyaḥ sa tasmād bhinnaḥ. Yathā bhṛtyādrājā.

Difference (duality) is also ascertained by inference. Thus the Supreme Lord differs from the individual soul as the object of its obedience; and he who is to be obeyed by any person differs from that person, a king, for instance, from his attendant.

न हि सुखं मे स्याद् दुःखं मे न मनागपि–इति पुरुषार्थमर्थयमानाः पुरुषाः स्थपतिपदं कामयमानाः सत्कारभाजो भवेयुः । प्रत्युत सर्वानर्थभाजनं भवन्ति । यः स्वस्यात्मनो हीनत्वं परस्य गुणोत्कर्षं च कथयति स स्तुत्यः प्रीतः स्तावकस्य तस्याभीष्टं प्रयच्छति । तदाह–

Na hi sukhaṁ me syād duḥkhaṁ me na manāgapi—iti puruṣārthayamānāḥ puruṣāḥ sthapatipadaṁ kāmayamānāḥ satkārabhājo bhaveyuḥ. Pratyuta sarvānarthabhājanaṁ bhavanti. Yaḥ svasyātmano hīnatvaṁ parasya guṇotkarṣaṁ ca kathayati sa stutyaḥ prītaḥ stāvakasya tasyābhīṣṭaṁ prayacchati. Tadāha—

For men, desiring as they do the end of man, Let me have pleasure, let me not have the slightest pain, if they covet the position of their lord, do not become objects of his favour, nay, rather, they become recipients of all kinds of evil. He who asserts his own inferiority and the excellence of his superior, he if is who is to be commended; and the gratified superior grants his eulogist his desire. Therefore, it has been said :—

3. घातयन्ति हि राजानो राजाहमिति वादिनः ।
ददत्यखिलमिष्टं च स्वगुणोत्कर्षवादिनाम् ॥ इति ।

Ghātayanti hi rājāno rājāhamiti vādinaḥ,
Dadatyakhilamiṣṭaṁ ca svaguṇotkarṣavādinām. iti.

"Kings destroy those who assert themselves to be kings,"

"And grant to those who proclaim their kingly pre-eminence all that they desire."

एवं च परमेश्वराभेदतृष्णया विष्णोर्गुणोत्कर्षस्य मृगतृष्णिकासमत्वाभिधानं विपुलकदलीफललिप्सया जिह्वाच्छेदनमनुहरति । एतादृशविष्णुविद्वेषणादन्धतमसप्रवेशप्रसङ्गात् । तदेतत्प्रतिपादितं मध्यमन्दिरेण महाभारत तात्पर्यनिर्णये–

Evaṁ ca parameśvarābhedatṛṣṇayā viṣṇorguṇotkarṣasya mṛgatṛṣṇikāsamatvābhidhānaṁ vipulakadalīphalalipsayā jihvācchedanamanuharati. Etādṛśaviṣṇuvidveṣaṇādandhatamasapraveśaprasaṅgāt. Tadetatpratipāditaṁ madhyamandireṇa mahābhārata tātparyanirṇaye—

Thus, the statement of those (advaita-vādins) in their thirst to be one with the Supreme Lord, that the supreme excellence of Vishṇu is like a mirage, is as if they were to cut off their tongues in trying to get a fine plantain, since it results that through offending this supreme Viṣṇu they must enter into the hell of blind darkness *(andha-tamasa)*. The same thing is laid down by Madhya-mandira in the *Mahābhārata-tātparya-nirṇaya* :—

4. अनादिद्वेषिणो दैत्या विष्णौ द्वेषो विवर्धितः ।
तमस्यन्धे पातयति दैत्यानन्ते विनिश्चयात् ॥(म. भा. ता. 1/111) इति ।

Anādidveṣiṇo daityā viṣṇau dveṣo vivardhitaḥ,
Tamasyandhe pātayati daityānante viniścayāt.
(Ma. Bhā. Tā. 1/111) iti.

"O Daityas, enemies of the eternal, Viṣṇu's anger is waxed great;"

"He hurls the Daityas into the blind darkness, because they decide blindly."

Triad Ways of Obedience to Almighty

सा च सेवा अङ्कन-नामकरण-भजनभेदात् त्रिविधा । तत्राङ्कनं नारायणायुधादीनां तद्रूपस्मरणार्थमपेक्षितार्थसिद्ध्यर्थं च । तथा च शाकल्यसंहितापरिशिष्टम्–

Sā ca sevā aṅkana-nāmakaraṇa-bhajanabhedāt trividhā. Tatrāṅkanaṁ nārāyaṇāyudhādīnāṁ tadrūpasmaraṇārthamapekṣitārthasiddhyarthaṁ ca. Tathā ca Śākalyasaṁhitāpariśiṣṭam—

This service (or obedience of which we have spoken) is trichotomised into (1) stigmatisation, (2) imposition of names, (3) worship.

Of these, (1) stigmatisation is (the branding upon oneself) of the weapons of Nārāyaṇa (or Viṣṇu) as a memorial of him, and as a means of attaining the end which is needful (emancipation). Thus, the sequel of the *Śākalyasaṁhitā* :—

5. चक्रं बिभर्त्ति पुरुषोऽभितप्तं बलं देवानाममृतस्य विष्णोः ।
स याति नाकं दुरितावधूय विशन्ति यद्यतयो वीतरागाः ॥

Cakraṁ bibhartti puruṣo'bhitaptaṁ balaṁ devānāmamṛtasya viṣṇoḥ,
Sa yāti nākaṁ duritāvadhūya viśanti yadyatayo vītarāgāḥ.

"The man who bears branded in him the discus of the immortal Vishṇu, which is the might of the gods,"
"He, shaking off his guilt, goes to the heaven (Vaikuṇṭha) which ascetics, whose desires are passed away, enter into."

6. देवासो येन विधृतेन बाहुना सुदर्शनेन प्रयातास्तमायन् ।
येनाङ्किता मनवो लोकसृष्टिं वितन्वन्ति ब्राह्मणास्तद्वहन्ति ॥

Devāso yena vidhṛtena bāhunā sudarśanena prayātā-stamāyan,
Yenāṅkitā manavo lokasṛṣṭiṁ vitanvanti brāhmaṇā-stadvahanti.

"The discus Sudarśana by which, uplifted in his arm, the gods entered that heaven;"
"Marked wherewith the Manus projected the emanation of the world, that weapon Brāhmaṇas wear (stamped upon them)."

7. तद्विष्णोः परमं पदं येन गच्छन्ति लाञ्छिताः ।
उरुक्रमस्य चिह्नैरङ्किता लोके सुभगा भवामः ॥ इति ।

Tadviṣṇoḥ paramaṁ padaṁ yena gacchanti lāñchitāḥ,
Urukramasya cinhairaṅkitā loke subhagā bhavāmaḥ. iti.

"Stigmatised wherewith they go to the supreme sphere of Vishṇu;"
"Marked with the stigmas of the wide-striding (Viṣṇu), let us become beatified."

'अतप्ततनूर्न तदामो अश्नुते श्रितास इद्वहन्तस्तत्समासत' (तै. आ. 1/11) इति तैत्तिरीयकोपनिषच्च । स्थानविशेषश्चाग्नेय पुराणे प्रदर्शित :—

'Ataptatanūrna tadāmo aśnute śritāsa idvahantastatsamāsata' (Tai. A. 1/11) iti taittirīyakopaniṣacca. Sthānaviśeṣaścāgneya purāṇe pradarśitaḥ—

Again, the *Taittirīyaka Upaniṣad* says : "He whose body is not branded, is raw, and tastes it not : votaries bearing it attain thereto." The particular parts to be branded are specified in the *Āgneya-purāṇa* :—

8. दक्षिणे तु करे विप्रो बिभृयाच्च सुदर्शनम् ।
सव्येन शङ्खं बिभृयादिति ब्रह्मविदो विदुः ॥

Dakṣiṇe tu kare vipro bibhṛyācca sudarśanam,
Savyena śaṅkhaṁ bibhṛyāditi brahmavido viduḥ.

"On his right hand let the Brāhmaṇa wear Sudarśana,"
"On his left the conch-shell : thus, have those who know the Veda declared."

अन्यत्र चक्रधारणे मन्त्रविशेषश्च दर्शितः-

Anyatra cakradhāraṇe mantraviśeṣaśca darśitaḥ—

In another passage is given the invocation to be recited on being branded with the discus :—

9. सुदर्शन महाज्वाल कोटिसूर्यसमप्रभ ।।
अज्ञानान्धस्य मे नित्यं विष्णोर्मार्गप्रदर्शय ॥

Sudarśana mahājvāla koṭisūryasamaprabha,
Ajñānāndhasya me nityaṁ viṣṇormārgapradarśaya.

"Sudarśana, brightly blazing, effulgent as ten million suns,"
"Show unto me, blind with ignorance, the everlasting way of Viṣṇu."

10. त्वं पुरा सागरोत्पन्नो विष्णुना विधृतः करे ।
नमितः सर्वदेवैश्च पाञ्चजन्य नमोऽस्तु ते ॥ इति ।

Tvaṁ purā sāgarotpanno viṣṇunā vidhṛtaḥ kare,
Namitaḥ sarvadevaiśca pāñcajanya namo'stu te. iti.

"Thou aforetime sprangest from the sea, brandished in the hand of Vishṇu,"
"Adored by all the gods; O Pāñcajanya, to thee be adoration."

Imposition of Names and Ten Kinds of Worship

नामकरणं पुत्रादीनां केशवादिनाम्ना व्यवहारः, सर्वदा तन्नामानुस्मरणार्थम् । भजनं दशविधं–वाचा सत्यं हितं प्रियं स्वाध्यायः, कायेन दानं परित्राणं,

परिरक्षणं, मनसा दया स्पृहा श्रद्धा चेति । अत्रैकैकं निष्पाद्य नारायणे समर्पणं भजनम् । तदुक्तम्–

Nāmakaraṇaṁ putrādīnāṁ keśavādināmnā vyavahāraḥ, sarvadā tannāmānusmaraṇārtham. Bhajanaṁ daśavidhaṁ—vācā satyaṁ hitaṁ priyaṁ svādhyāyaḥ, kāyena dānaṁ paritrāṇaṁ, parirakṣaṇaṁ manasā dayā spṛhā śraddhā ceti. Atraikaikaṁ niṣpādya nārāyaṇe samarpaṇaṁ bhajanam. Taduktam—

(2) Imposition of names in the appellation of sons and others by such names as Keśava, as a continual memorial of the name of the Supreme Lord.

(3) Worship is of ten kinds, viz., with the voice, (1) veracity, (2) usefulness, (3) kindliness, (4) sacred study; with the body, (5) almsgiving, (6) defence, (7) protection; with the common sensory, (8) mercy, (9) longing, and (10) faith. Worship is the dedication to Nārāyaṇa of each of these as it is realised. Thus, it has been said: –

अङ्कनं नामकरणं भजनं दशधा च तत् । इति ।

एवं ज्ञेयत्वादिनापि भेदोऽनुमातव्यः ।

Aṅkanaṁ nāmakaraṇaṁ bhajanaṁ daśadhā ca tat. iti.

Evaṁ jñeyatvādināpi bhedo'numātavyaḥ.

"Stigmatisation, imposition of names, worship; the last is of ten kinds."

Cognition of Difference by Revelation

तथा श्रुत्यापि भेदोऽवगन्तव्यः । 'सत्यमेनमनु विश्वे मदन्ति, रातिं देवस्य गृणतो मघोनः' । 'सत्यः सो अस्य महिमा गृणे शवो, यज्ञेषु विप्रराज्ये' । 'सत्य आत्मा, सत्यो जीवः, सत्यं भिदा सत्यं भिदा सत्यं भिदा, मैवारुवण्यो मैवारुवण्यो मैवारुवण्य' इति मोक्षानन्दभेदप्रतिपादकश्रुतिभ्यः ।

Tathā śrutyāpi bhedo'vagantavyaḥ. 'Satyamenamanu viśve madanti, rātiṁ devasya gṛṇato maghonaḥ.' 'Satyaḥ so asya mahimā gṛṇe śavo, yajñeṣu viprarājye.' 'Satya ātmā, satyo jīvaḥ, satyaṁ bhidā satyaṁ bhidā satyaṁ bhidā, maivāruvaṇyo maivāruvaṇyo maivāruvaṇya' iti mokṣānandabhedapratipādakaśrutibhyaḥ.

Difference (or duality between the Supreme Being and the universe) may also be inferred from cognisability and other marks. So

also difference (or duality) may be understood from revelation, from texts setting out duality in emancipation and beatitude, such as : "All rejoice over truth attained; truthful, and celebrating the gift of the divine Indra, they recount his glory"; "Sarva, among those that know the truth, O Brāhmaṇa, is in the universe, true spirit; true is individual spirit; truth is duality, truth is duality, truth is duality, in me is illusion, in me illusion, in me illusion."

11. इदं ज्ञानमुपाश्रित्य मम साधर्म्यमागताः ।
सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्ते प्रलये न व्यथन्ति च ।। (गीता 14/2)

Idaṁ jñānamupāśritya mama sādharmyamāgatāḥ,
Sarge'pi nopajāyante pralaye na vyathanti ca. (Gī. 14/2)

Again : –

"After attaining this knowledge, becoming like unto me,"

"In creation they are not born again, in retractation, they perish not" (Bhagavad-gītā, xiv.2)."

'जगद्व्यापारवर्जम्'; 'प्रकरणादसंनिहितत्वाच्च' (ब्र. सू. 4/4/17-18) इत्यादिभ्यश्च । न च 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' (मु. 3/2/9) इति श्रुतिबलाज्जीवस्य पारमैश्वर्यं शक्यशङ्कम् । 'सम्पूज्य ब्राह्मणं भक्त्या शूद्रोऽपि ब्रह्मणो भवेत्'–इतिवद् बृंहितो भवतीत्यर्थपरवात् ।

'Jagadvyāpāravarjam'; 'Prakaraṇādasaṁnihitatvācca' (Bra. Sū. 4/4/17-18) ityādibhyaśca. Na ca 'brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati' (Mu. 3/2/9) iti śrutibalājjīvasya pāramaiśvaryaṁ śakyaśaṅkam. 'Sampūjya brāhmaṇaṁ bhaktyā śūdro'pi brahmaṇo bhavet'—itivad bṛṁhito bhavatītyarthaparavāt.

According also to such aphorisms as, "Excepting cosmical operation because of occasion, and because of non-proximity."

Nor should suggestion be made that individual spirit is God in virtue of the text, He that knows the absolute becomes the absolute; for this text is hyperbolically eulogistic, like the text, Worshipping a Brāhmaṇa devoutly a Śūdra becomes a Brāhmaṇa, i.e., becomes exalted.

Illusion is Sole Cause of Duality

ननु– *Nanu—*

If any one urge that according to the text : –

12. प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत निवर्तेत न संशयः ।
मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः ॥ (माण्डूक्यकारिका 1/17)

Prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na saṁśayaḥ,
Māyāmātramidaṁ dvaitamadvaitaṁ paramārthataḥ.

(Māṇḍūkyakārikā 1/17)

"If the universe existed it would doubtless come to an end,"

इति वचनाद् द्वैतस्य कल्पितत्वमवगम्यत इति चेत्सत्यम् । भावमनभिसंधायाभिधानात् । तथा हि–यद्ययमुत्पद्येत तर्हि निवर्तेत न संशयः । तस्मादनादिरेवायं प्रकृष्टः पञ्चविधो भेदप्रपञ्चः । न चायमविद्यमानः । मायामात्रत्वात् । मायेति भगवदिच्छोच्यते ।

Iti vacanād dvaitasya kalpitatvamavagamyata iti cetsatyam. Bhāvamanabhisaṁdhāyābhidhānāt. Tathā hi—yadyayamutpadyeta tarhi nivarteta na saṁśayaḥ. Tasmādanādirevāyaṁ prakṛṣṭaḥ pañcavidho bhedaprapañcaḥ. Na cāyamavidyamānaḥ. Māyāmātratvāt. Māyeti bhagavadicchocyate.

This duality is merely illusory, and in reality a unity, and that duality is learnt to be illusorily imagined; it may be replied : What you say is true, but you do not understand its meaning; for the real meaning is, If this world had been produced, it would, without doubt, come to an end; therefore, this universe is from everlasting, a fivefold dual universe; and it is not non-existent, because it is mere illusion. Illusion is defined to be the will of the Lord, in virtue of the testimony of many such passages as :—

13. महामायेत्यविद्येति नियतिर्मोहिनीति च ।
प्रकृतिर्वासनेत्येव तवेच्छानन्त कथ्यते ॥

Mahāmāyetyavidyeti niyatirmohinīti ca,
Prakṛtirvāsanetyeva tavecchānanta kathyate.

"The great illusion, ignorance, necessity, the bewilderment,"
"The originant, ideation,—thus is thy will called, O infinite".

14. प्रकृतिः प्रकृष्टकरणाद्वासना वासयेद्यतः ।
अ इत्युक्तो हरिस्तस्य मायाविद्येति संज्ञिता ॥

Prakṛtiḥ prakṛṣṭakaraṇādvāsanā vāsayedyataḥ,
A ityukto haristasya māyāvidyeti saṁjñitā.

"The originant, because it originates greatly; ideation, because it produces ideas;"

"The illusion of Hari, who is called a, is termed (*a-vidyā*) ignorance."

15. मायेत्युक्ता प्रकृष्टत्वात्प्रकृष्टे हि मयाभिधा ।
विष्णोः प्रज्ञप्तिरेवैका शब्दैरेतैरुदीर्यते ॥

Māyetyuktā prakṛṣṭatvātprakṛṣṭe hi mayābhidhā,
Viṣṇoḥ prajñaptirevaikā śabdairetairudīryate.

"Styled (*māyā*) illusion, because it is pre-eminent, for the name māyā is used of the pre-eminent;"

"The excellent knowledge of Viṣṇu is called, though one only, by these names."

16. प्रज्ञप्तिरूपो हि हरिः सा च स्वानन्दलक्षणा ।

Prajñaptirūpo hi hariḥ sā ca svānandalakṣaṇā.

"For Hari is excellent knowledge, and this is characterised by spontaneous beatitude."

इत्यादिवचननिचयप्रामाण्यबलात् ।

Ityādivacananicayaprāmāṇyabalāt.

सैव प्रज्ञा मानत्राणकर्त्री च यस्य तन्मायामात्रम् । ततश्च परमेश्वरेण ज्ञानत्वाद्रक्षितत्वाच्च न द्वैतं भ्रान्तिकल्पितम् । न हीश्वरे सर्वस्य भ्रान्तिः संभवति । विशेषादर्शननिबन्धनत्वाद् भ्रान्तेः ।

Saiva prajñā mānatrāṇakartrī ca yasya tanmāyāmātram. Tataśca parameśvareṇa jñānatvādrakṣitatvācca na dvaitam bhrāntikalpitam. Na hīśvare sarvasya bhrāntiḥ saṁbhavati. Viśeṣādarśananibandhanatvād bhrānteḥ.

That in which this excellent knowledge produces knowledge and effects sustentation thereof, that is pure illusion, as known and sustained, therefore, by the Supreme Lord duality is not illusorily imagined. For in the Lord illusory imagination of the universe is not possible, illusory imagination arising from non-perception of differences (which as an imperfection is inconsistent with the divine nature).

तर्हि तद्व्यपदेशः कथमित्यत्रोत्तरमद्वैतं परमार्थत इति । परमार्थत इति परमार्थापेक्षया । तेन सर्वस्मादुत्तमस्य विष्णुतत्त्वस्य समभ्यधिकशून्यत्वमुक्तं भवति ।

Tarhi tadvyapadeśaḥ kathamityatrottaramadvaitaṁ paramārthata iti. Paramārthata iti paramārthāpekṣayā. Tena

sarvasmāduttamasya viṣṇutattvasya samabhyadhikaśūnyatvamuktaṁ bhavati.

If it be asked how then that (illusory duality) is predicated, the answer is that in reality there is a non-duality, that is in reality, Viṣṇu being better than all else, has no equal and no superior.

तथा च परमा श्रुतिः-

Tathā ca paramā śrutiḥ—

Accordingly, the grand revelation :—

17. **जीवेश्वरभिदा चैव जडेश्वरभिदा तथा ।**
जीवभेदो मिथश्चैव जडजीवभिदा तथा ॥

Jīveśvarabhidā caiva jaḍeśvarabhidā tathā,
Jīvabhedo mithaścaiva jaḍajīvabhidā tathā.

"A difference between soul and the Lord, a difference between the unsentient and the Lord,"

"A difference among souls, and a difference of the unsentient and the soul each from the other."

18. **मिथश्च जडभेदो यः प्रपञ्चो भेदपञ्चकः ।**
सोऽयं सत्योऽप्यनादिश्च सादिश्चेन्नाशमाप्नुयात् ॥

Mithaśca jaḍabhedo yaḥ prapañco bhedapañcakaḥ,
So'yaṁ satyo'pyanādiśca sādiścennāśamāpnuyāt.

"Also the difference of unsentient things from one another, the world with its five divisions."

"This same is real and from all eternity; if it had had a beginning it would have an end."

19. **न च नाशं प्रयात्येष न चासौ भ्रान्तिकल्पितः ।**
कल्पितश्चेन्निवर्तेत न चासौ विनिवर्तते ॥

Na ca nāśaṁ prayātyeṣa na cāsau bhrāntikalpitaḥ,
Kalpitaścennivarteta na cāsau vinivartate.

"Whereas it does not come to an end; and it is not illusorily imagined;"

"For if it were imagined it would cease, but it never ceases."

20. **द्वैतं न विद्यत इति तस्मादज्ञानिनां मतम् ।**
मतं हि ज्ञानिनामेतन्मितं त्रातं हि विष्णुना ॥

Dvaitaṁ na vidyata iti tasmādajñāninām matam,
Mataṁ hi jñāninām etanmitaṁ trātaṁ hi viṣṇunā.

"That there is no duality is therefore, the doctrine of those that lack knowledge;"

"For this the doctrine of those that have knowledge is known and sustained by Viṣṇu"

तस्मान्मात्रमिति प्रोक्तं परमो हरिरेव तु । इत्यादि ।

तस्माद्विष्णोः सर्वोत्कर्ष एव तात्पर्यं सर्वागमानाम् ।

Tasmānmātramiti proktaṁ paramo harireva tu. Ityādi.
Tasmādviṣṇoḥ sarvotkarṣa eva tātparyaṁ sarvāgamānām.

The purpose, then, of all revelations is to set out the supreme excellence of Viṣṇu.

Other Proofs Revealing Supremacy of Lord

एतदेवाभिसंधायाभिहितं भगवता-

Etadevābhisaṁdhāyābhihitaṁ bhagavatā—

With this in view the Lord declared :—

21. **द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च ।**
क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते ॥

Dvāvimau puruṣau loke kṣaraścākṣara eva ca,
Kṣaraḥ sarvāṇi bhūtāni kūṭastho'kṣara ucyate.

"Two are these persons in the universe, the perishable and the imperishable;"

"The perishable is all the elements, the imperishable is the unmodified."

22. **उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः ।**
यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य बिभर्त्यव्यय ईश्वरः ॥

Uttamaḥ puruṣastvanyaḥ paramātmetyudāhṛtaḥ,
Yo lokatrayamāviśya bibharttyavyaya īśvaraḥ.

"The other, the most excellent person, called the Supreme Spirit,"

"Is the undecaying Lord, who pervading sustains the three worlds."

23. यस्माक्षरमतीतोऽहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः ।

अतोऽस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः ॥

Yasmātkṣaramatīto'hamakṣarādapi cottamaḥ,
Ato'smi loke vede ca prathitaḥ puruṣottamaḥ.

"Since transcending the perishable, I am more excellent than the imperishable (soul),"

"Hence, I am celebrated among men and in the Veda as the best of persons *(Puruṣottama)*."

24. यो मामेवमसंमूढो जानाति पुरुषोत्तमम् ।

स सर्वविद्भजति मां सर्वभावेन भारत ॥

Yo māmevamasaṁmūḍho jānāti puruṣottamam,
Sa sarvavidbhajati māṁ sarvabhāvena bhārata.

"He who uninfatuated, knows me thus the best of persons, he all-knowing, worships me in every wise."

"Thus this most mysterious institute is declared, blameless (Arjuna)."

25. इति गुह्यतमं शास्त्रमिदमुक्तं मयानघ ।

एतद् बुद्ध्वा बुद्धिमान्स्यात्कृतकृत्यश्च भारत ॥(गी. 15/16-20) इति ।

Iti guhyatamaṁ śāstramidamuktaṁ mayānagha,
Etad buddhvā buddhimānsyātkṛtakṛtyaśca bhārata.

(Gīta 15/16-20) iti.

"Knowing this a man may be wise, and may have done what he was to do, O Bhārata" (Bhagavad-gītā, xv.16-20)."

Salvation Bestows on Devotee to Lord

महावराहेऽपि–

Mahāvarāhe'pi—

So, in the *Mahā-varāha*—

26. मुख्यं च सर्ववेदानां तात्पर्यं श्रीपतौ परे ।

उत्कर्षे तु तदन्यत्र तात्पर्यं यादवान्तरम् ॥ इति ।

Mukhyaṁ ca sarvavedānāṁ tātparyaṁ śrīpatau pare,
Utkarṣe tu tadanyatra tātparyaṁ yādavāntaram. iti.

"The primary purport of all the Vedas relates to the supreme spouse of Śrī;"

"Its purport regarding the excellence of any other deity must be subordinate."

युक्तं च विष्णोः सर्वोत्कर्षे महातात्पर्यम् । मोक्षो हि सर्वपुरुषार्थोत्तमः ।

Yuktaṁ ca viṣṇoḥ sarvotkarṣe mahātātparyam. Mokṣo hi sarvapuruṣārthottamaḥ.

It is reasonable that the primary purport should regard the supreme excellence of Viṣṇu. For emancipation is the highest end of all men.

27. धर्मार्थकामाः सर्वेऽपि न नित्या मोक्ष एव हि ।

नित्यस्तस्मात्तदर्थाय यतेत मतिमान्नरः ॥

इति भाल्लवेयश्रुतेः

Dharmārthakāmāḥ sarve'pi na nityā mokṣa eva hi,
Nityastasmāttadarthāya yateta matimānnaraḥ.
Iti Bhāllaveyaśruteḥ.

According to the text to the *Bhāllaveya Upanishad*: While merit, wealth, and enjoyment are transitory, emancipation is eternal;

Therefore, a wise man should strive unceasingly to attain thereto.

मोक्षश्च विष्णुप्रसादमन्तरेण न लभ्यते–

Mokṣaśca viṣṇuprasādamantareṇa na labhyate—

And emancipation is not won without the grace of Viṣṇu.

28. यस्य प्रसादात्परमार्त्तिरूपादस्मात्संसारान्मुच्यते नापरेण ।

नारायणोऽसौ परमो विचिन्त्यो मुमुक्षुभिः कर्मपाशादमुष्मात् ॥

इति नारायणश्रुतेः ।

Yasya prasādātparamārttirūpādasmātsaṁsārānmucyate nāpareṇa,
Nārāyaṇo'sau paramo vicintyo mumukṣubhiḥ karmapāśādamuṣmāt.
Iti nārāyaṇaśrute.

According to the text of the *Nārāyaṇa Upaniṣad* : Through whose grace is the highest state, through whose essence he is liberated from transmigration, while inferior men propitiating the divinities are not emancipated; the supreme object of discernment to those who desire to be liberated from this snare of works.

29. तस्मिन्प्रसन्ने किमिहास्त्यलभ्यं धर्मार्थकामैरलमल्पकास्ते ।
समाश्रिताद् ब्रह्मतरोरनन्तात् निःसंशयं मुक्तिफलं प्रयान्ति ॥
इति विष्णुपुराणोक्तेश्च । (वि. पु. 1/17/91)

Tasminprasanne kimihāstyalabhyaṁ dharmārthakāmairalamalpakāste,
Samāśritāda brahmataroranantāt niḥsaṁśayaṁ muktiphalaṁ prayānti.
iti Viṣṇupurāṇokteśca. (*Vi. Pu. 1/17/91*)

According also to the words of the Viṣṇu-purāṇa—

"If he be propitiated, what may not here be won? Enough of all wealth and enjoyments. These are scanty enough. On climbing the tree of the supreme essence, without doubt a man attains to the fruit of emancipation."

प्रसादश्च गुणोत्कर्षज्ञानादेव नाभेदज्ञानादित्युक्तम् ।

Prasādaśca guṇotkarṣajñānādeva nābhedajñānādityuktaṃ.

And it is declared that the grace of Viṣṇu is won only through the knowledge of his excellence, not through the knowledge of non-duality.

A Plea on 'That art Thou'

न च तत्त्वमस्यादितादात्म्यव्याकोपः । श्रुतितात्पर्यापरिज्ञानविजृम्भणात् ।

Na ca tattvamasyāditādātmyavyākopaḥ. Śrutitātparyāparijñānavijṛmbhaṇāt.

Nor is there in this doctrine any confliction with texts declaratory of the identity (of personal and impersonal spirit) such as, that art thou (for this pretended identity) is mere babbling from ignorance of the real purport.

30. आह नित्यपरोक्षं तु त्वच्छब्दो ह्यविशेषतः ।
त्वंशब्दश्चापरोक्षार्थं तयोरैक्यं कथं भवेत् ॥

Āha nityaparokṣaṁ tu tvacchabdo hyaviśeṣataḥ,
Tvaṁśabdaścāparokṣārthaṁ tayoraikyaṁ kathaṁ bhavet.

"The word That, when undetermined, designates the eternally unknown,"

"The word Thou designates a knowable entity; how can these be one?"

31. आदित्यो यूप इतिवत्सादृश्यार्था तु सा श्रुतिः । इति ।

Āditya yūpa itivatsādṛśyārthā tu sā śrutiḥ. iti.

And this text (That art thou) indicates similarity (not identity) like the text, The sun is the sacrificial post.

तथा च परमा श्रुतिः–

Tathā ca paramā śrutiḥ—
Thus, the grand revelation :—

32. जीवस्य परमैक्यं तु बुद्धिसारूप्यमेव तु ।
एकस्थाननिवेशो वा व्यक्तिस्थानमपेक्ष्य सः ॥

Jīvasya paramaikyaṁ tu buddhisārūpyameva tu,
Ekasthānaniveśo vā vyaktisthānamapekṣya saḥ.

"The ultimate unity of the individual soul is either similarity of cognition,"

"Or entrance into the same place, or in relation to the place of the individual."

33. न स्वरूपैकता तस्य युक्तस्यापि विरूपतः ।
स्वातन्त्र्यपूर्णतेऽल्पत्वपारन्त्र्ये विरूपते ॥ इति ।

Na svarūpaikatā tasya yuktasyāpi virūpataḥ,
Svātantryapūrṇate'lpatvapārantrye virūpate. iti.

"Not essential unity for even when it is emancipated it is different,"

"The difference being independence and completeness (in the Supreme Spirit), and smallness and dependence (in the individual spirit)."

Another Explanation of That Art Thou

अथवा तत्त्वमसीत्यत्र स एवात्मा स्वातन्त्र्यादिगुणोपेतत्वात् । अतत्त्वमसि त्वं तत्र भवसि तद्रहितत्वादित्येकत्वमतिशयेन निराकृतम् । तदाह–

Athavā tattvamasītyatra sa evātmā svātantryādiguṇopetatvāt. Atattvamasi tvaṁ tatra bhavasi tadrahitatvādityekatvamatiśayena nirākṛtam. Tadāha—

Or to propose another explanation of the text, *Ātmā tat tvaṁ asi*, That art thou, it may be divided, *ātmā atat tvaṁ asi*. He alone is soul as possessing independence and other attributes, and thou art

not-that (*atat*) as wanting those attributes; and thus, the doctrine of unity is utterly expelled. Thus, it has been said: –

अतत्त्वमिति वा छेदस्तेनैक्यं सुनिराकृतम् । इति ।

Atattvamiti vā chedastenaikyaṁ sunirākṛtaṃ. iti.

"Or the division may be *Atat tvaṁ*, and thus unity will be well got rid of."

तस्माद् दृष्टान्तनवकेऽपि 'स यथा शकुनिः सूत्रेण प्रबद्धः' (छा. 6/8/3) इत्यादिना भेद एव दृष्टान्ताभिधानान्नायमभेदोपदेश इति तत्त्ववादरहस्यम् ।

Tasmād dṛṣṭāntanavake'pi 'sa yathā śakuniḥ sūtreṇa prabaddhaḥ' (Chā. 6/8/3) ityādinā bheda eva dṛṣṭāntābhidhānānnāyamabhedopadeśa iti tattvavādarahasyaṃ.

According, therefore, to the *Tattva-vāda- rahasya*, the words in the nine examples (in the *cāndogya Upaniṣad*), He like a bird tied with a string, etc., teach unity with the view of giving an example of non-duality.

Nine Examples (supra) Establish the Duality

तथा च महोपनिषद्–

Tathā ca Mahopaniṣad—

Accordingly, the *Mahopaniṣad* :—

34. यथा पक्षी च सूत्रं च नानावृक्षरसा यथा ।
यथा नद्यः समुद्राश्च यथा जीवमहीरुहौ ॥

35. यथाणिमा च धाना च शुद्धोदलवणे यथा ।
चोरापहार्यौ च यथा यथा पुंविषयावपि ॥

Yathā pakṣī ca sūtraṁ ca nānāvṛkṣarasā yatha,
Yathā nadyaḥ samudrāśca yathā jīvamahīruhau,
Yathāṇimā ca dhānā ca śuddhodalavaṇe yathā,
Corāpahāryau ca yathā yathā puṁviṣayāvapi.

"Like a bird and the string; like the juices of various trees;"

"Like rivers and the sea; like fresh and salt water;"

"Like a robber and the robbed; like a man and his energy."

36. यथाज्ञो जीवसङ्घश्च प्राणादेश्च नियामकः ।
तथा जीवेश्वरौ भिन्नौ सर्वदैव विलक्षणौ ॥

Yathājño jīvasaṅghaśca prāṇādeśca niyāmakaḥ,
Tathā jīveśvarau bhinnau sarvadaiva vilakṣaṇau.

"So are soul and the Lord diverse, for ever different."

37. तथापि सूक्ष्मरूपत्वान्न जीवात्परमो हरिः ।
भेदेन मन्ददृष्टीनां दृश्यते प्रेरकोऽपि सन् ॥

Tathāpi sūkṣmarūpatvānna jīvātparamo hariḥ,
Bhedena mandadṛṣṭīnāṁ dṛśyate prerako'pi san.

"Nevertheless from subtilty (or imperceptibility) of form, the supreme Hari ;"

"Is not seen by the dim-sighted to be other than the individual spirit, though he is its actuator."

38. वैलक्षण्यं त योर्ज्ञात्वा मुच्यते बध्यतेऽन्यथा ॥ इति ॥

Vailakṣaṇyaṁ ta yorjñātvā mucyate badhyate'nyathā. iti.

"On knowing their diversity, a man is emancipated : otherwise, he is bound."

39. 'ब्रह्मा शिवः सुराद्याश्च शरीरक्षरणात्क्षराः ।
लक्ष्मीरक्षरदेहत्वादक्षरा तत्परो हरिः ॥

Brahmā śivaḥ surādyāśca śarīrakṣaraṇātkṣarāḥ,
Lakṣmīrakṣaradehatvādakṣarā tatparo hariḥ.

And again : –

"Brahmā, Śiva, and the greatest of the gods decay with the decay of their bodies;"

"Greater than these is Hari, undecaying, because his body is for the sustentation of Lakṣmī."

40. स्वातन्त्र्यशक्तिविज्ञानसुखाद्यैरखिलैर्गुणैः ।
निःसीमात्वेन ते सर्वे तद्वशाः सर्वदैव च ॥ इति ॥

Svātantryaśaktivijñānasukhādyairakhilairguṇaiḥ,
Niḥsīmātvena te sarve tadvaśāḥ sarvadaiva ca. iti.

"By reason of all his attributes, independence, power, knowledge, pleasure, and the rest,"

"All they, all the deities, are in unlimited obedience to him."

41. विष्णुं सर्वगुणैः पूर्णं ज्ञात्वा संसारवर्जितः ।
निर्दुःखानन्दभुङ् नित्यं तत्समीपे स मोदते ॥

Viṣṇuṁ sarvaguṇaiḥ pūrṇaṁ jñātvā saṁsāravarjitaḥ,
Nirduḥkhānandabhuṅ nityaṁ tatsamīpe sa modate.

And again: –

"Knowing Viṣṇnu, full of all excellences, the soul, exempted from transmigration,"

"Rejoices in his presence for ever, enjoying painless bliss.

42. मुक्तानां चाश्रयो विष्णुरधिकोऽधिपतिस्तथा ।
तद्वशा एव ते सर्वे सर्वदैव स ईश्वरः ॥ इति च ।

Muktānāṁ cāśrayo viṣṇuradhiko'dhipatistathā,
Tadvaśā eva te sarve sarvadaiva sa īśvaraḥ. iti ca.

"Viṣṇu is the refugee of liberated souls, and their supreme ruler."

"Obedient to him are they for ever; he is the Lord."

By Knowing the Supreme and the Cause the Inferior and Effect is Known

एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं च प्रधानत्वकारणत्वादिना युज्यते न तु सर्वमिथ्यात्वेन । न हि सत्यज्ञानेन मिथ्याज्ञानं सम्भवति । यथा प्रधानपुरुषाणां ज्ञानाज्ञानाभ्यां ग्रामो ज्ञातोऽज्ञात इत्येवमादिव्यपदेशो दृष्ट एव । यथा च कारणे पितरि ज्ञाते जानात्यस्य पुत्रमिति । यथा वा सादृश्यादेकस्त्रीज्ञानाद् अन्यस्त्रीज्ञानमिति ।

Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānaṁ ca pradhānatvakāraṇatvādinā yujyate na tu sarvamithyātvena. Na hi satyajñānena mithyājñānaṁ sambhavati. Yathā pradhānapuruṣāṇāṁ jñānājñānābhyāṁ grāmo jñāto'jñāta ityevamādivyapadeśo dṛṣṭa eva. Yathā ca kāraṇe pitari jñāte jānātyasya putramiti. Yathā vā sādṛśyādekastrījñānād anyastrījñānamiti.

That by knowledge of one thing there is knowledge of all things may be evinced from its supremacy and causality, not from the falsity of all things. For knowledge of the false cannot be brought about by knowledge of real existence. As we see the current assurance and expression that by knowing or not knowing its chief men a village is known or not known; and as when the father the cause is known, a man knows the son; (so by knowing the supreme and the cause, the inferior and the effect is known).

तदेव सादृश्यमत्रापि विवक्षितं 'यथा सोम्यकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्यात्' (छा. 6/1/4) इत्यादिना । अन्यथा 'सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृग्मयं विज्ञातम्' इत्यत्र एक-पिण्डशब्दौ वृथा प्रसज्येयाताम् । 'मृदा विज्ञातया' इत्येतावतैव वाक्यस्य पूर्णत्वात् ।

Tadeva sādṛśyamatrāpi vivakṣitaṁ 'yathā somyakena mṛtpiṇdena sarvaṁ mṛnmayaṁ vijñātaṁ syāt' (Chā. 6/1/4) ityādinā. Anyathā 'somyaikena mṛtpiṇḍena sarvaṁ mṛgmayaṁ vijñātaṃ' ityatra eka-piṇḍaśabdau vṛthā prasajyeyātāṃ. 'Mṛdā vijñātayā' ityetāvataiva vākyasya pūrṇatvāt.

Otherwise (on the doctrine of the Advaita-vādins that the world is false and illusory) the words one and lump in the text, By one lump of clay, fair sir, all that is made of clay is recognised, would be used to no purpose, for the text must be completed by supplying the words, By reason of clay recognised.

न च 'वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्' (छा. 6/1/5) इत्येतत्कार्यस्य मिथ्यात्वमाचष्ट इत्येष्टव्यम् । वाचारम्भणं विकारो यस्य तदविकृतं नित्यं नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्यादिकमित्येतद्वचनं सत्यमित्यर्थस्य स्वीकारात् । अपरथा नामधेयमितिशब्दयोर्वैयर्थ्यं प्रसज्येत । अतो न कुत्रापि जगतो मिथ्यात्वसिद्धिः ।

Na ca 'Vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyaṁ mṛttiketyeva satyam' (Chā. 6/1/5) ityetatkāryasya mithyātvamācaṣṭa ityeṣṭavyaṃ. Vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro yasya tadavikṛtaṃ nityaṁ nāmedheyaṁ mṛttiketpādikamityetadvacanaṁ satyamityarthasya svikārāt. Aparathā nāmadheyamitiśabdayorvaiyarthyaṁ prasajyeta. Ato na kutrāpi jagato mithyātvasiddhiḥ.

For the text, Utterance with the voice, modification, name, clay (or other determinate object), – these alone are real, cannot be assumed to impart the falsity of things made; the reality of these being admitted, for what is meant is, that of which utterance with the voice is a modification, is unmodified, eternal; and a name such as clay, such speech is true. Otherwise, it would result that the words name and alone would be otiose. There is no proof anywhere, then, that the world is unreal. Besides (we would ask) is the statement that the world is false itself true or false. If the statement is true, there is a violation of a real non-duality. If the statement is untrue, it follows that the world is true.

Rebuttal of Fallacy

किं च प्रपञ्चो मिथ्येत्यत्र मिथ्यात्वं तथ्यमतथ्यं वा । प्रथमे सत्याद्वैतभङ्गप्रसङ्गः । चरमे प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वापातः । नन्वनित्यत्वं नित्यमनित्यं वा । उभयथाप्यनुपपत्तिरित्याक्षेपवदयमपि नित्यसमजातिभेदः स्यात् ।

Kiṁ ca prapañco mithyetyatramithyātvaṁ tathyamatathyaṁ vā. Prathame satyādvaitabhaṅgaprasaṅgaḥ. Carame prapañcasatyatvāpātaḥ. Nanvanityatvaṁ nityamanityaṁ vā. Ubhayathāpyanupapattirityākṣepavadayamapi nityasamajātibhedaḥ syāt.

Perhaps it may be objected that this dilemma is a kind of fallacious reasoning, like the dilemma: Is transitoriness permanent or transitory? There is a difficulty in either case.

तदुक्तं न्यायनिर्माणवेधसा–'नित्यमनित्यभावादनित्ये नित्यत्वोपपत्तेर्नित्यसमः' (न्या. सू. 5/1/35) इति । तार्किकरक्षायां च –

Taduktaṁ nyāyanirmāṇavedhasā—'nityamanityabhāvādanitye nityatvopapatternityasamaḥ' (Nyā. Sū. 5/1/35) iti. Tārkikarakṣāyāṁ ca—

As it is said by the author of the Nyāya-nirvāṇa : The proof of the permanence of the transitory, as being both permanent and transitory, is a paralogism. And in the Tārkika-rakṣā –

43. धर्मस्य तदतद्रूपविकल्पानुपपत्तितः ।
धर्मिणस्तद्विशिष्टत्वभङ्गो नित्यसमो भवेत् ।। इति ।

Dharmasya tadatadrūpavikalpānupapattitaḥ,
Dharmiṇastadviśiṣṭatvabhaṅgo nityasamo bhavet. iti.

"When a mode cannot be evinced to be either such and such, or not such and such,"
"The denial of a subject characterised by such a mode is called Nitya-sama."

अस्याः संज्ञाया उपलक्षणत्वमभिप्रेत्याभिहितं प्रबोधसिद्धावन्वर्थित्वात्तूपरञ्जकधर्मसमेति । तस्मादसदुत्तरमिति चेत्–

Asyāḥ saṁjñāyā upalakṣaṇatvamabhipretyābhihitaṁ prabodhasiddhāvanvarthitvāttūparañjakadharmasameti. Tasmādasaduttaramiti cet—

With the implied mention of this same technical expression it is stated in the *Prabodha-siddhi* : Equality of characteristic modes results from significancy. If it be said, This then is a valid rejoinder, we reply.

अशिक्षितत्रासनमेतत् । दुष्टत्वमूलानिरूपणात् । तद् द्विविधं साधारणमसाधारणं च । तत्राद्यं स्वव्याघातकम् । द्वितीयं त्रिविधं युक्ताङ्गहीनत्वमयुक्ताङ्गाधिकत्वमविषयवृत्तित्वं चेति ।

Aśikṣitatrāsanametat. Duṣṭatvamūlānirūpaṇāt. Tad dvividhaṁ sādhāraṇamasādhāraṇaṁ ca. Tatrādyaṁ svavyāghātakam. Dvitīyaṁ trividhaṁ yuktāṅgahīnatvamayuktāṅgādhikatvamaviṣayavṛttittvaṁ ceti.

This is a mere scaring of the uninstructed, for the source of fallacy has not been pointed out. This is twofold, general and particular : of these, the former is self-destructive and the latter is of three kinds, defect of a requisite element, excess of an element not requisite, and residence in that which is not the subjicible subject.

तत्र साधारणमसम्भावितमेव । उक्तस्याक्षेपस्य स्वात्मव्यापनानुलम्भात् । एवमसाधारणमपि । घटस्य नास्तितायां नास्तितोक्तौ अस्तित्ववत्प्रकृतेऽप्युपपत्तेः ।

Tatra sādhāraṇamasambhāvitameva. Uktasyākṣepasya svātmavyāpanānulambhāt. Evamasādhāraṇamapi. Ghaṭasya nāstitāyāṁ nāstitoktau astittvavatprakṛte'pyupapatteḥ.

Of these (two forms of the fallacy), the general form is not suspected, no self-pervasion being observed in the dilemma in question (viz., Is the statement that the world is unreal itself true or false ? etc.) So likewise the particular; for if a water-jar be said to be non-existent, the affirmation of its non-existence is equally applicable to the water-jar as that of its existence.

ननु प्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वमभ्युपेयते नासत्त्वमिति चेत्, तदेतत्सोऽयं शिरश्छेदेऽपि शतं न ददाति, विंशतिपञ्चकं तु प्रयच्छतीति शाकटिकवृत्तान्तमनुहरेत् । मिथ्यात्वासत्त्वयोः पर्यायत्वादित्यलमतिप्रपञ्चेन ।

Nanu prapañcasya mithyātvamabhyupeyate nāsattvamiti cet, tadetatso'yaṁ śiraśchede'pi śataṁ na dadāti, viṁśatipañcakaṁ tu prayacchatīti śākaṭikavṛttāntamanuharet. Mithyātvāsattvayoḥ paryāyatvādityalamatiprapañcena.

If you reply : We accept the unreality (or falsity) of the world, not its non-existence; this reply is about as wise as the procedure of the carter who will lose his head rather than pay a hundred pieces of money, but will at once give five score; for falsity and non-existence are synonymous. We dismiss further prolixity.

Explanation on First Aphorism

तत्र 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' (ब्र. सू. 1/1/1) इति प्रथमसूत्रस्यायमर्थः–तत्राथशब्दो मङ्गलार्थोऽधिकारानन्तर्यार्थश्च स्वीक्रियते । अतःशब्दो हेत्वर्थः । तदुक्तं गारुडे–

Tatra 'Athāto brahmajijñāsā' (Bra. Sū. 1/1/1) iti prathamasūtrasyāyamarthaḥ—tatrāthaśabdo maṅgalārtho'-dhikārānantaryārthaśca svīkriyate. Ataḥśabdo hetvarthaḥ. Taduktaṁ gāruḍe—

The meaning of the first aphorism, viz., Then hence the absolute is to be desired to be known, is as follows: – The word then is allowed to purport auspiciousness, and to designate subsequency to the qualification (of the aspirant). The word hence indicates a reason. Accordingly it is stated in the Garuḍa-purāṇa : –

44. अथातःशब्दपूर्वाणि सूत्राणि निखिलान्यपि ।
प्रारभ्यन्ते नियत्यैव तत्किमत्र नियामकम् ॥

Athātaḥśabdapūrvāṇi sūtrāṇi nikhilānyapi,
Prārabhyante niyatyaiva tatkimatra niyāmakam.

"All the aphorisms begin with the words Then and Hence regularly; what then is the reason of this ?"

45. कश्चार्थस्तु तयोर्विद्वन्कथमुत्तमता तयोः ।
एतदाख्याहि मे ब्रह्मन्यथा ज्ञास्यामि तत्त्वतः ॥

Kaścārthastu tayorvidvankathamuttamatā tayoḥ,
Etadākhyāhi me brahmanyathā jñāsyāmi tattvataḥ.

"And what is the sense of those words, O sage? Why are those the most excellent?"

"Tell me this, Brahmā, that I may know it truly."

46. एवमुक्तो नारदेन ब्रह्मा प्रोवाच सत्तमः ।
आनन्तर्याधिकारे च मङ्गलार्थे तथैव च ॥
अथशब्दस्त्वतःशब्दो हेत्वर्थे समुदीरितः । इति ।

Evamukto nāradena brahmā provāca sattamaḥ,
Ānantaryādhikāre ca maṅgalārthe tathaiva ca;
Athaśabdastvataḥśabdo hetvarthe samudīritaḥ. iti.

Thus addressed by Nārada, the most excellent Brahmā replied: –

"The word Then is used of subsequency and of competency, and in an auspicious sense,"

"And the word Thence is employed to indicate the reason."

यतो नारायणप्रसादमन्तरेण न मोक्षो लभ्यते प्रसादश्च ज्ञानमन्तरेण, अतो ब्रह्माजिज्ञासा कर्तव्येति सिद्धम् ।

Yato nārāyaṇaprasādamantareṇa na mokṣo labhyate prasādaśca jñānamantareṇa, ato brahmājijñāsā kartavyeti siddham.

It is laid down that we must institute inquiries about the absolute, because emancipation is not attained without the grace of Nārāyaṇa, and his grace is not attained without knowledge.

Characteristics of Absolute

जिज्ञास्यब्रह्मणो लक्षणमुक्तं 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' (ब्र. सू. 1/1/2) इति । सृष्टिस्थित्यादि यतो भवति तद् ब्रह्मेति वाक्यार्थः । तथा च स्कान्दं वचः-

Jijñāsyabrahmaṇo lakṣaṇamuktaṁ 'janmādyasya yataḥ' (Bra. Sū. 1/1/2) iti. Sṛṣṭisthityādi yato bhavati tad brahmeti vākyārthaḥ. Tathā ca skāndaṁ vacaḥ—

The absolute, about which the inquiry is to be instituted, is described in the words (of the second aphorism): From which the genesis, and so forth, of this. The meaning of the sentence is that the absolute is that from which result emanation, sustentation, and retractation; according to the words of the Skandapurāṇa –

47. उत्पत्तिस्थितिसंहारा नियतिर्ज्ञानमावृत्तिः ।
बन्धमोक्षौ च पुरुषाद्यमात्स हरिरेकराट् ॥

Utpattisthitisaṁhārā niyatirjñānamāvṛttiḥ,
Bandhamokṣau ca puruṣādyamātsa harirekarāṭ.

"He is Hari the sole ruler, the spirit from whom are emanation, sustentation, retractation, necessity, knowledge, involution (in illusion), and bondage and liberation."

यतो वा इमानीत्ययादिश्रुतिभ्यश्च ।

Yato vā imānītyādiśrutibhyaśca.

And according to such Vedic texts, from which are these.

Evidence Adducible for the Absolute

तत्र प्रमाणमप्युक्तं 'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्' (ब्र. सू. 1/1/3) इति । 'नावेदविन्मनुते तं बृहन्तम्' (तै. ब्रा. 3/12/9/7) 'तं त्वौपनिषदम्' (बृ. 3/9/26) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यस्तस्यानुमानिकत्वं निराक्रियते । न चानुमानस्य स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रमाण्यमस्ति । तदुक्तं कौर्मे–

Tatra pramāṇamapyuktaṁ 'śāstrayonitvāt' (Bra. Sū. 1/1/3) iti. 'Nāvedavinmanute taṁ bṛhantaṃ' (Tai. Brāḥ. 3/12/9/7) 'Taṁ tvaupaniṣadaṃ' (Bṛ. 3/9/26) ityādiśrutibhyastasyānumānikatvaṁ nirākriyate. Na cānumānasya svātantryeṇa pramāṇyamasti. Taduktaṁ kaurme—

The evidence adducible for this is described (in the third aphorism): Because it has its source from the system. That the absolute should be reached by way of inference is rejected by such texts as, He that knows not the Veda cogitates not that mighty one; Him described in the Upaniṣads. Inference, moreover, is not by itself authoritative, as is said in the *Kūrma-purāṇa*—

48. श्रुतिसाहाय्यरहितमनुमानं न कुत्रचित् ।
निश्चयात्साधयेदर्थं प्रमाणान्तरमेव च ॥

Śrutisāhāyyarahitamanumānaṁ na kutracit,
Niścayātsādhayedarthaṁ pramāṇāntarameva ca.

"Inference, unaccompanied by revelation, in no case,"

"Can definitely prove a matter, nor can any other form of evidence."

49. श्रुतिस्मृतिसहायं यत्प्रमाणान्तरमुत्तमम् ।
प्रमाणपदवीं गच्छेन्नात्र कार्या विचारणा ॥ इति ।

Śrutismṛtisahāyaṁ yatpramaṇāntaramuttamaṃ,
Pramāṇapadavīṁ gacchennātra kāryā vicāraṇā. iti.

"Whatsoever other form of evidence, companioned by revelation and tradition,"

"Acquires the rank of probation, about this there can be no hesitation."

शास्त्रस्वरूपमुक्तं स्कान्दे—

Śāstrasvarūpamuktaṁ skānde—

What is Śāstra (or system of sacred institutes) is, has been stated in the *Skanda-purāṇa* :—

50. ऋग्यजुःसामाथर्वा च भारतं पाञ्चरात्रकम् ।
मूलरामायणं चैव शास्त्रमित्यभिधीयते ॥

Ṛgyajuḥsāmātharvā ca bhārataṁ pāñcarātrakaṃ,
Mūlarāmāyaṇaṁ caiva śāstramityabhidhīyate.

"The Ṛg-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Atharva-veda, the Mahābhārata, the Pañca-rātra, and the original Rāmāyaṇa, are called Śāstras."

51. यच्चानुकूलमेतस्य तच्च शास्त्रं प्रकीर्तितम् ।
अतोऽन्यो ग्रन्थविस्तारो नैव शास्त्रं कुवर्त्म तत् ॥ इति ।

Yaccānukūlametasya tacca śāstraṁ prakīrtitaṃ,
Ato'nyo granthavistāro naiva śāstraṁ kuvatrma tat. iti.

"That also which is conformable to these is called Śāstra."

"Any aggregate of composition other than this, is a heterodoxy."

तदनेन, 'अनन्यलभ्यः शास्त्रार्थः' इति न्यायेन भेदस्य प्राप्तत्वेन तत्र न तात्पर्यं किन्तु अद्वैतं एव वेदवाक्यानां तात्पर्यम्–इत्यद्वैतवादिनां प्रत्याशा प्रतिक्षिप्ता । अनुमानादीश्वरस्य सिद्ध्यभावेन तद्भेदस्यापि ततः सिद्ध्यभावात् । तस्मान्न भेदानुवादकत्वमिति तत्परत्वमवगम्यते । अत एवोक्तम्–

Tadanena, 'ananyalabhyaḥ śāstrārthaḥ' iti nyāyena bhedasya prāptatvena tatra na tātparyaṁ kintu advaitaṁ eva vedavākyānāṁ tātparyaṁ—ityadvaitavādināṁ pratyāśā pratikṣiptā. Anumānādīśvarasya siddhyabhāvena tadbhedasyāpi tataḥ siddhyabhāvāt. Tasmānna bhedānuvādakatvamiti tatparatvamavagaṁyate. Ata evoktaṃ—

According, then, to the rule that the sense of the sacred institutes is not to be taken from other sources than these, the Monist view, viz., that the purport of the texts of the Veda relates not to the duality learnt from those but to non-duality, is rejected : for as there is no proof of a God from inference, so there is no proof of the duality between God and other things from inference. Therefore, there can be in these texts no mere explanation of such duality, and the text must be understood to indicate the duality. Hence, it is that it has said :—

52. सदागमैकविज्ञेयं समतीतक्षराक्षरम् ।
नारायणं सदा वन्दे निर्दोषाशेषसद्गुणम् ॥ (वि. त. 1) इति ।

Sadāgamaikavijñeyaṁ samatītakṣarākṣaraṃ,
Nārāyaṇaṁ sadā vande nirdoṣāśeṣasadguṇaṃ. (Vi. Ta.1) iti.

"I ever laud Nārāyaṇa, the one being to be known from genuine revelation, who transcends the perishable and the

imperishable, without imperfections, and of inexhaustible excellences."

Co-ordination of Sacred Institutes from their Construction

शास्त्रस्य तत्र प्रामाण्यमुपपादितं 'तत्तु समन्वयात्' (ब्र. सू. 1/1/4) इति । समन्वय उपक्रमादिलिङ्गम् । उक्तं च बृहत्संहितायाम्–

Śāstrasya tatra pramāṇyamupapāditaṁ 'tattu samanvayāt' (Bra. Sū. 1/1/4) iti. Samanvaya upakramādiliṅgam. Uktaṁ ca Bṛhatsaṁhitāyām—

It has thus been evinced that sacred institutes are the evidence of (the existence of) this (ultimate reality, *Brahman*). (The fourth aphorism is) : But that is from the construction. In regard to this, the commencement and other elements are stated to be the marks of the construction, in the *Bṛhat-saṁhitā* :—

53. उपक्रमोपसंहारावभ्यासोऽपूर्वता फलम् ।
अर्थवादोपपत्ती च लिङ्गं तात्पर्यनिर्णये ।। इति ।

Upakramopasaṁhārāvabhyāso'pūrvatā phalam,
Arthavādopapattī ca liṅgaṁ tātparyanirṇaye. iti.

"Commencement, conclusion, reiteration, novelty, profit, eulogy, and demonstration, are the marks by which the purport is ascertained."

Conclusion

एवं वेदान्ततात्पर्यवशात् तदेव ब्रह्म शास्त्रगम्यमित्युक्तं भवति । दिङ्मात्रमत्र प्रादर्शि । शिष्टमानन्दतीर्थभाष्यव्याख्यानादौ द्रष्टव्यम् । ग्रन्थबहुत्वभियोपरम्यत इति।

Evaṁ vedāntatātparyavaśāt tadeva brahma śāstragamyamityuktaṁ bhavati. Diṅmātramatra prādarśi. Śiṣṭamānandatīrthabhāṣyavyākhyānādau draṣṭavyam. Granthabahutvabhiyoparamyata iti.

It is thus stated that in accordance with the purport of the Upaniṣads the absolute is to be apprehended only from the sacred institutes. We have here given merely a general indication. What remains may be sought from the Ānandatīrtha-bhāṣya-vyākhyāṇa (or exposition of the Commentary of Ānanda-tīrtha). We desist for fear of giving an undue prolixity to our treatise.

एतच्च रहस्यं पूर्णप्रज्ञेन मध्यमन्दिरेण वायोस्तृतीयावतारम्मन्येन निरूपितम् ।

Etacca rahasyaṁ pūrṇaprajñena madhyamandireṇa vāyostṛtīyāvatārammanyena nirūpitam.

This mystery was promulgated by Pūrṇa-prajña Madhya-mandira, who esteemed himself the third incarnation of Vāyu :—

54. प्रथमस्तु हनूमान्स्याद् द्वितीयो भीम एव च ।
पूर्णप्रज्ञस्तृतीयश्च भगवत्कार्यसाधकः ।।

Prathamastu hanūmānsyād dvitīyo bhīma eva ca,
Pūrṇaprajñastṛtīyaśca bhagavatkāryasādhakaḥ.

"The first was Hanumat, the second Bhīma,"

"The third Pūrṇa-prajña, the workers of the work of the Lord."

एतदेवाभिप्रेत्य तत्र तत्र ग्रन्थसमाप्ताविदं पद्यं लिख्यते–

Etadevābhipretya tatra tatra granthasamāptāvidaṁ padyaṁ likhyate—

After expressing the same idea in various passages, he has written the following stanza at the conclusion of his work:—

55. यस्य त्रीण्युदिता निवेदवचने दिव्यानि रूपाण्यलं
बट् तद्दर्शतमित्थमेव निहितं देवस्य भर्गो महत् ।
वायो रामवचोनयं प्रथमकं पृक्षो द्वितीयं
वपुर्मध्वो यत्तु तृतीयमेतदमुना ग्रन्थः कृतः केशवे ।।
(म. भा. ता. 32/181)

Yasya trīṇyuditā nivedavacane divyāni rūpāṇyalaṁ
baṭ taddarśatamitthameva nihitaṁ devasya bhargo mahat,
Vāyo rāmavaconayaṁ prathamakaṁ pṛkṣo dvitīyaṁ
vapurmadhvo yattu tṛtīyametadamunā granthaḥ kṛtaḥ keśave. (Ma. Bhā. Tā. 32/181)

"That whereof the three divine forms are declared in the text of the Veda, sufficiently,"

"Has that been set forth; this is the whole majesty in the splendour of the Veda;"

"The first incarnation of the Wind-god was he that bowed to the words of Rāma (Hanumat); the second was Bhīma;"

"By this Madhva, who is the third, this book has been composed in regard to Keśava."

एतत्पद्यार्थस्तु 'बलित्था तद्वपुषे धायि दर्शतं देवस्य भर्गः सहसो यतोऽजनि' (ऋ. 1/141/1) इत्यादिश्रुतिपर्यालोचनयाऽवगम्यत इति। तस्मात्सर्वस्य शास्त्रस्य विष्णुतत्त्वं सर्वोत्तममित्यत्र तात्पर्यमिति सर्वं निरवद्यम्।

Etatpadyārthastu 'balitthā tadvapuṣe dhāyi darśataṁ devasya bhargaḥ sahaso yato'jani' (Ṛg. 1/141/1) ityādiśrutiparyālocanayā'vagamyata iti. Tasmātsarvasya śāstrasya viṣṇutattvaṁ sarvottamamityatra tātparyamiti sarvaṁ niravadyam.

The import of this stanza may be learnt by considering various Vedic texts.

The purport of this is that Viṣṇu is the principle above all others in every system of sacred institutes. Thus, all is clear.[1]

A.E.G.

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे पूर्णप्रज्ञदर्शनम्।

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1. For a further account of Ānandatīrtha or Mādhva see Wilson, Works, vol.i.pp. 138-150. His Commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras* has been printed in Calcutta.

CHAPTER VI

THE PĀŚUPATA SYSTEM OF NAKULĪŚA

Fault Searching upon Vaiṣṇava System

तदेतद्वैष्णवमतं दासत्वादिपदवेदनीयं परतन्त्रत्वं दुःखावहत्वान्न दुःखान्तादीप्सितास्पदम् इत्यरोचयमानाः, पारमैश्वर्यं कामयमानाः, 'पराभिमता मुक्ता न भवन्ति, परतन्त्रत्वात्, पारमैश्वर्यरहितत्वात्, अस्मदादिवत्', 'मुक्तात्मानश्च परमेश्वरगुणसम्बन्धिनः, पुरुषत्वे सति समस्तदुःखबीजविधुरत्वात्परमेश्वरवत्',— इत्याद्यनुमानं प्रमाणं प्रतिपद्यमानाः, केचन माहेश्वराः परमपुरुषार्थसाधनं पञ्चार्थप्रपञ्चनपरं पाशुपतशास्त्रमाश्रयन्ते।

Tadetadvaiṣṇavamataṁ dāsatvādipadavedanīyaṁ paratantratvaṁ duḥkhāvahatvānna duḥkhāntādīpsitāspadam ityarocayamānāḥ, pāramaiśvaryaṁ kāmayamānāḥ, 'parābhimatā muktā na bhavanti, paratantratvāt, pāramaiśvaryarahitatvāt, asmadādivat', 'muktātmānaśca parameśvaraguṇasambandhinaḥ, puruṣatve sati samastaduḥkhabījavidhuratvātparameśvaravat'— ityādyanumānaṁ pramāṇaṁ pratipadyamānāḥ, kecana māheśvarāḥ paramapuruṣārthasādhanaṁ pañcārthaprapañcanaparaṁ pāśupataśāstramāśrayante.

Certain Māheśvaras disapprove of this doctrine of the Vaiṣṇavas known by its technicalities of the servitude of souls and the like, inasmuch as bringing with it the pains of dependence upon another, it cannot be a means of cessation of a pain and other desired ends. They recognise as stringent such arguments as, those depending on another and longing for independence do not become emancipated, because they still depend upon another, being destitute of independence like ourselves and others; and liberated spirits possess the attributes of the Supreme Deity, because at the same time, that they are spirits they are free from the germ of every pain as the Supreme Deity is. Recognising these arguments, these Māheśvaras adopt the Pāśupata system, which is conversant about the exposition of five categories, as the means to the highest end of man.

Explanation on the Nature of Spiritual Teacher

तत्रेदमादिसूत्रम्–'अथातः पशुपतेः पाशुपतयोगविधिं व्याख्यास्याम' इति । अस्यार्थः–अत्राथशब्दः पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षः । पूर्वप्रकृतश्च गुरुं प्रति शिष्यस्य प्रश्नः । गुरुस्वरूपं गणकारिकायां निरूपितम्–

Tatredamādisūtram—'athātaḥ paśupateḥ pāśupatayogavidhiṁ vyākhyāsyāma' iti. Asyārthaḥ—atrāthaśabdaḥ pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣaḥ. Pūrvaprakṛtaśca guruṁ prati śiṣyasya praśnaḥ. Gurusvarūpaṁ gaṇakārikāyāṁ nirūpitam—

In this system, the first aphorism is : Now, then we shall expound the Pāśupata union and rites of Paśupati. The meaning is as follows : – The word *now* refers to something antecedent, and this something antecedent is the disciple's interrogation of the spiritual teacher. The nature of a spiritual teacher is explicated in the Gaṇakārikā : –

1. पञ्चकास्त्वष्ट विज्ञेया गणश्चैकस्त्रिकात्मकः ।
   वेत्ता नवगणस्यास्य संस्कर्त्ता गुरुरुच्यते ॥

Pañcakāstvaṣṭa vijñeyā gaṇaścaikastrikātmakaḥ,
Vettā navagaṇasyāsya saṁskarttā gururucyate.

"But there are eight pentads to be known, and a group, one with three factors;"

"He that knows this ninefold aggregate is a self-purifier, a spiritual guide."

2. लाभा मला उपायाश्च देशावस्थाविशुद्धयः ।
   दीक्षाकारिबलान्यष्टौ पञ्चकास्त्रीणि वृत्तयः ॥

Lābhā malā upāyāśca deśāvasthāviśuddhayaḥ,
Dīkṣākāribalānyaṣṭau pañcakāstrīṇi vṛttayaḥ.

"The acquisitions, the impurities, the expedients, the localities, the perseverence, the purifications,"

"The initiations, and the powers, are the eight pentads; and there are three functions."

'तिस्रो वृत्तयः' इति प्रयोक्तव्ये 'त्रीणि वृत्तयः' इति च्छान्दसः प्रयोगः ।

'Tisro vṛttayaḥ' iti prayoktavye 'trīṇi vṛttayaḥ' iti cchāndasaḥ prayogaḥ.

The employment in the above line of the neuter numeral three (*trīṇi*), instead of the feminine three (*tisraḥ*), is a Vedic construction.

तत्र विधीयमानमुपायफलं लाभः । ज्ञानतपोनित्यत्वस्थितिशुद्धिभेदात्पञ्चविधः । तदाह हरदत्ताचार्यः–

Tatra vidhīyamānamupāyaphalaṁ lābhaḥ. Jñānataponityatvasthitiśuddhibhedātpañcavidhaḥ. Tadāha haradattācāryaḥ—

(a) Acquisition is the fruit of an expedient while realising, and is divided into five members, viz. knowledge, penance, permanence of the body, constancy, and purity. Thus, Haradattācārya says :

'ज्ञानं तपोऽथ नित्यत्वं स्थितिः शुद्धिश्च पञ्चमम्' ।

'Jñānaṁ tapo'tha nityatvaṁ sthitiḥ śuddhiśca pañcamaṁ.'

Knowledge, penance, permanence, constancy, and purity as the fifth.

आत्माश्रितो दुष्टभावो मलः । स मिथ्याज्ञानादिभेदात्पञ्चविधः तदप्याह–

Ātmāśrito duṣṭabhāvo malaḥ. Sa mithyājñānādibhedātpañcavidhaḥ tadapyāh—

(b) Impurity is an evil condition pertaining to the soul. This is of five kinds, false conception and the rest. Thus, Haradatta also says : –

3. मिथ्याज्ञानमधर्मश्च सक्तिहेतुश्च्युतिस्तथा ।
   पशुत्वमूलं पञ्चैते तन्त्रे हेया विविक्तितः ॥ (गणकारिका, 8) इति ।

Mithyājñānamadharmaśca saktihetuścyutistathā,
Paśutvamūlaṁ pañcaite tantre heyā viviktitaḥ.

(Gaṇakārikā, 8) iti.

"False conception, demerit, attachment, interestedness, and falling,"

"These five, the root of bondage, are in this system especially to be shunned."

(c) An expedient is a means of purifying the aspirant to liberation.

साधकस्य शुद्धिहेतुरुपायो वासचर्यादिभेदात्पञ्चविधः । तदप्याह–

Sādhakasya śuddhiheturupāyo vāsacaryādibhedātpañcavidhaḥ. Tadapyāha—

These expedients are of five kinds, use of habitation, and the rest. Thus, he also says : –

4. वासचर्या जपो ध्यानं सदा रुद्रस्मृतिस्तथा ।
प्रपत्तिश्चेति लाभानामुपायाः पञ्च निश्चिताः ॥ इति ।

Vāsacaryā japo dhyānaṁ sadā rudrasmṛtistathā,
Prapattiśceti lābhānāmupāyāḥ pañca niścitāḥ. iti.

"Use of habitation, pious muttering, meditation, constant recollection of Rudra,"

"And apprehension, are determined to be the five expedients of acquirements."

येनार्थानुसन्धानपूर्वकं ज्ञानतपोवृद्धी प्राप्नोति स देशो गुरुजनादिः । यदाह–

Yenārthānusandhānapūrvakaṁ jñānatapovṛddhī prāpnoti sa deśo gurujanādiḥ. Yadāha—

(d) Locality is that by which, after studying the categories, the aspirant attains increase of knowledge and austerity, viz., spiritual teachers and the rest. Thus, he says :–

5. गुरुर्जनो गुहादेशः श्मशानं रुद्र एव च । इति ।

Gururjano guhādeśaḥ śmaśānaṁ rudra eva ca. iti.

"The spiritual teachers, a cavern, a special place, the burning-ground, and Rudra only."

आलाभप्राप्तेरेकमर्यादावस्थितस्य यदवस्थानं साऽवस्था व्यक्तादिविशेषणविशिष्टा । तदुक्तम्–

Ālābhaprāpterekamaryādāvasthitasya yadavasthānaṁ sā'vasthā vyaktādiviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭā. Taduktam—

(e) Perseverence is the endurance in one or other of these pentads until the attainment of the desired end, and is distributed into the differenced and the rest. Thus, it is said :–

व्यक्ताऽव्यक्ता जया दानं निष्ठा चैव हि पञ्चमम् । इति ।

Vyaktā'vyaktā jayā dānaṁ niṣṭhā caiva hi pañcamam. iti.

"The differenced, the undifferenced, muttering, acceptance, and devotion as the fifth."

मिथ्याज्ञानादीनामत्यन्तव्यपोहो विशुद्धिः । सा प्रतियोगिभेदात्पञ्चविधा । तदुक्तम्–

Mithyājñānādīnāmatyantavyapoho viśuddhiḥ. Sā pratiyogibhedātpañcavidhā. Taduktam—

(f) Purification is the putting away, once for all, of false conception and the other four impurities. It is distributed into five species according to the five things to be put away. Thus, it is said :–

6. अज्ञानस्याप्यधर्मस्य हानिः सङ्गकरस्य च ।
च्युतेर्हानिः पशुत्वस्य शुद्धिः पञ्चविधा स्मृता ॥ इति ।

Ajñānasyāpyadharmasya hāniḥ saṅgakarasya ca,
Cyuterhāniḥ paśutvasya śuddhiḥ pañcavidhā smṛtā. iti.

"The loss of the ignorance, of demerit, of attachment, of interestedness,"

"And of falling, is declared to be the fivefold purification of the state of bondage."

दीक्षाकारिपञ्चकं चोक्तम्–

Dīkṣākāripañcakaṁ coktam—

(g) The five initiations are thus enumerated :—

7. द्रव्यं कालः क्रिया मूर्तिर्गुरुश्चैव हि पञ्चमः । इति ।

Dravyaṁ kālaḥ kriyā mūrtirguruścaiva hi pañcamaḥ. iti.

"The material, the proper time, the rite, the image, and the spiritual guide as the fifth."

बलपञ्चकं च–

Balapañcakaṁ ca—

(h) The five powers are as follow: –

8. गुरुभक्तिः प्रसादश्च मतेर्द्वन्द्वजयस्तथा ।
धर्मश्चैवाप्रमादश्च बलं पञ्चविधं स्मृतम् ॥ इति ।

Gurubhaktiḥ prasādaśca materdvandvajayastathā,
Dharmaścaivāpramādaśca balaṁ pañcavidhaṁ smṛtam. iti.

"Devotion to the spiritual guide, clearness of intellect, conquest of pleasure and pain,"

"Merit and carefulness, are declared the five heads of power."

पञ्चमल-लघूकरणार्थमागमाविरोधिनोऽन्नार्जनोपाया वृत्तयो भैक्ष्योत्सृष्टयथा-लब्धाभिधा इति । शेषमशेषमाकर एवावगन्तव्यम् ।

Pañcamala - laghūkaraṇārthamāgamāvirodhino'nnārjanopāyā vṛttayo bhaikṣyotsṛṣṭyathālabdhābhidhā iti. Śeṣamaśeṣamākara evāvagantavyam.

The three functions are the modes of earning daily food consistent with propriety, for the diminution of the five impurities, viz., mendicancy, living upon alms, and living upon what chance supplies. All the rest is to be found in the standard words of this sect.

Explanation to terms Comprising the Systems

अतः शब्देन दुःखान्तस्य प्रतिपादनम् । आध्यात्मिकादिदुःखत्रयव्यपोहप्रश्नार्थत्वात्तस्य । पशुशब्देन कार्यस्य । परतन्त्रवचनत्वात्तस्य । पतिशब्देन कारणस्य । 'ईश्वरः पतिरीशिता' इति जगत्कारणीभूतेश्वरवचनत्वात्तस्य । योगविधी तु प्रसिद्धौ ।

Ataḥ śabdena duḥkhāntasya pratipādanam. Ādhyātmikādiduḥkhatrayavyapohapraśnārthatvāttasya. Paśuśabdena kāryasya. Paratantravacanatvāttasya. Patiśabdena kāraṇasya. 'Īśvaraḥ patirīśitā' iti jagatkāraṇībhūteśvaravacanatvāttasya. Yogavidhī tu prasiddhau.

In the first aphorism above recited, the word *now* serves to introduce the exposition of the termination of pain (or emancipation), that being the object of the interrogation about the putting away of pain personal, physical, and hyperphysical. By the word *paśu*, we are to understand the effect (or created world), the word designating that which is dependent on something ulterior. By the word *pati,* we are to understand the cause (or *principium*), the word designating the Lord, who is the cause of the universe, the *pati*, or ruler. The meaning of the words sacrifices and rites every one knows.

Personal Impersonal Cessation of Pain

तत्र दुःखान्तो द्विविधः–अनात्मकः सात्मकश्चेति । तत्रानात्मकः सर्वदुःखानामत्यन्तोच्छेदरूपः । सात्मकस्तु दृक्क्रियाशक्तिलक्षणमैश्वर्यम् । तत्र दृक्शक्तिरेकाऽपि विषयभेदात्पञ्चविधोपचर्यते–दर्शनं श्रवणं मननं विज्ञानं सर्वज्ञत्वं चेति ।

Tatra duḥkhānto dvividhaḥ—anātmakaḥ sātmakaśceti. Tatrānātmakaḥ sarvaduḥkhānāmatyantocchedarūpaḥ. Sātmakastu dṛkkriyāśaktilakṣaṇamaiśvaryam. Tatra dṛkśaktirekā'pi viṣayabhedātpañcavidhopacaryate—darśanaṁ śravaṇaṁ mananaṁ vijñānaṁ sarvajñatvaṁ ceti.

In this system the cessation of pain is of two kinds, impersonal and personal. Of these, the impersonal consists in the absolute extirpation of all pains; the personal in supremacy consisting of the visual and active powers. Of these two powers, the visual, while only one power, is, according to its diversity of objects, indirectly describable as of five kinds, vision, audition, cogitation, discrimination, and omniscience.

तत्र सूक्ष्म-व्यवहित-विप्रकृष्टाशेष-चाक्षुष-स्पर्शादिविषयं ज्ञानं दर्शनम् । अशेषशब्दविषयं सिद्धिज्ञानं श्रवणम् । समस्तचिन्ताविषयं सिद्धिज्ञानं मननम् । निरवशेषशास्त्रविषयं ग्रन्थतोऽर्थतश्च सिद्धिज्ञानं विज्ञानम् । स्वशास्त्र येनोच्यते । उक्तानुक्ताशेषार्थेषु समासविस्तरविभागविशेषतश्च तत्त्वव्याप्तसदोदितसिद्धिज्ञानं सर्वज्ञत्वमिति । एषा धीशक्तिः ।

Tatra sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭāśeṣ-cākṣuṣa-sparśādiviṣayaṁ jñānaṁ darśanam. Aśeṣaśabdaviṣayaṁ siddhijñānaṁ śravaṇam. Samastacintāviṣayaṁ siddhijñānaṁ mananam. Niravaśeṣaśāstraviṣayaṁ granthato'rthataśca siddhijñānaṁ vijñānam. Svaśāstra yenocyate. Uktānuktāśeṣārtheṣu samāsavistaravibhāgaviśeṣataśca tattvavyāptasadoditasiddhijñānaṁ sarvajñatvamiti. Eṣā dhīśaktiḥ.

Of these five, vision is cognition of every kind of visual, tactual, and other sensible objects, though imperceptible, intercepted, or remote. Audition is cognition of principles, conversant about all articulate sounds. Cogitation is cognition of principles, conversant about all kinds of thoughts. Discrimination is cognition of principles conversant about the whole system of institutes, according to the text and according to its significance. Omniscience is cognition of principles ever arising and pervaded by truth, relative to all matters declared or not declared, summary or in detail, classified and specialised. Such is this intellectual power.

क्रियाशक्तिरेकापि त्रिविधोपचर्यते–मनोजवित्वं कामरूपित्वं विकरणधर्मित्वं चेति । तत्र निरतिशयशीघ्रकारित्वं मनोजवित्वम् । कर्मादिनिरपेक्षस्य स्वेच्छया एवानन्तसलक्षण-विलक्षण-स्वरूप-करणाधिष्ठातृत्वं कामरूपित्वम् । उपसंहृतकरणस्यापि निरतिशयैश्वर्यसम्बन्धित्वं विकरणधर्मित्वमिति । एषा क्रियाशक्तिः ।

Kriyāśaktirekāpi trividhopacaryate—manojavitvaṁ kāmarūpitvaṁ vikaraṇadharmitvaṁ ceti. Tatra niratiśayaśīghrakāritvaṁ manojavitvam. Karmādinirapekṣasya svecchayā evānanta-salakṣaṇa-vilakṣaṇa-svarūpa-karaṇādhiṣṭhātṛtvaṁ kāmarūpitvam. Upasaṁhṛtakaraṇasyāpi niratiśayaiśvaryasambandhitvaṁ vikaraṇadharmitvamiti. Eṣā kriyāśaktiḥ.

The active power, though one only, is indirectly describable as of three kinds, the possession of the swiftness of thought, the power of assuming forms at will, and the faculty of expatiation. Of these, the possession of the swiftness of thought is ability to act with

unsurpassable celerity. The power of assuming forms at will is the faculty of employing at pleasure, and irrespective of the efficacy of works, the organs similar and dissimilar of an infinity of organisms. The faculty of expatiation is the possession of transcendent supremacy even when such organs are not employed. Such is this active power.

Action of three Kinds : Sentiency, the Inserntient and the Sentient

अस्वतन्त्र सर्वं कार्यम् । तत्त्रिविधं-विद्या कला पशुश्चेति । एतेषां ज्ञानात्संशयादिनिवृत्तिः । तत्र पशुगुणो विद्या । सापि द्विविधा-बोधाबोधस्वभावभेदात् ।

Asvatantra sarvaṁ kāryam. Tattrividham—vidyā kalā paśuśceti. Eteṣāṁ jñānātsaṁśayādinivṛttiḥ. Tatra paśuguṇo vidyā. Sāpi dvividhā—bodhābodhasvabhāvabhedāt.

All that is effected or educed, depending on something ulterior, it is threefold, sentiency, the insentient, and the sentient.

बोधस्वभावा विवेकाविवेकप्रवृत्तिभेदाद् द्विविधा । सा चित्तमित्युच्यते । चित्तेन हि सर्वः प्राणी बोधात्मकप्रकाशानुगृहीतं सामान्येन विवेचितमविवेचितं चार्थं चेतयत इति ।

Bodhasvabhāvā vivekāvivekapravṛttibhedād dvividhā. Sā cittamityucyate. Cittena hi sarvaḥ prāṇī bodhātmakaprakāśānugṛhītaṁ sāmānyena vivecitamavivecitaṁ cārthaṁ cetayata iti.

Of these, sentiency is the attribute of the sentients. It is of two degrees according to its nature as cognitive or incognitive. Cognitive sentiency is dichotomised as proceeding discriminately and as proceeding indiscriminately. The discriminate procedure, manifestable by the instruments of knowledge, is called the cogitative. For by the cogitant organ, every sentient being is cognisant of objects in general, discriminated or not discriminated, when irradiated by the light which is identical with the external things. The incognitive sentiency, again, is either characterised or not characterised by the objects of the sentient soul.

तत्र विवेकप्रवृत्तिः प्रमाणमात्रव्यङ्ग्या । पश्वर्थधर्माधर्मिका पुनरबोधात्मिका विद्या । चेतनपरतन्त्रत्वे सत्यचेतना कला । सापि द्विविधा-कार्याख्या कारणाख्या चेति ।

तत्र कार्याख्या दशविधा-पृथिव्यादीनि पञ्चतत्त्वानि, रूपादयः पञ्चगुणाश्चेति । कारणाख्या त्रयोदशविधा-ज्ञानेन्द्रियपञ्चकं, कर्मेन्द्रियपञ्चकम्, अध्यवसायाभिमानसंकल्पाभिधवृत्तिभेदाद् बुद्ध्यहंकारमनोलक्षणमन्तःकरणत्रयं चेति ।

Tatra Vivekapravṛttiḥ pramāṇamātravyaṅgyā. Paśvarthadharmādharmikā punarabodhātmikā vidyā. Cetanaparatantratve satyacetanā kalā. Sāpi dvividhā—kāryākhyā kāraṇākhyā ceti. Tatra kāryākhyā daśavidhā—pṛthivyādīni pañcatattvāni, rūpādayaḥ pañcaguṇāśceti. Kāraṇākhyā trayodaśavidhā—jñānendriyapañcakaṁ, karmendriyapañcakam, adhyavasāyābhimānasaṅkalpābhidhavṛttibhedād buddhyahaṅkāramanolakṣaṇamantaḥkaraṇatrayaṁ ceti.

The insentient, which while unconscious is dependent on the conscious, is of two kinds, as styled the effect and as styled the cause. The insentient, styled the effect, is of ten kinds, viz., the earth and the other four elements, and their qualities, colour, and the rest. The insentient, called the causal insentient, is of thirteen kinds, viz., the five organs of cognition, the five organs of action, and the three internal organs, intellect, the egoising principle, and the cogitant principle, which have for their respective functions ascertainment, the illusive identification of self with not-self, and determination.

पशुत्वसम्बन्धी पशुः । सोऽपि द्विविधः-साञ्जनो निरञ्जनश्चेति । तत्र साञ्जनः शरीरेन्द्रियसम्बन्धी । निरञ्जनस्तु तद्रहितः । तत्प्रपञ्चस्तु पञ्चार्थभाष्यदीपिकादौ द्रष्टव्यः ।

Paśutvasambandhī paśuḥ. So'pi dvividhaḥ—sāñjano nirañjanaśceti. Tatra sāñjanaḥ śarīrendriyasambandhī. Nirañjanastu tadrahitaḥ. Tatprapañcastu pañcārthabhāṣyadīpikādau draṣṭavyaḥ.

The sentient spirit, that to which transmigratory conditions pertain, is also of two kinds, the appetent and non-appetent. The appetent is the spirit associated with an organism and organs; the non-appetent is the spirit apart from organism and organs. The details of all this are to be found in the *Pañcārtha-bhāṣyadīpikā* and other works.

Exposition of Cause and Creation/ Action

समस्तसृष्टिसंहारानुग्रहकारि कारणम् । तस्यैकस्यापि गुणकर्मभेदापेक्षया विभागः उक्तः 'पतिः साद्यः' इत्यादिना । तत्र पतित्वं निरतिशयदृक् क्रियाशक्तिमत्त्वं तेनैश्वर्येण नित्यसम्बन्धित्वम् । आद्यत्वमनागन्तुकैश्वर्यसम्बन्धित्वम्—इत्यादर्शकारादिभिस्तीर्थंकरैर्निरूपितम् ।

Samastasṛṣtisaṁhārānugrahakāri kāraṇam. Tasyaikasyāpi guṇakarmabhedāpekṣayā vibhāgaḥ uktaḥ 'patiḥ sādyaḥ' ityādinā. Tatra patitvaṁ niratiśayadṛk kriyāśaktimattvaṁ tenaiśvaryeṇa nityasambandhitvaṃ. Ādyatvamanāgantukaiśvaryasambandhitvaṃ— ityādarśakārādibhistīrthakarairnirūpitaṃ.

The cause is that which retracts into itself and evolves the whole creation. This though one is said to be divided according to a difference of attributes and actions (into Maheśvara, Viṣṇu, etc.). The Lord is the possessor of infinite, visual, and active power. He is absolutely first as connected eternally with this lordship or supremacy, as possessing a supremacy not adventitious or contingent. This is expounded by the author of the Ādarśa, and other institutional authorities.

चित्तद्वारेणेश्वरसम्बन्धहेतुर्योगः (पाशु. सू. 5/2) । स च द्विविधः-क्रियालक्षणः, क्रियोपरमलक्षणश्चेति । तत्र जपध्यानादिरूपः क्रियालक्षणः, क्रियोपरमलक्षणस्तु निष्ठासंविद्गत्यादिसंज्ञितः ।

Cittadvāreṇeśvarasambandhaheturyogaḥ (Pāśu. Sū. 5/2). Sa ca dvividhaḥ—kriyālakṣaṇaḥ, kriyoparamalakṣaṇaśceti. Tatra japadhyānādirūpaḥ kriyālakṣaṇaḥ, kriyoparamalakṣaṇastu niṣṭhāsaṁvidgatyādisaṁjñitaḥ.

Union is a conjunction of the soul with God through the intellect, and is of two degrees, that characterised by action, and that characterised by cessation of action. Of these, union characterised by action consists of pious muttering, meditation, and so forth; union characterised by cessation of action is called consciousness, etc.

Definition of Rite or Ritual

धर्मार्थसाधकव्यापारो विधिः । च द्विविधः-प्रधानभूतो गुणभूतश्च । तत्र प्रधानभूतः साक्षाद्धर्महेतुश्चर्या । सा द्विविधा-व्रतं द्वाराणि चेति । तत्र भस्मस्नानशयनोपहारजपप्रदक्षिणानि व्रतम् । तदुक्तं भगवता नकुलीशेन-भस्मना त्रिषवणं स्नायीत, भस्मनि शयीत (पा. सू. 1/8 अग्रतः) इति ।

Dharmārthasādhakavyāpāro vidhiḥ. Ca dvividhaḥ—pradhānabhūto guṇabhūtaśca. Tatra pradhānabhūtaḥ sākṣāddharmahetuścaryā. Sā dvividhā—vrataṁ dvārāṇi ceti. Tatra bhasmasnānaśayanopahārajapapradakṣiṇāni vrataṃ. Taduktaṁ bhagavatā nakulīśena—bhasmanā triṣavaṇaṁ snāyīta, bhasmani śayīta. (Pā. Sū. 1/8 agrataḥ) iti.

Rite or ritual is activity efficacious of merit as its end. It is of two orders, the principal and the subsidiary. Of these, the principal is the direct means of merit, religious exercise. Religious exercise is of two kinds, acts of piety and postures. The acts of piety are bathing with sand, lying upon sand oblations, mutterings, and devotional perambulation. Thus, the revered Nakulīśa says :–

"He should bathe thrice a day, he should lie upon the dust.

अत्रोपहारो नियमः । स च षडङ्गः । तदुक्तं सूत्रकारेण–हसित-गीत-नृत्य-हुडुक्कार-नमस्कार-जप्यषडङ्गोपहारेणोपतिष्ठेतेति ।

Atropahāro niyamaḥ. Sa ca ṣaḍaṅgaḥ. Taduktaṁ sūtrakāreṇa—hasita-gīta-nṛtya huḍukkāra-namaskāra-japyaṣaḍaṅgopahāreṇopatiṣṭheteti.

Oblation is an observance divided into six members."

Thus, the author of the aphorisms says :–

"He should worship with the six kinds of oblations, viz., laughter, song, dance, muttering *hum,* adoration, and pious ejaculation."

तत्र हसितं नाम कण्ठोष्ठपुटविस्फूर्जनपुरःसरम् अहहेत्यट्टहासः । गीतं गान्धर्वशास्त्रसमयानुसारेण महेश्वरसंबन्धिगुणधर्मादिनिमित्तानां चिन्तनम् । नृत्यमपि नाट्यशास्त्रानुसारेण हस्तपादादीनामुत्क्षेपणादिकमङ्गप्रत्यङ्गोपाङ्गसहितं भावाभावसमेतं च प्रयोक्तव्यम् । हुडुक्कारो नाम जिह्वातालुसंयोगान्निष्पाद्यमानः पुण्यो वृषनादसदृशो नादः । हुडुगिति शब्दानुकारो वषडितिवत् ।

Tatra hasitaṁ nāma kaṇṭhoṣṭapuṭavisphūrjanapuraḥsaraṃ ahahetyaṭṭahāsaḥ. Gītaṁ gāndharvaśāstrasamayānusāreṇa maheśvarasaṁbandhiguṇadharmādinimittānāṁ, cintanaṃ. Nṛtyamapi nāṭyaśāstrānusāreṇa hastapādādīnāmutkṣepaṇādikamaṅgapratyaṅgopāṅgasahitaṁ bhāvābhāvasametaṁ ca prayoktavyaṃ. Huḍukkāro nāma jihvātālusaṁyogānnispādyamānaḥ puṇyo vṛṣanādasadṛśo nādaḥ. Huḍugiti śabdānukāro vaṣaḍitivat.

Laughter is a loud laugh, Aha, Aha, by dilatation of the throat and lips. Song is a celebration of qualities, glories, etc., of Maheśvara, according to the conventions of the Gandharva-śāstra, or art of music. The dance also is to be employed according to the *ars saltatoria,* accompanied with gesticulations with hands and feet, and with motions of the limbs, and with outward indications of internal sentiment. The ejaculation *hum* is a sacred utterance, like the bellowing of a bull, accomplished by a contact of the tongue with the palate, an imitation of the sound *hudung*, ascribed to a bull, like the exclamation *Vaṣat*.

यत्र लौकिका भवन्ति तत्रैतत्सर्वं गूढं प्रयोक्तव्यम् । शिष्टं प्रसिद्धम् ।

Yatra laukikā bhavanti tatraitatsarvaṁ gūḍhaṁ prayoktavyam. Śiṣṭaṁ prasiddham.

Where the uninitiated are, all this should be gone through in secret. Other details are too familiar to require exposition.

द्वाराणि तु क्राथन-स्पन्दन-मन्दन-शृङ्गारणावितत्करणावितद्भाषणानि । तत्रासुप्तस्यैव सुप्तलिङ्गप्रदर्शनं क्राथनम् । वाय्वभिभूतस्येव शरीरावयवानां कम्पनम् स्पन्दनम् । उपहतपादेन्द्रियस्येव गमनम् मन्दनम् । रूपयौवनसम्पन्नां कामिनीमवलोक्यात्मानम् कामुकमिव यैर्विलासैः प्रदर्शयति तत् शृङ्गारणम् ।

Dvārāṇi tu krāthana-spandana-mandana-sṛṅgāraṇāvitatkaraṇāvitadbhāṣaṇāni. Tatrāsuptasyaiva suptaliṅgapradarśanaṁ krāthanam. Vāyvabhibhūtasyeva śarīrāvayavānāṁ kampanaṁ spandanam. Upahatapādendriyasyeva gamanam mandanam. Rūpayauvanasampannāṁ kāminīmavalokyātmānaṁ kāmukamiva yairvilāsaiḥ pradarśayati tat śṛṅgāraṇam.

The postures are snoring, trembling, limping, wooing, acting absurdly, talking non-sensically. Snoring is showing all the signs of being asleep while really awake. Trembling is a convulsive movement of the joints as if under an attack of rheumatism. Limping is walking as if the legs were disabled. Wooing is simulating the gestures of an *innamorato* on seeing a young and pretty woman.

कार्याकार्यविवेकविकलस्येव लोकनिन्दितकर्मकरणमवितत्करणम् । व्याहतापार्थकादिशब्दोच्चारणमवितद्भाषणमिति ।

Kāryākāryavivekavikalasyeva lokaninditakarmakaraṇamavitatkaraṇam. Vyāhatāpārthakādiśabdoccāraṇamavitadbhāṣaṇamiti.

Acting absurdly is doing acts which every one dislikes, as if bereft of all sense of what should and what should not be done. Talking non-sensically is the utterance of words which contradict each other, or which have no meaning, and the like.

गुणभूतस्तु विधिश्चर्यानुग्राहकोऽनुस्नानादिः भैक्ष्योच्छिष्टादिनिर्मितायोग्यताप्रत्ययनिवृत्यर्थः । तदप्युक्तं सूत्रकारेण–अनुस्नाननिर्माल्यलिङ्गधारीति ।

Guṇabhūtastu vidhiścaryānugrāhako'nusnānādiḥ bhaikṣyocchiṣṭādinirmitāyogyatāpratyayanivṛtyarthaḥ. Tadapyuktaṁ sūtrakāreṇa—anusnānanirmālyaliṅgadhārīti.

The subsidiary religious exercise is purificatory subsequent ablution for putting an end to the sense of unfitness from begging, living on broken food, etc. Thus, it is said by the author of the aphorisms : Bearing the marks of purity by after-bathing.

The Components Embedded with Omniscience—Definition

तत्र समासो नाम धर्मिमात्राभिधानम् । तच्च प्रथमसूत्र एव कृतम् । पञ्चानां पदार्थानां प्रमाणतः पञ्चाभिधानं विस्तरः । स खलु राशीकरभाष्ये द्रष्टव्यः । एतेषां यथासम्भवं लक्षणतोऽसङ्करेणाभिधानं विभागः । स तु विहित एव ।

Tatra samāso nāma dharmimātrābhidhānam. Tacca prathamasūtra eva kṛtam. Pañcānāṁ padārthānāṁ pramāṇataḥ pañcabhidhānaṁ vistaraḥ. Sa khalu rāśikarabhāṣye draṣṭavyaḥ. Eteṣāṁ yathāsambhavaṁ lakṣaṇato'saṅkareṇābhidhānaṁ vibhāgaḥ. Sa tu vihita eva.

(It has been stated above that omniscience, a form of the cognitive power, is cognition of principles ever arising and pervaded by truth, relative to all matters declared or not declared, summary, or in detail). The summary is the enouncement of the subjects of attributes generally. This is accomplished in the first aphorism : (Now, then we shall expound the Pāśupata union and rites of Paśupati). Detail is the fivefold enouncement of the five categories according to the instruments of true knowledge. This is to be found in the Rāśīkara-bhāṣya. Distribution is the distinct enouncement of these categories, as far as possible according to definitions.

शास्त्रान्तरेभ्योऽमीषां गुणातिशयेन कथनं विशेषः । तथा हि–अन्यत्र दुःखनिवृत्तिरेव दुःखान्तः । इह तु पारमैश्वर्यप्राप्तिश्च । अन्यत्राभूत्वा भावि कार्यम् । इह तु नित्य पश्वादि । अन्यत्र सापेक्षं कारणम् । इह तु निरपेक्षो भगवानेव । अन्यत्र कैवल्यादिफलको योगः । इह तु पारमैश्वर्यदुःखान्तफलकः ।

अन्यत्र पुनरावृत्तिरूपस्वर्गादिफलको विधिः । इह पुनरपुनरावृत्तिरूप-सामीप्यादिफलकः ।

Śāstrāntarebhyo'mīṣāṁ guṇātiśayena kathanaṁ viśeṣaḥ. Tathā hi—anyatra duḥkhanivṛttireva duḥkhāntaḥ. Iha tu pāramaiśvaryaprāptiśca. Anyatrābhūtvā bhāvi kāryam. Iha tu nitya paśvādi. Anyatra sāpekṣaṁ kāraṇam. Iha tu nirapekṣo bhagavāneva. Anyatra kaivalyadiphalako yogaḥ. Iha tu pāramaiśvaryaduḥkhāntaphalakaḥ. Anyatra punarāvṛttirūpasvargādiphalako vidhiḥ. Iha punarapunarāvṛttirūpasāmīpyādiphalakaḥ.

It is an enumeration of these according to their prevailing characters, different from that of other recognised systems. For example, the cessation of pain (or emancipation) is in other systems (as in the Sāṅkhya) the mere termination of miseries, but in this system it is the attainment of supremacy or of the divine perfections. In other systems, the create is that which has become, and that which shall become, but in this system, it is eternal, the spirits, and so forth, the sentient and insentient. In other systems, the *principium* is determined in its evolution or creative activity by the efficacy of works, whereas in this system, the *principium* is the Lord not thus determined. In other institutes, union results in isolation, etc., while in these institutes it results in cessation of pains by attainment of the divine perfections. In other systems, paradise and similar spheres involve a return to metempsychosis, but in this system, they result in nearness to the Supreme Being, either followed or not followed by such return to transmigratory experiences.

Critic view on Conecining Absolute (God) as Cause and Rejoinder to the Same

ननु महदेतदिन्द्रजालं यन्निरपेक्षः परमेश्वरः कारणमिति । तथात्वे कर्मवैफल्यं स्वकार्याणां समसमयसमुत्पादश्चेति दोषद्वयं प्रादुःष्यात् ।

Nanu mahadetadindrajālaṁ yannirapekṣaḥ parameśvaraḥ kāraṇamiti. Tathātve karmavaiphalyaṁ svakāryāṇāṁ samasamayasamutpādaśceti doṣadvayaṁ prāduḥṣyāt.

Great, indeed, an opponent may say, is this aggregate of illusions, since if God's causality be irrespective of the efficacy of works, then merits will be fruitless, and all created things will be simulta-

neously evolved (there being no reason why this should be created at one time, and that at another), and thus, there will emerge two difficulties.

मैवं मन्येथाः । व्यधिकरणत्वात् । यदि निरपेक्षस्य भगवतः कारणत्वं स्यात्तर्हि कर्मणो वैफल्ये किमायातम् ? प्रयोजनाभाव इति चेत्–कस्य प्रयोजनाभावः कर्मवैफल्ये कारणम् ? किं कर्मिणः, किं वा भगवतः ?

Maivaṁ manyethāḥ. Vyadhikaraṇatvāt. Yadi nirapekṣasya bhagavataḥ kāraṇatvaṁ syāttarhi karmaṇo vaiphalye kimāyātam? Prayojanābhāva iti cet—kasya prayojanābhāvaḥ karmavaiphalye kāraṇam? Kiṁ karmiṇaḥ, kiṁ vā bhagavataḥ?

Think not so, replies the Pāśupata, for your supposition is baseless. If the Lord, irrespective of the efficacy of works be the cause of all, and thus the efficacy of works be without results, what follows? If you rejoin that an absence of motives will follow, in whom, we ask, will this absence of motives follows? If the efficacy of works be without result, will causality belong to the doer of the works as to the Lord?

नाद्यः । ईश्वरेच्छानुगृहीतस्य कर्मणः सफलत्वोपपत्तेः । तदननुगृहीतस्य ययातिप्रभृतिकर्मवत् कदाचिन्निष्फलत्वसंभवाच्च । न चैतावता कर्मसु अप्रवृत्तिः । कर्षकादिवदुपपत्तेः । ईश्वरेच्छायतत्त्वाच्च पशूनां प्रवृत्तेः ।

Nādyaḥ. Īśvarecchānugṛhītasya karmaṇaḥ saphalatvopapatteḥ. Tadananugṛhītasya yayātiprabhṛtikarmavat kadācinniṣphalatvasaṁbhavācca. Na caitāvatā karmasu apravṛttiḥ. Karṣakādivadupapatteḥ. Īśvarecchāyatattvācca paśūnāṁ pravṛtteḥ.

It cannot belong to the doer of the works, for it is allowed that the efficacy of works is fruitful only when furthered by the will of the creator, and the efficacy so furthered may sometimes be fruitless, as in the case of the works of Yayāti, and others. From this, it will by no means follow that no one will engage in works, for they will engage in them as the husbandman engages in husbandry, though the crop be uncertain. Again, sentient creatures engage in works because they depend on the will of the creator.

नापि द्वितीयः । परमेश्वरस्य पर्याप्तकामत्वेन कर्मसाध्यप्रयोजनापेक्षाया अभावात् । यदुक्तं समसमयसमुत्पाद इति, तदप्ययुक्तम् । अचिन्त्यशक्तिकस्य परमेश्वरस्य

इच्छानुविधायिन्या अव्याहतक्रियाशक्त्या कार्यकारित्वाभ्युपगमात् । तदुक्तं सम्प्रदायविद्भिः-

Nāpi dvitīyaḥ. Parameśvarasya paryāptakāmatvena karmasādhyaprayojanāpekṣāyā abhāvāt. Yaduktaṁ samasamayasamutpāda iti, tadapyayuktam. Acintyaśaktikasya parameśvarasya icchānuvidhāyinyā avyāhatakriyāśaktyā kāryakāritvābhyupagamāt. Taduktaṁ sampradāyavidbhiḥ—

Nor does the causality pertain to the Lord alone, for as all his desires are already satisfied, he cannot be actuated by motives to be realised by works. As for your statement, continues the Pāśupata, that all things will be simultaneously evolved, this unreasonable, inasmuch as we hold that causal efficiency resides in the unobstructed active power which conforms itself to the will of the Lord, whose power is inconceivable. It has accordingly been said by those versed in sacred tradition :—

God—Cause of All Causes

9. कर्मादिनिरपेक्षस्तु स्वेच्छाचारी यतो ह्ययम् ।
ततः कारणतः शास्त्रे सर्वकारणकारणम् ।। इति ।

Karmādinirapekṣastu svecchācārī yato hyayam,
Tataḥ kāraṇataḥ śāstre sarvakāraṇakāraṇam. iti.

"Since, he, acting according to his will, is not actuated by the efficacy of works,"

"For this reason is he in this system, the cause of all causes."

Emancipation Through Recognition with God

ननु दर्शनान्तरेऽपीश्वरज्ञानान्मोक्षो लभ्यत एवेति कुतोऽस्य विशेष इति चेत्-मैवं वादीः । विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । किमीश्वरविषयज्ञानमात्रं निर्वाणकारणं किं वा साक्षात्कारः अथवा यथावत्तत्त्वनिश्चय ?

Nanu darśanāntare'pīśvarajñānānmokṣo labhyata eveti kuto'sya viśeṣa iti cet—maivaṁ vādīḥ. Vikalpānupapatteḥ. Kimīśvaraviṣayajñānamātraṁ nirvāṇakāraṇaṁ kiṁ vā sākṣātkāraḥ athavā yathāvattattvaniścaya.

Some one may urge : In another system, emancipation is attained through a knowledge of God, where does the difference lie? Say not so, replies the Pāśupata, for you will be caught in a trilemma. Is the mere knowledge of God the cause of emancipation, or the presentation, or the accurate characterisation, of God?

नाद्यः-शास्त्रमन्तरेणापि प्राकृतजनवद् 'देवानामधिपो महादेवः' इति ज्ञानोत्पत्तिमात्रेण मोक्षसिद्धौ शात्राभ्यासवैफल्यप्रसङ्गात् । नापि द्वितीयः-अनेकमलप्रचयोपचितानां पिशितलोचनानां पशूनाम् परमेश्वरसाक्षात्कारानुपपत्तेः ।

Nādyaḥ—śāstramantareṇāpi prākṛtajanavad 'devānāmadhipo mahādevaḥ' iti jñānotpattimātreṇa mokṣasiddhau śātrābhyāsavaiphalyaprasaṅgāt. Nāpi dvitīyaḥ—anekamalapracayopacitānāṁ piśitalocanānāṁ paśūnāṃ parameśvarasākṣātkārānupapatteḥ.

Not the mere knowledge, for then it would follow that the study of any system would be superfluous, inasmuch as without any institutional system one might, like the uninstructed, attain emancipation by the bare cognition that Mahādeva is the Lord of the gods. Nor is presentation or intuition of the deity the cause of emancipation, for no intuition of the deity is competent to sentient creatures burdened with an accumulation of various impurities, and able to see only with the eyes of the flesh.

तृतीयेऽस्मन्मतापातः । पाशुपतशास्त्रमन्तरेण यथावत्तत्वनिश्चयानुपपत्तेः । तदुक्तमाचार्यैः-

Tṛtīye'smanmatāpātaḥ. Pāśupataśāstramantareṇa yathāvattattvaniścayānupapatteḥ. Taduktamācāryaiḥ—

On the third alternative, viz., that the cause of emancipation is an accurate characterisation of the deity, you will be obliged to consent to our doctrine, in as much as such accurate characterisation can not be realised apart from the system of the Pāśupatas. Therefore, it is that our great teacher has said :—

10. ज्ञानमात्रे वृथा शास्त्रं साक्षाद् दृष्टिस्तु दुर्लभा ।
पञ्चार्थादन्यतो नास्ति यथावत्तत्त्वनिश्चयः ।। इति ।

Jñānamātre vṛthā śāstraṁ sākṣād dṛṣṭistu durlabhā,
Pañcārthādanyato nāsti yathāvattattvaniścayaḥ. iti.

"If by mere knowledge, it is not according to any system, but intuition is unattainable;"

"There is no accurate characterisation of principles otherwise than by the five categories."

तस्मात्पुरुषार्थकामैः पुरुषधौरेयैः पञ्चार्थप्रतिपादनपरं पाशुपतशास्त्रमाश्रयणीयमिति रमणीयम् ।।

Tasmātpuruṣārthakāmaiḥ puruṣadhaureyaiḥ pañcārthaprati-pādanaparaṁ pāśupataśāstramāśrayaṇīyamiti ramaṇīyaṃ.

Therefore, those excellent persons who aspire to the highest end of man must adopt the system of the Pāśupatas, which undertakes the exposition of the five categories.

A.E.G.

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे नकुलीशपाशुपतदर्शनम् ॥

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CHAPTER VII

THE ŚAIVA-DARŚANA

The seventh system in Mādhav's Sarva-Darśana-Saṅgraha is the Śaiva-darśana. This sect is very prevalent in the South of India, especially in the Tamil country. It is said to have arisen there about the eleventh century A.D. Several valuable contributions have been lately made to our knowledge of its tenets in the publications of the Rev. H.R.Hoisington and the Rev. T. Foulkes. The former especially, by his excellent articles in the American Oriental Society's Journal, has performed a great service to the students of Hindu philosophy. He has there translated the Tattuva-Kaṭṭalei, or law of the Tattwas, the Śiva-Gnānapotham, or instruction in the knowledge of God, and the Śiva-Pirakāsam, or light of Śiva, and the three works shed immense light on the outline as given by Mādhava. One great use of the latter is to enable us to recognise the original Sanskrit names in their Tamil disguise, no easy matter occasionally, as *aṛul* for *anugraha* and *tīḍchei* for *dīkṣā* may testify.

The Śaivas have considerable resemblance to the Theistic Sāṅkhya; they hold that God, souls, and matter are from eternity distinct entities,and the object of philosophy is to disunite the soul from matter and gradually to unite it to God. Śiva is the chief deity of the system and the relation between the three is quaintly expressed by the allegory of a beast, its fetters, and its owner. Paśupati is a well-known name of Śiva, as the master or creator of all things.

There seem to be three different sets of so-called Śaiva sūtras. One is in five books, called by Colebrooke the Paśupati-śāstra, which is probably the work quoted by Mādhava in his account of the Nakulīśa Pāśupatas; another is in three books, with a commentary by Kṣemarāja, with its first sūtra, *chaitanyam ātmā*. The third was commented on by Abhinava-gupta, and opens with the śloka given in the Sarva-Darśana-Saṅgraha, p.91, lines 1-4. The MS. which I consulted in Calcutta read the first words—

Kathañcid āsādya Maheśvarasya dāsyaṃ.

None of these works, however, appear to be the authority of the present sect. They seem chiefly to have relied on the twenty-eight Āgamas and some of the Purāṇas. A list of the Āgamas is given in Mr. Foulkes' "Catechism of the Śaiva Religion;" and of these the Kiraṇa and Karaṇa are quoted in the follwing treatise.

Assumption of the Lord, the Soul and the World

तमिमं 'परमेश्वरः कर्मादिनिरपेक्षः कारणमिति' पक्षं वैषम्य-नैर्घृण्यदोषदूषितत्वात् प्रतिक्षिपन्तः केचन माहेश्वराः शैवागमसिद्धान्ततत्त्वं यथावदीक्षमाणाः, 'कर्मादिसापेक्षः परमेश्वरः कारणमिति' पक्षं कक्षीकुर्वाणाः, पक्षान्तरमुपक्षिपन्ति–पतिपशुपाशभेदात् त्रयः पदार्था इति । तदुक्तम् तन्त्रतत्त्वज्ञैः:–

Tamimaṁ 'parameśvaraḥ karmādinirapekṣaḥ kāraṇamiti' pakṣaṁ vaiṣamya-nairghṛṇyadoṣadūṣitatvāt pratikṣipantaḥ kecana māheśvarāḥ śaivāgamasiddhāntatattvaṁ yathāvadīkṣa-māṇāḥ, 'karmādisāpekṣaḥ parameśvaraḥ kāraṇamiti' pakṣaṁ kakṣīkurvāṇāḥ, pakṣāntaramupakṣipanti—patipaśupāśabhedāt trayaḥ padārthā iti. Taduktaṃ tantratattvajñaiḥ—

Certain, however, of the Māheśvara sect receiving the system of truth authoritatively laid down in the Śaiva Āgama,[1] reject the foregoing opinion that "the Supreme Being is a cause as independent of our actions, etc.," on the ground of its being liable to the imputation of partiality and cruelty. They, on the contrary, hold the opinion that "the Supreme Being is a cause in dependence on our actions,etc.," and they maintain that there are three categories distinguished as the Lord, the soul, and the world (or literally "the master", "the cattle," and "the fetter"). As has been said by those well versed in the Tantra doctrines –

1. त्रिपदार्थं चतुष्पादं महातन्त्रं जगद्गुरुः ।
सूत्रेणैकेन संक्षिप्य प्राह विस्तरतः पुनः ॥ इति ।

Tripadārthaṁ catuṣpādaṁ mahātantraṁ jagadguruḥ,
Sūtreṇaikena saṁkṣipya prāha vistarataḥ punaḥ. iti.

"The Guru of the world, having first condensed in one sūtra the

1 Colebrooke speaks of the *Paśupati-śāstra (Maheśvara-siddhānta* or *Śivāgama*), as the text-book of the Pāśupata sect. The Āgamas are said to be twenty-eight (see their names in the Rev. T. Foulkes, "Catechism of the Śaiva Religion").

great tantra, possessed of three categories and four feet, has again declared the same at full length."

अस्यार्थः–उक्तास्त्रयः पदार्था यस्मिन्सन्ति तत्त्रिपदार्थं, विद्याक्रियायोग-चर्याख्याश्चत्वारः पादा यस्मिँस्तच्चतुष्चरणं महातन्त्रमिति । तत्र पशूनामस्वतन्त्र-त्वात्पाशानामचैतन्यात् तद्विलक्षणस्य पत्युः प्रथममुद्देशः । चेतनत्वसाधर्म्यात् पशूनां तदानन्तर्यम् । अवशिष्टानां पाशानामन्ते विनिवेश इति क्रमनियमः ।

Asyārthaḥ—Uktāstrayaḥ padārthā yasminsanti tattripadārthaṁ, vidyākriyāyogacaryākhyāścatvāraḥ pādā yasmiṁstaccatuścara-ṇaṁ mahātantramiti. Tatra paśūnāmasvatantratvātpāśānāma-caitanyāt tadvilakṣaṇasya patyuḥ prathamamuddeśaḥ. Cetanatvasādharmyāt paśūnāṁ tadānantaryaṃ. Avaśiṣṭānāṁ pāśānāmante viniveśa iti kramaniyamaḥ.

The meaning of this is as follows :—Its three categories are the three before mentioned; its four feet are learning, ceremonial action, meditation, and morality, hence it is called the great Tantra, possessed of three categories and four feet. Now, the "souls" are not independent, and the "fetters" are unintelligent, hence the Lord, as being different from these, is first declared; next follows the account of the souls as they agree with him in possessing intelligence; lastly follow the "fetters" or matter, such is the order of the arrangement[1].

दीक्षायाः परमपुरुषार्थहेतुत्वात् तस्याश्च पशुपाशेश्वरस्वरूप-निर्णयोपायभूतेन मन्त्रमन्त्रेश्वरादिमाहात्म्यनिश्चायकेन ज्ञानेन विना निष्पादयितुमशक्यत्वात् तदवबोधकस्य विद्यापादस्य प्राथम्यम् । अनेकविधसाङ्गदीक्षाविधिप्रदर्शकस्य क्रियापादस्य तदानन्तर्यम् । योगेन विना नाभिमतप्राप्तिरिति साङ्गयोगज्ञापकस्य योगपादस्य तदुत्तरत्वम् । विहिताचरणनिषिद्धवर्जनरूपां चर्यां विना योगोऽपि न निर्वहतीति तत्प्रतिपादकस्य चर्यापादस्य चरमत्वमिति विवेकः ।

1 "There must be three eternal entities, Deity, soul, matter"; "as the water is co-eternal with the sea and the salt with the water, so soul is coeternal with the Deity, and *pāśa* is eternally co-existent with soul" (J.A.O.S. iv., pp. 67, 85). In p. 58 we find the *advaita* of the Vedānta attacked. In p.62 it is said that the soul is eternally entangled in matter, and God carries on his five operations (see *infra*) to disentangle it, bringing out all that is required for previous desert.

Dīkṣāyāḥ paramapuruṣārthahetutvāt tasyāśca paśupāśeśvarasva rūpa-nirṇayopāyabhūtena mantramantreśvarādimāhātmyaniścāyakena jñānena vinā niṣpādayitumaśakyatvāt tadavabodhakasya vidyāpādasya prāthamyam. Anekavidhasāṅgadīkṣāvidhipradarśakasya kriyāpādasya tadānantaryam. Yogena vinā nābhimataprāptiriti sāṅgayogajñāpakasya yogapādasya taduttaratvam. Vihitācaraṇaniṣiddhavarjanarūpāṁ caryāṁ vinā yogo'pi na nirvahatīti tatpratipādakasya caryāpādasya caramatvamiti vivekaḥ.

Since, the ceremony of initiation is the means to the highest human end, and this cannot be accomplished without knowledge which establishes the undoubted greatness of the hymns, the Lords of the hymns, etc., and is a means for the ascertainment of the real nature of the "cattle," the "fetter," and the "master," we place as first the "foot" of knowledge (*jñana*) which makes known all this unto us.[1] Next follows the "foot" of *ceremonial action (kriyā)* which declares the various rules of initiation with the diverse component parts thereof. Without meditation the end cannot be attained, hence the "foot" of *meditation (yoga)* follows next, which declares the various kinds of yoga with their several parts. And as meditation is worthless without practice, i.e., the fulfilling what is enjoined and the abstaining from what is forbidden, lastly follows the fourth "foot" of practical duty *(caryā)*, which includes all this.

Śiva : The Lord of Liberated Souls

तत्र पतिपदार्थः शिवोऽभिमतः । मुक्तात्मनां विद्येश्वरादीनां च यद्यपि शिवत्वमस्ति, तथापि परमेश्वरपारतन्त्र्यात् स्वातन्त्र्यं नास्ति । ततश्च तनुकरणभुवनादीनां भावानां संनिवेशविशिष्टत्वेन कार्यत्वमवगम्यते । तेन च कार्यत्वेनैषां बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकत्वमनुमीयत इत्यनुमानवशात्परमेश्वरप्रसिद्धिरुपपद्यते ।

Tatra patipadārthaḥ śivo'bhimataḥ. Mūktātmanāṁ vidyeśvarādīnāṁ ca yadyapi śivatvamasti, tathāpi parameśvarapāratantryāt

1 These four feet are the four stages of religious life (see J.A.O.S. iv., pp.135,180), called in Tamil *sarithei, kirikei, yokam,* and *gnānam*. The first is the stage of practical piety and performance of the prescribed duties and rites; the second is that of the "confirmatory sacrament" and the five purifications involved in true *pūjā;* the third is that of the eight observances of the yogin; the fourth is that of knowledge which prepares the soul for intimate union with God.

svātantryaṁ nāsti. Tataśca tanukaraṇabhuvanādīnāṁ bhāvānāṁ saṁniveśaviśiṣṭatvena kāryatvamavagamyate. Tena ca kāryatvenaiṣāṁ buddhimatpūrvakatvamanumīyata ityanumānavaśātparameśvaraprasiddhirupapadyate.

Now, Śiva is held to be the Lord (or master). Although participation in the divine nature of Śiva belongs to liberated souls and to such beings as vidyeśvara, etc., yet these are not independent, since they depend on the Supreme Being; and the nature of an effect is recognised to belong to the worlds, etc., which resemble him, from the very fact of the orderly arrangement of their parts. And from their thus being effects we infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent being. By the strength of this inference is the universal acknowledgment of a Supreme Being confirmed.

Bodies Caused by An Intelligent Being, i.e. God

ननु देहस्यैव तावत्कार्यत्वमसिद्धम् । नहि क्वचित्केनचित् कदाचित् देहः क्रियमाणो इष्टचरः । सत्यम्, तथापि न केनचित् क्रियमाणत्वं देहस्य इष्टमिति कर्तृदर्शनापह्नवो न युज्यते । तस्यानुमेयत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेः ।

Nanu dehasyaiva tāvatkāryatvamasiddham. Nahi kvacitkenacit kadācit dehaḥ kriyamāṇo iṣṭacaraḥ. Satyam, tathāpi na kenacit kriyamāṇatvaṁ dehasya iṣṭamiti kartṛdarśanāpanhavo na yujyate. Tasyānumeyatvenāpyupapatteḥ.

"But may we not object that it is not proved that the body is thus an effect? For certainly none has ever, at any time or place, seen a body being made by any one." We grant it : yet it is not proper to deny that a body has some maker on the ground that its being made has not been seen by any one, since, this can be established from inference (if not from actual perception)."

तथा हि–देहादिकं कार्यं भवितुमर्हति संनिवेशविशिष्टत्वात् । विनश्वरत्वाद्वा घटादिवत् । तेन च कार्यत्वेन बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकत्वमनुमातुं सुकरमेव ।

Tathā hi—dehādikaṁ kāryaṁ bhavitumarhati saṁniveśaviśiṣṭatvāta. Vinaśvaratvādvā ghaṭādivat. Tena ca kāryatvena buddhimatpūrvakatvamanumātuṁ sukarameva.

Bodies, etc., must be effects, because they possess an orderly arrangement of parts, or because they are destructible, as jars, etc.; and from their being effects it is easy to infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent being.

विमतं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वाद् घटवत् । यदुक्तसाधनं तदुक्तसाध्यं यथार्थादि । न यदेवं न तदेवं यथात्मादि । परमेश्वरानुमानप्रामाण्यसाधनमन्यत्राकारीत्युपरम्यते ।

Vimataṁ sakartṛkaṁ kāryatvād ghaṭavat. Yaduktasādhanaṁ taduktasādhyaṁ yathārthādi. Na yadevaṁ na tadevaṁ yathātmādi. Parameśvarānumānaprāmāṇyasādhanamanyatrā-kārītyuparamyate.

Thus, the subject in the argument (sc.bodies, etc.) must have had a maker, from the fact that it is an effect, like jars, etc.; that which has the aforementioned middle term *(sādhana)* must have the aforementioned major *(sādhya)*; and that which has not the former will not have the latter, as the soul, etc.[1] The argument which establishes the authority of the original inference to prove a Supreme Being has been given elsewhere, so we refrain from giving it at length here. In fact, that God is the universal agent, but not irrespective of the actions done by living beings, is proved by the current verse[2]—

2. अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः ।
ईश्वरप्रेरितो गच्छेत्स्वर्गं वा श्वभ्रमेव वा ।।

इति न्यायेन प्राणिकृतकर्मापेक्षया परमेश्वरस्य कर्तृत्वोपपत्तेः ।

Ajño janturanīśo'yamātmanaḥ sukhaduḥkhayoḥ,
Īśvaraprerito gacchetsvargaṁ vā śvabhrameva vā.

Iti nyāyena prāṇikṛtakarmāpekṣayā parameśvarasya kartṛtvopapatteḥ.

"This ignorant *jīvātman*, incapable of its own true pleasures or pains, if it were only under God's direction (and its own merits not taken into account), would always go to heaven or always to hell.[3]"

न च स्वातन्त्र्यविहतिरिति वाच्यम् । करणापेक्षया कर्तुः स्वातन्त्र्यविहतेरनुपलम्भात् ।

1 cf. Colebrooke, *Essays* (2d ed.), vol.,i, p.315.

2 *Nyāyena* may here mean "argument."

3 Scil. if there were only one cause, there would be only one invariable effect. The very existence of various effects proves that there must be other concurrent causes (as human actions) necessary. The argument seems to me to require here this unnatural stress to be laid on *eva*, but this is certainly not the original meaning of the passage; it occurs Mahābhārata, iii.1144 (cf. Gauḍapāda, *S. Kār.* 61).

कोषाध्यक्षापेक्षस्य राज्ञः प्रसादादिना दानवत् । यथोक्तं सिद्धगुरुभिः—

Na ca svātantryavihatiriti vācyam. Karaṇāpekṣayā kartuḥ svātantryavihateranupalambhāt. Koṣādhyakṣāpekṣasya rājñaḥ prasādādinā dānavat. Yathoktaṁ siddhagurubhiḥ—

Nor can you object that this opinion violates God's independence, since, it does not really violate an agent's independence to allow that he does not act irrespectively of means; just as we say that the king's bounty shows itself in gifts, but these are not irrespective of his treasurer. As has been said by the Siddha Guru –

3. स्वतन्त्रस्याप्रयोज्यत्वं करणादिप्रयोक्तृता ।
कर्तुः स्वातन्त्र्यमेतद्धि न कर्माद्यनपेक्षता ।। इति ।

Svatantrasyāprayojyatvaṁ karaṇādiprayoktṛtā,
Kartuḥ svātantryametaddhi na karmādyanapekṣatā. iti.

"It belongs to independence to be uncontrolled and itself to employ means, etc;"

"This is an agent's true independence, and not the acting irrespectively of works, etc."

तथा च तत्तत्कर्माशयवशाद् भोग-तत्साधन-तदुपानादिविशेषज्ञः कर्तानुमानादिसिद्ध इति सिद्धम् । तदिदमुक्तं तत्रभवद्भिर्बृहस्पतिभिः-

Tathā ca tattatkarmāyavaśād bhoga-tatsādhana-tadupānādiviśeṣajñaḥ kartānumānādisiddha iti siddham. Tadidamuktaṁ tatrabhavadbhirbṛhaspatibhiḥ—

And thus we conclude that inference (as well as Śruti) establishes the existence of an agent who knows the various fruits (of action), their means, material causes, etc., according to the laws of the various individual merits. This has been thus declared by the venerable Bṛhaspati –

4. इह भोग्यभोगसाधनतदुपादानादि यो विजानाति ।
तमृते भवेन्न हीदं पुंस्कर्माशयविपाकज्ञम् ।। इति ।

Iha bhogyabhogasādhanatadupādānādi yo vijānāti,
Tamṛte bhavenna hīdaṁ puṁskarmāśayavipākajñam. iti.

"He who knows the fruits to be enjoyed, their means and material causes,"

"Apart from him this world knows not how the desert that resides an accumulated actions should ripen."

अन्यत्रापि–

5. विवादाध्यासितं सर्वं बुद्धिमत्कर्तृपूर्वकम् ।
कार्यत्वादावयोः सिद्धं कार्यं कुम्भादिकं यथा ।। इति ।

Anyatrāpi—
Vivādādhyāsitaṁ sarvaṁ buddhimatkartṛpūrvakaṃ,
Kāryatvādāvayoḥ siddhaṁ kāryaṁ kumbhādikaṁ yathā.
iti.

"The universe is the subject of our argument, and it must have had an intelligent maker,"
"This we maintain from its being an effect, just as we see in any other effect, as jars, etc."

सर्वकर्तृत्वादेवास्य सर्वज्ञत्वं सिद्धम् । अज्ञस्य कारणासम्भवात् । उक्तं च श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्रैः–

Sarvakartṛtvādevāsya sarvajñatvaṁ siddham. Ajñasya kāraṇāsambhavāt. Uktaṁ ca śrīmanmṛgendraiḥ—

God's omniscience also is proved from his being identical with everything, and also from the fact that an ignorant being cannot produce a thing[1]. This has been said by the illustrious Mṛgendra[2]—

6. सर्वज्ञः सर्वकर्तृत्वात्साधनाङ्गफलैः सह ।
यो यज्ञानाति कुरुते स तदेवेति सुस्थितम् ।। इति ।

Sarvajñaḥ sarvakartṛtvātsādhanāṅgaphalaiḥ saha,
Yo yañjānāti kurute sa tadeveti susthitaṃ. iti.

"He is omniscient from his being the maker of all things : for it is an established principle;"
"That he only can make a thing who knows it with its means, parts, and end."

Were God Corporeal, would be Subject to Trouble Like Us

अस्तु तर्हि स्वतन्त्रः ईश्वरः कर्ता । स तु नाशरीरः । घटादिकार्यस्य शरीरवता कुलालादिना क्रियमाणत्वदर्शनात् । शरीरवत्त्वे चास्मदादिवदीश्वरः। क्लेशयुक्तोऽसर्वज्ञः परिमितशक्तिं प्राप्नुयादिति चेत्–मैवं मंस्थाः । अशरीरस्याप्यात्मनः स्वशरीरस्पन्दादौ कर्तृत्वदर्शनात् ।

1 In p. 82, line 3, *infra*, I read Karaṇāsambhavācca.
2 This may be the same with the Meykāṇḍa of the Tamil work in J.A.O.S. His poem was called the Mṛgendra(?).

Astu tarhi svatantraḥ īśvaraḥ kartā. Sa tu nāśarīraḥ. Ghaṭādikāryasya śarīravatā kulālādinā kriyamāṇatvadarśanāt. Śarīravatve cāsmadādivadīśvaraḥ. Kleśayukto'sarvajñaḥ parimitaśaktiṁ prāpnuyāditi cet—maivaṁ maṁsthāḥ. Aśarīrasyāpyātmanaḥ svaśarīraspandādau kartṛtvadarśanāt.

"Well," our opponents may say, "we concede that God is an independent maker, but then he has no body.[1] Now, experience shows that all effects, as jars, etc., are produced by beings possessed of bodies, as potters, etc.; but if God were possessed of a body, then he would be like us subject to trouble, and no longer be omniscient or omnipotent." We, however, deny this, for we see that the incorporeal soul does still produce motion, etc., in its associated body; moreover, even though we conceded that God did possess a body, we should still maintain that the alleged defects would not necessarily ensue.

अभ्युपगम्यापि ब्रूमहे । शरीरवत्त्वेऽपि भगवतो न प्रागुक्तदोषानुषङ्गः । परमेश्वरस्य हि मलकर्मादिपाशजालासम्भवेन प्राकृतं शरीरं न भवति, किं तु शाक्तम् । शक्तिरूपरीशानादिभिः पंचभिः मंत्रैः मस्तकादिकल्पनायाम्–ईशानमस्तकः, तत्पुरुषवक्त्रः, अघोरहृदयः, वामदेवगुह्यः, सद्योजातपादः ईश्वरः–इति प्रसिद्ध्या यथाक्रमानुग्रहतिरोभावदानलक्षणस्थितिलक्षणोद्भवलक्षणकृत्य-पञ्चककारणं, स्वेच्छानिर्मितं तच्छरीरं न चास्मच्छरीरसदृशम् । तदुक्तं श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्रेः–

Abhyupagamyāpi brūmahe. Śarīravattve'pi bhagavato na prāguktadoṣānuṣaṅgaḥ. Parameśvarasya hi malakarmādipāśajālāsambhavena prākṛtaṁ śarīraṁ na bhavati, kiṁ tu śāktaṃ. Śaktirūparīśānādibhiḥ pañcabhiḥ mantraiḥ mastakādikalpanāyāṃ—īśānamastakaḥ, tatpuruṣavaktraḥ, aghorahṛdayaḥ, vāmadevaguhyaḥ, sadyojātapādaḥ īśvaraḥ—iti prasiddhyā yathākramānugrahatirobhāvadānalakṣaṇasthitilakṣaṇodbhavalakṣaṇakṛtya—pañcakakāraṇaṁ, svecchānirmitaṁ taccharīraṁ na cāsmaccharīrasadṛśaṃ. Taduktaṁ śrīmanmṛgendreḥ—

The Supreme Being, as he has no possible connection with the fetters of matter, such as *mala,*[2] action, etc., cannot have a material

1 Should we read *tāvad anaśarīraḥ* in p. 83, line 2?
2 I retain this word, see *infra*.

body, but only a body of pure energy (sākta),[1] since we know that his body is composed of the five hymns which are forms of Śakti, according to the well-known text : "The Supreme has the *Īśāna* as his head, the *Tatpuruṣa* as his mouth, the *Aghora* as his heart, the *Vāmedeva* as his secret parts, and the *Sadyojāta* as his feet."[2] And this body, created according to his own will, is not like our bodies, but is the cause of the five operations of the Supreme, which are repectively grace, obscuration, destruction, preservation, and production.[3] This has been said in the Śrīmat Mṛgendra—

मलाद्यसम्भवाच्छक्तं वपुर्नैतादृशं प्रभोः ।। इति ।

Malādyasambhavācchaktaṁ vapurnaitādṛśaṁ prabhoḥ. iti.

"From the impossibility of its possessing *mala*, etc., the body of the Supreme is of pure energy, and not like ours."

अन्यत्रापि–

Anyatrāpi—

And it has also been said elsewhere—

7. तद्वपुः पञ्चभिर्मन्त्रैः पञ्चकृत्योपयोगिभिः ।
ईशतत्पुरुषाघोरवामाद्यैर्मस्तकादिमत् ।। इति ।

Tadvapuḥ pañcabhirmantraiḥ pañcakṛtyopayogibhiḥ,
Īśatatpuruṣāghoravāmādyairmastakādimat. iti.

"His body is composed of the five mantras which are subservient to the five operations,"

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1 "Māyā (or *Prakṛti*) is the material, Śakti the instrumental, and Deity the efficient cause" (J.A.O.S.iv.p.55).

2 These are the five first names of the eleven mantras which are included in the five *kalās* (J.A.O.S. iv., pp.238-243). The Śivaliṅga (the visible object of worship for the enlightened)is composed of mantras, and is to be regarded as the body of śiva (see J.A.O.S.iv., p.101). These five mantras are given in the inverse order in *Taitt. Āraṇyaka*, x. 43-47 (cf. Nyāya-malāvist. p. 3)

3 These are the operations of the five manifestations of Śiva (see J.A.O.S.iv., 8.18) which in their decending order ar *sāthākkiyam* (i.e., Sadākṣaya?) or Sadā-Śiva, who is Śiva and Śakti combined, and the source of grace to all souls; *Ichchuran* or *Mayesuran*, the obscure; Suttavittei *(Śuddhavidyā)* which is properly the Hindu triad, Rudra, Vishnnu, and Brahmā. They are respectively symbolised by the *nāda*, *bindu,* m, u, and a of Oṁ.

"And his head, etc., are formed out of the Īṣa, Tatpuruṣa, Aghora, Vāma, and other hymns."

ननु पञ्चववक्त्रस्त्रिपञ्चदृगित्यादिनागमेषु परमेश्वरस्य मुख्यत एव शरीरेन्द्रियादियोगः श्रूयत इति चेत्–सत्यम्, निराकारे ध्यानपूजाद्यसम्भवेन भक्तानुग्रहकारणाय तत्तदाकारग्रहणाविरोधात् ।

Nanu pañcavavaktrastripañcadṛgityādināgameṣu parameśvarasya mukhyata eva śarīrendriyādiyogaḥ śrūyata iti cet—satyam, nirākāre dhyānapūjādyasambhavena bhaktānugrahakāraṇāya tattadākāragrahaṇāvirodhāt.

If your object to this view that "such passages in the Āgamas as 'He is five-faced and fifteen-eyed,' assert prominently the fact that the Supreme Being is endowed with a body, organs, etc.," we concede what you say, but we maintain that there is no contradiction in his assuming such forms to show his mercy to his devoted servants, since meditation, worship, etc., are impossible towards a Being entirely destitute of form.

तदुक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे–

Taduktaṁ śrīmatpauṣkare—

This has been said in the Pauṣkara—

8. साधकस्य तु रक्षार्थं तस्य रूपमिदं स्मृतम् । इति ।

Sādhakasya tu rakṣārthaṁ tasya rūpamidaṁ smṛtam. iti.

"This form of his is mentioned for the preservation of the devotee."

अन्यत्रापि–

Anyatrāpi—

And similarly elswhere—

आकारवांस्त्वं नियमादुपास्यो,
न वस्त्वनाकारमुपैति बुद्धिः ।। इति ।

कृत्यपञ्चकं च प्रपञ्चितं भोजराजेन–

Ākāravāṁstvaṁ niyamādupāsyo, na vastvanākāramupaiti buddhiḥ. iti.

Kṛtyapañcakaṁ ca prapañcitaṁ Bhojarājena—

"Thou art to be worshipped according to rule as possessed of form;"

"For the understanding cannot reach to a formless object."

Bhojarāja[1] has thus detailed the five operations—

9. पञ्चविधं तत्कृत्यं सृष्टिस्थितिसंहारतिरोभावः ।
तद्वदनुग्रहकरणं प्रोक्तं सततोदितस्यास्य ॥ इति ।

Pañcavidhaṁ tatkṛtyaṁ sṛṣṭisthitisaṁhāratirobhāvaḥ,
Tadvadanugrahakaraṇaṁ proktaṁ satatoditasyāsya. iti.

"Fivefold are his operations, creation, preservation, destruction, and obscuration,"

"And to these must be added the active grace of him who is eternally exalted."

एतच्च कृत्यपञ्चकं शुद्धाध्वविषये साक्षाच्छिवकर्तृकं, कृच्छ्राध्वविषये त्वन्तादिद्वारेणेति विवेकः । तदुक्तं श्रीमत्करणे—

Etacca kṛtyapañcakaṁ śuddhādhvaviṣaye sākṣācchivakartṛkaṁ, kṛcchrādhvaviṣaye tvantadidvāreṇeti vivekaḥ. Taduktaṁ śrīmatkaraṇe—

Now these five operations, in the view of the pure Path, are held to be performed directly by Śiva, but in that of the toilsome Path, they are ascribed to Ananta,[2] as is declared in the Śrīmat Karaṇa[3]—

शुद्धेऽध्वनि शिवः कर्ता प्रोक्तोऽनन्तोऽहिते प्रभोः ॥ इति ।

Śuddhe'dhvani śivaḥ kartā prokto'nanto'hite prabhoḥ. iti.

"In the Pure Path Śiva is declared to be the only agent, but Ananta in that which is opposed to the One Supreme."

एवं च शिवशब्देन शिवत्वयोगिनां मन्त्रमन्त्रेश्वरमहेश्वरमुक्तात्मशिवानां सवाचकानां शिवत्वप्राप्तिसाधनेन दीक्षादिनोपायकलापेन सह पतिपदार्थे संग्रहः कृत इति बोद्धव्यम् । तदित्थं पतिपदार्थो निरूपितः ।

Evaṁ ca śivaśabdena śivatvayogināṁ mantramantreśvaramaheśvaramuktātmaśivānāṁ savācakānāṁ śivatvaprāptisādhanena dīkṣādinopāyakalāpena saha patipadārthe saṅgrahaḥ kṛta iti boddhavyaṃ. Tadittharṁ patipadārtho nirūpitaḥ.

1 In Wilson's Mackenzie Cat. i. p. 138, we find a Tāntrik work, the *Narapati-jaya-caryā*, ascribed to Bhoja the king of Dhār.

2 Ananta is a name of Śiva in the Atharva-śiras Upaniṣad (see Indische Stud.i. 385).

3 This is the fourth of the twenty-eight Āgamas (see Foulkes' Catechism).

It must here be understood that the word Śiva includes in its proper meaning "the Lord," all those who have attained to the state of Śiva, as the Lords of the Mantras, Maheśvara, the emancipated souls who have become Śivas, and the inspired teachers *(vācakas)*, together with all the various means, as initiation, etc., for obtaining the state of Śiva. Thus, has been explained the first category, the Lord (pati).

Non-atomic Individual Oul or Knower of the Body's Paśu

संप्रति पशुपदार्थो निरूप्यते–अनणुः क्षेत्रज्ञादिपदवेदनीयो जीवात्मा पशुः । न तु चार्वाकादिवद् देहादिरूपः । 'नान्यदृष्टं स्मरत्यन्यः' इति न्यायेन प्रतिसन्धानानुपपत्तेः । नापि नैयायिकादिवत्प्रकाश्यः, अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । तदुक्तम्–

Samprati paśupadārtho nirūpyate—ananuḥ kṣetrajñādipadavedanīyo jīvātmā paśuḥ. Na tu cārvākādivad dehādirūpaḥ. 'Nānyadṛṣṭaṁ smaratyanyaḥ' iti nyāyena pratisandhānānupapatteḥ. Nāpi naiyāyikādivatprakāśyaḥ, anavasthāprasaṅgāt. Taduktaṃ—

We now proceed to explain the second category, the soul *(paśu)*. The individual soul which is also known by such synonyms as the non-atomic,[1] the Kṣetrajña, or knower of the body,[2] etc., is the *Paśu*. For we must not say with the Cārvākas that it is the same as the body, since on this view, we could not account for memory, as there is a proverb that one man cannot remember what another has seen. Nor may we say with the Naiyāyikas that it is cognisable by perception,[3] as this would involve *an ad infinitum regressus*. As has been said—

10. आत्मा यदि भवेन्मेयस्तस्य माता भवेत्परः ।
पर आत्मा तदानीं स्यात्स परो यदि दृश्यते ॥ इति ।

Ātmā yadi bhavenmeyastasya mātā bhavetparaḥ,
Para ātmā tadānīṁ syātsa paro yadi dṛśyate. iti.

1 aṇu? "The soul, when clothed with these primary things (desire, knowledge, action, etc.), is an exceedingly small body" (Foulkes). *Anaṇu* is used as an epithet of Brahman in Bṛhad Ār. Up. iii.8.8.

2 See Ind. studien, i. 301.

3 The mind or internal sense perceives soul (see Bhāṣā Paricceheda, śloka 49).

"If the soul were cognisable, there would need to be again a second knower;[1]"

"And this would require another still, if the second were itself to be known."

न च जैनवदव्यापकः नापि बौद्धवत्क्षणिकः । देशकालाभ्यामनवच्छिन्नत्वात् । तदप्युक्तम्–

Na ca jainavadavyāpakaḥ nāpi bauddhavatkṣaṇikaḥ. Deśakālābhyāmanavacchinnatvāt. Tadapyuktaṃ—

Nor must we hold it non-pervading with the Jainas, nor momentary with the Bauddhas, since it is not limited by space or time. As has been said–

11. अनवच्छिन्नसद्भावं वस्तु यद्देशकालतः ।
तन्नित्यं विभु चेच्छन्तीत्यात्मनो विभुनित्यता ॥ इति ।

Anavacchinnasadbhāvaṁ vastu yaddeśakālataḥ,
Tannityaṁ vibhu cecchantītyātmano vibhunityatā. iti.

"That object which is unlimited in its nature by space or time,"

"They hold to be eternal and pervading,–hence, the soul's all-pervadingness and eternity."

नापि अद्वैतवादिनामिवैकः । भोगप्रतिनियमस्य पुरुषबहुत्वज्ञापकस्य सम्भवात् ।

Nāpi advaitavādināmivaikaḥ. Bhogapratiniyamasya puruṣabahutvajñāpakasya sambhavāt.

Nor may we say with the Vedāntin that it is only one, since the apportionment of different fruits proves that there are many individual souls.

नापि सांख्यानामिवाकर्ता । पाशजालापोहने नित्यनिरतिशयदृक्क्रियारूपचैतन्यात्मकशिवत्वश्रवणात् । तदुक्तं श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्रैः–'पाशान्ते शिवताश्रुतेः' इति ।

Nāpi sāṅkhyānāmivākartā. Pāśajālāpohane nityaniratiśayadṛkkriyārūpacaitan yātmakaśivatvaśravaṇāt. Taduktaṁ śrīman-mṛgendrāiḥ—'pāśānte śivatāśruteḥ' iti.

Nor with the Sāṅkhyas that it is devoid of action, since, when all the various "fetters" are removed, Śruti informs us of a state of identity with Śiva, which consists in intelligence in the form of an

1 Dele the *iti* in p.84, line 5, *infra*.

eternal and infinite vision and action.[1] This has been declared in the Śrīmat Mṛgendra—"It is revealed that identity with Śiva results when all fetters are removed."

12. चैतन्यं दृक्क्रियारूपं तदस्त्यात्मनि सर्वदा ।
सर्वतश्च यतो मुक्तौ श्रूयते सर्वतोमुखम् ॥ इति ।

Caitanyaṁ dṛkkriyārūpaṁ tadastyātmani sarvadā,
Sarvataśca yato muktau śrūyate sarvatomukhaṃ. iti.

And again–

"Intelligence consists in vision and action, and since in his soul."

"This exists always and on every side, therefore, after liberation, Śruti calls it that which faces every way."

तत्त्वप्रकाशेऽपि–

Tattvaprakāśe'pi—

It is also said in the *Tattva-prakāśa*–

13. मुक्तात्मनोऽपि शिवाः किं त्वेते यत्प्रसादतो मुक्ताः ।
सोऽनादिमुक्त एको विज्ञेयः पञ्चमन्त्रतनुः ॥ इति ।

Muktātmano'pi śivāḥ kiṁ tvete yatpraśādato muktāḥ,
So'nādimukta eko vijñeyaḥ pañcamantratanuḥ. iti.

"The liberated souls are themselves Śivas, but these are liberated by his favour;"

"He is to be known as the one eternally liberated, whose body is the five Mantras."

Souls are of Three Kinds

पशुस्त्रिविधः–विज्ञानाकल-प्रलयाकल-सकलभेदात् । तत्र प्रथमो विज्ञानयोगसंन्यासैर्भोगेन वा कर्मक्षये सति कर्मक्षयार्थस्य कलादिभोगबन्धस्य अभावात् । केवलमलमात्रयुक्तो 'विज्ञानाकल' इति व्यपदिश्यते । द्वितीयस्तु प्रलयेन कलादेरुपसंहारान्मलकर्मयुक्तः 'प्रलयाकल' इति व्यवह्रियते । तृतीयस्तु मलमायाकर्मात्मकबन्धत्रयसहितः 'सकल' इति संलिप्यते ।

Pāśustrividhaḥ—vijñānākala-pralayākala-sakalabhedāt. Tatra prathamo vijñānayogasaṁnyāsairbhogena vā karmakṣaye sati karmakṣayārthasya kalādibhogabandhasya abhāvāt. Kevalama-

1 Cf. the Nakulīśa Pāśupatas, p.76,4 (*supra*, p.103).

lamātrayukto 'vijñānākala' iti vyapadiśyate. Dvitīyastu pralayena kalāderupasaṁhārānmalakarmayuktaḥ 'pralayākala' iti vyavahriyate. Tṛtīyastu malamāyākarmātmakabandhatrayasahitaḥ 'sakala' iti saṁlipyate.

Now, the souls are threefold, as denominated *vijñānā-kalāḥ*, *pralayākalāḥ* and *sakalāḥ*.[1] (a) The first are those who are under the influence of *mala* only, since, their actions are cancelled by receiving their proper fruits, or by abstraction, contemplation, and knowledge, and since they have no "fetters" in the form of enjoyments, such as *kalā*, etc. (which fetters would, however, be the cause of cancelling actions by bringing about their proper fruit). (b) The second are those who are under the influence of *mala* and *karman*, since in their case *kalā*, etc., are destroyed by mundane destructions, hence their name *pralayākala*. (c) The third are those who are bound in the three fetters of *mala, māyā*, and *karman*, hence their name *sakala*.

Sub-divisions of First Class Asamāptakaluṣa

तत्र प्रथमो द्विप्रकारो भवति-समाप्तकलुषासमाप्तकलुषभेदाद् । तत्राद्यान् कालुष्यपरिपाकवतः पुरुषधौरेयानधिकारयोग्यान् अनुगृह्य अनन्तादिविद्येश्वराष्टापदं प्रापयति । तद्विद्येश्वराष्टकं निर्दिष्टं बहुदैवत्ये-

1 For these three classes see J.A.O.S. iv, pp.87, 137. They are there described as being respectively under the influence of *āṇavam malam* only, or this with *kanmam malam,* or these with *mayei malam*. The *āṇavam* is described as original sin, or that source of evil which was always attached to the soul; *kanmam* is that fate which inheres in the soul's organism and metes out its deserts; *mayei* is matter in its obscuring or entangling power, the source of the senses. Mādhava uses "*kalā*," etc., for *māyā*. The reason is to be found in J.A.O.S.p.70, where it is said that the five *vidyātattvas* (*kalā, vidyā, rāga, niyati*, and *kalā*) and the twenty-four *ātmatattvas* (*sc.* the gross and subtile elements, and organs of sense and action, with the intellectual faculties *manas, buddhi, ahaṅkāra,* and *citta*), are all developed from *māyā*. This exactly agrees with the quotation from Soma Śambhu, *infra*. We may compare with it what Mādhava says, p.77, in his account of the Nakulīśa Pāśupatas, where he describes *kalā* as unintelligent, and composed of the five elements, the five *tanmātras*, and the ten organs, with *buddhi, ahaṅkāra* and *manas*.

Tatra prathamo dviprakāro bhavati—samāptakaluṣāsamāptakaluṣabhedād. Tatrādyān kāluṣyaparipākavataḥ puruṣadhaureyānadhikārayogyān anugṛhya anantādividyeśvarāṣṭāpadaṁ prāpayati. Tadvidyeśvarāṣṭakaṁ nirdiṣṭaṁ bahudaivatye—

The first class are again sub-divided into *samāptakaluṣāḥ* and *asamāpta-kaluṣāḥ*, according as their inherent corruption is perfectly exhausted or not. The former, having received the mature penalties of their corruptions,—are now, as foremost of men and worthy of the privilege, raised by Śiva's favour to the rank of the Lords of Knowledge (the Vidyeśvaras), Ananta, and the rest. This ogdoad of the Lords of Knowledge is described in the Bahudaivatya—

14. अनन्तश्चैव सूक्ष्मश्च तथैव च शिवोत्तमः ।
एकनेत्रस्तथैवैकरुद्रश्चापि त्रिमूर्त्तिकः ॥

Anantaścaiva sūkṣmaśca tathaiva ca śivottamaḥ,
Ekanetrastathaivaikarudraścāpi trimūrttikaḥ.

"Ananta, and Sūkṣma, and Śivottama,"
"Ekanetra, and again Ekarudra and Trimūrttika,"

15. श्रीकण्ठश्च शिखण्डी च प्रोक्ता विद्येश्वरा इमे । इति ।

Śrikaṇṭhaśca śikhaṇḍī ca proktā vidyeśvarā ime. iti.

"Śrīkaṇṭha and Śīkhaṇḍin,—these are declared to be the Vidyeśvaras."

अन्या-(न्त्या)-न्सप्तकोटिसंख्यातान्मन्त्राननुग्रहकरणान्विधत्ते तदुक्तं तत्त्वप्रकाशे-

Anyā—(ntyā)-nsaptakoṭisaṅkhyātānmantrānanugrahakaraṇānvidhatte taduktaṁ tattvaprakāśe—

The latter Śiva, in his mercy, raises to the rank of the seventy million Mantras.[1] All this is explained in the *Tattva-prakāśa*.[2] Similarly Soma-Śambhu has said—

16. पशवस्त्रिविधाः प्रोक्ता विज्ञानप्रलयकेवलौ सकलः ।
मलयुक्तस्त्रताद्यो मलकर्मयुतो द्वितीयः स्यात् ॥

Paśavastrividhāḥ proktā vijñānapralayakevalau sakalaḥ,
Malayuktastratādyo malakarmayuto dvitīyaḥ syāt.

1 See J.A.O.S. iv., p.137. I read *anugrahakaraṇāt* in p. 86, line 3.

2 I omit the quotation, as it only repeats the preceding. It, however, names the three classes as *vijñāna-kevala, pralaya-kevala*, and *sakala*.

17. मलमायाकर्मयुतः सकलस्तेषु द्विधा भवेदाद्यः ।
आद्यः समाप्तकलुषोऽसमाप्तकलुषो द्वितीयः स्यात् ॥

Malamāyākarmayutaḥ sakalasteṣu dvidhā bhavedādyaḥ,
Ādyaḥ samāptakaluṣo'samāptakaluṣo dvitīyaḥ syāt.

18. आद्यानुगृह्य शिवो विद्येशत्वे नियोजयत्यष्टौ ।
मन्त्राँश्च करोत्यपराँस्ते चोक्ताः कोटयः सप्त ॥ इति ।

Ādyānanugṛhya śivo vidyeśatve niyojayatyaṣṭau,
Mantrāṁśca karotyaparāṁste coktāḥ koṭayaḥ sapta. iti.

सोमशम्भुनाप्यभिहितम्–

Somaśambhunāpyabhitam—

19. विज्ञानाकलनामैको द्वितीयः प्रलयाकलः ।
तृतीयः सकलः शास्त्रेऽनुग्राह्यस्त्रिविधो मतः ॥

Vijñānākalanāmaiko dvitīyaḥ pralayākalaḥ,
Tṛtīyaḥ sakalaḥ śāstre'nugrāhyastrividho mataḥ.

"One class is named *vijñānākala*, the second *pralayākala*;"

"The third *sakala*,—these are the three whom the Śāstra regards as objects of mercy."

20. तत्राद्यो मलमात्रेण युक्तोऽन्यो मलकर्मभिः ।
कलादिभूमिपर्यन्ततत्त्वैस्तु सकलो युतः ॥ इति ।

Tatrādyo malamātreṇa yukto'nyo malakarmabhiḥ,
Kalādibhūmiparyantatattvaistu sakalo yutaḥ. iti.

"The first is united to *mala* alone, the second to *mala* and *karma*;"

"The third are united to all the tattvas beginning with *kalā* and ending with "earth."[1]

Pralayākalaḥ Sub-Divided into Two Forms

प्रलयाकलोऽपि द्विविधः–पक्वपाशद्वयस्तद्विलक्षणश्च । तत्र प्रथमो मोक्षं प्राप्नोति । द्वितीयस्तु पुर्यष्टकयुतः कर्मवशान्नानाविधजन्मभाग्भवति । तदप्युक्तं तत्त्वप्रकाशे–

Pralayākalo'pi dvividhaḥ—pakvapāśadvayastadvilakṣaṇaśca. Tatra prathamo mokṣaṁ prāpnoti. Dvitīyastu puryaṣṭakayutaḥ

1 i.e., thus including five of the *vidyātattvas* and all the twenty-four *ātmatattvas*.

karmavaśānnānāvidhajanmabhāgbhavati. Tadapyuktaṁ tattva-prakāśe—

The *Pralayākalāḥ* are also twofold, as being *pakvapāśadvaya* or not, *i.e.*, those in whom the two remaining fetters are matured, and those in whom they are not. The former attain liberation, but the latter, by the power of *karman*, are endowed with the *puryaṣṭaka*[1] body, and pass through various births. As has been said in the *Tattva-prakāśa*—

21. प्रलयाकलेषु येषामपक्वमलकर्मणी व्रजन्त्येते ।
पुर्यष्टकदेहयुता योनिषु निखिलासु कर्मवशात् ॥ इति ।

Pralayākaleṣu yeṣāmapakvamalakarmaṇī vrajantyete,
Puryaṣṭakadehayutā yoniṣu nikhilāsu karmavaśāt. iti.

"Those among the *Pralayākalās* whose *karman* and *mala* are immature,"

"Go, united with the *puryaṣṭaka* body, into many births by the power of *karman.*"

पुर्यष्टकमपि तत्रैव निर्दिष्टम्–

Puryaṣṭakamapi tatraiva nirdiṣṭam—

The *puryaṣṭaka* is also thus described in the same work—

स्यात्पुर्यष्टकमन्तःकरणं धीकर्मकरणानि । इति ।

Syātpuryaṣṭakamantaḥkaraṇaṁ dhīkarmakaraṇāni. iti.

"The *puryaṣṭaka* is composed of the internal organ, thought (*dhī*), *karman*, and the instruments."

विवृतं चाघोरशिवाचार्येण–पुर्यष्टकं नाम प्रतिपुरुषं नियतः, सर्गादा रभ्य कल्पान्तं मोक्षान्तं वा स्थितः, पृथिव्यादिकलापर्यन्तस्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वात्मकः, सूक्ष्मो देहः । तथा चोक्तं तत्त्वसंग्रहे–

Vivṛtaṁ cāghoraśivācāryeṇa—puryaṣṭakaṁ nāma pratipuruṣaṁ niyataḥ, sargādā rabhya kalpāntaṁ mokṣāntaṁ vā sthitaḥ, pṛthivyādikalāparyantarsṁtriśattattvātmakaḥ, sūkṣmo dehaḥ. Tathā coktaṁ tattvasaṅgrahe—

This is thus explained by Aghora Śiva Ācārya, "the *puryaṣṭaka* is a

1 This term seems to be derived from *purī*, "body" (cf. *puriśaya* for *puruṣa*, Bṛhad Ār. Up. ii.5,18), and *aṣṭaka* (cf. also the Sāṅkhya Pravacana *Bhāṣya*, p.135)

subtile body apportioned to each individual soul, which continues from the creation until the close of the kalpa, or until liberation : it is composed of the thirty[1] tattvas beginning with 'earth' and ending with *kalā*." As has been said in the *Tattvasaṅgraha*—

22. वसुधाद्यस्तत्त्वगणः प्रतिपुंनियतः कलान्तोऽयम् ।
पर्यटति कर्मवशाद् भुवनजदेहेष्वयं च सर्वेषु ।। इति ।

Vasudhādyastattvagaṇaḥ pratipuṁniyataḥ kalānto'yam,
Paryaṭati karmavaśād bhuvanajadeheṣvayaṁ ca sarveṣu. iti.

"This set of tattvas, commencing with 'earth' and ending with kalā, is assigned to each soul,"

"And wanders by the law of *karman* through all the bodies produced by the world."

तथा चायमर्थः समपद्यत—अन्तःकरणशब्देन मनोबुद्ध्यहंकारवाचिनाऽन्यान्यपि पुंसो भोगक्रियायामन्तरङ्गाणि कला-काल-नियति-विद्या-राग-प्रकृति-गुणाख्यानि सप्त तत्त्वान्युपलक्ष्यन्ते । धीकर्मशब्देन ज्ञयानि पञ्चभूतानि तत्कारणानि च तन्मात्राणि विवक्ष्यन्ते । करणशब्देन ज्ञानकर्मेन्द्रियदशकं संगृह्यते ।

Tathā cāyamarthaḥ samapadyata—antaḥkaraṇaśabdena manobuddhyahaṅkāravācinā'nyānyapi puṁso bhogakriyāyāmantaraṅgāṇi kalā-kāla-niyati-vidyā-rāga-prakṛti-guṇākhyāni sapta tattvānyupalakṣyante. Dhīkarmaśabdena jñayāni pañcabhūtāni tatkāraṇāni ca tanmātrāṇi vivakṣyante. Karaṇaśabdena jñānakarmendriyadaśakaṁ saṅgṛhyate.

The following is the full meaning of this passage:—The word "internal organ," which properly includes "mind", "intelligence", "egoism," and "reason,"[2] includes also the seven tattvas which enter into the production of enjoyment (or experience), viz., those called *kalā*, time, fate, knowledge, concupiscence, nature, and quality;[3] the words *"thought" (dhī)* and *karman* signify the five

1 Or rather thirty-one?

2 *Manas, buddhi, ahaṁkāra, citta.*

3 These are the seven *vidyā tattvas, kalā, kāla, niyati* (fate), *vidyā, rāga, prakṛti*, and *guṇa*. Hoisington, however, puts *puruṣan* "the principle of life," instead of *guṇa*, which seems better, as the three *guṇas* are included in *prakṛti*. He translates *kalā* by "continency," and describes it as "the power by which the senses are subdued and the carnal self brought into subjection."

cognisable gross elements, and their originators, the subtile rudiments. By the word *"instruments"* are comprehended the ten organs of sense and action.

ननु श्रीमत्कालोत्तरे—

Nanu śrīmatkālottare—

23. शब्दः स्पर्शस्तथा रूपं रसो गन्धश्च पञ्चकम् ।
बुद्धिर्मनस्त्वहंकारः पुर्यष्टकमुदाहृतम् ।।

Śabdaḥ sparśastathā rūpaṁ raso gandhaśca pañcakam,
Buddhirmanastvahaṅkāraḥ puryaṣṭakamudāhṛtam.

"But is it not declared in the Śrīmat Kālottara that 'The set of five : sound, touch, form, taste and smell, intelligence, mind and egoism, these constitute the *puryaṣṭaka*?'"

इति श्रूयते । तत्कथमन्यथा कथ्यते ? अद्धा, अत एव च तत्रभवता रामकाण्डेन तत्सूत्रं त्रिंशत्तत्त्वपरतया व्याख्यायीत्यलमतिप्रपञ्चेन ।

Iti śrūyate. Tatkathamanyathā kathyate ? Addhā, ata eva ca tatrabhavatā rāmakāṇḍena tatsūtraṁ triṁśattattvaparatayā vyākhyāyītyalamatiprapañcena.

How, then, can any different account be maintained? We grant this, and hence, the venerable Rāma Kaṇṭha has explained that sūtra in its literal meaning (*i.e, as puryaṣṭaka*, is derived from *aṣṭa*, "eight").

तथापि कथमस्य पुर्यष्टकत्वम्? भूततन्मात्रबुद्धीन्द्रियकर्मेन्द्रियान्तःकरणसंज्ञैः पञ्चभिर्वर्गैः तत्कारणेन प्रधानेन कलादिपञ्चकात्मना वर्गेण चारब्धत्वादित्यविरोधः । तत्र पुर्यष्टकयुतान्विशिष्टपुण्यसंपन्नान् काँश्चिदनुगृह्यभुवनपतित्वमत्र महेश्वरोऽनन्तः प्रयच्छति । तदुक्तम्—

Tathāpi kathamasya puryaṣṭakatvam? Bhūtatanmātrabuddhīndriyakarmendriyāntaḥkaraṇasaṁjñaiḥ pañcabhirvargaiḥ tatkāraṇena pradhānena kalādipañcakātmanā vargeṇa cārabdhatvādityavirodhaḥ. Tatra puryaṣṭakayutānviśiṣṭapuṇyasaṁpannān kāṁścidanugṛhyabhuvanapatitvamatra maheśvaro'nantaḥ prayacchati. Taduktam—

So, why should we be prolix in the discussion? Still, if you ask how we can reconcile our account with the strict nominal definition of *puryaṣṭaka*, we reply that there is really no contradiction, as we maintain that it is composed of a set of eight in the following manner :—(1) The five elements; (2) the five rudiments; (3) the five

organs of knowledge; (4) those of action; (5) the fourfold internal organ; (6) their instrument;[1] (7) nature (*prakṛti*); and (8) the class composed of the five, beginning with *kalā*, which form a kind of case.[2]

Now, in the case of some of those souls who are joined to the *puryaṣṭaka* body, Maheśvara Ananta having compassionated them as possessed of peculiar merit, constitutes them here as lords of the world; as has been said—

काँश्चिदनुगृह्य वितरति भुवनपतित्वं महेश्वरस्तेषाम् ॥ इति ।

Kāṁścidanugṛhya vitarati bhuvanapatitvaṁ maheśvarasteṣām. iti.

"Maheśvara pities some and grants them to be lords of the world."

Two Kinds of Sakala

सकलोऽपि द्विविधः । पक्वकलुषापक्वकलुषभेदात् । तत्राद्यान्परमेश्वरस्तत्परिपाकपरिपाट्या । तदनुगुणशक्तिपातेन मण्डल्याद्यष्टादशोत्तरशतमन्त्रेश्वरपदं प्रापयति । तदुक्तम्–

Sakalo'pi dvividhaḥ. Pakvakaluṣāpakvakaluṣabhedāt. Tatrādyānparameśvarastatparipākaparipāṭyā. Tadanuguṇaśaktipātena maṇḍalyādyaṣṭādaśottaraśatamantreśvarapadaṁ prāpayati. Taduktam—

The class called *sakala* is also divided into two, as *pakvakaluṣa* and *apakvakaluṣa*. As for the former, the Supreme Being, in conformity with their maturity *(paripāka)*, puts forth a power agreeable thereto, and transfers them to the position of the hundred and eighteen Lords of the Mantras, signified by the words *Maṇḍalī*, etc., as has been said—

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1 This "instrument" *(karaṇa)* seems to mean what Hoisington calls *puruṣan* or "the principle of life which establishes or supports the whole system in its operation;" he makes it one of the seven *vidyātattvas*. According to Mādhava, it should be what he calls *guṇa*.

2 The thirty-one *tattvas* are as follow :—Twenty-four *ātma-tattvas*, five elements, five *tanmātras*, ten organs of sense and action, four organs of the *antaekaraṇa*, and seven *vidyātattvas* as enumerated above. (See J. A. O. S. iv., pp.16-17.)

24. शेषा भवन्ति सकलाः कलादियोगादहर्मुखे काले ।
शतमष्टादश तेषां कुरुते स्वयमेव मन्त्रेशान् ॥

Śeṣā bhavanti sakalāḥ kalādiyogādaharmukhe kāle,
Śatamaṣṭādaśa teṣāṁ kurute svayameva mantreśān.

"The rest are denominated *sakala*, from their connection with *Kalā*, etc., seized by time whose mouths are days;"

"The Supreme of his own will makes one hundred and eighteen of these the Lords of the Mantras."

25. तत्राष्टौ मण्डलिनः क्रोधाद्यास्तत्समाश्च वीरेशः ।
श्रीकण्ठः शतरुद्राः शतमित्यष्टादशाभ्यधिकम् ॥ इति ।

Tatrāṣṭau maṇḍalinaḥ krodhādyāstatsamāśca vīreśaḥ
Śrīkaṇṭhaḥ śatarudrāḥ śatamityaṣṭādaśābhyadhikam. iti.

"Eight of these are called *Maṇḍalins*; eight again are Krodha etc."

"Vīreśa, Śrīkaṇṭha, and the hundred Rudras,—these together are the hundred and eighteen."

तत्परिपाकाधिक्यानुरोधेन शक्त्युपसंहारेण दीक्षाकरणेन मोक्षप्रदो भवत्याचार्यमूर्तिमास्थाय परमेश्वरः । तदप्युक्तम्–

Tatparipākādhikyānurodhena śaktyupasaṁhāreṇa dīkṣākaraṇena mokṣaprado bhavatyācāryamūrtimāsthāya parameśvaraḥ. Tadapyuktam—

In their case again, the Supreme, having assumed the form of a teacher, stops the continued accession of maturity and contracts his mainfested power, and ultimately grants to them liberation by the process of initiation; as has been said—

26. परिपक्वमलानेतानुत्सादनहेतुशक्तिपातेन ।
योजयति परे तत्त्वे स दीक्षयाचार्यमूर्तिस्थः ॥ इति ।

Paripakvamalānetānutsādanahetuśaktipātena,
Yojayati pare tattve sa dīkṣayācāryamūrtisthaḥ. iti.

"These creatures whose mala is matured, by putting forth a healing power,"

"He, assuming the form of a teacher, unites by initiation to the highest principle."

श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्रेऽपि–

पूर्वं व्यत्यासितस्याणोः पाशजालमपोहति ॥ इति ।

Śrimanmṛgendre'pi—

Pūrvaṁ vyatyāsitasyāṇoḥ pāśajālamapohati. iti.

It is also said in the *Śrīmad Mṛgendra*—

"He removes from that infinitesimal soul all the bonds which previously exerted a contrary influence over it."[1]

व्याकृतं च नारायणकण्ठेन । तत्सर्वं तत एवावधार्यम् । अस्माभिस्तु विस्तरभिया न प्रस्तूयते । अपक्वकलुषान्बद्धानणून्भोगभाजो विधत्ते परमेश्वरः कर्मवशात् । तदप्युक्तम्–

Vyākṛtaṁ ca nārāyaṇakaṇṭhena. Tatsarvaṁ tata evāvadhāryam. Asmābhistu vistara bhiyā na prastūyate. Apakvakaluṣānbaddhānaṇūnbhogabhājo vidhatte parameśvaraḥ karmavaśāt. Tadapyuktam—

All this has been explained at great length by Nārāyaṇa-Kaṇṭha, and there it is to be studied; but we are obliged to pass on through fear of prolixity.

But as for the second class, or those called *apakvakaluṣa*, the Supreme Being, as impelled by the desert of their respective actions, appoints them, as bound and endued with infinitesimal bodies, to enjoy the rewards of their previous actions.[2] As has been said—

27. बद्धाञ्छेषानपरान् विनियुङ्क्ते भोगभुक्तये पुंसः ।

तत्कर्मणानुगमादित्येवं कीर्तिताः पशवः ॥ इति ।

Baddhāñcheṣānaparān viniyuṅkte bhogabhuktaye puṁsaḥ,

Tatkarmaṇānugamādityevaṁ kīrtitāḥ paśavaḥ. iti.

"The other souls, bound (in their material bonds) he appoints to enjoy their various deserts,"

1 I take *aṇu* in this verse as the soul, but it may mean the second kind of *mala* mentioned by Hoisington. The first kind of *mala* is the *māyā-mala*, the second *āṇava-mala*, the third *kāma-mala* (*karman*).

2 "The soul, when clothed with these primary things (desire, knowledge, action, the *kalādipañcaka*, etc.), is an exceedingly small body" (Foulkes). One of three *malas* is called *āṇava*, and is described as the source of sin and suffering to souls.

"According to their respective actions : such are the various kinds of souls."

Third Category of Matter

अथ पाशपदार्थः कथ्यते । पाशश्चतुर्विधः–मलकर्ममायारोधशक्तिभेदात् । ननु–

Atha pāśapadārthaḥ kathyate. Pāśaścaturvidhaḥ—malakarmamāyārodhaśaktibhedāt. Nanu—

We now proceed to describe the third category, matter (or *pāśa*). This is fourfold, *mala*,[1] *karman*, *māyā*, and *rodha-śakti*. But it may be objected.

28. शैवागमेषु मुख्यं पतिपशुपाशा इति क्रमात् त्रितयम् ।

तत्र पतिः शिव उक्तः पशवो ह्यणवोऽर्थपञ्चकं पाशाः ॥

Śaivāgameṣu mukhyaṁ patipaśupāśā iti kramāt tritayam,

Tatra patiḥ śiva uktaḥ paśavo hyaṇavo'rthapañcakaṁ pāśāḥ.

"Is it not said in the Śaiva Āgamas that the chief things are the Lord, souls, and matter? Nor the Lord has been shown to mean Śiva, 'souls' mean atoms (or beings endowed with atomic bodies), and matter (or 'bond') is said to be the pentad[2]."

1 The first three are the three kinds of *mala* in the J.A.O.S., viz., *āṇavam*, *karman*, and *māyei*, the last is the "obsuring" power of *Māyesuran* (cf.vol.iv.,pp.13,14. The Śaivas hold the *Pāśa*, like the Sāṅkhya Prakṛti, is in itself eternal although its connection with any particular soul is temporary (See J.A.O.S. iv, p. 228).

2 These are the five, *vindu*, *mala*, *karman*, *māyā*, and *rodha-śakti*. *Vindu* is described in Foulke's translation of the Śiva-prakāśa-patalai : "A sound proceeds out of the mystical syllable *Om*; ... and in that sound a rudimentary atom of matter is developed. From this atom are developed the four sounds, the fiftyone Sanskrit letters, the Vedas, Mantras, etc., the bodily, intellectual, and external enjoyments of the soul that have not attained to spiritual knowledge at the end of each period of the world's existence, and have been swept away by the waters of the world-destroying deluge; after these, the three stages of heavenly happiness are developed, to be enjoyed by the souls and have a favourable balance of meritorious deeds, or have devoted themselves to the service of God or the abstract contemplation of the Deity, viz., (1) the enjoyment of the abode of Śiva; (2) that of near approach to him; (3) that of union with him." *Vindu* is

इति पाशः पञ्चविधः कथ्यते । तत्कथं चतुर्विध इति गण्यते?

Iti pāsaḥ pañcavidhaḥ kathyate. Tatkathaṁ caturvidha iti ganyate.?

hence matter will be fivefold. How then is it now reckoned to be only fourfold ?"

उच्यते–बिन्दोर्मायात्मनः शिवतत्त्वपदवेदनीयस्य शिवपदप्राप्तिलक्षणपरम-मुक्त्यपेक्षया पाशत्वेऽपि तद्योगस्य विद्येश्वरादिपदप्राप्तिहेतुत्वेन अपरमुक्तित्वात्पाशत्वेनानुपादानम् । इत्यविरोधः । अत एवोक्तं तत्त्वप्रकाशे– 'पाशाश्चतुर्विधाः स्युः' इति । श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्रेऽपि–

Ucyate—bindormāyātmanaḥ śivatattvapadavedanīyasya śivapadaprāptilakṣaṇaparamamuktyapekṣayā pāśatve'pi tadyogasya vidyeśvarādipadaprāptihetutvena aparamuktitvātpāśatvenānupādānam. Ityavirodhaḥ. Ata evoktaṁ tattvaprakāśe—'Pāśāścaturvidhāḥ syuḥ' iti. Śrimanmṛgendre'pi—

To this we reply as follows :– Although the *vindu* or nasal dot, which is the germinal atom of *māyā*, and is called a Śiva-tattva, may be well regarded as material in comparison with the highest liberation as defined by the attainment of the state of Śiva, still it cannot really be considered as matter when we remember that it is a secondary kind of liberation as causing the attainment of the state of such deities as Vidyeśvara, etc. Thus, we see there is no contradiction. Hence it has been said in the *Tattva-prakāśa*–"The bonds of matter will be fourfold." And again in the *Śrīmad Mṛgendra*–

29. प्रावृतीशो बलं कर्म मायाकार्यं चतुर्विधम् ।
पाशजालं समासेन धर्मा नाम्नैव कीर्तिताः ।। इति ।

Prāvṛtīśo balaṁ karma māyākāryaṁ caturvidham,
Pāśajālaṁ samāsena dharmā namnaiva kirtitāḥ. iti.

"The enveloper-controller *(mala)*, the overpowerer *(rodha)*, action, and the work of Māyā,"

"These are the four 'bonds,' and they are collectively called by the name of 'merit.'"

similarly described, J.A.O.S. iv., pp.152,153 (cf. also Weber, *Rāmatāpanyīa* Up., pp. 312,315).

अस्यार्थः–प्रावृणोति प्रकर्षेणाच्छादयत्यात्मनः स्वाभाविक्यौ दृक्क्रिये इति प्रावृतिरशुचिर्मलः । स च ईष्टे स्वातन्त्र्येणेति ईशः । तदुक्तम्–

Asyārthaḥ—prāvṛṇoti prakarṣeṇācchādatyātmanaḥ svābhāvikyau dṛkkriye iti prāvṛtiraśucirmalaḥ. Sa ca īṣṭe svātantryeṇeti īśaḥ. Taduktam—

The following is the meaning of this couplet :–

(1) "Enveloping," because *mala* exceedingly obscures and veils the soul's powers of vision and action; "controlling," because *mala*, a natural impurity, controls the soul by its independent influence. As has been said–

30. एको ह्यनेकशक्तिर्दृक्क्रिययोश्छादको मलः पुंसः ।
तुषतण्डुलवज्ज्ञेयस्ताम्राश्रितकालिकावद्वा इति ।

Eko hyanekaśaktirdṛkkriyayośchādako malaḥ puṁsaḥ,
Tuṣatanḍulavajjheyastāmrāśritakālikāvadvā. iti.

"Mala, though itself one, by manifold influence interrupts the soul's vision and action;"

"It is to be regarded as the husk in rice or rust on copper.[1]"

बलं रोधशक्तिः । अस्याः शिवशक्तेः पाशाधिष्ठानेन पुरुषतिरोधायकत्वादुपचारेण पाशत्वम् । तदुक्तम्–

Balaṁ rodhaśaktiḥ. Asyāḥ śivaśakteḥ pāśādhiṣṭhānena puruṣatirodhāyakatvādupacāreṇa pāśatvam. Taduktam—

(2) The "overpowerer" is the obscuring power; this is called a "bond" (or matter) in a metaphorical sense, since this energy of Śiva obscures the soul by superintending matter (rather than by itself partaking of the nature of matter). Thus, it has been said–

31. तासामहं वरा शक्तिः सर्वानुग्राहिका शिवा ।
धर्मानुवर्तनादेव पाश इत्युपचर्यते ।। इति ।

Tāsāmahaṁ varā śaktiḥ sarvānugrāhikā śivā,
Dharmānuvartanādeva pāśa ityupacaryate. iti.

"Of these I am the chief energy, and the gracious friend of all,"

"I am metaphorically called pāśa,[2] because I follow desert."

क्रियते फलार्थिभिरिति कर्म धर्माधर्मात्मकं बीजाङ्कुरवत्प्रवाहरूपेणानादि ।

1 See the same illustrations in J.A.O.S. iv., p.150.

2 Some forced derivation seems here intended as of *pāśa* from *paścāt*.

यथोक्तं श्रीमत्किरणे–

Kriyate phalārthibhiriti karma dharmādharmātmakaṁ bījāṅkuravatpravāharūpeṇānādi. Yathoktaṁ śrīmatkiraṇe—

(3) Action (or rather its consequences, *karman)* as being performed by those who desire the fruit. It is in the form of merit or demerit, like the seed and shoot, and it is eternal in a never-beginning series. As has been said in the *Śrīmat Kiraṇa*—

32. यथानादिर्मलस्तस्य कर्माल्पकमनादिकम् ।
यद्यनादिन संसिद्धं वैचित्र्यं केन हेतुना ।। इति ।

Yathānādirmalastasya karmālpakamanādikam,
Yadyanādina saṁsiddhaṁ vaicitryaṁ kena hetunā. iti.

"As *Mala* has no beginning, its least actions are beginningless;"

"If an eternal character is thus established, then what cause could produce any change therein ?"

मात्यस्यां शक्त्यात्मना प्रलये सर्वं जगत्सृष्टौ व्यक्तिमायातीति माया । यथोक्तं श्रीमत्सौरभेये–

Mātyasyāṁ śaktyātmanā pralaye sarvaṁ jagatsṛṣṭau vyaktimāyātīti māyā. Yathoktaṁ śrīmatsaurabheye—

(4) "Māyā," because herein as an energy of the Divine Being all the world is potentially contained *(māti)* at a mundane destruction, and again at a creation it all comes *(yāti)* into manifestation, hence the derivation of the name. This has been said in the *Śrīmat Saurabheya*—

33. शक्तिरूपेण कार्याणि तल्लीनानि महाक्षये ।
विकृतौ व्यक्तिमायाति सा कार्येण कलादिना ।। इति ।

Śaktirūpeṇa kāryāṇi tallīnāni mahākṣaye,
Vikṛtau vyaktimāyāti sā kāryeṇa kalādinā. iti.

"The effects, as a form of the Divine energy, are absorbed therein at a mundane destruction,"

"And again at a renovation it is manifested anew in the form of effects as *kalā*, etc."[1]

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1 In p.90, line 2, read *sā kāryeṇa*.

Conclusion

यद्यप्यत्र बहु वक्तव्यमस्ति तथापि ग्रन्थभूयस्त्वभयादुपरम्यते । तदित्थं पतिपशुपाशपदार्थास्त्रयः प्रदर्शिताः ।

Yadyapyatra bahu vaktavyamasti tathāpi granthabhūyastvabhayāduparamyate. Taditthaṁ patipaśupāśapadārthāstrayaḥ pradarśitāḥ.

Although much more might be added on this topic, yet we stop here through fear of extending this treatise too for. Thus, have the three categories been declared,—the Lord, the soul, and matter. A different mode of treating the subject is found in the *Jñānaratnāvalī*, etc., in such lines as—

34. पतिविद्ये तथाविद्या पशुः पाशश्च कारणम् ।
तन्निवृत्ताविति प्रोक्ताः पदार्थाः षट् समासतः ।।

Patividye tathāvidyā paśuḥ pāśaśca kāraṇam,
Tannivṛttāviti proktāḥ padārthāḥ ṣaṭ samāsataḥ.

"The Lord, knowledge, ignorance, the soul, matter, and the cause;"

"Of the cessation thereof,—these are collectively the six categories."

इत्यादिना प्रकारान्तरं ज्ञानरत्नावल्यादौ प्रसिद्धम् । सर्वं तत एवावगन्तव्यमिति सर्वं समञ्जसम् ।

Ityādinā prakārāntaraṁ jñānaratnāvalyādau prasiddham. Sarvaṁ tata evāvagantavyamiti sarvaṁ samañjasam.

But our readers must seek for full information from the work itself. Thus, our account of the system is complete.

E.B.C.

।। इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे शैवदर्शनम् ।।

❖

CHAPTER VIII

THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ-DARŚANA OR RECOGNITIVE SYSTEM

Scope of the System

अत्रापेक्षाविहीनानां जडानां कारणत्वं दुष्यतीत्यपरितुष्यन्तो, मतान्तरमन्विष्यन्तः परमेश्वरेच्छावशादेव जगन्निर्माणं परिघुष्यन्तः स्वसंवेदनोपत्त्या आगमसिद्धप्रत्यगात्मतादात्म्ये नानाविधमानमेयादिभेदाभेदशालिपरमेश्वरोऽनन्यमुखप्रेक्षित्वलक्षण-स्वातन्त्र्यभाक् स्वात्मदर्पणे भावान्प्रतिबिम्बवद् अवभासयतीति भणन्तो, बाह्याभ्यन्तरचर्याप्राणायामातिक्लेशप्रयासकलापवैधुर्येण सर्वसुलभमभिनवं प्रत्यभिज्ञामात्रं परापरसिद्ध्युपायमभ्युगच्छन्तः, परे माहेश्वराः प्रत्यभिज्ञाशास्त्रमभ्यस्यन्ति ।

Atrāpekṣāvihīnānāṁ jaḍānāṁ kāraṇatvaṁ duṣyatītyaparituṣyanto, matāntaramanviṣyantaḥ parameśvarecchāvaśādeva jagannirmāṇaṁ parighuṣyantaḥ, svasaṁvedanopattyā āgamasiddhapratyagātmatādātmye nānāvidhamānameyādibhedābhedaśāliparameśvaro'nanyamukhaprekṣitvalakṣaṇasvātantryabhāk svātmadarpaṇe bhāvānpratibimbavad avabhāsayatīti bhaṇanto, bāhyābhyantaracaryāprāṇāyāmātikleśaprayāsakalāpavaidhuryeṇa sarvasulabhamabhinavaṁ pratyabhijñāmātraṁ parāparasiddhyupāyamabhyugacchantaḥ, pare māheśvarāḥ pratyabhijñāśāstramabhyasyanti.

Other Māheśvaras are dissatisfied with the views set out in the Śaiva system as erroneous in attributing to motiveless and insentient things causality (in regard to the bondage and liberation of transmigrating spirits). They therefore seek another system, and proclaim that the construction of the world (or series of environments of those spirits) is by the mere will of the Supreme Lord. They pronounce that this Supreme Lord, who is at once other than and the same with the several cognitions and *cognita*, who is identical with the transcendent self posited by one's own consciousness, by rational proof, and by revelation, and who possesses independence, that is, the power of witnessing all things without reference

to aught ulterior, gives manifestation, in the mirror of one's own soul, to all entities[1] as if they were images reflected upon it. Thus, looking upon recognition as a new method for the attainment of ends and of the highest end, available to all men alike, without any the slightest trouble and exertion, such as external, and internal worship, suppression of the breath, and the like, these Māheśvaras set forth the system of recognition *(pratyabhijñā)*.

Components of Study as a Whole System

तस्येयत्तापि न्यरूपि परीक्षकैः–

Tasyeyattāpi nyarūpi parīkṣakaiḥ—

The extent of this system is thus described by one of their authorities –

1. सूत्रं वृत्तिर्विवृतिर्लघ्वी बृहतीत्युभे विमर्शिन्यौ ।
   प्रकरणविवरणपञ्चकमिति शास्त्रं प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः ॥

Sūtraṁ vṛttirvivṛtirlaghvī bṛhatītyubhe vimarśinyau,
Prakaraṇavivaraṇapañcakamiti śāstraṁ pratyabhijñāyāḥ.

"The aphorisms, the commentary, the gloss, the two explications the greater and the less,"

"The five topics, and the expositions,—such is the system of recognition."

Exposition to the First Aphorism

तत्रेदं प्रथम सूत्रम्–

Tatredaṁ prathama sūtram—

The first aphorism in their text-book is as follows [2] :–

2. कथंचिदासाद्य महेश्वरस्य दास्यं जनस्याप्युपकारमिच्छन् ।
   समस्तसम्पत्समवाप्तिहेतुं तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञामुपपादयामि ॥ इति ।

Kathaṁcidāsādya maheśvarasya dāsyaṁ janasyāpyupakāramicchan.
Samastasampatsamavāptihetuṁ tatpratyabhijñāmupapādayāmi. iti.

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1 Read *bhāvān* for *bhāvāt*.

2 Cf. *supra*, p.113. Mādhava here condenses Abhinava Gupta's commentary. Abhinava Gupta lived in the beginning of the eleventh century (see Bühler's Tour in Cashmere, pp. 66,80).

"Having reached somehow or other the condition of a slave of Maheśvara, and wishing also to help mankind,"

"I set forth the recognition of Maheśvara, as the method of attaining all felicity."

कथञ्चिदिति—परमेश्वराभिन्नगुरुचरणारविन्दयुगलसमाराधनेन परमेश्वरघटितेन एवेत्यर्थः । आसाद्येति—आ समन्तात्परिपूर्णतया सादयित्वा, स्वात्मोपभोग्यतां निरर्गलां गमयित्वा । तदनेन विदितवेद्यत्वेन परार्थशास्त्रकरणेऽधिकारो दर्शितः । अन्यथा प्रतारणमेव प्रसज्येत ।

Kathañciditi—parameśvarābhinnagurucaraṇāravindayugalasamārādhanena parameśvaraghaṭitena evetyarthaḥ. Āsādyeti—Ā samantātparipūrṇatayā sādayitvā, svātmopabhogyatāṁ nirargalāṁ gamayitvā. Tadanena viditavedyatvena parārthaśāstrakaraṇe'dhikāro darśitaḥ. Anyathā pratāraṇameva prasajyeta.

This aphorism may be developed as follows :—"Somehow or other," by a propitiation, effected by God, of the lotus feet of a spiritual director identical with God, "having reached," having fully attained, this condition, having made it the unintercepted object of fruition to myself. Thus, knowing that which has to be known, he is qualified to construct a system for others : otherwise the system would be a mere imposture.

मायोत्तीर्णा अपि महामायाधिकृता विष्णुविरिञ्च्याद्या यदीयैश्वर्यलेशेन ईश्वरीभूताः स भगवाननवच्छिन्नप्रकाशानन्दस्वातन्त्र्यपरमार्थो महेश्वरः । तस्य दास्यम् । दीयतेऽस्मै स्वामिना सर्वं यथाभिलषितमिति दासः । परमेश्वरस्वरूपस्वातन्त्र्यपात्रमित्यर्थः ।

Māyottīrṇā api mahāmāyādhikṛtā viṣṇuviriñcyādyā yadīyaiśvaryaleśena īśvarībhūtāḥ sa bhagavānanavacchinnaprakāśānandasvātantryaparamārtho maheśvaraḥ. Tasya dāsyam. Dīyate'smai svāminā sarvaṁ yathābhilaṣitamiti dāsaḥ. Parameśvarasvarūpasvātantryapātramityarthaḥ.

Maheśvara is the reality of unintermitted self-luminousness, beatitude, and independence, by portions of whose divine essence Viṣṇu, Viriñci, and other deities are deities, who, though they transcend the fictitious world, are yet implicated in the infinite illusion.

The condition of being of slave to Maheśvara is the being a

recipient of that independence or absoluteness which is the essence of the divine nature, a slave being one to whom his lord grants all things according to his will and pleasure (i.e., *dāsya*, from *dā*).

जनशब्देनाधिकारिविषयनियमाभावः प्रादर्शि । यस्य यस्य हीदं स्वरूपकथनं तस्य तस्य महाफलं भवति । प्रज्ञानस्यैव परमार्थफलत्वात् । तथोपदिष्टं शिवदृष्टौ परमगुरुभिर्भगवत्सोमानन्दनाथपादैः—

Janaśabdenādhikāriviṣayaniyamābhāvaḥ prādarśi. Yasya yasya hīdaṁ svarūpakathanaṁ tasya tasya mahāphalaṁ bhavati. Prajñānasyaiva paramārthaphalatvāt. Tathopadiṣṭaṁ śivadṛṣṭau paramagurubhirbhagavatsomānandanāthapādaiḥ—

The word *mankind* imports that there is no restriction of the doctrine to previously qualified students. Whoever he may be to whom this exposition of the divine nature is made, he reaps its highest reward, the emanatory *principium* itself operating to the highest end of the transmigrating souls. It has been accordingly laid down in the Śivadṛṣṭi by that supreme guide the revered Somānandanātha—

3. एकवारं प्रमाणेन शास्त्राद्वा गुरुवाक्यतः ।
ज्ञाते शिवत्वे सर्वस्थे प्रतिपत्त्या दृढात्मना ॥

Ekavāraṁ pramāṇena śāstrādvā guruvākyataḥ,
Jñāte śivatve sarvasthe pratipattyā dṛḍhātmanā.

"When once the nature of Śiva that resides in all things has been known with tenacious recognition, whether by proof or by instruction in the words of a spiritual director."

4. करणेन नास्ति कृत्यं क्वापि भावनयाऽपि वा ।
ज्ञाते सुवर्णे करणं भावनां वा परित्यजेत् ॥ इति ।

Karaṇena nāsti kṛtyaṁ kvāpi bhāvanayā'pi vā.
Jñāte suvarṇe karaṇaṁ bhāvanāṁ vā parityajet. iti.

"There is no further need of doing aught, or of any further reflection. When he knows Suvarṇa (or Śiva) a man may cease to act and to reflect."

Motive Energises of the Man

अपिशब्देन स्वात्मनस्तदभिन्नतामाविष्कुर्वता पूर्णत्वेन स्वात्मनि परार्थसम्पत्त्यतिरिक्तप्रयोजनान्तरावकाशश्च पराकृतः । परार्थश्च प्रयोजनं भवत्येव ।

तल्लक्षणयोगात् । न ह्ययं देवशापः 'स्वार्थ एव प्रयोजनं न परार्थ' इति । अत एवोक्तमक्षपादेन–'यमर्थधिकृत्य प्रवर्तते तत्प्रयोजनम्' (गौ. सू. 1/1/24) इति ।

Apiśabdena svātmanastadabhinnatāmāviṣkurvatā pūrṇatvena svātmani parārtha sampattyatiriktaprayojanāntarāvakāśaśca parākṛtaḥ. Parārthaśca prayojanaṁ bhavatyeva. Tallakṣaṇayogāt. Na hyaṁ devaśāpaḥ 'svārtha eva prayojanaṁ na parārtha' iti. Ata evoktamakṣapādena—'yamarthadhikṛtya pravartate tatprayojanaṃ' (Gau. Sū. 1/1/24) iti.

The word *also* excludes the supposition that there is room in self which has recognised the nature of Maheśvara, and which manifests to itself its own identity with him, and is therefore fully satisfied, for any other motive than felicity for others. The well-being of others is a motive, whatever may be said, for the definition of a motive applies to it : for there is no such divine curse laid upon man that self-regard should be his sole motive to the exclusion of a regard for others. Thus, Akṣapāda (i.24) defines a motive : A motive is that object towards which a man energises.

उपशब्दः सामीप्यार्थः । तेन जनस्य परमेश्वरसमीपताकरणमात्रं फलम् अत एवाह–समस्तेति । परमेश्वरतालाभे हि सर्वाः सम्पदस्तन्निष्यन्दमय्यः सम्पन्ना एव, रोहणाचललाभे रत्नसम्पद इव । एवं परमेश्वरतालाभे किमन्यत्प्रार्थनीयम् ? तदुक्तमुत्पलाचार्यैः–

Upaśabdaḥ sāmīpyārthaḥ. Tena janasya parameśvarasamīpatākaraṇamātraṁ phalaṃ ata evāha—samasteti. Parameśvaratālābhe hi sarvāḥ sampadastanniṣyandamayyaḥ sampannā eva, rohaṇācalalābhe ratnasampada iva. Evaṁ parameśvaratālābhe kimanyatprārthanīyaṃ ? Taduktamutpalācāryaiḥ—

The preposition *upa in upapādayāmi* (I set forth) indicates proximity : the result is the bringing of mankind near unto God.
Hence, the word *all* in the phrase *the method of attaining all felicities*. For when the nature of the Supreme Being is attained, all felicities, which are but the efflux thereof, are overtaken, as if a man acquired the mountain Rohaṇa (Adam's Peak), he would acquire all the treasures it contains. If a man acquire the divine nature, what else is there that he can ask for? Accordingly, Utpalācārya says—

6. भक्तिलक्ष्मीसमृद्धानां किमन्यदुपयाचितम् ।
एतया वा दरिद्राणां किमन्यदपयाचितम् ।। इति ।

Bhaktilakṣmīsamṛddhānāṁ kimanyadupayācitaṃ,
Etayā vā daridrāṇāṁ kimanyadapayācitaṃ. iti.

"What more can they ask who are rich in the wealth of devotion? What else can they ask who are poor in this ?"

इत्थं षष्ठीसमासपक्षे प्रयोजनं निर्दिष्टम् । बहुव्रीहिपक्षे तूपपादयामः । समस्तस्य बाह्याभ्यन्तरस्य नित्यसुखादेर्या सम्पत्सिद्धिः तथावत्प्रकाशः, तस्याः सम्यगवाप्तिर्यस्याः प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः हेतुः सा तथोक्ता । तस्य महेश्वरस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञा, प्रति आभिमुख्येन, ज्ञानम् । लोके हि स एवायं चैत्र इति प्रतिसन्धानेनाभिमुखीभूते वस्तुनि ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञेति व्यवह्रियते । इहापि प्रसिद्धपुराणासिद्धागमानुमानादिज्ञातपरिपूर्णशक्तिके परमेश्वरे सति स्वात्मनि अभिमुखीभूते तच्छक्तिप्रतिसन्धानेन ज्ञानमुदेति नूनं स एवेश्वरोऽहमिति ।

Itthaṁ ṣaṣṭhīsamāsapakṣe prayojanaṁ nirdiṣṭaṃ. Bahuvrīhipakṣe tūpapādayāmaḥ. Samastasya bāhyābhyantarasya nityasukhāderyā sampatsiddhiḥ tathāvatprakāśaḥ, tasyāḥ samyagavāptiryasyāḥ pratyabhijñāyāḥ hetuḥ sā tathoktā. Tasya maheśvarasya pratyabhijñā, prati ābhimukhyena, jñānaṃ. Loke hi sa evāyaṁ caitra iti pratisandhānenābhimukhībhūte vastuni jñānaṁ pratyabhijñeti vyavahriyate. Ihāpi prasiddhapurāṇāsiddhāgamānumānādijñātaparipūrṇaśaktike parameśvare sati svātmani abhimukhībhūte tacchaktipratisandhānena jñānamudeti nūnaṁ sa eveśvaro'hamiti.

We have thus, explained the motive expressed in the words the method of attaining all felicities, on the supposition that the compound term is a Tat-puruṣa genitively constructed. Let it be taken as a Bahuvrīhi or relative compound. Then the recognition of Maheśvara, the knowing him through vicarious idols, has for its motive the full attainment the manifestation, of all felicities, of every external and internal permanent happiness in their proper nature. In the language of everyday life, recognition is a cognition relative to an object represented in memory : for example, This (perceived) is the same (as the remembered) Caitra. In the recognition propounded in this system,—there being a God whose omnipotence is learnt from the accredited legendaries, from accepted revelation, and from argumentation,—there arises in relation to my presented personal self the cognition that I am that very God,—in virtue of my recollection of the powers of that God.

तामेतां प्रत्यभिज्ञामुपपादयामि । उपपत्तिः सम्भवः । सम्भवतीति तत्समर्थाचरणेन प्रयोजकव्यापारेण सम्पादयामीत्यर्थः ।

Tāmetāṁ pratyabhijñāmupapādayāmi. Upapattiḥ sambhavaḥ. Sambhavatīti tatsamarthācaraṇena prayojakavyāpāreṇa sampādayāmītyarthaḥ.

This same recognition I set forth. To set forth is to enforce. I establish this recognition by a stringent process which renders it convincing. (Such is the articulate development of the first aphorism of the Recognitive Institutes.)

Revelation of Cognitive and Active Powers is Necessary in Order to Manifestation of the Soul

यदीश्वरस्वभाव एवात्मा प्रकाशते, तर्हि किमनेन प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रदर्शनप्रयासेनेति चेत्–तत्रायं समाधिः । स्वप्रकाशतया सततमवभासमानेऽप्यात्मनि मायावशाद् भागेन प्रकाशमाने पूर्णतावभाससिद्धये दृक्क्रियात्मकशक्त्याविष्करणेन प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रदर्श्यते ।

Yadīśvarasvabhāva evātmā prakāśate, tarhi kimanena pratyabhijñāpradarśanaprayāseneti cet—tatrāyaṁ samādhiḥ. Svaprakāśatayā satatamavabhāsamāne'pyātmani māyāvaśād bhāgena prakāśamāne pūrṇatāvabhāsasiddhaye dṛkkriyātmakaśaktyāviṣkaraṇena pratyabhijñā pradarśyate.

Here it may be asked: If soul is manifested only as consubstantial with God, why this laboured effort to exhibit the recognition? The answer is this :—The recognition is thus exhibited, because though the soul is, as you contend, continually manifested as self-luminous (and therefore identical with God), it is nevertheless under the influence of the cosmothetic illusion manifested as partial, and therefore the recognition must be exhibited by an expansion of the cognitive and active powers in order to achieve the manifestation of the soul as total (the self being to the natural man a part, to the man of insight the whole, of the divine pleroma).

तथा च प्रयोगः 'अयमात्मा परमेश्वरो भवितुमर्हति । ज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिमत्त्वात् । यो यावति ज्ञाता कर्ता च स तावतीश्वरः प्रसिद्धेश्वरवद्राजवद्वा । आत्मा च विश्वज्ञाता कर्ता च । तस्मादीश्वरोऽयम्' इति । अवयवपञ्चकस्याश्रयणं मायावदेव नैयायिकमतस्य कक्षीकारात् । तदुक्तमुदयाकरसूनुना–

Tathā ca prayogaḥ 'ayamātmā parameśvaro bhavitumarhati. Jñānakriyāśaktimattvāt. Yo yāvati jñātā kartā ca sa tāvatīśvaraḥ prasiddheśvaravadrājavadvā. Ātmā ca viśvajñātā kartā ca. Tasmādīśvaro'yaṁ' iti. Avayavapañcakasyāśrayaṇaṁ māyāvadeva naiyāyikamatasya kakṣīkārāt. Taduktamudayākarasūnunā—

Thus, then, the syllogism : This self must be God, because it possesses cognitive and active powers; for so far forth as any one is cognitive and active, to that extent he is a lord, like a lord in the world of everyday life, or like a king, therefore the soul is God. The five-membered syllogism is here employed, because so long as we deal with the illusory order of things, the teaching of the Naiyāyikas may be accepted. It has thus been said by the son of Udayākara—

7. कर्तरि ज्ञातरि स्वात्मन्यादिसिद्धे महेश्वरे ।
अजडात्मा निषेधं वा सिद्धिं वा विदधीत कः ॥

Kartari jñātari svātmanyādisiddhe maheśvare,
Ajaḍātmā niṣedhaṁ vā siddhiṁ vā vidadhīta kaḥ.

"What self-luminous self can affirm or deny that self-active and cognitive is Maheśvara the primal being?"

8. किं तु मोहवशादस्मिन्दृष्टेऽप्यनुपलक्षिते ।
शक्त्याविष्करणेनेयं प्रत्यभिज्ञोपदर्श्यते ॥

Kiṁ tu mohavaśādasmindṛṣṭe'pyanupalakṣite,
Śaktyāviṣkaraṇeneyaṁ pratyabhijñopadarśyate.

"Such recognition must be effected by an expansion of the powers, the self being cognised under illusion, and imperfectly discerned."

Knowledge and Action are Essence to Life

तथा हि–

Tathā hi—

And again—

9. सर्वेषामिह भूतानां प्रतिष्ठा जीवदाश्रया ।
ज्ञानं क्रिया च भूतानां जीवतां जीवनं मतम् ॥

Sarveṣāmiha bhūtānāṁ pratiṣṭhā jīvadāśrayā,
Jñānaṁ kriyā ca bhūtānāṁ jīvatāṁ jīvanaṁ matam.

"The continuance of all living creatures in this transmigratory world lasts as long as their respiratory *involucrum*; knowledge and action are accounted the life of living creatures."

10. तत्र ज्ञानं स्वतः सिद्धं क्रिया कार्याश्रिता सती ।
परैरप्युपलक्ष्येत तथान्यज्ञानमुच्यते ।। इति ।

Tatra jñānaṁ svataḥ siddhaṁ kriyā kāryāśritā satī,
Parairapyupalakṣyeta tathānyajñānamucyate. iti.

"Of these, knowledge is spontaneously developed, and action (or ritual), which is best at Kāśi,"

"Is indicated by others also : different from these is real knowledge."

11. या चैषां प्रतिभा तत्तत्पदार्थक्रमरूपिता ।
अक्रमानन्दचिद्रूपः प्रमाता स महेश्वरः ।। इति च ।

Yā caiṣāṁ pratibhā tattatpadārthakramarūpitā,
Akramānandacidrūpaḥ pramātā sa maheśvaraḥ. iti ca.

And also—

"The knowledge of these things follows the sequence of those things;"

"The knower, whose essence is beatitude and knowledge without succession, is Maheśvara."

सोमानन्दनाथपादैरपि–

Somānandanāthapādairapi—

Somānanda-nātha also says—

सदा शिवात्मना वेत्ति सदा वेत्ति मदात्मना । इत्यादि ।

Sadā śivātmanā vetti sadā vetti madātmanā. ityādi.

"He always knows by identity with Śiva : he always knows by identity with the real."

ज्ञानाधिकारपरिसमाप्तावपि–

Jñānādhikāraparisamāptāvapi—

Again at the end of the section on knowledge—

12. तदैक्येन विना नास्ति संविदां लोकपद्धतिः ।
प्रकाशैक्यात्तदेकत्वं मातैकः स इति स्थितिः ।।

Tadaikyena vinā nāsti saṁvidāṁ lokapaddhatiḥ,
Prakāsaikyāttadekatvaṁ mātaikaḥ sa iti sthitiḥ.

"Unless there were this unity with Śiva, cognitions could not exist as facts of daily life;"

"Unity with God is proved by the unity of light. He is the one knower (or illuminator of cognitions)".

13. स एव विमृशत्वेन नियतेन महेश्वरः ।
विमर्श एव देवस्य शुद्धे ज्ञानक्रिये यतः ।। इति ।

Sa eva vimṛśatvena niyatena maheśvaraḥ,
Vimarśa eva devasya śuddhe jñānakriye yataḥ. iti.

"He is Maheśvara, the great Lord, by reason of the unbroken continuity of objects;"

"Pure knowledge and action are the playful activity of the deity."

Diversity or Plurality is Due to Tint Cast upon Light

विवृतं चाभिनवगुप्ताचार्यैः । 'तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं, तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति' (काठक. 2/2) इति श्रुत्या प्रकाशचिद्रूपमहिम्ना सर्वस्य भावजातस्य भासकत्वमभ्युपेयते । ततश्च विषयप्रकाशस्य नीलप्रकाशः पीतप्रकाश इति विषयोपरागभेदाद्भेदः । वस्तुतस्तु देशकालाकारसंकोचवैकल्यादभेद एव । स एव चैतन्यरूपः प्रकाशः प्रमातेत्युच्यते ।

Vivṛtaṁ cābhinavaguptācāryaiḥ. 'Tameva bhāntamanubhāti sarvaṁ, tasya bhāsā sarvamidaṁ vibhāti' (Kāṭhaka. 2/2) iti śrutyā prakāśacidrūpamahimnā sarvasya bhāvajātasya bhāsakatvama-bhyupeyate. Tataśca viṣayaprakāśasya nīlaprakāśaḥ pītaprakāśa iti viṣayoparāgabhedādbhedaḥ. Vastutastu deśakālākārasaṅko-cavaikalyādabheda eva. Sa eva caitanyarūpaḥ prakāśaḥ pramātetyucyate.

The following is an explanation of Abhinavagupta :—

The text,"After that as it shines the all of things, by the light of that shines diversely this All," teaches that God illumines the whole round of things by the glory of His luminous intelligence, and that the diversity or plurality of the object world, whereby the light which irradiates objects is a blue, a yellow light, and the like, arises from diversity of tint cast upon the light by the object. In reality, God is without plurality or difference, as transcending all

limitations of space, time, and figure. He is pure intelligence, self-luminousness, the manifester.

तथा च पठितं शिवसूत्रेषु-'चैतन्यमात्मा' (1/1) इति । तस्य चिद्रूपत्वमनवच्छिन्नविमर्शत्वमनन्योन्मुखत्वमानन्दैकघनत्वं माहेश्वर्यमिति पर्यायः । स एव ह्ययं भावात्मा विमर्शः शुद्धे पारमार्थिक्यौ ज्ञानक्रिये । तत्र प्रकाशरूपता ज्ञानम् । स्वतो जगन्निर्मातृत्वं क्रिया ।

Tathā ca paṭhitaṁ śivasūtreṣu—'caitanyamātmā' (1/1) iti. Tasya cidrūpatvamanavacchinnavimarśatvamananyonmukhatvamāna-ndaikaghanatvaṁ māheśvaryamiti paryāyaḥ. Sa eva hyayaṁ bhāvātmā virmarśaḥ śuddhe pāramārthikyau jñānakriye. Tatra prakāśarūpatā jñānaṃ. Svato jagannirmātṛtvaṁ kriyā.

And thus we may read in the Śaiva aphorisms, "Self is intelligence." His synonymous titles are Intelligential essence, Unintermitted Cognition, Irrespective Intuition, Existence as a mass of Beatitude, Supreme Domination. This self-same existing self is knowledge. By pure knowledge and action (in the passage of Somānandanātha cited above) are meant real or transcendent cognition and activity. Of these, the cognition is self-luminousness, the activity is energy constructive of the world of series or spheres of transmigratory experience.

तच्च निरूपितं क्रियाधिकारे-

Tacca nirūpitaṁ kriyādhikāre—

This is described in the section on activity–

14. एष चानन्तशक्तित्वादेवमाभासयत्यमून् ।
भावानिच्छावशादेषां क्रिया निर्मातृतास्य सा ।। इति ।

Eṣa cānantaśaktitvādevamābhāsayatyamūn,
Bhāvānicchāvaśādeṣāṁ kriyā nirmātṛtāsya sā. iti.

"He by his power of bliss gives light unto these objects, through the efficacy of his will : this activity is creativeness."

उपसंहारेऽपि-

Upasaṁhāre'pi—

And at the close of the same section–

15. इत्थं तथा घटपटाद्याकारजगदात्मना ।
तिष्ठासोरेवमिच्छैव व हेतुकर्तृकृता क्रिया ।। इति ।

Itthaṁ tathā ghaṭapaṭādyākārajagadātmanā,
Tiṣṭhāsorevamicchaiva va hetukartṛkṛtā kriyā. iti.

"The mere will of God, when he wills to become the world under its forms of jar, of cloth, and other objects, is his activity worked out by motive and agent."

God is Only Creator of Universe

16. तस्मिन्सतीदमस्तीति कार्यकारणताऽपि या ।
साप्यपेक्षाविहीनानां जडानां नोपपद्यते ।।

Tasminsatīdamastīti kāryakāraṇatā'pi yā,
Sāpyapekṣāvihīnānāṁ jaḍānāṁ nopapadyate.

"This process of essence into emanation, whereby if this be that comes to be, cannot be attributed to motiveless, insentient things."

इति न्यायेन यतो जडस्य न कारणता न वाऽनीश्वरस्य चेतनस्यापि, तस्मात्तेन तेन जगद्गतजन्मस्थित्यादिभावविकारतत्तद्भेदक्रियासहस्ररूपेण स्थातुमिच्छोः स्वतन्त्रस्य भगवतो महेश्वरस्येच्छैव उत्तरोत्तरमुच्छूनस्वभावा क्रिया विश्वकर्तृत्वं वोच्यत इति ।

Iti nyāyena yato jaḍasya na kāraṇatā na vā'nīśvarasya cetanasyāpi, tasmāttena tena jagadgatajanmasthityādibhāvavi-kāratattadbhedakriyāsahasrarūpeṇa sthātumicchoḥ svatantrasya bhagavato maheśvarasyecchaiva uttarottaramucchūnasvabhāvā kriyā viśvakartṛtvaṁ vocyata iti.

According to these principles, causality not pertaining either to the insentient or to the non-divine intelligence, the mere will of Maheśvara, the absolute Lord, when he wills to emanate into thousands of forms, as this or that difference, this or that action, this or that modification of entity, of birth, continuance, and the like, in the series of transmigratory environments,—his mere will is his progressively higher and higher activity, that is to say, his universal creativeness.

इच्छामात्रेण जगन्निर्माणमित्यत्र दृष्टान्तोऽपि स्पष्टं निर्दिष्टः:-

Icchāmātreṇa jagannirmāṇamityatra dṛṣṭānto'pi spaṣṭaṁ nirdiṣṭaḥ—

How he creates the world by his will alone is clearly exhibited in the following illustration–

17. योगिनामपि मृद्बीजे विनैवेच्छावशेन यत् ।
घटादि जायते तत्तत्स्थिरभावक्रियाकरम् ।। इति ।

Yogināmapi mṛdbīje vinaivecchāvaśena yat,
Ghaṭādi jāyate tattatsthirabhāvakriyākaram. iti.

"The tree or jar produced by the mere will of thaumaturgists, without clay, without seed, continues to serve its proper purpose as tree or jar."

यदि घटादिकं प्रति मृदाद्येव परमार्थतः कारणं स्यात्तर्हि कथं योगीच्छामात्रेण घटादिजन्म स्यात् ? अथोच्येत–अन्य एव मृद्बीजादिजन्या घटाङ्कुरादयो, योगीच्छाजन्यास्त्वन्य एवेति । तत्रापि बोध्यसे–सामग्रीभेदात्तावत्कार्यभेद - इति सर्वजनप्रसिद्धम् ।

Yadi ghaṭādikaṁ prati mṛdādyeva paramārthataḥ kāraṇaṁ syāttarhi kathaṁ yogīcchāmātreṇa ghaṭādijanma syāt? Athocyeta—Anya eva mṛdbījādijanyā ghaṭāṅkurādayo, yogīcchā-janyāstvanya eveti. Tatrāpi bodhyase—Sāmagrībhedāttāvatkār-yabheda iti sarvajanaprasiddhaṃ.

If clay and similar materials were really the substantial cause of the jar and the rest, how could they be produced by the mere volition of the thaumaturgist? If you say : Some jars and some plants are made of clay, and spring from seeds, while others arise from the bare volition of the thaumaturgist; then we should inform you that it is a fact notorious to all the world that different things must emanate from different materials.

Genesis : Congress of Male and Female is Necessary

ये तु वर्णयन्ति नोपादानं विना घटाद्युत्पत्तिरिति, योगी त्विच्छया परमाणून्व्यापारयन् संघटयतीति तेऽपि बोधनीयाः । यदि परिदृष्टकार्यकारणभाव-विपर्ययो न लभ्येत तर्हि घटे मृद्दण्डचक्रादि देहे स्त्रीपुरुषसंयोगादि सर्वमपेक्ष्येत । तथा च योगीच्छासमनन्तरसंजातघटदेहादिसंभवो दुःसमर्थ एव स्यात् ।

Ye tu varṇayanti nopādānaṁ vinā ghaṭādyutpattiriti, yogī tvicchayā paramāṇūnvyāpārayan saṅghaṭayatīti te'pi bodhanīyāḥ. Yadi paridṛṣṭakāryakāraṇabhāvaviparyayo na labhyeta tarhi ghaṭe mṛddaṇḍacakrādi dehe strīpuruṣasaṁyogādi sarvamapekṣyeta. Tathā ca yogīcchāsamanantarasaṁjātaghaṭa-dehādisaṁbhavo duḥsamartha eva syāt.

As for those who say that a jar or the like cannot be made without

materials to make it of, and that when a thaumaturgist makes one he does so by putting atoms in motion by his will, and so composing it : they may be informed that unless there is to be a palpable violation of the causal relation, *all* the co-efficients, without exception, must be desiderated; to make the jar there must be the clay, the potter's staff, the potter's wheel, and all the rest of it; to make a body there must be the congress of the male and female, and the successive results of that congress. Now, if that be the case, the genesis of a jar, a body, or the like, upon the mere volition of the thaumaturgist, would be hardly possible.

चेतन एव तु तथा भाति, भगवान् भूरिभगो महादेवो नियत्यनुवर्तनोल्लङ्घनतर-स्वातन्त्र्य इति पक्षे न काचिदनुपपत्तिः । अत एवोक्तं बसुगुप्ताचार्यैः–

Cetana eva tu tathā bhāti, bhagavān bhūribhago mahādevo niyatyanuvartanollaṅghanatarasvātantrya iti pakṣe na kācidanupapattiḥ. Ata evoktaṁ vasuguptācāryaiḥ—

On the other hand, there is no difficulty in supposing that Mahādeva, amply free to remain within or to overstep any limit whatever, the Lord, manifold in his operancy, the intelligent principle, thus, operates. Thus, it is that Basuguptācārya says—

18. निरुपादानसंभारमभित्तावेव तन्वते ।
जगच्चित्रं नमस्तस्मै कलानाथाय शूलिने ।। इति ।

Nirupādānasaṁbhāramabhittāveva tanvate,
Jagaccitraṁ namastasmai kalānāthāya śūline. iti.

"To him that painted this world-picture without materials; without appliances, without a wall to paint it on,—to him be glory, to him resplendent with the lunar digit, to him that bears the trident."

Nexus Established Between Soul and Transmigratory World

ननु प्रत्यगात्मनः परमेश्वराभिन्नत्वे संसारसम्बन्धः कथं भवेदिति चेत्–तत्रोक्तमागमाधिकारे–

Nanu pratyagātmanaḥ parameśvarābhinnatve saṁsārasambandhaḥ kathaṁ bhavediti cet—tatroktamāgamādhikāre—

It may be asked : If the supersensible self be no other than God, how comes this implication in successive transmigratory conditions? The answer is given in the section treating of accredited institution—

19. एष प्रमाता मायान्धः संसारी कर्मबन्धनः ।
विद्यादिज्ञापितैश्वर्यश्चिद्घनो मुक्त उच्यते ।। इति ।

Eṣa pramātā māyāndhaḥ saṁsārī karmabandhanaḥ,
Vidyādijñāpitaiśvaryaściddhano mukta ucyate. iti.

"This agent of cognition, blinded by illusion, transmigrates through the fatality of works;"

"Taught his divine nature by science, as pure intelligence, he is enfranchised."

Distinction Between Self-Bound to Objects and that of Self-Liberated

ननु प्रमेयस्य प्रमात्रभिन्नत्वे बद्धमुक्तयोः प्रमेयं प्रति को विशेषः ? अत्राप्युत्तरमुक्तं तत्त्वार्थसंग्रहाधिकारे—

Nanu prameyasya pramātrabhinnatve baddhamuktayoḥ prameyaṁ prati ko viśeṣaḥ? Atrāpyuttaramuktaṁ tattvārtha-saṅgrahādhikāre—

It may be asked : If the subject and the object are identical, what difference can there be between the self bound and the self liberated in regard to the objects cognisable by each? The answer to this question is given in a section of the *Tattvārtha-Saṅgraha*—

20. मेयं साधारणं मुक्तः स्वात्माभेदेन मन्यते ।
महेश्वरो यथा बद्धः पुनरत्यन्तभेदवत् ।। इति ।

Meyaṁ sādhāraṇaṁ muktaḥ svātmābhedena manyate,
Maheśvaro yathā baddhaḥ punaratyantabhedavat. iti.

"Self liberated cognises all that is cognisable as identical with itself, like Maheśvara free from bondage : the other (or unliberated) self has in its infinite plurality."

Recognition Essential for Intuition

ननु आत्मनः परमेश्वरत्वं स्वाभाविकं चेन्नार्थः प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रार्थनया । न हि बीजमप्रतिज्ञातं सति सहकारिसाकल्येऽङ्कुरं नोत्पादयति । तस्मात्कस्माद्वात्मप्रत्यभिज्ञाने निर्बन्ध इति चेत्—

Nanu ātmanaḥ parameśvaratvaṁ svābhāvikaṁ cennārthaḥ pratyabhijñāprārthanayā. Na hi bījamapratijñātaṁ sati sahakārisākalye'ṅkuraṁ notpādayati. Tasmātkasmādvātmapratyabhijñāne nirbandha iti cet—

An objection may be raised : If the divine nature is essential to the soul, there can be no occasion to seek for this recognition; for if all requisites be supplied, the seed does not fail to germinate because it is unrecognised. Why, then, this toilsome effort for the recognition of the soul ?

उच्यते । शृणु तावदिदं रहस्यम् । द्विविधा ह्यर्थक्रिया–बाह्याङ्कुरादिका, प्रमातृविश्रान्तिचमत्कारसारा प्रीत्यादिरूपा च । तत्राद्या प्रत्यभिज्ञानं नापेक्षते । द्वितीया तु तदपेक्षत एव ।

Ucyate. Śṛṇu tāvadidaṁ rahasyaṃ. Dvividhā hyarthakriyā—bāhyāṅkurādikā, pramātṛviśrānticamatkārasārā prītyādirūpā ca. Tatrādyā pratyabhijñānaṁ nāpekṣate. Dvitīyā tu tadapekṣata eva.

To such an objection we reply : Only listen to the secret we shall tell you. All activity about objects is of two degrees, being either external, as the activity of the seed in developing the plant, or internal, as the activity which determines felicity, which consists in an intuition which terminates in the conscious self. The first degree of activity presupposes no such recognition as the system proposes, the second does presuppose it.

इहाप्यहमीश्वर इत्येवंभूतचमत्कारसारा परापरसिद्धिलक्षणजीवात्मैकत्वशक्तिविभूतिरूपार्थक्रियेति. स्वरूपप्रत्यभिज्ञानमपेक्षणीयम् ।

Ihāpyahamīśvara ityevaṁbhūtacamatkārasārā parāparasiddhila-kṣaṇajīvātmaikatvaśaktivibhūtirūpārthakriyeti svarūpapratya-bhijñānamapekṣaṇīyaṃ.

In the Recognitive System the peculiar activity is the exertion of the power of unifying personal and impersonal spirit, a power which is the attainment of the highest and of mediate ends, the activity consisting in the intuition I am God. To this activity, a recognition of the essential nature of the soul is a pre-requisite.

ननु प्रमातृविश्रान्तिसाराऽर्थक्रिया प्रत्यभिज्ञानेन विना अदृष्टा सती तस्मिन्दृष्टेति क्व दृष्टम् ? अत्रोच्यते–नायकगुणगणसंश्रवणप्रवृद्धानुरागा काचन कामिनी मदनविह्वला विरहक्लेशमसहमाना मदनलेखावलम्बनेन स्वावस्थानिवेदनानि विधत्ते । तथा वेगात्तन्निकटमटन्त्यपि तस्मिन्नवलोकितेऽपितदवलोकनं तदीयगुणपरामर्शाभावे जनसाधारणत्वं प्राप्ते हृदयङ्गमभावं न लभते । यदा तु दूतीवचनात् तदीयगुणपरामर्शं करोति तदा तत्क्षणमेव पूर्णभावमभ्येति ।

Nanu pramātṛviśrāntisārā'rthakriyā pratyabhijñānena vinā adṛṣṭā satī tasmindṛṣṭeti kva dṛṣṭam? Atrocyate— nāyakaguṇa-gaṇasaṁśravaṇapravṛddhānurāgā kācana kāminī madanavi-hvalā virahakleśamasahamānā madanalekhāvalambanena svāvasthānivedanāni vidhatte. Tathā vegāttannikaṭamata- ntyapi tasminnavalokite'pitadavalokanaṁ tadīyaguṇaparā- marśābhāve janasādhāraṇatvaṁ prāpte hṛdayaṅgamabhāvaṁ na labhate. Yadā tu dūtīvacanāt tadīyaguṇaparāmarśaṁ karotī tadā tatkṣaṇameva pūrṇabhāvamabhyeti.

It may be urged that peculiar activity terminating in the conscious self is observed independent of recognition. To this, it is replied : A certain damsel, hearing of the many good qualities of a particular gallant, fell in love with him before she had seen him, and agitated by her passion and unable to suffer the pain of not seeing him, wrote to him a love-letter descriptive of her condition. He at once came to her, but when she saw him she did not recognise in him the qualities she had heard about; he appeared much the same as any other man, and she found no gratification in his society. So soon, however, as she recognised those qualities in him as her companions now pointed them out, she was fully gratified.

एवं स्वात्मनि विश्वेश्वरात्मना भासमानेऽपि । तन्निर्भासनं तदीयगुणपरामर्शविरह-समये पूर्णभावं न सम्पादयति । यदा तु गुरुवचनादिना सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वकर्तृत्वाति-लक्षणपरमेश्वरोत्कर्षपरामर्शो जायते तदा तत्क्षणमेव पूर्णात्मतालाभः ।

Evaṁ svātmani viśveśvarātmanā bhāsamāne'pi. Tannirbhāsanaṁ tadīyaguṇaparāmarśavirahasamaye pūrṇabhāvaṁ na sampādayati. Yadā tu guruvacanādinā sarvajñatvasarvakartṛtvātila-kṣaṇaparameśvarotkarṣaparāmarśo jāyate tadā tatkṣaṇameva pūrṇātmatālābhaḥ.

In like manner, though the personal self be manifested as identical with the universal soul, its manifestation effects no complete satisfaction so long as there is no recognition of those attributes; but as soon as it is taught by a spiritual director to recognise in itself the perfections of Maheśvara, his omniscience, omnipotence, and other attributes, it attains the whole pleroma of being.

Conclusion

तदुक्तं चतुर्थे विमर्शे–

Taduktaṁ caturthe vimarśe—

It is therefore said in the fourth section–

21. तैस्तरप्युपयाचितैरुपनतस्तस्याः स्थितोऽस्यन्तिके ।
कान्तो लोकसमान एवमपरिज्ञातो न रन्तुं यथा ॥
लोकस्यैष तथानवेक्षितगुणः स्वात्मापि विश्वेश्वरो
नैवायं निजवैभवाय तदियं तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञोदिता ॥
(ई.प्र. 4/2/2) इति ।

Taistarapyupayācitairupanatastasyāḥ sthito'syantike,
Kānto lokasamāna evamaparijñāto na rantuṁ yathā.
Lokasyaiṣa tathānavekṣitaguṇaḥ svātmāpi viśveśvaro,
Naivāyaṁ nijavaibhavāya tadiyaṁ tatpratyabhijñoditā.
(Ī.Pra. 4/2/2) iti.

"As the gallant standing before the damsel is disdained as like all other men, so long as he is unrecognised, though he humble himself before her with all manner of importunities : In like manner, the personal self of mankind, though it be the universal soul, in which there is no perfection unrealised, attains not its own glorious nature; and therefore, this recognition thereof must come into play."

अभिनवगुप्तादिभिराचार्यैर्विहितप्रतानोऽप्ययमर्थः संग्रहमुपक्रममाणैरस्माभिर्विस्तर-भिया न प्रतानित इति सर्वं शिवम् ॥

Abhinavaguptādibhirācāryairvihitapratāno'pyayamarthaḥ saṁgrahamupakramamāṇairasmābhivistarabhiyā na pratānita iti sarvaṁ śivaṃ.

This system has been treated in detail by Abhinavagupta and other teachers, but as we have in hand a summary exposition of systems, we cannot extend the discussion of it any further lest our work become too prolix. This then may suffice.[1]

A.E.G.

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे प्रत्यभिज्ञादर्शन ।

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1 I have seen in Calcutta a short Comm. on the Śivasūtras by Utpala, the son of Udayākara (cf. pp. 130,131).— E.B.C.

CHAPTER IX

THE RASEŚVARA-DARŚANA OR MERCURIAL SYSTEM[1]

Liberation Depends on Robust Body Attained from Mercury

अपरे माहेश्वराः परमेश्वरतादात्म्यवादिनोऽपि, पिण्डस्थैर्ये सर्वाभिमता जीवन्मुक्तिः सेत्स्यतीत्यास्थाय, पिण्डस्थैर्योपायं पारदादिपदवेदनीयं रसमेव संगिरन्ते ।

Apare māheśvarāḥ parameśvaratādātmyavādino'pi, piṇḍasthairye sarvābhimatā jīvanmuktiḥ setsyatītyāsthāya, piṇḍasthairyopāyaṁ pāradādipadavedanīyaṁ rasameva saṅgirante.

Other Māheśvaras there are who, while they hold the identity of self with God, insist upon the tenet that the liberation in this life taught in all the systems depends upon the stability of the bodily frame, and therefore, celebrate the virtues of mercury of quicksilver as a means of strengthening the system.

रसस्य पारदत्वं संसारपरप्रापणहेतुत्वेन । तदुक्तम्–

Rasasya pāradatvaṁ saṁsāraparaprāpaṇahetutvena. Taduktam—

Mercury is called *pārada*, because it is a means of conveyance beyond the series of transmigratory states. Thus, it has been said—

1. संसारस्य परं पारं दत्तेऽसौ पारदः स्मृतः । इति ।

Saṁsārasya paraṁ pāraṁ datte'sau pāradaḥ smṛtaḥ. iti.

1 Cf. Marco Polo's account of the Indian yogis in Colonel Yule's edit. vol.ii.p., 300. Pārada-pāna is one of the practices of the *Siddhopāsakas* in the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya*. No. 49, to obviate *apamṛtyu*, *akālamṛtyu*, etc.

"It gives the farther shore of metempsychosis : it is called *pārada*."

रसार्णवेऽपि–

Rasārṇave'pi—

And again in the *Rasārṇava*—

पारदो गदितो यस्मात्परार्थं साधकोत्तमैः ।

Pārado gadito yasmātparārthaṁ sādhakottamaiḥ.

"It is styled *pārada* because it is employed for the highest end by the best votaries."

2. सुप्तोऽयं मत्समो देवि ! मम प्रत्यङ्गसम्भवः ।
मम देवरसो यस्माद्रसस्तेनायमुच्यते ।। इति ।

Supto'yaṁ matsamo devi! mama pratyaṅgasambhavaḥ,
Mama devaraso yasmādrasastenāyamucyate. iti.

"Since this in sleep identical with me, goddess, arises from my members, and is the exudation of my body, it is called *rasa*."

Pārada Ensures Liberation in Existing Life

ननु प्रकारान्तरेणापि जीवन्मुक्तियुक्तौ नेयं वाचोयुक्तिर्युक्तिमतीति चेन्न, षट्स्वपि दर्शनेषु देहपातानन्तरं मुक्तेरुक्ततया तत्र विश्वासानुपपत्त्या निर्विचिकित्स-प्रवृत्तेरनुपपत्तेः । तदप्युक्तं तत्रैव–

Nanu prakārāntareṇāpi jīvanmuktiyuktau neyaṁ vācoyuktiryuktimatīti cenna, ṣaṭsvapi darśaneṣu dehapātānantaraṁ mukteruktatayā tatra viśvāsānupapattyā nirvicikitsapravṛtteranupapatteḥ. Tadapyuktaṁ tatraiva—

It may be urged that the literal interpretation of these words is incorrect, the liberation in this life being explicable in another manner. This objection is not allowable, liberation being set out in the six systems as subsequent to the death of the body, and upon this there can be no reliance, and consequently, no activity to attain to it free from misgivings. This is also laid down in the same treatise—

3. षड्दर्शनेऽपि मुक्तिस्तु दर्शिता पिण्डपातने ।
करामलकवत्सापि प्रत्यक्षा नोपलभ्यते ।
तस्मात्तं रक्षयेत्पिण्डं रसैश्चैव रसायनैः ।। इति ।

Ṣaḍdarśane'pi muktistu darśitā piṇḍapātane,
Karāmalakavatsāpi pratyakṣā nopalabhyate,
Tasmāttaṁ rakṣayetpiṇḍaṁ rasaiścaiva rasāyanaiḥ. iti.

"Liberation is declared in the six systems to follow the death of the body."

"Such liberation is not cognised in perception like an emblic myrobalan fruit in the hand."

"Therefore, a man should preserve that body by means of mercury and of medicaments."

Healthy Body Formed of Mercury and Mica can Only Attain Emancipation

गोविन्दभगवत्पादाचार्यैरपि–

Govindabhagavatpādācāryairapi—

Govinda-bhagavat also says–

4. इति धनशरीरभोगान्मत्वाऽनित्यान्सदैव यतनीयम् ।
मुक्तौ सा च ज्ञानात्तच्चाभ्यासात्स च स्थिरे देहे ।। इति ।

Iti dhanaśarīrabhogānmatvā'nityānsadaiva yatanīyam,
Muktau sā ca jñānāttaccābhyāsātsa ca sthire dehe. iti.

"Holding that the enjoyments of wealth and of the body are not permanent, one should strive."

"After emancipation; but emancipation results from knowledge, knowledge from study, and study is only possible in a healthy body."

ननु विनश्वरतया दृश्यमानस्य देहस्य कथं नित्यत्वमवसीयत इति चेत्–मैवं मंस्थाः । षाट्कौशिकस्य शरीरस्यानित्यत्वेऽपि रसाभ्रकपदाभिलप्यहरगौरीसृष्टिजातस्य नित्यत्वोपपत्तेः ।

Nanu vinaśvaratayā dṛśyamānasya dehasya kathaṁ nityatvamavasīyata iti cet—maivaṁ maṁsthāḥ. Ṣāṭkauśikasya śarīrasyānityatve'pi rasābhrakapadābhilapyaharagaurīsṛṣṭijātasya nityatvopapatteḥ.

The body, some one may say, is seen to be perishable, how can its permanency be effected? Think not so, it is replied, for though the body, as a complexus of six sheaths or wrappers of the soul, is dissoluble, yet the body, as created by Hara and Gaurī under the names of mercury and mica, may be perdurable.

तथा च रसहृदये–

Tathā ca rasahṛdaye—

Thus, it is said in the *Rasahṛdaya*–

5. ये चात्यक्तशरीरा हरगौरीसृष्टिजां तनुं प्राप्ताः ।
मुक्तास्ते रससिद्धा मन्त्रगणः किंकरो येषाम् ।। (1/7) इति ।

Ye cātyaktaśarīrā haragaurīsṛṣṭijāṁ tanuṁ prāptāḥ,
Muktāste rasasiddhā mantragaṇaḥ kiṅkaro yeṣām. (1/7) iti.

"They who,without quitting the body, have attained to a new body, the creation of Hara and Gaurī."

"They are to be lauded, perfected by mercury, at whose service is the aggregate of magic texts."

तस्माज्जीवन्मुक्तिं समीहमानेन योगिना प्रथमं दिव्यतनुर्विधेया । हरगौरीसृष्टिसंयोगजनितत्वं च रसस्य हरजत्वेनाभ्रकस्य गौरीसंभवत्वेन तत्तदात्मकत्वमुक्तम्–

Tasmājjīvanmuktiṁ samīhamānena yoginā prathamaṁ divyatanurvidheyā. Haragaurīsṛṣṭisaṁyogajanitatvaṁ ca rasasya harajatvenābhrakasya gaurīsaṁbhavatvena tattadātmakatvamuktam—

The ascetic, therefore, who aspires to liberation in this life should first make to himself a glorified body. And in as much as mercury is produced by the creative conjunction of Hara and Gaurī, and mica is produced from Gaurī, mercury and mica are severally identified with Hara and Gaurī in the verse–

6. अभ्रकस्तव बीजं तु मम बीजं तु पारदः ।
अनयोर्मेलनं देवि मृत्युदारिद्र्यनाशनम् ।। इति ।

Abhrakastava bījaṁ tu mama bījaṁ tu pāradaḥ,
Anayormelanaṁ devi mṛtyudāridryanāśanam. iti.

"Mica is thy seed, and mercury is my seed;"

"The combination of the two,O goddess, is destructive of death and poverty."

Divine-body through Quicksilver

अत्यल्पमिदमुच्यते । देवदैत्यमुनिमानवादिषु बहवो रससामर्थ्याद्दिव्यं देहमाश्रित्य जीवन्मुक्तिमाश्रिताः श्रूयन्ते रसेश्वरसिद्धान्ते–

Atyalpamidamucyate. Devadaityamunimānavādiṣu bahavo rasasāmarthyāddivyaṁ dehamāśritya jīvanmuktimāśritāḥ śrūyante raseśvarasiddhānte—

This is very little to say about the matter. In the *Raseśvarasiddhānta* many among the gods, the Daityas, the Munis, and mankind, are declared to have attained to liberation in this life by acquiring a divine body through the efficacy of quicksilver.

7. देवाः केचिन्महेशाद्या दैत्याः काव्यपुरस्सराः ।
मुनयो बालखिल्याद्या नृपाः सोमेश्वरादयः ॥

Devāḥ kecinmaheśādyā daityāḥ kāvyapurassarāḥ,
Munayo bālakhilyādyā nṛpāḥ someśvarādayaḥ.

"Certain of the gods, Maheśa and others; certain Daityas, Śukra and others;"

"Certain Munis, the Bālakhilyas and others; certain kings, Someśvara and others."

8. गोविन्दभगवत्पादाचार्यो गोविन्दनायकः ।
चर्वटिः कपिलो व्यालिः कापालिः कन्दलायनः ॥

Govindabhagavatpādācāryo govindanāyakaḥ,
Carvaṭiḥ kapilo vyāliḥ kāpāliḥ kandalāyanaḥ.

"Govinda-bhagavat, Govinda-nāyaka,"

"Carvaṭi, Kapila, Vyāli, Kāpāli, Kandalāyana."

9. एतेऽन्ये बहवः सिद्धा जीवन्मुक्ताश्चरन्ति हि ।
तनुं रसमयीं प्राप्य तदात्मककथाचणाः ॥ इति ।

Ete'nye bahavaḥ siddhā jīvanmuktāścaranti hi,
Tanuṁ rasamayīṁ prāpya tadātmakakathācaṇāḥ. iti.

"These and many others proceed perfected, liberated while alive,"

"Having attained to a mercurial body, and therewith identified."

Two Kinds of Karma Yoga

अयमेवार्थः परमेश्वरेण परमेश्वरीं प्रति प्रपञ्चितः—

Ayamevārthaḥ parameśvareṇa parameśvarīṁ prati prapañcitaḥ—

The meaning of this, as explicated by Parameśvara to Parameśvarī, is as follows :—

10. कर्मयोगेण देवेशि प्राप्यते पिण्डधारणम् ।
रसश्च पवनश्चेति कर्मयोगो द्विधा स्मृतः ॥

Karmayogeṇa deveśi prāpyate piṇḍadhāraṇaṃ,
Rasaśca pavanaśceti karmayogo dvidhā smṛtaḥ.

"By the method of works is attained, O supreme of goddesses, the preservation of the body;"

"And the method of works is said to be twofold, mercury and air."

11. मूर्च्छितो हरति व्याधीन्मृतो जीवयति स्वयम् ।
बद्धः खेचरतां कुर्याद्रसो वायुश्च भैरवि ॥ इति ।

Mūrcchito harati vyādhīnmṛto jīvayati svayaṃ,
Baddhaḥ khecaratāṁ kuryādraso vāyuśca bhairavi. iti

"Mercury and air swooning carry off diseases, dead they restore of life,"

"Bound they give the power of flying about."

Quicksilver Swooned, Dead and Bound

मूर्च्छितस्वरूपमुक्तम्—

Mūrcchitasvarūpamuktaṃ—

The swooning state of mercury is thus described—

12. नानावर्णो भवेत्सूतो विहाय घनचापलम् ।
लक्षणं दृश्यते यस्य मूर्च्छितं तं वदन्ति हि ॥

Nānāvarṇo bhavetsūto vihāya ghanacāpalaṃ,
Lakṣaṇaṁ dṛśyate yasya mūrcchitaṁ taṁ vadanti hi.

"They sey quicksilver to be swooning when it is perceived, as characterised thus,"

"Of various colours, and free from excessive volatility."

13. आर्द्रत्वं च घनत्वं च तेजो गौरवचापलम् ।
यस्यैतानि न दृश्यन्ते तं विद्यान्मृतसूतकम् ॥ इति ।

Ārdratvaṁ ca ghanatvaṁ ca tejo gauravacāpalaṃ,
Yasyaitāni na dṛśyante taṁ vidyānmṛtasūtakaṃ. iti.

"A man should regard that quicksilver as dead, in which the following marks are seen,"

"Wetness, thickness, brightness, heaviness, mobility."

अन्यत्र बद्धस्वरूपमप्यभ्यधायि-

Anyatra baddhasvarūpamapyabhyadhāyi—

The bound condition is described in another place as follows :—

14. अक्षतश्च लघुद्रावी तेजस्वी निर्मलो गुरुः ।
स्फोटनं पुनरावृत्तौ बद्धसूतस्य लक्षणम् ।। इति ।

Akṣataśca laghudrāvī tejasvī nirmalo guruḥ,
Sphoṭanaṁ punarāvṛttau baddhasūtasya lakṣaṇam. iti.

"The character of bound quicksilver is, that it is,"

"Continuous, fluent, luminous, pure, heavy; and that it parts asunder under friction."

Eighteen Modes of Quicksilver are Self-evident

ननु हरगौरीसृष्टिसिद्धौ पिण्डस्थैर्यमास्थातुं पार्यते, तत्सिद्धिरेव कथमिति चेत्-न । अष्टादशसंस्कारवशात्तदुपपत्तेः । तदुक्तमाचार्यैः-

Nanu haragaurīsṛṣṭisiddhau piṇḍasthairyamāsthātuṁ pāryate, tatsiddhireva kathamiti cet—Na. Aṣṭādaśasaṁskāravaśa-ttadupapatteḥ. Taduktamācāryaiḥ—

Some one may urge : If the creation of mercury by Hara and Gaurī were proved, it might be allowed that the body could be made permanent; but how *can* that be proved? The objection is not allowable, inasmuch as that can be proved by the eighteen modes of elaboration. Thus, it is stated by the authorities—

15. तस्य प्रसाधनविधौ सुधिया प्रतिकर्मनिर्मलाः प्रथमम् ।
अष्टादश संस्कारा विज्ञातव्याः प्रयत्नेन ।। इति ।

Tasya prasādhanavidhau sudhiyā pratikarmanirmalāḥ prathamam,
Aṣṭādaśa saṁskārā vijñātavyāḥ prayatnena. iti.

"Eighteen modes of elaboration are to be carefully discriminated,"

"In the first place, as pure in every process, for perfecting the adepts."

ते च संस्कारा निरूपिताः-

Te ca saṁskārā nirūpitāḥ—

And these modes of elaboration are enumerated thus—

16. स्वेदनमर्दनमूर्च्छनस्थापनपातननिरोधनियमाश्च ।
दीपनगमनग्रासप्रमाणमथ जारणपिधानम् ।।

Svedanamardanamūrcchanasthāpanapātananirodhaniyamāśca,
Dīpanagamanagrāsapramāṇamatha jāraṇapidhānam.

"Sweating, rubbing, swooning, fixing, dropping, coercion, restraining,"

"Kindling, going, falling into globules, pulverising, covering."

17. गर्भद्रुतिबाह्यद्रुतिक्षारणसंरागसारणाश्चैव ।
क्रामणवेधौ भक्षणमष्टादशधेति रसकर्म ।। इति ।

Garbhadrutibāhyadrutikṣāraṇasaṁrāgasāraṇāścaiva,
Krāmaṇavedhau bhākṣaṇamaṣṭādaśadheti rasakarma. iti.

"Internal flux, external flux, burning, colouring, and pouring,"

"And eating it by parting and piercing it,—are the eighteen modes of treating quicksilver."

तत्प्रपञ्चस्तु गोविन्दभगवत्पादाचार्य-सर्वज्ञरामेश्वरभट्टारकप्रभृतिभिः प्राचीनैराचार्यैः निरूपित इति ग्रन्थभूयस्त्वभयादुदास्यते ।

Tatprapañcastu govindabhagavatpādācārya—sarvajñarāme-śvarabhaṭṭārakaprabhṛtibhiḥ prācīnairācāryairnirūpita iti granthabhūyastvabhayādudāsyate.

These treatments have been described at length by Govinda-bhagavat, Sarvajña-rāmeśvara and the other ancient authorities, and are here omitted to avoid prolixity.

Mercury : A Means to Attain Liberation

न च रसशास्त्रं धातुवादार्थमेवेति मन्तव्यम् । देहवेधद्वारा मुक्तेरेव परमप्रयोजनत्वात् । तदुक्तं रसार्णवे-

Na ca rasaśāstraṁ dhātuvādārthameveti mantavyam. Dehavedhadvārā muktereva paramaprayojanatvāt. Taduktaṁ rasārṇave—

The mercurial system is not to be looked upon as merely eulogistic of the metal, it being immediately, through the conservation of the body, a means to the highest end, liberation. Thus, it is said in the *Rasārṇava*—

18. लोहवेधस्त्वया देव यदर्थमुपवर्णितः ।
तं देहवेधमाचक्ष्व येन स्यात्खेचरी गतिः ।।

Lohavedhastvayā deva yadarthamupavarṇitaḥ,
Taṁ dehavedhamācakṣva yena syātkhecarī gatiḥ.

"Declare to me, O god, that supremely efficacious destruction of the blood, that destruction of the body, imparted by thee, whereby it attained the power of flying about in the sky."

19. यथा लोहे तथा देहे कर्तव्यः सूतकः सता ।
समानं कुरुते देवि प्रत्ययं देहलोहयोः ।
पूर्वं लोहे परीक्षेत पश्चाद्देहे प्रयोजयेत् ।। इति ।

Yathā lohe tathā dehe kartavyaḥ sūtakaḥ satā,
Samānaṁ kurute devi pratyayaṁ dehalohayoḥ,
Pūrvaṁ lohe parīkṣeta paścāddehe prayojayet. iti.

Goddess (he replied), quicksilver is to be applied both to the blood and to the body. This makes the appearance of body and blood alike. A man should first try it upon the blood, and then apply it to the body.

Genesis of Principle, Existence, Intelligence etc. When Body is Healthy

ननु सच्चिदानन्दात्मकपरतत्त्वस्फुरणादेव मुक्तिसिद्धौ किमनेन दिव्यदेहसंपादनप्रयासेनेति चेत्–तदेतद्वार्तम् । अवार्तशरीरालाभे तद्वार्तया अयोगात् । तदुक्तं रसहृदये–

Nanu saccidānandātmakaparatattvasphuraṇādeva muktisiddhau kimanena divyadehasaṁpādanaprayāseneti cet—tadetadvārtam. Avārtaśarīrālābhe tadvārtāyā ayogāt. Taduktaṁ rasahṛdaye—

It will be asked : Why should we make this effort to acquire a celestial body, seeing that liberation is effected by the self-manifestation of the supreme principle, existence, intelligence, and beatitude? We reply : This is no objection, such liberation being inaccessible unless we acquire a healthy body. Thus, it is said in the *Rasahṛdaya*–

20. गलितानल्पविकल्पः सर्वाध्वविवक्षितश्चिदानन्दः ।
स्फुरितोऽप्यस्फुरिततनोः करोति किं जन्तुवर्गस्य ।।

(र. हृ. 1/20) इति

Galitānalpavikalpaḥ sarvādhvavivakṣitaścidānandaḥ,
Sphurito'pyasphuritatanoḥ karoti kiṁ jantuvargasya.

"That intelligence and bliss set forth in all the systems in which a multitude of uncertainties are melted away,"

"Though it manifest itself, what can it effect for beings whose bodies are unglorified ?" *(Ra. Hṛ.1/20) iti.*

21. यज्जरया जर्जरितं कासश्वासादिदुःखविशदं च ।
योग्यं यन्न समाधौ प्रतिहतबुद्धीन्द्रियप्रसरम् ।। (र. हृ. 1/29) इति

Yajjarayā jarjaritaṁ kāsaśvāsādiduḥkhaviśadaṁ ca,
Yogyaṁ yanna samādhau pratihatabuddhīndriyaprasaram.

(Ra. Hṛ. 1/29) iti.

"He who is worn out with decrepitude, though he be free from cough, from asthma, and similar infirmities,"

"He is not qualified for meditation in whom the activities of the cognitive organs are obstructed."

22. बालः षोडशवर्षो विषयरसास्वादलम्पटः परतः ।
यातविवेको वृद्धो मर्त्यः कथमाप्नुयान्मुक्तिम् ।। इति ।

Bālaḥ ṣoḍaśavarṣo viṣayarasāsvādalampaṭaḥ parataḥ,
Yātaviveko vṛddhau martyaḥ kathamāpnuyānmuktim. iti.

"A youth of sixteen addicted to the last degree to the enjoyment of sensual pleasures,"

"An old man in his dotage, how should either of these attain to emancipation?"

Existence of Life is Must for Attaining Liberation

ननु जीवत्वं नाम संसारित्वम् । तद्विपरीतत्वं मुक्तत्वम् । तथा च परस्परविरुद्धयोः कथमेकायतनत्वमुपपन्नं स्यादिति चेत्–तदनुपपन्नम् । विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । मुक्तिस्तावत्सर्वतीर्थकरसंमता । सा किं ज्ञेयपदे निविशते न वा । चरमे शशविषाणकल्पा स्यात् । प्रथमे न जीवनं वर्जनीयम् । अजीवतो ज्ञातृत्वानुपपत्तेः । तदुक्तं रसेश्वरसिद्धान्ते–

Nanu jīvatvaṁ nāma saṁsāritvaṃ. Tadviparītatvaṁ muktatvaṃ. Tathā ca parasparaviruddhayoḥ kathamekāyatanatvamupapannaṁ syāditi cet—tadanupapannaṃ. Vikalpānupapatteḥ. Muktistāvatsarvatīrthakarasaṁmatā. Sā kiṁ jñeyapade niviśate na vā. Carame śaśaviṣāṇākalpā syāt. Prathame na jīvanaṁ varjanīyaṃ. Ajīvato jñātṛtvānupapatteḥ. Taduktaṁ raseśvara-siddhānte—

Some one will object : It is the nature of the personal soul to pass through a series of embodiments, and to be liberated is to be extricated from that series of embodiments; how, then, can these two mutually exclusive conditions pertain to the same bodily tenement? The objection is invalid, as unable to stand before the following dilemmatic argument :—Is this extrication, as to the nature of which all the founders of institutes are at one, to be held as cognisable or as incognisable? If it is incognisable, it is a pure chimera; if it is cognisable, we cannot be dispense with life, for that which is not alive cannot be cognisant of it. Thus, it is said in the *Rasasiddhānta*—

23. रसाङ्कमेयमार्गोक्तो जीवमोक्षोऽन्यथा तु न ।
प्रमाणान्तरवादेषु युक्तिभेदावलम्बिषु ।।

Rasāṅkameyamārgokto jīvamokṣo'nyathā tu na,
Pramāṇāntaravādeṣu yuktibhedāvalambiṣu.

"The liberation of the personal soul is declared in the mercurial system, O subtile thinker,"

"In the tenets of other schools which repose on a diversity of argument."

24. ज्ञातृज्ञेयमिदं विद्धि सर्वतन्त्रेषु संमतम् ।
नाजीवञ्ज्ञास्यति ज्ञेयं यदतोऽस्त्येव जीवनम् ।। इति ।

Jñātṛjñeyamidaṁ viddhi sarvatantreṣu saṁmatam,
Nājīvañjñāsyati jñeyaṁ yadato'styeva jīvanam. iti.

"Know that this knowledge and knowable is allowed in all sacred texts;"

"One not living cannot know the knowable, and therefore, there is and must be life."

Evidence of Everlasting Body—Man-Lion

न चेदमदृष्टचरमिति मन्तव्यम् । विष्णुस्वामिमतानुसारिभिर्नृपञ्चास्यशरीरस्य नित्यत्वोपपादनात् । तदुक्तं साकारसिद्धौ–

Na cedamadṛṣṭacaramiti mantavyam. Viṣṇusvāmimatānusāribhirnṛpañcāsyaśarīrasya nityatvopapādanāt. Taduktaṁ sākārasiddhau—

And this is not to be supposed to be unprecedented, for the adherents of the doctrine of Viṣṇu-svāmin maintain the eternity of the

body of Viṣṇu half-man and half-lion. Thus, it is said in the *Sākāra-siddhi*—

25. सच्चिन्नित्यनिजाचिन्त्यपूर्णानन्दैकविग्रहम् ।
नृपञ्चास्यमहं वन्दे श्रीविष्णुस्वामिसंमतम् ।। इति ।

Saccinnityanijācintyapūrṇānandaikavigraham.
Nṛpañcāsyamahaṁ vande śrīviṣṇusvāmisaṁmatam. iti.

"I glorify the man-lion set forth by Viṣṇu-svāmin,"

"Whose only body is existence, intelligence, and eternal and inconceivably perfect beatitude."

नन्वेतत्सावयवं रूपवदवभासमानं नृकण्ठीरवाङ्गं सदिति न संगच्छत इत्यादि-नाक्षेपपुरःसरं सनकादिप्रत्यक्षं, 'सहस्रशीर्षा पुरुषः' (श्वे. 3/14) इत्यादि श्रुति,–

Nanvetatsāvayavaṁ rūpavadavabhāsamānaṁ nṛkaṇṭhīravāṅgaṁ saditi na saṅgacchata ityādinākṣepapuraḥsaraṁ sanakādipratyakṣaṁ, 'sahasraśīrṣā puruṣaḥ' (Śve. 3/14) ityādi śruti,—

If the objection be raised that the body of the man-lion, which appears as composite and as coloured, is incompatible with real existence, it may be replied : How can the body of the man-lion be otherwise than really existent, proved as it is by three kinds of proof : (1) by the intuition of Śanaka and others, (2) by Vedic texts such as, A thousand heads has Puruṣa; and (3) by Purāṇic texts such as.

तमद्भुतं बालकमम्बुजेक्षणं चतुर्भुजं शङ्खगदाद्युदायुधम् । (भाग. 10/3/9), इत्यादिपुराणलक्षणेन प्रमाणत्रयेण सिद्धं नृपञ्चाननाङ्गं कथमसत्स्यादिति सदादीनि विशेषणानि गर्भश्रीकान्तमिश्रैर्विष्णुस्वामिचरणपरिणतान्तःकरणैः प्रतिपादितानि । तस्मादस्मदिष्टदेहनित्यत्वमत्यन्तादृष्टं न भवतीति पुरुषार्थकामुकैः पुरुषैरेष्टव्यम् । अत एवोक्तम्–

Tamadbhutaṁ bālakamambujekṣaṇaṁ caturbhujaṁ śaṅkhagadādyudāyudham. (Bhāga. 10/3/9), ityādipurāṇalakṣaṇena pramāṇatrayeṇa siddhaṁ nṛpañcānanāṅgaṁ kathamasatsyāditi sadādīni viśeṣaṇāni garbhaśrikāntamiśrairviṣṇusvāmicaraṇapariṇatāntaḥkaraṇaiḥ pratipāditāni. Tasmādasmadiṣṭadehanityatvamatyantādṛṣṭaṁ na bhavatīti purūśārthakāmukaiḥ purūṣaireṣṭavyam. Ata evoktam—

That wondrous child, lotus-eyed, four-armed, armed with the conch-shell, the club, and other weapons? Real existence and other

like predicates are affirmed also by Śrīkāntamiśra, the devoted adherent of Viṣṇu-svāmin. Let, then, those who aspire to the highest end of personal souls be assured that the eternity of the body which we are setting forth is by no means of mere innovation. It has thus been said –

26. आयतनं विद्यानां मूलं धर्मार्थकाममोक्षाणाम् ।
श्रेयः परं किमन्यच्छरीरमजरामरं विहायैकम् ॥ इति ।

Āyatanaṁ vidyānāṁ mūlaṁ dharmārthakāmamokṣāṇām,
Śreyaḥ paraṁ kimanyaccharīramajarāmaraṁ vihāyaikam. iti.

"What higher beatitude is there than a body undecaying immortal,"

"The repository of sciences, the roof of merit, riches, pleasure, liberation?"

Mercury Builds the Body Immortal

अजरामरीकरणसमर्थश्च रसेन्द्र एव । तदाह–

एकोऽसौ रसराजः शरीरमराजमरं कुरुते । इति ।
किं वर्ण्यते रसस्य माहात्म्यम्?
दर्शनस्पर्शनादिनापि महत्फलं भवति ।

Ajarāmarīkaraṇasamarthaśca rasendra eva. Tadāha—
Eko'sau rasarājaḥ śarīramarājamaraṁ kurute. iti.
Kiṁ varṇyate rasasya māhātmyam?
Darśanasparśanādināpi mahatphalaṁ bhavati.

It is mercury alone that can make the body undecaying and immortal, as it is said –

"Only this supreme medicament can make the body undecaying and imperishable."

Why describe the efficacy of this metal? Its value is proved even by seeing it, and by touching it.

Significance of Mercury Pari-Materia to Shiva-Linga

तदुक्तं रसार्णवे–

Taduktaṁ rasārṇave—

As it is said in the *Rasārṇava* –

27. दर्शनात्स्पर्शनात्तस्य भक्षणात्स्मरणादपि ।
पूजनाद्रसदानाच्च दृश्यते षड्विधं फलम् ॥

Darśanātsparśanāttasya bhakṣaṇātsmaraṇādapi,
Pūjanādrasadānācca dṛśyate ṣaḍvidhaṁ phalam.

"From seeing it, from touching it, from eating it, from merely remembering it,"

"From worshipping it, from tasting it, from imparting it appear its six virtues."

28. केदारादीनि लिङ्गानि पृथिव्यां यानि कानिचित् ।
तानि दृष्ट्वा तु यत्पुण्यं तत्पुण्यं रसदर्शनात् ॥ इत्यादिना ।

Kedārādīni liṅgāni pṛthivyāṁ yāni kānicit,
Tāni dṛṣṭvā tu yatpuṇyaṁ tatpuṇyaṁ rasadarśanāt.
ityādinā.

"Equal merit accrues from seeing mercury as accrues from seeing all the phallic emblems;"

"On earth, those at Kedāra, and all others whatsoever."

अन्यत्रापि–

Anyatrāpi—

In another place we read –

29. काश्यादिसर्वलिङ्गेभ्यो रसलिङ्गार्चनाच्छिवः ।
प्राप्यते येन तल्लिङ्गं भोगारोग्यामृतप्रदम् ॥ इति ।

Kāśyādisarvaliṅgebhyo rasaliṅgārcanācchivaḥ,
Prāpyate yena talliṅgaṁ bhogārogyāmṛtapradam. iti.

"The adoration of the sacred quicksilver is more beatific than the worship of all the phallic emblems at Kāśī and elsewhere,"

"In as much as there is attained thereby enjoyment, health, exemption from decay, and immortality."

रसनिन्दायाः प्रत्यवायोऽपि दर्शितः–

Rasanindāyāḥ pratyavāyo'pi darśitaḥ—

The sin of disparaging mercury is also set out –

30. प्रमादाद्रसनिन्दायाः श्रुतावेनं स्मरेत्सुधीः ।
द्राक्त्यजेन्निन्दकं नित्यं निन्दया पूरिताशुभम् ॥ इति ।

Pramādādrasanindāyāḥ śrutāvenaṁ smaretsudhīḥ,
Drāktyajennindakaṁ nityaṁ nindayā pūritāśubham. iti.

"The adept on hearing quicksilver heedlessly disparaged should recall quicksilver to mind."

"He should at once shun the blasphemer, who is by his blasphemy for ever filled with sin."

Divine Body Evolves Highest Principle thereby Attainment of Highest end-Liberation

तस्मादस्मदुक्तया रीत्या दिव्यं देहं संपाद्य योगाभ्यासवशात्परतत्त्वे दृष्टे पुरुषार्थप्राप्तिर्भवति । तदा-

Tasmādasmaduktayā rītyā divyaṁ dehaṁ saṁpādya yogābhyāsavaśātparatattve dṛṣṭe puruṣārthaprāptirbhavati. Tadā—

The attainment, then, of the highest end of the personal soul takes place by an intuition of the highest principle by means of the practice of union after the acquisition of a divine body in the manner we have described. Thereafter—

31. भ्रूयुगमध्यगतं यच्छिखिविद्युत्सूर्यवज्जगद्भासि ।
केषांचित्पुण्यदृशामुन्मीलति चिन्मयं ज्योतिः ॥

Bhrūyugamadhyagataṁ yacchikhividyutsūryavajjagadbhāsi,
Keṣāṁcitpuṇyadṛśāmunmīlati cinmayaṁ jyotiḥ.

"The light of pure intelligence shines forth unto certain men of holy vision,"

"Which, seated between the two eyebrows, illumines the universe, like fire, or lightning, or the sun."

32. परमानन्दैकरसं परमं ज्योतिःस्वभावमविकल्पम् ।
विगलितसकलक्लेशं ज्ञेयं शान्तं स्वसंवेद्यम् ॥

Paramānandaikarasaṁ paramaṁ jyotiḥsvabhāvamavikalpam,
Vigalitasakalakleśaṁ jñeyaṁ śāntaṁ svasaṁvedyam.

"Perfect beatitude, unalloyed, absolute, the essence whereof is luminousness, undifferenced,"

"From which all troubles are fallen away, knowable, tranquil, self-recognised."

33. तस्मिन्नाधाय मनः स्फुरदखिलं चिन्मयं जगत्पश्यन् ।
उत्सन्नकर्मबन्धो ब्रह्मत्वमिहैव चाप्नोति ॥(र. हृ. 1/21-23)

Tasminnādhāya manaḥ sphuradakhilaṁ cinmayaṁ jagatpaśyan,
Utsannakaramabandho brahmatvamihaiva cāpnoti.
(Ra. Hṛ. 1/21-23)

"Fixing the internal organ upon that, seeing the whole universe manifested, made of pure intelligence,"

"The aspirant even in this life attains to the absolute, his bondage to works annulled."

Mercury and Liberation : An Analogue

श्रुतिश्च-'रसो वै सः । रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वानन्दी भवति' (तै. 2/7/1) इति । तदित्थं भवदैन्यदुःखभरतरणोपायो रस एवेति सिद्धम् । तथा च रसस्य परब्रह्मणा साम्यमिति प्रतिपादकः श्लोकः-

Śrutiśca—'raso vai saḥ. Rasaṁ hyevāyaṁ labdhvānandī bhavati' (Tai. 2/7/1) iti. Tadithaṁ bhavadainyaduḥkha-bharataraṇopāyo rasa eveti siddham. Tathā ca rasasya parabrahmaṇā sāmyamiti pratipādakaḥ ślokaḥ—

A Vedic text also declares : That is *Rasa* (mercury), having obtained this he becomes beatitude.

Thus, then, it has been shown that mercury alone is the means of passing beyond the burden of transmigratory pains. And conformably we have a verse which sets forth the identity between mercury and the supreme self.

34. यः स्यात्प्रावरणाविमोचनधियां साध्यः प्रकृत्या पुनः ।
सम्पन्नः सह तेन दीव्यति परं वैश्वानरे जाग्रति ॥
ज्ञातो यद्यपरं न वेदयति च स्वस्मात्स्वयं द्योतते ।
यो ब्रह्मेव स दैन्यसंसृतिभयात्पायादसौ पारदः ॥

Yaḥ syātprāvaraṇāvimocanadhiyāṁ sādhyaḥ prakṛtyā punaḥ,
Sampannaḥ saha tena dīvyati paraṁ vaiśvānare jāgrati,
Jñāto yadyaparaṁ na vedayati ca svasmātsvayaṁ dyotate,
Yo brahmeva sa dainyasaṁsṛtibhayātpāyādasau pāradaḥ.

"May that mercury, which is the very self, preserve us from dejection and from the terrors of metempsychosis,"

"Which is naturally to be applied again and again by those that aspire to liberation from the enveloping illusion,"

"Which perfected endures, which plays not again when the soul awakes,"

"Which, when it arises, pains no other soul, which shines forth by itself from itself." A.E.G.

CHAPTER X

THE VAIŚEṢIKA OR AULŪKYA DARŚANA[1]

Knowledge of the Supreme only Being Panacea to All Ills

इह खलु निखिलप्रेक्षावान् निसर्गप्रतिकूलवेदनीयतया निखिलात्मसंवेदनसिद्धं दुःखं जिहासुस्तद्धानोपायं जिज्ञासुः परमेश्वरसाक्षात्कारमुपायमाकलयति ।

Iha khalu nikhilaprekṣāvān nisargapratikūlavedanīyatayā nikhilātmasaṁvedanasiddhaṁ duḥkhaṁ jihāsustaddhānopāyaṁ jijñāsuḥ parameśvarasākṣātkāramupāyamākalayati.

Whose wishes to escape the reality of pain, which is established by the consciousness of every soul through its being felt to be essentially contrary to every rational being, and wishes therefore to know the means of such escape, —learns that the knowledge of the Supreme Being is the true means thereof, from the authority of such passages as these (*Śvetāśvatara Upan.*vi.20)—

1. यदा चर्मवदाकाशं वेष्टयिष्यन्ति मानवाः ।
तदा शिवमविज्ञाय दुःखस्यान्तो भविष्यति ।।

Yadā carmavadākāśaṁ veṣṭayiṣyanti mānavāḥ,
Tadā śivamavijñāya duḥkhasyānto bhaviṣyati.

इत्यादिवचननिचयप्रामाण्यात् ।

Ityādivacananicayaprāmāṇyāt.

"When men shall roll up the sky as a piece of leather,"
"Then shall there be an end of pain without the knowledge of Śiva."

परमेश्वरसाक्षात्कारश्च श्रवणमननभावनाभिर्भावनीयः । यदाह–

Parameśvarasākṣātkāraśca śravaṇamananabhāvanārbhirbhāvanīyaḥ. Yadāha—

Now, the knowledge of the Supreme is to be gained by hearing

1 The Vaiśeṣikas are called Aulūkyāḥ in Hemacandra's *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi*; in the Vāyu-purāṇa (quoted in Aufrecht's Catal. p.53b 1.23), Akṣapāda, Ka āda, Ulūka, and Vatsa are called the sons of Śiva.

(*śravaṇa*), thought (*manana*), and reflection (*bhāvanā*), as it has been said—

2. आगमेनानुमानेन ध्यानाभ्यासबलेन च ।
त्रिधा प्रकल्पयन्प्रज्ञां लभते योगमुत्तमम् ।। इति ।

Āgamenānumānena dhyānābhyāsabalena ca,
Tridhā prakalpayanprajñāṁ labhate yogamuttamam. iti

"By scripture, by inference, and by the force of repeated meditation,"
"By these three methods producing knowledge, he gains the highest union (*yoga*)."

तत्र मननमनुमानाधीनम् । अनुमानं च व्याप्तिज्ञानाधीनम् । व्याप्तिज्ञानं च पदार्थविवेकसापेक्षम् । अतः पदार्थषट्कम् 'अथातो धर्मं व्याख्यास्यामः', (वै. सू. 1/1/1) इत्यादिकायां दशलक्षण्यां कणभक्षेण भगवता व्यवस्थापितम् ।

Tatra mananamanumānādhīnam. Anumānaṁ ca vyāptijñānādhīnam. Vyāptijñānaṁ ca padārthavivekasāpekṣam. Ataḥ padārthaṣaṭkam 'athāto dharmaṁ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ' (Vai. Sū. 1/1/1) ityādikāyāṁ daśalakṣaṇyāṁ kaṇabhakṣeṇa bhagavatā vyavasthāpitam.

Here thought depends on inference, and inference depends on the knowledge of the *vyāpti* (or universal proposition), and the knowledge of the *vyāpti* follows the right understanding of the categories, —hence, the saint *Kaṇāda*[1] establishes the six categories in his tenfold treatise, commencing with the words, "Now, therefore, we shall explain duty."

Subject Matter of System

तत्राह्निकद्वयात्मके प्रथमेऽध्याये समवेताशेषपदार्थकथनमकारि । तत्रापि प्रथमाह्निके जातिमन्निरूपणम् । द्वितीयाह्निके जातिविशेषयोर्निरूपणम् ।

Tatrāhnikadvayātmake prathame'dhyāye samavetāśeṣapadārthakathanamakāri. Tatrāpi prathamāhnike jātimannirūpaṇam. Dvitīyānhike jātiviśeṣayornirūpaṇam.

आह्निकद्वययुक्ते द्वितीयेऽध्याये द्रव्यनिरूपणम् । तत्रापि प्रथमेऽध्याये भूतविशेषलक्षणम् । द्वितीये दिक्कालप्रतिपादनम् ।

1 He is here called by his synonym Kanabhakṣa.

Āhnikadvayayukte dvitīye'dhyāye dravyanirūpaṇam. Tatrāpi prathame'dhyāye bhūtaviśeṣalakṣaṇam. Dvitīye dikkālapratipādanam.

आह्निकद्वययुक्ते तृतीय आत्मान्तःकरणलक्षणम् । तत्राप्यात्मलक्षणं प्रथमे । द्वितीयेऽन्तःकरणलक्षणम् । आह्निकद्वययुक्ते चतुर्थे शरीरतदुपयोगिविवेचनम् । तत्रापि प्रथमे तदुपयोगिविवेचनम् । द्वितीये शरीरविवेचनम् ।

Āhnikadvayayukte tṛtīya ātmāntaḥkaraṇalakṣaṇam. Tatrāpyātmalakṣaṇaṁ prathame. Dvitīye'ntaḥkaraṇalakṣaṇam. Āhnikadvayayukte caturthe śarīratadupayogivivecanam. Tatrāpi prathame tadupayogivivecanam. Dvitīye śarīravivecanam.

In the first book, consisting of two daily lessons, he describes all the categories which are capable of intimate relation. In the first *ānhika* he defines those which possess "genus" (*jāti*), in the second "genus" (or "generality") itself and "particularity". In the similarly divided second book, he discusses "substance,"giving in the first *ānhika* the characteristics of the five elements, and in the second, he establishes the existence of space and time. In the third book, he defines the soul and the internal sense, the former in the first *ānhika*, the latter in the second. In the fourth book he discusses the body and its adjuncts, the latter in the first *ānhika*, and the former in the second.

आह्निकद्वयवति पञ्चमे कर्मप्रतिपादनम् । तत्रापि प्रथमे शरीरसंबन्धिकर्मचिन्तनम् । द्वितीये मानसकर्मचिन्तनम् । आह्निकद्वयशालिनि षष्ठे श्रौतधर्मनिरूपणम् । तत्रापि प्रथमे दानप्रतिग्रहधर्मविवेकः । द्वितीये चातुराश्रम्योचितधर्मनिरूपणम् ।

Āhnikadvayavati pañcame karmapratipādanam. Tatrāpi prathame śarīrasaṁbandhikarmacintanam. Dvitīye mānasakarmacintanam. Āhnikadvayaśalini ṣaṣṭhe śrautadharmanirūpaṇam. Tatrāpi prathame dānapratigrahadharmavivekaḥ. Dvitīye cāturāśramyocitadharmanirūpaṇam.

In the fifth book he investigates action; in the first *ānhika* he considers action as connected with the body, in the second as belonging to the mind. In the sixth book, he examines merit and demerit as revealed in Śruti; in the first *ānhika* he discusses the merit of giving, receiving gifts, etc., in the second the duties of the four periods of religious life.

तथाविधे सप्तमे गुणसमवायप्रतिपादनम् । तत्रापि प्रथमे बुद्धिनिरपेक्षगुणप्रतिपादनम् । द्वितीये तत्सापेक्षगुणप्रतिपादनं समवायप्रतिपादनं च ।

Tathāvidhe saptame guṇasamavāyapratipādanam. Tatrāpi prathame buddhinirapekṣaguṇapratipādanam. Dvitīye tatsāpekṣaguṇapratipādanaṁ samavāyapratipādanaṁ ca.

In the seventh book, he discusses quality and intimate relation; in the first *ānhika* he considers the qualities independent of thought, in the second those qualities which are related to it, and also intimate relation.

अष्टमे निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकप्रत्यक्षप्रमाणचिन्तनम् । नवमे बुद्धिविशेषप्रतिपादनम् । दशमेऽनुमानभेदप्रतिपादनम् ।

Aṣṭame nirvikalpakasavikalpakapratyakṣapramāṇacintanam. Navame buddhiviśeṣapratipādanam. Daśame'numānabhedapratipādanam.

In the eighth book he examines "indeterminate" and "determinate" perception, and means of proof. In the ninth book, he discusses the characteristics of intellect. In the tenth book, he establishes the different kinds of inference.[1]

Method of System

तत्रोद्देशो लक्षणं परीक्षा चेति त्रिविधास्य शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिः (वात्स्यायन. 1/1/1) । ननुविभागापेक्षया चातुर्विध्ये वक्तव्ये कथं त्रैविध्यमुक्तमिति चेत्–मैवं मंस्थाः । विभागस्य विशेषोद्देशरूपत्वात् उद्देश एवान्तर्भावात् । तत्र द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवाया इति षडेव ते पदार्था इत्युद्देशः ।

Tatroddeśo lakṣaṇaṁ parīkṣā ceti trividhāsya śāstrasya pravṛttiḥ (Vātsyāyana. 1/1/1). Nanuvibhāgāpekṣayā cāturvidhye vaktavye kathaṁ traividhyamuktamiti cet—maivaṁ maṁsthāḥ. Vibhāgasya viśeṣoddeśarūpatvāt uddeśa evāntarbhāvāt. Tatra dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyā iti ṣaḍeva te padārthā ityuddeśaḥ.

The method of this system is said to be threefold, "enunciation," "definition," and "investigation."[2] "But," it may be objected, "ought we not to include 'division,' and so make the method four-

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1 It is singular that this is inaccurate.The ninth book treats of that perception which arises from supersensible contact, etc., and inference. The tenth treats of the mutual difference of the qualities of the soul, and the three causes.

2 For this extract from the old Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, see Colebrooke's *Essays* (new edition), vol.i., p.285.

fold, not threefold?" We demur to this, because "division" is really included in a particular kind of enunciation. Thus, when we declare that substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and intimate relation are the only six positive categories—this is an example of enunciation.

किमत्र क्रमनियमे कारणम् ? उच्यते ? समस्तपदार्थायतनत्वेन प्रधानस्य द्रव्यस्य प्रथममुद्देशः । अनन्तरं गुणत्वोपाधिना सकलद्रव्यवृत्तेर्गुणस्य । तदनु सामान्यवत्त्वसाम्यात्कर्मणः । पश्चात्तत्त्रितयाश्रितस्य सामान्यस्य । तदनन्तरं समवायाधिकरणस्य विशेषस्य । अन्तेऽवशिष्टस्य समवायस्येति ।

Kimatra kramaniyame kāraṇam? Ucyate? Samastapadārthāyatanatvena pradhānasya dravyasya prathamamuddeśaḥ. Anantaraṁ guṇatvopādhinā sakaladravyavṛtterguṇasya. Tadanu sāmānyavattvasāmyātkarmaṇaḥ. Paścāttattritayā-śritasya sāmānyasya. Tadanantaraṁ samavāyādhikaraṇasya viśeṣasya. Ante'vaśiṣṭasya samavāyasyeti.

If you ask, "What is the reason for this definite order of the categories?" we answer as follows :— Since "substance"is the chief, as being the substratum of all the categories, we enounce this first; next "quality,"since it resides in its generic character in all substances (though different substances have different qualities); then "action,"as it agrees with "substance" and "quality" in possessing "generality,"[1] then "generality," as residing in these three; then "particularity," inasmuch as it possesses "intimate relation;"[2] lastly, "intimate relation" itself; such is the principle of arrangement.

Ascertainment of Categories

ननु षडेव पदार्था इति कथं कथ्यते ? अभावस्यापि सद्भावात् इति चेत्-मैवं वोचः। नञर्थानुल्लिखितधीविषयतया भावरूपतया षडेवेति विवक्षितत्वात् । तथापि कथं षडेवेति नियम उपपद्यते ? विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । नियमव्यवच्छेद्यं प्रमितं न वा ? प्रमितत्वे कथं निषेधः ? अप्रमितत्वे कथंतराम् ?

Nanu ṣaḍeva padārthā iti kathaṁ kathyate? Abhāvasyāpi sadbhāvāt iti cet—maivaṁ vocaḥ. Nañrthānullikhitadhīviṣayatayā bhāvarūpatayā ṣaḍeveti vivakṣitatvāt. Tathāpi kathaṁ ṣaḍeveti niyama upapadyate? Vikalpānupapatteḥ. Niyamavyavacchedyaṁ pramitaṁ na vā? Pramitatve kathaṁ niṣedhaḥ? Apramitatve kathaṁtarām ?

If you ask, "Why do you say that there are only six categories since 'non-existence' is also one?" We answer : Because we wish to speak of the six as positive categories, *i.e.*, as being the objcets of conceptions which do not involve a negative idea. "Still,"the objector may retort, "how do you establish this definite number 'only six'? for either horn of the alternative fails. For, we ask, is the thing to be thus excluded already thoroughly ascertained or not? If it is thoroughly ascertained, why do you exclude it? and still more so, if it is not thoroughly ascertained ?,

न हि कश्चित्प्रेक्षावान्मूषिकविषाणं प्रतिषेद्धुं यतते । ततश्चानुपपत्तेर्न नियम इति चेत्-मैवं भाषिष्ठाः । सप्तमतया प्रमितेऽन्धकारादौ भावत्वस्य, भावतया प्रमिते शक्तिसादृश्यादौ सप्तमत्वस्य च निषेधादिति कृतं विस्तरेण ।

Na hi kaścitprekṣāvānmūṣikaviṣāṇaṁ pratiṣeddhuṁ yatate. Tataścānupapatterna niyama iti cet—maivaṁ bhāṣiṣṭhāḥ. Saptamatayā pramite'ndhakārādau bhavatvasya, bhāvatayā pramite śaktisādṛśyādau saptamatvasya ca niṣedhāditi kṛtaṁ vistareṇa.

What sensible man, pray, spends his strength in denying that a mouse has horns? Thus, your definite number 'only six' fails as being inapplicable." This, however, we cannot admit; if darkness, etc., are allowed to form certainly a seventh category (as "non-existence"), we thus (by our definite number) deny it to be one of the six *positive* categories, and if others attempt to include "capacity", "number,"etc., which we allow to be certainly positive existences, we thus deny that they make a *seventh* category. But enough of this long discussion.

Characteristics of Six Categories : Duality and Action

तत्र द्रव्यादित्रितयस्य द्रव्यत्वादिजातिर्लक्षणम् । द्रव्यत्वं नाम गगनारविन्दसमवेतत्वे सति, नित्यत्वे सति, गन्धासमवेतत्वम् ।

Tatra dravyāditritayasya dravyatvādijātirlakṣaṇam. Dravyatvaṁ nāma gaganāravindasamavetatve sati, nityatve sati, gandhāsamavetatvam.

Substantiality, etc. (*dravyatvādi*), *i.e.*, the genera of substance, quality, and action, are the definition of the triad substance,

1 Cf. *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, śloka. 4.

2 "Particularity" *(viśeṣa)* resides by "intimate relation" in the eternal atoms, etc.

quality, and action respectively. The genus of substance (*dravyatva*) is that which, while it alike exists with intimate relation in the (eternal) sky and the (transitory) lotus, is itself eternal,[1] and does not exist with intimate relation in smell.[2]

Meaning of Karmatva, Samānya, Viśeṣa and Samavāya

गुणत्वं नाम समवायिकारणासमवेतासमवायिकारणभिन्नसमवेतसत्तासाक्षाद्व्याप्यजातिः । कर्मत्वं नाम नित्यासमवेतत्वसहितसत्तासाक्षाद्व्याप्यजातिः । सामान्यं तु प्रध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वरहितमनेकसमवेतम् । विशेषो नामान्योन्याभावविरोधिसामान्यरहितः समवेतः । समवायस्तु समवायरहितः सम्बन्धः इति षण्णां लक्षणानि व्यवस्थितानि ।

Guṇatvaṁ nāma samavāyikāraṇāsamavetāsamavāyikāraṇa-bhinnasamavetasattāsākṣādvyāpyajātiḥ. Karmatvaṁ nāma nityāsamavetatvasahitasattāsākṣādvyāpyajātiḥ. Sāmānyaṁ tu pradhvaṁsapratiyogitvarahitamanekasamavetam. Viśeṣo nāmānyonyābhāvavirodhisāmānyarahitaḥ samavetaḥ. Samavāyastu samavāyarahitaḥ sambandhaḥ iti ṣaṇṇāṁ lakṣaṇāni vyavasthitāni.

The genus of quality (*guṇatva*) is that which is immediately subordinate to the genus existence, and exists with intimate relation in whatever is not an intimate or mediate cause.[3] The genus of action (*karmatva*) is that which is immediately subordinate to the genus existence, and is not found with intimate relation in anything eternal.[4] Generality (or genus, *sāmānya*) is that which is found in many

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1 This clause is added, as otherwise the definition would apply to "duality and "conjunction."

2 This is added, as otherwise the definition would apply to "existence"(*sattā*), which is the *summum genus*, to which substance, quality, and action are immediately subordinate.

3 Existence (*sattā*) is the genus of *dravya*, *guṇa*, and *kriyā*. *Dravya* alone can be the intimate cause of anything; and all actions are the mediate (or non-intimate) cause of conjunction and disjunction. Some qualities (as *saṁyoga*, *rūpa*, etc.) may be mediate causes, but this is accidental and does not belong to the essence of *guṇa*, as many *guṇas* can never be mediate causes.

4 As all karmas are transitory, *karmatva* is only found in the *anitya*. I correct in p. 105, line 20, *nityāsamavetatva*; this is the reading of the MS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit College Library.

things with intimate relation, and can never be the counter-entity to emergent non-existence.[1] Particularity[2] (*viśeṣa*) exists with intimate relation, but it is destitute of generality, which stops mutual non-existence.[3] Intimate relation (*samavāya*) is that connection which itself has not intimate relation.[4] Such are the definitions of the six categories.

Kinds and Characteristics of the Matter

द्रव्यं नवविधं पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि इति । तत्र पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयस्य पृथिवीत्वादिजातिर्लक्षणम् ।

Dravyaṁ navavidhaṁ pṛthivyaptejovāyvākāśakāladigātmamanāṁsi iti. Tatra pṛthivyādicatuṣṭayasya pṛthivītvādijātirlakṣaṇam.

Substance is ninefold,—earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and mind. The genera of earth, etc. (*pṛthivītva*), are the definitions of the first four. The genus of earth is that generality which is immediately subordinate to substance, and resides in the same subject with colour produced by baking.[5]

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1 *I.e.*, it can never be destroyed. Indestructibility, however, is found in time, space, etc.; to exclude these, therefore, the former clause of the definition is added.

2 "Particularity" (whence the name Vaiśeṣika) is not "individuality, as of this particular flash of lightning,"— but it is the individuality either of those eternal substances which, being single, have no genus, as ether, time, and space; or of the different atomic minds; or of the atoms of the four remaining substances, earth, water, fire, and air, these atoms being supposed to be the *ne plus ultra*, and as they have no parts, they are what they are by their own indivisible nature. Ballantyne translated viśeṣa as "ultimate difference." I am not sure whether the individual soul has viśeṣa.

3 Mutual non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*) exists between two notions which have no property in common, as a "pot is not cloth;" but the genus is the same in two pots, both alike being pots.

4 *"Samavāyasambandhābhāvāt samavāyo na jātiḥ,"* *Siddh. Mukt.* (*Saṁyoga* being a *guṇa* has *guṇatva* existing in it with intimate relation).

5 The feel or touch of earth is said to be "neither hot nor cold, and its colour, taste, smell, and touch are changed by union with fire" (*Bhāṣāparicchcheda*, *śl.*103,104).

पृथिवीत्वं नाम पाकजरूपसमानाधिकरणद्रव्यत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्यजातिः । अप्त्वं नाम सरित्सागरसमवेतत्वे सति ज्वलनासमवेतं सामान्यम् ।

Pṛthivītvaṁ nāma pākajarūpasamānādhikaraṇadravyatvasākṣādvyāpyajātiḥ. Aptvaṁ nāma saritsāgarasamavetatve sati jvalanāsamavetaṁ sāmānyam.

The genus of water is that generality which is found with intimate relation in water, being also found in intimate relation in river and sea.

तेजस्त्वं नाम चन्द्रचामीकरसमवेतत्वे सति सलिलासमवेतं सामान्यम् । वायुत्वं नाम त्वगिन्द्रियसमवेतद्रव्यत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्यजातिः ।

आकाशकालदिशामेकैकत्वादपरजात्यभावे पारिभाषिक्यस्तिस्रः संज्ञा भवन्ति । आकाशं कालो दिगिति ।

Tejastvaṁ nāma candracāmīkarasamavetatve sati salilāsamavetaṁ sāmānyam. Vāyutvaṁ nāma tvagindriyasamavetadravyatvasākṣādvyāpyajātiḥ.

Ākāśakāladiśāmekaikatvādaparajātyabhāve pāribhāṣikyastisraḥ saṁjñā bhavanti. Ākāśaṁ kālo digiti.

The genus of fire is that generality which is found with intimate relation in fire, being also found in intimate relation in the moon and gold. The genus of air is that which is immediately subordinate to substance, and is found with intimate relation in the organ of the skin.[1]

As ether, space, and time, from their being single, cannot be subordinate genera, their several names stand respectively for their technical appellations. Either is the abode of particularity, and is found in the same subject with the non-eternal (*janya*) special quality which is not produced by contact.[2]

संयोगाजन्यजन्यविशेषगुणसमानाधिकरणविशेषाधिकरणमाकाशम् । विभुत्वे सति दिगसमवेतपरत्वासमवायिकारणाधिकरणः कालः । अकालत्वे सति अविशेषगुणा महती दिक् ।

1 The organ of touch is an aerial integument.—*Colebrooke*.

2 Sound is twofold—"produced from contact," as the *first* sound, and "produced from sound," as the *second*. *Janya* is added to exclude God's knowledge, wile *saṁyogā-janya* excludes the soul's which is produced by contact, as of the soul and mind, mind and the senses, etc.

Saṁyogājanyajanyaviśeṣaguṇasamānādhikaraṇaviśeṣādhikaraṇamākāśam. Vibhutve sati digasamavetaparatvāsamavāyikāraṇādhikaraṇaḥ kālaḥ. Akālatve sati aviśeṣaguṇā mahatī dik.

Time is that which, being a pervading substance, is the abode of the mediate cause[1] of that idea of remoteness (*paratva*) which is not found with intimate relation in space;[2] while space is that pervading substance which possesses no special qualities and yet is not time.[3]

आत्ममनसोरात्मत्वमनस्त्वे । आत्मत्वं नामामूर्तसमवेतद्रव्यत्वापरजातिः । मनस्त्वं नाम द्रव्यसमवायिकारणत्वरहिताणुसमवेतद्रव्यत्वापरजातिः ।

Ātmamanasorātmatvamanastve. Ātmatvaṁ nāmāmūrtasamavetadravyatvāparajātiḥ. Manastvaṁ nāma dravyasamavāyikāraṇatvarahitāṇusamavetadravyatvāparajātiḥ.

The general terms *ātmatva* and *manastva* are the respective definitions of soul (*ātman*) and mind (*manas*). The general idea of soul is that which is subordinate to substance, being also found with intimate relation in that which is without form[4] *amūrtta.* The general idea of mind is that which is subordinate to substance, being also found existing with intimate relation in an atom, but (unlike other atoms) not the intimate cause of any substance.

Twenty-four Qualities and their Characteristics

रूप-रस-गन्ध-स्पर्श-संख्या-परिमाण-पृथक्त्व-संयोग-विभाग-परत्वा-परत्व-बुद्धि-सुख-दुःखेच्छा-द्वेष-प्रयत्नाश्च कण्ठोक्ताः सप्तदश; चशब्दसमुच्चिताः गुरुत्व-द्रवत्व-स्नेह-संस्कारादृष्ट-शब्दाः सप्तैवेत्येवं चतुर्विंशतिर्गुणाः ।

Rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśa-saṅkhyā-parimāṇa-pṛthaktva-saṅyoga-vibhāga-paratvā-paratva-buddhi-sukha-duḥkhecchā-dveṣa-prayatnāśca kaṇṭhoktāḥ saptadaśa, caśabdasamuccitāḥ gurutva-

1 The mediate cause itself is the conjunction of time with some body, etc., existing in time,—this latter is the intimate cause, while the knowledge of the revolutions of the sun is the instrumental cause. In p.106. line 12, read *adhikaraṇam*.

2 *Paratva* being of two kinds, *daiśika* and *kālika*.

3 Time, space, and mind have no special qualities; the last, however, is not pervading but atomic.

4 The three other *padārthas*, beside soul, which are *amūrtta*,—time, either, and space,—are not genera.

dravatva-sneha-saṁskārадṛṣṭa-śabdāḥ saptaivetyevaṁ caturviṁśatirguṇāḥ.

तत्र रूपादिशब्दान्तानां रूपत्वादिजातिर्लक्षणम् । रूपत्वं नाम नीलसमवेतुगुणत्वापरजातिः । अनया दिशा शिष्टानां लक्षणानि द्रष्टव्यानि ।

Tatra rūpādiśabdāntānāṁ rūpatvādijātirlakṣaṇam. Rūpatvaṁ nāma nīlasamavetaguṇatvāparajātiḥ. Anayā diśā śiṣṭānāṁ lakṣaṇāni draṣṭavyāni.

There are twenty-four qualities; seventeen are mentioned directly in Kaṇāda's Sūtras (i.1,6), "colour, taste, smell, touch, number, quantity, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort;" and, besides these, seven others are understood in the word "and," viz., gravity, fluidity, viscidity, faculty, merit, demerit, and sound. Their respective genera (*rūpatva*, etc.) are their several definitions. The class or genus of "colour" is that which is subordinate to quality and exists with intimate relation in blue. In the same way may be formed the definitions of the rest.

Five Kinds of Action

कर्म पञ्चविधम् । उत्क्षेपणापक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारणगमनभेदात् । भ्रमणरेचनादीनां गमन एवान्तर्भावः । उत्क्षेपणादीनामुत्क्षेपणत्वादिजातिर्लक्षणम् । तत्रोत्क्षेपणत्वं नामोर्ध्वदेशसंयोगासमवायिकारणसमवेतकर्मत्वापरजातिः । एवमपक्षेपणत्वादीनां लक्षणं कर्तव्यम् ।

Karma pañcavidham. Utkṣepaṇāpakṣepaṇākuñcanaprasāraṇagamanabhedāt. Bhramaṇarecanādīnāṁ gamana evāntarbhāvaḥ. Utkṣepaṇādīnāmutkṣepaṇatvādijātirlakṣaṇam. Tatrotkṣepaṇatvaṁ nāmordhvadeśasaṁyogāsamavāyikāraṇasamavetakarmatvāparajātiḥ. Evamapakṣepaṇatvādīnāṁ lakṣaṇaṁ kartavyam.

"Action" is fivefold, according to the distinction of throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding, and going : revolution, evacuating, etc., being included under "going". The genus of throwing upwards, etc., will be their respective definitions. The genus of throwing upwards is a subordinate genus to action; it exists with intimate relation, and is to be known as the mediate cause of conjunction with higher place. In the same manner are to be made the definitions of throwing downwards etc.

सामान्यं द्विविधं परमपरं च । परं सत्ता द्रव्यगुणसमवेता । अपरं द्रव्यत्वादि । तल्लक्षणं प्रागेवोक्तम् ।

Sāmānyaṁ dvividhaṁ paramaparaṁ ca. Paraṁ sattā dravyaguṇasamavetā. Aparaṁ dravyatvādi. Tallakṣaṇaṁ prāgevoktam.

Generality (or genus) is twofold, extensive and non-extensive; existence is extensive as found with intimate connection in substance and quality, or in quality and action; substance, etc., are non-extensive. The definition of generality has been given before.

विशेषाणामनन्तत्वात् समवायस्य चैकत्वाद् विभागो न सम्भवति । तल्लक्षणं च प्रागेवावादि ।

Viśeṣāṇāmanantatvāt samavāyasya caikatvād vibhāgo na sambhavati. Tallakṣaṇaṁ ca prāgevāvādi.

Particularity and intimate relation cannot be divided, in the former case in consequence of the infinite number of separate particularities, in the latter from intimate relation being but one; their definitions have been given before.

Discuss on Origin of Duality

3. द्वित्वे च पाकजोत्पत्तौ विभागे च विभागजे ।
यस्य न स्खलिता बुद्धिस्तं वै वैशेषिकं विदुः ॥

इत्याभाणकस्य सद्भावाद् द्वित्वाद्युत्पत्तिप्रकारः प्रदर्श्यते ।

Dvitve ca pākajotpattau vibhāge ca vibhāgaje,
Yasya na skhalitā buddhistaṁ vai vaiśeṣikaṁ viduḥ.

Ityābhāṇakasya sadbhāvād dvitvādyutpattiprakāraḥ pradarśyate.

There is a popular proverb—

"Duality, change produced by baking, and disjunction produced by disjunction,—he whose mind vacillates not in these three is the true Vaiśeṣika;" and therefore, we will now show the manner of the production of duality, etc."

Duality—Origin in a Seriatim

1. तत्र प्रथममिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षः । 2. तस्मादेकत्वसामान्यज्ञानम् । 3. ततोऽपेक्षाबुद्धिः । 4. ततो द्वित्वोत्पत्तिः । 5. ततो द्वित्वत्वसामान्यज्ञानम् । 6. तस्माद् द्वित्वगुणज्ञानम् । 7. ततो 'द्वे द्रव्ये' इति धीः । 8. ततः संस्कारः । 9. तदाह–

1. Tatra prathamamindriyārthasaṁnikarṣaḥ. 2. Tasmādekatva-sāmānyajñānaṃ. 3. Tato'pekṣābuddhiḥ. 4. Tato dvitvotpattiḥ. 5. Tato dvitvatvasāmānyajñānaṃ. 6. Tasmād dvitvaguṇajñānaṃ. 7. Tato 'dve dravye' iti dhīḥ. 8. Tataḥ saṁskāraḥ. 9. Tadāha—

4. आदाविन्द्रियसंनिकर्षघटनादेकत्वसामान्यधी-
रेकत्वोभयगोचरा मतिरतो द्वित्वं ततो जायते ।
द्वित्वत्वप्रमितिस्ततो नु परतो द्वित्वप्रमाऽनन्तरं
द्वे द्रव्ये इति धीरियं निगदिता द्वित्वोदयप्रक्रिया ॥ इति ॥

Ādāvindriyasaṁnikarṣaghaṭanādekatvasāmānyadhī-
Rekatvobhayagocarā matirato dvitvaṁ tato jāyate,
Dvitvatvapramitistato nu parato dvitvapramā'nantaraṁ
Dve dravye iti dhīriyaṁ nigaditā dvitvodayaprakriyā. iti.

There is here first the contact of the organ of sense with the object; thence there arises the knowledge of the genus unity; then the distinguishing perception *apekṣā-buddhi* (by which we apprehend "this is one," "this is one," etc.); then the production of duality, *dvitva* (in the object);[1] then the knowledge of the abstract genus of duality (*dvitvatva*); then the knowledge of the quality duality as it exists in the two things; then imagination[2] (*saṁskāra*).[3]

द्वित्वादेरपेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यत्वे किं प्रमाणम्? अत्राहुराचार्याः–अपेक्षाबुद्धिर्द्वित्वादेरुत्पादिका भवितुमर्हति । व्यञ्जकत्वानुपपत्तौ तेनानुविधीयमानत्वात् । शब्दं प्रति संयोगवदिति । वयं तु ब्रूमः—द्वित्वादिकमेकत्वद्वयविषयानित्यबुद्धिव्यङ्ग्यं न भवति। अनेकाश्रितगुणत्वात् पृथक्त्वादिवदिति ।

Dvitvāderapekṣābuddhijanyatve kiṁ pramāṇam? Atrāhurācāryāḥ—apekṣābuddhirdvitvāderutpādikā bhavitumarhati. Vyañjakatvānupapattau tenānuvidhīyamānatvāt. Śabdaṁ prati saṁyogavaditi. Vayaṁ tu brūmaḥ—dvitvādikamekatvadvayaviṣayānityabuddhivyaṅgaṁ na bhavati. Anekāśritaguṇatvāt pṛthaktvādivaditi.

But it may here be asked what is the proof of duality, etc., being thus produced from *apekṣābuddhi* ? The great doctor (Udayana) maintained that *apekṣābuddhi* must be the producer of duality, etc., because duality is never found separated from it, while, at the same time, we cannot hold *apekṣābuddhi* as the cause only of its being known (and therefore it follows that it must be the cuase of its being produced [1]), just as contact is with regard to sound. We, however, maintain the same opinion by a different argument; duality, etc.,cannot be held to be made known (*jñāpya*) by that non-eternal apprehension whose object is two or more individual unities (i.e., *apekṣābuddhi*), because these are qualities which reside in a plurality of subjects (and not in any one individual[2]) just as "severalty" does (and, therefore, as *apekṣābuddhi* is not their *jñāpaka*, it must be their *janaka*).

Successive Vanishing of the Duality

निवृत्तिक्रमो निरूप्यते–अपेक्षाबुद्धित एकत्वसामान्यज्ञानस्य द्वित्वोत्पत्तिसमकालं निवृत्तिः । अपेक्षाबुद्धेर्द्वित्वसामान्यज्ञानाद् द्वित्वगुणबुद्धिसमसमयम् । द्वित्वस्यापेक्षाबुद्धिनिवृत्तेर्द्रव्यबुद्धिसमकालम् । गुणबुद्धेर्द्रव्यबुद्धितः संस्कारोत्पत्ति-समकालम्। द्रव्यबुद्धेस्तदनन्तरं संस्कारादिति ।

Nivṛttikramo nirūpyate—apekṣābuddhita ekatvasāmānyajñānasya dvitvotpattisamakālaṁ nivṛttiḥ. Apekṣābuddherdvitvasāmānyajñānād dvitvaguṇabuddhisamasamayaṃ. Dvitvasyāpekṣābuddhinivṛtterdravyabuddhisamakālaṃ. Guṇabuddherdravyabuddhitaḥ saṁskārotpattisamakālaṃ. Dravyabuddhestadanantaraṁ saṁskārāditi.

तथा च संग्रहश्लोकाः:–

Tathā ca saṅgrahaślokāḥ—

5. आदावपेक्षाबुद्ध्या हि नश्येदेकत्वजातिधीः ।
द्वित्वोदयसमं, पश्चात् सा च तज्जातिबुद्धितः ॥

1 All numbers, from duality upwards, are artificial, *i.e.*, they are made by our minds; unity alone exists in things themselves—each being *one;* and they only become two, etc., by our choosing to regard them so, and thus joining them in thought.

2 *Saṁskāra* is here the idea conceived by the mind-created, in fact, by its own energies out of the material previously supplied to it by the senses and the internal organ or mind.(Cf. the tables in p.153.)

3 Here and elsewhere I omit the metrical summary of the original, as it adds nothing new to the previous prose.

1 Every cause must be either *jñāpaka* or *janaka; apekṣābuddhi,* not being the former, must be the latter.

2 *Apekṣābuddhi* apprehends "this is one", "this is one," etc.; but duality, for instance, does not reside in either of these, but in both together.

Ādāvapekṣābuddhyā hi naśyedekatvajātidhīḥ,
Dvitvodayasaṁ, paścāt sā ca tajjātibuddhitaḥ.

6. द्वित्वाख्यगुणधीकाले, ततो द्वित्वं निवर्तते ।
अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशेन द्रव्यधीजन्मकालतः ॥

Dvitvākhyaguṇadhīkāle, tato dvitvaṁ nivartate,
Apekṣābuddhināśena dravyadhījanmakālataḥ.

7. गुणबुद्धिर्द्रव्यबुद्ध्या संस्कारोत्पत्तिकालतः ।
द्रव्यबुद्धिश्च संस्कारादिति नाशक्रमो मतः ॥ इति ।

Guṇabuddhirdravyabuddhyā saṁskārotpattikālataḥ,
Dravyabuddhiśca saṁskārāditi nāśakramo mataḥ. iti.

Next we will describe the order of the successive destructions. From *apekṣābuddhi* arises, simultaneously with the production of duality *(dvitva)*, the destruction of the knowledge of the genus of unity; next from the knowledge of the genus of duality (*dvitvatva*) arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the quality duality, the destruction of *apekṣābuddhi*; next from the destruction of *apekṣābuddhi* arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the two substances, the destruction of the duality; next from the knowledge of the two substances arises, simultaneously with the production of imagination (*saṁskāra*), the destruction of the knowledge of the quality; and next from imagination arises the destruction of the knowledge of the substances.

बुद्धेर्बुद्ध्यन्तरविनाश्यत्वे संस्कारविनाश्यत्वे च प्रमाणम्–विवादाध्यासितानि ज्ञानान्युत्तरोत्तरकार्यविनाश्यानि क्षणिकविभुविशेषगुणत्वाच्छब्दवत् । क्वचिद् द्रव्यारम्भकसंयोगप्रतिद्वन्द्विविभागजनककर्मसमकालमेकत्वसमकालचिन्तयाऽऽश्रयनिवृत्तेरेव द्वित्वनिवृत्तिः । कर्मसमकालमपेक्षाबुद्धिचिन्तनादुभाभ्यामिति संक्षेपः ।

Buddherbuddhyantaravināśyatve saṁskāravināśyatve ca pramāṇaṃ—vivādādhyāsitāni jñānānyuttarottarakāryavināśyāni kṣaṇikavibhuviśeṣaguṇatvācchabdavat. Kvacid dravyārambhakasaṁyogapratidvandvivibhāgajanakakarmasamakālamekatvasamakālacintayā"śrayanivṛttereva dvitvanivṛttiḥ. Karmasamakālamapekṣābuddhicintanādubhābhyāmiti saṁkṣepaḥ.

The evidence for the destruction of one kind of knowledge by another, and for the destruction of another knowledge by imagination, is to be found in the following argument; these knowledges themselves which are the subjects of the discussion are successively destroyed by the rise of others produced from them, because knowledge, like sound, is a special quality of an all-pervading substance, and of momentary duration.[1] I may briefly add, that when you have the knowledge of the genus of unity simultaneously with an action in one of the two things themselves, producing that separation which is the opposite to the conjunction that produced the whole, in that case you have the subsequent destruction of duality produced by the destruction of its abiding-place (the two things); but where you have this separate action taking place simultaneously with the rise of *apekṣābuddhi*, there you have the destruction of duality produced by the united influence of both.[2]

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1 The *Vaiśeṣikas* held that the *jīvātman* and space are each an all pervading substance, but the individual portions of each have different special qualities; hence one man knows what another is ignorant of and one portion of ether has sound when another portion has not. Dr. Röer, in his version of the *Bhāṣā Pariccheda*, has mistranslated an important Sūtra which bears on this point. It is said in Sūtra 26—

—athākāśaśarīriṇām,
avyapyavṛttiḥ kṣaṇiko viśeṣaguṇa iṣyate.

which does not mean "the special qualities of either and soul are limitation to space and momentary duration," but "the special qualities of either and soul (i.e., sound, knowledge, etc.) are limited to different portions and of momentary duration."

2 The author here mentions two other causes of the destruction of *dvitva* besides that already given in p. 152,1.14 *(apekṣābuddhi-nāśa)*, viz., *āśrayanāśa*, and the united action of both :—

1.Ekatva-jñāna...	Avayava-kriyā...	....
2.Apekṣābuddhi..	Avayava-vibhāga..	Avayava-vikriyā
3.Dvitvotpatti and ekatva-jñāna-nāśa :	Avayava- saṁyoganāś	Avayava-Vibrāga
4.Dvitvatvajñāna. .	Dvitvādhārasya (i.e., avayavinaī) nāśaḥ	Avayava-saṃyoga-nāśa
5.Dvitvaguṇa-buddhi and apekṣābuddhināśa	Dvitva-nāśa (i.e., of avayavin). . . .	Ādhāra-nāśa (of avayavin)...
6.Dvitva-nāśạ and dravya-buddhi . .	....	Dvitva-nāśa.

The second and third columns represent what takes place when, in the course of the six steps of *ekatvajñāna*, etc., one of the two parts is itself divided either at the *first* or the *second* moment. In the first case, the

Meaning of Apekṣābuddhi

अपेक्षाबुद्धिर्नाम विनाशकविनाशप्रतियोगिनी बुद्धिरिति बोद्धव्यम् ।

Apekṣābuddhirnāma vināśakavināśapratiyoginī buddhiriti boddhavyaṃ.

Apekṣābuddhi is to be considered as that operation of the mind which is the counter-entity to that emergent non-existence (i.e., destruction) which itself causes a subsequent destruction[1].

Structural Formation of Drayaṇuka

अथ द्व्यणुकनाशमारभ्य कतिभिः क्षणैः पुनरन्यद् द्व्यणुकमुत्पद्य रूपादिमद्भवतीति जिज्ञासायामुत्पत्तिप्रकारः कथ्यते–नोदनादिक्रमेण द्व्यणुकनाशः, नष्टे द्व्यणुके परमाणावग्निसंयोगाच्छ्यामादीनां निवृत्तिः । निवृत्तेषु श्यामादिषु पुनरन्यस्मादग्निसंयोगाद् रक्तादीनामुत्पत्तिः ।

Atha dvyaṇukanāśamārabhya katibhiḥ kṣaṇaiḥ punaranyad dvyaṇukamutpadya rūpādimadbhavatīti jijñāsāyāmutpattiprakāraḥ kathyate—nodanādikrameṇa dvyaṇukanāśaḥ, naṣṭe dvyaṇuke paramāṇāvagnisaṁyogācchayāmādīnāṁ nivṛttiḥ. Nivṛtteṣu śyāmādiṣu punaranyasmādagnisaṁyogād raktādīnāmutpattiḥ.

Next we will inquire in how many moments, commencing with the destruction of the compound of two atoms (the *dvyaṇuka*), another

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dvitva of the whole is destroyed in the fifth moment, and therefore its only cause is its immediately preceding *dvitvādhāra-nāśa*, or, as Mādhava calls it, *āśrayanivṛtti*. In the second case, the *nāśa* arrives at the same moment simultaneously by both columns (1) and (2), and hence it may be ascribed to the united action of two causes, *apekṣābuddhi-nāśa* and *ādhāra-nāśa*. Any *kriyā* which arose in one of the parts after the second moment would be unimportant, as the *nāśa*, of the dvitva of the whole would take place by the original sequence in column (1) in the sixth moment; and in this way, it would be too late to affect that affect that result.

1 I.e., from the destruction of *apekṣābuddhi* follows the destruction of *dvitva*; but the other destructions previously described were followed by some production,—thus the knowledge of *dvitvatva* arose from the destruction of *ekatvajñāna*, etc. (cf. *Sidd. Mukt.*, p.107) I may remind the reader that in Hindu logic the counter-entity to the non-existence of a thing is the thing itself.

compound of two atoms is produced, having colour, etc. In the course of this investigation, the mode of production will be explained. First, the compound of two atoms is gradually destroyed by the series of steps commencing with the contact of fire;[1] secondly, from the conjunction of fire arises the destruction of the qualities black, etc., in the single atom; thirdly, from another conjunction of fire arises the production of red, etc., in the atom.

उत्पन्नेषु रक्तादिषु अदृष्टवदात्मसंयोगात्परमाणौ द्रव्यारम्भणाय क्रिया । तया पूर्वदेशाद्विभागः । विभागेन पूर्वदेशसंयोगनिवृत्तिः । तस्मिन्निवृत्ते परमाण्वन्तरेण संयोगोत्पत्तिः । संयुक्ताभ्यां परमाणुभ्यां द्व्यणुकारम्भः । आरब्धे द्व्यणुके कारणगुणादिभ्यः कार्यगुणादीनां रूपादीनामुत्पत्तिरिति यथाक्रमं नव क्षणाः ।

Utpanneṣu raktādiṣu adṛṣṭavadātmasaṁyogātparamāṇau dravyārambhaṇāya kriyā. Tayā pūrvadeśādvibhāgaḥ. Vibhāgena pūrvadeśasaṁyoganivṛttiḥ. Tasminnivṛtte paramāṇvantareṇa saṁyogotpattiḥ. Saṁyuktābhyāṁ paramāṇubhyāṁ dvyaṇukārambhaḥ. Ārabdhe dvyaṇuke kāraṇaguṇādibhyaḥ kāryaguṇādīnāṁ rūpādīnāmutpattiriti yathākramaṁ nava kṣaṇāḥ.

दशक्षणादिप्रकारान्तरं विस्तरभयान्नेह प्रतन्यते । इत्थं पीलुपाकप्रक्रिया । पिठरपाकप्रक्रिया नैयायिकधीसंमता ।

Daśakṣaṇādiprakārāntaraṁ vistarabhayānneha pratanyate. Itthaṁ pīlupākaprakriyā. Piṭharapākaprakriyā naiyāyikadhīsaṁmatā.

Fourthly, from conjunction with a soul possessing merit arises an action[2] in the atom for the production of a substance; fifthly, by that action is produced a separation of that atom from its former place; sixthly, there is produced thereby the destruction of its conjunction with that former place; seventhly, is produced the conjunction with another atom; eighthly, from these two atoms arises the compound of two atoms; ninthly, from the qualities, etc., of the causes (*i.e.*, the atoms) are produced colour, etc., the qualities

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1 From the conjunction of fire is produced an action in the atoms of the jar; thence a separation of one atom from another; thence a destruction of the conjunction of atoms which made the black (or unbaked) jar; thence the destruction of the compound of two atoms.

2 I.e., a kind of initiative tendency.

of the effect (*i.e.*, the *dvyaṇuka*). Such is the order of the series of nine moments. The other two series,[1] that of the ten and that of the eleven moments, are omitted for fear of prolixity. Such is the mode of production, if we hold (with the Vaiśeṣikas) that the baking process takes place in the atoms of the jar.[2] The Naiyāyikas, however, maintain that the baking process takes place in the jar.

Species of Disjunction

विभागजविभागो द्विविधः—कारणमात्रविभागजः कारणाकारणविभागजश्च । तत्र प्रथमः कथ्यते—कार्यव्याप्ते कारणे कर्मोत्पन्नं यदाऽवयवान्तराद्विभागं विधत्ते, न तदाऽऽकाशादिदेशाद्विभागः । यदा त्वाकाशादिदेशाद्विभागः, न तदाऽवयवान्तरादिति स्थितिनियमः ।

Vibhāgajavibhāgo dvividhaḥ—Kāraṇamātravibhāgajaḥ kāraṇākāraṇavibhāgajaśca. Tatra prathamaḥ kathyate— Kāryavyāpte kāraṇe karmotpannaḥ yadā'vayavāntarādvibhāgaṁ vidhatte, na tadā"kāśādideśādvibhāgaḥ. Yadā tvākāśādideśādvibhāgaḥ, na tadā'vayavāntarāditi sthitiniyamaḥ.

"Disjunction produced by disjunction" is twofold,—that produced by the disjunction of the intimate (or material) causes only, and

1 These are explained at full length in the *Siddhānta Muktāvalī*, pp. 104, 105. In the first series we have-1. the destruction of the *dvyaṇuka* and simultaneously a disjunction from the old place produced by the disjunction (of the parts); 2. the destruction of the black colour in the *dvyaṇuka*, and the simultaneous destruction of the conjunction of the *dvyaṇuka* with that place; 3. the production of the red colour in the atoms, and the simultaneous conjunction with another place; 4. the cessation of the action in the atom produced by the original conjunction of fire. The remaining 5-10 agree with the 4-9 above.

2 The Vaiśeṣikas hold when a jar is baked, the old black jar is destroyed, its several compounds of two atoms, etc., being destroyed; the action of the fire then produces the red colour in the separate atoms, and, joining these into new compounds, eventually produces as new red jar. The exceeding rapidity of the steps prevents the eye's detecting the change of the jars. The followers of the Nyāya maintain that the fire penetrates into the different compounds of two or more atoms, and, without any destruction of the old jar, produces its effects on these compounds, and thereby changes not the jar but its colour, etc.,—it is still the same jar, only it is red, not black.

that produced by the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause (i.e., the place). We will first describe the former kind.

It is a fixed rule that when the action of breaking arises in the (material) cause which is inseparably connected with the effect (i.e., in one of the two halves of the pot), and produces a disjunction from the other half, there is not produced at that time a disjunction from the place or point of space occupied by the pot; and, again, when there is a disjunction from that point of space occupied by the pot, the disjunction from the other half is not contemporary with it, but has already taken place.

कर्मणो गगनविभागाकर्तृत्वस्य द्रव्यारम्भकसंयोगविरोधिविभागारम्भकत्वेन धूमस्य धूमध्वजवर्गेणेव व्यभिचारानुपलम्भात् । ततश्चावयवकर्मावयवान्तरादेव विभागं करोति नाकाशादिदेशात् । तस्माद्विभागाद् द्रव्यारम्भकसंयोगनिवृत्तिः । ततः कारणाभावात्कार्याभाव इति न्यायादवयवनिवृत्तिः ।

Karmaṇo gaganavibhāgākartṛtvasya dravyārambhakasaṁyoga-virodhivibhāgārambhakatvena dhūmasya dhūmadhvajavargeṇeva vyabhicārānupalambhāt. Tataścāvayavakarmāvayavāntarādeva vibhāgaṁ karoti nākāśādideśāt. Tasmādvibhāgād dravyārambhakasaṁyoganivṛttiḥ. Tataḥ kāraṇābhāvātkāryābhāva iti nyāyādavayavanivṛttiḥ.

For just as we never see smoke without its cause, fire, so we never see that effect of the breaking in the pot which we call the disjunction from the point of space,[1] without there having previously been the origination of that disjunction of the halves which stops the conjunction where by the pot was brought into being. Therefore, the action of breaking in the parts produces the disjunction of one part from another, but not the disjunction from the point of space; next, this disjunction of one part from another produces the destruction of that conjunction which had brought the pot into existence; and thence arises the destruction of the pot, according to the principle, *cessante causā cessat effectus*.

निवृत्तेऽवयविनि तत्कारणयोरवयवयोः वर्तमानो विभागः कार्यविनाशविशिष्टं कालं स्वतन्त्रं वायवयमपेक्ष्य न सक्रियस्यैवावयवस्य कार्यसंयुक्तादाकाशदेशदेशाद्विभागमारभते न निष्क्रियस्य । कारणाभावात् ।

1 In p.109, line 14, I read *gaganavibhāgakartṛtvasya*.

Nivṛtte'vayavini tatkāraṇayoravayavayoḥ vartamāno vibhāgaḥ kāryavināśaviśiṣṭaṁ kālaṁ svatantraṁ vāyavayamapekṣya na sakriyasyaivāvayavasya kāryasaṁyuktādākāśadeśadeśādvibhāgamārabhate na niṣkriyasya. Kāraṇābhāvāt.

The pot being thus destroyed, that disjunction which resides in both the halves (which are the material or intimate causes of the pot) during the time that is marked by the destruction of the pot or perhaps having reference only to one independent half, initiates, in the case of that half where the breaking began, a disjunction from the point of space which had been connected with the pot; but not in the case of the other half, as there is no cause to produce it.[1]

Disjunction of the Cause and the Non-Cause

द्वितीयस्तु हस्ते कर्मोत्पन्नम् अवयवान्तराद्विभागं कुर्वत् आकाशादिदेशेभ्यो विभागानारभते । ते कारणाकारणविभागाः कर्म यां दिशं प्रति कार्यारम्भाभिमुखं, तामपेक्ष्य कार्याकार्यविभागमारभन्ते । यथा हस्ताकाशविभागाच्छरीराकाशविभागः।

Dvitīyastu haste karmotpannaṃ avayavāntarādvibhāgaṁ kurvat ākāśādideśebhyo vibhāgānārabhate. Te kāraṇākāraṇavibhāgāḥ karma yāṁ diśaṁ prati kāryārambhābhimukhaṁ, tāmapekṣya kāryākāryavibhāgamārabhante. Yathā hastākāśavibhāgāccharīrākāśavibhāgaḥ.

But the second kind is as follows :– As action which arises in the hand, and causes a disjunction from that with which it was in contact, initiates a disjunction[2] from the points of space in which the original conjunction took place; and this is "the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause." When the action in the hand

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1 The *Siddhānta Muktāvalī*, p.112, describes the series of steps :— 1. An action, as of breaking, in one of the halves; 2. the disjunction of the two halves; 3. the destruction of the conjunction which originally produced the pot; 4. the destruction of the pot; 5. by the disjunction of the two halves is produced a disjunction of the severed half from the old place; 6. the destruction of the conjunction with that old place; 7. the conjunction with the new place; 8. the cessation of the original impulse of fracture. Here the second disjunction (viz., of the half of the pot and the place) is produced by the previous disjunction of the halves, the intimate causes of the pot.

2 The original has plural *vibhāgān*, *i.e.*, disjunctions from the several points.

produces an effect in relation to any points of space, it initiates also in the same direction a disjunction of the intimate effect and the non-effect.

न चासौ शरीरक्रियाकार्यः । तदा तस्य निष्क्रियत्वात् । नापि हस्तक्रियाकार्यः व्यधिकरणस्य कर्मणो विभागकर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः । अतः पारिशेष्यात् कारणाकारणविभागस्तस्य कारणमङ्गीकरणीयम् ।

Na cāsau śarīrakriyākāryaḥ. Tadā tasya niṣkriyatvāt. Nāpi hastakriyākāryaḥ vyadhikaraṇasya karmaṇo vibhāgakartṛtvānupapatteḥ. Ataḥ pāriśeṣyāt kāraṇākāraṇavibhāgastasya kāraṇamaṅgīkaraṇīyam.

Thus, the disjunction of the body (the intimate effect) and the points of space arises from the disjunction of the hand and the points of space (the hand being an intimate or material cause of the body, but the points of space being not a cause). This second disjunction is not produced by the action of the body, because the body is supposed to be at the time inactive; nor is it produced by the action of the hand, because it is impossible that in action residing in some other place (as the hand) should produce the effect of disjunction (in the body). Therefore, we conclude by exhaustion that we must accept the view—that it is the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause[1] which causes the second disjunction of the body and the points of space.

Discuss on the Subsistence of Darkness

यदवादि-'अन्धकारादौ भावत्वं निषिध्यते' इति तदसंगतम् । तत्र चतुर्धा विवादसम्भवात् । तथाहि—द्रव्यं तम इति भाट्टा वेदान्तिनश्च भणन्ति । आरोपितं नीलरूपमिति श्रीधराचार्याः । आलोकज्ञानाभावः इति प्राभाकरैकदेशिनः । आलोकाभाग इति नैयायिकादय इति चेत्–

Yadavādi—'andhakārādau bhāvatvaṁ niṣidhyate' iti tadasaṅgataṃ. Tatra caturdhā vivādasambhavāt. Tathāhi—dravyaṁ tama iti bhāṭṭā vedāntinaśca bhaṇanti. Āropitaṁ nīlarūpamiti śrīdharācāryāḥ. Ālokajñānābhāvaḥ iti prābhākaraikadeśinaḥ. Ālokābhāga iti naiyāyikādaya iti cet—

But an opponent may here object that "what you formerly stated (p. 147) as to existence being denied of darkness, etc., is surely

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1 I.e., the disjunction of the hand and the points of space.

unreasonable; for, in fact, there are no less than four different opinions maintained on this point, – thus—(a) the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins hold that darkness is a substance; (b). Śrīdhara Ācārya[1] holds that the colour of dark blue is imposed (and thus darkness will be a quality); (c) some of the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas hold that it is the absence of the cognition of light; (d) the Naiyāyikas, etc., hold that it is the absence of light."

तत्र द्रव्यत्वपक्षो न घटते । विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । द्रव्यं भवदन्धकाराख्यं पृथिव्याद्यन्यतममन्यद्वा । नाद्यः । यत्रान्तर्भावोऽस्य तस्य यावन्तो गुणास्तावद्गुणकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न द्वितीयः । निगुर्णस्य तस्य द्रव्यत्वासम्भवेन द्रव्यान्तरत्वस्य सुतरामसम्भवात ।

Tatra dravyatvapakṣo na ghaṭate. Vikalpānupapatteḥ. Dravyaṁ bhavadandhakārākhyaṁ pṛthivyādyanyatamamanyadvā. Nādyaḥ. Yatrāntarbhāvo'sya tasya yāvanto guṇāstāvadguṇakatvaprasaṅgāt. Na dvitīyaḥ. Nirguṇasya tasya dravyatvāsambhavena dravyāntaratvasya sutarāmasambhavāt.

In reply, we assert that as for the first alleged opinion (a) it is quite out of the question, as it is consistent with neither of the two possible alternatives; for if darkness is a substance, it must either be one of the nine well-known substances, earth, etc.,[2] or some different one. But it cannot be any one of the nine, since, under whichever one you would place it, all the qualities of that substance should certainly be found in it; nor can you, on the other hand, assert that it is some substance different from these nine, since, being in itself destitute of qualities, it cannot properly be a substance at all (the very definition of substance being "that which is the substratum of qualities"), and therefore, of course, it cannot be a different substance from the nine.

ननु तमालश्यामलत्वेनोपलभ्यमानं तमः कथं निर्गुणं स्यादिति चेत्–तदसारम् । गन्धादिव्याप्तस्य नीलरूपस्य तन्निवृत्तौः निवृत्तेः ।

Nanu tamālaśyāmalatvenopalabhyamānaṁ tamaḥ kathaṁ nirguṇaṁ syāditi cet—tadasāraṃ. Gandhādivyāptasya nīlarūpasya tannivṛttauḥ nivṛtteḥ.

But you may ask, "How can you say that darkness is destitute of

1 The author of a commentary on the *Bhagavad Gītā*.

2 For *dravyādi* read *pṛthivyādi*.

qualities, when it is perceived as possessed of the dark blue of the tamāla blossom?" We reply, that this is merely an error, as when men say that the (colourless) sky is blue. But enough of this onslaught on ancient sages.[1] (b) Hence, it follows that darkness cannot have its colour imposed upon it, since you cannot have an imposition of colour without supposing some substratum to receive it[2].

अथ नीलं तम इति गतेः का गतिरिति चेत्–नीलं नभ इतिवद् भ्रान्तिरेवेत्यलं वृद्धवीवधया । अत एव नारोपितरूपं तमः । अधिष्ठानप्रत्यय-मन्तरेणाऽऽरोपायोगात् । बाह्यालोकसहकारिरहितस्य चक्षुषो रूपारोपे सामर्थ्यानुपलम्भाच्च ।

Atha nīlaṁ tama iti gateḥ kā gatiriti cet—nīlaṁ nabha itivad bhrāntirevetpalaṁ vṛddhavīvadhayā. Ata eva nāropitarūpaṁ tamaḥ. Adhiṣṭhānapratyayamantareṇā"ropāyogāt. Bāhyālokasahakārirahitasya cakṣuṣo rūpārope sāmarthyānupalambhācca.

And again, we cannot conceive the eye as capable of imposing a colour when deprived of the concurrent cause, the external light. Nor can we accept that it is an impression independent of the eye (*i.e.*, produced by the internal sense, mind), because the concurrence of the eye is not a superfluous but an indispensable condition to its being produced. Nor can you maintain that "absence or non-existence (*abhāva*[3]) is incapable of being expressed by affirmative tense affixes (and, therefore, as we do use such phrases as *tenebroe oriuntur,* darkness cannot be a mere non-existence"); because your assertion is too broad, as it would include such cases of non-existence as a mundane collapse, destruction, inattention,[4] etc. (and yet we all know that men do speak of any of these things as past, present, or future, and yet all are cases of *abhāva*).

न चायमचाक्षुषः प्रत्ययः । यदनुविधानस्यानन्यथासिद्धत्वात् । अत एव

1 I am not sure that it would not be better to read *viddhavevidhayā*, rewounding the wounded, instead of *vṛddhavīvadhayā*.

2 Unless you *see* the rope you cannot mistake it for a serpent.

3 In p. 110, last line, read *bhāve*.

4 Read in p. 110, last line, *anavadhānādiṣu*. *Vidhipratyaya* properly means an imperative or potential affix implying "command;" but the pandit takes *vidhi* here as *bhāvabodhaka-kriyā*. It has that meaning in *Kāvyaprakāśa*, V.(p.114, ii).

नालोकज्ञानाभावः । अभावस्य प्रतियोगिग्राहकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वनियमेन मानसत्व-प्रसङ्गात् ।

Na cāyamacākṣuṣaḥ pratyayaḥ. Yadanuvidhānasyānanyathāsiddhatvāt. Ata eva nālokajñānābhāvaḥ. Abhāvasya pratiyogigrāhakendriyagrāhyatvaniyamena mānasatvaprasaṅgāt.

(c) Hence, darkness cannot be the absence of the cognition of light, since, by the well-known rule that the organ which perceives a certain object can also perceive its absence, it would follow that darkness would be perceived by the mind (since, it is the mind which perceives cognitions).[1]

Lack of Light is Darkness

तस्मादालोकाभाव एव तमः । न च विधिप्रत्ययवेद्यत्वेनाभावत्वायोग इति सांप्रतम् । प्रलयविनाशावसानादिषु व्यभिचारात् । न चाभावे भावधर्माध्यारोपो दुरुपपादः । दुःखाभावे सुखत्वारोपस्य संयोगाभावे विभागत्वाभिमानस्य च दृष्टत्वात् ।

Tasmādālokābhāva eva tamaḥ. Na ca vidhipratyayavedyatvenābhāvatvāyoga iti sāmpratam. Pralayavināśāvasānādiṣu vyabhicārāt. Na cābhāve bhāvadharmādhyāropo durupapādaḥ. Duḥkhābhāve sukhatvāropasya saṁyogābhāve vibhāgatvābhimānasya ca dṛṣṭatvāt.

Hence, we conclude that the fourth or remaining opinion must be the true one, viz., that darkness is only the absence of light. And it need not be objected that it is very difficult to account for the attribution to non-existence of the qualities of existence, for we all see that the quality happiness is attributed to the absence of pain, and the idea of separation is connected with the absence of conjunction.

न चालोकाभावस्य घटाद्यभाववद् रूपवदभावत्वेनालोकसापेक्षचक्षुर्जन्यज्ञानविषयत्वं स्यादित्येषितव्यम् यद्ग्रहे यदपेक्षं चक्षुः, तदभावग्रहेऽपि तदपेक्षत इति न्यायेनालोकग्रहं आलोकापेक्षाया अभावेन तदभावग्रहेऽपि तदपेक्षाया अभावात् ।

Na cālokābhāvasya ghaṭādyabhāvavad rūpavadabhāvatvenālokasāpekṣacakṣurjanyajñānaviṣayatvaṁ syādityeṣitavyam yadgrahe yadapekṣaṁ cakṣuḥ, tadabhāvagrahe'pi tadapekṣata iti nyāyenālokagrahaṁ ālokāpekṣayā abhāvena tadabhāvagrahe'pi tadapekṣayā abhāvāt.

1 The mind perceives *āloka-jñāna*, therefore, it would perceive its absence, *i.e.*, darkness, but this last is perceived by the *eye*.

And you need not assert that "this absence of light must be the object of a cognition produced by the eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an object possessing colour,[1] as we see in the case of a jar's absence," because by the very rule on which you rely, viz., that on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on to perceive that object's absence, it follows that as there is no dependence of the eye on light to perceive light, it need not depend thereon to perceive this light's absence.

न चाधिकरणग्रहणावश्यंभावः । अभावप्रतीतावधिकरणग्रहणावश्यंभावानङ्गीकारात् । अपरथा, 'निवृत्तः कोलाहलः' इति शब्दप्रध्वंसः प्रत्यक्षो न स्यात्—इति अप्रामाणिकं परवचनम् । तत्सर्वमभिसंधाय भगवान्कणादः प्रणिनाय सूत्रं–'द्रव्यगुणकर्मनिष्पत्तिवैधर्म्यादभावस्तमः' (व. सू. 5/2/19) इति ।

Na cādhikaraṇagrahaṇāvaśyaṁbhāvaḥ. Abhāvapratītāvadhikaraṇagrahaṇāvaśyaṁbhāvānaṅgīkārāt. Aparathā, 'nivṛttaḥ kolāhalaḥ' iti śabdapradhvaṁsaḥ pratyakṣo na syāt—iti aprāmāṇikaṁ paravacanam. Tatsarvamabhisaṁdhāya bhagavānkaṇādaḥ praṇināya sūtraṁ—'dravyaguṇakarmaniṣpattivaidharmyādabhāvastamaḥ' (Va. Sū. 5/2/19) iti.

Nor need our opponent retort that "the cognition of darkness (as the absence of light) necessitates the cognition of the place where the absence resides (and this will require light)," as such an assertion is quite untenable, for we cannot admit that in order to have a conception of absence, it is necessary to have a conception of the place where the absence resides, else we could not have the perception of the cessation of sound, as is implied in such an expression as "the tumult has ceased."[2] Hence, having all these difficulties in his mind, the venerable Kaṇāda uttered his aphorism (as an *ipse dixit* to settle the question) : "*Dravya-guṇa-karma-niṣpatti-vaidharmyād abhāvas tamas*" (*Vaiś. Sūt.*v.2, 19), "Darkness is really non-existence, since it is dissimilar to the production of substances, qualities, or actions." The same thing has been also

1 I.e., light possesses colour, and we cannot see a jar's absence in the dark.

2 Sound resides in the imperceptible ether, and cessation is the *dhvaṁśābhāva*, or "emergent non-existence."

established by the argument that darkness is perceived by the eye[1] (without light, whereas all substances, if perceptible at all, require the presence of light as well as of the eye to be visible).

Relative Non-Existence and Reciprocal Non-Existence

अभावस्तु निषेधमुखप्रमाणगम्यः सप्तमो निरूप्यते । स चासमवायत्वे सत्यसमवायः ।

Abhāvastu niṣedhamukhapramāṇagamyaḥ saptamo nirūpyate. Sa cāsamavāyatve satyasamavāyaḥ.

Non-existence (*abhāva*) is considered to be the seventh category, as established by negative proofs.

संक्षेपतो द्विविधः—संसर्गाभावान्योन्याभावभेदात् । संसर्गाभावोऽपि त्रिविधः—प्राक्प्रध्वंसात्यन्ताभावभेदात् । तत्रानित्योऽनादितमः प्रागभावः । उत्पत्तिमानविनाशी प्रध्वंसः । प्रतियोग्याश्रयोऽभावोऽत्यन्ताभावः । अत्यन्ताभावव्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति अनवधिरभावोऽन्योन्याभावः ।

Saṁkṣepato dvividhaḥ—saṁsargābhāvānyonyābhāvabhedāt. Saṁsargābhāvo'pi trividhaḥ—prākpradhvaṁsātyantābhāva-bhedāt. Tatrānityo'nāditamaḥ prāgabhāvaḥ. Utpattimānavināśī pradhvaṁsaḥ. Pratiyogyāśrayo'bhāvo'tyantābhāvaḥ. Atyantā-bhāvavyatiriktatve sati anavadhirabhāvo'nyonyābhāvaḥ.

It may be concisely defined as that which, itself not having intimate relation, is not intimate relation;[2] and this is twofold, "relative non-existence"[3] and "reciprocal non-existence." The former is again divided into "antecedent", "emergent," and "absolute." "Antecedent" is that non-existence which, though without any beginning, is not everlasting; "emergent" is that which, though having a beginning, is everlasting; "absolute" is that non-existence

1 The reading *pratyayavedyatvena* seems supported by p.110, last line, but it is difficult to trace the argument; I have, terefore, ventured hesitatingly to read *pratyakṣavedyatvena*, and would refer to the commentary (*Vaiś. Sūt.* p. 250), *"yadi hi nila-rūpavan nīlaṃ rūpam eva vā tamaḥ syāt, vāhyālokapragrahaṁ antareṇa cakṣuṣā na gṛhyeta."*

2 Intimate relation has also no intimate relation.

3 "Relative non-existence" (*saṁsargābhāva*) is the negation of a relation; thus "the jar is not in the house" is "absolute non-existence", "it was not in the house" is "antecedent," and "it will not be in the house" is "emergent," non-existence.

which abides in its own counter-entity;[1] "reciprocal non-existence" is that which, being different from "absolute" has yet no defined limit (i.e., no *terminus ad quem* nor *terminus a quo*, as "antecedent" and "emergent" have).

ननु अन्योन्याभाव एवात्यन्ताभाव इति चेत्—अहो राजमार्ग एव भ्रमः । अन्योन्याभावो हि तादात्म्यप्रतियोगिकः प्रतिषेधः । यथा घटः घटात्मा न भवतीति । संसर्गप्रतियोगिकः प्रतिषेधोऽत्यन्ताभावः । यथा वायौ रूपसम्बन्धो नास्तीति ।

Nanu anyonyābhāva evātyantābhāva iti cet—aho rājamārga eva bhramaḥ. Anyonyābhāvo hi tādātmyapratiyogikaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ. Yathā ghaṭaḥ ghaṭātmā na bhavatīti. Saṁsargapratiyogikaḥ pratiṣedho'tyantābhāvaḥ. Yathā vāyau rūpasambandho nāstīti.

If you raise the objection that " 'reciprocal non-existence' is really the same as 'absolute non-existence,'" we reply that this is indeed to lose one's way in the king's highroad; for "reciprocal non-existence" is that negation whose opposite is held to be identity, as "a jar is not cloth;" but "absolute non-existence" is that negation whose opposite is connection, as "there is no colour in the air."[2]

न चास्य पुरुषार्थौपयिकत्वं नास्तीत्याशङ्कनीयम् । दुःखात्यन्तोच्छेदापरपर्यायनिः-श्रेयसरूपत्वेन परमपुरुषार्थत्वात् ।

Na cāsya puruṣārthaupayikatvaṁ nāstītyāśaṅkanīyaṃ. Duḥkhātyantocchedāparaparyāyaniḥśreyasarūpatvena parama-puruṣārthatvāt.

Nor need you here raise the objection that *"abhāva* can never be a means of producing any good to man," for we maintain that it is his *summum bonum*, in the form of final beatitude, which is only another term for the absolute abolition of all pain (and therefore comes under the category of *abhāva)*. E.B.C.

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे औलूक्यदर्शनम् ॥

❖

1 I.e., the absolute absence of the jar is found in the jar, as, of course, the jar does not reside in the jar, but in the spot of ground,—it is the jāti *ghaṭatva* which resides in the jar.

2 The opposite is "there is colour in the air."

CHAPTER XI

THE AKṢAPĀDA (OR NYĀYA) DARŚANA

Preamble of System

तत्त्वज्ञानाद् दुःखात्यन्तोच्छेदलक्षणं निःश्रेयसं भवतीति समानतन्त्रेऽपि प्रति-पादितम् । तदाह सूत्रकारः—प्रमाणप्रमेयेत्यादितत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगमः (न्या. सू. 1/1/1) इति । इदं न्यायशास्त्रस्यादिमं सूत्रम् ।

Tattvajñānād duḥkhātyantocchedalakṣaṇaṁ niḥśreyasaṁ bhavatīti samānatantre'pi pratipāditaṃ. Tadāha sūtrakāraḥ—pramāṇaprameyetyāditattvajñānānniḥśreyasādhigamaḥ (Nyāya Sū. 1/1/1) iti. Idaṁ nyāyaśāstrasyādimaṁ sūtraṃ.

The principle that final bliss, *i.e.*, the absolute abolition of pain, arises from the knowledge of the truth (though in a certain sense universally accepted), is established in a special sense as a particular tenet[1] of the Nyāya school, as is declared by the author of the aphorisms in the words "proof, that which is to be proved, etc.,—from knowledge of the truth as to these things, there is the attainment of final bliss." This is the first aphorism of the Nyāya Śāstra.

न्यायशास्त्रं च पञ्चाध्यायात्मकम् । तत्र प्रत्यध्यायमाह्निकद्वयम् । तत्र प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथमाह्निके भगवता गौतमेन प्रमाणादिपदार्थनवकलक्षणनिरूपणं विधाय द्वितीये वादादि सप्तपदार्थलक्षणनिरूपणं कृतम् । द्वितीयस्य प्रथमे संशयपरीक्षणं प्रमाणचतुष्टयाप्रामाण्यशङ्कानिराकरणं च । द्वितीयेऽर्थापत्त्यादेरन्तर्भावनिरूपणम् ।

Nyāyaśāstraṁ ca pañcādhyāyātmakaṃ. Tatra pratyadhyāyamāhnikadvayaṃ. Tatra prathamādhyāyasya prathamāhnike bhagavatā gautamena pramāṇādipadārthanavakalakṣaṇanirūpaṇaṁ vidhāya dvitīye vādādi saptapadārthalakṣaṇanirūpaṇaṁ kṛtaṃ. Dvitīyasya prathame saṁśayaparīkṣaṇaṁ pramāṇacatuṣṭayāprāmāṇyaśaṅkānirākaraṇaṁ ca. Dvitīye'rthāpattyāderantarbhāvanirūpaṇaṃ.

Now, the Nyāya Śāstra consists of five books, and each book con-

1 Cf. Nyāya Sūtras, I. 29.

tains two "daily portions." In the first daily portion of the first book the venerable Gautama discusses the definitions of nine categories, beginning with "proof," and in the second, those of the remaining seven, beginning with "discussion" (*vāda*). In the first daily portion of the second book, he examines "doubt," discusses the four kinds of "proof," and refutes the suggested objections to their being instruments of right knowledge; and in the second he shows that "presumption," etc., are really included in the four kinds of "proof" already given (and therefore, need not be added by the Mīmāṁsakas as separate ones).

तृतीयस्य प्रथम आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थपरीक्षणम् । द्वितीये बुद्धिमनःपरीक्षणम् । चतुर्थस्य प्रथमे प्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गपरीक्षणम् । द्वितीये दोषनिमित्तक (त)-त्वनिरूपणमवयव्यादिनिरूपणं च । पञ्चमस्य प्रथमे जातिभेदनिरूपणम् द्वितीये निग्रहस्थानभेदनिरूपणम् ।

Tṛtīyasya prathama ātmaśarīrendriyārthaparīkṣaṇaṃ. Dvitīye buddhimanaḥparīkṣaṇaṃ. Caturthasya prathame pravṛttidoṣapretyabhāvaphaladuḥkhāpavargaparīkṣaṇaṃ. Dvitīye doṣanimittaka-(Ta)-tvanirūpaṇamavayavyādinirūpaṇaṁ ca. Pañcamasya prathame jātibhedanirūpaṇaṃ dvitīye nigrahasthānabhedanirūpaṇaṃ.

In the first daily portion of the third book, he examines the soul, the body, the senses, asnd their objects; in the second, "understanding" *(buddhi)*, and "mind" *(manas)*. In the first daily portion of the fourth book he examines "volition" *(pravṛtti)*, the "faults," "transmigration," "fruit" (of actions), "pain," "final liberation;" in the second, he investigates the truth[1] as to the causes of the "faults," and also "wholes" and "parts." In the first daily portion of the fifth books he discusses the various kinds of futility (*jāti*), and in the second, the various kinds of "occasion for rebuke" (*nigrahasthāna*, or "unfitness to be argued with").

Enunciation of Proof

मानाधीना मेयसिद्धिरिति न्यायेन प्रमाणस्य प्रथममुद्देशे तदनुसारेण लक्षणस्य कथनीयतया प्रथमोद्दिष्टस्य प्रमाणस्य प्रथमं लक्षणं कथ्यते–

1 In p.112, line 16, of the Calcutta edition, I read *doṣanimittatattva* for *doṣanimittakatva* (compare *Nyāya Sūt.* iv. 68).

साधनाश्रयाव्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति प्रमाव्याप्तं प्रमाणम् ।

Mānādhīnā meyasiddhiriti nyāyena pramāṇasya prathamamuddeśe tadanuśāreṇa lakṣaṇasya kathanīyatayā prathamoddiṣṭasya pramāṇasya prathamaṁ lakṣaṇaṁ kathyate—sādhanāśrayāvyatiriktatve sati pramāvyāptaṁ pramāṇaṃ.

In accordance with the principle that "to know the thing to be measured you must first know the measure," "proof" (*pramāṇa*) is first enunciated, and as this must be done by defining it, we have first a definition of "proof." "Proof" is that which is always accompanied by right knowledge, and is at the same time, not disjoined from the proper instruments (as the eye, etc.), and from the site of knowledge (*i.e.*, the soul);[1] and this definition thus, includes the peculiar tenet of the Nyāya School that God is a source of right knowledge,[2] as the author of the aphorisms has expressly declared (ii. 68),

एवं च प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्तसिद्धं परमेश्वरप्रामाण्यं संगृहीतं भवति । यदचकथत् सूत्रकार:—मन्त्रायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवच्च तत्प्रामाण्यमाप्तप्रामाण्यात् (न्या. सू. 2/1/68) इति । तथा च न्यायनयपारावारपारदृश्वा विश्वविख्यातकीर्तिरुदयनाचार्योऽपि न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलौ चतुर्थे स्तबके—

Evaṁ ca pratitantrasiddhāntasiddhaṁ parameśvaraprāmāṇyaṁ saṅgṛhītaṁ bhavati. Yadacakathat sūtrakāraḥ—mantrāyurvedaprāmāṇyavacca tatprāmāṇyamāptaprāmāṇyāt (Nyāya Sū. 2/1/68) iti. Tathā ca nyāyanayapārāvārapāradṛśvā viśvavikhyātakīrtirudayanācāryo'pi nyāyakusumāñjalau caturthe stabake—

"and the fact of the Veda's being a cause of right knowledge, like spells and the medical science, follows from the fact that the fit one who gave the Veda was source of right knowledge." And thus, too hath the universally renowned teacher Udayana, who saw to the farthest shore of the ocean of logic, declared in the fourth chapter of the *Kusumāñjali* :

1 Without this last clause, the definition might include the objects (viṣaya), as these are, of course, connected with right knowledge.

2 Īśvara is a cause of right knowledge *(paramāṇa)* according to the definition, because he is *pramāyā āśrayaḥ*.

1. मितिः सम्यक्परिच्छित्तिस्तद्वत्ता च प्रमातृता ।
तदयोगव्यवच्छेदः प्रामाण्यं गौतमे मते ॥ (4/5) इति ।

Mitiḥ samyakparicchittistadvattā ca pramātṛtā,
Tadayogavyavacchedaḥ prāmāṇyaṁ gautame mate.
(4/5) iti.

"Right knowledge is accurate comprehension, and right knowing is the possession thereof; authoritativeness is, according to Gautama's school, the being separated from all absence thereof."

2. साक्षात्कारिणि नित्ययोगिनि परद्वारानपेक्षस्थितौ
भूतार्थानुभवे निविष्टनिखिलप्रस्ताविवस्तुक्रमः ।
लेशादृष्टिनिमित्तदुष्टिविगमप्रभ्रष्टशङ्कातुषः
शङ्कोन्मेषकलङ्किभिः किमपरैस्तन्मे प्रमाणं शिवः ॥
(न्या. कु. 4/6) इति ।

Sākṣātkāriṇi nityayogini paradvārānapekṣasthitau,
Bhūtārthānubhave niviṣṭanikhilaprastāvivastukramaḥ;
Leśādṛṣṭinimittaduṣṭivigamaprabhraṣṭaśaṅkātuṣaḥ,
Śaṅkonmeṣakalaṅkibhiḥ kimaparaistanme pramāṇaṁ śivaḥ.
(Nyāya Ku. 4/6 iti.)

"He in whose intuitive unerring perception, inseparably united to Him and dependent on no foreign inlets, the succession of all the various existing objects is contained,—all the chaff of our suspicion being swept away by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the slightest want of observation in Him,—He, Śiva, is my authority; what have I to do with others, darkened as their authority must ever be with rising doubts ?"

तच्चतुर्विधं प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दभेदात् ।

Taccaturvidhaṁ pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdabhedāt.

"Proof" is fourfold, as being divided into perception, inference, analogy, and testimony.

Components of Testimony

प्रमायां यद्धि प्रतिभासते तत्प्रमेयम् । तच्च द्वादशप्रकारम्—आत्म-शरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमनः-प्रवृत्ति-दोष-प्रेत्यभाव-फल-दुःखापवर्ग-भेदात् ।

Pramāyāṁ yaddhi pratibhāsate tatprameyam. Tacca dvādaśaprakāram—ātmaśarīrendriyārthabuddhimanaḥ–pravṛtti-doṣa-pretyabhāva-phala-duḥkhāpavargabhedāt.

The "thing to be proved" (or the "object of right notion") is of twelve kinds, viz., soul, body, the senses, their objects, understanding, mind, volition, faults, transmigration, fruit, pain, and final liberation.

Interpretation of Doubt, Motive and Example

अनवधारणात्मकं ज्ञानं संशयः । स त्रिविधः–साधारणधर्मासाधारणधर्म-विप्रतिपत्तिलक्षणभेदात् । यमधिकृत्य प्रवर्तन्ते पुरुषास्तत्प्रयोजनम् । तद् द्विविधम्–दृष्टादृष्टभेदात् । व्याप्तिसंवेदनभूमिर्दृष्टान्तः । स द्विविधः–साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यभेदात् ।

Anavadhāraṇātmakaṁ jñānaṁ saṁśayaḥ. Sa trividhaḥ—sādhāraṇadharmāsādhāraṇadharmavipratipattilakṣaṇabhedāt. Yamadhikṛtya pravartante purūṣāstatprayojanam. Tad dvividham–dṛṣṭādṛṣṭabhedāt. Vyāptisaṁvedanabhūmirdṛṣṭāntaḥ. Sa dvividhaḥ—sādharmyavaidharmyabhedāt.

"Doubt" is a knowledge whose nature is uncertainty; and this is threefold, as being caused by the object's possessing only qualities which are common to other things also, and therefore, not distinctive,—or by its possessing only irrelevant qualities of its own, which do not help us in determining the particular point in question,[1]—or by conflicting testimony. The thing which one proposes to one's self before proceeding to act, is "a motive" (*prayojana*); this is twofold, *i.e.*, visible and invisible. "An example" is a fact brought forward as a ground for establishing a general principle, and it may be either affirmative or negative.[2]

प्रामाणिकत्वेनाभ्युपगतोऽर्थः सिद्धान्तः । स चतुर्विधः–सर्वतन्त्रप्रतितन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमभेदात् ।

परार्थानुमानवाक्यैकदेशोऽवयवः । स पञ्चविधः–प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदाहरणोपनयनिगमनभेदात् ।

Prāmāṇikatvenābhyupagato'rthaḥ siddhāntaḥ. Sa caturvidhaḥ—sarvatantrapratitantrādhikaraṇābhyupagama-bhedāt.

1 On this compare *Siddhānta Muktāvalī*, p. 115.

2 On these, compare my not be Colebrook's *Essays*, vol.i, p.315.

Parārthānumānavākyaikadeśo'vayavaḥ. Sa pañcavidhaḥ-pratijñāhetudāharaṇopanayanigamanabhedāt.

A "tenet" (*siddhānta*) is something which is accepted as being authoritatively settled as true; it is of four kinds, as being "common to all the schools," "peculiar to one school," "a pregnant assumption" (leading, if conceded, to a further conclusion), and "an implied dogma" (i.26-31). The "member"(of a demonstration) is a part of the sentence containing an inference for the sake of another; and these are five, the proposition, the reason, the example, the application, and the conclusion (i. 32-38).

An Interpretation of Confutation

व्याप्यारोपेण व्यापकारोपस्तर्कः । स चैकादशविधः । व्याघातात्माश्रयेतरेतराश्रय-चक्रकाश्रयानवस्थाप्रतिबन्धिकल्पनाकल्पनालाघवकल्पनागौरवोत्सर्गापवादवैजात्य-भेदात् ।

Vyāpyāropeṇa vyāpakāropastarkaḥ. Sa caikādaśavidhaḥ. Vyāghātātmāśrayetaretarāśrayacakrakāśrayānavasthāpratibandhikalpanākalpanālāghavakalpanāgauravotsargāpavādavaijātyabhedāt.

"Confutation" (*tarka*, i.39) is the showing that the admission of a false minor necessitates the admission of a false major[1] (cf. Sūt. i. 39, and iv. 3); and this is of eleven kinds, as *vyāghāta*, *ātmāśraya*, *itretarāśraya*, etc.

Meaning of Ascertainment, Discussion, Wrangling and Cavilling

यथार्थानुभवपर्याया प्रमितिर्निर्णयः । स चतुर्विधः । साक्षात्कृत्यनुमित्युपमितिशाब्दभेदात् । तत्त्वनिर्णयफलः कथाविशेषो वादः । उभयसाधनवती विजिगीषुकथा जल्पः । स्वपक्षस्थापनहीनः कथाविशेषो वितण्डा । कथा नाम वादिप्रतिवादिनोः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहः ।

Yathārthānubhavaparyāyā pramitirnirṇayaḥ. Sa caturvidhaḥ. Sākṣātkṛtyanumityupamitiśābdabhedāt. Tattvanirṇayaphalaḥ

1 "Our coming to the conclusion that there can be no smoke in the hill if there be no fire, while we see the smoke, is the confutation of there being no fire in the hill" *(Ballantyne)*. Or, in other words, "the mountain must have the absence-of-smoke (*vyāpaka*) if it has the absence-of fire (the false-*vyāpya*)".

kathāviśeṣo vādaḥ. Ubhayasādhanavatī vijigīṣukathā jalpaḥ. Svapakṣasthāpanahīnaḥ kathāviśeṣo vitaṇḍā. Kathā nāmavādiprativādinoḥ pakṣapratipakṣaparigrahaḥ.

"Ascertainment" (*nirṇaya,* i.40) is right knowledge or a perception of real state of the case. It is of four kinds as produced by perception, inference, analogy, or testimony. "Discussion" (*vāda*) is a particular kind of conversation, having as its end the ascertainment of truth (i.41). "Wrangling" (*jalpa*) is the talk of a man only wishing for victory, who is ready to employ arguments for either side of the question (i.42). "Cavilling" (*vitaṇḍā*) is the talk of a man who does not atempt to establish his own side of the question (i.43). "Dialogue" (*kathā*) is the taking of two opposite sides by two disputants.

What is Fallacy ?

असाधको हेतुत्वेनाभिमतो हेत्वाभासः । स पंञ्चविधः-सव्यभिचारविरुद्ध-प्रकरणसम-साध्यसमातीतकालभेदात् ।

Asādhako hetutvenābhimato hetvābhāsaḥ. Sa pañcavidhaḥ—savyabhicāraviruddhaprakaraṇasama-sādhyasamātītakālabhedāt.

A "fallacy" is an inconclusive reason which is supposed to prove something, and this may be of five kinds, the "erratic," the "contradictory," the "uncertain," the "unproved," and the "precluded" or "mistimed" (Sūt.i.44-49).

शब्दवृत्तिव्यत्ययेन प्रतिषेधहेतुश्छलम् । तत्त्रिविधम् । अभिधानतात्पर्योपचार-वृत्तिव्यत्ययभेदात् ।

Śabdavṛttivyatyayena pratiṣedhahetuśchalam. Tattrividham. Abhidhānatātparyopacāravṛttivyatyayabhedāt.

"Unfairness" (*chala*) is the bringing forward a contrary argument by using a term wilfully in an ambiguous sense; this is of three kinds, as there may be fraud in respect of a term, the meaning, or a metaphorical phrase (i. 50-54).

Futility and its Twenty-four Kinds

स्वव्याघातकमुत्तरं जातिः । सा चतुर्विंशतिधा । साधर्म्यवैधर्म्योत्कर्षा- पकर्षवर्ण्या-वर्ण्य-विकल्प-साध्य-प्राप्त्यप्राप्ति-प्रसङ्ग-प्रतिदृष्टान्तानुत्पत्ति-संशय-प्रकरण-हेत्वर्था-पत्त्यविशेषोपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धि-नित्यानित्य-कार्य-समभेदात् ।

Svavyāghātakamuttaraṁ jātiḥ. Sā caturviṁśatidhā. Sādharmya-vaidharmyotkarṣāpakarṣavarṇyāvarṇya-vikalpa-sādhya-prāptya-prāpti-prasaṅga-pratidṛṣṭāntāntā nutpatti saṁśaya-prakaraṇa-hetvarthāpattyaviśeṣopapattyupalabdhyanupalabdhi-nityānitya-kārya-samabhedāt.

"Futility" (*jāti*) is a self-destructive argument (i.58). This is of twenty-four kinds (as described in the fifth book of the Nyāya aphorisms (1-38).

पराजयनिमित्तं निग्रहस्थानम् । तद् द्वाविंशतिप्रकारम् । प्रतिज्ञाहानिप्रतिज्ञान्तर-प्रतिज्ञाविरोध-प्रतिज्ञासंन्यास-हेत्वन्तरार्थान्तर-निरर्थकाविज्ञातार्थापार्थकाप्राप्तकाल-न्यूनाधिक-पुनरुक्ताननुभाषणाज्ञानाप्रतिभा-विक्षेप-मतानुज्ञा-पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षण-निरनु-योज्यानुयोगापसिद्धान्त-हेत्वाभासभेदात् ।

अत्र सर्वान्तर्गणिकस्तु विशेषस्तत्र शास्त्रे विस्पष्टोऽपि विस्तरभिया न प्रस्तूयते ।

Parājayanimittaṁ nigrahasthānam. Tad dvāviṁśatiprakāram. Pratijñāhānipratijñāntara-pratijñāvirodha-pratijñāsaṁnyāsa-hetvantarārthāntara-nirarthakāvijñātārthāpārthakāprāptakāla-nyūnādhika-punaruktānanubhāṣaṇājñānāpratibhā-vikṣepa-matānujñā-paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa-niranuyojyānuyogāpasiddhā-nta-hetvābhāsabhedāt.

Atra sarvāntargaṇikastu viśeṣastatra śāstre vispaṣṭo'pi vistarabhiyā na prastūyate.

"Occasion for rebuke" is where the disputant loses his cause (by stupidity), and this is of twenty-two kinds (as described in the fifth book of the aphorisms, 44-67). We do not insert here all the minute sub-divisions through fear of being too prolix,—they are fully explained in the aphorisms.

Reasons for Nomenclature Given

ननु प्रमाणादिपदार्थषोडशके प्रतिपाद्यमाने कथमिदं न्यायशास्त्रमिति व्यपदिश्यते ? सत्यम् । तथाऽप्यसाधारण्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्तीति न्यायेन न्यायस्य परार्थानुमाना-परपर्यायस्य सकलविद्याऽनुग्राहकतया सर्वकर्मानुष्ठानसाधनतया प्रधानत्वेन तथा व्यपदेशो युज्यते ।

Nanu pramāṇādipadārthaṣoḍaśake pratipādyamāne kathamidaṁ nyāyaśastramiti vyapadiśyate? Satyam. Tathā'pyasādhāraṇyena vyapadeśā bhavantīti nyāyena nyāyasya parārthānumānāparaparyāyasya sakalavidyā'nugrāhakatayā

sarvakarmānuṣṭhānasādhanatayā pradhānatvena tathā vyapadeśo yujyate.

But here an objector may say, "If these sixteen topics, proof, etc., are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has received the name of the Nyāya Śāstra, (as reasoning, *i.e., Nyāya*, or logic, properly forms only a small part of the topics which it treats of ?) We allow the force of the objection; still as names are proverbially said to be given for some special reason, we maintain that the name Nyāya was rightly applied to Gautama's system, since "reasoning," or inference for the sake of another, is justly held to be predominant feature from its usefulness in all kinds of knowledge, and from its being a necessary means for every kind of pursuit.

तथाभाणि सर्वज्ञेन-'सोऽयं परमो न्यायो विप्रतिपन्नपुरुषं प्रति प्रतिपादकत्वात् । तथा प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वाच्च' (न्या. सू. वार्तिक 1/1/1) इति । पक्षिलस्वामिना च-'सेयमान्वीक्षिकी विद्या प्रमाणादिभिः पदार्थैः प्रविभज्यमाना-

Tathābhāṇi sarvajñena—'So'yaṁ paramo nyāyo vipratipannapuruṣaṁ prati pratipādakatvāt. Tathā pravṛttihetutvācca' (Nyāya Sū. Vārtika 1/1/1) iti. Pakṣilasvāminā ca—'seyamānvīkṣikī vidyā pramāṇādibhiḥ padārthaiḥ pravibhajyamānā—

So, it has been said by Sarvajña, "This is te pre-eminent science of Nyāya from its establishing our doctrines against opponents, and from its producing action;"[1] and by Pakṣila Svāmin, "This is the science of reasoning (*ānvīkṣikī*) divided into the different categories, 'proof,' etc.

3. प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानामुपायः सर्वकर्मणाम् ।
अश्रयः सर्वधर्माणां विद्योद्देशे परीक्षिता ॥

(न्या. सू. भाष्य 1/1/1) इति ।

Pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānāmupāyaḥ sarvakarmaṇām,
Aśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṁ vidyoddeśe parīkṣitā.

(Nyāyasūtra Bhāṣya 1/1/1)

1 Action (*pravṛtti*) follows after the ascertainment of the truth by *nyāya*.

"The lamp of all sciences, the means for aiding all actions, the ultimate appeal of all religious duties, well proved in the declarations of science."[1]

Systematic Steps Towards Liberation

ननु तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसं भवतीत्युक्तम् । तत्र किं तत्त्वज्ञानादन्तरमेव निःश्रेयसं संपद्यते ? नेत्युच्यते । किन्तु तत्त्वज्ञानाद् 'दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः' (न्या. सू. 1/1/2) इति ।

Nanu tattvajñānānniḥśreyasaṁ bhavatītyuktam. Tatra kiṁ tattvajñānādantarameva niḥśreyasaṁ saṁpadyate? Netyucyate. Kintu tattvajñānād 'duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamithyājñānānā-muttarottarāpāye tadanantarāpāyādapavargaḥ' (Nyā. Sū. 1/1/2) iti.

But here an objector may say, "When you declare that final liberation arises from the knowledge of the truth, do you mean that liberation ensues immediately upon this knowledge being attained?" We reply, "No," for it is said in the second Nyāya aphorism, "Pain, birth, activity, faults, false notions,—on the successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before it," by means of this knowledge of the truth.

तत्र मिथ्याज्ञानं नामानात्मनि देहादावात्मबुद्धिः । तदनुकूलेषु रागः । तत्प्रतिकूलेषु द्वेषः । वस्तुतस्त्वात्मनः प्रतिकूलमनुकूलं वा न किंचिद्वत्स्वस्ति । परस्परानुबन्धित्वाच्च रागादीनां मूढो रज्यति, रक्तो मुह्यति, मूढः कुप्यति, कुपितो मुह्यतीति ।

Tatra mithyājñānaṁ nāmānātmani dehādāvātmabuddhiḥ. Tadanukūleṣu rāgaḥ. Tatpratikūleṣu dveṣaḥ. Vastutastvātmanaḥ pratikūlamanukūlaṁ vā na kiṁcidvatsvasti. Parasparānubandhitvācca rāgādīnāṁ mūḍho rajyati, rakto muhyati, mūḍhaḥ kupyati, kupito muhyatīti.

Now false notions are the thinking the body, etc., which are not the soul, to be the soul; "faults" are a desire for those things which seem agreeable to the soul, and a dislike to those things which seem disagreeable to it,[2] though in reality, nothing is either agree-

1 Cp. Vātsyāyana's Comment., p.6. The, Calcutta edition reads *prakirtitā* for *parikṣitā*.

2 The printed text omits the third faults, "a stupid indifference, *moha*," wich is however referred to presently.

able or disagreeable to the soul. And through the mutual reaction of these different "faults", the stupid man desires and the desiring man is stupid; the stupid man is angry, and the angry man is stupid.

ततस्तैर्दोषैः प्रेरित; प्राणी प्रतिषिद्धानि शरीरेण हिंसास्तेयादीनि आचरति । वाचा अनृतादीनि । मनसा परद्रोहादीनि । सेयं पापरूपा प्रवृत्तिरधर्मः शरीरेण प्रशस्तानि दानपरपरित्राणादीनि । वाचा हितसत्यादीनि । मनसा अजिघांसादीनि । सेयं पुण्यरूपा प्रवृत्तिर्धर्मः । सेयमुभयी प्रवृत्तिः ।

Tatastairdoṣaiḥ prerita; prāṇī pratiṣiddhāni śarīreṇa hiṁsāsteyādīni ācarati. Vācā anṛtādīni. Manasā paradrohādīni. Seyaṁ pāparūpā pravṛttiradharmaḥ śarīreṇa praśastāni dānaparaparitrāṇādīni. Vācā hitasatyādīni. Manasā ajighāṅsādīni. Seyaṁ puṇyarūpā pravṛttirdharmaḥ. Seyamubhayī pravṛttiḥ.

Moreover the man, impelled by these faults, does those things which are forbidden : thus, by the body he does injury, theft, etc.; by the voice, falsehood, etc.; by the mind, malevolence, etc.; and this same sinful "activity" produces demerit. Or, again, he may do laudable actions by his body, as alms, saving others, etc., truthful speaking, upright counsel, etc., by his voice, and guilelessness, etc., by his mind; and this same right activity produces merit.

ततः स्वानुरूपं प्रशस्तं निन्दितं वा जन्म पुनः शरीरादेः प्रादुर्भावः । तस्मिन् सति प्रतिकूलवेदनीयतया बाधनात्मकं दुःखं भवति । न ह्यप्रवृत्तस्य दुःखं प्रत्यापद्यत इति कश्चित्प्रपद्यते । त इमे मिथ्याज्ञानादयो दुःखान्ता अविच्छेदेन प्रवर्तमानाः संसारशब्दार्थो घटीचक्रवन्निरवधिरनुवर्तते ।

Tataḥ svānurūpaṁ praśastaṁ ninditaṁ vā janma punaḥ śarīrādeḥ prādurbhāvaḥ. Tasmin sati pratikūlavedanīyatayā bādhanātmakaṁ duḥkhaṁ bhavati. Na hyapravṛttasya duḥkhaṁ pratyāpadyata iti kaścitprapadyate. Ta ime mithyājñānādayo duḥkhāntā avicchedena pravartamānāḥ saṁsāraśabdārtho ghaṭīcakravanniravadhiranuvartate.

But both are forms of activity, and each lead to a similar laudable or blamable birth or bodily manifestation; and while this birth lasts, there arises the impression of "pain," which we are conscious of as of something that jars against us. Now this series, beginning with "false notions" and ending with "pain" is continually

going on, and is what we mean by the words "mundane existence," which rolls on ceaselessly, like a waterwheel.

यदा कश्चित्पुरुषधौरेयः पुराकृतसुकृतपरिपाकवशादाचार्योपदेशेन सर्वमिदं दुःखायतनं दुःखानुषक्तं च पश्यति, तदा तत्सर्वं हेयत्वेन बुध्यते । ततस्तन्निर्वर्तकमविद्यादि निर्वर्तयितुमिच्छति । तन्निवृत्त्युपायश्च तत्त्वज्ञानमिति ।

Yadā kaścitpuruṣadhaureyaḥ purākṛtasukṛtaparipākavaśādācāryopadeśena sarvamidaṁ duḥkhāyatanaṁ duḥkhānuṣaktaṁ ca paśyati, tadā tatsarvaṁ heyatvena budhyate. Tatastannirvartakamavidyādi nirvartayitumicchati. Tannivṛttyupāyaśca tattvajñānamiti.

And whenever some pre-eminent man, by the force of his previous good deeds, obtains through the teaching of a great teacher the knowledge that all this present life is only a scene of pain and bound up with pain, he recognises that it is all to be avoided, and desires to abolish the ignorance, etc., which are the causes that produced it.[1] Then he learns that the one means to abolish it is the knowledge of the truth.

कस्यचिच्चतसृभिर्विधाभिर्विभक्तं प्रमेयं भावयतः सम्यग्दर्शनपदवेदनीयतया तत्त्वज्ञानं जायते । तत्त्वज्ञानान्मिथ्याज्ञानमपैति । मिथ्याज्ञानापाये दोषा अपयान्ति । दोषापाये प्रवृत्तिरपैति । प्रवृत्त्यपाये जन्मापैति । जन्मापाये दुःखमत्यन्तं निवर्तते । सा आत्यन्तिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिरपवर्गः । निवृत्तेरात्यन्तिकत्वं नाम निवर्त्यसजातीयस्य पुनस्तत्रानुत्पाद इति । तथा च पारमर्षं सूत्रम्—दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः (न्या. सू. 1/1/2) इति ।

Kasyaciccatasṛbhirvidhābhirvibhaktaṁ prameyaṁ bhāvayataḥ samyagdarśanapadavedanīyatayā tattvajñānaṁ jāyate. Tattvajñānānmithyājñānamapaiti. Mithyājñānāpāye doṣā apayānti. Doṣāpāye pravṛttirapeti. Pravṛttyapāye janmāpaiti. Janmāpāye duḥkhamatyantaṁ nivartate. Sā ātyantikī duḥkhanivṛttirapavargaḥ. Nivṛtterātyantikatvaṁ nāma nivartyasajātīyasya punastatrānutpāda iti. Tathā ca pāramarṣaṁ sūtram—duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamithyājñānānā-muttarottarāpāye tadanantarāpāyādapavargaḥ. (Nyāya Sū. 1/1/2) iti.

And as he meditates on the objects of right knowledge divided into

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1 In p.116, line 3, I would read *tannirrartakam* for *tannivartakam*.

the four sciences,[1] there arises in his mind, the knowledge of the truth, or, in other words, a right view of things as they are; and from this knowledge of the truth false notions disappear. When false notions disappear, the "faults" pass away; with them ceases "activity;" and with it ceases "birth;"and with the cessation of "birth" comes the entire abolition of "pain," and this absolute abolition is final bliss. Its absoluteness consists in this, that nothing similar to that which is thus abolished can ever revive, as is expressly said in the second aphorism of the *Nyāya Sūtras* : "Pain, birth, activity, faults, false notions,—since, on the successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before it, there is [on the annihilation of the last of them] final beatitude."

Comparative Analysis of Liberation with that of Bauddha's Approach

ननु दुःखात्यन्तोच्छेदोऽपवर्ग इत्येतदद्यापि कफोणिगुडायितं वर्तते । तत्कथं सिद्धवत्कृत्य व्यवह्रियते इति चेत्–मैवम् । सर्वेषां मोक्षवादिनामपवर्गदशायामात्यन्तिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिरस्तीत्यस्यार्थस्य सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तसिद्धतया घण्टापथत्वात् । तथा हि—आत्मोच्छेदो मोक्ष इति माध्यमिकमते दुःखोच्छेदोऽस्तीत्येतावत्तावदविवादम् ।

Nanu duḥkhātyantocchedo'pavarga ityetadadyāpi kaphoṇiguḍāyitaṁ vartate. Tatkathaṁ siddhavatkṛtya vyavahriyate iti cet–maivam. Sarveṣāṁ mokṣavādināmapavargadaśāyāmātya- ntikī duḥkhanivṛttirastītyasyārthasya sarvatantrasiddhāntasiddhatayā ghaṇṭāpathatvāt. Tathā hi—ātmocchedo mokṣa iti mādhyamikamate duḥkhocchedo'stītyetāvattāvadavivādam.

"But is not your definition of the *summum bonum*, liberation, *i.e.*, 'the absolute abolition of pain,' after all as much beyond our reach as treacle on the elbow is to the tongue;[2] why then is this continually put forth as if it were established beyond all dispute?" We reply that as all those who maintain liberation in any form do include therein the absolute abolition of pain, our definition, as being thus, a tenet accepted in all the schools, may well be called the royal highway[1] of philosophy. No one, in fact, maintains that pain is possible without the individual's activity. Thus, even the Mādhyamika's opinion that "liberation consists in the abolition of soul," does not controvert our point, so far as any rate as that it is the abolition of pain.

1 This refers to the couplet so often quoted in Hindu authors, "Logic, the three Vedas, trade and agriculture, and the eternal doctrine of polity,—these four sciences are the causes of the stability of the world" (cf. Manu, vii.43). It occurs in Kāmandaki's *Nītisāra*, ii. 2, and seems to be referred to in Vātsyāyana's Com.p.3, from which Mādhava is here borrowing.

2 Compare the English proverb, "As soon as the cat can lick her ear."

अथ मन्येथाः–शरीरादिवदात्माऽपि दुःखहेतुत्वादुच्छेद्य इति तन्न संगच्छते । विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । किमात्मा ज्ञानसंतानो विवक्षितस्तदतिरिक्तो वा? प्रथमे न विप्रतिपत्तिः । कः खल्वनुकूलमाचरति प्रतिकूलमाचरेत्? द्वितीये तस्य नित्यत्वे निवृत्तिरशक्यविधानैव । अनित्यत्वे प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिः । व्यवहारानुपपत्तिश्चाधिकं दूषणम् । न खलु कश्चित्प्रेक्षावानात्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवतीति सर्वतः प्रियतमस्यात्मनः समुच्छेदाय प्रयतते । सर्वो हि प्राणी सति धर्मिणि मुक्त इति व्यवहरति ननु ।

Atha manyethāḥ—śarīrādivadātmā'pi duḥkhahetutvāducchedya iti tanna saṅgacchate. Vikalpānupapatteḥ. Kimātmā jñānasaṁtāno vivakṣitastadatirikto vā? Prathame na vipratipattiḥ. Kaḥ khalvanukūlamācarati pratikūlamācaret ? Dvitīye tasya nityatve nivṛttiraśakyavidhānaiva. Anityatve pravṛttyanupapattiḥ. Vyavahārānupapattiścādhikaṁ dūṣaṇam. Na khalu kaścitprekṣāvānātmanastu kāmāya sarvaṁ priyaṁ bhavatīti sarvataḥ priyatamasyātmanaḥ samucchedāya prayatate. Sarvo hi prāṇī sati dharmiṇi mukta iti vyavaharati nanu.

"But if you proceed to argue that the soul, as being the cause of pain, is to be abolished just like the body, etc., we reply that this does not hold, since it fails under either alternative. For do you mean by "the soul," (a) the continued succession of cognitions, or (b) something different therefrom? (a) If the former, we make no objection, (since we Naiyāyīkas allow that cognition is evanescent,[2] and we do desire to abolish cognition as a cause of *pravṛtti*

1 Literally the "bell-road," *i.e.*, "the chief road through a village, or that by which elephants, etc., decorated with tinkling ornaments, proceed."—*Wilson's Dict.*

2 The cognition is produced in the first moment, remains during the second, and ceases in the third.

or action[1]), for who would oppose a view which makes for his own side? (b) But if the latter, then, since it must be eternal,[2] its abolition is impossible; and, again, a second objection would be that no one would try to gain your supposed *"summum bonum;"* for surely, no sensible person would strive to annihilate the soul, which is always the dearest of all, on the principle that "everything else is dear for the soul's pleasure;" and, again everybody uses such a phrase as "liberated," (and this very term refutes the idea of annihilation or abolition).

Doctrine of Summum bonum

धर्मिनिवृत्तौ निर्मलज्ञानोदयो महोदय इति विज्ञानवादिवादे सामग्र्यभावः सामानाधिकरण्यानुपपत्तिश्च । भावनाचतुष्टयं हि तस्य कारणमभीष्टम् । तच्च क्षणभङ्गपक्षे स्थिरैकाधारासंभवात् लङ्घनाभ्यासादिवत् अनासादितप्रकर्षं न स्फुटमभिज्ञानमभिजनयितुं प्रभवति सोपप्लवस्य ज्ञानसन्तानस्य बद्धत्वे निरुपप्लवस्य च मुक्तत्वे यो बद्धः स एव मुक्त इति सामानाधिकरण्यं न संगच्छते ।

Dharminivṛttau nirmalajñānodayo mahodaya iti vijñānavādivāde sāmagryabhāvaḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyānupapattiśca. Bhāvanācatuṣṭayaṁ hi tasya kāraṇamabhīṣṭam. Tacca kṣaṇabhaṅgapakṣesthiraikādhārāsaṁbhavāt laṅghanābhyāsādivat anāsāditaprakarṣaṁ na sphuṭamabhijñānamabhijanayituṁ prabhavati sopaplavasya jñānasantānasya baddhatve nirupaplavasya ca muktatve yo baddhaḥ sa eva mukta iti sāmānādhikaraṇyaṁ na saṅgacchate.

"But why not say with those Bauddhas who hold the doctrine of pure intelligence (i.e., the Yogācāras and the Sautrāntikas[3]), that 'the *summum bonum*' is the rising of pure intelligence consequent on the cessation of the conscious subject?" To this view, we object that there is an absence of means; and also it cannot be established that the locus (or subject) of the two states is the same. For the former, if it is replied that the well-known fourfold set of Bauddha

1 See Nyāya Sūt.i.2.

2 As otherwise why should we require liberation at all? Or rather the author probably assumes that other Naiyāyikas have sufficiently established this point against its opponents, cf. p.167, line 11.

3 See *supra*, pp.24-32.

contemplations[1] are to be accepted as the cause, we answer that, as (according to the Buddha, tenet of the momentary existence of all things) there cannot be one abiding subject of these contemplations, they will necessarily exercise a languid power like studies pursued at irregular intervals, and be thus ineffectual to produce any distinct recognition to the real nature of things.

And for the latter, since the continued series of cognitions when accompanied by the natural obstacles[2] is said to be "bound," and when freed from those obstacles is said to be "liberated," you cannot establish an identity of the subject in the two states so as to be able to say that the very same being which was bound is now liberated.

Liberation as per Jainas Outlook

आवरणमुक्तिर्मुक्तिरिति जैनमताभिमतोऽपि मार्गो न निसर्गतो निरर्गलः । अङ्ग, भवान्पृष्टो व्याचष्टां किमावरणम् । धर्माधर्मभ्रान्तय इति चेत्–इष्टमेव । अथ देहमेवावरणम् । तथा च तन्निवृत्तौ पञ्जरान्मुक्तस्य शुकस्येवात्मनः सततोर्ध्वगमनं मुक्तिरिति चेत्–तदा वक्तव्यम् ।

Āvaraṇamuktirmuktiriti jainamatābhimato'pi mārgo na nisargato nirargalaḥ. Aṅga, bhavānpṛṣṭo vyācaṣṭāṁ kimāvaraṇam. Dharmādharmabhrāntaya iti cet—iṣṭameva. Atha dehamevāvaraṇam. Tathā ca tannivṛttau pañjarānmuktasya śukasyevātmanaḥ satatosdhvagamanaṁ muktiriti cet—tadā vaktavyam.

Nor do we find the path of the Jainas, viz., that "Liberation is the releasing from all 'obstructions,'" a path entirely free from bars to impede the wayfarer. Pray, will our Jaina friend kindly inform us what he means ; by "obstruction"?[3] If he answers "merit, demerit, and error," we readily grant what he says. But if he maintains that "the body is the true obstruction, and hence Liberation is the continual upspringing of the soul consequent on the body's annihilation, as of a parrot released from its cage,"

किमयमात्मा मूर्तोऽमूर्तो वा? प्रथमे निरवयवः सावयवो वा ? निरवयवत्वे

1 All is momentary, all is pain, all is *sui generis*, all is unreal.

2 In the form of the various *kleśas* or "afflictions."

3 *Āvaraṇa*, cf. pp. 55, 58.

निरवयवो मूर्तः परमाणुरिति परमाणुलक्षणापत्त्या परमाणुधर्मवदात्मधर्माणामतीन्द्रियत्वं प्रसजेत् । सावयवत्वे यत्सावयवं तदनित्यमिति प्रतिबन्धबलेनानित्यत्वापत्तौ कृतप्रणाशाकृताभ्यागमौ निष्प्रतिबन्धौ प्रसरेताम् ।

Kimayamātmā mūrto'mūrto vā? Prathame niravayavaḥ sāvayavo vā? Niravayavatve niravayavo mūrtaḥ paramāṇuriti paramāṇulakṣaṇāpattyā paramāṇudharmavadātmadharmāṇāmatīndriyatvaṁ prasajet. Sāvayavatve yatsāvayavaṁ tadanityamiti pratibandhabalenānityatvāpattau kṛtapraṇāśākṛtābhyāgamau niṣpratibandhau prasaretām.

अमूर्तत्वे गमनमनुपपन्नमेव । चलनात्मिकायाः क्रियायामूर्तत्वप्रतिबन्धात् ।

Amūrtatve gamanamanupapannameva. Calanātmikāyāḥ kriyāyāmūrtatvapratibandhāt.

Then we must inquire whether this said soul possesses form or not. If it possesses form, then has it parts or not? If it has no parts, then, since the well-known definition on an atom will apply here as "that which has form without parts," it will follow that the attributes of the soul are, like those of an atom, imperceptible to the senses.[1] If you say that it has parts, then the general maxim that "whatever has parts is non-eternal," would necessitate that the soul is non-eternal; and if this were conceded, then two grand difficulties (against the Providential course of the world) would burst in unopposed, viz., that what the soul has done would, at its cessation, perish with it (and thus fail of producing the proper fruit), while it would have reaped during life, the effects of what it had not done (as the good and evil which happened to it would not be the consequences of its actions in a former birth). If, on the other hand, the Jaina maintains that the soul does not possess form at all, then how can he talk of the soul's "upspringing," since all such actions as motion necessarily involve an agent possessing form?[2]

True Liberation as per Cārvāka and Sāṅkhya Systems

'पारतन्त्र्यं बन्धः, स्वातन्त्र्यं मोक्षः' इति चार्वाकपक्षेऽपि स्वातन्त्र्यं

1 But the Nyāya holds that the attributes of the soul, as happiness, desire, aversion, etc., are perceived by the internal sense, mind (*Bhāṣā* P. No. 83).

2 The reading *mūrtapratibandhāt* is difficult, but I believe that *pratibandha* means here *vyāpti*, as it does in *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, i.100.

दुःखनिवृत्तिश्चेत्–अविवादः । ऐश्वर्यं चेत्–सातिशयतया सदृक्षतया च प्रेक्षावतां नाभिमतम् ।

'Pāratantryaṁ bandhaḥ', svātantryaṁ mokṣaḥ' iti cārvākapakṣe'pi svātantryaṁ duḥkhanivṛttiścet—avivādaḥ. Aiśvaryaṁ cet—sātiśayatayā sadṛkṣatayā ca prekṣāvatāṁ nābhimatam.

Again, if we take the Cārvāka's view "that the only bondage is dependence on another, and therefore, independence is the true liberation," —if by "independence" he means the cessation of pain, we have no need to controvert it. But if he means autocratic power, then no sensible man can concede it, as the very idea of earthly power involves the idea of capability of being increased and of being equalled.[1]

प्रकृतिपुरुषान्यत्वख्यातौ प्रकृत्युपरमे पुरुषस्य स्वरूपेणावस्थानं मुक्तिरिति सांख्याख्यातेऽपि पक्षे दुःखोच्छेदोऽस्त्येव । विवेकज्ञानं पुरुषाश्रयं प्रकृत्याश्रयं वेत्येतावदवशिष्यते । तत्र पुरुषाश्रयमिति न श्लिष्यते । पुरुषस्य कौटस्थ्यावस्थाननिरोधापातात् । नापि प्रकृत्याश्रयः । अचेतनत्वात्तस्याः ।

Prakṛtipuruṣānyatvakhyātau prakṛtyuparame puruṣasya svarūpeṇāvasthānaṁ muktiriti sāṅkhyākhyāte'pi pakṣe duḥkhocchedo'styeva. Vivekajñānaṁ puruṣāśrayaṁ prakṛtyāśrayaṁ vetyetāvadavaśiṣyate. Tatra puruṣāśrayamiti na śliaṣyate. Puruṣasya kauṭasthyāvasthānanirodhāpātāt. Nāpi prakṛtyāśrayaḥ. Acetanatvāttasyāḥ.

Again, the Sāṅkhya opinion, which first lays down that nature and soul are utterly distinct, and then holds that "liberation is the soul's remaining as it is in itself after nature (on being known) has withdrawn," —even this opinion accepts our tenet of the abolition of pain; but there is left a difficulty as to whether this cognition of the distinction between nature and soul resides in the soul or in nature. It is not consistent to say that it resides in the soul, since the soul is held to be unchangeable, and this would seem to involve that previously it had been hampered by ignorance; nor can we say that it resides in nature, since nature is always held to be unintelligent.

किं च प्रकृतिः प्रवृत्तिस्वभावा निवृत्तिस्वभावा वा ? आद्येऽनिर्मोक्षः स्वभावस्यानपायात् । द्वितीये संप्रति संसारोऽस्तमियात् ।

1 The ture *summum bonum* must be *niratiśaya*,—incapable of being added to.

Kiṁ ca prakṛtiḥ pravṛttisvabhāvā nivṛttisvabhāvā vā? Ādye'nirmokṣaḥ svabhāvasyānapāyāt. Dvitīye saṁprati saṁsāro'stamiyāt.

Moreover, is nature, spontaneously active or inactive? If the former, then it follows that there can be no liberation at all, since, the spontaneous actions of things cannot be set aside; and if the latter, the course of mundane existence would at once cease to go on.

Liberation as per the Doctrine of Bhaṭṭa Sarvajña

नित्यनिरतिशयसुखाभिव्यक्तिर्मुक्तिरिति भट्टसर्वज्ञाद्यभिमतेऽपि दुःखनिवृत्तिरभिम-तैव । परं तु नित्यसुखं न प्रमाणपद्धतिमध्यास्ते । श्रुतिस्तत्रप्रमाणमिति चेत्–न- । योग्यानुपलब्धिबाधिते तदनवकाशात् । अवकाशे वा ग्रावप्लवेऽपि तथाभावप्रसङ्गात् ।

Nityaniratiśayasukhābhivyaktirmuktiriti bhaṭṭasarvajñādyabhimate'pi duḥkhanivṛttirabhimataiva. Paraṁ tu nityasukhaṁ na pramāṇapaddhatimadhyāste. Śrutistatrapramāṇamiti cet—na. Yogyānupalabdhibādhite tadanavakāśat. Avakāśe vā grāvaplave'pi tathābhāvaprasaṅgāt.

Again, we have the same recognition of our "abolition of pain" in the doctrine of Bhaṭṭa Sarvajña and his followers, that "Liberation is the manifestation of an eternal happiness incapable of being increased;" but here we have the difficulty that an eternal happiness does not come within the range of definite proof. If you allege Śruti as the proof, we reply that Śruti has no place when the thing itself is precluded by a valid non-perception;[1] or if you allow its authority, then you will have to concede the existence of such things as floating stones.[2]

Liberation in the Eyes of Naiyāyikas

ननु सुखाभिव्यक्तिर्मुक्तिरिति पक्षं परित्यज्य दुःखनिवृत्तिरेव मुक्तिरिति स्वीकारः क्षीरं विहायारोचकग्रस्तस्य सौवीररुचिमनुभावयतीति चेत्–तदेतन्नाटकपक्षपतितं त्वद्वच इत्युपेक्ष्यते । सुखस्य सातिशयतया सादृक्षतया बहुप्रत्यनीकाक्रान्ततया

1 *Yogyānupalabdhi* is when an object is not seen, and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, as the eye, light, etc.

2 Alluding to the Vedic phrase, "*grāvānaḥ plavanti*," see Uttara Naiṣadha, xvii. 37. The phrase *aśmānaḥ plavanti* occurs in Shaḍv. Br. 5, 12.

साधनप्रार्थनपरिक्लिष्टतया च दुःखाविनाभूतत्वेन विषानुषक्तमधुवद् दुःखपक्षनिक्षेपात् ।

Nanu sukābhivyaktirmuktiriti pakṣam parityajya duḥkhanivṛttireva muktiriti svīkāraḥ kṣīraṁ vihāyārocakagrastasya sauvīrarucimanubhāvayatīti cet—tadetannāṭakapakṣapatitaṁ tvadvaca ityupekṣyate. Sukhasya sātiśayatayā sādṛkṣatayā bahupratyanīkākrāntatayā sādhanaprārthanaparikliṣṭatayā ca duḥkhāvinābhūtatvena viṣānuṣaktamadhuvad duḥkhapakṣanikṣepāt.

"But if you give up the view that 'liberation is the manifestation of happiness,' and then accept such a view as that which holds it to be only the cessation of pain, does not your conduct resemble that of the dyspeptic patient who refused sweet milk and preferred sour ricegruel?" Your satire, however, falls powerless, as fitter for some speech in a play (rather than for a grave philosophical argument). The truth is that all happiness must be included under the category of pain, since, like honey mixed with poison, it is always accompanied by pain, either as admitting of increase,[1] or as being an object or perception, or as being exposed to many hostile influences, or as involving an irksome necessity of seeking all kinds of instruments for its production.

नन्वेकमनुसंधित्सतोऽपर प्रच्यवत इति न्यायेन दुःखवत्सुखमप्युच्छिद्यत इत्यकाम्योऽयं पक्ष इति चेत्–मैवं मंस्थाः । सुखसम्पादने दुःखसाधनबाहुल्यानुषङ्गनियमेन तप्तायःपिण्डे तपनीयबुद्ध्या प्रवर्तमानेन साम्यापातात् । तथा हि–न्यायोपार्जितेषु विषयेषु कियन्तः सुखखद्योताः कियन्ति दुःखदुर्दिनानि । अन्यायोपार्जितेषु तु यद् भविष्यति तन्मनसाऽपि चिन्तयितुं न शक्यमिति ।

Nanvekamanusaṁdhitsato'para pracyavata iti nyāyena duḥkhavatsukhamapyucchidyata ityakāmyo'yaṁ pakṣa iti cet—maivaṁ maṁsthāḥ. Sukhasampādane duḥkhasādhanabāhulyānuṣaṅganiyamena taptāyaḥpiṇḍe tapanīyabuddhyā pravartamānena sāmyāpātāt. Tathā hi—nyāyopārjiteṣu viṣayeṣu kiyantaḥ sukhakhadyotāḥ kiyanti duḥkhadurdināni. Anyāyopārjiteṣu tu yad bhaviṣyati tanmanasā'pi cintayituṁ na śakyamiti.

1 Or perhaps "capable of being surpassed."

Nor may you retort on us that we have fulfilled the proverb of "seeking one thing and dropping another in the search," since, we have abolished happiness as being ever tainted by some incidental pain, and, at the same time, our own favourite alternative is one which no one can consider desirable. For the truth is that any attempt to establish happiness as the *summum bonum*, since it is inevitably accompanied by various causes of pain, is only like the man who would try to grasp a red-hot ball of iron under the delusion that it was gold. In the case of objects of enjoyment got together by rightful means, we may find many firefly— like pleasures; but then how many are the rainy days to drown them? And in the case of those got together by wrong means, the mind cannot even conceive the future issue which will be brought about.

एतत्स्वानुभवमप्रच्छादयन्तः सन्तो विदांकुर्वन्तु विदां वरा भवन्तः । तस्मात्परिशेषात् परमेश्वरानुग्रहवशात् श्रवणादिक्रमेण आत्मतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारवतः पुरुषधौरेयस्य दुःखनिवृत्तिरात्यन्तिकी निःश्रेयसमिति निरवद्यम् ।

Etatsvānubhavamapracchādayantaḥ santo vidāṁkurvantu vidāṁ varā bhavantaḥ. Tasmātpariśeṣāt parameśvarānugrahavaśāt śravaṇādikrameṇa ātmatattvasākṣātkāravataḥ. Puruṣadhaureyasya duḥkhanivṛttirātyantikī niḥśreyasamiti niravadyam.

Let our intelligent readers consider all this, and not attempt to disguise their own conscious experience. Therefore, it is that we hold it as indisputable that for him, pre-eminent among his fellows, who, through the favour of the Supreme Being, has, by the regular method of listening to the revealed Śruti, etc., attained unto the knowledge of the real nature of the soul, for him the absolute abolition of pain is the true Liberation.

Existence of Perception, Inference or Śruti—A Former View

नन्वीश्वरसद्भावे किं प्रमाणं प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमागमो वा । न तावदत्र प्रत्यक्षं क्रमते । रूपादिरहितत्वेनातीन्द्रियत्वात् । नाप्यनुमानम् । तद्व्याप्तलिङ्गाभावात् । नागमः । विकल्पासहत्वात् । किं नित्योऽवगमयति अनित्यो वा ? आद्येऽपसिद्धान्तापातः । द्वितीये परस्पराश्रयापातः । उपमानादिकमशक्यशङ्कम् । नियतविषयत्वात् । तस्मादीश्वरः शशविषाणायत इति चेत्–

Nanvīśvarasadbhāve kiṁ pramāṇaṁ pratyakṣamanumānamāgamo vā. Na tāvadatra pratyakṣaṁ kramate. Rūpādirahitatvenātīndriyatvāt. Nāpyanumānaṃ. Tadvyāptaliṅgābhāvāt. Nāgamaḥ. Vikalpāsahatvāt. Kiṁ nityo'vagamayati anityo vā? Ādye'pasiddhāntāpātaḥ. Dvitīye parasparāśrayāpātaḥ. Upamānādikamaśakyaśaṅkaṃ. Niyataviṣayatvāt. Tasmādīśvaraḥ śaśaviṣāṇāyata iti cet—

But it may be objected, "Is there any proof at all at the existence of a Supreme Being, *i.e.*, perception, inference, or Śruti ? Certainly, perception cannot apply here, since the Deity, as devoid of form, etc., must be beyond the senses. Nor can inference hold, since there is no universal proposition or true middle term which can apply.[1] Nor can Śruti, since neither of the resulting alternatives can be sustained; for is it supposed to reveal, as being itself eternal, or as non-eternal ? Under the former view, an established tenet of our school would be contradicted (viz., that the Veda is non-eternal); under the latter, we should be only arguing in a circle.[2] As for comparison and any other proof which might be adduced (as that sometimes called presumption, etc.,) , they need not be thought of for a moment, as their object matter is definitely limited, and cannot apply to the present case.[3] Therefore, the Supreme Being seems to be as unreal as a hare's horn."

Existence of Almighty

तदेतन्न चतुरचेतसां चेतसि चमत्कारमाविष्करोति । विवादास्पदं नगसागरादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वात्कुम्भवत् । न चायमसिद्धो हेतुः । सावयवत्वेन तस्य सुसाधनत्वात् । ननु किमिदं सावयवत्वम् ? अवयवसंयोगित्वमवयवसमवायित्वं वा ? नाद्यः । गगनादौ व्यभिचारात् । न द्वितीयः तन्तुत्वादावनैकान्त्यात् ।

Tadetanna caturacetasāṁ cetasi camatkāramāviṣkaroti. Vivādāspadaṁ nagasāgarādikaṁ sakartṛkaṁ kāryatvātkumbhavat. Na cāyamasiddho hetuḥ. Sāvayavatvena tasya susādhanatvāt. Nanu kimidaṁ sāvayavatvaṃ? Avayavasaṁyogitvamavayavasamavāyitvaṁ vā? Nādyaḥ. Gaganādau vyabhicārāt. Na dvitīyaḥ tantutvādāvanaikāntyāt.

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1 Since, the Supreme Being is a single instance.

2 Since, the Veda, if non-eternal, must (to be authoritative) have been created by God, and yet it is brought forward to reveal the existence of God.

3 The Nyāya holds presumption to be included under inference, and comparison is declared to be ascertaining the relation of a name to the thing named.

But all this elaborate disputation need excite no flurry in the breast of the intelligent, as it can be at once met by the old argument, "The mountain, seas, etc., must have had a maker from their possessing the nature of effects just like a jar." (a) Nor can our middle term (possessing the nature of effects) be rejected as unproved *(asiddha)*, since it can be established beyond a doubt by the fact of the subject's possessing parts. "But what are we to understand by this 'possessing parts'? It is 'existing in contact with parts,' or 'in intimate relation with parts'? It cannot be the first, since this would equally apply to such eternal things as either,[1] etc.; nor can it be the second, since this would prove too much, as applying to such cases as the (eternal) species, thread, which abides in intimate relation with the individual threads.

तस्मादनुपपन्नमिति चेत्–मैवं वादीः समवेतद्रव्यत्वं सावयवत्वमिति निरुक्तेर्वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् । अवान्तरमहत्त्वेन वा कार्यत्वानुमानस्य सुकरत्वात् ।

Tasmādanupapannamiti cet—maivaṁ vādīḥ samavetadravyatvaṁ sāvayavatvamiti nirūktervaktuṁ śakyatvāt. Avāntaramahattvena vā kāryatvānumānasya sukaratvāt.

It therefore, fails as a middle term for your argument." We reply, that it holds if we explain the "possessing parts" as "belonging to the class of those substances which exist in intimate relation."[2] Or we may adopt another view and maintain that it is easy to infer the "possessing the nature of effects" from the consideration of their possessing intermediate magnitude.[3]

नापि विरुद्धो हेतुः । साध्यविपर्ययव्याप्तेरभावात् । नाप्यनैकान्तिकः । पक्षादन्यत्र वृत्तेरदर्शनात् । नापि कलात्ययापदिष्टः । बाधकानुपलम्भात् । नापि सत्प्रतिपक्षः। प्रतिभटादर्शनात् ।

1 Since, either is connected by contact with the parts of everything, as *e.g.*, a jar.

2 The whole (as the jar) resides by intimate relation in its parts (as the jar's two halves). But the eternal substances, either, time, the soul, mind, and the atoms of earth, water, fire, and air, do not thus, reside in anything, although, of course, the category *viśeṣa* does reside in them by intimate relation. The word "substances" excludes *tantutva*, and "existing in intimate relation" excludes ether, etc.

3 Intermediate between infinite and infinitesimal, all eternal substances being the one or the other.

Nāpi viruddho hetuḥ. Sādhyaviparyayavyāpterabhāvāt. Nāpyanaikāntikaḥ. Pakṣādanyatra vṛtteradarśanāt. Nāpi kalātyayāpadiṣṭaḥ. Bādhakānupalambhāt. Nāpi satpratipakṣaḥ. Pratibhaṭādarśanāt.

(b) Nor can our middle term be rejected as "contradictory" *(viruddha)*,[1] since there is no such acknowledge, universal proposition connected with it as would establish the opposite major term to that in our syllogism (i.e., that they must have had no maker). (c) Nor is our middle term too general *(anaikānta)*, since it is never found in opposite instances (such as the lake, which is the *vipakṣa* in the argument, "The mountain has fire because it has smoke"). (d) Nor again is it precluded (*bādhita or kālātyayopadiṣta*), for there is no superior evidence to exercise such a precluding power. (e) Nor is it counterbalanced (*sat-pratipakṣita*), for there does not appear to be any such equally valid antagonist.

ननु नगादिकमकर्तृकं शरीराजन्यत्वाद् गगनवदिति चेत्–नैतत्परीक्षाममीक्ष्यते । न हि कठोरकण्ठीरवस्य कुरङ्गशावः प्रतिभटो भवति । अजन्यत्वस्यैव समर्थतया शरीरविशेषणवैयर्थ्यात् ।

Nanu nagādikamakartṛkaṁ śarīrājanyatvād gaganavaditi cet—naitatparīkṣāmamīkṣyate. Na hi kaṭhorakaṇṭhīravasya kuraṅgaśāvaḥ pratibhaṭo bhavati. Ajanyatvasyaiva samarthatayā śarīraviśeṣaṇavaiyarthyāt.

If you bring forward as an antagonistic syllogism, "The mountains, etc., cannot have had a maker, from the fact that they were not produced by a body, just as is the case with the eternal ether,"—this pretended inference will no more stand examination than the young fawn can stand the attack of the full-grown lion; for the additional words "by a body" are useless, since "from the fact that they were not produced" would be a sufficient middle term by itself (and the argument thus involves the fallacy called *vyāpyatvāsiddhi)*.[2]

1 The *viruddha-hetu* is that which is never found where the major term is.

2 This and much more of the whole discussion is taken from the *Kusumāñjali*, v.2, and I extract my note on the passage there. "The older Naiyāyikas maintained that the argument 'the mountain has fire because it has blue smoke,' involved the fallacy of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*, because the al-

तर्ह्यजन्यत्वमेव साधनमिति चेत्–न असिद्धेः । नापि सोपाधिकत्व-शङ्काकलङ्काङ्कुरः सम्भवी । अनुकूलतर्कसम्भवात् ।
यद्ययमकर्तृकः स्यात्कार्यमपि न स्यात् । इह जगति नास्त्येव तत्कार्यं नाम यत्कारकचक्रमवधीर्यात्मानमासादयेदित्येतदविवादम् । तच्च सर्वं कर्तृविशेषोपहितमर्यादम् ।

Tarhyajanyatvameva sādhanamiti cet—na asiddheḥ. Nāpi sopādhikatvaśaṅkākalaṅkāṅkuraḥ sambhavī. Anukūlatarkasambhavāt.

Yadyayamakartṛkaḥ syātkāryamapi na syāt. Iha jagati nāstyeva tatkāryaṁ nāma yatkārakacakramavadhīryātmānamāsādayedityetadavivādam. Tacca sarvaṁ kartṛviśeṣopahitamaryādam.

Nor can you retort, "Well, let this then be our middle term;" for you cannot establish it as a real fact. Nor again is it possible to raise the smallest shadow of a fear lest our middle term should be liable to limitation by any suggested condition (*upādhi*),[1] (such as "the being produced by a corporeal agent," to limit our old reason "from having the nature of effects"), because we have on our side, a valid line of argument to establish our view, viz., "If the mountains, etc., had no maker, then they would not be effects" (but all do acknowledge that they have the nature of effects), for in this world that is not an effect which can attain its proper nature independently of any series of concurrent causes.

Kartā and His Characteristics

कर्तृत्वं चेतरकारकाप्रयोज्यत्वे सति सकलकारकप्रयोक्तृत्वलक्षणं ज्ञानचिकीर्षाप्रयत्नाधारत्वम् । एवं च कर्तृव्यावृत्तेस्तदुपहितसमस्तकारकव्यावृत्तौ अकारणककार्योत्पादप्रसङ्ग इति स्थूलः प्रमादः । तथा निरटङ्कि शङ्करकिङ्करेण–

Kartṛtvaṁ cetarakārakāprayojyatve sati sakalakārakaprayoktṛtvalakṣaṇaṁ jñānacikīrṣāprayatnādhāratvaṃ. Evaṁ ca kartṛvayāvṛttestadupahitasamastakārakavyāvṛttau akāraṇakakāryotpādaprasaṅga iti sthūlaḥ pramādaḥ. Tathā niraṭaṅki śaṅkarakiṅkareṇa–

And this series inevitably involves the idea of some sort of maker; and I mean by "being a maker" the being possessed of that combination of volition, desire to act, and knowledge of the proper means, which sets in motion all other causes, but is itself set in motion by none. And hence, we hold that if the necessity of a maker were overthrown, the necessity of the action of all the other causes would be simultaneously overthrown, since these are dependent thereon; and this would lead to the monstrous doctrine that effects could be produced without any causes at all. There is a rule laid down by Śaṅkara-kiṅkara which applies directly to the present case –

4. अनुकूलेन तर्केण सनाथे सति साधने ।
साध्यव्यापकताभङ्गात्पक्षे नोपाधिसम्भवः ॥ इति ।

Anukūlena tarkeṇa sanāthe sati sādhane,
Sādhyavyāpakatābhaṅgātpakṣe nopādhisambhavaḥ. iti.

"When a middle term is accompanied by a sound argument to establish its validity,
"Then you cannot attempt to supply a limiting condition on account of the (supposed) non-invariable concomitance of major term."

यदीश्वरः कर्ता स्यात्तर्हि शरीरी स्यादित्यादिप्रतिकूलतर्कजातं जागर्तीति चेत्–ईश्वरसिद्ध्यसिद्धिभ्यां व्याघातः । तदुदितमुदयनेन–

Yadīśvaraḥ kartā syāttarhi śarīrī syādityādipratikūlatarkajātaṁ jāgartīti cet—īśvarasiddhyasiddhibhyāṁ vyāghātaḥ. Taduditamudayanena—

If you maintain that there are many sound counter-arguments, such as "If the Supreme Being were a maker, He would be possessed of a body ," etc., we reply, that all such reasoning is equally inconsistent, whether we allow that Supreme Being's existence to be established or not.[1] As has been said by Udayana Ācārya (in the *Kusumāñjali*, iii. 5) –

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leged middle term was unnecessarily restricted (see *Siddhānta Muktāv.* p.77). The moderns, however, more wisely consider it as a harmless error, and they would rather meet the objection by asserting that there is no proof to establish the validity of the assumed middle term."

1 For the *upādhi* cf. pp. 7, 8.

1 As in the former case it would be clear that it is a subject for separate discussion; and in the latter you would be liable to the fault of *āśrayāsiddhi*, a "baseless inference," since your subject (or minor term),

5. आगमादेः प्रमाणत्वे बाधनादिनिषेधनम् ।
आभासत्वे तु सैव स्यादाश्रयासिद्धिरुद्धता ।। (न्या. कु. 3/5) इति ।

Āgamādeḥ pramāṇatve bādhanādiniṣedhanam,
Ābhāsatve tu saiva syādāśrayāsiddhiruddhatā.
(Nyāyakusumāñjali 3/5) iti

"If Śruti, etc., have any authority, your negative argument fails from being precluded; if they are fallacious, our old objection of a 'baseless inference' returns stronger than ever."

न च विशेषविरोधः शक्यशङ्कः । ज्ञातत्वाज्ञातत्वविकल्पपराहतत्वात् ।

Na ca viśeṣavirodhaḥ śakyaśaṅkaḥ. Jñātatvājñātatvavikalpaparāhatatvāt.

Nor need we fear the possibility of any other contradiction to our argument, since it would be overthrown by either alternative of God's being known or unknown.[1]

Creation of World by God : A Former View

स्यादेतत् । परमेश्वरस्य जगन्निर्माणे प्रवृत्तिः किमर्था ? स्वार्था परार्था वा ? आद्येऽपि, इष्टप्राप्त्यर्थाऽनिष्टपरिहारार्था वा ? नाद्यः । अवाप्तसकलकामस्य तदनुपपत्तेः । अत एव न द्वितीयः । द्वितीये प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिः । कः खलु परार्थं प्रवर्तमानं प्रेक्षावानित्याचक्षीत ?

Syādetat. Parameśvarasya jagannirmāṇe pravṛttiḥ kimarthā? Svārthā parārthā vā? Ādye'pi, iṣṭaprāptyarthā'niṣṭaparihārārthā vā? Nādyaḥ. Avāptasakalakāmasya tadanupapatteḥ. Ata eva na dvitīyaḥ. Dvitīye pravṛttyanupapattiḥ. Kaḥ khalu parārthaṁ pravartamānaṁ prekṣāvānityācakṣīta?

"Well, let all this be granted; but the activity of God in creating the world, what end did it have in view? His own advantage or

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being itself non-existent, cannot be the locus or subject of a negation (cf. *Kusumāñjali*, iii.2). "Just as that subject from which a given attribute is excluded cannot be unreal, so neither can an unreal thing be the subject of a negation."

1 If God is known, then His existence must be granted; if He is not known, how can we argue about Him? I read lines 15,16, in p. 120 of the Calcutta edition, *vikalpaparāhatatvāt*, and then begin the next clause with *syād etat*. The printed text, *vikalpaparāhataḥ syāt tad etat*, seems unintelligible.

some other beings ? If it was for the former end, was it in order to attain something desired, or to avoid something not desired? It could not be the first, because this would be quite incongruous in a being who possesses every possible desire gratified; and for the same reason too it could not be the second. If it was for the latter end (the advantage of another) it would be equally incongruous; for who would call that being "wise" who busied himself in acting for another? "

अथ करुणया प्रवृत्त्युपपत्तिरित्याचक्षीत कश्चित्, तं प्रत्याचक्षीत । तर्हि सर्वान् प्राणिनः सुखिन एव सृजेदीश्वरः । न दुःखशबलान् । करुणाविरोधात् । स्वार्थमनपेक्ष्य परदुःखप्रहाणेच्छा हि कारुण्यम् । तस्मादीश्वरस्य जगत्सर्जनं न युज्यते । तदुक्तं भट्टाचार्यैः–

Atha karuṇayā pravṛttyupapattirityācakṣīta kaścit, taṁ pratyācakṣīta. Tarhi sarvān prāṇinaḥ sukhina eva sṛjedīśvaraḥ. Na duḥkhaśabalān. Karuṇāvirodhāt. Svārthamanapekṣya paraduḥkhaprahāṇecchā hi kāruṇyam. Tasmādīśvarasya jagatsarjanaṁ na yujyate. Taduktaṁ bhaṭṭācāryaiḥ—

If you replied that His activity was justified by compassion, any one would at once retort that this feeling of compassion should have rather induced Him to create all living beings happy, and not checkered with misery, since, this militates against His compassion; for we define compassion as the disinterested wish to avoid causing another pain. Hence, we conclude that it is not befitting for God to create the world. This has been said by Bhaṭṭācārya –

6. प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते ।
जगच्च सृजतस्तस्य किं नाम न कृतं भवेत् ।। इति ।

Prayojanamanuddiśya na mando'pi pravartate,
Jagacca sṛjatastasya kiṁ nāma na kṛtaṁ bhavet. iti.

"Not even a fool acts without some object in view;"

"Suppose that God did not create the world, what end would be left undone by Him?" –

Doctrine Inherent of God Created Universe

अत्रोच्यते–नास्तिकशिरोमणे ! तावदीर्ष्याकषायिते चक्षुषी निमील्य परिभावयतु भवान् । करुणया प्रवृत्तिरस्त्येव । न च निसर्गतः सुखमयसर्गप्रसङ्गः । सृज्यप्राणिकृतदुष्कृतसुकृतपरिपाकविशेषाद् वैषम्योपपत्तेः । न च स्वातन्त्र्यभङ्ग

शङ्कनीयः । स्वाङ्गं स्वव्यवधायकं न भवतीति न्यायेन प्रत्युत तन्निर्वाहात् । 'एक एव रुद्रो न द्वितीयोऽवतस्थे' (तै. सं. 1/8/6) इत्यादिरागमस्तत्र प्रमाणम् ।

Atrocyate—nāstikaśiromaṇe! Tāvadīrṣyākaṣāyite cakṣuṣī nimīlya paribhāvayatu bhavān. Karuṇayā pravṛttirastyeva. Na ca nisargataḥ sukhamayasargaprasaṅgaḥ. Sṛjyaprāṇikṛtaduṣkṛta sukṛtaparipākaviśeṣād vaiṣamyopapatteḥ. Na ca svātantryabhaṅga śaṅkanīyaḥ. Svāṅgaṁ svavyavadhāyakaṁ na bhavatīti nyāyena pratyuta tannirvāhāt. 'Eka eva rudro na dvitīyo'vatasthe' (Tai. Saṁ. 1/8/6) ityādirāgamastatra pramāṇaṃ.

We reply, O thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school, be pleased for a moment to close thy envy-dimmed eyes and to consider the following suggestions. His action in creation is indeed solely caused by compassion; but the idea of a creation which shall consist only of happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things, since there cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which will ripen from the good or evil actions of the beings who are to be created. Nor need you object that this would interfere with God's own independence (as He would thus, seem to depend on others' actions), since, there is the well-known saying, "One's own body does not hinder one;" may rather it helps to carry out one's aims;[1] and for this, there is authority in such passages of the Veda as that (in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, iii.2), "There is one Rudra only; he admit[2] not of a second," etc.

यद्येवं तर्हि परस्पराश्रयबाधव्याधिं समाधत्स्वेति चेत्–तस्यानुत्थानात् । किमुत्पत्तौ परस्पराश्रयः शङ्क्यते ज्ञप्तौ वा । नाद्यः । आगमस्येश्वराधीनोत्पत्तिकत्वेऽपि परमेश्वरस्य नित्यत्वेनोत्पेत्तेरनुपपत्तेः । नापि ज्ञप्तौ । परमेश्वरस्यागमाधीनज्ञप्तिकत्वेऽपि तस्यान्यतोऽवगमात् । नापि तदनित्यत्वज्ञप्तौ । आगमानित्यत्वस्य तीव्रादिधर्मोपितत्वादिना सुगमत्त्वात् । यस्मान्निवर्तकधर्मानुष्ठानवशादीश्वरप्रसाद-सिद्धावभिमतेष्टसिद्धिरिति सर्वमवदातम् ।

1 The aggregate of the various subtile bodies constitutes *Hiraṇyagarbha*, or the supreme soul viewed in His relation to the world as creator, while the aggregate of the gross bodies similarly constitutes his gross body (*virāj*).

2 The usual reading is *tasthur* for *tasthe*.

Yadyivaṁ tarhi parasparāśrayabādhavyādhiṁ samādhatsveti cet—tasyānutthānāt. Kimutpattau parasparāśrayaḥ śaṅkyate jñaptau vā. Nādyaḥ. Āgamasyeśvarādhīnotpattikatve'pi parameśvarasya nityatvenotpetteranupapatteḥ. Nāpi jñaptau. Parameśvarasyāgamādhīnajñaptikatve'pi tasyānyato'vagamāt. Nāpi tadanityatvajñaptau. Āgamānityatvasya tīvrādidharmopetatvādinā sugamatvāt. Yasmānnivartakadharmānuṣṭhānavaśādīśvaraprasādasiddhāvabhimateṣṭasiddhiriti sarvamavadātaṃ.

"But then how will you remedy your deadly sickness of reasoning in a circle? (for you have to prove the Veda by the authority of God, and then again you have to prove God's existence by Veda") We reply, that we defy you to point out any reasoning in a circle in our argument. Do you suspect this "reciprocal dependence of each," which you call "reasoning in a circle," in regard to their being produced or in regard to their being known?[1] It cannot be the former, for though the production of the Veda is dependent on God, still as God Himself is eternal, there is no possibility of His being produced; nor can it be in regard to their being known, for even if our knowledge of God were dependent on the Veda, the Veda might be learned from some other source; nor, again, can it be in regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the Veda, for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by any *yogin* endowed with the transcendent faculties (*tīvra*,[2] etc.)

Therefore, when God has been rendered propitious by the performance of duties which produce His favour, the desired end, Liberation, is obtained; thus, everything is clear.

E.B.C.

NOTE ON HEVĀBHĀSAS

We have here an exemplification of the five fallacies or *hetvābhāsas* of the modern Hindu logic (cf. *Siddhāntamukt.*, no. 71, *Tarkasaṁgr.*, 55-67), viz., *anaikānta, viruddha, asiddha, kālātyayopadiṣta* or *bādhita*, and *pratipakṣita* or *sat-pratipakṣa*. The four first of these, generally correspond to the *savyabhicāra* or *"erratic," viruddha* or "contradictory," *sādhyasama* or *"unproved,"* and *atītakāla* or "mistimed," i.e., *"pre-*

1 For these divisions of the *anyonyāśraya* fallacy, see *Nyāyasūtra vṛtti* i.39 (p.33).

2 For *tīvra*. Cf. *Yogasūtras*, i.21,22.

cluded," as given in the list of fallacies of the older logic in p. 318; but *pratipakshita* corresponds imperfectly to *prakaraṇasama*. The *prakaraṇasama* or "uncertain" reason is properly that reason which is equally available for both sides, as, e.g., the argument, "Sound is eternal because it is audible," which could be met by the equally plausible argument, "Sound is non-eternal because it is audible;" or, according to other authorities, it is that reason which itself raises the same difficulties as the original question, as, *e.g.*, "sound is non-eternal because eternal qualities are not perceived in it;" here this alleged reason is as much the subject of dispute as the old question, "Is sound eternal?" But the *pratipakṣita* reason is one which is counterbalanced by an equally valid reason, as "Sound is eternal because it is audible," and "Sound is non-eternal because it is a product."

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहेऽक्षपाददर्शनम् ॥

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CHAPTER XII

THE JAIMINI-DARŚANA

Contents of the System

ननु धर्मानुष्ठानवशादभिमतधर्मसिद्धिरिति जेगीयते भवता । तत्र धर्मः किंलक्षणकः किंप्रमाणक इति चेत्–उच्यते । श्रूयतामवधानेन । अस्य प्रश्नस्य प्रतिवचनं प्राच्यां मीमांसायां प्रादर्शि जैमिनिना मुनिना । सा हि मीमांसा द्वादशलक्षणी ।

Nanu dharmānuṣṭhānavaśādabhimatadharmasiddhiriti jegīyate bhavatā. Tatra dharmaḥ kiṁlakṣaṇakaḥ kiṁpramāṇaka iti cet—ucyate. Śrūyatāmavadhānena. Asya praśnasya prativacanaṁ prācyāṁ mīmāṁsāyāṁ prādarśi jaimininā muninā. Sā hi mīmāṁsā dvādaśalakṣaṇī.

An objector may here ask, "Are you not continually repeating that merit (*dharma*) comes from the practice of duty (*dharma*), but how is duty to be defined or proved?" Listen attentively to my answer. A reply to this question has been given in the older[1] Mīmāṁsā by the holy sage Jaimini. Now, the Mīmāṁsā consists of twelve books.[2]

तत्र प्रथमेऽध्याये विध्यर्थवादमन्त्रस्मृतिनामधेयार्थकस्य शब्दराशेः प्रामाण्यम् । द्वितीये उपोद्घातकर्मभेदप्रमाणापवादप्रयोगभेदरूपोऽर्थः । तृतीये श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यादिविरोधप्रतिपत्तिकर्मानारभ्याधीतबहुप्रधानोपकारकप्रयाजादियाजमानचिन्तनम् ।

Tatra prathame'dhyāye vidhyarthavādamantrasmṛtināmadheyārthakasya śabdarāśeḥ prāmāṇyam. Dvitīye upodghātakarmabhedapramāṇāpavādaprayogabhedarūpo'rthaḥ. Tṛtīye śrutiliṅgavākyādivirodhapratipattikarmānārabhyādhītabahupradhānopakārakaprayājādiyājamānacintanam.

In the first book is discussed the authoritativeness of those collections of words which are severally meant by the terms injunction (*vidhi*), "explanatory passage" (*arthavāda*), hymn (*mantra*), tradition (*smṛti*), and "name." In the second, certain subsidiary discus-

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1 Mādhava here calls it the *Prācī Mīmāṁsā*.
2 *Cf.* J. *Nyāyamālāvist*, pp. 5-9.

sions (as *e.g.*, on apūrva) relating to the difference of various rites, refutation of (erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of performance (as in "constant" and "voluntary" offerings). In the third, *Śruti*, "sign" or "sense of the passage" (*liṅga*), "context" (*vākya*), etc., and their respective weight when in apparent opposition to one another, the ceremonies called *pratipatti-karmāṇi*, things mentioned incidentally (*anārabhyādhīta*), things accessory to several main objects, as *prayājas*, etc., and the duties of the sacrificer.

चतुर्थे प्रधानप्रयोजकत्वाप्रधानप्रयोजकत्वजुहूपर्णतादिफलराजसूयगतजघन्याङ्गाक्षद्यूतादिचिन्ता । पञ्चमे श्रुत्यादिक्रम-तद्विशेषवृद्ध्यवर्धनप्राबल्यदौर्बल्यचिन्ता । षष्ठेऽधिकारितद्धर्मद्रव्यप्रतिनिध्यर्थलोपनप्रायश्चित्त-सत्रदेय-वह्निविचारः । सप्तमे प्रत्यक्षवचनातिदेशशेषनामलिङ्गातिदेशविचारः ।

Caturthe pradhānaprayojakatvāpradhānaprayojakatvajuhūparṇatādiphalarājasūyagatajaghanyāṅgākṣadyūtādicintā. Pañcame śrutyādikrama-tadviśeṣavṛddhyavardhanaprābalyadaurbalyacintā. Ṣaṣṭhe'dhikāritaddharmadravyapratinidhyarthalopanaprāyaścitta-satradeya-vahnivicāraḥ. Saptame pratyakṣavacanātideśaśeṣanāmaliṅgātideśavicāraḥ.

In the fourth, the influence on other rites of the principal and subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the *juhū* being made of the *butea frondosa,* etc., and the dice-playing, etc., which form subordinate parts of the *rājasūya* sacrifice. In the fifth, the relative order of different passages of *Śruti*, etc., the order of different parts of a sacrifice (as the seventeen animals at the *vājapeya),* the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and the respective force of the words of *Śruti,* order of mention, etc., in determining the order of performance. In the sixth, the persons qualified to offer sacrifices, their obligations, the substitutes for enjoined materials, supplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory rites, the *sattra* offerings, things proper to be given, and the different sacrificial fires. In the seventh, transference of the ceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vedic text, and then as inferred by "name" or "sign."

अष्टमे स्पष्टास्पष्टप्रबललिङ्गातिदेशापवादविचारः । नवमे ऊहविचारारम्भसामोहमन्त्रोहतत्प्रसङ्गागतविचारः । दशमे बाधहेतुद्वारलोपविस्तारबाधकारणकार्यैकत्वसमुच्चयग्रहादिसामप्रकीर्णनञर्थविचारः। एकादशे तन्त्रोपोद्घातन्त्रावापतन्त्रप्रपञ्चनवापप्रपञ्चनचिन्तनानि । द्वादशे प्रसङ्गतन्त्रिनिर्णयसमुच्चयविकल्पविचारः ।

Aṣṭame spaṣṭāspaṣṭaprabalaliṅgātideśāpavādavicāraḥ. Navame ūhavicārārambhasāmohamantrohatatprasaṅgātavicāraḥ. Daśame bādhahetudvāralopavistārabādhakāraṇakāryaikatvasamuccayagrahādisāmaprakīrṇanañarthavicāraḥ. Ekādaśe tantropodghātantrāvāpatantraprapañcanavāpaprapañcanacintanāni. Dvādaśe prasaṅgatantrinirṇayasamuccayavikalpavicāraḥ.

In the eighth, transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or obscurely expressed "sign," or by the predominant "sign," and cases where no transference takes place. In the ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the adaptation of hymns when quoted in a new connection (*ūha*), the adaptation of *sāmans* and *mantras*, and collateral questions connected therewith. In the tenth, the discussion of occasions where the non-performance of the primary rite involves the "preclusion" and non-performance of the dependent rites, and of occasions where rites are precluded because other rites produce their special result, discussions connected with the *graha* offerings, certain *sāmans*, and various other things, and a discussion on the different kinds of negation. In the eleventh, the incidental mention and subsequently the fuller discussion of *tantra*[1] (where several acts are combined into one), and *āvāpa* (or the performing an act more than once). In the twelfth, a discussion on *prasaṅga* (where the rite is performed for one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference), *tantra*, cumulation of concurrent rites (*samuccaya*) and option.

First Aphorism and Its Authoritative Impact

तत्राथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा (जै. सू. 1/1/1) इति प्रथममधिकरणं पूर्वमीमांसारम्भोपपादनपरम् । अधिकरणं च पञ्चावयवामाचक्षते परीक्षकाः । ते च पञ्चावयवा विषयसंशयपूर्वपक्षसिद्धान्तसंगतिरूपाः ।

Tatrāthāto dharmajijñāsā (Jaimini 1/1/1) iti prathamamadhikaraṇaṁ pūrvamīmāṁsārambhopapādanaparaṃ. Adhikaraṇaṁ

1 Thus, it is said that he who desires to be a family priest should offer a black-necked animal to Agni, a parti-coloured one to Soma, and a black-necked one to Agni. Should this be a case for *tantra* or not? By *tantra* one offering to Agni would do for both; but as the offering to Soma comes between, they cannot be united, and thus, it must be a case of *āvāpa*, *i.e.*, offering the two separately (J. *Nyāyamālā*, xi.i, 13).

ca pañcāvayavāmācakṣate parīkṣakāḥ. Te ca pañcāvayavā viṣayasaṁśayapūrvapakṣasiddhāntasaṅgatirūpāḥ.

Now, the first topic which introduces the discussions of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā arises from the aphorism, "Now therefore, a desire to know duty (is to be entertained by thee"). Now, the learned describe a "topic" as consisting of five members, and these are (a) the subject, (b) the doubt, (c) the *primā facie* argument, (d) the demonstrated conclusion, and (e) the connection (*saṅgati*). The topic is discussed according to the doctrines held by the great teachers of the system.

Authority Established as per Bhaṭṭa's Approach

तत्राचार्यमतानुसारेणाधिकरणं निरूप्यते । 'स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः' इत्येतद्वाक्यं विषयः । 'चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः' (जै. सू. 1/1/2) इति आरभ्य 'अन्वाहार्ये च दर्शनात्' (जै. सू. 12/4/47) इत्येतदन्तं जैमिनीयं धर्मशास्त्रमनारभ्यमारभ्यं वेति संदेहः । अध्ययनविधेरदृष्टार्थत्वदृष्टार्थत्वाभ्याम् ।

Tatrācāryamatānusāreṇādhikaraṇaṁ nirūpyate. 'Svādhyāyo'dhyetavyaḥ' ityetadvākyaṁ viṣayaḥ 'codanālakṣaṇo'rtho dharmaḥ'. (Jai. Sū. 1/1/2) iti ārabhya 'anvāhārye ca darśanāt' (Jai. Sū. 12/4/47) ityetadantaṁ jaiminīyaṁ dharmaśāstramanārabhyamārabhyaṁ veti sandehaḥ. Adhyayanavidheradṛṣṭārthatvadṛṣṭārthatvābhyām.

Thus, the "subject" to be discussed is the sentence, "The Veda is to be read." Now, the "doubt" which arises is whether the study of Jaimini's *śāstra* concerning duty, beginning with the aphorism, "Duty is a thing which is to be recognised by an instigatory passage," and ending with "and from seeing it in the *anvāhārya*" is to be commenced or not.

Study on Pūrvamīmāṁsā Need'nt any Injunction

तत्रानारभ्यमिति पूर्वः पक्षः । अध्ययनविधेरर्थावबोधलक्षणदृष्टफलकत्वानुपपत्तेः । अर्थावबोधार्थमध्ययनविधिरिति वदन् वादी प्रष्टव्यः–किमत्यन्तमप्राप्तमध्ययनं विधीयते किं वा पाक्षिकमवघातवन्नियम्यत इति ?

Tatrānārabhyamiti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ. Adhyayanavidherarthāvabodhalakṣaṇadṛṣṭaphalakatvānupapatteḥ. Arthāvabodhārthamadhyayanavidhiriti badan vādī praṣṭavyaḥ—kimatyantamaprāptamadhyayanaṁ vidhīyate kiṁ vā pākṣikamavaghātavanniyamyata iti?

The *primā facie* argument is that it is not to be commenced, whether the injunction to read the Veda be held to have a visible and present or an invisible and future fruit.

न तावदाद्यः । विवादपदं वेदाध्ययनमर्थावबोधहेतुरध्ययनत्वाद्, भारताध्ययनवत्– इत्यनुमानेन विध्यनपेक्षतया प्राप्तत्वात् । अस्तु तर्हि द्वितीयो यथा नखविदलनादिना तण्डुलनिष्पत्तिसम्भवात् पाक्षिकोऽवघातोऽवश्यं कर्तव्य इति विधिना नियम्यते, तथा लिखितपाठेनार्थज्ञानसम्भवात्पाक्षिकमध्ययनं विधिना नियम्यत इति चेत् ।

Na tāvadādyaḥ. Vivādapadaṁ vedādhyayanamarthāvabodhahetur adhyayanatvād, bhāratādhyayanavat—ityanumānena vidhyanapekṣatayā prāptatvāt. Astu tarhi dvitīyo yathā nakhavidalanādinā taṇḍulaniṣpattisambhavāt pākṣiko'vaghāto'vaśyaṁ kartavya iti vidhinā niyamyate, tathā likhitapāṭhenārthajñānasambhavātpākṣikamadhyayanaṁ vidhinā niyamyata iti cet.

(a) If you say that this injunction must have a visible fruit, and this can be no other[1] than the knowledge of the meaning of what is read, we must next ask you whether this said reading is enjoined as something which otherwise would not have been thought of, or whether as something which otherwise would have been optional, as we see in the rule for shelling rice.[2]

नैतच्चतुरस्रम् । दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोर्वैधर्म्यसम्भवात् । अवघातनिष्पन्नैरेव तण्डुलैः पिष्टपुरोडाशादिकरणेऽवान्तरापूर्वद्वारा दर्शपूर्णमासौ परमापूर्वमुत्पादयतो नापरथा । अतोऽपूर्वमवघातस्य नियमहेतुः । प्रकृते लिखितपाठजन्येनाध्ययनजन्येन वाऽर्थावबोधेन क्रत्वनुष्ठानसिद्धेरध्ययनस्य नियमहेतुर्नास्त्येव । तस्मादर्थावबोधहेतुविचारशास्त्रस्य वैधत्वं नास्तीति ।

Naitaccaturasram. Dṛṣṭāntadārṣṭāntikayorvaidharmyasambhavāt. Avaghātaniṣpannaireva taṇḍulaiḥ piṣṭapuroḍāśādikaraṇe'vāntarāpūrvadvārā darśapūrṇamāsau paramāpūrvamutpādayato nāparathā. Ato'pūrvamavaghātasya niyamahetuḥ. Prakṛte likhitapāṭhajanyenādhyayanajanyena vā'rthāvabodhena kratvanuṣṭhānasiddheradhyayanasya niyamaheturnāstyeva. Tasmādarthāvabodhahetuvicāraśāstrasya vaidhatvaṁ nāstīti.

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1 In p. 123, line 4, I read *vilakṣaṇa-dṛṣṭaphala*.

2 In the former case, it would be a *vidhi*, in the latter a *niyama*. *Cf.* The lines *vidhir atyantam aprāpto niyamaḥ pākṣike sati, tatra cānyatra ca prāptau parisaṁkhyā vidhīyate*.

It cannot be the former, for the reading of the Veda is a means of knowing the sense thereof from its very nature as reading, just as in the parallel instance of reading the *Mahābhārata*; and we see by this argument that it would present itself as an obvious means quite independently of the injunction. Well, then, let it be the latter alternative; just as the baked flour cake called *puroḍāsa* is made only of rice prepared by being unhusked in a mortar, when, but for the injunction, it might have been unhusked by the finger-nails. There, however, the new moon and full moon sacrifices only produce their unseen effect, which is the principal *apūrva*, by means of the various minor effects or subordinate *apūrvas*, produced by the various subordinate parts of the whole ceremony; and consequently the minor *apūrva* of the unhusking is the reason there for the restricting injunction. But in the case which we are discussing, there is no such reason for any such restriction, as the rites can be equally well performed by gaining the knowledge of the Veda's meaning by reading a written book, or by studying under an authorised teacher. Hence, we conclude that there is no injunction to study the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā as a means of knowing the sense of the Veda.

तर्हि श्रूयमाणस्य विधेः का गतिरिति चेत्–स्वर्गफलकोऽक्षरग्रहणमात्रविधिरिति भवान्परितुष्यतु । विश्वजिन्न्यायेनाश्रुतस्यापि स्वर्गस्य कल्पयितुं शक्यत्वात् । यथा 'स स्वर्गः सर्वान्प्रत्यविशिष्टत्वात्' (जै. सू. 4/3/15) इति विश्वजिति अश्रुतमप्यधिकारिणं सम्पादयता, तद्विशेषणं स्वर्गः फलं युक्त्या निरणायि तद्वदध्ययनेऽप्यस्तु । तदुक्तम्–

Tarhi śrūyamāṇasya vidheḥ kā gatiriti cet—svargaphalako'kṣaragrahaṇamātravidhiriti bhavānparituṣyatu. Viśvajinnyāyenāśrutasyāpi svargasya kalpayituṁ śakyatvāt. Yathā 'sa svargaḥ sarvānpratyaviśiṣṭatvāt' (Jai. Sū. 4/3/15) iti viśvajiti aśrutamapyadhikāriṇaṁ sampādayatā, tadviśeṣaṇaṁ svargaḥ phalaṁ yuktyā niraṇāyi tadvadadhyayane'pyastu. Taduktam—

1. विनापि विधिना दृष्टलाभान्न हि तदर्थता ।
कल्प्यस्तु विधिसामर्थ्यात्स्वर्गो विश्वजिदादिवत् ॥

Vinūpi vidhinā dṛṣṭalābhānna hi tadarthatā,
Kalpyastu vidhisāmarthyātsvargo viśvajidādivat.

(b) "What, then, becomes of the Vedic injunction, 'The Veda is to be read' ?" Well, you must be content with the fact that the

injunction will have heaven as its (future) fruit, although it merely enjoins the making oneself master of the literal words of the Vedic text (without any care to understand the meaning which they may convey), since heaven, though not expressly mentioned, is to be assumed as the fruit, according to the analogy of the Viśvajita offering. Just as Jaimini, in his aphorism (iv.3, 15), "Let that fruit be heaven, since it equally applies to all," establishes that those who are not expressly mentioned are still qualified to offer the Viśvajit sacrifice, and infers by argument that its characteristic fruit is heaven, so let us assume it to be in the present case also. As it has been said—

"Since, the visible fruit would be equally obtained without the injunction, this cannot be its sole object; we must rather suppose heaven to be the fruit from the injunction's significance, after the analogy of the Viśvajita, etc."

एवं च सति वेदमधीत्य स्नायादिति स्मृतिरनुगृहीता भवति । अत्र हि वेदाध्ययनसमावर्तनयोरव्यवधानमवगम्यते । तावके मते त्वधीतेऽपि वेदे धर्मविचाराय गुरुकुले वस्तव्यम् । तथा सत्यव्यवधानं बाध्येत । तस्माद्विचारशास्त्रस्य वैधत्वाभावात्पाठमात्रेण स्वर्गसिद्धेः समावर्तनशास्त्राच्च धर्मविचारशास्त्रमनारम्भणीयमिति पूर्वपक्षसंक्षेपः ।

Evaṁ ca sati vedamadhītya snāyāditi smṛtiranugṛhītā bhavati. Atra hi vedādhyayanasamāvartanayoravyavadhānamavagamyate. Tāvake mate tvadhīte'pi vede dharmavicārāya gurukule vastavyam. Tathā satyavyavadhānaṁ bādhyeta. Tasmādvicāraśāstrasya vaidhatvābhāvātpāṭhamātreṇa svargasiddheḥ samāvartanaśāstrācca dharmavicāraśāstramanārambhaṇīyamiti pūrvapakṣasaṁkṣepaḥ.

Thus, too, we shall keep the Smṛti rule from being violated : "Having read the Veda, let him bathe." For this rule clearly implies that no long interval is to take place between reading the Veda and the student's return to his home; while, according to your opinion, after he had read the Veda, he would still have to remain in his preceptor's house to read the Mīmāṁsā discussions, and thus, the idea of no interval between would be contradicted. Therefore, for three reasons, (a) that the study of Mīmāṁsā is not enjoined, (b) that heaven can be obtained by the simple reading of the text, and (c) that the rule for the student's return to his home is

thus fulfilled, we maintain that the study of the Mīmāṁsā discussions on duty is not to be commenced.

Authoritative Conclusion—Study is Must

सिद्धान्तस्त्वन्यतः प्राप्तत्वादप्राप्तविधित्वं मास्तु । नियमविधित्वपक्षस्तु वज्रहस्तेनापि नापहस्तयितुं पार्यते । तथा हि–'स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः' (तै. आ. 2/15) इति तव्यप्रत्ययः प्रेरणापरपर्यायां पुरुषप्रवृत्तिरूपार्थभावनाभाव्यामभिधाभावनां प्रत्याययति । सा ह्यर्थभावना भाव्यमाकाङ्क्षति ।

Siddhāntastvanyataḥ prāptatvādaprāptavidhitvaṁ māstu. Niyamavidhitvapakṣastu vajrahastenāpi nāpahastayituṁ pāryate. Tathā hi—'svādhyāyo'dhyetavyaḥ' (Tai. Āra. 2/15) iti tavyapratyayaḥ preraṇāparaparyāyāṁ puruṣapravṛtti-rūpārthabhāvanābhāvyāmabhidhābhāvanāṁ pratyāyayati. Sā hyarthabhāvanā bhāvyamākāṅkṣati.

The "authoritative conclusion" (*siddhānta*), however, is as follows:—

We grant that it cannot be a case of *vidhi*, for it might have been adopted on other grounds; but not even Indra with his thunderbolt could make us lose our hold of the other alternative that it is a case of *niyama*. In the sentence, "The Veda is to be read," the affix *tavya* expresses an enforcing power in the word,[1] which is to be rendered visible by a corresponding action in man, bringing a certain effect into existence; and this enforcing power seeks some corresponding end which is connected with the man's creative effort.

न तावत्समानपदोपात्तमध्ययनं भाव्यत्वेन परिरमते । अध्ययनशब्दार्थस्य स्वाधीनोच्चारणक्षमत्वस्य वाङ्मनसव्यापारस्य क्लेशार्थकस्य भाव्यत्वासम्भवात् । नापि समानवाक्योपात्तः स्वाध्यायः । स्वाध्यायशब्दार्थस्य वर्णराशेर्नित्यत्वेन विभुत्वेन चोत्पत्त्यादीनां चतुर्णां क्रियाफलानामसम्भवात् ।

1 The *Mīmāṁsā* holds that the potential and similar affixes, which constitute a twofold power; by the one they express an active volition of the agent, corresponding to the root-meaning (*arthabhāvanā*); by the other an enforcing power in the word (*śabda-bhāvanā*). Thus, in *svargakāmo yajeta* the *eta* implies "let him produce heaven by means of certain acts which together make up a sacrifice possessing a certain mystic influence;" next it implies an enforcing power residing in itself (as it is the word of the self-existent Veda and not of God) which sets the hearer upon this course of action.

Na tāvatsamānapadopāttamadhyayanaṁ bhāvyatvena pariramate. Adhyayanaśabdārthasya svādhīnoccāraṇakṣamatva-sya vāṅmanasavyāpārasya kleśārthakasya bhāvyatvāsaṁbhavāt. Nāpi samānavākyopāttaḥ svādhyāyaḥ. Svādhyāyaśabdārthasya varṇarāśernityatvenavibhutvena cotpattyādīnāṁ caturṇāṁ kriyāphalānāmasaṁbhavāt.

Now, it cannot be the act itself of reading, as suggested by the whole word *adhyetavya*, which it thus seeks as an end; for this act of reading, thus expressed by the word, could never be regarded as an end, since it is a laborious operation of the voice and mind, consisting in the articulate utterance of the portion read. Nor could the portion read, as suggested by the whole sentence, be regarded as the end. For the mass of words called *"Veda,"* which is what we really mean by the words "portion read," being eternal and omnipresent, could never fulfil the conditions of the four "fruits of action," production, etc.[1]

Knowledge of Meaning is the Sole Axiom of Injunction

तस्मात्सामर्थ्यप्राप्तोऽवबोधो भाव्यत्वेनावतिष्ठते । अर्थी समर्थो विद्वानधिक्रियत इति न्यायेन दर्शपूर्णमासादिविधयः स्वविषयावबोधमपेक्षमाणाः स्वार्थबोधे स्वाध्यायं विनियुञ्जते । अध्ययनविधिश्च लिखितपाठादिव्यावृत्त्याऽध्ययन-संस्कृतत्वं स्वाध्यायस्यावगमयति ।

Tasmātsāmarthyaprāpto'vabodho bhāvyatvenāvatiṣṭhate. Arthī samartho vidvānadhikriyata iti nyāyena darśapūrṇamā-sādividhayaḥ svaviṣayāvabodhamapekṣamāṇāḥ svārthabodhe svādhyāyaṁ viniyuñjate. Adhyayanavidhiśca likhitapāṭhā-divyāvṛttyā'dhyayanasaṁskṛtatvaṁ svādhyāyasyāvagamayati.

Therefore, the only true end which remains to us is the knowledge of the meaning, as obtained by carrying out the sense of the words of the injunction. According to the old rule, "He has the right who

1 These four "fruits of action" are obscure, and I do not remember to have seen them alluded to elsewhere. I was told in India that they were a thing's coming into being, growing, declining, and perishing. If so, they are the second, third , fifth, and sixth of the six *vikāras* mentioned in Śaṅkara's Vajrasūci, 2, *i.e.*, *asti, jāyate, vardhate, vipariṇamate, apakṣīyate, naśyati.* I do not see how there could be any reference to the four kinds of *apūrva*, sc. *Phala, samudāya, utpatti*, and *aṅga*, described in *Nyāya M.V.*ii.1,2.

has the want, the power, and the wit," those who are aiming to understand certain things as the new and full moon sacrifices, use their daily reading to learn the truth about them. And the injunction for reading, since it virtually excludes the reading of written books, etc. (from the well-known technical sense of the word "read" when used in this connection), conveys the idea that the reading the Veda enjoined has a consecrated character (as taught by a duly authorised teacher).

तथा च यथा दर्शपूर्णमासादिजन्यं परमापूर्वमवघातादिजन्यस्यावान्तरापूर्वस्य कल्पकं तथा समस्तक्रतुजन्यमपूर्वजातं क्रतुज्ञानसाधनाध्ययननियमजन्यमपूर्वं कल्पयिष्यति । नियमादृष्टानिष्टौ विधिश्रवणवैफल्यमापद्येत । न च विश्वजिन्न्यायेन फलकल्पनावकल्प्यते । अर्थावबोधे दृष्टे फले सति फलान्तरकल्पनाया अयोगात् । तदुक्तम्–

Tathā ca yathā darśapūrṇamāsādijanyaṁ paramāpūrvamavaghātādijanyasyāvāntarāpūrvasya kalpakaṁ tathā samastakratujanyamapūrvajātaṁ kratujñānasādhanādhyayananiyamajanyamapūrvaṁ kalpayiṣyati. Niyamādṛṣṭāniṣṭau vidhiśravaṇavaiphalyamāpadyeta. Na ca viśvajinnyāyena phalakalpanāvakalpyate. Arthāvabodhe dṛṣṭe phale sati phalāntarakalpanāyā ayogāt. Taduktam—

Therefore, as the principal *apūrva*, produced by the great new and full moon sacrifices, necessitates and establishes the subordinate *apūrvas* produced by the inferior sacrificial acts, as unhusking the rice, etc., so the mass of *apūrva* produced by all the sacrifices necessitates and establishes a previous *apūrva* produced by the restricting injunction (*niyama*), which prescribes reading the Veda as the means to know how to perform these sacrifices. If you hesitate to concede that a *niyama* could have this future influence called *apūrva*, the same doubt might equally invalidate the efficacy of a *vidhi* (as the two stand on the same level as to their enjoining power). Nor is the supposition a valid one that heaven is the fruit, according to the analogy of the *Viśvajita* offering, since, if there is a present and visible fruit in the form of a knowledge of the meaning of the sacred text, it is improper to suppose any other future and unseen fruit. Thus, it has been said–

2. लभ्यमाने फले दृष्टे नादृष्टफलकल्पना ।
विधेस्तु नियमार्थत्वान्नानर्थक्यं भविष्यति ॥ इति ।

Labhyamāne phale dṛṣṭe nādṛṣṭaphalakalpanā,
Vidhestu niyamārthatvānnānarthakyaṁ bhaviṣyati. iti.

"Where a seen fruit is obtained, you must not suppose an unseen one; but if a *vidhi* has the restricting meaning of *niyama*, it does not thereby become meaningless."

Certain Questions and Their Answers

ननु वेदमात्राध्यायिनोऽर्थावबोधानुदयेऽपि साङ्गवेदाध्यायिनः पुरुषस्यार्थावबोधसम्भवाद्विचारशास्त्रस्य वैफल्यमिति चेत्–तदसमञ्जसम् । बोधमात्रसम्भवेऽपि निर्णयस्य विचाराधीनत्वात् । तद्यथा–'अक्ताः शर्करा उपदधाति' (तै. ब्रा. 3/12/5) इत्यत्र घृतेनैव न तैलादिना इत्ययं निर्णयो व्याकरणेन निगमेन निरुक्तेन वा न लभ्यते । विचारशास्त्रेण तु तेजो वै घृतमिति वाक्यशेषवशादर्थनिर्णयो लभ्यते ।

Nanu vedamātrādhyāyino'rthāvabodhānudaye'pi sāṅgavedādhyāyinaḥ puruṣasyārthāvabodhasambhavādvicāraśāstrasya vaiphalyamiti cet—tadasamañjasam. Bodhamātrasambhave'pi nirṇayasya vicārādhīnatvāt. Tadyathā—'Aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhāti' (Tai. Brā. 3/12/5) ityatra ghṛtenaiva na tailādinā ityayaṁ nirṇayo vyākaraṇena nigamena niruktena vā na labhyate. Vicāraśāstreṇa tu tejo vai ghṛtamiti vākyaśeṣavaśādarthanirṇayo labhyate.

But an objector may say, "Although a man who reads the simple text of the Veda may not attain to a knowledge of its meaning, still as he who reads the Veda with its aṅgas, grammar, etc., may attain to this knowledge, the study of Mīmāṁsā will be useless." But this is not true : for even though, he may attain to a simple knowledge of the literal meaning, all deeper investigation must depend on this kind of discussion. For instance, when it is said, "He offers anointed gravel," neither grammar nor *nigama*[1] nor *nirukta* will determine the true meaning that it is to be anointed with ghee and not with oil, etc.; it is only by a Mīmāṁsā discussion that the true meaning is unravelled from the rest of the passage, "Verily, ghee is brightness."[2]

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1 The Nigamas are the Vedic quotations in Yāska's *Nirukta*.
2 See *Nyāya-mālā-vistāra*, i.4, 19.

Injunction (Mīmāṁsā Śāstra) is Authoritative—Conclusion

तस्माद्विचारशास्त्रस्य वैधत्वं सिद्धम् । ते च वेदमधीत्य स्नायादिति शास्त्रं गुरुकुलनिवृत्तिपरं व्यवधानप्रतिबन्धकं बाध्येतेति मन्तव्यम् । 'स्नात्वा भुङ्क्ते' इतिवत् पूर्वापरीभावसमानकर्तृकत्वमात्रप्रतिपत्त्या अध्ययनसमावर्तनयोर्नैरन्तर्याप्रतिपत्तेः । तस्माद्विधिसामर्थ्यादेवाधिकरणसहस्रात्मकं पूर्वमीमांसाशास्त्रमारम्भणीयम् ।

Tasmādvicāraśāstrasya vaidhatvaṁ siddham. Te ca vedamadhītya snāyāditi śāstraṁ gurukulanivṛttiparaṁ vyavadhānapratibandhakaṁ bādhyeteti mantavyam. 'Snātvā bhuṅkte' itivat pūrvāparībhāvasamānakartṛkatvamātrapratipattyā adhyayanasamāvartanayornairantaryāpratipatteḥ. Tasmādvidhisāmarthyādevādhikaraṇasahasrātmakaṁ pūrvamīmāṁsāśāstramārambhaṇīyam.

इदं चाधिकरणं शास्त्रेणोपोद्घातत्वेन सम्बध्यते । तदाह–

चिन्तां प्रकृतिसिद्ध्यर्थामुपोद्घातं प्रचक्षते । इति ।

Idaṁ cādhikaraṇaṁ śāstreṇopodghātatvena saṁbadhyate. Tadāha—

Cintāṁ prakṛtisiddhyarthāmupodghātaṁ pracakṣate. iti.

It is therefore established that the study of Mīmāṁsā is enjoined. Nor need it be supposed that this contradicts the passage of Smṛti, "Having read the Veda, let him bathe," which implies that he should now leave his teacher's house, and prohibits any further delay; as the words do not necessarily imply that the return to the paternal roof is to follow immediately on his having read the Veda, but only that it is to follow it at some time, and that both actions are to be done by the same person, just as we see in the common phrase, "Having bathed, he eats." Therefore, from the purport of the injunction we conclude that the study of the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā Śāstra, consisting of a thousand "topics,"[1] is to be commenced. This topic is connected with the main subject of the Śāstra as being a subsidiary digression, as it is said, "They call that a subsidiary digression which helps to establish the main subject."[2]

1 The exact number is 9 1 5.

2 This is to explain the last of the five members, the *saṅgati*.

Smṛti Rule Propounded by Guru Prabhākara

इदमेवाधिकरणं गुरुमतमनुसृत्योपन्यस्यते । अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणमुपनयीत, तमध्यापयीतेत्यत्राध्यापनं नियोगविषयः प्रतिभासते । नियोगश्च नियोज्यमपेक्षते । कश्चात्र नियोज्य इति चेत्–आचार्यककाम एव । 'सम्मानन'–(पा. सू. 1/3/36) इत्यादिना पाणिन्यनुशासनेनाचार्यके गम्यमाने नयतेर्धातोरात्मनेपदस्य विधानात् । उपनयने यो नियोज्यः स एवाध्यापनेऽपि । तयोरेकप्रयोजनत्वात् ।

Idamevādhikaraṇaṁ gurumatamanusṛtyopanyasyate. Aṣṭavarṣaṁ brāhmaṇamupanayīta, tamadhyāpayītetyatrādhyāpanaṁ niyogaviṣayaḥ pratibhāsate. Niyogaśca niyojyamapekṣate. Kaścātra niyojya iti cet—ācāryakakāma eva. 'Sammānana'– (Pā. Sū. 1/3/36) ityādinā pāṇinyanuśāsanenācāryake gamyamāne nayaterdhātorātmanepadasya vidhānāt. Upanayane yo niyojyaḥ sa evādhyāpane'pi. Tayorekaprayojanatvāt.

I now proceed to give a sketch of the discussion of the same "topic"in accordance with the teaching of the Guru Prabhākara.

In the Smṛti rule,[1] "Let him admit as a pupil the Brahman lad when eight years old (by investing him with the sacred cord), let him instruct him," the object of the direction appears to be the pupil's instruction. Now, a direction must have reference to somebody to be directed; and if you ask who is here to be directed, I reply, "He who desires to be a teacher," since, by Pāṇini's rule (I. 3, 36), the root *nī* is used in the *ātmanepada* when honour, etc., are implied, *i.e.*, here the duty which a teacher performs to his pupils.

अत एवोक्तं मनुना मुनिना–

3. उपनीय तु यः शिष्यं वेदमध्यापयेद् द्विजः ।
साङ्गं च सरहस्यं च तमाचार्यं प्रचक्षते ॥ (मनु. 2/140) इति ।

Ata evoktaṁ Manunā muninā—

Upanīya tu yaḥ śiṣyaṁ vedamadhyāpayed dvijaḥ,
Sāṅgaṁ ca sarahasyaṁ ca tamācāryaṁ pracakṣate.
(Manu. 2/140) iti.

He who is to be directed as to admitting a pupil is the same person who is to be directed as to teaching him, since both are the object of one and the same command. Hence, the inspired sage Manu has said (ii. 140).

1 *Cf.* Āśvalāyana's *Gṛhya Sūtras*, i.19,1.

"The Brāhmaṇa who girds his pupil with the sacrificial cord and then instructs him in the Veda, with its subsidiary aṅgas and mystic doctrines, they call a spiritual teacher (*ācārya*)."

ततश्चाचार्यकर्तृकमध्यापनं माणवककर्तृकेनाध्ययनेन विना न सिध्यतीत्यध्यापनविधिप्रयुक्त्यैवाध्ययनानुष्ठानं सेत्स्यति । प्रयोज्यव्यापारमन्तरेण प्रयोजकव्यापारस्यानिर्वाहात् ।

Tataścācāryakartṛkamadhyāpanaṁ māṇavakakartṛkenādhyayanena vinā na sidhyatītyadhyāpanavidhiprayuktyaivādhyayanānuṣṭhānaṁ setsyati. Prayojyavyāpāramantareṇa prayojakavyāpārasyānirvāhāt.

Now, the teaching which is the function of the teacher cannot be fulfilled without the learning which is the function of the pupil, and therefore, the very injunction to teach implies and establishes a corresponding obligation to learn, since the influencer's efforts fail without those of one to be influenced.

तर्हि 'अध्येतव्यः' (त. आ. 2/15) इत्यस्य विधित्वं न सिध्यतीति चेत्–मा सैत्सीत्का नो हानिः ? पृथगध्ययनविधेरभ्युपगमे प्रयोजनाभावात् । विधिवाक्यस्य नित्यानुवादत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेः । तस्मादध्ययनविधिमुपजीव्य पूर्वमुपन्यस्तौ पूर्वोत्तरपक्षौ प्रकारान्तरेण प्रदर्शनीयौ ।

Tarhi 'adhyetavyaḥ' (Ta. Ār. 2/15) ityasya vidhitvaṁ na sidhyatīti cet—mā saitsītkā no hāniḥ. ? Pṛthagadhyayanavidherabhyupagame prayojanābhāvāt. Vidhivākyasya nityānuvādatvenāpyupapatteḥ. Tasmādadhyayanavidhimupajīvya pūrvamupanyastau pūrvottarapakṣau prakārāntareṇa pradarśanīyau.

If you object that this view does not make reading the Veda the object of definite injunction, I reply, What matters it to us if it is not ? For even if there is no reason for us to admit a separate injunction for reading the Veda, it will still remain perpetually enjoined as a duty, because the passage which mentions it is a perpetual *anuvāda* or "supplementary repetition."[1] Therefore, the former *prima facie* argument and its answer, which were given be-

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1 The *anuvāda*, of course, implies a previous *vidhi*, which it thus, repeats and supplements, and so carries with it an equal authority. The *anuvāda* in the present case is the passage which mentions that the Veda is to be read, as it enforces the previous *vidhi* as to teaching.

fore under the idea that there was a definite injunction to read the Veda, must now be discussed in another way to suit this new view.

विचारशास्त्रमवैधत्वेनानारब्धव्यमिति पूर्वपक्षः । वैधत्वेनारब्धव्यमिति राद्धान्तः ।

Vicāraśāstramavaidhatvenānārabdhavyamiti pūrvapakṣaḥ. Vaidhatvenārabdhavyamiti rāddhāntaḥ.

Now, the *primā facie* argument was that the study of Mīmāṁsā, not being authoritatively enjoined, is not to be commenced; the "conclusion" was that it is to be commenced as being thus authoritatively enjoined.

Study of Mimāṁsā not to be Commenced—Prabhākara Approach

तत्र वैधत्वं वदता वदितव्यं–किमध्यापनविधिर्माणवकस्यार्थावबोधमपि प्रयुङ्क्ते, किं वा पाठमात्रम् ? नाद्यः, विनाप्यर्थावबोधेनाध्यापनसिद्धेः । न द्वितीयः । पाठमात्रे विचारस्य विषयप्रयोजनयोरसम्भवात् । आपाततः प्रतिभातः संदिग्धोऽर्थो विचारशास्त्रस्य विषयो भवति ।

Tatra vaidhatvaṁ vadatā vaditavyaṃ—kimadhyāpanavidhirmāṇavakasyārthāvabodhamapi prayuṅkte, kiṁ vā pāṭhamātram ? Nādyaḥ, vināpyarthāvabodhenādhyāpanasiddheḥ. Na dvitīyaḥ. Pāṭhamātre vicārasya viṣayaprayojanayorasambhavāt. Āpātataḥ pratibhātaḥ sandigdho'rtho vicāraśāstrasya viṣayo bhavati.

Now, the upholders of the former or *prima facie* view argue as follows :—"We put to the advocates of the conclusion, the following dilemma: Does the injunction to teach imply that the pupil is to understand the meaning of what is read, or does it only refer to the bare reading? It cannot be the former, for obviously, the act of teaching cannot depend for its fulfilment on the pupil's understanding what is taught (as this will depend on his ability as a recipient); and the latter will not help you, as, if the bare reading is sufficient, the Mīmāṁsā discussions in question will have no subject or use. For their proper subject is a point in the Veda, which is doubted about from having been only looked at in a rough and impromptu way; now if there is no need of understanding the meaning at all.

तथा सति यत्रार्थावगतिरेव नास्ति तत्र सन्देहस्य का कथा ? विचारफलस्य निर्णयस्य प्रत्याशा दूरत एव । तथा च यदसन्दिग्धमप्रयोजनं, न च तत्प्रेक्षावत्प्रतिपित्सागोचरः । यथा समनस्केन्द्रियसन्निकृष्टः स्पष्टालोक-

मध्यमध्यासीनो घट इति न्यायेन विषयप्रयोजनयोरसम्भवेन विचारशास्त्रमनारभ्यमिति पूर्वः पक्षः ।

Tathā sati yatrārthāvagatireva nāsti tatra sandehasya kā kathā? Vicāraphalasya nirṇayasya pratyāśā dūrata eva. Tathā ca yadāsandigdhamaprayojanaṁ, na ca tatprekṣāvatpratipitsāgocaraḥ. Yathā samanaskendriyasannikṛṣṭaḥ spaṣṭālokamadhyamadhyāsīno ghaṭa iti nyāyena viṣayaprayojanayorasambhavena vicāraśāstramanārabhyamiti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ.

Why should we talk of doubts and still more of any hope of ascertaining the true meaning by means of laborious discussion ? And therefore, in accordance with the well-known principle, 'That which is a thing of use and not a matter of doubt is an object of attainment to an intelligent man, as, for instance, a jar which is in broad light and in contact with the external and internal senses,' as there is in the present case, no such thing as a subject to exercise it upon, or a useful end to be attained by it, we maintain that the study of Mīmāṁsā is not to be commenced."

Reasons for Study of Mimāṁsā to be Commenced

अध्यापनविधिनाऽर्थावबोधो मा प्रयोजि । तथापि साङ्गवेदाध्यायिनो गृहीतपदपदार्थसंगतिकस्य पुरुषस्य पौरुषेयेष्विव प्रबन्धेष्वाम्नायेऽप्यर्थावबोधः प्राप्नोत्येव । ननु यथा 'विषं भुङ्क्ष्व' इत्यत्र प्रतीयमानोप्यर्थो न विवक्ष्यते । 'मास्य गृहे भुङ्क्थाः' इति भोजनप्रतिषेधस्य मातृवाक्यतात्पर्यविषयत्वात् । तथाम्नायार्थस्याविवक्षायां विषयाद्यभावदोषः प्राचीनः प्रादुःष्यात् इति चेत्–

Adhyāpanavidhinā'rthāvabodho mā prayoji. Tathāpi sāṅgavedādhyāyino gṛhītapadapadārthasaṁgatikasya puruṣasya pauruṣeyeṣviva prabandheṣvāmnāye'ṅyarthāvabodhaḥ prāpnotyeva. Nanu yathā 'Viṣaṁ bhuṅkṣva' ityatra pratīyamānopyartho na vivakṣyate. 'Māsya gṛhe bhuṅkthāḥ' iti bhojanapratiṣedhasya mātṛvākyatātparyaviṣayatvāt. Tathāmnāyārthasyāvivakṣāyāṁ viṣayādyabhāvadoṣaḥ prācīnaḥ prāduḥṣyāt iti cet—

We grant, in reply, that the injunction to teach does not imply a corresponding necessity that the student must understand the meaning; still when a man has read the Veda with its subsidiary *aṅgas*, and has comprehended the general connection of the words with their respective meanings, this will imply an understanding of the meaning of the Veda, just as it would in any ordinary human

compositions. "But may we not say that, just as in the case of the mother who said to her son, 'Eat poison,' the meaning literally expressed by the words was not what she wished to convey, since, she really intended to forbid his eating anything at all in such a house; so if the literal meaning of the Veda does not express its real purport, the old objection will recur with full force that the study of Mīmāṁsā will have neither subject not end (as there will be no use in understanding the literal meaning, since, as in the mother's case, it may only lead astray, and so common sense must be the ultimate judge").

मैवं वोचः । दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोर्वैषम्यसम्भवात् ।

विषभोजनवाक्यस्याप्तप्रणीतत्वेन मुख्यार्थपरिग्रहे बाधः स्यादिति विवक्षा नाश्रीयते । अपौरुषेये तु वेदे प्रतीयमानोऽर्थः कुतो न विवक्ष्यते । विवक्षिते च वेदार्थे यत्र यत्र पुरुषस्य संदेहः स सर्वोऽपि विचारशास्त्रस्य विषयो भविष्यति । तन्निर्णयश्च प्रयोजनम् । तस्मादध्यापनविधिप्रयुक्तेनाध्ययनेनावगम्यमानस्यार्थस्य विचारार्हत्वाद्विचारशास्त्रस्य वैधत्वेन विचारशास्त्रमारम्भणीयमिति राद्धान्तसंग्रहः ।

Maivaṁ vocaḥ. Dṛṣṭāntadārṣṭāntikayorvaiṣamyasambhavāt. Viṣabhojanavākyasyāptapraṇītatvena mukhyārthaparigrahe bādhaḥ syāditi vivakṣā nāśrīyate. Apauruṣeye tu vede pratīyamāno'rthaḥ kuto na vivakṣyate. Vivakṣite ca vedārthe yatra yatra puruṣasya sandehaḥ sa sarvo'pi vicāraśāstrasya viṣayo bhaviṣyati. Tannirṇayaśca prayojanam. Tasmādadhyāpanavidhiprayu ktenādhyayanenāvagamyamānasyārthasya vicārārhatvādvicāraśāstrasya vaidhatvena vicāraśāstramārambhaṇīyamiti rāddhāntasaṅgrahaḥ.

We reply, that your supposed illustration and the case in question are not really parallel. In the supposed illustration, the primary meaning of the words would be obviously precluded, because a direction to eat poison would be inconceivable in the mouth of an authoritative and trustworthy speaker like a mother, and you would know at once that this could not be what she wished to say; but in the case of the Veda, which is underived from any personal author, why should not the literal meaning be the one actually intended? And it is just the doubts that arise, as they occasionally will do, in reference to this intended meaning, which will be the proper "subject" of Mīmāṁsā discussion; and the settlement of these doubts will be its proper "end". Therefore, whenever the true meaning of

the Veda is not obtained[1] by that reading which is virtually prescribed by the authoritative injunction to a Brāhmaṇa to teach, it will be a proper subject for systematic discussion; and hence we hold that the study of Mīmāṁsā is enjoined, and should be commenced.

Veda Originated from a Personal Author—First Evidence

स्यादेतत् । वेदस्य कथमपौरुषेयत्वमभिधीयते ? तत्प्रतिपादकप्रमाणाभावात् । अथ मन्येथाः 'अपौरुषेया वेदाः', सम्प्रदायाविच्छेदे सत्यस्मर्यमाणकर्तृकत्वादात्मवत्' इति । तदेतन्मन्दम् । विशेषणासिद्धेः । पौरुषेयवेदवादिभिः प्रलये सम्प्रदायविच्छेदस्य कक्षीकरणात् । किं च किमिदमस्मर्यमाणकर्तृकत्वं नामाप्रमीयमाणकर्तृकत्वमस्मरणगोचरकर्तृकत्वं वा ? न प्रथमः कल्पः । परमेश्वरस्य कर्तुः प्रमितेरभ्युपगमात् ।

Syādetat. Vedasya kathamapauruṣeyatvamabhidhīyate ? Tatpratipādakapramāṇābhāvāt. Atha manyethāḥ 'Apauruṣeyā vedāḥ', saṁpradāyāvicchede satyasmaryamāṇakartṛkatvādātmavat' iti. Tadetanmandam. Viśeṣaṇāsiddheḥ. Pauruṣeyavedavādibhiḥ pralaye saṁpradāyavicchedasya kakṣīkaraṇāt. Kiṁ ca kimidamasmaryamāṇakartṛkatvaṁ nāmāpramīyamāṇakartṛkatvamasmaraṇagocarakartṛkatvaṁ vā? Na prathamaḥ kalpaḥ parameśvarasya kartuḥ pramiterabhyupagamāt.

"Well,[2] be it so" (say the followers of the Nyāya), "but how can the Vedas be said to be underived from any personal author, when there is no evidence to establish this ? Would you maintain that they have no personal author because, although there is an unbroken line of tradition, there is no remembrance of any author, just as is the case with the soul"?[3] This argument is weak, because the alleged characteristics (unbroken tradition, etc.) are not proved; for those who hold the human origin of the Vedas maintain that the line of tradition was interrupted at the time of the dissolution of the universe. And, again what is meant by this assertion that the author

1 I read in p. 127, line 12, *anavagamyamānasya*, and so the recension given in the Nyāya M.V.p.14, *na budhyamānasya*.

2 In the next two or three pages, I have frequently borrowed from Dr. Muir's translation in his Sanskrit texts, vol. iii.p. 88.

3 The soul may be traced back through successive transmigrations, but you never get back to its beginning.

is not remembered? Is it (1) that no author is believed, or (2) that no author is remembered? The first alternative cannot be accepted, since we hold that God is proved to have been the author.

न द्वितीयः । विकल्पासहत्वात् । तथा हि–किमेकेनास्मरणमभिप्रैयते सर्वैर्वा ? नाद्यः । 'यो धर्मशीलो जितमानरोषः' इत्यादिषु मुक्तकोक्तिषु व्यभिचारात् । न द्वितीयः सर्वास्मरणस्यासर्वज्ञदुर्ज्ञानत्वात् । पौरुषेयत्वेप्रमाणसंभवाच्च । वेदवाक्यानि पौरुषेयाणि वाक्यत्वात् कालिदासादिवाक्यवत् । वेदवाक्यान्याप्तप्रणीतानि, प्रमाणत्वे सति वाक्यत्वान्मन्वादिवाक्यवदिति ।

Na dvitīyaḥ. Vikalpāsahatvāt. Tathā hi–kimekenāsmaraṇamabhipraiyate sarvairvā ? Nādyaḥ. 'Yo dharmaśīlo jitamānaroṣaḥ' ityādiṣu muktakoktiṣu vyabhicārāt. Na dvitīyaḥ, sarvāsmaraṇasyāsarvajñadurjñānatvāt. Pauruṣeyatvepramāṇasambhavācca. Vedavākyāni pauruṣeyāṇi vākyatvāt kālidāsādivākyavat. Vedavākyānyāptapraṇītāni, pramāṇatve sati vākyatvānmanvādivākyavaditi.

Nor can the second, because it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma, viz., is it meant (a) that no author of the Veda is remembered by some one person, or (b) by any person whatever ? The former supposition breaks down, as it would prove too much, since it would apply to such an isolated stanza as "He who is religious and has overcome pride and anger," etc.[1] And the latter supposition is inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not omniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any person whatever. Moreover, there is actual proof that the Veda had a personal author, for we argue as follows:—The sentences of the Veda must have originated from a personal author since they have the character of sentences like those of Kālidāsa and other writers. And, again, the sentences of the Veda have been composed by a competent person, since, while

1 Mādhava means that the author of this stanza, though unknown to many people, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his contemporaries, no doubts, knew who wrote it, and his descendants might perhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have an instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the origin, but which, nevertheless, had as human author. The stanza in question is quoted in full in Böhtlingk's Indische Sprüche, No. 5598, from the MS. anthology called the *Subhāṣitārṇava*. For *muktaka*, see *Sāh. Darp.*, No. 558.

they possess authority, they have, at the same time, the character of sentences, like those of Manu and other sages.

ननु-

Nanu—

But (ask the Mīmāṁsaksa)

4. वेदस्याध्ययनं सर्वं गुर्वध्ययनपूर्वकम् ।
वेदाध्ययनसामान्यादधुनाध्ययनं यथा ॥ (श्लो. वा. 7/366)

Vedasyādhyayanaṁ sarvaṁ gurvadhyayanapūrvakam,
Vedādhyayanasāmānyādadhunādhyayanaṁ yathā.
(Ślo. Vā. 7/366)

May it not be assumed that "all study of the Veda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since the study of the Veda must always have had one common character which was the same in former times as now."

इत्यनुमानं प्रतिसाधनं प्रगल्भत इति चेत्–तदपि न प्रमाणकोटिं प्रवेष्टुमीष्टे ।

Ityanumānaṁ pratisādhanaṁ pragalbhata iti cet—tadapi na pramāṇakoṭiṁ praveṣṭumīṣṭe.

And therefore, this uninterrupted succession has force to prove the eternity of the Veda? This reasoning, however the Naiyāyikas' (answer), cannot rise to the height of proof, for it has no more validity than such obviously illusory reasoning.

5. भारताध्ययनं सर्वं गुर्वध्ययनपूर्वकम् ।
भारताध्ययनत्वेन सांप्रताध्ययनं यथा ॥

Bhāratādhyayanaṁ sarvaṁ gurvadhyayanapūrvakam,
Bhāratādhyayanatvena sāṁpratādhyayanaṁ yathā.

इत्याभाससमानयोगक्षेमत्वात् ।

Ityābhāsasamānayogakṣematvāt.

"As All study of the *Mahābhārata* was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since it is the study of the Mahābhārata, which must have been the same in former times as now."

ननु तत्र व्यासः कर्तेति स्मर्यते–

को ह्यन्यः पुण्डरीकाक्षान्महाभारतकृद्भवेत् । इत्यादाविति चेत्–तदसारम् ।

—'ऋचः सामानि जज्ञिरे । छन्दांसि जज्ञिरे तस्माद्यजुस्तस्मादजायत ॥'
(ऋ. 10/90/9)

Nanu tatra vyāsaḥ karteti smaryate—
Ko hyanyaḥ puṇḍarīkākṣānmahābhāratakṛdbhavet.
Ityādāviti cet—tadasāram.
—'Ṛcaḥ sāmāni jajñire.
Candāṁsi jajñire tasmādyajustasmādajāyata.'
(Ṛg. 10/90/9)

इति पुरुषसूक्ते वेदस्य सकर्तृकताप्रतिपादनात् ।

Iti puruṣasūkte vedasya sakartṛkatāpratipādanāt.

But (the Mīmāṁsakas will ask whether there is not a difference between these two cases, since) the Smṛti declares that (Viṣṇu incarnate as) Vyāsa was the author of the *Mahābhārata*, in accordance with the line, "Who else than the lotus-eyed Viṣṇu could be the maker of the *Mahābhārata*?" (while nothing of this sort is recorded in any Smṛti in regard to the Veda). This argument, however, is pithless, since those words of the Puruṣasūkta (Ṛg., x.90), "From him sprang the *Ṛcas* and *Sāman* Verses; from him sprang the Metres; from him the Yajus arose;" prove that the Veda had a maker.

Second Postulation Regarding Veda Composed by the Author in Person

किं चानित्यः शब्दः सामान्यवत्त्वे सत्यस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वाद् घटवत् । नन्विदमनुमानं स एवायं गकार इति प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रमाणप्रतिहतमिति चेत्–तदतिफल्गु । लूनपुनर्जातकेशकुन्दादाविव प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः सामान्यविषयत्वेन बाधकत्वाभावात् ।

Kiṁ cānityaḥ śabdaḥ sāmānyavattve satyasmadādibāhyendriyagrāhyatvād ghaṭavat. Nanvidamanumānaṁ sa evāyaṁ gakāra iti pratyabhijñāpramāṇapratihatamiti cet–tadati-phalgu. Lūnapunarjātakeśakundādāviva pratyabhijñāyāḥ sāmānyaviṣayatvena bādhakatvābhāvāt.

Further (proceed the Naiyāyikas) we hold that sound in non-eternal[1] because it has genus, and is also perceptible to the external

1 The eternity of the Veda depends on this tenet of the *Mīmāṁsā* that sound is eternal.

organs of beings such as ourselves, just as a jar is.[1] "But," you may object, "is not this argument refuted by the proof arising from the fact that we recognise the letter *g* (for example) as the same we have heard before?" This objection however, is extremely weak, for the recognition in question is powerless to refute our argument, since it has reference only to identity of *species*, as in the case of a man whose hair has been cut and has grown again, or of a jasmine which has blossomed afresh.

नन्वशरीरस्य परमेश्वरस्य ताल्वादिस्थानाभावेन वर्णोच्चारणासम्भवात्कथं तत्प्रणीतत्वं वेदस्य स्यादिति चेत्—न तद्भद्रम् । स्वभावतोऽशरीरस्यापि तस्य भक्तानुग्रहार्थं लीलाविग्रहग्रहणसम्भवात् । तस्माद्वेदस्यापौरुषेयत्ववाचोयुक्तिर्न युक्तेति चेत्—।

Nanvaśarīrasya parameśvarasya tālvādisthānābhāvena varṇoccāraṇāsambhavātkathaṁ tatpraṇītatvaṁ vedasya syāditi cet—na tadbhadram. Svabhāvato'śarīrasyāpi tasya bhaktānugrahārthaṁ līlāvigrahagrahaṇasambhavāt. Tasmādvedasyāpauruṣeyatvavācoyuktirna yukteti cet—

"But (asks the Mīmāṁsaka) how can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Parameśvara, who has no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot have pronounced the letters?" "This objection (answers the Naiyāyika) is not happy, because, though Parameśvara is by nature incorporeal, he can yet assume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his worshippers. Consequently, the arguments in favour of the doctrine that the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive."

Rebuttal of Former View—In Principle

तत्र समाधानमभिधीयते । किंमिदं पौरुषेयत्वं सिसाधयिषितम् ? पुरुषादुत्पन्नत्वमात्रं यथास्मदादिभिरहरहरुच्चार्यमाणस्य वेदस्य? प्रमाणान्तरेणार्थमुपलभ्य तत्प्रकाशनाय रचितत्वं वा यथास्मदादिभिरेव निबध्यमानस्य प्रबन्धस्य?

1 Eternal things (as the atoms of earth, fire, water, and air, minds, time, space, ether, and soul) have *viśeṣa*, not *sāmānya* or genus, and they are all imperceptible to the senses. Genera are themselves eternal (though the individuals in which they reside are not), but they have not themselves genus. Both these arguments belong rather to the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school than to the Nyāya.

Tatra samādhānamabhidhīyate. Kiṁmidaṁ pauruṣeyatvaṁ sisādhayiṣitam? Puruṣādutpannatvamātraṁ yathāsmadādibhiraharaharuccāryamāṇasya vedasya? Pramāṇāntareṇārthamupalabhya tatprakāśanāya racitatvaṁ vā yathāsmadādibhireva nibadhyamānasya prabandhasya?

I shall now (says the Mīmāṁsaka) clear up the whole question. What is meant by this *Pauruṣeyatva* ("derivation form a personal author") which it is sought to prove? Is it (1) mere procession (*utpannatva*) from a person; like the procession of the Veda from persons such as ourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2) is it the arrangement—with a view to its manifestation—of knowledge acquired by other modes of proof, as in the case of treatises composed by persons like ourselves ?

प्रथमे न विप्रतिपत्तिः । द्वितीये किमनुमानबलात्तत्साधनमागमबलाद्वा ? नाद्यः । मालतीमाधवादिवाक्येषु सव्यभिचारत्वात् । अथ प्रमाणत्वे सतीति विशिष्यत इति चेत्—तदपि न विपश्चितो मनसि वैशद्यमापद्यते । प्रमाणान्तरागोचरार्थप्रतिपादकं हि वाक्यं वेदवाक्यम् । तत्प्रमाणान्तरगोचरार्थप्रतिपादकमिति साध्यमाने मम माता वन्ध्येतिवद् व्याघातापातात् ।

Prathame na vipratipattiḥ. Dvitīye kimanumānabalāttatsādhanamāgamabalādvā ? Nādyaḥ. Mālatīmādhavādivākyeṣu savyabhicāratvāt. Atha pramāṇatve satīti viśiṣyata iti cet—tadapi na vipaścito manasi vaiśadyamāpadyate. Pramāṇāntarāgocarārthapratipādakaṁ hi vākyaṁ vedavākyam. Tatpramāṇāntaragocarārthapratipādakamiti sādhyamāne mama mātā vandhyetivad vyāghātāpātāt.

If the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute between us.[1] If the second sense be meant, I ask whether it is established (a) by inference,[2] or (b) by supernatural testimony? (a) The former alternative cannot be correct, because your argument would equally apply to the sentences in dramas such as the *Mālatīmādhava*

1 The Mīmāṁsaka allows that the *uccāraṇa* or utterance is non-eternal.

2 The inference will be as follows : "The Vedas were arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, with a view to their manifestation, from the very fact of their having the nature of sentences, just like the compositions of Manu, etc."

(which, of course, being a work of fiction, has no authoritative character). If you qualify your argument by inserting the saving clause, "while they possess authority,"[1] (as supra, p.188, line 21), even this explanation will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the sentences of the Veda are universally defined to be sentences which prove things that are not provable by other evidence. But if you could establish that these Vedic sentences only prove what is provable by other evidence, this definition would be once contradicted, just as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren women.

Second Rebuttal of Former View

किं च परमेश्वरस्य लीलाविग्रहपरिग्रहाभ्युपगमेऽप्यतीन्द्रियार्थदर्शनं न संजाघटीति। देशकालस्वभावविप्रकृष्टार्थग्रहणोपायाभावात् । न च तच्चक्षुरादिकमेव तादृक्प्रतीतिजननक्षममिति मन्तव्यम् । दृष्टानुसारेणैव कल्पनाया आश्रयणीयत्वात् । तदुक्तं गुरुभिः सर्वज्ञनिराकरणवेलायाम्–

Kiṁ ca parameśvarasya līlāvigrahaparigrahābhyupagame'pyatīndriyārthadarśanaṁ na sanjāghaṭīti. Deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭārthagrahaṇopāyābhāvāt. Na ca taccakṣurādikameva tādṛkpratītijananakṣamamiti mantavyaṃ. Dṛṣṭānusāreṇaiva kalpanāyā āśrayaṇīyatvāt. Taduktaṁ gurubhiḥ sarvajñanirākaraṇavelāyāṃ—

And even if we granted that Parameśvara might assume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his worshippers, it would not at all follow that he would perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in time, and in nature.[2] Nor is it to be assumed that his eyes and other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge, for we can only draw upon our imagination in accordance with our past experience. This has been declared by the Guru (Prabhākara) when he refutes the supposition of an omniscient author—

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1 The argument will now run, "The Vedas were arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, because, while they possess authority, they still have the nature of sentences, like the composition of Manu, etc."

2 In assuming a material body, he would be subject to material limitations.

6. यत्राप्यतिशयो दृष्टः स स्वार्थानतिलङ्घनात् ।
दूरसूक्ष्मादिदृष्टौ स्यान्न रूपे श्रोत्रवृत्तिता ।। इति ।

Yatrāpyatiśayo dṛṣṭaḥ sa svārthānatilaṅghanāt,
Dūrasūkṣmādidṛṣṭau syānna rūpe śrotravṛttitā. iti.

"Wherever we do find the power of an organ intensified,[1] it is done without its going beyond its own proper objects; thus, it may appear in the power of seeing the very distant or the very minute, but not in the ear's becoming cognisant of form."

अत एव नागमबलात्तत्साधनम् । यथा 'तेन प्रोक्तम्' (पा. सू. 4/3/101) इति पाणिन्यनुशासने जाग्रत्यपि काठक-कालाप-तैत्तिरीयमित्यादिसमाख्याध्ययन-सम्प्रदायप्रवर्तकविषयत्वेनोपपद्यते, तद्वदत्रापि सम्प्रदायप्रवर्तक विषयत्वेनाप्युपपद्यते ।

Ata eva nāgamabalāttatsādhanaṃ. Yathā 'tena proktaṃ' (Pā. Sū. 4/3/101) iti. Pāṇinyanuśāsane jagratyapi kāṭhaka-kālāpa-taittirīyamityādisamākhyādhyayanasampradāyapravartakaviṣayatvenopapadyate, tadvadatrāpi sampradāyapravartaka viṣayatvenāpyupapadyate.

Hence, (b) we also maintain that your position cannot be established by any supposed supernatural testimony (as that quoted above from the Ṛg-Veda, "from him sprang the *Ṛcās* and *Sāman* verses"). For the rule of Pāṇini (iv.3, 101) will still remain inviolate, that the grammatical affixes with which such names as Kāṭhaka, Kālāpa, and Taittirīya are formed, impart to those derivatives the sense of "uttered by" Kaṭha, Kālāpin, etc., though we maintain that these names have reference (not to those parts of the Veda as first composed by these sages, but) to the fact that these sages instituted certain schools of traditional study. And in the same way, we hold (in reference to this verse from the Ṛg-Veda) that it only refers to the institution of certain schools of traditional study of these Vedas.

Words are All Immortal

न चानुमानबलाच्छब्दस्यानित्यत्वसिद्धिः । प्रत्यभिज्ञाविरोधात् । न चासत्यप्येकत्वे सामान्यनिबन्धनं तदिति साम्प्रतम् । सामान्यनिबन्धनत्वमस्य बलवद्बाध–

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1 The Jainas allow thirty-four such superhuman developments (*atiśayāḥ*) in their saints.

कोपनिपातादास्थीयते क्वचिद् व्यभिचारदर्शनाद्वा । तत्र क्वचिद् व्यभिचारदर्शने तदुत्प्रेक्षायामुक्तं स्वतः प्रामाण्यवादिभिः-

Na cānumānabalācchabdasyānityatvasiddhiḥ. Pratyabhijñā-virodhāt. Na cāsatyapyekatve sāmānyanibandhanaṁ taditi sāmpratam. Sāmānyanibandhanatvamasya balavadvādhakopa-nipātādāsthīyate kvacid vyabhicāradarśanādvā. Tatra kvacid vyabhicāradarśane tadutprekṣāyāmuktaṁ svataḥ prāmāṇyavā-dibhiḥ—

Nor will any supposed inference establish the non-eternity of sound, because (as we said before) it is opposed to the evidence of our consciousness, (since we certainly recognise the letter now heard as the one heard before). Nor is it reasonable to reply that, although the letters are not the same, they seem to be so on account of their identity of species. For here we ask our opponents a question—Is this idea that "the apparent sameness arises from identity of species" put forward from a wish to preclude entirely any idea of the letters being the same, or only (from an imagined fear of error) because experience shows that the recognition will sometimes be erroneous (as in the cases of the hair and jasmine mentioned above)? (a) If it arises from the latter reason, we Mīmāṁsakas, who hold that the Veda is its own evidence, have said in reference to this timid imagination—

7. उत्प्रेक्षेत हि यो मोहादज्ञातमपि बाधनम् ।
स सर्वव्यवहारेषु संशयात्मा विनश्यति ।। इति ।

Utprekṣeta hi yo mohādajñātamapi bādhanam,
Sa sarvavyavahāreṣu saṁśayātmā vinaśyati. iti.

"He who foolishly imagines that something as yet unknown to him will come hereafter to stop his present conclusion, will go to utter ruin in every transaction of life, his mind a mass of doubts."

नन्विदं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं गत्वादिजातिविषयं न गादिव्यक्तिविषयम् । तासां प्रतिपुरुषं भेदोपलम्भात् । अन्यथा 'सोमशर्माऽधीते' इति विभागो न स्यादिति चेत्-तदपि शोभां न विभर्ति । गादिव्यक्तिभेदे प्रमाणाभावेन गत्वादिजातिविषयकल्पनायां प्रमाणाभावात् । यथा गोत्वमजानत एकमेव भिन्नदेशपरिमाणसंस्थान-

व्यक्त्युपधानवशाद्भिन्नदेशमिवाल्पमिव महदिव दीर्घमिव वामनमिव प्रथते तथा-गव्यक्तिमजानत एकापि व्यञ्जकभेदात् तत्तद्धर्मानुबन्धिनी प्रतिभासते ।

Nanvidaṁ pratyabhijñānaṁ gatvādijātiviṣayaṁ na gādivyaktiviṣayam. Tāsāṁ pratipuruṣaṁ bhedopalambhāt. Anyathā 'Somaśarmā'dhīte' iti vibhāgo na syāditi cet—tadapi śobhāṁ na vibharti. Gādivyaktibhede pramāṇābhāvena gatvādijātiviṣayakalpanāyāṁ pramāṇābhāvāt. Yathā gotvamajānata ekameva bhinnadeśaparimāṇasaṁsthānavyakt-yupadhānavaśādbhinnadeśamivālpamiva mahadiva dīrghamiva vāmanamiva prathate tathāgavyaktimajānata ekāpi vyañjakabhedāt tattaddharmānubandhinī pratibhāsate.

(b) "But (the Naiyāyikas will ask) does not this recognition of *g* and other letters (as the same which we heard before) refer to the species which exists the same in each, and not to the several individual letters, since, in fact, we perceive that they are different as uttered by different persons, otherwise we could not make such distinctions as we do when we say 'Somaśarman is reading'?" This objection, however, has as little brilliancy as its predecessors, for as there is no proof of any distinction between the individual *g*'s, there is no proof that we ought to assume any such thing as a species *g*; and we maintain that, just as to the man who does not understand (the Naiyāyika doctrine of) the species *g*, the one speices (in the Naiyāyika view) will by the influence of distinction of place, magnitude, form, and individual sounds, appear as if it were variously modified as itself distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, as short; so to the man who does not understand our (Mīmāṁsaka doctrine of) one individual *g*, the one *g* (in our view) will by the diversity of "manifesters,"[1] appear to him associated with their respective peculiarities; and as contrary characters are in this way ascribed (to the letter *g*), there is a fallacious appearance of distinction (between different *g*'s).

एतेन विरुद्धधर्माध्यासाद् भेदसिद्धिरिति प्रत्युक्तम् । तत्र किं स्वाभाविको विरुद्धधर्माध्यासो भेदसाधकत्वेनाभिमतः प्रातीतिको वा ? प्रथमेऽसिद्धिः । अपरथा स्वाभाविकभेदाभ्युपगमे 'दशगकारानुदचारयच्चैत्रः' इति प्रतिपत्तिःस्यान्न तु दशकृत्वोगकार इति ।

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1 Jaimini maintains that the vibrations of the air "manifest" the always existing sound.

Etena viruddhadharmādhyāsād bhedasiddhiriti pratyuktaṃ. Tatra kiṁ svābhāviko viruddhadharmādhyāso bhedasādhakatvenābhimataḥ prātītiko vā ? Prathame'siddhiḥ. Aparathā svābhāvikabhedābhyupagame 'daśagakārānudacārayaccaitraḥ' iti pratipattiḥ syānna tu daśakṛtvo gakāra iti.

But does this ascription of contrary characters, which is thus regarded as creating a difference (between the *g*'s), result (1) from the nature of the thing, or (2) from our imagination ? There is no proof of the former alternative; for, if it were true, as an inherent difference would have to be admitted between different g's, we should have to say, "Caitra has uttered ten *g*'s," and not "Caitra has uttered the same *g* ten times."

द्वितीये तु न स्वाभाविकभेदसिद्धिः । न हि परोपाधिभेदेन स्वाभाविकमैक्यं विहन्यते । मा भून्नभसोऽपि कुम्भाद्युपाधिभेदात्स्वाभाविको भेदः । तत्र व्यावृत्तव्यवहारो नादनिदानः । तदुक्तमाचार्यैः-

Dvitīye tu na svābhāvikabhedasiddhiḥ. Na hi paropādhibhedena svābhāvikamaikyaṁ vihanyate. Mā bhūnnabhaso'pi kumbhādyupādhibhedātsvābhāviko bhedaḥ. Tatra vyāvṛttavyavahāro nādanidānaḥ. Taduktamācāryaiḥ—

On the latter supposition, there is no proof of any inherent distinction between *g*'s, for inherent oneness is not destroyed by a difference of external disguises. Thus, we must not conceive, from the apparent distinction caused by such external disguises as jars, etc., that there is any inherent distinction, as of parts, in the one indivisible ether. The current use of the rejected phrase (*i.e.*, "different" as applied to the *g*'s) is really caused by the *noise*, which in each case is different. This has been said by the great teacher—

8. प्रयोजनं तु यज्जातेस्तद्वर्णादेव लप्स्यते ।
व्यक्तिलभ्यं तु नादेभ्य इति गत्वादिधीर्वृथा ॥

Prayojanaṁ tu yajjātestadvarṇādeva lapsyate,
Vyaktilabhyaṁ tu nādebhya iti gatvādidhīrvṛthā.

"The object which the Naiyāyikas seek by supposing a species is, in fact, gained from the letter itself; and the object which they aim at by supposing an individuality in letters, is attained from audible noises;[1] so that the assumption of species is useless."

तथा च-

9. प्रत्यभिज्ञा यदा शब्दे जागर्ति निरवग्रहा ।
अनित्यत्वानुमानानि सैव सर्वाणि बाधते ॥ इति ।

Tathā ca —

Pratyabhijñā yadā śabde jāgarti niravagrahā,
Anityatvānumānāni saiva sarvāṇi bādhate. iti.

And again—

"Since, in regard to sounds such an irresistible instinct of recognition is always awake within us, it precludes by its superior evidence all the inferences to prove sound's non-eternity."

Veda : Self Established Authority

एतेनेदमपास्तं यदवादि वागीश्वरेण मानमनोहरे-'अनित्यः शब्दः, इन्द्रियग्राह्यविशेषगुणत्वाच्चक्षूरूपवदिति' । शब्दद्रव्यत्ववादिनं प्रत्यसिद्धेः । ध्वन्यंशे सिद्धसाधनत्वाच्च । अश्रावणत्वोपाधिबाधितत्वाच्च । उदयनस्तु आश्रयाप्रत्यक्षत्वेऽप्यभावस्य प्रत्यक्षतां महता प्रबन्धेन प्रतिपादयन्निवृत्तः कोलाहलः, उत्पन्नः शब्द 'इति व्यवहाराचरणे कारणं प्रत्यक्षं शब्दानित्यत्वे प्रमाणयति स्म ।

Etenedamapāstaṁ yadavādi vāgīśvareṇa mānamanohare—'Anityaḥ śabdaḥ' indriyagrāhyaviśeṣaguṇatvāccakśūrūpavaditi'. śabdadravyatvavādinaṁ pratyasiddheḥ. Dhvanyaṁśe siddhasādhanatvācca. Aśrāvaṇatvopādhibādhitatvācca. Udayanastu āśrayāpratyakṣatve'pyabhāvasya pratyakṣatāṁ mahatā prabandhena pratipādayannivṛttaḥ kolāhalaḥ, utpannaḥ śabda iti vyavahārācaraṇe kāraṇaṁ pratyakṣaṁ śabdānityatve pramāṇayati sma.

This at once refutes the argument given in the (Naiyāyika) treatise by Vāgīśvara, entitled *Māna-manohara*, "sound is non-eternal

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1 "What is meant by 'noise' (*nāda*) is these 'conjunctions' and 'disjunctions,' occasioned by the vibrations of the air."
—Ballantyne, *Mīmāṁsā Aphorisms*, i. 17.

from the fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of sense[1] (sc. the ear), just as colour is to the eye."

We can also refute it in the following ways: (a) If we follow the (Sāṅkhya and Vedānta) view that sound is a substance, it is evidently overthrown[2] (as in that case sound cannot be a quality); (b) if we take it as referring to the *noise* not the *sound*, we have no dispute, as it only establishes what we ourselves allow; and (c) the inference is overthrown by the "limiting condition" (*upādhi*) of *aśrāvaṇatva*, or "the not causing audition."[3] So, Udayana tries at great length to establish that, although ether, the site of sound, is imperceptible, the non-existence of that which abides in this site is perceptible; and he then brings forward as an evidence for the non-eternity of sound, that sense perception which causes the use of such common expressions as "The tumult is stopped", "The sound has arisen."[4]

1. The Nyāya holds that colour and sound are respectively special qualities of the elements light and ether; and as the organs of seeing and hearing are composed of light and ether, each will, of course, have its corresponding special quality.

2 In p. 131, line 7, I read *pratyakṣāsiddheḥ*.

3 *Cf*. my note pp. 7,8, (on the *Cārvāka-darśana*) for the *upādhi*. The *upādhi* or " Condition" limits a too general middle term; it is defined as "that which always accompanies the major term. But does not always accompany the middle." Thus, if the condition "produced from wet fuel"is added to "fire," the argument "the mountain has smoke because it has fire"is no longer a false one. Here, in answer to the Nyāya argument in the text, our author objects that its middle term ("from the fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of sense") is too wide, *i.e.*, it is sometimes found where the major term "non-eternal" is not found, as, *e.g.*, in sound itself, according to the *Mīmāṁsā* doctrine. To obviate this, he proposes to add the "condition", "not causing audition," as he will readily concede that all those things are non-eternal which, *while not causing audition* are special qualities belonging to an organ of sense, as, *e.g.*, colour. But I need scarcely add that this addition would make the whole argument nugatory. In fact, the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and the Nyāya can never argue together on this question of the eternity of sound, as their points of view are so totally different.

4 In the former case, we have the *dhvaṁsa* of sound, in the latter its *prāgabhāva*.

सोऽपि विरुद्धधर्मसंसर्गस्यौपाधिकत्वोपपादनन्यायेन दत्तरक्तबलिवेतालसमः । यो हि नित्यत्वे सर्वदोपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गो न्यायभूषणकारोक्तः, सोऽपि ध्वनिसंस्कृतस्योपलम्भाभ्युपगमात्प्रतिक्षिप्तः । यत्तु युगपदिन्द्रियसम्बन्धित्वेन प्रतिनियतसंस्कारकसंस्कार्यत्वाभावानुमानं तदात्मन्यैकान्तिकमित्यलमतिकलहेन । ततश्च वेदस्यापौरुषेयतया निरस्तसमस्तशङ्काकलङ्काङ्कुरत्वेन स्वतःसिद्धं धर्मे प्रामाण्यमिति सुस्थितम् ।

So'pi viruddhadharmasaṁsargasyaupādhikatvopapādananyāyena dattaraktabalivetālasamaḥ. Yo hi nityatve sarvadopalabdhyanupalabdhiprasaṅgo nyāyabhūṣaṇakāroktaḥ, so'pi dhvanisaṁskṛtasyopalambhābhyupagamātpratikṣiptaḥ. Yattu yugapadindriyasambandhitvena pratiniyatasaṁskārakasaṁskāryatvābhāvānumānaṁ tadātmanyaikāntikamityalamatikalahena. Tataśca vedasyāpauruṣeyatayā nirastasamastaśaṅkākalaṅkāṅkuratvena svataḥsiddhaṁ dharme prāmāṇyamiti susthitam.

But he is sufficiently answered[1] by our old reply (in p.193), that the fallacious appearance of distinction arises from contrary characters being erroneously ascribed, just as, in the story, the demon Tāla went away (as well as Betāla) when the offering of blood was given to the latter.[2] And as for the objection raised by the author of the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*,[3] that if sound were eternal, the conclusion must follow that it would be either always perceptible or always imperceptible, this also is obviated by our allowing that we only perceive that sound which is manifested by our articulate noise.[4] And as for

1 In p. 131, line 12, I read *samapauhi* for *samāpohi*, *i.e.*, the passive aorist of *sam+apa+ūh*.

2 I do not know this legend. Tāla and Betāla are the two demons who carry Vikramāditya on their shoulders in the *Siṁhāsan-battīsī*. It appears to be referred to here as illustrating how one answer can suffice for two opponents.

3 This is probably a work by *Bhāsarvajña* (see Dr. Hall's Bibl. Index, p.26).

4 *Dhvani*, or our "articulate noise," produces the vibrations of air which render manifest the ever-existing sound. There is always an eternal but inaudible hum going on, which we modify into a definite speech by our various articulations. I take *saṁskṛta* here as equivalent to *abhivyakta*.

the (Naiyāyika) argument against the existence[1] of such a constant relation as this which is supposed between the manifested "sound" and the manifesting "noise," since they both come simultaneously in contact with the sense of hearing, this is invalid, as it will indisputably apply with equal force in the case of the soul.[2]

Therefore, as the Veda is thus proved to have not originated from any personal author, and as the minutest germ of suspicion against it is thus, absolutely destroyed, we hold it as satisfactorily demonstrated that it has a self-established authority in all matters relating to duty.

स्यादेतत्– *Syādetat—*

10. प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे स्वतः सांख्याः समाश्रिताः ।
नैयायिकास्ते परतः, सौगताश्चरमं स्वतः ॥

Pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve svataḥ sāṅkhyāḥ samāśritāḥ,
Naiyāyikāste parataḥ, saugatāścaramaṁ svataḥ.

11. प्रथमं परतः प्राहुः प्रामाण्यं, वेदवादिनः ।
प्रमाणत्वं स्वतः प्राहुः परतश्चाप्रमाणताम् ॥

Prathamaṁ parataḥ prāhuḥ prāmāṇyaṁ, vedavādinaḥ,
Pramāṇatvaṁ svataḥ prāhuḥ parataścāpramāṇatām.

इति वादिविवाददर्शनात्कथंकारं स्वतः धर्मे प्रमाण्यमिति सिद्धवत्कृत्य स्वीक्रियते?

Iti vādivivādadarśanātkathaṅkāraḥ svataḥ dharme pramāṇyamiti siddhavatkṛtya svīkriyate?

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1 I read in p.131, line 15 *saṁskārakasaṁskāryabhāvābhāvānumānam.*

2 It would be a case of *vyabhicāra*. The *Naiyāyika* argument would seem to be something as follows :—Sound is not thus, manifested by noise, since both are simultaneously perceived by the senses, just as we see in the parallel case of the individual and its species: these are both perceived together, but the individual is not manifested by the species. But the *Mīmāṁsā* rejoins that this would equally apply to the soul and knowledge; as the internal sense perceives both simultaneously, and therefore, knowledge ought not to be manifested by the soul, which is contrary to experience. But I am not sure that I rightly understand the argument.

"Well"[1] (say our opponents), "let this question rest; but how about another well-known controversy ? It is said–

"The Sāṁkhyas hold that both authoritativeness and non-authoritativeness are self-proved; the followers of the Nyāya hold that both are proved by something else (as inference, etc.); the Buddhists hold that the latter is self-proved and the former proved by something else; the teachers of the Veda maintain that authoritativeness is self-proved and non-authoritativeness proved by something else.'

Meaning of Self-Proved Authoritativeness

किं च किमिदं स्वतः प्रामाण्यं नाम ? किं स्वत एव प्रामाण्यस्य जन्म ? आहोस्वित् स्वाश्रयज्ञानजन्यत्वम् ? किमुत स्वाश्रयज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यत्वम् ? उताहो ज्ञानसामान्यसामग्रीजन्यज्ञानविशेषाश्रितत्वम्? किं वा ज्ञानसामान्यसामग्रीमात्रजन्यज्ञानविशेषाश्रितत्वम् ?

Kiṁ ca kimidaṁ svataḥ prāmāṇyaṁ nāma ? Kiṁ svata eva prāmāṇyasya janma? Āho svit svāśrayajñānajanyatvam ? Kimuta svāśrayajnānasāmagrījanyatvam? Utāho jñānasāmānyasāmagrījanyajñānaviśeṣāśritatvam ? Kiṁ vā jñānasāmānyasāmagrīmātrajanyajñānaviśeṣāśritatvam ?

Now we ask, amidst all this discussion, how do the Mīmāṁsakas accept as established their tenet that the authoritativeness of duty is self-proved ? And what is the meaning of this so-called self-proved authoritativeness ? Is it (a) that authoritativeness springs from itself? or (b) that it springs from the right knowledge in which it resides? or (c) that it springs from the instrumental causes (as the eye, etc.) which produced the right knowledge in which it resides? or (d) that it resides in a particular knowledge produced by the instrumental causes which produced the right knowledge ?[2] or

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1 Here begins a long *pūrvapakṣa*, from p. 131, line 18, down to p. 133, line 9; see p. 198 *infra*.

2 This is Prabhākara's view (see *Siddh. Muktāv.*, p.118).The first knowledge is in the form "This is a jar;" the second knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive the jar;" and this latter produces authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya*), which resides in it as its characteristic.

(e) that it resides in a particular knowledge produced by the instrumental causes only which produced the right knowledge?

तत्राद्यः सावद्यः । कार्यकारणभावस्य भेदसमानाधिकरणत्वेन एकस्मिन्नसंभवात्। नापि द्वितीयः । गुणस्य सतो ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यं प्रति समवायिकारणतया द्रव्यत्वापातात् ।

Tatrādyaḥ sāvadyaḥ. Kāryakāraṇabhāvasya bhedasamānādhikaraṇatvena ekasminnasaṁbhavāt. Nāpi dvitīyaḥ. Guṇasya sato jñānasya prāmāṇyaṁ prati samavāyikāraṇatayā dravyatvāpātāt.

"(a) It cannot be the first, because wherever the relation of cause and effect is found, there must be a difference, and therefore these two cannot reside in the same subject (*i.e.*, authoritativeness cannot cause itself). (b) It cannot be the *second*, because, if knowledge, which is a quality; were the causes of authoritativeness, it would have to be a substance, as being an intimate cause.[1]

नापि तृतीयः, प्रामाण्यस्योपाधित्वे जातित्वे वा जन्मायोगात् । स्मृतित्वानधिकरणस्य ज्ञानस्य बाधात्यन्ताभावः प्रामाण्योपाधिः । न च तस्योत्पत्तिसंभवः । अत्यन्ताभावस्य नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् । अत एव न जातेरपि जनिर्युज्यते ।

Nāpi tṛtīyaḥ, prāmāṇyasyopādhitve jātitve vā janmāyogāt. Smṛtitvānadhikaraṇasya jñānasya bādhātyantābhāvaḥ prāmāṇyopādhiḥ. Na ca tasyotpattisaṁbhavaḥ. Atyantābhāvasya nityatvābhyupagamāt. Ata eva na jāterapi janiryujyate.

(c) It cannot be the third, because 'authoritativeness' cannot properly be 'produced' at all,[2] whether we call it a general characteristic (*upādhi*) or a species (*jāti*);[3] for if we call it an *upādhi*, it is defined as the absolute non-existence of any contradiction to a certain kind

1 Substances are "intimate causes" to their qualities, and only substances have qualities; now if authoritativeness, which is a characteristic of right knowledge, were caused by it, it would be a quality of it, that is, right knowledge would be its intimate cause and therefore a substance.

2 The eye, etc., would be its instrumental causes.

3 The first three categories "substance", "quality," and "action," are called *jātis* or species; the last four, "genus", "*viśeṣa*", "intimate relation," and "non-existence," are called *upādhi* or "general characteristics."

of knowledge which does not possess the nature of recollection;[1] and this cannot be produced, for we all allow that absolute non-existence is eternal; and still less can we speak of its being produced, if we regard it as a species.

नापि चतुर्थः । ज्ञानविशेषो ह्यप्रमा । विशेषसामग्र्यां च सामान्यसामग्री अनुप्रविशति शिंशपासामग्र्यामिव वृक्षसामग्री । अपरथा तस्याकस्मिकत्वं प्रसज्येत । तस्मात्परतस्त्वेन स्वीकृताप्रामाण्यं विज्ञानसामान्यसामग्रीजन्याश्रितमित्यतिव्याप्तिरापद्येत ।

Nāpi caturthaḥ. Jñānaviśeṣo hyapramā. Viśeṣasāmagryāṁ ca sāmānyasāmagrī anupraviśati śiṁśapāsāmagryāmiva vṛkṣasāmagrī. Aparathā tasyākasmikatvaṁ prasajyeta. Tasmātparatastvena svīkṛtāprāmāṇyaṁ vijñānasāmānyasāmagrījanyāśritamityativyāptirāpadyeta.

(d) Nor can it be the fourth, for wrong knowledge (as well as right knowledge) is a particular kind of knowledge, and the instrumental causes which produce the general are included in those which produce the particular,[2] just as the general idea 'seed,' as applied to 'tree,' is included in the particular seed of any special tree, as, e.g., the Dalbergia *Sisu*; otherwise we might suppose that the particular had no instrumental causes at all. Your definition would therefore, extend too far (and include erroneous as well as true knowledge); for non-authoritativeness, which Vedantists and most Mīmāṃsaakas allow to be produced by something external, must also be considered as residing in a particular knowledge (i.e., a wrong knowledge) produced (in part) by the instrumental causes which produced the right knowledge.

पञ्चमविकल्पं विकल्पयामः । किं दोषाभावसहकृतज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यत्वमेव ज्ञानसामग्रीमात्रजन्यत्वं, किं वा दोषाभावासहकृतज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यत्वम् ? नाद्यः । दोषाभावसहकृतज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यत्वमेव परतः प्रामाण्यवादिभिरुररीकरणात् ।

Pañcamavikalpaṁ vikalpayāmaḥ. Kiṁ doṣābhāvasahakṛtajñānasāmagrījanyatvameva jñānasāmagrīmātrajanyatvaṁ, kiṁ vā doṣābhāvāsahakṛtajñānasāmagrījanyatvam? Nādyaḥ. Doṣābhā-

1 The Pūrva *Mīmāṁsā* denies that recollection is right knowledge.

2 Wrong knowledge is produced by the same instrumental causes (as the eye, etc.) which produced right knowledge, but by these together with a "defect," as biliousness, distance, etc.

vasahakṛtajñānasāmagrījanyatvameva parataḥ prāmāṇyavādibhirurarīkaraṇāt.

(e) As for your fifth view, we ask whether by being produced by the instrumental causes only which produced right knowledge, you mean to include or exclude the absence of a 'defect'? It cannot be the former alternative; because the followers of the Nyāya who hold that authoritativeness is proved by something external (as inference, etc.), would at once grant that authoritativeness is produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge combined with the absence of a 'defect.'

नापि द्वितीयः । दोषाभावसहकृतत्वेन सामग्र्यां सहकृतत्वे सिद्धेऽन्यथासिद्धावन्वयव्यतिरेकसिद्धतया दोषाभावस्य कारणताया वज्रलेपायमानत्वात् । अभावः कारणमेव न भवतीति चेत्तदा वक्तव्यमभावस्य कार्यत्वमस्ति न वा ? यदि नास्ति तदा घटप्रध्वंसानुत्पत्त्या घटस्य नित्यताप्रसङ्गः । अथास्ति, किमपराद्धं कारणत्वेनेति सेयमुभयतस्पाशा रज्जुः ।

Nāpi dvitīyaḥ. Doṣābhāvasahakṛtatvena sāmagryāṁ sahakṛtatve siddhe'nyathāsiddhāvanvayavyatirekasiddhatayā doṣābhāvasya kāraṇatāyā vajralepāyamānatvāt. Abhāvaḥ kāraṇameva na bhavatīti cettadā vaktavyamabhāvasya kāryatvamasti na vā? Yadi nāsti tadā ghaṭapradhvaṁsānutpattyā ghaṭasya nityatāprasaṁgaḥ. Athāsti, kimaparāddhaṁ kāraṇatveneti seyamubhayataspāśā rajjuḥ.

Neither can it be the latter alternative; for, in as much as it is certain that the absence of a 'defect' is found combined with the various instrumental causes, this absence of a 'defect' is fixed as by adamantine glue to be a cause of right knowledge, since right knowledge will always accompany its presence, and be absent if it is absent,[1] and it will at the same time be not an unimportant condition.[2] If you object that non-existence (or absence) cannot be cause, we reply by asking you whether non-existence can be an effect or not? If it cannot, then we should have to allow that cloth is eternal, as its "emergent non-existence" or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an effect, then why should it not be a cause also? So, this rope binds you at both ends.

1 *Scil*, if there be *doṣābhāva* there is *pramā*; if not, not. In p.132, line 20, I read *doṣābhāvatvena* for *doṣābhāvasahakṛtatvena.*

2 *Anyathāsiddhatvaṃ* means *niyatapūrvavartitve sati anāvaśyakatvaṁ*.

तदुदितमुदयनेन– *Taduditamudayanena*—

भावो यथा तथाभावः कारणं कार्यवन्मतः । (न्या. कु. 1/10) इति ।

Bhāvo yathā tathābhāvaḥ kāraṇaṁ kāryavanmataḥ.

(Nyā. Ku. 1/10) iti.

This has been said by Udayana (in his *Kusumāñjali*, i. 10)

"As existence, so too non-existence is held to be a cause as well as an effect."

तथा च प्रयोगः–विमतं प्रामाण्यं ज्ञानहेत्वतिरिक्तहेत्वधीनं, कार्यत्वे सति तद्विशेषाश्रितत्वादप्रामाण्यवत् । प्रामाण्यं परतो ज्ञायते अनभ्यासदशायां सांशयिकत्वादप्रामाण्यवत् । तस्मादुत्पत्तौ ज्ञप्तौ च परतस्त्वे प्रमाणसंभवात्स्वतः सिद्धं प्रामाण्यमित्येतत्पूतिकूष्माण्डायत इति चेत्–

Tathā ca prayogaḥ—vimataṁ prāmāṇyaṁ jñānahetvatiriktahetvadhīnaṁ kāryatve sati tadviśeṣāśritatvādaprāmāṇyavat. Prāmāṇyaṁ parato jñāyate anabhyāsadaśāyāṁ sāṁśayikatvādaprāmāṇyavat. Tasmādutpattau jñaptau ca parastve pramāṇasambhavātsvataḥ siddhaṁ prāmāṇyamityetatpūtikūṣmāṇḍāyata iti cet—

"The argument, in my opinion, runs as follows:—Right knowledge depends on some cause[1] other than the common causes of knowledge, from the very fact that, while it is an effect, it is also knowledge, just as wrong knowledge, does.[2] Authoritativeness is known through something external to itself (*e.g.*, inference), because doubt arises in regard to it in an unfamiliar case, as we also see in non-authoritativeness.

"Therefore, as we can prove that authoritativeness is both produced and recognised by means of something external, the Mīmāṁsā tenet that 'authoritativeness is self-proved' is like a gourd overripe and rotten."

Right Knowledge may be Produced by Instrumental Causes or even in Absence of them

तदेतदाकाशमुष्टिहननायते । विज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यत्वे सति तदतिरिक्तहेत्वजन्यत्वं

1 *Scil.* or the absence of "defect," *doṣābhāva*.

2 Wrong knowledge has *doṣābhāva* or the presence of a "defect" as its cause, in addition to the common causes.

प्रमायाः स्वतस्त्वमिति निरुक्तिसंभवात् । अस्ति चात्रानुमानम्–विमता प्रमा विज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यत्वे सति तदतिरिक्तजन्या न भवति । अप्रमात्वानधिकरणत्वात् । घटादिप्रमावत् ।

Tadetadākāśamuṣṭihananāyate. Vijñānasāmagrījanyatve sati tadatiriktahetvajanyatvaṁ pramāyāḥ svatastvamiti niruktisaṁbhavāt. Asti cātrānumānaṁ–vimatā pramā vijñānasāmagrījanyatve sati tadatiriktajanyā na bhavati. Apramātvānadhikaraṇatvāt. Ghaṭādipramāvat.

This lone harangue of our opponent, however, is but a vain attempt to strike the sky with his fist; for (a) we mean by our phrase "self-proved" that while right knowledge is produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge, it is not produced by any other cause (as "defect,"etc.). The following is our argument as drawn out in full :— Right knowledge is not produced by any other instrumental causes than those of knowledge, while, at the same time, it is produced by these, because it is not the site of wrongness of knowledge, —just like a jar.[1]

न चौदयनमनुमानं परतस्त्वसाधकमिति शङ्कनीयम् । प्रमा दोषव्यतिरिक्तज्ञानहेत्वतिरिक्तजन्या न भवति ज्ञानत्वादप्रमावदिति प्रतिसाधनग्रहग्रस्तत्वात् । ज्ञानसामग्रीमात्रादेव प्रमोत्पत्तिसंभवे तदतिरिक्तस्य गुणस्य दोषाभावस्य वा कारणत्वकल्पनायां कल्पनागौरवप्रसङ्गाच्च । ननु दोषस्याप्रमाहेतुत्वेन तदभावस्य प्रमां प्रति हेतुत्वं, दुर्निवारमिति चेन्न । दोषाभावस्याप्रमाप्रतिबन्धकत्वेनान्यथासिद्धत्वात् ।

Na caudayanamanumānaṁ paratastvasādhakamiti śaṅkanīyam. Pramā doṣavyatiriktajñānahetvatiriktajanyā na bhavati jñānatvādapramāvaditi pratisādhanagrahagrastatvāt. Jñānasāmagrīmātrādeva pramotpattisaṁbhave tadatiriktasya guṇasya doṣābhāvasya vā kāraṇatvakalpanāyāṁ kalpanāgauravaprasaṅgācca. Nanu doṣasyāpramāhetutvena tadabhāvasya pramāṁ prati hetutvaṁ, durnivāramiti cenna. Doṣābhāvasyāpramāpratibandhakatvenānyathāsiddhatvāt.

1 Wrongness of knowledge (*apramātva*) can only reside in knowledge as a characteristic or quality thereof; it cannot reside in a jar. The jar is, of course, produced by other instrumental causes than those of knowledge (as *e.g.*, the potter's stick, etc.), but it is not produced by these other causes in combination with being also produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge (with which it has nothing directly to do); and so by a quiable, which is less obvious in Sanskrit than in English, this wretched sophism is allowed to pass muster. The jar is not produced by-any-other-instrumental-causes-than-those-of-knowledge,-while-at-the same-time-it-is-produced-by-these.

Nor can Udayana's [1] argument be brought forward as establishing the dependence of authoritativeness on something external, for it is swallowed up by the dragon of the equally potent contradictory argument. "Right knowledge is not produced by any cause which is other than the causes of knowledge and is also other than 'defect',[2] from the very fact of its being knowledge—like wrong knowledge." Again, since right knowledge can arise from the causes of knowledge *per se*, it would be a needless complexity to suppose that anything else is a cause, whether you call it a *guṇa* or the absence of a "defect" (*doṣa*).[3]

12. तस्माद् गुणेभ्यो दोषाणामभावस्तदभावतः ।
अप्रामाण्यद्वयासत्त्वं तेनोत्सर्गोऽनपोदितः ।। इति ।

Tasmād guṇebhyo doṣāṇāmabhāvastadabhāvataḥ,
Aprāmāṇyadvayāsattvaṁ tenotsargo'napoditaḥ. iti.

"But surely if the presence of a defect is the cause of wrong knowledge, it is difficult to deny that its absence must be a cause of right knowledge?" We meet this, however, by maintaining that the absence of defect is only an indirect and remote cause, as it only acts negatively by preventing wrong knowledge. As it has been said—

1 I suppose this is the argument given at the close of the previous long *pūrva-pakṣa*.

2 These words "and is other than defect" (*doṣa-vyatirikta*) are, of course, meaningless as far as right knowledge is concerned; they are simply added to enable the author to bring in "wrong knowledge" as an example. Wrong knowledge is caused by the causes of knowledge plus "defect;" right knowledge by the former alone.

3 The Nyāya holds that wrong knowledge is produced by a "defect," as jaundice, etc., in the eye, and right knowledge; by a guṇa or "virtue" (as the direct contact of the healthy organ with a true object), or by the absence of a "defect."

Only Girdle of Mis-directions Wrap, if Self-proof not Accepted

तथा प्रमाज्ञप्तिरपि ज्ञानज्ञापकसामग्रीत एव जायते । न च संशयानुदयप्रसङ्गो बाधक इति युक्तं वक्तुम् । सत्यपि प्रतिभासपुष्कलकारणे प्रतिबन्धकदोषादिसमवधानात्तदुपपत्तेः । किं च तावकमनुमानं स्वतः प्रमाणं न वा? आद्येऽनैकान्तिकता । द्वितीये तस्यापि परतः प्रामाण्यमेवं तस्य, तस्यापीत्यनवस्था दुरवस्था स्यात् ।

Tathā pramājñaptirapi jñānajñāpakasāmagrīta eva jāyate. Na ca saṁśayānudayaprasaṅgo bādhaka iti yuktaṃ vaktum. Satyapi pratibhāsapuṣkalakāraṇe pratibandhakadoṣādisamavadhānātt-adupapatteḥ. Kiṁ ca tāvakamanumānaṁ svataḥ pramāṇaṁ na vā? Ādye'naikāntikatā. Dvitīye tasyāpi parataḥ prāmāṇyamevaṁ tasya, tasyāpītyanavasthā duravasthā syāt.

"Therefore, we reasonably conclude from the presence of *guṇas* the absence of 'defects,'[1] from their absence, the non-existence of the two kinds of non-authoritativeness,[2] and from this, the general conclusion."[3]

(b) We maintain that the recognition of right knowledge is produced by the same causes only which make us perceive the first knowledge[4] (sc. the eye, mind, etc.). Nor can you object that this view is precluded, because it would imply that there could be no such thing as doubt; for we answer that doubt arises in cases where, although all the causes which produce knowledge are present, there is also the simultaneous presence of some opposing cause, as a "defect," etc.

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1 The *guṇa* (or beatlorn eels) of an organ is not properly a cause of *pramā* but rather *doṣabhāva-bodhaka*.

2 *Scil.* "doubtful" (*sandigdha*) and "ascertained non-authoritativeness" (*niścitāprāmāṇya*).

3 *Utsarga* is a general conclusion which is not necessarily true in every particular case; but here it means the conclusion that "right knowledge has no special causes but the common causes of knowledge, the eye," etc.

4 The first knowledge is "This is a *jār*," the second knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive the jar;" and simultaneously with it arises the cognition of the truth of the perception, *i.e.*, its authoritativeness or *prāmāṇya*.

As for your argument (O Naiyāyika ! given *supra*, in p. 381, lines 12-21), I ask, Is your own argument an authoritative proof by itself or not? If it is, it proves too much (for it would properly apply to itself and lead us to infer its own dependence on external proof, whereas you hold it to be independent of such); and if it is not, we should have a case of *regressus in infinitum,* for it will want some other proof to confirm its authoritativeness, and this too in its turn will want some fresh proof, and so on for ever.

Authority does not Inherit in Aptitude

यदत्र कुसुमाञ्जलावुदयनेन झटिति प्रचुरप्रवृत्तेः प्रामाण्यनिश्चयाधीनत्वा-भावमापादयता प्रण्यगादि–'प्रवृत्तिर्हीच्छामपेक्षते । तत्प्राचुर्यं चेच्छाप्राचुर्यम् । इच्छा चेष्टसाधनताज्ञानम् । तच्चेष्टजातीयत्वलिङ्गानुभवम् । सोऽपीन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षम् । प्रामाण्यग्रहणं तु न क्वचिदुपयुज्यते' इति ।

Yadatra kusumāñjalāvudayanena jhaṭiti pracurapravṛtteḥ prāmāṇyaniścayādhīnatvābhāvamāpādayatā praṇyagādi—'pravṛttirhīcchāmapekṣate. Tatprācuryaṃ cecchāprācuryaṃ. Icchā ceṣṭasādhanatājñānaṃ. Tacceṣṭajātīyatvaliṅgānubhavaṃ. So'pīndriyārthasannikarṣaṃ. Prāmāṇyagrahaṇaṁ tu na kvacidupayujyate' iti.

As for the argument urged by Udayana[1] in the *Kusumāñjali*, when he tries to establish that immediate and vehement action does not depend on the agent's certainty as to the authoritativeness of the speech which sets him acting: "Action depends on wish, its vehemence on that of the wish[2], wish on the knowledge that the thing wished for is a means to attain some wished-for end, and this is only ascertained by an inference based on some 'sign' which proves that the thing is closely connected with the wished for end, and this inference depends on the things being in direct contact with the agent's senses; but throughout the whole series of antecedent steps, the Mīmāṁsā idea of the perception of authoritativeness is never once found as a cause of action."

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1 This seems to be a quotation of Udayana's own words, and no doubt is taken from his very rare prose commentary on the Kusumāñjali, a specimen of which I Printed in the preface to this edition. This passage must come from the fifth book (v.6?).

2 I read *tat-prācuryaṁ* for *tatprācurye* in p. 134, line 7.

Rebuttal of Otherwise Pleas on Autority of Knowledge

तदपि तस्करस्य पुरस्तात्कक्षे सुवर्णमुपेत्य सर्वाङ्गोद्घाटनमिव प्रतिभाति । यतः समीहितसाधनताज्ञानमेव प्रमाणतयावगम्यमानमिच्छां जनयतीत्यत्रैव स्फुट एव प्रामाण्यग्रहणस्योपयोगः । किं च क्वचिदपि चेन्निर्विचिकित्सा प्रवृत्तिः संशयादुपपद्येत, तर्हि सर्वत्र तथाभावसंभवात् प्रामाण्यनिश्चयो निरर्थकः स्यात् ।

Tadapi taskarasya purastātkakṣe suvarṇamupetya sarvāṅgodghāṭanamiva pratibhāti. Yataḥ samīhitasādhanatājñānameva pramāṇatayāvagamyamānamicchāṁ janayatītyatraiva sphuṭa eva prāmāṇyagrahaṇasyopayogaḥ. Kiṁ ca kvacidapi cennirvicikitsā pravṛttiḥ saṁśayādupapadyeta, tarhi, sarvatra tathābhāvasambhavāt prāmāṇyaniścayo nirarthakaḥ syāt.

All this appears to us simple bluster, like that of the thief who ostentatiously throws open all his limbs before me, when I had actually found the gold under his armpit. It is only the knowledge that the thing is a means to attain the desired end, and this knowledge, recognised as authoritative and right knowledge, which causes the definite volition to arise at all; and in this, we can distinctly trace the influence of that very perception of authoritativeness (whose existence he so vehemently pretended to deny). If unhesitating action ever arose in any case from doubt, then, as it might always arise so in every given case, all ascertainment of authoritativeness would be useless; and as the very existence of what is unascertained is rendered uncertain, poor authoritativeness would have to be considered as dead and buried !

तथोक्तम्–अनिश्चितस्य सत्त्वमेव दुर्लभमिति । यदि सत्त्वं सुलभं भवेत्तदा प्रामाण्यं दत्तजलाञ्जलिकं भवेदित्यलमतिप्रपञ्चेन । यस्मादुक्तम्–

Tathoktam—aniścitasya sattvameva durlabhamiti. Yadi sattvaṁ sulabhaṁ bhavettadā prāmāṇyaṁ dattajalāñjalikaṁ bhavedityalamatiprapañcena. Yasmāduktam—

But enough of this prolix controversy; since, it has been said–

13. तस्मात्सद्बोधकत्वेन प्राप्ता बुद्धेः प्रमाणता ।
अर्थान्यथात्वहेतूत्थदोषज्ञानादपोद्यते ॥ इति ।

Tasmātsadbodhakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā,
Arthānyathātvahetūtthadoṣajñānādapodyate. iti.

"Therefore, the authoritativeness of a cognition, which (authoritativeness) presented itself as representing a real fact, may be overthrown by the perception of a 'defect', which perception is produced by some sign that proves the discrepancy between the cognition and the fact."[1]

Veda : Self-Proved and Authoritative in Regard to Duty

तस्माद्धर्मे स्वतःसिद्धप्रमाणभावे 'ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इत्यादिविध्यर्थवादमन्त्रनामधेयात्मके वेदे 'यजेत' इत्यत्र तप्रत्ययः प्रकृत्यर्थोपरक्तां भावनामभिधत्ते–इति सिद्धे व्युत्पत्तिमभ्युपगच्छतामभिहितान्वयवादिनां भट्टाचार्याणां सिद्धान्तः । यागविषयं नियोगमिति कार्ये व्युत्पत्तिमनुसरतामन्विताभिधानवादिनां प्रभाकरगुरुणां सिद्धान्त इति सर्वमवदातम् ॥

Tasmāddharme svataḥsiddhapramāṇabhāve 'Jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta' ityādividhyarthavādamantranāmadheyātmake vede 'yajeta' ityatra tapratyayaḥ prakṛtyarthoparaktāṁ bhāvanāmabhidhatte—iti siddhe vyutpattimabhyupagacchatāma bhihitānvayavādināṁ bhaṭṭācāryāṇāṁ siddhāntaḥ. Yāgaviṣayaṁ niyogamiti kārye vyutpattimanusaratāmanvitābhidhānavādināṁ prabhākaragurūṇāṁ siddhānta iti sarvamavadātam.

Now with regard to the Veda, which is the self-proved and authoritative criterion in regard to duty, (we have the following divergence between the two great Mīmāṁsā school) : – The Veda is composed of three portions, respectively called "hymns" (*mantra*), "explanatory passages" (*arthavāda*), and "injunctions" (*vidhi*); and by "injunction" we mean such sentences as "Let him who desires heaven sacrifice with the *jyotiṣṭoma.*" Here ta, the affix of the third person singular, denotes an enjoining power, which is "coloured" (or rendered definite) by the meaning of the root, according to the opinion of the followers of Bhaṭṭa Kumārila, who maintains that words singnify[2] something definite by themselves (apart from the sentence). The followers of Guru Prabhākara, on the contrary, hold that the whole sentence is a command relating to the sacrifice,

1 This stanza affirms that according to the *Mīmāṁsā* school, while authoritativeness is self-proved, non-authoritativeness is proved from something else (as inference, etc.)

2 I take *vyutpatti* here as used for *śakti*; *siddhe* means *ghaṭādau*.

as they maintain that words only signify an action or something to be done.[1] Thus all has been made plain.

E . B. C.

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे जैमिनिदर्शनम् ।

❖

1 These are the two great Mīmāṁsā schools. The former, called *abhihitānvaya-vādinaḥ*, hold (like the Naiyāyika school) that words by themselves can express their separate meaning by the function *abhidhā* or "denotation;" these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing one connected idea. The latter, called *anvitābhidhāna-vādinaḥ*, hold that words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence and grammatically connected with each other; they only mean an action or something connected with an action. In *gāṁ ānaya*, *gāṁ* does not properly mean *gotva*, but *ānayanānvita-gotva*, *i.e*, the bovine genus as connected with "bringing." We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb, and *vice versa*. Cf. Waitz, as quoted by Professor Sayce (*Comparative Philology*, page 136) : "We do not think in words but in sentences; hence, we may assert that a living language consists of sentences, not of words. But a sentence is formed not of single independent words, but of words which refer to one another in a particular manner, like the corresponding thought, which does not consist of single independent ideas, but of such as, connected, form a whole, and determine one another mutually."

CHAPTER XIII

THE PĀṆINI-DARŚANA[1]

Classification of Root and an Affix

नन्वयं प्रकृतिभागोऽयं प्रत्ययभाग इति प्रकृतिप्रत्ययविभागः कथमवगम्यत इति चेत्–पीतपातञ्जलजलानामेतच्चोद्यं चमत्कारं न करोति । व्याकरणशास्त्रस्य प्रकृतिप्रत्ययेविभागप्रतिपादनपरतायाः प्रसिद्धत्वात् ।

Nanvayaṁ prakṛtibhāgo'yaṁ pratyayabhāga iti prakṛtipratyayavibhāgaḥ kathamavagamyata iti cet—pītapātañjalajalānāmetaccodyaṁ camatkāraṁ na karoti. Vyākaraṇaśāstrasya prakṛtipratyayevibhāgapratipādanaparatāyāḥ prasiddhatvāt.

If any one asks, "Where are we to learn how to separate a root and an affix so as to be able to say, 'This part is the original root and this is an affix'," may we not reply that to those who have drunk the waters of Pātañjali this question produces no confusion, since it is notorious that the rules of grammar have reference to this very point of the separation of the original roots and affixes?

Meaning of 'Śabdānuśāsanaṃ'

तथा हि पतञ्जलेर्भगवतो महाभाष्यकारस्येदमादिमं वाक्यम्–'अथशब्दानुशासनम्' (पात. म. भा. 1/1/1) इति । अस्यार्थः–अथेत्यम् शब्दोऽधिकारार्थः प्रयुज्यते । अधिकारः प्रस्तावः । प्रारम्भ इति यावत् । शब्दानुशासनशब्देन च पाणिनिप्रणीतं व्याकरणशास्त्रं विवक्ष्यते । शब्दानुशासनमित्येतावत्यभिधीयमाने सन्देहः स्यात् । किं शब्दानुशासनं प्रस्तूयते न वेति । तथा मा प्रसाङ्क्षीदित्यथशब्दं प्रायुङ्क्त ।

Tathā hi patañjalerbhagavato mahābhāṣyakārasyedamādimaṁ vākyaṃ—'athaśabdānuśāsanaṃ' (Pāta. Ma. Bhā. 1/1/1) iti. Asyārthaḥ—athetyayaṁ śabdo'dhikārārthaḥ prayujyate. Adhikāraḥ prastāvaḥ. Prārambha iti yāvat. Śabdānuśāsanaśabdena ca pāṇinipraṇītaṁ vyākaraṇaśāstraṁ vivakṣyate. Śabdānuśāsanamityetāvatyabhidhīyamāne sandehaḥ syāt. Kiṁ

1 Mādhava uses this peculiar term because the grammarians adopted and fully developed the idea of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* school that sound is eternal. He therefore, treats of *sphoṭa* here, and not in his Jaimini chapter.

śabdānuśāsanaṁ prastūyate na veti. Tathā mā prasāṅkṣīditya-thaśabdaṁ prāyuṅkta.

Thus, the very first sentence of the venerable Pātañjali, author of the "Great Commentary," is "*atha śabdānuśāsanam,*" "Now comes the exposition of words." The particle *atha* ("now") is used here as implying a new topic or a commencement; and by the phrase, "exposition of words," is meant the system of grammar put forth by Pāṇini. Now a doubt might here arise as to whether this phrase implies that the exposition of words is to be the main topic or not; and it is to obviate any such doubt that he employed the particle *atha*, since this particle implies that what follows is to be treated as the main topic to the exclusion of everything else.

अथ शब्दप्रयोगबलेनार्थान्तरव्युदासेन प्रस्तूयत इत्यस्याभिधीयमानत्वात् । अनेन हि वैदिकाः शब्दाः 'शं नो देवीरभिष्टये' (अथर्व. सं. 1/1, ऋ. सं. 10/9/4) इत्यादयस्तदुपकारिणो लौकिकाः शब्दाः 'गौरश्वः पुरुषो हस्ती शकुनिः' इत्यादयश्चानुशिष्यन्ते, व्युत्पाद्य संस्क्रियन्ते प्रकृतिप्रत्ययविभागवत्तया बोध्यन्त इति शब्दानुशासनम् ।

Atha śabdaprayogabalenārthāntaravyudāsena prastūyata ityasyābhidhīyamānatvāt. Anena hi vaidikāḥ śabdāḥ 'śaṁ no devīrabhiṣṭaye' (Atharva. Saṁ. 1/1, Ṛgveda Saṁ. 10/9/4) ityādayastadupakāriṇo laukikāḥ śabdāḥ 'gauraśvaḥ puruṣo hastī śakuniḥ' ityādayaścānuśiṣyante, vyutpādya saṁskriyante prakṛtipratyayavibhāgavattayā bodhyanta iti śabdānuśāsanam.

The word "exposition" (*anuśāsana*), as here used, implies that thereby Vaidic words, such as those in the line *śaṃ no devīr abhīṣṭaye,*[1] etc., and secular words as ancillary to these, as the common words for "cow," "horse," "man," "elephant" "birds," etc., are made the subject of the exposition i.e., are deduced from their original roots and properly formed, or, in other words, are explained as divided into root and affix.

What for Śabdānuśāsana Stands

अत्र केचित्पर्यनुयुञ्जते–अनुशासिक्रियायाः सकर्मकत्वात्कर्मभूतस्य शब्दस्य कर्तृभूतस्याचार्यस्य प्राप्तौ सत्याम् 'उभय-प्राप्तौ कर्मणि' (पा. सू. 2/3/66) इत्यनुशासनबलात् कर्मण्येषा षष्ठी विधातव्या । तथा च 'कर्मणि च' (पा. सू. 2/2/14) इति समासप्रतिषेधसम्भवाच्छब्दानुशासनशब्दो न प्रमाणपथमवतरतीति ।

1 *Ṛgveda*, x.9,4.

Atra kecitparyanuyuñjate—anuśāsikriyāyāḥ sakarmakatvātka-rmabhūtasya śabdasya kartṛbhūtasyācāryasya prāptau satyām 'ubhaya-prāptau karmaṇi' (Pā. Sū. 2/3/66) ityanuśāsanabalāt karmaṇyeṣā ṣaṣṭhī vidhātavyā. Tathā ca 'karmaṇi ca' (Pā. Sū. 2/2/14) iti samāsapratiṣedhasambhavācchabdānuśāsanaśabdo na pramāṇapathamavataratīti.

We must consider that the compound in this phrase represents a genitive of the object (*śabdānuśāsanam* standing for *śabdasyānuśāsanam*), and as there is a rule of Pāṇini (*karmaṇi ca*, ii.2, 14), which prohibits composition in such a construction, we are forced to concede that the phrase *śabdānuśāsanam* does not come before us as a duly authorised compound.

अत्रायं समाधिरभिधीयते–यस्मिन्कृत्प्रत्यये कर्तृकर्मणोरुभयोः प्राप्तिरस्ति, तत्र कर्मण्येव षष्ठीविभक्तिर्भवति न कर्तरीति बहुब्रीहिविज्ञानबलान्नियम्यते । तद् यथा–आश्चर्यो गवां दोहोऽशिक्षितेन गोपालकेनेति । शब्दानुशासनमित्यत्र तु शब्दानामनुशासनं नार्थानामित्येतावतो विवक्षितस्यार्थस्याचार्यस्य कर्तुरुपादानेन विनापि सुप्रतिपादत्वादाचार्योपादानमकिञ्चित्करम् ।

Atrāyaṁ samādhirabhidhīyate—yasminkṛtpratyaye kartṛkarma-ṇorubhayoḥ prāptirasti, tatra karmaṇyeva ṣaṣṭhīvibhaktir-bhavati na kartarīti bahubrīhivijñānabalānniyamyate. Tad yathā—āścaryo gavāṁ doho'śikṣitena gopālakeneti. Śabdānu-śāsanamityatra tu śabdānāmanuśāsanaṁ nārthānāmityetāvato vivakṣitasyārthasyācāryasya karturupādānena vināpi supratipā-datvadācāryopādānamakiñcitkaram.

Here, however, arises a discussion (as to the true application of the alleged rule of Pāṇini), for we hold that, by ii.3, 66, wherever an object and an agent are both expressed in one and the same sentence in connection with a word ending with a *kṛt* affix, there the object alone can be put in the genitive and not the agent;[1] this

1 *Śabdānuśāsana*, if judged by the apparent sense of *Pāṇini*, ii.2,14, would be a wrong compound; but it is not so, because ii.2, 14 must be interpreted in the sense of ii.3,66, whence it follows that the compound would only be wrong if there were an agent expressed *as well as* an object, *i.e.*, if such a word as *ācāryeṇa* followed. In the example given, we cannot say *āścaryo godoho śikṣitena gopālena* (as it would violate ii. 2, 14), neither can we say *āścaryo gavāṁ doho' śikṣitasya gopālasya* (as it would violate ii.3, 66).

limitation arising from our taking *ubhayaprāpti* in the *Sūtra* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound.[1] Thus, we must say, "Wonderful is the milking of cows by an unpractised cowherd." We may, however, remark in passing that some authors do maintain that the agent may in such cases be put in the genitive (as well as the object).

तस्मादुभयप्राप्तेरभावादुभयप्राप्तौ कर्मणीत्येषा षष्ठी न भवति । किन्तु 'कर्तृकर्मणोः कृति' (पा. सू. 2/3/65) इति कृद्योगे कर्तरि कर्मणि च षष्ठीविभक्तिर्भवतीति कृद्योगलक्षणा षष्ठी भविष्यति । तथा च इध्मप्रव्रश्चन-पलाशशातनादिवत्समासो भविष्यति ।

Tasmādubhayaprāpterabhāvādubhayaprāptau karmaṇītyeṣā ṣaṣṭhī na bhavati. Kintu 'kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti' (Pā. Sū. 2/3/65) iti kṛdyoge kartari karmaṇi ca ṣaṣṭhīvibhaktirbhavatīti kṛdyogalakṣaṇā ṣaṣṭhī bhaviṣyati. Tathā ca idhmapravraścana-palāśaśātanādivatsamāso bhaviṣyati.

Hence, we find it stated in the *Kāśikā* Commentary : "Some authors maintain that there should be an option in such cases without any distinction, and thus, they would equally allow such a construction as 'the exposition of words *of* the teacher'or '*by* the teacher.'" Inasmuch, however, as the words of the phrase in question really mean that the "exposition" intended relates to *words* and not to *things*, and since this can be at once understood without any mention of the agent, i.e., the teacher, any such mention would be plainly superfluous; and therefore, as the object and the agent are *not* both expressed in one and the same sentence, this is not an instance of the genitive of the object (coming under ii.3, 66, and ii. 2, 14), but rather an instance of quite another rule, viz., ii.3,65, which directs that an agent or an object, in connection with a word ending with a *kṛt* affix, is to be put in the genitive (which in this instance is expressed by the *tatpuruṣa* compound); and the compound in question will be strictly analogous to such recognised forms as *idhma-pravraścana, palāśa-śātana*, etc.[2]

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1 That is, the *ubhayaprāpti* of ii. 3, 66, is a *bahuvrīhi* agreeing with *kṛti* in ii.3, 65. These points are all discussed at some length in the Commentaries on Pāṇini.

2 These actually occur in the Commentaries to *Pāṇini*, ii.2,8; iii. 3, 117, etc.

कर्तर्य्यपि षष्ठी भवतीति केचित् ब्रुवते । अत एवोक्तं काशिकावृत्तौ (2/3/66, पृ. 122)–केचिदविशेषेणैव विभाषामिच्छन्ति, शब्दानामनुशामनमाचार्येणाचार्यस्य वेति ।

Kartaryyapi ṣaṣṭhī bhavatīti kecit bruvate. Ata evoktaṁ kāśikāvṛttau (2/3/66, Page 122)—Kecidaviśeṣeṇaiva vibhāṣāmicchanti, śabdānāmanuśāmanamācāryeṇācāryasya veti.

अथवा शेषलक्षणेयं षष्ठी । तत्र किमपि चोद्यं नावरतरत्येव । यद्येवं तर्हि शेषलक्षणायाः षष्ठ्याः सर्वत्र सुवचत्वात् षष्ठीसमासप्रतिषेधसूत्राणामानर्थक्यं प्राप्नुयादिति चेत्–सत्यम् । तेषां स्वरचिन्तायामुपयोगो वाक्यपदीये हरिणा प्रादर्शि ।

Athavā śeṣalakṣaṇeyaṁ ṣaṣṭhī. Tatra kimapi codyaṁ nāvarataratyeva. Yadyevaṁ tarhi śeṣalakṣaṇāyāḥ ṣaṣṭhyāḥ sarvatra suvacatvāt ṣaṣṭhīsamāsapratiṣedhasūtrāṇāmānarthakyaṁ prāpnuyāditi cet—satyaṃ. Teṣāṁ svaracintāyāmupayogo vākyapadīye hariṇā prādarśi.

Or we might argue that the genitive case implied in this *saṣṭhītatpuruṣa* is one of the class called "residual,"in accordance with Pāṇini's rule (ii.3, 50), "Let the genitive be used in the *residuum*," (*i. e.*, in the other constructions not provided for by special rules);[1] and this way, we might defend the phrase against the opponent's attack. "But," it might be replied, "your alleged 'residual genitive' could be assumed everywhere, and we should thus, find all the prohibitions of composition in constructions with a genitive case rendered utterly nugatory." This we readily grant, and hence, Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya* has shown that these rules are mainly useful where the question relates to the *accent*.[2]

तदाह महोपाध्यायवर्धमानः–

1. लौकिकव्यवहारेषु यथेष्टं चेष्टताम् जनः ।
वैदिकेषु तु मार्गेषु विशेषोक्तिः प्रवर्तताम् ।।

Tadāha mahopādhyāyavardhamānaḥ—

Laukikavyavahāreṣu yatheṣṭaṁ ceṣṭatāṃ janaḥ,
Vaidikeṣu tu mārgeṣu viśeṣoktiḥ pravartatāṃ.

To this effect are the words of the great doctor Vardhamāna –

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1 This takes in all cases of relation, *sambandha* (*i.e.*, (*ṣaṣṭhī-sambandha*).

2 As in such rules as vi. 2, 139.

"In secular utterances men may proceed as they will,
But in Vaidic paths, let minute accuracy of speech be employed."

2. इति पाणिनिसूत्राणामर्थवत्त्वमसौ यतः ।
जनिकर्तुरिति ब्रूते तत्प्रयोजक इत्यपि ।। इति ।

Iti pāṇinisūtrāṇāmarthavattvamasau yataḥ.
Janikarturiti brūte tatprayojaka ityapi. iti.

"Thus have they explained the meaning of Pāṇini's sūtras, since."

"He himself uses such phrases as *janikartuḥ* and *tatprayojakaḥ*."[1]

तथा च शब्दानुशासनापरनामधेयम् व्याकरणशास्त्रमारब्धं वेदितव्यमिति वाक्यार्थः सम्पद्यते ।

Tathā ca śabdānuśāsanāparanāmadheyam vyākaraṇaśastramārabdhaṁ veditavyamiti vākyārthaḥ sampadyate.

Hence, it follows that the full meaning of the sentence in question (of the *Mahābhāṣya*) is that "it is to be understood that the rules of grammar which may be taken as a synonym for 'the exposition concerning words' are now commenced."

Grammar is Subordinate Study to Veda

तस्यार्थस्य झटिति प्रतिपत्तये 'अथ व्याकरणम्' इत्येवाभिधीयताम् । अथ शब्दानुशासनमित्यधिकाक्षरं मुधाभिधीयत इति । मैवम् । शब्दानुशासनमित्यन्वर्थसमाख्योपादाने तदीयवेदाङ्गत्वप्रतिपादकप्रयोजनान्वाख्यानसिद्धेः । अन्यथा प्रयोजनानभिधाने व्याकरणाध्ययनेऽध्येतॄणां प्रवृत्तिरेव न प्रसजेत् ।

Tasyārthasya jhaṭiti pratipattaye 'Atha vyākaraṇam' ityevābhidhīyatām. Atha śabdānuśāsanamityadhikākṣaraṁ mudhābhidhīyata iti. Maivam. Śabdānuśāsanamityanvarthasamākhyopādāne tadīyavedāṅgatvapratipādakaprayojanānvākhyānasiddheḥ. Anyathā prayojanānabhidhāne vyākaraṇādhyayane'dhyetṛṇāṁ pravṛttireva na prasajet.

1 These compounds occur in Pāṇini's own *sūtras* (i.4,30 and i. 4, 55), and would violate his own rule in ii. 2, 15, if we were to interpret the latter without some such saving modification as *ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe*.

"Well, then, for the sake of directly understanding this intended meaning, it would have been better to have said 'now comes grammar,' as the words 'now comes the exposition of words' involve a useless excess of letters." This objection cannot, however, be allowed, since the employment of such a word as *śabdānuśāsanaṃ*, the sense of which can be so readily inferred from its etymology, proves that the author intends to imply an end which shall establish that grammar is a subordinate study (*aṅga*) to the Veda.[1] Otherwise, if there were no such end set forth, there would be no consequent application of the readers to the study of grammar.

ननु 'निष्कारणो धर्मः षडङ्गो वेदोऽध्येतव्यः' इत्यध्येतव्यविधानादेव प्रवृत्तिः सेत्स्यति इति चेत्–मैवम् । तथा विधानेऽपि तदीयवेदाङ्गत्वप्रतिपादकप्रयोजनानभिधाने तेषां प्रवृत्तेरनुपपत्तेः। तथा हि–पुरा किल वेदमधीत्याध्येतारस्त्वरितं वक्तारो भवन्ति ।

Nanu 'niṣkāraṇo dharmaḥ ṣaḍaṅgo vedo'dhyetavyaḥ' ityadhyetavyavidhānādeva pravṛttiḥ setsyati iti cet–maivam. Tathā vidhāne'pi tadīyavedāṅgatvapratipādakaprayojanānabhidhāne teṣāṁ pravṛtteranupapatteḥ. Tathā hi—purā kila vedamadhītyādhyetārastvaritaṁ vaktāro bhavanti.

Nor may you say that this application will be sufficiently enforced by the injunction for study, "the Veda with its six subordinate parts must be read as a duty without any (special) end,"[2] because, even though there be such an injunction, it will not follow that students will apply to this study, if no end is mentioned which will establish that it is an *aṅga* of the Veda.

Thus, in old times the students, after reading the Veda, used to be in haste to say—

वेदान्नो वैदिकाः शब्दाः सिद्धा लोकाच्च लौकिकाः ।

Vedānno vaidikāḥ śabdāḥ siddhā lokācca laukikāḥ.

तस्मादनर्थकं व्याकरणमिति । तस्माद्वेदाङ्गत्वं मन्यमानास्तदध्ययने प्रवृत्तिमकार्षुः ।

1 The very word *śabda* in *śabdānuśāsanaṃ* implies the Veda, since this is pre-eminently *śabda*.

2 Compare Max Müller, *Sansk. Liter.*, p. 113. It is quoted as from the Veda in the *Mahābhāṣya*.

ततश्च इदानींतनानामपि तत्र प्रवृत्तिर्न सिध्येत् । सा मा प्रसाङ्क्षीदिति तदीयवेदाङ्गत्वप्रतिपादकं प्रयोजनमन्वाख्येयमेव ।

Tasmādanarthakaṁ vyākaraṇamiti. Tasmādvedāṅgatvaṁ manyamānāstadadhyayane pravṛttimakārṣuḥ. Tataśca idānīṁtanānāmapi tatra pravṛttirna sidhyet. Sā mā praśāṅgakṣīditi tadīyavedāṅgatvapratipādakaṁ prayojanamanvākhyeyameva.

"Are not Vaidic words established by the Veda and secular by common life,"

"And therefore, grammar is useless ?"

Therefore, it was only when they understood it to be an *aṅga* of the Veda that they applied themselves to its study. So in the same way, the students of the present day would not be likely to apply themselves to it either. It is to obviate this danger that it becomes necessary to set forth some end which shall, at the same time, establish that grammar is an *aṅga* of the Veda.

यद्यन्वाख्यातेऽपि प्रयोजने न प्रवर्तेरंस्तर्हि लौकिकशब्दसंस्कारज्ञानरहितास्ते याज्ञे कर्मणि प्रत्यवायभाजो भवेयुः । धर्माद्धीयेरन् । अत एव याज्ञिकाः पठन्ति–आहिताग्निरपशब्दं प्रयुज्य प्रायश्चित्तीयां सारस्वतीमिष्टिं निर्वपेत् (पात. म भा. पस्पश.) इति ।

Yadyanvākhyāte'pi prayojane na pravarteraṁstarhí laukikaśabdasaṁskārajñānarahitāste yājñe karmaṇi pratyavāyabhājo bhaveyuḥ. Dharmāddhīyeran. Ata eva yājñikāḥ paṭhanti—āhitāgnirapaśabdaṁ prayujya prāyaścittīyāṁ sārasvatīmiṣṭiṁ nirvapet (Pā. Ma. Bhā. Paspaśa.) iti.

If, when the end is explained, they should still not apply themselves, then, being destitute of all knowledge of the true formation of secular words, they would become involved in sin in the course of sacrificial acts, and would consequently, lose their religious merit. Hence, the followers of sacrifice read, "One who keeps up a sacrificial fire, on using an incorrect word, should offer an expiatory offering to Sarasvatī."

अतस्तदीयवेदाङ्गत्वप्रतिपादकप्रयोजनान्वाख्यानार्थमथ शब्दानुशासनमित्येव कथ्यते, नाथ व्याकरणमिति । भवति च शब्दसंस्कारो व्याकरणशास्त्रस्य प्रयोजनम् । तस्माच्छब्दानुशिष्टिः संस्कारपदवेदनीया शब्दानुशासनस्य प्रयोजनम् ।

Atastadīyavedāṅgatvapratipādakaprayojanānvākhyānārthamatha śabdānuśāsanamityeva kathyate, nātha vyākaraṇamiti. Bhavati ca śabdasaṁskāro vyākaraṇaśāstrasya prayojanam. Tasmācchabdānuśiṣṭiḥ saṁskārapadavedanīyā śabdānuśāsanasya prayojanam.

Now, it is to declare this end which establishes that it is an *aṅga* of the Veda that he uses the words *atha śabdānuśāsanam* and not *atha vyākaraṇam*. Now the rules of grammar must have an end, and a thing's end is determined by men's pursuit of it with a view thereto. Just as in a sacrifice undertaken with a view to heaven, heaven is the end; in the same way, the end of the exposition of words is instruction concerning words, i.e., propriety of speech.

Reading Word by Word is not Procedure of Vyākaraṇaśāstra

नन्वेवमप्यभिमतं प्रयोजनं न लभ्यते । तदुपायाभावात् । अथ प्रतिपदपाठ एवाभ्युपाय इति मन्येथास्तर्हि स ह्यनभ्युपायः शब्दानां प्रतिपत्तौ प्रतिपदपाठो भवेत् । शब्दापशब्दभेदेनानन्त्याच्छब्दानाम् । एवं हि समाम्नायते–बृहस्पतिरिन्द्राय दिव्यं वर्षसहस्रं प्रतिपदपाठविहितानां शब्दानां शब्दपारायणं प्रोवाच । नान्तं जगाम । बृहस्पतिश्च प्रवक्ता । इन्द्रोऽध्येता । दिव्यं वर्षसहस्रमध्ययनकालः । न च पारावाप्तिरभूत । किमुताद्य यश्चिरं जीवति स वर्षशतं जीवति । अधीतिबोधाचरणप्रचारणश्चतुर्भिर्हुपायैर्विद्योपयुक्ता भवति । तत्राध्ययनकालेनैव सर्वमायुरुपयुक्तं स्यात् ।

Nanvevamapyabhimataṁ prayojanaṁ na labhyate. Tadupāyābhāvāt. Atha pratipadapāṭha evābhyupāya iti manyethāstarhi sa hyanabhyupāyaḥ śabdānāṁ pratipattau pratipadapāṭho bhavet. Śabdāpaśabdabhedenānantyācchabdānāṃ. Evaṁ hi samāmnāyate—bṛhaspatirindrāya divyaṁ varṣasahasraṁ pratipadapāṭhavihitānāṁ śabdānāṁ śabdapārāyaṇaṁ provāca. Nāntaṁ jagāma. Bṛhaspatiśca pravaktā. Indro'dhyetā. Divyaṁ varṣasahasramadhyayanakālaḥ. Na ca pārāvāptirabhūta. Kimutādya yaściraṁ jīvati sa varṣaśataṁ jīvati. Adhītibodhācaraṇapracāraṇaścaturbhirhyupāyairvidyopayuktā bhavati. Tatrādhyayanakālenaiva sarvamāyurupayuktaṁ syāt.

"But," an objector may say, "will not the desired end be still unattained for want of the true means to it? Nor can it be said that reading the Veda word by word is the true means; for this cannot be a means for the understanding of words, since their number is

infinite, as divided into proper and improper words.[1] Thus, there is a tradition that Bṛhaspati for a thousand divine years taught to Indra the study of words as used in their individual forms when the Veda is read word by word,[2] and still he came not to the end. Here the teacher was Bṛhaspati, the pupil was Indra, and the time of study a thousand years of the gods; and yet the termination was not reached, —how much less, then, in our day, let a man live ever so long ? Learning is rendered efficient by four appropriate means,—reading, understanding, practising, and handing it on to others; but in the proposed way life would only suffice for the bare time of reading."

तस्मादनभ्युपायः शब्दानां प्रतिपत्तौ प्रतिपदपाठ इति प्रयोजनं न सिध्येदिति चेत्–मैवम् । शब्दप्रतिपत्तेः प्रतिपदपाठसाध्यत्वानङ्गीकारात् । प्रकृत्यादिविभागकल्पनावत्सु लक्ष्येषु सामान्यविशेषरूपाणां लक्षणानां पर्जन्यवत्सकृदेव प्रवृत्तौ बहूनां शब्दानामनुशासनोपलम्भाच्च ।

Tasmādanabhyupāyaḥ śabdānāṁ pratipattau pratipadapāṭha iti prayojanaṁ na sidhyediti cet–maivam. Śabdapratipatteḥ pratipadapāṭhasādhyatvānaṅgīkārāt. Prakṛtyādivibhāgakalpanāvatsu lakṣyeṣu sāmānyaviśeṣarūpāṇāṁ lakṣaṇānāṁ parjanyavatsakṛdeva pravṛttau bahūnāṁ śabdānāmanuśāsanopalambhācca.

Therefore, the reading word by word is not a means for the knowledge of words, and consequently, as we said at first, the desired end is not established. We reply, however, that it was never conceded that the knowledge of words was to be attained by this reading word by word. And again, since general and special rules apply at once to many examples, when these are divided into the artificial parts called roots; etc. (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in this way, we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words.

तथा हि । 'कर्मण्यण्' (पा. सू. 3/2/1) इत्येकेन सामान्यरूपेण लक्षणेन कर्मोपपदाद्धातुमात्रादण्प्रत्यये कृते, 'कुम्भकारः', 'काण्डलावः' इत्यादीनां बहूनां शब्दानामनुशारानमुपलभ्यते । एवम्, 'आतोऽनुपसर्गे कः' (पा. सू. 3/2/18)

1 In the Calcutta text, p. 138, *dele daṇḍa* in line 3 after *bhavet*, and insert it in line 4 after *śabdānāṁ*.

2 As in the so-called *pada* text.

इत्येकेन विशेषलक्षणेनाकारान्ताद्धातोः कप्रत्यये कृते, 'धान्यदः', 'धनदः' इत्यादीनां बहूनां शब्दानामनुशासनमुपलभ्यते । बृहस्पतिरिन्द्रायेति प्रतिपदपाठस्याशक्यत्वप्रतिपादनपरोऽर्थवादः ।

Tathā hi. 'Karmaṇyaṇ' (Pā. Sū. 3/2/1) ityekena sāmānyarūpeṇa lakṣaṇena karmopapadāddhātumātrādaṇpratyaye kṛte, 'kumbhakāraḥ', 'kāṇḍalāvaḥ' ityādīnāṁ bahūnāṁ śabdānāmanuśāsanamupalabhyate. Evam, 'āto'nupasarge kaḥ' (Pa. Sū. 3/2/18) ityekena viśeṣalakṣaṇenākārāntāddhātoḥ kapratyaye kṛte, 'dhānyadaḥ', 'dhanadaḥ' ityādīnāṁ bahūnāṁ śabdānāmanuśāsanamupalabhyate. Bṛhaspatirindrāyeti pratipadapāṭhasyāśakyatvapratipādanaparo'rthavādaḥ.

Thus, for instance, by the general rule (iii.2,1), *karmaṇi*, the affix *aṇ* is enjoined after a root when the object is in composition with it; and by this rule, we learn many words, as *kumbhakāra*, "a potter," *kāṇḍalāva*, "a cutter of stems," etc. But the supplementary special rule (iii 2, 3), *āto'nupasarge kaḥ*, directing that the affix *ka* is to be used after a root that ends in long *ā* when there is no *upasarga*, shows how impracticable this reading word by word would be (since it would never teach us how to distinguish an *upasarga*).

Grammar : First Aṅga of Veda

नन्वन्येष्वप्यङ्गेषु सत्सु किमित्येतदेवाद्रियते ? उच्यते–प्रधानं च षट्स्वङ्गेषु व्याकरणम् । प्रधाने च कृतो यत्नः फलवान्भवति । तदुक्तम्–

Nanvanyeṣvapyaṅgeṣu satsu kimityetadevādriyate ? Ucyate—pradhānaṁ ca ṣaṭsvaṅgeṣu vyākaraṇam. Pradhāne ca kṛto yatnaḥ phalavānbhavati. Taduktam—

"But since there are other *aṅgas*, why do you single out grammar as the one object of honour?" We reply that among the six *aṅgas* the principal one is grammar and labour devoted to what is the principal is sure to bear fruit. Thus, it has been said–

3. आसन्नं ब्रह्मणतस्य तपसामुत्तमं तपः ।
प्रथमं छन्दसामङ्गमाहुर्व्याकरणं बुधाः ॥ (वा. प. 1/11) इति ।

Āsannaṁ brahmaṇatasya tapasāmuttamaṁ tapaḥ,
Prathamaṁ chandasāmaṅgamāhurvyākaraṇaṁ budhāḥ.
(Vā. Pa. 1/11) iti.

"Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious austerities,"

"The wise have called grammar the first *aṅga* of the Veda."

तस्माद् व्याकरणशास्त्रस्य शब्दानुशासनं भवति साक्षात्प्रयोजनम् । पारम्पर्येण तु वेदरक्षादीनि । अत एवोक्तं भगवता भाष्यकारेण—रक्षोहागमलघ्वसन्देहाः प्रयोजनम् (पा. म. भा. पस्पश) इति ।

Tasmād vyākaraṇaśāstrasya śabdānuśāsanaṁ bhavati sākṣātprayojanaṃ. Pāramparyeṇa tu vedarakṣādīni. Ata evoktaṁ bhagavatā bhāṣyakāreṇa—rakṣohāgamalagh- vasandehāḥ prayojanaṃ (Pā. Ma. Bhā. Paspaśa) iti.

Hence, we conclude that the exposition of words is the direct end of the rules of grammar, but its indirect end is the preservation, etc., of the Veda. Hence, it has been said by the worshipful author of the great commentary (quoting a Vārttika), "the end (or motive) is preservation, inference, scripture, facility, and assurance."[1]

Accession to be Achieved by Grammar

साधुशब्दप्रयोगवशादभ्युदयोऽपि भवति । तथा च कथितं कात्यायनेन–शास्त्रपूर्वके प्रयोगेऽभ्युदयस्तत्तुल्यं वेदशब्देनेति । अन्यैरप्युक्तम्–एकः शब्दः सम्यग् ज्ञातः सुष्ठु प्रयुक्तः स्वर्गे लोके कामधुग्भवतीति । तथा–

Sādhuśabdaprayogavaśādabhyudayo'pi bhavati. Tathā ca kathitaṁ kātyāyayanena—śāsastrapūrvake prayoge'bhyuda- stattulyaṁ vedaśabdeneti. Anyairapyuktaṃ–ekaḥ śabdaḥ samyag jñātaḥ suṣṭhu prayuktaḥ svarge loke kāmadhugbhavatīti. Tathā—

Moreover prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word; thus Kātyāyana has said, "There is prosperity in the employment of a word according to the *śāstra*; it is equal to the words of the Veda itself." Others also have said that "a single word thoroughly understood and rightly used becomes in *Svarga* the desire-milking cow." Thus (they say)—

4. नाकमिष्टसुखं यान्ति सुयुक्तैर्बद्धवाग्रथैः ।
अथ पत्काषिणो यान्ति ये चिक्कमितभाषिणः ॥

Nākamiṣṭasukhaṁ yānti suyuktairbaddhavāgrathaiḥ,
Atha patkāṣiṇo yānti ye cikkamitabhāṣiṇaḥ.

1 See Ballantyne's *Mahābhāṣya*. pp.12, 64.

"They proceed to heaven, with every desired happiness, in well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech;"

"But those who use such false forms as *achīkramata* must trudge thither on foot."[1]

नन्वचेतनस्य शब्दस्य कथमीदृशं सामर्थ्यमुपपद्यत इति चेत्–मैवं मन्येथाः । महता देवेन साम्यश्रवणात् । तदाह श्रुतिः–

Nanvacetanasya śabdasya kathamīdṛśaṁ sāmarthyamupapa- dyata iti cet–maivaṁ manyethāḥ. Mahatā devena sāmyaśravaṇāt. Tadāha śrutiḥ—

Nor need you ask "how can irrational word possess such power?" since we have revelation declaring that it is like to the great god. For the Śruti says, "Four are its horns, three its feet, two its heads, and seven its hands,—roars loudly the threefold-bound bull, the great god enters mortals" (*Ṛgveda*, iv. 58, 3).

5. चत्वारि शृङ्गा त्रयो अस्य पादा द्वे शीर्षे सप्त हस्तासो अस्य ।
त्रिधा वद्धो वृषभो रोरवीति महो देवो मर्त्यां आ विवेश ॥
(ऋ. सं. 4/58/3) इति ।

Catvāri śṛṅgā trayo asya pādā dve śīrṣe sapta hastāso asya,
Tridhā vaddho vṛṣabho roravīti maho devo martyāṁ ā viveśa.
(Ṛgveda Saṁ. 4/58/3) iti.

व्याचकार च भाष्यकारः–चत्वारि शृङ्गाणि चत्वारि पदजातानि, नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपाताः । त्रयो अस्य पादा लडादिविषयास्त्रयो भूतभविष्यद्वर्तमानकालाः । द्वे शीर्षे द्वौ शब्दात्मानौ नित्यः कार्यश्च –। व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभेदात् । सप्त हस्तासो अस्य, तिङा सह सप्त सुब्विभक्तयः । त्रिधा बद्धः त्रिषु स्थानेषु उरसि कण्ठे शिरसि च बद्धः । वृषभ इति प्रसिद्धवृषभत्वेन रूपणं क्रियते । वर्षणात् । वर्षणं च ज्ञानपूर्वकानुष्ठानेन फलप्रदत्वम् । रोरवीति शब्दं करोति । रौतिः शब्दकर्मा ।

Vyācakāra ca bhāṣyakāraḥ–Catvāri śṛṅgāṇi catvāri padajātāni, nāmākhyātopasarganipātāḥ. Trayo asya pādā laḍādiviṣa- yāstrayo bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānakālāḥ. Dve śīrṣe dvau śabdātmānau niytaḥ kārayśca. Vyaṅgyavyañjakabhedāt. Sapta hastāso asya, tiṅā saha sapta subvibhaktayaḥ. Tridhā baddhaḥ

1 *Acīkramata* seems put here as a purposely false form of the frequentative of *kram* for *acaṅkramyata*.

triṣu sthāneṣu urasi kaṇṭhe śirasi ca baddhaḥ. Vṛṣabha iti prasiddhavṛṣabhatvena rūpaṇaṁ kriyate. Varṣaṇāt. Varṣaṇaṁ ca jñānapūrvakānuṣṭhānena phalapradatvaṁ. Roravīti śabdaṁ karoti. Rautiḥ śabdakarmā.

इह शब्दशब्देन प्रपञ्चो विवक्षितः । महो देवो मर्त्यां आविवेश । महान् देवः शब्दो मर्त्यां मरणधर्माणो मनुष्यास्तानाविवेशेति । महता देवेन परेण ब्रह्मणा साम्यमुक्तं स्यात् (महाभाष्यम्, पृ. 3) इति ।

Iha śabdaśabdena prapañco vivakśitaḥ. Maho devo matryāṁ āviveśa. Mahān devaḥ śabdo martyāṁ maraṇadharmāṇo manuṣyāstānāviveśeti. Mahatā devena pareṇa brahmaṇā sāmyamuktaṁ syāt (Mahābhāṣyam, Page 3) iti.

The great commentator thus explains it :—The "four horns" are the four kinds of words—nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles; its "three feet" mean the three times, past, present, and future, expressed by the tense-affixes, *laṭ*, etc.; the "two heads," the eternal and temporary (or produced) words, distinguished as the "manifested" and the "manifester;" its "seven hands"are the seven case affixes, including the conjugational terminations; "threefold bound," as enclosed in the three organs—the chest, the throat, and the head. The metaphor "bull" (*vṛṣabha*) is applied from its pouring fourth (*varṣaṇa*), i.e., from its giving fruit when used with knowledge. "Loudly roars," i.e., utters sound, for the root *ru* means "sound;" hereby the word "sound" developed speech (or language)[1] is implied; "the great god enters mortals,"— the "great god," i.e., speech,—enters mortals, i.e., men endowed with the attribute of mortality. Thus, is declared the likeness (of speech)[2] to the supreme Brahman.

Word is Indestructibe Essence of Speech

जगन्निदानं स्फोटाख्यो निरवयवो नित्यः शब्दो ब्रह्मैवेति हरिणाभाणि ब्रह्मकाण्डे–

Jagannidānaṁ sphoṭākhyo niravayavo nityaḥ śabdo brahmaiveti hariṇābhāṇi brahmakāṇḍe—

The eternal word, called *sphoṭa*, without parts, and the cause of the

1 Or it may mean "the developed universe." Compare the lines of Bhartṛhari which immediately follow.

2 One would naturally supply *śabdasya* after *sāmyaṃ*, but the *Mahābhāṣya* has *naḥ sāmyaṃ* (see Ballantyne's ed., p. 27).

world, is verily Brahman; thus it has been declared by Bhartṛhari in the part of his book called the Brahmakāṇḍa—

6. अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं तदक्षरम् ।
विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ।।(वाक्यप. 1/1) इति ।

Anādinidhanaṁ brahma śabdatattvaṁ tadakṣaraṃ,
Vivartate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ.
(Vākayapa. 1/1) iti.

"Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible essence of speech,"
"Which is developed in the form of things, and whence springs the creation of the world."

Division of Word

ननु नामाख्यातभेदेन पदद्वैविध्यप्रतीतेः कथं चातुर्विध्यमुक्तमिति चेत्–मैवम् । प्रकारान्तरस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात् । तदुक्तं प्रकीर्णके–

Nanu nāmākhyātabhedena padadvaividhyapratīteḥ kathaṁ cāturvidhyamuktamiti cet—maivaṃ. Prakārāntarasya prasiddhatvāt. Taduktaṁ prakīrṇake—

"But since there is a well-known twofold division of words into nouns and verbs, how comes this fourfold division?" We reply, because this, too, is well known. Thus, it has been said in the *Prakīrṇaka—*

7. द्विधा कैश्चित्पदं भिन्नं चतुर्धा पञ्चधाऽपि वा ।
अपोद्धृत्यैव वाक्येभ्यः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादिवत् ।। इति ।

Dvidhā kaiścitpadaṁ bhinnaṁ caturdhā pañcadhā'pi vā,
Apoddhṛtyaiva vākyebhyaḥ prakṛtipratyayādivat. iti.

"Some make a twofold division of words, some a fourfold or a fivefold,"
"Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix, and the like."

कर्मप्रवचनीयेन वै पञ्चमेन सह पदस्य पञ्चविधत्वमिति हेलाराजो व्याख्यातवान् । कर्मप्रवचनीयास्तु क्रियाविशेषोपजनितसम्बन्धावच्छेदहेतव इति सम्बन्धविशेष-द्योतनद्वारेण क्रियाविशेषद्योतनादुपसर्गेष्वेवान्तर्भवन्तीत्यभिसन्धाय पदचातुर्विध्यं भाष्यकारेणोक्तं युक्तमिति विवेक्तव्यम् ।

Karmapravacanīyena vai pañcamena saha padasya pañcavidhatvamiti helārājo vyākhyātavān. Karmapravacanīyāstu kriyāviśeṣopajanitasambandhāvacchedahetava iti sambandhaviśeṣadyotanadvāreṇa kriyāviśeṣadyotanādupasargeṣveväntarbhavantītyabhisandhāya padacāturvidhyaṁ bhāṣyakāreṇoktaṁ yuktamiti vivektavyam.

Helārāja interprets the fivefold division as including *karmapravacanīyas*.[1] But the fourfold division, mentioned by the great commentator, is proper, since *karmapravacanīyas* distinguish a connection produced by a particular kind of verb, and thus, as marking out a particular kind of connection and so marking out a particular kind of verb, they are really included in compounded prepositions (*upasargas*).[2]

Ward-off Doubts Raised by Naiyākikas

ननु भवता स्फोटात्मा नित्यः शब्द इति निजागद्यते । तन्न मृष्यामहे । तत्र प्रमाणाभावादिति केचित् । अत्रोच्यते । प्रत्यक्षमेवात्र प्रमाणम् । गौरित्येकं पदमिति नानावर्णातिरिक्तैकपदावगतेः सर्वजनीनत्वात् । न ह्यसति बाधके पदानुभवः शक्यो मिथ्येति वक्तुम् । पदार्थप्रतीत्यन्यथानुपपत्त्यापि स्फोटोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः ।

Nanu bhavatā sphoṭātmā nityaḥ śabda iti nijāgadyate. Tanna mṛṣyāmahe. Tatra pramāṇābhāvāditi kecit. Atrocyate. Pratyakṣamevātra pramāṇam. Gaurityekaṁ padamiti nānāvarṇātiriktaikapadāvagateḥ sarvajanīnatvāt. Na hyasati bādhake padānubhavaḥ śakyo mithyeti vaktum. Padārthapratītyanyathānupapattyāpi sphoṭo'bhyupagantavyaḥ.

"But," say some, "why do you talk so much of an eternal sound called *sphoṭa* ? This we do not concede, since there is no proof that there is such a thing." We reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus there is one word "cow", since all men have the

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1 *I.e.*, prepositions used separately as governing cases of their own, and not (as usually in Sanskrit) in composition.

2 The *karmapravacanīyas* imply a verb other than the one expressed, and they are said to determine the relation which is produced by this understood verb. Thus, in the example, *Śākalyasaṁhitāṁ anu prāvarṣat*, "he rained after the *Śākalya* hymns," *anu* implies an understood verb *niśamya*, "having heard," and this verb shows that there is a relation of cause and effect between the hymns and the rain. This *anu* is said to determine this relation.

cognition of a word distinct from the various letters composing it. You cannot say, in the absence of any manifest contradiction, that this perception of the word is a false perception. Hence, you must concede that there is such a thing as *sphoṭa*, as otherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the word.

न च वर्णेभ्य एव तत्प्रत्ययः प्रादुर्भवतीति परीक्षाक्षमम् । विकल्पासहत्वात् । किं वर्णाः समस्ता व्यस्ता वार्थप्रत्ययं जनयन्ति ? नाद्यः वर्णानां क्षणिकानां समूहसंभवात् । नान्त्यः । व्यस्तवर्णेभ्योऽर्थप्रत्ययासंभवात् । न च व्याससमासाभ्यामन्यः प्रकारः समस्तीति । तस्माद्वर्णानां वाचकत्वानुपपत्तौ यद्बलादर्थप्रतिपत्तिः स स्फोटः । वर्णातिरिक्तो वर्णाभिव्यङ्ग्योऽर्थप्रत्यायको नित्यः शब्दः स्फोट इति तद्विदो वदन्ति ।

Na ca varṇebhya eva tatpratyayaḥ prādurbhavatīti parīkṣākṣamam. Vikalpāsahatvāt. Kiṁ varṇāḥ samastā vyastā vārthapratyayaṁ janayanti ? Nādyaḥ. Varṇānāṁ kṣaṇikānāṁ samūhasaṁbhavāt. Nāntyaḥ. Vyastavarṇebhyo'rthapratyayāsaṁbhavāt. Na ca vyāsasamāsābhyāmanyaḥ prakāraḥ samastīti. Tasmādvarṇānāṁ vācakatvānupapattau yadbalādarthapratipattiḥ sa sphoṭaḥ. Varṇātirikto varṇābhivyaṅgyo'rthapratyāyako nityaḥ śabdaḥ sphoṭa iti tadvido vadanti.

For the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot bear examination, since it breaks down before either horn of the following dilemma :—Are the letters supposed to produce this cognition of the meaning in their united or their individual capacity? Not the first, for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore, cannot form a united whole at all; and not the second, since the single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning (which the word is to convey). There is no conceivable alternative other than their single or united capacity; and therefore it follows (say the wise in these matters) that, as the letters cannot cause the cognition of the meaning, there must be a *sphoṭa* by means of which arises knowledge of the meaning; and this *sphoṭa*, is an eternal sound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes the cognition of the meaning.

अत एव स्फुट्यते व्यज्यते वर्णैरिति स्फोटो वर्णाभिव्यङ्ग्यः, स्फुटति स्फुटीभवत्यस्मादर्थ इति स्फोटोऽर्थप्रत्यायक इति स्फोटशब्दार्थमुभयथा निराहुः । तथा चोक्तं भगवता पतञ्जलिना महाभाष्ये–'अथ गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः?

येनोच्चारितेन सास्ना-लाङ्गूल-ककुद-खुरविषाणिनां सम्प्रत्ययो भवति, स शब्दः' (महाभा., पृ. 1) इति ।

Ata eva sphuṭyate vyajyate varṇairiti sphoṭo varṇābhivyaṅgyaḥ, sphuṭati sphuṭibhavatyasmādartha iti sphoṭo'rthapratyāyaka iti sphoṭaśabdārthamubhayathā nirāhuḥ. Tathā coktaṁ bhagavatā patañjalinā mahābhāṣye—'atha gaurityatra kaḥ śabdaḥ ? Yenoccāritena sāsnā-lāṅgūla-kakuda-khuraviṣāṇinām sampratyayo bhavati, sa śabdaḥ' (Mahābhā, Page 1) iti.

"It is disclosed (*sphuṭyate*) or revealed by the letters," hence it is called *sphoṭa*, as revealed by the letters; or "from it is disclosed the meaning," hence it is called *sphoṭa* as causing the knowledge of the meaning, – these are the two etymologies to explain the meaning of the word. And thus it hath been said by the worshipful Pātañjali in the great Commentary, "Now, what is the word *'cow' gauḥ* ? It is that word by which, when pronounce, here is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs, and horns."

विवृतं च कैयटेन–'वैयाकरणा वर्णव्यतिरिक्तस्य पदस्य वाचकत्वमिच्छन्ति । वर्णानां वाचकत्वे द्वितीयादिवर्णोच्चारणानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गादित्यादिना तद्व्यतिरिक्तः स्फोटो नादाभिव्यङ्ग्यो वाचको विस्तरेण वाक्यपदीये व्यवस्थापितः' इत्यन्तेन प्रबन्धेन ।

Vivṛtaṁ ca kaiyaṭena—'Vaiyākaraṇā varṇavyatiriktasya padasya vācakatvamicchanti. Varṇānāṁ vācakatve dvitīyādivarṇoccāraṇānarthakyaprasaṅgādityādinā tadvyatiriktaḥ sphoṭo nādābhivyaṅgyo vācako vistareṇa vākyapadīye vyavasthāpitaḥ' ityantena prabandhena.

This is expounded by Kaiyaṭa in the passage commencing, "Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct from the letters, which expreses the meaning, since, if the letters expressed it, there would be no use in pronouncing the second and following ones (as the first would have already conveyed all we wished)," and ending, "The *Vākyapadīya* has established at length that it is the *sphoṭa* which, distinct from the letters and revealed by the sound expresses the meaning."[1]

1 See Ballantyne's ed., 10.

Other Doubts Raised by Mīmāṁsaka

ननु स्फोटस्याप्यर्थप्रत्यायकत्वं न घटते । विकल्पासहत्वात् । किमभिव्यक्तः स्फोटोऽर्थं प्रत्याययत्यनभिव्यक्तो वा ? न चरमः । सर्वदार्थप्रत्ययलक्षण-कार्योत्पादप्रसङ्गात् । स्फोटस्य नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमेन निरपेक्षस्य हेतोः सदा सत्त्वेन कार्यस्य विलम्बायोगात् ।

Nanu sphoṭasyāpyarthapratyāyakatvaṁ na ghaṭate. Vikalpāsahatvāt. Kimabhivyaktaḥ sphoṭo'rthaṁ pratyāyayatyanabhivyakto vā? Na caramaḥ. Sarvadārthaṁpratyayalakṣaṇa-kāryotpādaprasaṅgāt. Sphoṭasya nityatvābhyupagamena nirapekṣasya hetoḥ sadā sattvena kāryasya vilambāyogāt.

Here, however, an objector may urge, "But should we not rather say that the *sphoṭa* has no power to convey the meaning, as it fails under either of the following alternatives, for is it supposed to convey the meaning when itself manifested or unmanifested? Not the latter, because it would then follow that we should find the effect of conveying the meaning always produced, since, as *sphoṭa* is supposed to be eternal, and there would thus be an ever present cause independent of all subsidiary aids, the effect could not possibly fail to appear.

अथैतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षयाऽभिव्यक्तः स्फोटोऽर्थं प्रत्याययतीति कक्षीक्रियते, तथाऽप्यभिव्यञ्जयन्तो वर्णाः किं प्रत्येकमभिव्यञ्जयति सम्भूय वा ? पक्षद्वयेऽपि वर्णानां वाचकत्वपक्षे भवता ये दोषा भाषितास्त एव स्फोटाभिव्यञ्जकत्वपक्षे व्यावर्तनीयाः । तदुक्तं भट्टाचार्यैर्मीमांसाश्लोकवार्तिके–

Athaitaddoṣaparijihīrṣayā'bhivyaktaḥ sphoṭo'rthaṁ pratyāyayatīti kaksīkriyate, tathā'pyabhivyañjayanto varṇāḥ kiṁ pratyekamabhivyañjayati sambhūya vā ? Pakṣadvaye'pi varṇānāṁ vācakatvapakṣe bhavatā ye doṣā bhāṣitāsta eva sphoṭābhivyañjakatvapakṣe vyāvartanīyāḥ. Taduktaṁ bhaṭṭācāryairmīmāṁsāślokavārtike—

Therefore, to avoid this fault, we must allow the other alternative, viz., that *sphoṭa* conveys the meaning when it is itself manifested. Well, then, do the manifesting letters exercise this manifesting power separately or combined? Whichever alternative you adopt, the very same faults which you alleged against the hypothesis of the letters expressing the meaning, will have to be met in your hypothesis that they have this power to manifest *sphoṭa*. This has been said by Bhaṭṭa in his *Mīmāṁsā-śloka-vārttika*.

8. यस्यानवयवः स्फोटो व्यज्यते वर्णबुद्धिभिः ।
सोऽपि पर्यनुयागेन नैकेनापि विमुच्यते ।। इति ।

Yasyānavayavaḥ sphoṭo vyajyate varṇabuddhibhiḥ,
So'pi paryanuyāgena naikenāpi vimucyate. iti.

"The grammarian who holds that *sphoṭa* is manifested by the letters as they are severally apprehended, though itself one and indivisible, does not thereby escape from a single difficulty."

विभक्त्यन्तेष्वेव वर्णेषु 'सुप्तिङन्तं पदम् (पा. सू. 1/4/14) इति पाणिनिना, 'ते विभक्त्यन्ताः पदम्' (न्या. सू. 2/2/60) इति गौतमेन च पदसंज्ञाया विहितत्वात्संकेत ग्रहेणानुग्रहवशाद्वर्णेष्वेव पदबुद्धिर्भविष्यति । तर्हि सर इत्येतस्मिन्पदे यावन्तो वर्णास्तावन्त एव रस इत्यत्रापि । एवं 'वनं नवं', 'नदी दीना', 'रामो मारो', 'राजा जारे'त्यादिष्वर्थभेदप्रतीतिर्न स्यादिति चेत्–न । क्रमभेदेन भेदसम्भवात् । तदुक्तं तौतातितैः–

Vibhaktyanteṣveva varṇeṣu 'Suptiṅantaṁ padam (Pā. Sū. 1/4/4) iti pāṅininā, 'te vibhaktyantāḥ padam' (Nyā. Sū. 2/2/60) iti gautamena ca padasaṁjñāyā vihitatvātsaṅketa grahenānugrahavaśādvarṇeṣveva padabuddhirbhaviṣyati. Tarhi sara ityetasminpade yāvanto varṇāstāvanta eva rasa ityatrāpi. Evaṁ 'vanaṁ navaṁ', 'nadī dīnā', 'Rāma māro', 'rājā jāre'tyādiṣvarthabhedapratītirna syāditi cet—na. Kramabhedena bhedasambhavāt. Taduktaṁ tautātitaiḥ—

The truth is, that, as *Pāṇini* (i.4,14) and *Gotama* (*Sūt*. ii. 123) both lay it down that letters only then form a word when they have an affix at the end, it is the letters which convey the word's meaning through the apprehension of the conventional association of ideas which they help.[1] If you object that as there are the same letters in *rasa* as in *sara*, in *nava* as in *vana*, in *dīnā* as in *nādī*, in *māra* as in *rāmā,*—as in *rājā* as in *jāra,* etc., these several pairs of words would not convey a different meaning, we reply that the difference in the order of the letters will produce a difference in the meaning. This has been said by *Tautātita*–

1 This is not very clear, the *anu* in *anugraha* might mean *krameṇa*, and so imply the successive order of the letters.

9. यावन्तो यादृशा ये च यदर्थप्रतिपत्तये ।
वर्णाः प्रज्ञातसामर्थ्यास्ते तथैवावबोधकाः ।। इति ।

Yāvanto yādṛśā ye ca yadarthapratipattaye,
Varṇāḥ prajñātasāmarthyāste tathaivāvabodhakāḥ. iti.

"As are the letters in number and kind, whose power is perceived in conveying any given meaning of a word, so will be the meaning which they convey."

तस्माद्यश्चोभयोः समो दोषो न तेनैकश्चोद्यो भवतीति न्यायाद्वर्णानामेव वाचकत्वोपपत्तौ नातिरिक्तस्फोटकल्पनावकल्पत इति चेत् –

Tasmādyaścobhayoḥ samo doṣo na tenaikaścodyo bhavatīti nyāyādvarṇānāmeva vācakatvopapattau nātiriktasphoṭakalpanāvakalpata iti cet—

Therefore, as there is a well-known rule that when the same fault attaches to both sides of an argument, it cannot be urged against one alone, we maintain that the hypothesis of the existence of a separate thing called *sphoṭa* is unnecessary, as we have proved that it is the letters which express the word's meaning (your arguments against our view having been shown to be irrelevant)."

Rejoinder to Mīmāṁsakas, Doubts—Sphoṭa Siddhi

तदेतत्काशकुशावलम्बनकल्पम् । विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । किं वर्णमात्रं पदप्रत्ययावलम्बनं वर्णसमूहो वा? नाद्यः । परस्परविलक्षणवर्णमालायामभिन्नं निमित्तं पुष्पेषु विना सूत्रं मालाप्रत्ययवदित्येकं पदमिति प्रतिपत्तेरनुपपत्तेः । नापि द्वितीयः । उच्चरितप्रध्वस्तानां वर्णानां समूहभावासम्भवात् ।

Tadetatkāśakuśāvalambanakalpam. Vikalpānupapatteḥ. Kiṁ varṇamātraṁ padapratyayāvalambanaṁ varṇasamūho vā ? Nādyaḥ. Parasparavilakṣaṇavarṇamālāyāmabhinnaṁ nimittaṁ puṣpeṣu vinā sūtraṁ mālāpratyyayavadityekaṁ padamiti pratipatteranupapatteḥ. Nāpi dvitīyaḥ. Uccaritapradhvastānāṁ varṇānāṁ samūhabhāvāsambhavāt.

All this long oration is really only like a drowning man's catching at a straw;[1] for either of the alternatives is impossible, whether you hold that it is the single letters or their aggregation which conveys the meaning of the word. It cannot be the former, because a col-

1 In the Calcutta edition, p. 142, line 11, I read *kalpaṃ* for *kalpanaṃ*.

lection of separate letters, without any one pervading cause,[1] could never produce the idea of a word any more than a collection of separate flowers would form a garland without a string. Nor can it be the latter, because the letters, being separately pronounced and done with, cannot combine into an aggregate.

तत्र हि समूहव्यपदेशो ये पदार्था एकस्मिन्प्रदेशे सहावस्थिततया बहवोऽनुभूयन्ते । यथैकस्मिन्प्रदेशे सहावस्थितयानुभूयमानेषु धवखदिरपलाशादिषु समूहव्यपदेशो यथा वा गजनरतुरगादिषु । न च ते वर्णास्तथानुभूयन्ते । उत्पन्नप्रध्वस्तत्वात् । अभिव्यक्तिपक्षेऽपि क्रमेणैवाभिव्यक्तिः । समूहासम्भवात् ।

Tatra hi samūhavyapadeśo ye padārthā ekasminpradeśe sahāvasthitatayā bahavo'nubhūyante. Yathaikasminpradeśe sahāvasthitayānubhūyamāneṣu dhavakhadirapalāśādiṣu samūhavyapadeśo yathā vā gajanaraturagādiṣu. Na ca te varṇāstathānubhūyante. Utpannapradhvastatvāt. Abhivyaktipakse'pi kramenaivābhivyaktiḥ. Samūhāsambhavāt.

For we use the term "aggregate" where a number of objects are perceived to be united together in one place; thus, we apply it to a Grislea tomentosa, an Acacia catechu, a Butea frondosa, etc., or to an elephant, a man, a horse, etc., seen together in one place; but these letters are not perceived thus united together, as they are severally produced and pass away; and even on the hypothesis of their having a "manifesting" power, they can have no power to form an aggregate, as they can only manifest a meaning successively and not simultaneously.

नापि वर्णेषु काल्पनिकः समूहः कल्पनीयः । परस्पराश्रयप्रसङ्गात् । एकार्थप्रत्यायकत्वसिद्धौ तदुपाधिना वर्णेषु पदत्वप्रतीतिस्तत्सिद्धावेकार्थप्रत्यायकत्वसिद्धिरिति । तस्माद्वर्णानां वाचकत्वासम्भवात्स्फोटोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः ।

Nāpi varṇeṣu kālpanikaḥ samūhaḥ kalpanīyaḥ. Parasparāśrayaprasaṅgāt. Ekārthapratyāyakatvasiddhau tadupādhinā varṇeṣu padatvapratītistatsiddhāvekārthapratyāyakatvasiddhiriti. Tasmādvarṇānāṁ vācakatvāsambhavātsphoṭo'bhyupagantavyaḥ.

Nor can you imagine an artificial aggregate in the letters, because this would involve a "mutual dependence" (or reasoning in a circle); for, on the one hand, the letters would only become a word

1 In p. 142, line 13, I add *vinā* after *nimittaṃ*.

when their power to convey one meaning had been established; and, on the other hand, their power to convey one meaning would only follow when the fact of their being a word was settled. Therefore, since, it is impossible that letters should express the meaning, we must accept the hypothesis of *sphoṭa*.

Sphoṭa : Other Objections and Their Solutions

ननु स्फोटव्यञ्जकतापक्षेऽपि प्रागुक्तविकल्पप्रसरेण घट्टकुटीप्रभातायितमिति चेत्-तदेतन्मनोराज्यविजृम्भणम् । वैषम्यसम्भवात् । तथा हि-अभिव्यञ्जकोऽपि प्रथमो ध्वनिः स्फोटमस्फुटमभिव्यनक्ति । उत्तरोत्तराभिव्यञ्जकक्रमेण स्फुटं स्फुटतरं स्फुटतमम् । यथा स्वाध्यायः सकृत्पठ्यमानो नावधार्यते । अभ्यासेन तु स्फुटावसायः । यथा वा रजतत्वं प्रथमप्रतीतौ स्फुटं न चकास्ति । चरमे चेतसि यथावदभिव्यज्यते ।

Nanu sphoṭavyañjakatāpakṣe'pi prāguktavikalpaprasareṇa ghaṭṭakuṭīprabhātāyitamiti cet—tadetanmanorājyavijṛmbhaṇam Vaiṣamyasambhavāt. Tathā hi—abhivyañjako'pi prathamo dhvaniḥ sphoṭamasphuṭamabhivyanakti. Uttarottarābhivyañjakakrameṇa sphuṭaṁ sphuṭataraṁ sphuṭamaṃ. Yathā svādhyāyaḥ sakṛtpaṭhyamāno nāvadhāryate. Abhyāsena tu sphuṭāvasāyaḥ. Yathā vā rajatatvaṁ prathamapratītau sphuṭaṁ na cakāsti. Carame cetasi yathāvadabhivyajyate.

"But even on your own hypothesis that there is a certain thing called *sphoṭa* which expresses the meaning, the same untenable alternative will recur which we discussed before; and therefore it will only be a case of the proverb that 'the dawn finds the smuggler with the revenue-officer's house closeby.'"[1] This however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy from the wide difference between the two cases. For the first letter, in its manifesting power, reveals the invisible *sphoṭa*, and each successive letter makes this *sphoṭa* more and more manifest, just as the Veda, after one reading, is not retained, but is made sure by repetition; or as the real nature of a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely manifested at the final examination.

1 The *ghaṭṭa* is the place where dues and taxes are collected. Some one anxious to evade payment is going by a private way by night, but he arrives at the tax-collector's house just as day dawns and is thus caught. Hence, the proverb means *uddeśyāsiddhi*.

10. नादैराहितबीजायामन्त्येन ध्वनिना सह ।
आवृत्तिपरिपाकायां बुद्धौ शब्दोऽवधार्यते ॥ (वाक्यप. 1/84)

Nādairāhitabījāyāmantyena dhvaninā saha,
Āvṛttiparimākāyāṁ buddhau śabdo'vadhāryate.
(Vākyapa. 1/84)

This is in accordance with the authoritative saying (of the teacher): "The seed is implanted by the sounds, and, when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition, the word is finally ascertained simultaneously with the last uttered letter."

इति प्रामाणिकोक्तेः । तस्मादस्माच्छब्दादर्थं प्रतिपद्यामह इति व्यवहारवशाद्वर्णानामर्थवाचकत्वानुपपत्तेः । प्रथमे काण्डे तत्रभवद्भिर्भर्तृहरिभिरभिहितत्वान्निरवयवमर्थप्रत्यायकं शब्दतत्त्वं स्फोटाख्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति । एतत्सर्वं परमार्थसंविल्लक्षणसत्ता जातिरेव सर्वेषां शब्दानामर्थ इति प्रतिपादनपरे जातिसमुद्देशे प्रतिपादितम् ।

Iti prāmāṇikokteḥ. Tasmādasmācchabdādarthaṁ pratipadyāmaha iti vyavahāravaśādvarṇānāmarthavācakatvānupapatteḥ. Prathame kāṇḍe tatrabhavadbhirbhartṛharibhirabhihitatvānniravayavamarthapratyāyakaṁ śabdatattvaṁ sphoṭākhyamabhyupagantavyamiti. Etatsarvaṁ paramārthasaṁvillaksaṇasattā jātireva sarveṣāṁ sabdānāmartha iti pratipādanapare jātisamuddeśe pratipāditam.

Therefore, since Bhartṛhari has shown in his first book that the letters of a word (being many and successive) cannot manifest the meaning of the word, as is implied by the very phrase, "We gain such and such a meaning from such and such a *word*," we are forced to assume the existence[1] of an indivisible *sphoṭa* as a distinct category, which has the power to manifest the word's meaning. All this has been established in the discussion (in the *Mahābhāṣya*) on "genus" (*jāti*), which aims at proving that the meaning of all words is ultimately that *summum genus*, i.e., that existence whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality[2] (Brahman).

1 In p. 143, line 13, I read *sphoṭakabhāvaṃ* for *sphoṭābhāvaṃ*.
2 *Cf.* Ballantyne's Transl. of the *Mahābhāṣya*, pp. 9, 32.

Existence is Sole Meaning of Words

यदि सत्तैव सर्वेषां शब्दानामर्थस्तर्हि सर्वेषां शब्दानां पर्यायता स्यात् । तथा च क्वचिदपि युगपत्त्रिचतुरपदप्रयोगायोग इति महच्चातुर्यमायुष्मतः । तदुक्तम्–

Yadi sattaiva sarveṣāṁ śabdānāmarthastarhi sarveṣāṁ śabdānāṁ paryāyatā syāt. Tathā ca kvacidapi yugapattricaturapadaprayogāyoga iti mahaccāturyamāyuṣmataḥ Taduktaṃ—

"But if all words mean only that supreme existence, then all words will be synonyms, having all the same meaning; and your grand logical ingenuity would produce an astonishing result in demonstrating the uselessness of human language as laboriously using several words to no purpose at the same time"! Thus, it has been said—

11. पर्यायाणां प्रयोगो हि यौगपद्येन नेष्यते ।
पर्यायेणैव ते यस्माद्वदन्त्यर्थं न संहताः ॥ इति ।

Paryāyāṇāṁ prayogo hi yaugapadyena neṣyate,
Paryāyeṇaiva te yasmādvadantyarthaṁ na saṁhatāḥ. iti.

तस्मादयं पक्षो न क्षोदक्षम इति चेत्–

Tasmādayaṁ pakṣo na kṣodakṣama iti cet—

"The employment of synonymous terms at the same time is to be condemned; for they only express their meaning in turn and not by combination."

"Therefore, this opinion of yours is really hardly worth the trouble of refuting."

तदेतद्गगनरोमन्थकल्पम् । नीललोहितपीताद्युपरञ्जकद्रव्यभेदेन स्फटिकमणेरिव सम्बन्धिभेदात्सत्तायास्तदात्मना भेदेन प्रतिपत्तिसिद्धौ, गोसत्तादिरूपगोत्वादिभेदनिबन्धनव्यवहारवैलक्षण्योपपत्तेः । तथा चाप्तवाक्यम्–

Tadetadgaganaromanthakalpaṃ. Nīlalohitapītādyuparañjakadravyabhedena sphaṭikamaṇeriva sambandhibhedātsattāyāstadātmanā bhedena pratipattisiddhau, gosattādirūpagotvādibhedanibandhanavyavahāravailakṣaṇyopapatteḥ. Tathā cāptavākyaṃ—

All this is only the ruminating of empty either; for just as the colourless crystal is affected by different objects which colour it as blue, red, yellow, etc., so, since the *summum genus*, Brahman, is

variously cognised through its connection with different things, as severally identified with each, we thus account for the use of the various conventional words which arise from the different species,[1] as cow, etc., these being "existence" (the *summum genus*) as found in the individual cow, etc. To this purport, we have the following authoritative testimony –

12. स्फटिकं विमलं द्रव्यं यथा युक्तं पृथक्पृथक् ।
नीललोहितपीताद्यस्तद्वर्णमुपलभ्यते ॥ इति ।

Sphaṭikaṁ vimalaṁ dravyaṁ yathā yuktaṁ pṛthakpṛthak,
Nīlalohitapītādyastadvarṇamupalabhyate. iti.

"Just as crystal, that colourless substance, when severally joined with blue, red, or yellow objects, is seen as possessing that colour."

तथा हरिणाप्युक्तम्–

Tathā hariṇāpyuktam—

And so it has been said by Hari, "Existence"—

13. सम्बन्धिभेदात्सत्तैव भिद्यमाना गवादिषु ।
जातिरित्युच्यते तस्यां सर्वे शब्दा व्यवस्थिताः ॥ (वाक्य. 3/1/33)

Sambandhibhedātsattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu,
Jātirityucyate tasyāṁ sarve śabdā vyavasthitāḥ.

(Vākya. 3/1/33)

(pure and simple) being divided, when found in cows, etc., by reason of its connection with different subjects, is called this or that species, and on it all words depend.

14. तां प्रातिपदिकार्थं च धात्वर्थं च प्रचक्षते ।
सा नित्या सा महानात्मा तामाहुस्त्वतलादयः ॥ (वाक्य. 3/1/34) इति

Tāṁ prātipadikārthaṁ ca dhātvarthaṁ ca pracakṣate,
Sā nityā sā mahānātmā tāmāhustvatalādayaḥ.

(Vākyapa. 3/1/34) iti.

1 The *Mīmāṁsā* holds that a word means the genus (*jāti*) and not the individual (*vyakti*); the Nyāya that a word means an individual as distinguished by such and susch a genus (or species).

This they call the meaning of the stem and of the root. This is existence, this is the great soul; and it is this which the affixes *tva, tal*, etc., express" (*Pāṇini* v.i,119).

आश्रयभूतैः सम्बन्धिभिर्भिद्यमाना कल्पितभेदा गवाश्वादिषु सत्तैव महासामान्यमेव जातिः। गोत्वादिकमपरं सामान्यं परमार्थतस्ततो भिन्नं न भवति । गोसत्तैव गोत्वं, नापरमन्वयि प्रतिभासते । एवमश्वसत्ताऽश्वत्वमित्यादि वाच्यम् । एवं च तस्यामेव गवादिभेदभिन्नायां सत्तायां जातौ सर्वे गोशब्दादयो वाचकत्वेन व्यवस्थिताः ।

Āśrayabhūtaiḥ sambandhibhirbhidyamānā kalpitabhedā gavāśvādiṣu sattaiva mahāsāmānyameva jātiḥ. Gotvādikamaparaṁ sāmānyaṁ paramārthatastato bhinnaṁ na bhavati. Gosattaiva gotvaṁ, nāparamanvayi pratibhāsate. Evamaśvasattā'śvatvamityādi vācyam. Evaṁ ca tasyāmeva gavādibhedabhinnāyāṁ sattāyāṁ jātau sarve gośabdādayo vācakatvena vyavasthitāḥ.

"Existence" is that great *summum genus* which is found in cows, horses, etc., differentiated by the various subjects in which it resides; and the inferior species, "cow," "horse,"etc., are not really different from it; for the species "cow" and "horse" (*gotva* and *aśvatva*) are not really new subjects, but each is "existence" as residing in the subject "*cow*" and "horse". Therefore, all words, as expressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that one *summum genus* existence, which is differentiated by the various subjects, cows, etc., in which it resides.

प्रातिपदिकार्थश्च सत्तेति प्रसिद्धम् । भाववचनो धातुरिति पक्षे भावः सत्तैवेति धात्वर्थः सत्ता भवत्येव । क्रियावचनो धातुरिति पक्षेऽपि 'जातिमन्ये क्रियामाहुरनेकव्यक्तिवर्तिनीम्' इति क्रियासमुद्देशे (वा. प. 3/8) क्रियाया जातिरूपत्वप्रतिपादनाद्धात्वर्थः सत्ता भवत्येव ।

Prātipadikārthaśca satteti prasiddhaṃ. Bhāvavacano dhāturiti pakṣe bhāvaḥ sattaiveti dhātvarthaḥ sattā bhavatyeva. Kriyāvacano dhāturiti pakṣe'pi 'jātimanye kriyāmāhuranekavyaktivartinīṃ' iti kriyāsamuddeśe (Vā. Pa. 3/8) kriyāyā jātirūpatvapratipādanāddhātvarthaḥ sattā bhavatyeva.

And hence "existence" is the meaning of the stem-word (*prātipadika*). A "root" is sometimes defined as that which expresses *bhāva*;[1] now, as *bhāva* is "existence,"the meaning of a

1 *Cf. Ṛgveda Prātiśā.*, xii. 5.

root is really existence.[1] Others say that a root should be defined as that which expresses "action" (*kriyā*); but here again the meaning of a root will really be "existence," since this "action" will be a genus, as it is declared to reside in many subjects, in accordance with the common definition of a genus, in the line—"Others say that action (*kriyā*) is a genus, residing in many individuals."

'तस्य भावस्त्वतलौ' (पा. सू. 5/1/119) इति भावार्थेत्वतलादीनां विधानात्सत्तावाचित्वं युक्तम् । सा च सत्ता उदयव्ययवैधुर्यान्नित्या । सर्वस्य प्रपञ्चस्य तद्विवर्ततया देशतः कालतो वस्तुतश्च परिच्छेदराहित्यात्सा सत्ता महानात्मेति व्यपदिश्यत इति कारिकाद्वयार्थः ।

'Tasya bhāvastvatalau' (Pā. Sū. 5/1/119) iti bhāvārthe-tvatalādīnām vidhānātsattāvācitvaṁ yuktaṃ. Sā ca sattā udayavyayavaidhuryānnityā. Sarvasya prapañcasya tadvivarta-tayā deśataḥ kālato vastutaśca paricchedarāhityātsā sattā mahānātmeti vyapadiśyata iti kārikādvayārthaḥ.

So, too, if we accept Pāṇini's definition (v.i,119), "Let the affixes *tva* and *tal* come after a word (denoting anything), when we speak of the nature (*bhāva*) thereof," it is clear from the very fact that abstract terms ending in *tva* or *tā* (as *aśvatva* and *aśvatā*) are used in the sense of *bhāva*, that they do express "existence." "This is pure existence" from its being free from all coming into being or ceasing to be; it is eternal, since, as all phenomena are developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in space, time, or substance: this existence is called "the great soul." Such is the meaning of Hari's two *kārikās* quoted above.

Word Meaning is Meaning of Substance

द्रव्यपदार्थवादिनोऽपि नये संविल्लक्षणं तत्त्वमेव सर्वशब्दार्थ इति सम्बन्धसमुद्देशे समर्थितम्–

Dravyapadārthavādino'pi naye saṁvillakṣaṇaṁ tattvameva sarvaśabdārtha iti sambandhasamuddeśe samarthitaṃ—

So, too, it is laid down in the discussion on sambandha (in Hari's verses).

1 He here is trying to show that his view is confirmed by the commonly received definitions of some grammatical terms.

15. सत्यं वस्तु तदाकारैरसत्यैरवधार्यते ।
असत्योपाधिभिः शब्दैः सत्यमेवाभिधीयते ।। (वा. प. 3/1/2)

Satyaṁ vastu tadākārairasatyairavadhāryate,
Asatyopādhibhiḥ śabdaiḥ satyamevābhidhīyate.
(Vā. Pa. 3/1/2)

That the ultimate meaning of all words is that something whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the real meaning of the word Substance.

16. अध्रुवेण निमित्तेन देवदत्तगृहं यथा ।
गृहीतं गृहशब्देन शुद्धमेवाभिधीयते ।।

Adhruveṇa nimittena devadattagṛhaṁ yathā,
Gṛhītaṁ gṛhaśabdena śuddhamevābhidhīyate.

"The true Reality is ascertained by its illusory forms; the true substance is declared by words through illusory disguises; as the object, 'Devadatta's house,' is apprehended by a transitory cause of discrimination,[1] but by the word 'house' itself, the pure idea (without owners) is expressed."[2]

भाष्यकारेणापि 'सिद्धेशब्दार्थसम्बन्धे' इत्येतद्वार्तिकव्याख्यानावसरे द्रव्यं हि नित्यमित्यनेन ग्रन्थेनासत्योपाध्यवच्छिन्नं ब्रह्मतत्त्वं द्रव्यशब्दवाच्यं सर्वशब्दार्थ इति निरूपितम् ।

Bhāṣyakāreṇāpi 'siddheśabdārthasambandhe' ityetadvārtikavyākhyānāvasare dravyaṁ hi nityamityanena granthenāsatyopādhyavacchinnaṃ brahmatattvaṁ dravyaśabdavācyaṁ sarvaśabdārtha iti nirūpitaṃ.

So too, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, when explaining the Vārttika[3] "a word, its meaning, and its connection being fixed," in the passage beginning "substance is eternal,"has shown that the meaning of all words is Brahman, expressed by the word 'substance" and determined by various unreal[4] conditions (as "the nature of horse," etc.)

1 Since Devadatta is only its transient owner.

2 So by the words "horse," "cow," etc., Brahman is really meant, the one abiding existence.

3 *Cf.* Ballantyne's *Mahābhāṣya*, pp. 44, 50.

4 In p. 145, line 8, read *asatya* for *aśvattha*.

Genus and Person are Substance—An Approach

जातिशब्दार्थवाचिनो वाजप्यायनस्य मते गवादयः शब्दा भिन्नद्रव्य-समवेतजातिमभिदधति । तस्यामवगाह्यमानायां तत्सम्बन्धाद् द्रव्यमवगम्यते । शुक्लादयः शब्दा गुणसमवेतां जातिमाचक्षते । गुणे तत्सम्बन्धात्प्रत्ययः । द्रव्ये सम्बन्धिसम्बन्धात् ।

Jātiśabdārthavācino vājapyāyanasya mate gavādayaḥ śabdā bhinnadravyasamavetajātimabhidadhati. Tasyāmavagāhyamānāyāṁ tatsambandhād dravyamavagamyate. Śuklādayaḥ śabdā guṇasamavetāṁ jātimācakṣate. Guṇe tatsambandhātpratyayaḥ. Dravye sambandhisambandhāt.

According to the opinion of Vājapyāyana, who maintains that all words mean a genus, words like "cow," etc.,[1] denote a genus which resides by intimate relation in different substances; and when this genus is apprehended, through its connection with it we apprehend the particular substance in which it resides. Words like "white," etc., denote a genus which similarly resides in qualities; through the connection with genus we apprehend the quality, and through the connection with the guality we apprehend the individual substance.

संज्ञाशब्दानामुत्पत्तिप्रभृत्या विनाशच्छैशवकौमारयौवनाद्यवस्थादिभेदेऽपि स एवायमित्यभिन्नप्रत्ययबलात्सिद्धा देवदत्तत्वादिजातिरभ्युपगन्तव्या । क्रियास्वपि जातिरालक्ष्यते । सैव धातुवाच्या । पचतीत्यादावनुवृत्तप्रत्ययस्य प्रादुर्भावात् ।

Saṁjñāśabdānāmutpattiprabhṛtyā vināśacchaiśavakaumārayauvanādyavasthādibhede'pi sa evāyamityabhinnapratyayabalātsiddhā devadattatvādijātirabhyupagantavyā. Kriyāsvapi jātirālakṣyate. Saiva dhātuvācyā. Pacatītyādāvanuvṛttapratyayasya prādurbhāvāt.

So in the case of words expressing particular names, in consequence of the recognition that "this is the same person from his first coming into existence to his final destruction, in spite of the difference produced by the various states of childhood, youth, adolescence, etc.," we must accept a fixed genus as Devadatta-hood,[2] etc. (as directly denoted by them). So, too, in words expressing "action" a genus is denoted; this is the root meaning, as in *paṭhati*, "he reads," etc., since we find here a meaning common to all who read.

1 We have here the well-known four grammatical categories, *jāti*, *guṇa*, *dravya* or *sañjnā*, and *kriyā*.

2 But *cf. Siddh. Muktāv*., p.6, line 12.

द्रव्यपदार्थवादिव्याडिनये शब्दस्य व्यक्तिरेवाभिधेयतया प्रतिभासते । जातिस्तूपलक्षणतयेति नानन्त्यादिदोषावकाशः ।

Dravyapadārthavādivyāḍinaye śabdasya vyaktirevābhidheyatayā pratibhāsate. Jātistūpalakṣaṇatayeti nānantyādidoṣāvakāśaḥ.

In the doctrine of *Vyāḍi*, who maintained that words meant individual things (and not classes or genera), the individual thing is put forward as that which is primarily denoted, while the genus is implied (as a characteristic mark); and he thus, avoids the alleged faults of "indefiniteness," and "wandering away from its proper subject."[1]

Subject, the Object and Perception are Insusceptible of Doubt

पाणिन्याचार्यस्योभयं सम्मतम् । यतो जातिपदार्थमभ्युपगम्य 'जात्याख्यायामेकस्मिन्बहुवचनमन्यतरस्याम्' (पा. सू. 1/2/58) इत्यादिव्यवहारः। द्रव्यपदार्थमङ्गीकृत्य 'सरूपाणामेकशेष एकविभक्तौ' (पा. सू. 1/2/64) इत्यादिः । व्याकरणस्य सर्वपार्षदत्वान्मतद्वयाभ्युपगमे न कश्चिद्विरोधः । तस्माददृयं सत्यं परं ब्रह्म तत्त्वं सर्वशब्दार्थ इति स्थितम् ।

Pāṇinyācāryasyobhayaṁ sammataṃ. Yato jātipadārthamabhyupagamya 'jātyākhyāyāmekasminbahuvacanamanyatarasyāṃ' (Pā. Sū. 1/2/58) ityādivyavahāraḥ. Dravyapadārthamaṅgīkṛtya 'sarūpāṇāmekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau' (Pā. Sū.1/2/64) ityādiḥ. Vyākaraṇasya sarvapārṣadatvānmatadvyābhyupagame na kaścidvirodhaḥ. Tasmādadvayaṁ satyaṁ paraṁ brahma tattvaṁ sarvaśabdārtha iti sthitaṃ.

Both views are allowed by the great teacher Pāṇini; since in i. 2, 58, he accepts the theory that a word means the genus, where he

1 Thus, we read in the *Siddhānta Muktāvali*, p.82, that the Mimāṁsā holds that a word means the genus and not the individual, since otherwise there would be *vyabhicāra* and *ānantya* (*cf.* Also Maheśacandra Nyāyaratna's note, *Kāvya-prakāśa*, p.10). If a word is held to mean only one individual, there will be the first fault, as it will "wander away" and equally express others which it should not include; if it is held to mean many individuals, it will have an endless variety of meanings and be "indefinite."

says that "when the singular is used to express the class the plural may be optionally used" (as in the sentence, "A Brāhmaṇa is to be honoured," which may equally run, "Brāhmaṇas are to be honoured"); while in i. 2, 64, he accepts the theory that a word means the individual thing, where he says, "In any individual case there is but one retained of things similar in form" (*i.e.*, the dual means Rāma, and Rāma, and the plural means Rāma, and Rāma and Rāma; but we retain only one, adding a dual or plural affix). Grammar, in fact, being adapted to all assemblies, can accept both theories without being compromised. Therefore, both theories are in a sense true;[1] but the real fact is that all words ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman.

तदुक्तम् (वा. प. 3/3/87)-

Taduktaṃ (Vā. Pa. 3/3/87)—

As it has been said—

17. तस्माच्छक्तिविभागेन सत्यः सर्वः सदात्मकः ।
एकोऽर्थः शब्दवाच्यत्वे बहुरूपः प्रकाशते ॥ इति ।

Tasmācchaktivibhāgena satyaḥ sarvaḥ sadātmakaḥ,
Eko'rthaḥ śabdavācyatve bahurūpaḥ prakāśate. iti.

"Therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words, one true universal meaning, identical with the one existent, shines out in many forms as the thing denoted."

सत्यस्वरूपमपि हरिणोक्तं सम्बन्धसमुद्देशे (72)-

Satyasvarūpamapi hariṇoktaṁ sambandhasamuddeśe (72)—

Hari also, in his chapter discussing *sambandha*, thus describes the nature of this true meaning—

18. यत्र द्रष्टा च दृश्यं च दर्शनं चाविकल्पितम् ।
तस्यैवार्थस्य सत्यत्वमाहुस्त्रय्यन्तवेदिनः ॥ इति ।

Yatra draṣṭā ca dṛśyaṁ ca darśanaṁ cāvikalpitaṃ,
Tasyaivārthasya satyatvamāhustrayyantavedinaḥ. iti.

1 This seems the meaning of the text as printed *tasmāt dvayaṃ satyaṁ*, but I Should prefer to read conjecturally *tasmād advayaṃ* "therefore non-duality is the truth."

"That meaning in which the subject, the object, and the perception (which unites them) are insusceptible of doubt,[1] that only is called the truth by those who know the end of the three Vedas."

द्रव्यसमुद्देशेऽपि (वा. प. 3/2/15)-

Dravyasamuddeśe'pi (Vā. Pa. 3/2/15)—

So too in his description of substance, he says—

19. विकारापगमे सत्यं सुवर्णं कुण्डले यथा ।
विकारापगमो यत्र तामाहुः प्रकृतिं पराम् ॥ इति ।

Vikārāpagame satyaṁ suvarṇaṁ kuṇḍale yathā,
Vikārāpagamo yatra tāmāhuḥ prakṛtiṁ parāṃ. iti.

"*That* which remains as the Real during the presence of modification, as the gold remains under the form of the earring,—that wherein change comes and goes, that they call the Supreme Nature."

Words Denote this Supreme Nature Identical yet with Varying Relation

अभ्युपगताद्वितीयत्वनिर्वाहाय वाच्यवाचकयोरविभागः प्रदर्शितः (वा. प. 3/2/16)-

Abhyupagatādvitīyatvanirvāhāya vācyavācakayoravibhāgaḥ pradarśitaḥ (Vā. Pa. 3/2/16)—

The essential unity of the word and its meaning is maintained in order to preserve inviolate the non-duality of all things which is a cardinal doctrine of our philosophy.

20. वाच्या सा सर्वशब्दानां शब्दाच्च न पृथक्तत: ।
अपृथक्त्वेऽपि सम्बन्धस्तयोर्जीवात्मनोरिव ॥ इति ।

Vācyā sā sarvaśabdānāṁ śabdācca na pṛthaktataḥ,
Apṛthaktve'pi sambandhastayorjīvātmanoriva. iti.

"This (Supreme Nature) is the thing denoted by all words, and it is identical with the word; but the relation of the two, while they are thus ultimately identical, varies as does the relation of the two souls."[2]

1 *Scil.* they can only be the absolute Brahman who alone exists.
2 *Scil.* the individual soul (*jīva*) and Brahman.

तत्तदुपाधिपरिकल्पितभेदबहुलतया व्यवहारस्याविद्यामात्रकल्पितत्वेन प्रतिनियताकारोपधीयमानरूपभेदं ब्रह्मतत्त्वं सर्वशब्दविषयः । अभेदे च पारमार्थिके संवृतिवशाद् व्यवहारदशायां स्वप्नावस्थावदुच्चावचः प्रपञ्चो विवर्तत इति कारिकार्थः ।

Tattadupādhiparikalpitabhedabahulatayā vyavahārasyāvidyāmātrakalpitatvena pratiniyatākāropadhīyamānarūpabhedaṁ brahmatattvaṁ sarvaśabdaviṣayaḥ. Abhede ca pāramārthike saṁvṛtivaśād vyavahāradaśāyāṁ svapnāvasthāvaduccāvacaḥ prapañco vivartata iti kārikārthaḥ.

The meaning of this *Kārikā* is that Brahman is the one object denoted by all words; and this one object has various differences imposed upon it according to each particular form; but the conventional variety of the differences produced by these illusory conditions is only the result of ignorance. Non-duality is the true state; but through the power of "concealment"[1] (exercised by illusion) at the time of the conventional use of words a manifold expansion takes place, just as is the case during sleep.

तदाहुर्वेदान्तवादनिपुणाः-

Tadāhurvedāntavādanipuṇāḥ—

Thus, those skilled in Vedānta lore tell us –

21. यथा स्वप्नप्रपञ्चोऽयं मयि मायाविजृम्भितः ।
एवं जाग्रत्प्रपञ्चोऽपि मयि मायाविजृम्भितः ॥ इति ।

Yathā svapnaprapañco'yaṁ mayi māyāvijṛmbhitaḥ,
Evaṁ jāgratprapañco'pi mayi māyāvijṛmbhitaḥ. iti.

"As all the extended world of dreams is only the development of illusion in me, so all this extended waking world is a development of illusion likewise."

तदित्थं कूटस्थे परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि सच्चिदानन्दरूपे प्रत्यगभिन्नेऽवगतेऽनाद्यविद्यानिवृतौ तादृग्ब्रह्मात्मनावस्थानलक्षणं निःश्रेयस सेत्स्यति ।

Taditthaṁ kūṭasthe parasminbrahmaṇi saccidānandarūpe pratyagabhinne'vagate'nādyavidyānivṛtau tādṛgbrahmātmanāvasthānalakṣaṇaṁ niḥśreyasa setsyati.

1 The *Saṁvṛti* of the text seems to correspond to the *āvaraṇa* so frequent in Vedānta books.

When the unchangeable Supreme Brahman is thus known as the existent joy-thought and identical with the individual soul, and when primeval ignorance is abolished, final bliss is accomplished, which is best defined as the abiding in identity with this Brahman, according to the text.

Exposition of Words means to Attain Final Bliss

'शब्दब्रह्मणि निष्णातः परं ब्रह्माधिगच्छति' (महाभारत, शा. प. अ. 270) इत्यभियुक्तोक्तेः । तथा च शब्दानुशासनशास्त्रस्य निःश्रेयससाधनत्वं सिद्धम् ।

'Śabdabrahmaṇi niṣṇātaḥ paraṁ brahmādhigacchti' (Mahābhārata, Śā. Pa. A. 270) ityabhiyuktokteḥ. Tathā ca śabdānuśāsanaśāstrasya niḥśreyasasādhanatvaṁ siddhaṃ.

"He who is well versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the Supreme Brahman."[1] And thus, we establish the fact that the "exposition of words" is the means to final bliss.

तदुक्तम्-

Taduktaṃ—

Thus, it has been said –

22. तद् द्वारमपवर्गस्य वाङ्मलानां चिकित्सितम् ।
पवित्रं सर्वविद्यानामधिविद्यं प्रचक्षते ॥
(वाक्यपदीयम् 1/14) इति ।

Tad dvāramapavargasya vāṅmalānāṁ cikitsitaṃ,
Pavitraṁ sarvavidyānāmadhividyaṁ pracakṣate.
(Vākyapadīyaṃ 1/14) iti.

"They call it the door of emancipation, the medicine of the diseases of speech, the purifier of all sciences, the science of sciences."[2]

तथा-

Tathā—

And so again –

23. इदमाद्यं पदस्थानं सिद्धिसोपानपर्वणाम् ।
इयं सा मोक्षमाणानामजिह्मा राजपद्धतिः ॥ (वाक्य. 1/16) इति ।

1 This passage is quoted in the *Maitrī Upaniṣad*, vi. 22.

2 *Adhividyaṃ* occurs in *Taitt. Upaniṣad*, i.3, 1. where it is explained by *śaṅkara* as *vidyāsv adhi yad darśanaṃ tad adhividyaṁ.*

Idamādyaṁ padasthānaṁ siddhisopānaparvaṇām,
Iyaṁ sā mokṣamāṇānāmajihmā rājapaddhatiḥ.

(Vākya. 1/16) iti.

"This is the first foot-round of the stages of the ladder of final bliss, this the straight royal road of the travellers to emancipation."

तस्माद् व्याकरणशास्त्रं परमपुरुषार्थसाधनतयाऽध्येतव्यमिति सिद्धम् ।

Tasmād vyākaraṇaśāstraṁ paramapuruṣārthasādhana-tayā'dhyetavyamiti siddham.

Therefore, our final conclusion is that the Śāstra of grammar should be studied as being the means for attaining the chief end of man.

E.B.C.

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे पाणिनिदर्शनम् ।

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<u>*CHAPTER XIV*</u>

THE SĀṄKHYA-DARŚANA

Contents of Sāṅkhya Darśana

अथ सांख्यैराख्याते परिणामवादे परिपन्थिनि जागरूके कथंकारं विवतंवादः आदरणीयो भवेत् । एष हि तेषामाघोषः । संक्षेपेण हि सांख्यशास्त्रे चतस्रो विधाः सम्भाव्यन्ते । कश्चिदर्थः प्रकृतिरेव, कश्चिद्विकृतिप्रकृतिश्च, कश्चिद्विकृतिरेव, कश्चिदनुभय इति ।

Atha saṅkhyairākhyāte pariṇāmavāde paripanthini jāgarūke kathaṅkāraṁ vivataṁvādaḥ ādaraṇīyo bhavet. Eṣa hi teṣāmāghoṣaḥ. Saṅkṣepeṇa hi sāṁkhyaśāstre catasro vidhāḥ sambhāvyante. Kaścidarthaḥ prakṛtireva, kaścidvikṛtiprakṛtiśca, kascidvikṛtireva, kaścidanubhaya iti.

"But how can we accept the doctrine of illusory emanation (thus held by the grammarians, following the guidance of the *pūrva* and *uttara* Mīmāṁsā schools), when the system of development propounded by the Sāṅkhyas is still alive to oppose it?" Such is their loud vaunt. Now, the Śāstra of this school may be concisely said to maintain four several kinds of existences, viz., that which is evolvent[1] only, that which is evolute only, that which is both evolute and evolvent, and that which is neither.

Nature Alias Root-Evolvent

तत्र केवला प्रकृतिः प्रधानपदेन वेदनीया मूलप्रकृतिः । नासावन्यत्य कस्यचिद् विकृतिः । प्रकरोतीति प्रकृतिरिति व्युत्पत्त्या सत्त्वरजस्तमोगुणानां साम्यावस्थाया अभिधानात् । तदुक्तं–'मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिः' (सा. का. 3) इति । मूलं चासौ प्रकृतिश्च मूलप्रकृतिः ।

Tatra kevalā prakṛtiḥ pradhānapadena vedanīyā mūlaprakṛtiḥ. Nāsāvanyatya kasyacid vikṛtiḥ. Prakarotīti prakṛtiriti vyutpattyā sattvarajastamoguṇānāṁ sāmyāvasthāyā abhidhā-nāt. Taduktam—'mūlaprakṛtiravikṛtiḥ' (Sā. Kā. 3) iti. Mūlaṁ cāsau prakṛtiśca mūlaprakṛtiḥ.

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1 I borrow this term from Dr. Hall.

(a) Of these the first is that which is only evolvent, called the root-evolvent or the primary; it is not itself the evolute of anything else. It evolves, hence it is called the evolvent (*prakṛti*) since it denotes in itself the equilibrium of the three qualities, goodness, activity, and darkness.

This is expressed (in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*), "the root-evolvent is no evolute." It is called the root-evolvent, as being both root and evolvent; it is the root of all the various effects, as the so-called "great one," etc., but of it, as the primary, there is no root, as otherwise we should have a *regressus ad infinitum*.

महदादेः काकर्यलापस्यासौ मूलं न त्वस्य प्रधानस्य मूलान्तरमस्ति । अनवस्थापातात् । न च बीजाङ्कुरवदनवस्थादोषो न भवतीति वाच्यम् । प्रमाणाभावादिति भावः ।

Mahadādeḥ kākaryalāpasyāsau mūlaṁ na tvasya pradhānasya mūlāntaramasti. Anavasthāpātāt. Na ca bījāṅkuravadanavasthādoṣo na bhavatīti vācyaṃ. Pramāṇābhāvāditi bhāvaḥ.

Nor can you reply that such a *regressus ad infinitum* is no objection, if, like the continued series of seed and shoot, it can be proved by the evidence of our senses,[1]—because here, there is no evidence to establish the hypothesis.

विकृतयश्च प्रकृतयश्च महदहंकारतन्मात्राणि । तदप्युक्तं 'महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त' (सा. का. 3) इति । अस्यार्थः–प्रकृतयश्च ता विकृतयश्चेति प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त महदादीनि तत्त्वानि । तत्रान्तः करणादिपदवेदनीयं महत्तत्त्वमहंकारस्य प्रकृतिः । मूलप्रकृतेस्तु विकृतिः ।

Vikṛtayaśca prakṛtayaśca mahadahaṅkāratanmātrāṇi. Tadapyuktaṁ 'mahadādyāḥ prakṛtivikṛtayaḥ sapta' (Sā. Kā. 3) iti. Asyārthaḥ—Prakṛtayaśca tā vikṛtayaśceti prakṛtivikṛtayaḥ sapta mahadādīni tattvāni. Tatrāntaḥ karaṇādipadavedanīyaṁ mahattattvamahaṅkārasya prakṛtiḥ. Mūlaprakṛtestu vikṛtiḥ.

Elements Containing Evolutes and Evolvents

एवमहंकारतत्त्वमभिमानापरनामधेयं महतो विकृतिः । प्रकृतिश्च तदेवाहकारतत्त्वं तामसं सत्पञ्चतन्मात्राणां सूक्ष्माभिधानाम् । तदेव सात्त्विकं सत्प्रकृतिरेकादशेन्द्रियाणां बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनात्वगाख्यानां

1 Compare *Kusumāñjali*, i.4.

कर्मेन्द्रियाणां वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाख्यानामुभयात्मकस्य मनसश्च । रजसस्तूभयत्र क्रियोत्पादनद्वारेण कारणत्वमस्तीति न वैयर्थ्यम् ।

Evamahaṅkāratattvamabhimānāparanāmadheyaṁ mahato vikṛtiḥ. Prakṛtiśca tadevāhakāratattvaṁ tāmasaṁ satpañcatanmātrāṇāṁ sūkṣābhidhānāṃ. Tadeva sāttvikaṃ satprakṛtirekādaśendriyāṇāṁ buddhīndriyāṇāṁ cakṣuḥśrotraghrāṇarasanātvagākhyānāṁ karmendriyāṇāṁ vākpāṇipādapāyūpasthākhyānāmubhayātmakasya manasaśca. Rajasastūbhayatra kriyotpādanadvārena kāraṇatvamastīti na vaiyarthyaṃ.

(b) The "evolutes and evolvents" are the great one, egoism, and the subtile elements,—thus the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (No. 3), "the seven, the great one, etc., are evolute-evolvents." The seven are the seven principles, called the great one, etc. Among these, the great principle, called also the intellect,[1] etc., is itself the evolute of nature and the evolvent of egoism; in the same manner the principle egoism, called also "self-consciousness" (*abhimāna*), is the evolute of the great one, intellect; but this same principle, as affected by the quality of darkness is the evolvent of the five rudiments called subtile elements; and, as affected by the quality of goodness, it is the evolvent of the eleven organs, viz., the five organs of perception, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin; the five organs of action, the voice, hands, feet, anus, and generative organ; and the mind, partaking of the character of both; nor can you object that in our arrangement, the third quality, activity, is idle, as it acts as a cause by producing action in the others.

तदुक्तमीश्वरकृष्णेन–

Taduktamīśvarakṛṣṇena—

This has been thus declared by Íśvara Kṛṣṇa in his *Kārikās*[2] (24-27)

1. अभिमानोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ।
एकादशकरणगणस्तन्मात्रापञ्चकं चैव ॥

1 One great defect in the *sāṅkhya* nomenclature is the ambiguity between the terms for intellect (*buddhi*) and those for mind (*manas*). Mādhava here applies to the former the term *antaḥkaraṇa* or "internal organ," the proper term for the latter. I have ventured to alter it in the translation.

2 It is singular that this is Mādhava's principal Sāṅkhya authority, and not the Sāṅkhya Sūtras.

Abhimāno'haṅkārastasmād dvividhaḥ pravartate sargaḥ,
Ekādaśakaraṇagaṇastanmātrāpañcakaṁ caiva.

"Self-consciousness is egoism. Thence proceeds a two fold creation, the elevenfold set and the five elemental rudiments."

2. सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहंकारात् ।
भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसस्तैजसादुभयम् ॥

Sāttvika ekādaśakaḥ pravartate vaikṛtādahaṅkārāt,
Bhūtādestanmātraḥ sa tāmasastaijasādubhayam.

From modified[1] egoism originates the class of eleven imbued with goodness; from egoism as the source of the elements originate the rudimentary elements, and these are affected by darkness; but it is only from egoism as affected by activity that the one and the other rise.

3. बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्र-घ्राणरसनत्वागाख्यानि ।
वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाः कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥

Buddhīndriyāṇi cakṣuḥśrotra-ghrāṇarasanatvāgākhyāni,
Vākpāṇipādapāyūpasthāḥ karmendriyāṇyāhuḥ.

The intellectual organs are the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin; those of action are the voice, feet, hands, anus, and organ of generation.

4. उभयात्मकमत्र मनः संकल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात् ॥
(सां. का. 24-27) इति ।

Ubhayātmakamatra manaḥ saṅkalpakamindriyaṁ ca sādharmyāt. (*Sāṁ. Kā.* 24-27) *iti.*

In this set is mind, which has the character of each; it determines, and it is an organ (like the other ten) from having a common property with them."[2]

विवृतं च तत्त्वकौमुद्यामाचार्यवाचस्पतिभिः ।

Vivṛtaṁ ca tattvakaumudyāmācāryavācaspatibhiḥ.

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1 *Vaikṛta* is here a technical term meaning that goodness predominates over darkness and activity. On this *Kārikā*, comp. Dr. Hall's preface to the *Sāṅkhya-sāra*, pp. 30-35.

2 As produced, like them, from modified egoism, the reading *saṅkalpavikalpātmakaṁ* must be corrected by the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*.

All this has been explained at length by the teacher Vācaspati Miśra in the *Sāṅkhyatattva-kaumudī*.

Evolute Only Exists as Material Cause

केवला विकृतिस्तु वियदादीनि पञ्च महाभूतानि, एकादशेन्द्रियाणि च । तदुक्तं–'षोडशकस्तु विकारः' (सां. का. 3) इति । षोडशसंख्यावच्छिन्नो गणः षोडशको विकार एव, न प्रकृतिरित्यर्थः । यद्यपि पृथिव्यादयो गोघटादीनां प्रकृतिस्तथापि न ते पृथिव्यादिभ्यस्तत्त्वान्तरमिति न प्रकृतिः । तत्त्वान्तरोपादानत्वं चेह प्रकृतित्वमभिमतम् । गोघटादीनां स्थूलत्वेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वयोः समानत्वेन तत्त्वान्तरत्वाभावः ।

Kevalā vikṛtistu viyadādīni pañca mahābhūtāni, ekādaśendriyāṇi ca. Taduktam—'ṣoḍaśakastu vikāraḥ' (Sāṁ. Kā. 3) iti. Ṣoḍaśasaṅkhyāvacchinno gaṇaḥ ṣoḍaśako vikāra eva, na prakṛtirityarthaḥ. Yadyapi pṛthivyādayo goghaṭādīnāṁ prakṛtistathāpi na te pṛthivyādibhyastattvāntaramiti na prakṛtiḥ. Tattvāntaropādānatvaṁ ceha prakṛtitvamabhimatam. Goghaṭādīnāṁ sthūlatvendriyagrāhyatvayoḥ samānatvena tattvāntaratvābhāvaḥ.

(c) The "evolute only" means the five gross elements, ether, etc., and the eleven organs, as said in the *Kārikā*, "The evolute consists of sixteen;" that is, the set of sixteen is evolute only, and not evolvent. Although it may be said that earth, etc., are the evolvents of such productions as cows, jars, etc., yet these are not a different "principle" (*tattva*) from earth, etc., and therefore earth, etc., are not what we term "evolvents;" as the accepted idea of an evolvent is that which is the material cause of a separate principle; and in cows, jars, etc., there is the absence of being any such first principle, in consequence of their being all alike gross (i.e., possessed of dimensions) and perceptible to the senses.

तत्र शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धतन्मात्रेभ्यः पूर्वपूर्वसूक्ष्मभूतसहितेभ्यः पञ्चमहाभूतानि वियदादीनि क्रमेणैकद्वित्रिचतुष्पञ्चगुणानि जायन्ते । इन्द्रियसृष्टिस्तु प्रागेवोक्त । तदुक्तम्–

Tatra śabdasparśarūparasagandhatanmātrebhyaḥ pūrvapūrva-sūkṣamabhūtasahitebhyaḥ pañcamahābhūtāni viyadādīni krameṇaikadvitricatuṣpañcaguṇāni jāyante. Indriyasṛṣṭistu prāgevokta. Taduktam—

The five gross elements, either, etc., are respectively produced

from sound, touch, form, taste, and smell, each subtile element being accompanied by all those which precede it, and thus the gross elements will have respectively one, two, three, four, and five qualities.[1] The creation of the organs has been previously described. This is thus propounded in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (No. 22)—

5. प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहंकारस्तस्माद्गणश्च षोडशकः ।
तस्मादपि षोडशकात्पञ्चभ्यः पञ्चभूतानि: ।। (सां. का. 22) इति ।

Prakṛtermahāṁstato'haṅkārastasmādgaṇaśca ṣoḍaśakaḥ,
Tasmādapi ṣoḍaśakātpañcabhyaḥ pañcabhūtāni.

(Sāṅ. Kā. 22) iti.

"From nature springs the great one, from this egoism, from this the set of sixteen, and from five among the sixteen proceed the five gross elements."

The Sole is Neither Evolvent and Nor Evolute

अनुभयात्मकः पुरुषः । तदुक्तं–'न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः' (सां. का. 3) इति । पुरुषस्तु कूटस्थनित्योऽपरिणामी न कस्यचित्प्रकृतिर्नापि विकृतिः कस्यचिदित्यर्थः ।

Anubhayātmakaḥ puruṣaḥ. Taduktam—'na prakṛtirna vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ' (Sāṅ. Kā. 3) iti. Puruṣastu kūṭasthanityo'pariṇāmī na kasyacitprakṛtirnāpi vikṛtiḥ kasyacidityarthaḥ.

(d) The soul is neither,—as is said in the *Kārikā*, "The soul is neither evolvent nor evolute." That is, the soul, being absolute, eternal, and subject to no development, is itself neither the evoluvent nor the evolute of aught beside.

Perception, Inference and Testimony are Three Proofs

एतत्पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वसाधकत्वेन प्रमाणत्रयमभिमतम् । तदप्युक्तम्–

Etatpañcaviṁśatitattvasādhakatvena pramāṇatrayamabhimatam. Tadapyuktam—

Three kinds of proof are accepted as establishing these twenty-five principles; and thus the *Kārikā* (No. 4).

1 *Cf.* Colebrook Essays, vol.i, p. 256. The *tanmātrās* will reproduce themselves as the respective qualities of the gross elements.

6. दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।
त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टं प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ।। (सां. का. 4) इति ।

Dṛṣṭamanumānamāptavacanaṁ ca sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt,
Trividhaṁ pramāṇamiṣṭaṁ prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇāddhi.

(Sāṅ. Kā. 4) iti.

"Perception, inference, and the testimony of worthy persons are acknowledged to be the threefold proof, for they comprise every mode of demonstration. It is from proof that there results belief of that which is to be proven."

Divergence of Views on Cause and Effect Relation

इह कार्यकारणभावे चतुर्धा विप्रतिपत्तिः प्रसरति । असतः सज्जायत इति सौगताः संगिरन्ते । नैयायिकादयः सतोऽसज्जायत इति । वेदान्तिनः सतो विवर्तः कार्यजातं न वस्तुसदिति । सांख्याः पुनः सतः सज्जायत इति ।

Iha kāryakāraṇabhāve caturdhā vipratipattiḥ prasarati. Asataḥ sajjāyata iti saugatāḥ saṅgirante. Naiyāyikādayaḥ sato'sajjāyata iti. Vedāntinaḥ sato vivartaḥ kāryajātaṁ na vastusaditi. Sāṅkhyāḥ punaḥ sataḥ sajjāyata iti.

Here a fourfold discussion arises as to the true nature of cause and effect. The *Saugatās*[1] maintain that the existent is produced from the non-existent; the Naiyāyikas, etc., that the (as yet) non-existent is produced from the existent; the Vedāntins, that all effects are an illusory emanation from the existent and not themselves really existent; while the Sāṅkhyas hold that the existent is produced from the existent.

Rebuttal of Cause and Effect Doctrine

तत्रासतः सज्जायत इति न प्रामाणिकः पक्षः । असतो निरुपाख्यस्य शशविषाणवत्कारणत्वानुपपत्तेः । तुच्छातुच्छयोस्तादात्म्यानुपपत्तिश्च ।

Tatrāsataḥ sajjāyata iti na prāmāṇikaḥ pakṣaḥ. Asato nirupākhyasya śaśaviṣāṇavatkāraṇatvānupapatteḥ. Tucchātucchayostādātmyānupapattiśca.

(a) Now, the first opinion is clearly untenable, since that which is itself non-existent and unsubstantial can never be a cause

1 A name of the Buddhists.

any more than the hare's horn; and, again, the real and the unreal can never be identical.

नापि सतोऽसज्जायते । कारकव्यापारात्प्रागसतः शशविषाणवत्सत्तासम्बन्ध-लक्षणोत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । न हि नीलं निपुणतमेनापि पीतं कर्तुं पार्यते । ननु सत्त्वासत्त्वे घटस्य धर्माविति चेत्–तदचारु । असति धर्मिणि तद्धर्म इति व्यपदेशानुपपत्त्या धर्मिणः सत्त्वापत्तेः ।

Nāpi sato'sajjāyate. Kārakavyāpārātprāgasataḥ śaśaviṣāṇavatsattāsambandhalakṣaṇotpattyanupapatteḥ. Na hi nīlaṁ nipuṇatamenāpi pītaṁ kartuṁ pāryate. Nanu sattvāsattve ghaṭasya dharmāviti cet—tadacāru. Asati dharmiṇi taddharma iti vyapadeśānupapattyā dharmiṇaḥ sattvāpatteḥ.

(b) Nor can the non-existent be produced from the existent; since it is impossible that that which, previous to the operation of the originating cause, was as non-existent as a hare's horn should ever be produced, *i.e.*, become connected with existence; for not even the cleverest man living can make blue yellow.[1] If you say, "But are not existence and non-existence attributes of the same jar ?" This is incorrect, since we cannot use such an expression "as its quality" in regard to a non-existent subject, for it would certainly imply that the subject itself did exist.

Effect is Existent Prior to Cause

तस्मात्कारकव्यापारात्प्रागपि कार्यं सदेव । सतश्चाभिव्यक्तिरुपपद्यते । यथा पीडनेन तिलेषु तैलस्य, दोहनेन सौरभेयीषु पयसः । असतः कारणे किमपि निदर्शनं न दृश्यते ।

Tasmātkārakavyāpārātprāgapi kāryaṁ sadeva. Sataścābhivyaktirupapadyate. Yathā pīḍanena tileṣu tailasya, dohanena saurabheyīsu payasaḥ. Asataḥ kāraṇe kimapi nidarśanaṁ na dṛśyate.

Hence, we conclude that the effect is existent even previously to the operation of the cause, which only produces the manifestation of this already existent thing, just like the manifestation of the oil in sesame seed by pressing, or of the milk in cows by milking.

1 *I.e.*, the nature of a thing (*svabhāva*) cannot be altered—a man cannot be made a cow, nor a woman a man.

Again, there is no example whatever to prove the production of a thing previously non-existent.

किं च कार्येण कारणं सम्बद्धं तज्जनकमसम्बद्धं वा । प्रथमे कार्यस्य सत्त्वमायातम् । सतोरेव सम्बन्ध इति नियमात् । चरमे सर्वं कार्यजातं सर्वस्माज्जायेत । असम्बद्धत्वाविशेषात् ।

Kiṁ ca kāryeṇa kāraṇaṁ sambaddhaṁ tajjanakamasambaddhaṁ vā. Prathame kāryasya sattvamāyātaṃ. Satoreva sambandha iti niyamāt. Carame sarvaṁ kāryajātaṁ sarvasmājjāyeta. Asambaddhatvāviśeṣāt.

Moreover, the cause must produce its effect as being either connected with it or not connected; in the former alternative, the effect's existence is settled by the rule that connection can only be between two existent things; in the latter, any and every effect might arise from any and every cause, as there is nothing to determine the action of an unconnected thing.

तदाख्यायि सांख्याचार्यैः–

Tadākhyāyi sāṅkhyācāryaiḥ—

This has been thus put by the *Sāṅkhya* teacher :—

7. असत्त्वान्नास्ति सम्बन्धः कारणैः सत्त्वसङ्गिभिः ।
असम्बद्धस्य चोत्पत्तिमिच्छतो न व्यवस्थितिः ॥ इति ।

Asattvānnāsti sambandhaḥ kāranaiḥ sattvasaṅgibhiḥ,
Asambaddhasya cotpattimicchato na vyavasthitiḥ. iti.

"From the supposed non-existence of the effect, it can have no connection with causes which always accompany existence; and to him who holds the production of a non-connected thing, there arises an utter want of determinateness."

अथैवमुच्येत–'असम्बद्धमपि तत्तदेव जनयति यत्र यच्छक्तम् । शक्तिश्च कार्यदर्शनोन्नेयेति ।' तन्न सङ्गच्छते । तिलेषु तैलजननशक्तिरित्यत्र तैलस्यासत्त्वे सम्बद्धत्वासम्बद्धत्वविकल्पेन तच्छक्तिरिति निरूपणायोगात् ।

Athaivamucyeta—'asambaddhamapi tattadeva janayati yatra yacchaktaṃ. Śaktiśca kāryadarśanonneyeti.'. Tanna saṅgacchate. Tileṣu tailajananaśaktirityatra tailasyāsattve sambaddhatvāsambaddhatvavikalpena tacchaktiriti nirūpaṇāyogāt.

If you rejoin that "the cause, though not connected with its effect, can yet produce it, where it has a capacity of so doing, and this ca-

pacity of producing is to be inferred from seeing the effect actually produced," still this cannot be allowed, since in such a case as "there is a capacity for producing oil in sesame seeds," you cannot determine, while the oil is non-existent, that there is this capacity in the sesame seeds, whichever alternative you may accept as to their being connected or not with the oil (since our before-mentioned dilemma will equally apply here).

कार्यकारणयोरभेदाच्च कारणात्पृथक्कार्यस्य सत्त्वं न भवति । पटस्तन्तुभ्यो न भिद्यते । तद्धर्मत्वात् । न यदेवं, न तदेवं यथा गोरश्वः । तद्धर्मश्च पटः । तस्मान्नार्थान्तरम् । तर्हि प्रत्येकं त एव प्रावरणकार्यं कुर्युरिति चेन्न । संस्थानभेदेनाविर्भूतपटभावानां प्रावरणार्थक्रियाकारित्वोपपत्तेः । यथा हि कूर्मस्याङ्गानि कूर्मशरीरे निविशमानानि तिरोभवन्ति, निःसरन्ति चाविर्भवन्ति; एवं कारणस्य तन्त्वादेः पटादयो विशेषा निःसरन्त आविर्भवन्त उत्पद्यन्त इत्युच्यन्ते । निविशमानास्तिरोभवन्तो विनश्यन्तीत्युच्यन्ते ।

Kāryakāraṇayorabhedācca kāraṇātpṛthakkāryasya sattvaṁ na bhavati. Paṭastantubhyo na bhidyate. Taddharmatvāt. Na yadevaṁ, na tadevaṁ yathā gorasvaḥ. Taddharmaśca paṭaḥ. Tasmānnārthāntaram. Tarhi pratyekaṁ ta eva prāvaraṇa-kāryaṁ kuryuriti cenna. Saṁsthānabhedenāvirbhūtapaṭabhā-vānāṁ prāvaraṇārthakriyākāritvopapatteḥ. Yathā hi kūrmasyāṅgāni kūrmaśarīre niviśamānāni tirobhavanti, niḥsaranti cāvirbhavanti, evaṁ kāraṇasya tantvādeḥ paṭādayo viṣeṣā niḥsaranta āvirbhavanta utpadyanta ityucyante. Niviśamānāstirobhavanto vinaśyantītyucyante.

From our tenet that the cause and effect are identical, it follows that the effect does not exist distinct from the cause; thus the cloth is not something distinct from the threads, as it abides in the latter (as its material cause); but where this identity is not found, there we do not find the relation of cause and effect; thus a horse and a cow are distinct from each other (for one is not produced from the other, and therefore, their qualities are not the same); but the cloth is an acknowledged effect, and therefore, not anything different from its cause.[1] If you object that, if this were true, the separate threads ought to fulfil the office of clothing, we reply, that the office of clothing is fulfilled by the threads manifesting the nature of cloth when they are placed in a particular arrangement. As the limbs of a tortoise when they retire within its shell are concealed, and, when they come forth, are revealed, so the particular effects, as cloth, etc., of a cause, as threads, etc., when they come forth and are revealed, are said to be produced; and when they retire and are concealed, they are said to be destroyed.

1 I take *arthāntaram* here as simply (*bhinnam cf.* Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati's note, *Tattva Kaumudī*, p. 47).

न पुनरसतामुत्पत्तिः सतां वा विनाशः । यथोक्तं भगवद्गीतायाम्—

Na punarasatāmutpattiḥ satāṁ vā vināśaḥ. Yathoktaṁ bhagavadgītāyām—

नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः । (गीता 2/16) इति ।

Nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ. (Gītā 2/16) iti.

But there is no such thing as the production of the non-existent or the destruction of the existent. As has been said in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (ii. 16)—

"There is no existence for the non-existent, nor non-existence for the existent."

ततश्च कार्यानुमानात्तत्प्रधानसिद्धिः । तदुक्तम्—

Tataśca kāryānumānāttatpradhānasiddhiḥ. Taduktam—

And, in fact, it is by inference from its effects that we establish the existence of the great evolvent, Nature (*prakṛti*). This has been said (in the *Kārikā*, No. 9)—

8. असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात्सर्वसम्भवाभावात् ।
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्कारणभावाच्च सत्कार्यम् ॥ (सां. का. 9) इति ।

Asadakaraṇādupādānagrahaṇātsarvasambhavābhāvāt,
Śaktasya śakyakaraṇātkāraṇabhāvācca satkāryam.
(Sā. Kā. 9) iti.

"Effect exists, for what exists not can by no operation of cause be brought into existence; materials, too, are selected which are fit for the purpose; everything is not by every means possible; what is capable does that to which it is competent; and like is produced from like."[1]

1 Colebrooke's translation.

Rebuttal of Otherwise View

नापिसतो ब्रह्मतत्त्वस्य विवर्तः प्रपञ्चः । बाधानुपलम्भात् । अधिष्ठानारोप्ययोश्चिज्जडयोः कलधौतशुक्त्यादिवत्सारूप्याभावेनारोपासंभवाच्च ।

Nāpisato brahmatattvasya vivartaḥ prapañcaḥ. Bādhānupalambhāt. Adhiṣṭhānāropyayościjjaḍayoḥ kaladhautasuktyādivatsārūpyābhāvenāropāsaṁbhavācca.

Nor can we say (with the Vedāntin) that the world is an illusory emanation from the one existent Brahman, because we have no contradictory evidence to preclude by its superior validity the *prima facie* belief that the external world is real (as we have in the case of mistaking a rope for a snake, where a closer inspection will discover the error); and again, where the subject and the attributed nature are so dissimilar as the pure intelligent Brahman and the unintelligent creation, we can no more allow the supposed attribution to be possible than in the case of gold and silver (which no one mistakes for each other).

External World have a Material Cause

ततश्च सुखदुःखमोहात्मकस्य प्रपञ्चस्य तथाविधकारणमवधारणीयम् । तथा च प्रयोगः–विमतं भावजातं सुखदुःखमोहात्मककारणकं तदन्वितत्वात् । यद्येनान्वीयते तत्तत्कारणकं यथा रुचकादिकं सुवर्णान्वितं सुवर्णकारणकम् । तथा चेदं, तस्मात्तथेति ।

Tataśca sukhaduḥkhamohātmakasya prapañcasya tathāvidhakāraṇamavadhāraṇīyam. Tathā ca prayogaḥ—vimataṁ bhāvajātaṁ sukhaduḥkhamohātmakakāraṇakaṁ tadanvitatvāt. Yadyenānvīyate tattatkāraṇakaṁ yathā rucakādikaṁ suvarṇānvitaṁ suvarṇakāraṇakam. Tathā cedaṁ, tasmāttatheti.

Hence, we conclude that an effect which is composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, must imply a cause similarly composed; and our argument is as follows :—The subject of the argument, viz., the external world, must have a material cause composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, because it is itself endued therewith; whatever is endued with certain attributes must have a cause endued with the same,—thus, a ring has gold for its material cause, because it has the attributes of gold; our subject is a similar case, therefore we may draw a similar conclusion.

तत्र जगत्कारणे येयं सुखात्मकता तत्सत्त्वं, या दुःखात्मकता तद्रजः, या च मोहात्मकता तत्तम इति त्रिगुणात्मककारणसिद्धिः । तथा हि–प्रत्येकं भावास्त्रैगुण्यवन्तोऽनुभूयन्ते । यथा मैत्रदारेषु सत्यवत्यां मैत्रस्य सुखमाविरस्ति । तं प्रति सत्त्वगुणप्रादुर्भावात् । तत्सपत्नीनां दुःखम् । ताः प्रति रजोगुणप्रादुर्भावात् । तामलभमानस्य चैत्रस्य मोहो भवति । तं प्रति तमोगुणसमुद्भवात् ।

Tatra jagatkāraṇe yeyaṁ sukhātmakatā tatsattvaṁ, yā duḥkhātmakatā tadrajaḥ, yā ca mohātmakatā tattama iti triguṇātmakakāraṇasiddhiḥ. Tathā hi—pratyekaṁ bhāvāstraiguṇyavanto'nubhūyante. Yathā maitradāreṣu satyavatyāṁ maitrasya sukhamāvirasti. Taṁ prati sattvaguṇaprādurbhāvāt. Tatsapatnīnāṁ duḥkham. Tāḥ prati rajoguṇaprādurbhāvāt. Tāmalabhamānasya caitrasya moho bhavati. Taṁ prati tamoguṇasamudbhavāt.

What we call "being composed of happiness" in the external world is the quality of goodness; the "being composed of misery" is the quality of activity;[1] the "being composed of stupidity" is the quality of darkness; hence, we establish our cause composed of the three qualities (*i.e.*, *prakṛti*, Nature). And we see that individual objects are found by experience to have these three qualities; thus Maitra's happiness is found in his wife Satyavatī, because the quality of "goodness" in her is manifested towards him; but she is the misery of her fellow-wives, because the quality of "activity" is manifested towards them; while she causes indifference to Caitra who does not possess her, because towards him the quality of "darkness" is manifested.

एवमन्यदपि घटादिकं लभ्यमानं सुखं करोति । परैरपह्रियमाणं दुःखाकरोति । उदासीनस्योपेक्षाविषयत्वेनोपतिष्ठते । उपेक्षाविषयत्वं नाम मोहः । मुह वैचित्ये इत्यस्माद्धातोर्मोहशब्दनिष्पत्तेः । उपेक्षणीयेषु चित्तवृत्त्यनुदयात् । तस्मात्सर्वभावजातं सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं त्रिगुणप्रधानकारणकमवगम्यते ।

Evamanyadapi ghaṭādikaṁ labhyamānaṁ sukhaṁ karoti. Paraiṛapahriyamāṇaṁ duḥkhākaroti. Udāsīnasyopekṣāviṣayatvenopatiṣṭhate. Upekṣāviṣayatvaṁ nāma mohaḥ. Muha vaicitye ityasmāddhātormohaśabdaniṣpatteḥ. Upekṣaṇīyeṣu cittavṛttyanudayāt. Tasmātsarvabhāvajātaṁ sukhaduḥkhamohātmakaṁ triguṇapradhānakāraṇakamavagamyate.

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1 Or "passion" *rajas*.

So, too, in other cases also; thus a jar, when obtained, causes us pleasure; when seized by others it causes us pain; but it is viewed with indifference by one who has no interest in it. Now this being regarded with no interest is what we mean by "stupidity," since the word *moha* is derived from the root muh, "to be confused," since no direct action of the mind arises towards those objects to which it is indifferent. Therefore, we hold that all things, being composed of pleasure, pain, and stupidity, must have as their cause Nature, which consists of the three qualities.

तथा च श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषदि श्रूयते–

Tathā ca śvetāśvataropaniṣadi śrūyate—

And so it is declared in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (iv.5)

9. अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः ।
अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥
(श्वे. उप. 4/5) इति ।

Ajāmekāṁ lohitaśuklakṛṣṇāṁ
bahvīḥ prajāḥ sṛjamānāṁ sarūpāḥ,
Ajo hyeko juṣamāṇo'nuśete
jahātyenāṁ bhuktabhogāmajo'nyaḥ. (*Śve. 4/5) iti.*

"The one unborn, for his enjoyment, approaches the one unborn (Nature) which is red, white, and black, and produces a manifold and similar offspring; the other unborn abandons her when once she has been enjoyed."

अत्र लोहितशुक्लकृष्णशब्दाः रञ्जकत्वप्रकाशकत्वावरकत्वसाधर्म्यात् रजःसत्वतमोगुणत्रयप्रतिपादनपराः ।

Atra lohitaśuklakṛṣṇaśabdāḥ rañjakatvaprakāśakatvāvarakatvasādharmyāt rajaḥsatvatamoguṇatrayapratipādanaparāḥ.

Here the words "red", "white," and "black,"express the qualities "activity,""goodness," and "darkness," from their severally possessing the same attributes of colouring, manifesting, and concealing.

Assumption of Supreme Lord

नन्वचेतनं प्रधानं चेतनानुधिष्ठितं महदादिकार्ये न व्याप्रियते । अतः केनचिच्चेतनेनाधिष्ठात्रा भवितव्यम् । तथा च सर्वार्थदर्शी परमेश्वरः स्वीकर्तव्यः

स्यादिति चेत्–तदसंगतम् । अचेतनस्यापि प्रधानस्य प्रयोजनवशेन प्रवृत्त्युपपत्तेः ।

Nanvacetanaṁ pradhānaṁ cetanānudhiṣṭhitaṁ mahadādikārye na vyāpriyate. Ataḥ kenaciccetanenādhiṣṭhātrā bhavitavyam. Tathā ca sarvārthadarśī parameśvaraḥ svīkartavyaḥ syāditi cet—tadasaṅgatam. Acetanasyāpi pradhānasya prayojanava- śena pravṛttyupapatteḥ.

Here, however, it may be objected, "But will not your unintelligent Nature, without the superintendence of something intelligent, fail to produce these effects, intellect, etc.? Therefore, there must be some intelligent superintendent; and hence, we must assume an all-seeing, supreme Lord."

दृष्टं चाचेतनं चेतनानधिष्ठितं पुरुषार्थाय प्रवर्तमानं यथावत्सविवृद्ध्यर्थमचेतनं क्षीरं प्रवर्तते, यथा च जलमचेतनं लोकोपकाराय प्रवर्तते, तथा प्रकृतिरचेतनापि पुरुषविमोक्षाय प्रवर्त्स्यति । तदुक्तम्–

Dṛṣṭaṁ cācetanaṁ cetanānadhiṣṭhitaṁ puruśārthāya pravartamānaṁ yathāvatsavivṛddhyyarthamacetanaṁ kṣīraṁ pravartate, yathā ca jalamacetanaṁ lokopakārāya pravartate, tathā prakṛtiracetanāpi puruṣavimokṣāya pravartsyati. Taduktam—

We reply that this does not follow, since even unintelligent Nature will act under the force of an impulse; and experience shows us that an unintelligent thing, without any intelligent superintendent, does act for the good of the soul, just as the unintelligent milk acts for the growth of the calf, or just as the unintelligent rain acts for the welfare of living creatures; and so unintelligent Nature will act for the liberation of the soul. As it has been said in the *Kārikā* (No. 57)–

10. वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य ।
पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥ (सां. का. 57) इति ।

Vatsavivṛddhinimittaṁ kṣīrasya yathā pravṛttirajñasya,
Puruṣavimokṣanimittaṁ tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānasya.
(Sāṅ. Kā. 57) iti.

"As the unintelligent milk acts for the nourishment of the calf, so Nature acts for the liberation of soul."

God is not a Promoter of This Universe

यस्तु 'परमेश्वरः करुणया प्रवर्तकः' इति परमेश्वरास्तित्ववादिनां डिण्डिमः स

गर्भस्रावेण गतः । विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । स किं सृष्टेः प्राक्प्रवर्तते सृष्ट्युत्तरकालं वा ? आद्ये शरीराद्यभावेन दुःखानुत्पत्तौ जीवानां दुःखप्रहाणेच्छानुपपत्तिः । द्वितीये परस्पराश्रयप्रसङ्गः । करुणया सृष्टिः सृष्ट्या च कारुण्यमिति ।

Yastu 'parameśvaraḥ karuṇayā pravartakaḥ' iti parameśvarāstitvavādinām ḍiṇḍimaḥ sa garbhasrāveṇa gataḥ. Vikalpānupapatteḥ. Sa kiṁ sṛṣṭeḥ prākpravartate sṛṣṭyuttarakālaṁ vā ? Ādye śarīrādyabhāvena duḥkhānutpattau jīvānām duḥkhaprahāṇecchānupapattiḥ. Dvitīye parasparāśrayaprasaṅgaḥ. Karuṇayā sṛṣṭiḥ sṛṣṭyā ca kāruṇyamiti.

But as for the doctrine of "a Supreme Being who acts from compassion," which has been proclaimed by beat of drum by the advocates of his existence, this has well-nigh passed away out of hearing, since the hypothesis fails to meet either of the two alternatives. For does he act thus before or after creation? If you say "before," we reply that as pain cannot arise in the absence of bodies, etc., there will be no need, as long as there is no creation, for his desire to free living beings from pain (which is the main characteristic of compassion); and if you adopt the second alternative, you will be reasoning in a circle, as on the one hand you will hold that God created the world through compassion (as this is His motive in acting at all), and on the other hand[1] that He compassionated after He had created.

Nexus and Coherence of Nature and Soul

तस्मादचेतनास्यापि चेतनानधिष्ठितस्य प्रधानस्य महदादिरूपेण परिणामः पुरुषार्थप्रयुक्तः प्रधानपुरुषसंयोगनिमित्तः । यथा निर्व्यापारस्याप्ययस्कान्तस्य सन्निधानेन व्यापारस्तथा निर्व्यापारस्य पुरुषस्य सन्निधानेन प्रधानव्यापारो युज्यते । प्रकृतिपुरुषसम्बन्धश्च पङ्ग्वन्धवत् परस्परापेक्षानिबन्धनः । प्रकृतिर्हि भोग्यतया भोक्तारं पुरुषमपेक्षते । पुरुषोऽपि भेदाग्रहाद् बुद्धिच्छायापत्त्या तद्गतं दुःखत्रयं वारयमाणः कैवल्यमपेक्षते । तत्प्रकृतिपुरुषनिबन्धनं न च तदन्तरेण युक्तमिति कैवल्यार्थं पुरुषः प्रधानमपेक्षते ।

1 In other words—on the one hand the existing misery of beings induced God to create a world in order to relieve their misery, and on the other hand it was the existence of a created world which caused their misery at all.

Tasmādacetanāsyāpi cetanānadhiṣṭhitasya pradhānasya mahadādirūpeṇa pariṇāmaḥ puruśārthaprayuktaḥ pradhānapuruṣasaṁyoganimittaḥ. Yathā nirvyāpārasyāpyayaskāntasya sannidhānena vyāpārastathā nirvyāpārasya puruṣasya sannidhānena pradhānavyāpāro yujyate. Prakṛtipuruṣasaṁbandhaśca paṅgvandhavat parasparāpekṣānibandhanaḥ. Prakṛtirhi bhogyatayā bhoktāraṁ puruṣamapekṣate. Puruṣo'pi bhedāgrahād buddhicchāyāpattyā tadgataṁ duḥkhatrayaṁ vārayamāṇaḥ kaivalyamapekṣate. Tatprakṛtipuruṣanibandhanaṁ na ca tadantareṇa yuktamiti kaivalyārthaṁ puruṣaḥ pradhānamapekṣate.

Therefore, we hold that the development of unintelligent Nature (even without any intelligent superintendent)—in the order of the series intellect, self-consciousness, etc., is caused by the union of Nature and Soul, and the moving impulse is the good of Soul. Just as there takes place a movement in the iron in the proximity of the unmoved magnet, so there takes place a movement in Nature in the proximity of the unmoved Soul; and this union of Nature and Soul is caused by mutual dependence, like the union of the lame man and the blind man. Nature, as the thing to be experienced, depends on Soul the experiencer; and Soul looks to final bliss, as it seeks to throw off the three kinds of pain, which, though really apart from it, have fallen upon it by its coming under the shadow of intellect through not recognising its own distinction therefrom.[1] This final bliss (or absolute isolation) is produced by the discrimination of Nature and Soul, nor is this end possible without it; therefore Soul depends on Nature for its final bliss.

यथा खलु कौचित्पङ्ग्वन्धौ पथि सार्थेन गच्छन्तौ दैवकृतादुपप्लवात्परित्यक्तसाथौ मन्दमन्दमितस्ततः परिभ्रमन्तौ भयाकुलौ दैववशात्संयोगमुपगच्छेताम् । तत्र चान्धेन पङ्गुः स्कन्धमारोपितः । ततः पङ्गुदर्शितेन मार्गेणान्धः समीहितं स्थानं प्राप्नोति, पङ्गुरपि स्कन्धाधिरूढः । तथा परस्परापेक्षप्रधानपुरुषनिबन्धनः सर्गः । यथोक्तम्–

Yathā khalu kaucitpaṅgvandhau pathi sārthena gacchantau daivakṛtādupaplavātparityaktasāthau mandamandamitastataḥ paribhramantau bhayākulau daivavasātsaṁyogamupagacchetām. Tatra cāndhena paṅguḥ skandhamāropitaḥ. Tataḥ

1 Bondage, etc., reside in the intellect, and are only reflected upon soul through its proximity (*cf. Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, I. 58).

paṅgudarśitena mārgeṇāndhaḥ samīhitaṁ sthānaṁ prāpnoti, paṅgurapi skandhādhirūḍhaḥ. Tathā parasparāpekṣa-pradhānapuruṣanibandhanaḥ sargaḥ. Yathoktam—

Just as a lame man and a blind man,[1] travelling alone with a caravan, by some accident having become separated from their companions, wandered slowly about in great dismay, till by good luck they met each other, and then the lame man mounted on the blind man's back, and the blind man, following the path indicated by the lame man, reached his desired goal, as did the lame man also mounted on the other's shoulders; so, too, creation is effected by Nature and the soul, which are likewise mutually dependent. This has been said in the *Kārikā* (No. 21)—

11. पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।
पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि सम्बन्धस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ।। (सां. का. 21) इति ।

Puruṣasya darśanārthaṁ kaivalyārthaṁ tathā pradhānasya,
Paṅgvandhavadubhayorapi sambandhastatkṛtaḥ sargaḥ.
(Sāṅ. Kā. 21) iti.

"For the soul's contemplation of Nature and for its final separation the union of both takes place, as of the lame man and the blind man. By that union a creation is formed."

Cessation of the Play by Nature (Pralaya)

ननु पुरुषार्थनिबन्धना भवतु प्रकृतेः प्रवृत्तिः । निवृत्तिस्तु कथमुपपद्यत इति चेत्–उच्यते । यथा भर्त्रा दृष्टदोषा स्वैरिणी पुनर्भर्तारं नोपैति, यथा वा कृतप्रयोजना नर्तकी निवर्तते तथा प्रकृतिरपि । यथोक्तम्–

Nanu puruṣārthanibandhanā bhavatu prakṛteḥ pravṛttiḥ. Nivṛttistu kathamupapadyata iti cet—ucyate. Yathā bhartrā dṛṣṭadoṣā svairiṇī punarbhartāraṁ nopaiti, yathā vā kṛtaprayojanā nartakī nivartate tathā prakṛtirapi. Yathoktam—

"Well, I grant that Nature's activity may take place for the good of the soul, but how do you account for its ceasing to act?" I reply, that as a wilful woman whose faults have once been seen by her husband does not return to him, or as an actress, having performed her part, retires from the stage, so too does Nature desist. Thus, it

1 This apologue is a widely spread piece of folk-lore. It is found in the Babylonian Talmud, *Sanhedrim*, fol. 91, b, and in the Gesta Romanorum.

is said in the *Kārikā* (No. 59)—

12. रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।
पुरुषस्य तथात्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ।। (सा. का. 59) इति ।

Raṅgasya darśayitvā nivartate nartakī yathā nṛtyāt,
Puruṣasya tathātmānaṁ prakāśya vinivartate prakṛtiḥ.
(Sā. Kā. 59) iti.

"As an actress, having exhibited herself to the spectators, desists from the dance, so does Nature desist, having manifested herself to Soul."

एतच्च निरीश्वरसांख्यशास्त्रप्रवर्तककपिलादिमतानुसारिणां मतमुपन्यस्तम् ।।

Etacca nirīśvarasāṅkhyaśāstrapravartakakapilādimatānusāriṇāṁ matamupanyastam.

For this end has the doctrine of those who follow Kapila, the founder to the atheistic Sāṅkhya School, been propounded.

E.B.C

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे सांख्यदर्शनम् ।

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CHAPTER XV

THE PĀTAÑJALA-DARŚANA

Subject-Matter of Yogasūtra

साम्प्रतं सेश्वरसांख्यप्रवर्तकपतञ्जलिप्रभृतिमुनिमतमनुवर्तमानानां मतमुपन्यस्यते । तत्र सांख्यप्रवचनापरनामधेयं योगशास्त्रं पतञ्जलिप्रणीतं पादचतुष्टयात्मकम् । तत्र प्रथमे पादे 'अथ योगानुशासनम्' (यो.सू. 1/1) इति योगशास्त्रप्रतिज्ञां विधाय 'योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः' (यो.सू. 1/2) इत्यादिना योगलक्षणमभिधाय समाधिं सप्रपञ्चं निरदिक्षद्भगवान्पतञ्जलिः ।

Sāmpratam seśvarasāṅkhyapravartakapatañjaliprabhṛtimunimatamanuvartamānānām matamupanyasyate. Tatra sāṅkhyapravacanāparanāmadheyam yogaśāstram patañjalipraṇītam pādacatuṣṭayātmakam. Tatra prathame pāde 'atha yogānuśāsanam' (Yo. Sū. 1/1) iti yogaśāstrapratijñām vidhāya 'yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ' (Yo. Sū. 1/2) ityādinā yogalakṣaṇamabhidhāya samādhim saprapañcam niradikṣadbhagavānpatañjaliḥ.

We now set forth the doctrine of that school which professes the opinions of such Munis as Pātañjali and others, who originated the system of the Theistic Sāṅkhya philosophy. This school follows the so-called Yoga Śāstra promulgated by Pātañjali, and consisting of four chapters, which also bears the name of the "Sāṅkhya Pravacana," or detailed explanation of the Sāṅkhya.[1] In the first chapter thereof the venerable Pātañjali, having in the opening aphorism, "Now is the exposition of Concentration" (*yoga*), avowed his commencement of the Yoga Śāstra, proceeds in the second aphorism to give a definition of his subject, "Concentration is the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle," and then he expounds at length the nature of Meditation (*samādhi*).

द्वितीये 'तपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि क्रियायोगः' (पात. यो. सू. 2/1) इत्यादिना व्युत्थितचित्तस्य क्रियायोगं यमादीनि च पञ्च बहिरङ्गानि साधनानि ।

1 On this see Dr. Hall's Pref. To *Sāṅkhya* Pr. Bhāsh., p. 20; *S. Sāra*, p.11.

तृतीये 'देशबन्धश्चित्तस्य धारणा' (पात. यो. सू. 3/1) इत्यादिना धारणाध्यानसमाधित्रयमन्तरङ्गं संयमपदवाच्यं तदवान्तरफलं विभूतिजातम् ।

Dvitīye 'tapaḥsvādhyāyeśvarapraṇidhānāni kriyāyogaḥ' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 2/1) ityādinā vyutthitacittasya kriyāyogam yamādīni ca pañca bahiraṅgāni sādhanāni. Tṛtīye 'deśabandhaścittasya dhāraṇā' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 3/1) ityādinā dhāraṇādhyānasamādhitrayamantaraṅgam saṁyamapadavācyam tadavāntaraphalam vibhūtijātam.

In the second chapter, in the series of aphorisms commencing. "The practical part of Concentration is mortification, muttering, and resignation to the Supreme," he expounds the practical part of *yoga* proper to him whose mind is not yet thoroughly abstracted (iii.9), viz., the five external subservients or means, "forbearance,"and the rest. In the third chapter, in the series commencing "Attention is the fastening (of the mind) on some spot," he expounds the three internal subservients-attention, contemplation, and meditation, collectively called by the name "subjugation" (*saṁyama*), and also the various superhuman powers which are their subordinate fruit.

चतुर्थे 'जन्मौषधिमन्त्रतपःसमाधिजाः सिद्धयः' (पात. यो. सू. 4/1) इत्यादिना सिद्धिपञ्चकप्रपञ्चनंपुरस्सरं परमं प्रयोजनं कैवल्यम् । प्रधानादीनि पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वानि प्राचीनान्येव सम्मतानि । षड्विंशस्तु परमेश्वरः क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषः स्वेच्छया निर्माणकायमधिष्ठाय लौकिकवैदिकसम्प्रदायप्रवर्तकः संसाराङ्गारे तप्यमानानां प्राणभृतामनुग्राहकश्च ।

Caturthe 'janmauṣadhimantratapaḥ samādhijāḥ siddhayaḥ' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 4/1) ityādinā siddhipañcakaprapañcanapurassaram paramam prayojanam kaivalyam. Pradhānādīni pañcaviṁśatitattvāni prācīnānyeva sammatāni. Ṣaḍviṁśastu parameśvaraḥ kleśakarmavipākāśayairaparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣaḥ svecchayā nirmāṇakāyamadhiṣṭhāya laukikavaidikasampradāyapravartakaḥ saṁsārāṅgāre tapyamānānām prāṇabhṛtāmanugrāhakaśca.

In the fourth chapter, in the series commencing, "Perfections spring from birth, plants, spells, mortification, and meditation," he expounds the highest end, Emancipation, together with a detailed account of the five so-called "perfections" (*siddhis*). This school accepts the old twenty-five principles (of the Sāṅkhya), "Nature,"

etc.; only adding the Supreme Being as the twenty-sixth—a Soul untouched by affliction, action, fruit or stock of desert, who of His own will assumed a body in order to create, and originated all secular or Vaidic traditions,[1] and is gracious towards those living beings who are burned in the charcoal of mundance existence.

Doubts Raised about Emancipation with Their Solution

ननु पुष्करपलाशवन्निर्लेपस्य तस्य तप्यभावः कथमुपपद्यते येन परमेश्वरोऽनुग्राहकतया कक्षीक्रियत इति चेत्–उच्यते । तापकस्य रजसः सत्त्वमेव तप्यं बुद्ध्यात्मना परिणतमिति सत्त्वे परितप्यमाने तदारोपवशेन तदभेदावगाहिपुरुषोऽपि तप्यत इत्युच्यते । तदुक्तमाचार्यैः–

Nanu puṣkarapalāśavannirlepasya tasya tapyabhāvaḥ kathamupapadyate yena parameśvaro'nugrāhakatayā kakṣīkriyata iti cet—ucyate. Tāpakasya rajasaḥ sattvameva tapyaṁ buddhyātmanā pariṇatamiti sattve paritapyamāne tadāropavaśena tadabhedāvagāhipuruṣo'pi tapyata ityucyate. Taduktamācāryaiḥ.

"But how can such an essence as soul, undefiled as the (glossy) leaf of a lotus, be said to be burned, that we should need to accept any Supreme Being as gracious to it?" To this we reply, that the quality Goodness develops itself as the understanding, and it is this which is, as it were, burned by the quality Activity; and the soul, by the influence of Darkness, blindly identifying itself with this suffering quality, is also said itself to suffer. Thus, the teachers have declared–

1. सत्त्वं तप्यं बुद्धिभावेन वृत्तं
   भावा ये वा राजसास्तापकास्ते ।
   तप्याभेदग्राहिणी तामसी या
   वृत्तिस्तस्यां तप्य इत्युक्त आत्मा ॥ इति ।

Sattvaṁ tapyaṁ buddhibhāvena vṛttaṁ
Bhāvā ye vā rājasāstāpakāste,
Tapyābhedagrāhiṇī tāmasī yā
Vṛttistasyāṁ tapya ityukta ātmā. iti.

1 *i.e.*, he revealed the Veda, and also originated the meanings of words, as well as instructed the first fathers of mankind in the arts of life.

"It is Goodness which suffers under the form of the understanding and the substances belonging to Activity which torment,[1]
And it is through the modification of Darkness, as wrongly identifying, that the Soul is spoken of as suffering."

पञ्चशिखेनाप्युक्तम्–अपरिणामिनी हि भोक्तृशक्तिरप्रतिसंक्रमा च परिणामिन्यर्थे प्रतिसंक्रान्तेव तद्वृत्तिमनुपततीति । भोक्तृशक्तिरिति चिच्छक्तिरुच्यते । सा चात्मैव। परिणामिन्यर्थे बुद्धितत्त्वे प्रतिसंक्रान्तेव प्रतिबिम्बितेव तद्वृत्तिमनुपततीति बुद्धौ प्रतिबिम्बिता सा चिच्छक्तिर्बुद्धिच्छायापत्त्या बुद्धिवृत्त्यनुकारवतीति भावः ।

Pañcaśikhenāpyuktam—apariṇāminī hi bhoktṛśaktirapratisaṅkramā ca pariṇāṅinyarthe pratisaṁkrānteva tadvṛttimanupatatīti. Bhoktṛśaktiriti cicchaktirucyate. Sā cātmaiva. Pariṇāminyarthe buddhitattve pratisaṅkrānteva pratibimbiteva tadvṛttimanupatatīti buddhau pratibimbitā sā cicchaktirbuddhicchāyāpattyā buddhivṛttyanukāravatīti bhāvaḥ.

It has been also said by Pātañjali,[2] "The power of the enjoyer, which is itself incapable of development or of transference, in an object wich is developed and transferred experiences the modifications thereof."

Now, the "power of the enjoyer" is the power of intelligence, and this is the soul; and in an object which is "developed" and "transferred," or reflected,–*i.e.*, in the thinking principle or the understanding,–it experiences the modifications thereof, *i.e.*, the power of intelligence, being reflected in the understanding, receives itself the shadow of the understanding, and imitates the modifications of it.

तथा शुद्धोऽपि पुरुषः प्रत्ययं बौद्धमनुपश्यति तमनुपश्यन्नतदात्मापि तदात्मक इव प्रतिभासत इति । इत्थं तप्यमानस्य पुरुषस्यादर-नैरन्तर्य-दीर्घकालानुबन्धि-यम-नियमाद्यष्टाङ्गयोगानुष्ठानेन परमेश्वरप्रणिधानेन च सत्त्वपुरुषान्यता-ख्यातावनुपप्लवाय जातायामविद्यादयः पञ्च क्लेशाः समूलकाषं कषिता भवन्ति । कुशलाकुशलाश्च कर्माशयाः समूलघातं हताः भवन्ति । ततश्च पुरुषस्य निर्लेपस्य कैवल्येनावस्थानं कैवल्यमिति सिद्धम् ।

1 I read *ye* for *te* with Dr. Hall's MS. *Tapya* means rather "susceptible of suffering."

2 This is really Vyāsa's comm. On *Sūt*. iv.21.

Tathā śuddho'pi puruṣaḥ pratyayaṁ bauddhamanupaśyati, tamanupaśyannatadātmāpi tadātmaka iva pratibhāsata iti. Itthaṁ tapyamānasya puruṣasyādara-nairantaryadīrghakālānubandhi-yama-niyamādyaṣṭāṅgayogānuṣṭhānena parameśvara-praṇidhānena ca sattvapuruṣānyatākhyātāvanupaplavāya jātāyāmavidyādayaḥ pañca kleśāḥ samūlakāṣaṁ kaṣitā bhavanti. Kuśalākuśalāśca karmāśayāḥ samūlaghātaṁ hatāḥ bhavanti. Tataśca puruṣasya nirlepasya kaivalyenāvasthānaṁ kaivalyamiti siddham.

Thus the soul, though in itself pure, sees according to the idea produced by the understanding; and, while thus seeing at second hand, though really it is different from the understanding, it appears identical therewith. It is while the soul is thus suffering, that, by the practice of the eight subservient means, forbearance, religious observance, etc., earnestly, uninterruptedly, and for a long period, and by continued resignation to the Supreme Being, at length there is produced an unclouded recognition of the distinction between the quality Goodness and the Soul; and the five "afflictions," ignorance, etc., are radically destroyed, and the various "stocks of desert," fortunate or unfortunate, are utterly abolished, and, the undefiled soul abiding emancipated, perfect Emancipation is accomplished.

Meaning of "Atha"—First Aphorism

तत्र 'अथ योगानुशासनम्' (पा. यो. सू. 1/1) इति प्रथमसूत्रेण प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्त्यङ्गं' विषयप्रयोजनसम्बन्धाधिकारिरूपमनुबन्धचतुष्टयं प्रतिपाद्यते ।

Tatra 'atha yogānuśāsanam' (Pā. Yo. Sū. 1/1) iti prathama-sūtreṇa prekṣāvatpravṛttyaṅgaṁ' viṣayaprayojanasambandhādhikārirūpamanubandhacatuṣṭayaṁ pratipādyate.

The words of the first aphorism, "Now is the exposition of concentration," establish the four preliminaries which lead to the intelligent reader's carrying the doctrine into practice, viz., the object-matter, the end proposed, the connection (between the treatise and the object), and the person properly qualified to study it.

अत्राथशब्दोऽधिकारार्थः स्वीक्रियते । अथशब्दास्यानेकार्थत्वे सम्भवति कथमारम्भार्थत्वपक्षे पक्षपातः सम्भवेत् ? अथशब्दस्य मङ्गलाद्यनेकार्थत्वं नामलिङ्गानुशासनेनानुशिष्टं–'मङ्गलानन्तरारम्भप्रश्नकार्त्स्न्येष्वथो अथ ।' (अमरको.

3/3/246) इति । अत्र प्रश्नकार्त्स्न्ययोरसम्भवेऽपि आनन्तर्यमङ्गल-पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षारम्भलक्षणानां चतुर्णामर्थानां सम्भवादारम्भार्थत्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्–

Atrāthaśabdo'dhikārārthaḥ svīkriyate. Athaśabdāsyānekārthatve sambhavati kathamārambhārthatvapakṣe pakṣapātaḥ sambhavet ? Athaśabdasya maṅgalādyanekārthatvaṁ nāmaliṅgānuśāsanenānuśiṣṭam—'maṅgalānantarārambhapraśnakārtsnyeṣvatho atha'. (Amarako. 3/3/246) iti. Atra praśnakārtsnyayorasambhave'pi ānantaryamaṅgalapūrvaprakṛtāpekṣārambhalakṣaṇānāṁ caturṇāmarthānāṁ sambhavādārambhārthatvānupapattiriti cet—

The word "now" (*atha*) is accepted as having here an inceptive meaning, (as intimating that a distinct topic is now commenced). "But," it may be objected, "there are several possible significations of this word *atha*; why, then, should you show an unwarranted partiality for this particular 'inceptive' meaning? The great Canon for nouns and their gender (the Amara Kosha Dictionary) gives many such meanings. '*Atha* is used in the sense of an auspicious particle,—after,—now (inceptive),—What? (interrogatively),—and all (comprehensively).' Now, we willingly surrender such senses as interrogation or comprehensiveness; but since there are four senses certainly suitable *i.e.*, 'after', 'an auspicious particle,' 'reference to a previous topic,' and 'the inceptive now,' there is no reason for singling out the *last*."

मैवं मंस्थाः । विकल्पासहत्वात् । आनन्तर्यमथशब्दार्थ इति पक्षे यतः कुतश्चिदानन्तर्यं पूर्ववृत्तशमाद्यसाधारणात्कारणादानन्तर्यं वा ? न प्रथमः । 'न हि कश्चित्क्षणमपि जातु तिष्ठत्यकर्मकृत्' (गीता. 3/5) इति न्यायेन सर्वो जन्तुरवश्यं किंचित्कृत्वा किंचित्करोत्येवेति तस्याभिधानमन्तरेणापि प्राप्ततया तदर्थाथशब्दप्रयोगवैयर्थ्यप्रसक्तेः ।

न चरमः । शमाद्यनन्तरं योगस्य प्रवृत्तावपि तस्यानुशासनप्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धत्वेनोपात्ततया शब्दतः प्राधान्याभावात् ।

Maivaṁ maṁsthāḥ. Vikalpāsahatvāt. Ānantaryamathaśabdārtha iti pakṣe yataḥ kutaścidānantaryaṁ pūrvavṛttaśamādyasādhāraṇātkāraṇādānantaryaṁ vā ? Na prathamaḥ. 'Na hi kaścitkṣaṇamapi jātu tiṣṭhatyakarmakṛt' (Gītā 3/5) iti nyāyena sarvo janturavaśyaṁ kiñcitkṛtvā kiñcitkarotyeveti tasyābhidhānamantareṇāpi prāptatayā tadarthāthaśabdaprayoga-vaiyarthyaprasakteḥ.

Na caramaḥ. Śamādyanantaraṁ yogasya pravṛttāvapi tasyānuśāsanapravṛttyanubandhatvenopāttatayā śabdataḥ prādhānyābhāvāt.

This objection, however, will not stand, for it cannot bear the following alternative. If you maintain the sense of "after," then do you hold that it implies following after anything whatever, or only after some definite cause as comprehended under the general definition of causation,[1] *i.e.*, "previous existence (relatively to the effect")? It cannot be the former, for, in accordance with the proverb that "No one stands for a single moment, inactive," everybody must always do everything after previously doing something else; and since this is at once understood without any direct mention at all, there could be no use in employing the particle *atha* to convey this meaning. Nor can it be the latter alternative; because, although we fully grant that the practice of concentration does in point of fact follow after previous tranquillity, etc., yet these are rather the necessary preliminaries to the work of exposition, and consequently cannot have that avowed predominance (which the presumed cause should have).

न च शब्दतः प्रधानभूतस्यानुशासनस्य शमाद्यानन्तर्यमथशब्दार्थः किं न स्यादिति वदितव्यम् । अनुशासनमिति हि शास्त्रमाह । अनुशिष्यते व्याख्यायते लक्षणभेदोपायफलसहितो योगो येन तदनुशासनमिति व्युत्पत्तेः ।

Na ca sabdataḥ pradhānabhūtasyānuśāsanasya śamādyānantaryamathaśabdārthaḥ kiṁ na syāditi vaditavyaṃ. Anuśāsanamiti hi śāstramāha. Anuśiṣyate vyākhyāyate lakṣaṇabhedopāyaphalasahito yogo yena tadanuśāsanamiti vyutpatteḥ.

"But why should we not hold that the word *atha* implies that this very exposition is avowedly the predominant object, and does follow after previous tranquillity of mind, etc.?" We reply, that the aphorism uses the term "exposition"(*anuśāsana*), and this word etymologically analysed, implies that by which the *yoga* is explained, accompanied with definitions, divisions, and detailed means and results.

अनुशासनस्य च तत्त्वज्ञानचिख्यापयिषानन्तरभावित्वेन शमदमाद्यानन्तर्यनियमाभावात् । जिज्ञासाज्ञानयोस्तु शमाद्यानन्तर्यमाम्नायते–'तस्माच्छान्तो दान्त

1 *Cf. Bhāṣā-paricched*, 15, a.

उपरतस्तितिक्षुः समाहितो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत्' (बृ. उ. 4/4/23) इत्यादिना । नापि तत्त्वज्ञानचिख्यापयिषानन्तर्यमथशब्दार्थः । तस्य सम्भवेऽपि श्रोतृप्रतिपत्तिप्रवृत्त्योरनुपयोगेनानभिधेयत्वात् ।

Anuśāsanasya ca tattvajñānacikhyāpayiṣānantarabhāvitvena śamadamādyānantaryaniyamābhāvāt. Jijñāsājñānayostu śamādyānantaryamāmnāyate—'tasmāchānto dānta uparatastitikṣuḥ samāhito bhūtvātmanyevātmānaṁ paśyet' (Bṛ. Up. 4/4/23) ityādinā. Nāpi tattvajñānacikhyāpayiṣānantaryamathaśabdārthaḥ. Tasya sambhave'pi śrotṛpratipattipravṛttyoranupayogenānabhidheyatvāt.

And there is no rule that such an exposition must follow previous tranquillity of mind, etc., the rule rather being that, as far as the teacher is concerned, it must follow a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; for it is rather the student's desire to know and his derived knowledge which should have quiet of mind, etc., as their precursors, in accordance with the words of Śruti : "Therefore, having become tranquil, self-subdued, loftily indifferent, patient, full of faith and intent, let him see the soul in the soul.[1]" Nor can the word *atha* imply the necessary precedence, in the teacher, of a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; because, even granting that both these are present, they need not be mentioned thus prominently, as they are powerless in themselves to produce the necessary intelligence and effort in the student.

तवापि निःश्रेयसहेतुतया योगानुशासनं प्रमितं न वा ? आद्ये तदभावेऽपि उपादेयत्वं भवेत् । द्वितीये तद्भावेऽपि हेयत्वं स्यात् । प्रमितं चास्य निःश्रेयसनिदानत्वम् ।

Tavāpi niḥśreyasahetutayā yogānuśāsanaṁ pramitaṁ na vā ? Ādye tadabhāve'pi upādeyatvāṁ bhavet. Dvitīye tadbhāve'pi heyatvaṁ syāt. Pramitaṁ cāsya niḥśreyasanidānatvaṃ.

अध्यात्मयोगाधिगमेन देवं
गत्वा धीरो हर्षशोकौ जहाति । (का. 2/12) इति श्रुतेः।

Adhyātmayogādhigamena devaṁ
Gatvā dhīro harṣaśokau jahāti. (Kā. 2/12) iti śruteḥ.

1 *Śatapatha Br.*, xiv. 7, 2, 28.

समाधावचला बुद्धिस्तदा योगमवाप्स्यसि । (गी. 2/53) इति स्मृतेश्च ।

Samādhāvacalā buddhistadā yogamavāpsyasi. (Gītā 2/53) iti smṛteśca.

Still (however we may settle these points) the question arises, Is the exposition of the *yoga* ascertained to be a cause of final beatitude or not? If it is, then it is still a desirable object, even if certain presupposed conditions should be absent; and if it is not, then it must be undesirable, whatever conditions may be present.[1] But it is clear that the exposition in question is such a cause, since we have such a passage of the Śruti as that (in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, ii.12) : "By the acquirement of *yoga* or intense concentration on the Supreme Soul, the wise man having meditated leaves behind joy and sorrow;" and again, such a passage of the Smṛti as that (in the *Bhagavad Gītā*,ii.53) : "The intellect unwavering in contemplation will then attain *yoga*."

अत एव शिष्यप्रश्नतपश्चरणरसायनोपयोगाद्यानन्तर्यं पराकृतम् । 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' (ब्र. सू. 1/1/1) इत्यत्र तु ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अनधिकार्यत्वेनाधिकारार्थत्वं परित्यज्य साधनचतुष्टयसम्पत्तिविशिष्टाधिकारिसमर्पणाय शमदमादिवाक्यविहिताच्छमादेरानन्तर्यमथशब्दार्थ इति शंकराचार्यैर्निरटङ्कि ।

Ata eva śiṣyapraśnatapaścaraṇarasāyanopayogādyānantaryaṁ parākṛtam. 'Athāto brahmajijñasā' (Bra. Sū. 1/1/1) ityatra tu brahmajijñāsāyā anadhikāryatvenādhikārārthatvaṁ parityajya sādhanacatuṣṭayasampattiviṣiṣṭādhikārisamarpaṇāya śamadamādidavākyavihitācchamāderānantaryamathaśabdārtha iti śaṅkarācāryairniraṭaṅki.

Hence, we conclude that it is untenable to interpret *atha* as implying that the exposition must follow "after" a previous inquiry on the part of the student, or "after"a previous course of ascetic training and use of elixirs, etc. (to render the body strong).

But in the case of the *Vedānta Sūtras*, which open with the aphorism, "Now, therefore, there is the wish to know Brahman," Śaṅkarācārya has declared that the inceptive meaning of *atha* must be left out of the question, as the wish to know Brahman is not to be undertaken (at will); and therefore, it must be there interpreted to mean "after," *i.e.*, that this desire must follow a previous course of tranquillity, etc., as laid down by the well-known rule which enjoins the practice of tranquillity, self-control, indifference, endurance, contemplation, and faith, the object being to communicate the teaching to a proper student as distinguished by the possession of the four so-called "means."[1]

1 I read in the second clause *tadbhāve'pi*, understanding by *tad* the different conditions which *atha* is supposed to assume as being necessarily present.

The Exposition of the Term "Atha"—Not Auspicious

अथ मा नाम भूदानन्तर्यार्थोऽथशब्दः । मङ्गलार्थः किं न स्यात्? मङ्गलस्य वाक्यार्थे समन्वयाभावात् । अगर्हिताभीष्टावाप्तिमङ्गलम् । अभीष्टं च सुखावाप्तिदुःखपरिहाररूपतयेष्टम् । योगानुशासनस्य च सुखदुःखनिवृत्त्योरन्यतरत्वाभावान्न मङ्गलता । तथा च योगानुशासनं मङ्गलमिति न सम्पनीपद्यते ।

Atha mā nāma bhūdānantaryārtho'thaśabdaḥ. Maṅgalārthaḥ kiṁ na syāt ? Maṅgalasya vākyārthe samanvayābhāvāt. Agarhitābhīṣṭāvāptimaṅgalam. Abhīṣṭaṁ ca sukhāvāptiduḥkhaparihārarūpatayeṣṭam. Yogānuśāsanasya ca sukhaduḥkhanivṛttyoranyataratvābhāvānna maṅgalatā. Tathā ca yogānuśāsanaṁ maṅgalamiti na sampanīpadyate.

"Well, then, let us grant that *atha* cannot mean 'after'; but why should it not be simply an auspicious particle?" But this it cannot be, from the absence of any connection between the context and such auspicious meaning. Auspiciousness implies the obtaining of an unimpeached and desired good, and what is desired is so desired as being the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain; but this auspiciousness cannot belong to the exposition of *yoga*, since, it is in itself neither pleasure nor the cessation of pain.[2]

मृदङ्गध्वनेरिवाथशब्दश्रवणस्य कार्यतया मङ्गलस्य वाच्यत्वलक्ष्यत्वयोरसम्भवाच्च । यथार्थिकार्थो वाक्यार्थे न निविशते तथा कार्यमपि न निविशेत । अपदार्थत्वाविशेषात् । पदार्थ एव वाक्यार्थे समन्वीयते । अन्यथा शब्दप्रमाणकानां शाब्दी ह्याकाङ्क्षा शब्देनैव पूर्यत इति मुद्राभङ्गः कृतो भवेत् ।

1 These are, (i) the discrimination of the eternal from the phenomenal; (ii) the rejection of the fruit of actions here or hereafter; (iii) possession of the six qualities, tranquillity, etc.; and, (iv) the desire for liberation.

2 It may be *sukha-janaka*, but it is not itself *sukha*.

Mṛdaṅgadhvanerivāthaśabdaśravaṇasya kāryatayā maṅgalsya vācyatvalakṣyatvayorasaṁbhavācca. Yathārthikārtho vākyārthe na niviśate tathā kāryamapi na niviśeta. Apadārthatvāviśeṣāt. Padārtha eva vākyārthe samanvīyate. Anyathā śabdapramāṇakānāṁ śābdī hyākāṅkṣā śabdenaiva pūryata iti mudrābhaṅgaḥ kṛto bhavet.

Therefore, it cannot be at all established that the meaning of the aphorism is that "the exposition of the *yoga* is auspicious"; for auspiciousness cannot be either the primary meaning of *atha* or its secondary meaning by metonymy, since it is its very sound which is in itself auspicious (without any reference to the meaning), like that of a drum. "But why not say that just as an implied meaning may enter into the direct meaning of a sentence, so an effect (like this of auspiciousness) may also be included, since both are equally unexpressed so far as the actual words are concerned?"[1] We reply, that in the meaning of a sentence the connection must be between the meaning of one word and that of another; otherwise we should be guilty of breaking the seal which the rule of the grammarians has set, that "verbal expectancy[2] can be fulfilled by words alone".

ननु प्रारिप्सितप्रबन्धपरिसमाप्तिपरिपन्थिप्रत्यूहव्यूहप्रशमनाय शिष्टाचारपरिपालनाय च शास्त्रारम्भे मङ्गलाचरणमनुष्ठेयम् । 'मङ्गलादीनि मङ्गलमध्यानि मङ्गलान्तानि च शास्त्राणि प्रथन्ते, आयुष्मत्पुरुषकाणि वीरपुरुषकाणि च भवन्ति' (पात. भाष्य. आह्नि. 3) इत्यभियुक्तोक्तेः । भवति च मङ्गलार्थोऽथशब्दः:-

Nanū prāripsitaprabandhaparisamāptiparipanthipratyūhavyūhapraśamanāya śiṣṭācāraparipālanāya ca śāstrārambhe maṅgalācaraṇamanuṣṭheyam. 'Maṅgalādīni maṅgalamadhyāni maṅgalāntāni ca śastrāṇi prathante, āyuṣmatpuruṣakāṇi vīrapuruṣakāṇi ca bhavanti' (Pāta. Bhāṣya. Āhnika 3) ityabhiyuktokteḥ. Bhavati ca maṅgalārtho'thaśabdaḥ—

"But ought not a prayer for an auspicious commencement to be put at the beginning of a Śāstra, in order to lay the hosts of obstacles

1 Granting that *atha* does not here mean "auspicious," why should not this be the implied meaning, as all allow that the particle *atha* does produce an auspicious influence?

2 *i.e.*, a word's incapacity to convey a meaning without some other word to complete the construction.

that would hinder the completion of the work which the author desires to begin, and also to observe the immemorial practice of the good, since it has been said by the wise, 'Those Śāstras become widely famous which have auspicious commencements, auspicious middles, and auspicious endings, and their students have long lives and are invincible in disputation'?[1] Now, the word *atha* implies 'auspiciousness,' since there is a Smṛti which says—

2. ओंकारश्चाथशब्दश्च द्वावेतौ ब्रह्मणः पुरा ।
कण्ठं भित्त्वा विनिर्यातौ तस्मान्माङ्गलिकावुभौ ॥

इतिस्मृतिसम्भवात् । तथा च 'वृद्धिरादैच्' (पा. सू. 1/1/1) इत्यादौ वृद्ध्यादिशब्दवदथशब्दो मङ्गलार्थः स्यादिति चेत्-

Oṁkāraścāthaśabdaśca dvāvetau brahmaṇaḥ purā,
Kaṇṭhaṁ bhittvā viniryātau tasmānmāṅgalikāvubhau.

Itismṛtisambhavāt. Tathā ca 'vṛddhirādaic' (Pā. Sū. 1/1/1) ityādau vṛddhyādiśabdavadathasabdo maṅgalārthaḥ syāditi cet—

"The word *Oṁ* and the word *atha*,—these two in the ancient time,"
"Cleaving the throat of Brahman, came forth; therefore they are both auspicious."
"Therefore, let the word *atha* stand here as signifying 'auspiciousness,' like the word '*vṛddhi*' used by Pāṇini in his opening sūtra '*vṛddhir ād aic.*'"[2]

मैवं भाषिष्ठाः । अर्थान्तराभिधानाय प्रयुक्तस्याथशब्दस्य वीणावेणवादिध्वनिवत् श्रवणमात्रेण मङ्गलफलत्वोपपत्तेः । अथार्थान्तरारम्भवाक्यार्थधीफलकस्याथशब्दस्य कथमन्यफलकतेति चेन्न । अन्यार्थं नीयमानोदकुम्भोपलम्भवत्तत्सम्भवात् । न च स्मृतिव्याकोपः । माङ्गलिकाविति मङ्गलप्रयोजनत्वविवक्षया प्रवृत्तेः ।

1 This is found with some variations in the *Mahābhāṣya* (p.7, Kielhorn's ed.).

2 The commentators hold that the word *vṛddhiḥ* is placed at the beginning of the first sūtra, while *guṇaḥ* in the second is placed at the end (*ad eṅ guṇaḥ*), in order to ensure an auspicious opening, *vṛddhi* meaning "increase," "prosperity," as well as "the second strengthening of a vowel."

Maivaṁ bhāṣiṣṭhāḥ. Arthāntarābhidhānāya prayuktasyāthaśabdasya vīṇāveṇvādidhvanivat śravaṇamātreṇa maṅgalaphalatvopapatteḥ. Athārthāntarārambhavākyārthadhīphalakasyāthaśa bdasya kathamanyaphalakateti cenna. Anyārthaṁ nīyamānodakumbhopalambhavattatsambhavāt. Na ca smṛtivyākopaḥ. Māṅgalikāviti māṅgalaprayojanatvavivakṣayā pravṛtteḥ.

This view, however, is untenable; since the very word *atha*, when heard, has an auspicious influence, even though it be employed to convey some other special signification, just as the hearing the sound of lutes, flutes, etc. (is auspicious for one starting on a journey). If you still object, "How can the particle *atha* have any other effect, if it is specially used here to produce the idea that the meaning of the sentence is that a new topic is commenced?" We reply that it certainly *can* have such other additional effect, just as we see that jars of water brought for some other purpose are auspicious omens at the commencement of a journey.[1] Nor does this contradict the Smṛti, since the Smṛti will still hold good, as the words "they are both auspicious"mean only that they produce an auspicious effect.

Inherent meaning of Atha for Reference or Authority

नापि पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षोऽथशब्दः । फलत आनन्तर्याव्यतिरेकेण प्रागुक्तदूषणानुषङ्गात् । किमयमथशब्दोऽधिकारार्थोऽथानन्तर्यार्थ इत्यादिविमर्शवाक्ये पक्षान्तरो पन्यासे तत्सम्भवेऽपि प्रकृते तदसम्भवाच्च ।

1 In the old Bengali poem Caṇḍī, we have an interesting list of these omens. The hero Candraketu, starting on a journey, has the following good omens : On his right hand a cow, a deer, a Brāhmaṇa, a full-blown lotus; on his left, a jackal and a jar full of water. He hears on is right hand the sound of fire and a cowherdess calling "milk" to buyers. He sees a cow with her calf, a woman calling "jaya," *dūrvā* grass, rice, garlands of flowers, diamonds, sapphires, pearls, corals; and on the left twelve women. He hears drums and cymbals and men dancing and singing "Hari." It is, however, all spoiled by seeing a *guana* (*godhikā*). The author adds, "This is a bad omen according to all śāstras, and so is a tortoise, a rhinoceros, the tuberous, root of the water-lily, and a hare." Elsewhere, a vulture, a kite, a lizard, and a woodman carrying wood are called bad omens.

Nāpi pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣo'thaśabdaḥ. Phalata ānantaryāvyatirekeṇa prāguktadūṣaṇānuṣaṅgāt. Kimayamathaśabdo'dhikārārtho'thānantaryārtha ityādivimarśavākye pakṣāntaropanyāse tatsambhave'pi prakṛte tadasambhavācca.

Nor can the particle *atha* have here the meaning of "reference to a previous topic," since the previously mentioned faults will all equally apply here, as this meaning really involves that of "after" (which we have already discussed and rejected). And again, in such discussions as this, as to whether this particular *atha* means "the inceptive now" or "after,"if another topic had been previously suggested, then "reference thereto" would be a possible meaning; but in the present case (where no other topic has been previously suggested) it is not a possible meaning.

तस्मात्पारिशेष्याददधिकारपदवेदनीयप्रारम्भार्थोऽथशब्द इति विशेषो भाष्यते । यथा 'अथैष ज्योतिरथैष विश्वज्योतिः' इत्यत्राथशब्द क्रतुविशेषप्रारम्भार्थः परिगृहीतः, यथा च 'अथ शब्दानुशासनम्' (पात. भा. 1/1) इत्यत्राथशब्दो व्याकरणशास्त्राधिकारार्थस्तद्वत् ।

Tasmātpāriśeṣyādadhikārapadavedanīyaprārambhārtho'thaśabda iti viśeṣo bhāṣyate. Yathā 'athaiṣa jyotirathaiṣa viśvajyotiḥ' ityatrāthaśabda kratuviśeṣaprārambhārthaḥ parigṛhītaḥ, yathā ca 'atha śabdānuśāsanaṃ' (Pāta. Bhā. 1/1) ityatrāthaśabdo vyākaraṇaśāstrādhikārārthastadvat.

Therefore, by exhaustion, the commentator finally adopts, for the *atha* of the sūtra, the remaining meaning of "the inceptive now." So, when it is said (in the *Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa*, xvi. 8, 1; xvi; 10, 1), "Now this is the Jyotiṣ," "Now this is the Viśvajyotis,"[1] the particle *atha* is acepted as signifying the commencement of the description of a particular sacrifice, just as the *atha* in the commencement of the *Mahābhāṣya*, "now comes the exposition of words," signifies the commencement of the Institutes of Grammar.

तदभाषि व्यासभाष्ये योगसूत्रविवरणपरे अथेत्ययमधिकारार्थः प्रयुज्यते इति । तद् व्याचख्यौ वाचस्पतिः । तदित्थम्–अमुष्याथशब्दस्याधिकारार्थत्वपक्षे शास्त्रेण प्रस्तूयमानस्य योगस्योपवर्तनात्समस्तशास्त्रतात्पर्यार्थव्याख्यानेन शिष्यस्य सुखावबोधप्रवृत्तिर्भवतीत्यथशब्दस्याधिकारार्थत्वमुपपन्नम् ।

1 These are the names of two out of the four sacrifices lasting for one day, in which a thousand cows are given to the officiating Brāhmaṇas.

Tadabhāṣi vyāsabhāṣye yogasūtravivaraṇapare athetyayamadhikārārthaḥ prayujyate iti. Tad vyācakhyau vācaspatiḥ. Tadittham—amuṣyāthaśabdasyādhikārārthatvapakṣe śāstreṇa prastūyamānasya yogasyopavartanātsamastaśāstratātparyarthavyākhyānena śiṣyasya sukhāvabodhapravṛttirbhavatītyathaśabdasyādhikārārthatvamupapannam.

This has been declared by Vyāsa in his Commentary on the Yoga Aphorisms, "the *atha* in this opening aphorism indicates a commencement;" and Vācaspati has similarly explained it in his gloss; therefore, it may be considered as settled that the *atha* here indicates a commencement and also signifies auspiciousness. Therefore, accepting the view that this *atha* implies a commencement, let the student be left in peace to strive after a successful understanding of the śāstra through the attainment of the *yoga*, which is its proposed subject, by means of the teacher's explanation of its entire purport.

ननु 'हिरण्यगर्भो योगस्य वक्ता नान्यः पुरातनः' इति याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृतेः पतञ्जलिः कथं योगस्य शासितेति–अद्धा । अत एव तत्र तत्र पुराणादौ विशिष्य योगस्य विप्रकीर्णतया दुर्ग्राह्यार्थत्वं मन्यमानेन भगवता कृपासिन्धुना फणिपतिना सारं संजिघृक्षुणानुशासनमारब्धं न तु साक्षाच्छासनम् ।

Nanu 'hiraṇyagarbho yogasya vaktā nānyaḥ purātanaḥ' iti yājñavalkyasmṛteḥ patañjaliḥ kathaṁ yogasya śāsiteti—addhā. Ata eva tatra tatra purāṇādau viśiṣya yogasya viprakīrṇatayā durgrāhyārthatvaṁ manyamānena bhagavatā kṛpāsindhunā phaṇipatinā sāraṁ sañjighṛkṣuṇānuśāsanamārabdhaṁ na tu sākṣācchāsanam.

But here some one may say, "Does not the Smṛti of Yājñavalkya say, 'Hiraṇyagarbha is the promulgator of the *Yoga*, and no other ancient sage?' how then is Pātañjali the teacher thereof ?" We reply that it was for this reason that the venerable Pātañjali,[1] that ocean of compassion, considering how difficult it was to grasp all the different forms of *Yoga* scattered up and down in the Purāṇas, etc., and wishing to collect together their essence, commenced his *anuśāsana*,—the preposition *anu* implying that it was teaching

1 He is here called *phaṇipati*, "lord of snakes," Pātañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, being represented as a snake in mythology.

which followed a primary revelation and was not itself the immediate origin of the system.

Yoga is to be Commenced like Vedānta

यदायमथशब्दोऽधिकारार्थस्तदैवं वाक्यार्थः सम्पद्यते–योगानुशासनं शास्त्रमधिकृतं वेदितव्यमिति । तस्मादयमथशब्दोऽधिकारद्योतको मङ्गलार्थश्चेति सिद्धम् । तत्र शास्त्रे व्युत्पाद्यमानतया योगः ससाधनः सफलो विषयः । तद्व्युत्पादनमवान्तरफलम् । व्युत्पादितस्य योगस्य कैवल्यं परमप्रयोजनम् । शास्त्रयोगयोः प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादकभावलक्षणः सम्बन्धः । योगस्य कैवल्यस्य च साध्यसाधनभावलक्षणः सम्बन्धः । स च श्रुत्यादिप्रसिद्ध इति प्रागेवावादिषम् । मोक्षमपेक्षमाणा एवाधिकारिण इत्यर्थसिद्धम् ।

Yadāyamathaśabdo'dhikārārthastadaivaṁ vākyārthaḥ sampadyate—yogānuśāsanaṁ śāstramadhikṛtaṁ veditavyamiti. Tasmādayamathaśabdo'dhikāradyotako maṅgalārthaśceti siddham. Tatra śāstre vyutpādyamānatayā yogaḥ sasādhanaḥ sapholo viṣayaḥ. Tadvyutpādanamavāntaraphalam. Vyutpāditasya yogasya kaivalyaṁ paramaprayojanam. śāstrayogayoḥ pratipādyapratipādakabhāvalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ. Yogasya kaivalyasya ca sādhyasādhanabhāvalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ. Sa ca śrutyādiprasiddha iti prāgevāvādiṣam. Mokṣamapekṣamāṇā evādhikāriṇa ityarthasiddham.

Since this *atha* in the aphorism signifies "commencement," the full meaning of the sentence comes out as follows: "be it known that the institute for the exposition of the *yoga* is now commenced." In this institute, the "object-matter", as being that which is produced by it, is *yoga* (or the "concentration of the mind"), with its means and its fruit; the producing this is its inferior "end;"supreme absorption (*kaivalya*) is the highest "end"of the *yoga* when it is produced. The "connection"between the institute and *yoga* is that of the producer and the thing to be produced; the "connection" between *yoga* and supreme absorption is that of the means and the end; and this is well known from Śruti and Smṛti, as I have before shown. And it is established by the general context that those who aim at liberation are the duly qualified persons to hear this institute.

न च 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' (ब्र. सू. 1/1/1) इत्यादावधिकारिणोऽर्थतः सिद्धिराशङ्कनीया । तत्राथशब्देनानन्तर्याभिधानप्रणाडिकयाऽधिकारिसमर्पणसिद्धौ

आर्थिकत्वशङ्कानुदयात् । अत एवोक्तं–श्रुतिप्राप्ते प्रकरणादीनामनवकाश इति । अस्यार्थः–यत्र हि श्रुत्यार्थो न लभ्यते तत्रैव प्रकरणादयोऽर्थं समर्पयन्ति नेतरत्र । यत्र तु शब्दादेवार्थस्योपलम्भस्तत्र नेतरस्य सम्भवः ।

Na ca 'athāto brahmajijñāsā' (Bra. Sū. 1/1/1) ityādāvadhikāriṇo'rthataḥ siddhirāśaṅkanīyā. Tatrāthaśabdenānantaryābhidhānapraṇādikayā'dhikārisamarpaṇasiddhau ārthikatvaśaṅkānudayāt. Ata evoktaṁ—śrutiprāpte prakaraṇādīnāmanavakāśa iti. Asyārthaḥ—yatra hi śrutyārtho na labhyate tatraiva prakaraṇādayo'rthaṁ samarpayanti netaratra. Yatra tu śabdādevārthasyopalambhastatra netarasya sambhavaḥ.

Nor need any one be alarmed lest a similar course should be adopted with the opening aphorism of the *Vedānta sūtras*, "Now, therefore, there is a wish to know Brahman;" and lest here, too, we should seek to establish by the general context that all persons who aim at liberation are duly qualified students of the Vedānta. For the word *atha*, as there used signifies "succession" (or "after"); and it is a settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted through a regular channel to duly qualified students, and consequently the question cannot arise as to whether any other meaning is suggested by the context.

शीघ्रबोधिन्या श्रुत्या विनियोगस्य बोधनेन निराकाङ्क्षतयेतरेषामनवकाशात् । किं च श्रुत्या बोधितेऽर्थे तद्विरुद्धार्थं प्रकरणादि समर्पयति, अविरुद्धं वा ? न प्रथमः । विरुद्धार्थबोधकस्य तस्य बाधितत्त्वात् । न चरमः । वैयर्थ्यात् । तदाह–'श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां समवाये पारदौर्बल्यमर्थविप्रकर्षात्' (जै. सू. 3/3/14) इति ।

Śīghrabodhinyā śrutyā viniyogasya bodhanena nirākāṅkṣatayetareṣāmanavakāśāt. Kiṁ ca śrutyā bodhite'rthe tadviruddhārthaṁ prakaraṇādi samarpayati, aviruddhaṁ vā? Na prathamaḥ. Viruddhārthabodhakasya tasya bādhitatvāt. Na caramaḥ. Vaiyarthyāt. Tadāha—'śrutiliṅgavākyaprakaraṇasthānasamākhyānāṁ samavāye pāradaurbalyamarthaviprakarṣāt' (Jai. Sū. 3/3/14) iti.

Hence, it has been said, "When Śruti comes (as the determining authority) 'the subject-matter" and the rest have no place.[1] The full meaning of this is as follows: Where a thing is not apprehended

[1] *Cf.* Śaṅkara, *Vedānta-sūtras,* iii, 3.49.

from the Veda itself, there the subject-matter and the rest can establish the true meaning, not otherwise; but wherever we can attain the meaning by a direct text, there the other modes of interpretation are irrelevant. For when a thing is declared by a text of the Veda which makes its meaning obvious at once, the "subject-matter" and the rest either establish a contrary conclusion or one not contrary. Now, in the former case, the authority which would establish this contrary conclusion is (by the very nature of "*śruti*") already precluded from having any force; and in the latter, it is useless. This is all declared in Jaimini's aphorism (iii.3,14); "A definite text, a 'sign,' the 'sentence,' the 'subject-matter,' the 'relative position,' or 'the title',—when any of these come into collision, the later in order is the weaker because its meaning is more remote"[1] (and therefore, less obvious). It has been thus

1 This is the Mīmāṁsā rule for settling the relative value of the proofs that one thing is ancillary to another. I. *Śruti*, "a definit text," as "let him offer with curds,"where curds are clearly an ancillary part of the sacrifice. 2. *Liṅga*, "a sign,"or "the sense of the words," as leading to an inference, as in the text "he divides by the ladle;" here we infer that the thing to be divided must be a liquid like ghee, since a ladle could not divide solid things like the baked flour cakes. 3. *Vākya*, "the being mentioned in one sentence," *i.e.*, the context, as in the text "'(I cut) thee for food,' thus saying, he cuts the branch;" here the words "(I cut) thee for food" are ancillary to the action of cutting; or in the text, "I offer the welcome (oblation) to Agni," the words "the welcome (oblation) to Agni," as they form one sentence with the words "I offer," are ancillary to the act of offering. 4. *Prakaraṇa*, "the subject-matter viewed as a whole, with an interdependence of its parts," as in the *darśa-pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, where the *prayāja* ceremonies, which have no special fruit mentioned, produce, as parts, a mystic influence (*apūrva*) which helps forward that influence of the whole by which the worshippers obtain heaven. Here the *prakaraṇa* proves them to be ancillary. 5. *Sthāna* (or *krama*), "relative position" or "order,"as the recital of the hymn *Śundhadhvam*, etc., "Be ye purified for the divine work," in connection with the mention of the *sānnāyya* vessels, where this position proves that the hymn is ancillary to the action of sprinkling those vessels. 6. *Samākhyā*, "title;" thus the *Yajurveda* is called the special book for the *adhvaryu* priests; hence in any rite mentioned in it they are *prima facie* to be considered as the priests employed. The order in the aphorism represents the

summed up—

3. बाधिकैव श्रुतिर्नित्यं समाख्या बाध्यते सदा ।

मध्यमानां तु बाध्यत्वं बाधकत्वमपेक्षया ।। इति च ।

Bādhikaiva śrutirnityaṁ samākhyā badhyate sadā,
Madhyamānāṁ tu bādhyatvaṁ bādhakatvamapekṣayā.
iti ca.

"A text always precludes the rest; the 'title is always precluded by any of the preceding modes;"

"But whether any intervening one is precluded, or itself precludes, depends on circumstances."

तस्माद्विषयादिमत्त्वात् ब्रह्मविचारकशास्त्रवद्योगानुशासनमारम्भणीयमिति स्थितम् ।

Tasmādviṣayādimattvāt brahmavicārakaśāstravadyogānuśāsanamārambhaṇīyamiti sthitam.

Therefore (after all this long discussion) it may be now considered as settled that, since it has an "object,"as well as the other preliminaries, the study of the Śāstra, which teaches the Yoga, is to be commenced like that of the Vedānta, which discusses the nature of Brahman.

Correlation between Yoga and Śāstra

ननु व्यत्पाद्यमानतया योग एवात्र प्रस्तुतो न शास्त्रमिति चेत्–सत्यम् । प्रतिपाद्यतया योगः प्राधान्येन प्रस्तुतः । स च तद्विषयेण शास्त्रेण प्रतिपाद्यत इति तत्प्रतिपादने करणं शास्त्रम् । करणगोचरश्च कर्तृव्यापारो न कर्मगोचरतामाचरति ।

Nanu vyatpādyamānatayā yoga evātra prastuto na śāstramiti cet—satyaṃ. Pratipādyatayā yogaḥ prādhānyena prastutaḥ. Sa ca tadviṣayeṇa śāstreṇapratipādyata iti tatpratipādane karaṇaṁ śāstraṃ. Karaṇagocaraśca kartṛvyāpāro na karmagocaratāmācarati.

"But," it may be objected, "it is the *Yoga* which was said to be the object-matter, since it is this which is to be produced, not the Śāstra." We grant that the *Yoga* is the principal object, as that which is to be produced; but since it is produced by the Śāstra, especially directed thereto, this Śāstra is the means for its production, and, as a general rule, the agent's activity is directly concerned with the means rather than with the end.

relative weight to be attached to each; the first, *śruti*, being the most important; the last, *samākhyā*, the least, *Cf. Jaimini's Sūtras*, ii.3, 14; *Mimāṁsā paribhāṣā*, pp.8, 9.

यथा छेत्तुर्देवदत्तस्य व्यापारभूतमुद्यमननिपातादिकर्म करणभूतपरशुगोचरं न कर्मभूतवृक्षादिगोचरम् । तथा च वक्तुः पतञ्जलेः प्रवचनव्यापारापेक्षया योगविषयस्याधिकृतता करणस्य शास्त्रस्य । अभिधानव्यापारापेक्षया तु योगस्यैवेति विभागः । ततश्च योगशास्त्रस्यारम्भः सम्भावनां भजते ।

Yathā chetturdevadattasya vyāpārabhūtamudyamananipātādikarma karaṇabhūtaparaśugocaraṁ na karmabhūtavṛkṣādigocaraṃ. Tathā ca vaktuḥ patañjaleḥ pravacanavyāpārāpekṣayā yogaviṣayasyādhikṛtatā karaṇasya śāstrasya. Abhidhānavyāpārāpekṣayā tu yogasyaiveti vibhāgaḥ. Tataśca yogaśāstrasyārambhaḥ sambhāvanāṁ bhajate.

Just as the operations of Devadatta the woodcutter, *i.e.*, his lifting his arm up and down, etc., relate rather to the instrument, *i.e.*, the axe, than to the object, *i.e.*, the tree, so here the speaker, Pātañjali, in his immediate action of speaking, means the *Yoga-Śāstra* as his primary object, while he intends the *Yoga* itself in his ultimate action of "denotation." In consequence of this distinction, the real meaning is that the commencing the Yogaśāstra is that which primarily claims our attention.

Characteristics and Meditation (Samādhi) of Yoga

अत्र चानुशासनीयो योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोध इत्युच्यते । ननु युजिर्योग इति संयोगार्थतया परिपठिताद् युजेर्निष्पन्नो योगशब्दः संयोगवचन एव स्यान्न तु निरोधवचनः । अत एवोक्तं याज्ञवल्क्येन–

संयोगो योग इत्युक्तो जीवात्मपरमात्मनोः । इति ।

Atra cānuśāsanīyo yogaścittavṛttinirodha ityucyate. Nanu yujiryoga iti saṁyogārthatayā paripaṭhitād yujerniṣpanno yogaśabdaḥ saṁyogavacana eva syānna tu nirodhavacanaḥ. Ata evaktaṁ yājñavalkyena—

Saṁyogo yoga ityukto jīvātmaparamātmanoḥ. iti.

While the "*yoga*," or the restraint of the modifications of the mind, is what is to be expounded in this Śāstra. "But as we read in the lists of roots that the root *yuj* is used in the sense of 'joining,' should not the word *yoga*, its derivative, mean 'conjunction,' and

not 'restraint'? And indeed this has been said by Yājñavalkya :[1]

"The conjunction of the individual and the supreme souls is called *yoga.*"

तदेतद्वार्तम् । जीवपरयोः संयोगे कारणस्यान्तरकर्मादेरसम्भवात् । अजसंयोगस्य कणभक्षाक्षचरणादिभिः प्रतिक्षेपाच्च । मीमांसकमतानुसारेण तदङ्गीकारेऽपि नित्यसिद्धस्य तस्य साध्यत्वाभावेन शास्त्रवैफल्यापत्तेश्च । धातूनामनेकार्थत्वेन युजेः समाध्यर्थत्वोपपत्तेश्च । तदुक्तम्–

Tadetadvārtam. Jīvaparayoḥ saṁyoge kāraṇasyāntarakarmāderasambhavāt. Ajasaṁyogasya kaṇabhakṣākṣacaraṇādibhiḥ pratikṣepācca. Mīmāṁsakamatānusāreṇa tadaṅgīkāre'pi nityasiddhasya tasya sādhyatvābhāvena śāstravaiphalyāpatteśca. Dhātūnāmanekārthatvena yujeḥ samādhyarthatvopapatteśca. Taduktam—

This, however, is untenable, since there is no possibility of any such action,[2] etc., in either as would produce this conjunction of the two souls. (Nor, again, is such an explanation needed in order to remove the opposition of other philosophical schools); for the notion of the conjunction of two eternal things is opposed to the doctrines of the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya schools (and therefore, they would still oppose our theory). And even if we accepted the explanation in accordance with the Mīmāṁsā (or Vedānta), our Yogaśāstra would be rendered nugatory by this concession (and the very ground cut from under our feet); because the identity of the individual and supreme souls being in that school something to be produced by our Śāstra. And lastly, as it is notorious that roots are used in many different senses, the root *yuj* may very well be used here in the sense of "contemplation."[3] Thus, it has been said—

4. निपाताश्चोपसर्गाश्च धातवश्चेति ते त्रयः ।
अनेकार्थाः स्मृताः सर्वे पाठस्तेषां निदर्शनम् ।। इति ।

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1 I.e, Yogi-Yājñavalkya, the author of the *Yājñavalkya-gītā*. See Hall, *Bibl. Index*, p.14; Aufrecht, *Bodl. Catal*, p. 87b.

2 *Karman* seems here used for *Kriyā*, which properly belongs only to the body, as the soul is draṣṭrī.

3 *Scil. Samādhi*, or the restraining the mind and senses to profound contemplation.

Nipātāścopasargāśca dhātavaśceti te trayaḥ,
Anekārthāḥ smṛtāḥ sarve pāṭhasteṣāṁ nidarśanam. iti.

"Particles, prepositions, and roots—these three are all held to be of manifold meaning; instances found in reading are their evidence."

अत एव केचन युजिं समाधावपि पठन्ति–'युज समाधौ' (पा. धातुपाठ, दि. 71, आत्मने.) इति । नापि याज्ञवल्क्यवचनव्याकोपः । तत्रस्थस्यापि योगशब्दस्य समाध्यर्थत्वात् ।

Ata eva kecana yujiṁ samādhāvapi paṭhanti—'yuja samādhau' (Pā. Dhātupāṭha, Di. 71, Ātmane.) iti. Nāpi yājñavalkyavacanavyākopaḥ. Tatrasthasyāpi yogaśabdasya samādhyarthatvāt.

Therefore some authors expressly give *yuj* in this sense, and insert in their lists "*yuj* in the sense of *samādhi.*" Nor does this contradict Yājñavalkya's declaration, as the word *yoga*, used by him, may bear this meaning; and he has himself said—

समाधिः समतावस्था जीवात्मपरमात्मनोः ।
ब्रह्मण्येव स्थितिर्या सा समाधिः प्रत्यगात्मनः ।।

Samādhiḥ samatāvasthā jīvātmaparamātmanoḥ,
Brahmaṇyeva sthitiryā sā samādhiḥ pratyagātmanaḥ.

"*Samādhi* is the state of identity of the individual and supreme souls; this abiding absolutely in Brahman is the *samādhi* of the individual soul."

इति तेनोक्तत्वाच्च । तदुक्तं भगवता व्यासेन (योग भा. 1/1) योगः समाधिरिति ।

Iti tenoktatvācca. Taduktaṁ bhagavatā vyāsena (Yoga Bhā. 1/1) yogaḥ samādhirti.

It has been also said by the venerable Vyāsa (in his Commentary on the *Yoga-sūtras*, i.1), "*Yoga* is *samādhi.*"

Objection Raised on Purportion of Yoga as Samādhi

नन्वेवमष्टाङ्गयोगे चरमस्याङ्गस्य समाधित्वमुक्तं पतञ्जलिना (पात. यो. सू. 2/29)–'यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोऽष्टावङ्गानि योगस्य' इति । न चाङ्गी एवाङ्गत्वं गन्तुमुत्सहते । उपकार्योपकारकभावस्य दर्शपूर्णमासप्रयाजादौ भिन्नायतनत्वेनात्यन्तभेदात् । अतः समाधिरपि न योगशब्दार्थो युज्यत इति चेत्–।

Nanvevamaṣṭāṅgayoge caramasyāṅgasya samādhitvamuktaṁ patañjalinā (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 2/29)—'yamaniyamāsanaprāṇāyāma-pratyāhāradhāraṇādhyānasamādhayo'ṣṭāvaṅgāni yogasya' iti. Na caṅgī evāṅgatāṁ gantumutsahate. Upakāryopakāraka-bhāvasya darśapūrṇamāsaprayājādau bhinnāyatanatvenātyan-tabhedāt. Ataḥ samādhirapi na yogaśabdārtho yujyata iti cet.

An objection, however, may be here raised that "the term *samādhi* is used by Pātañjali (in ii. 29) in the sense of one of the eight ancillary parts[1] of the eightfold concentration (or *yoga*); and the whole cannot be thus itself a part as well as a whole, since the principal and the ancillary must be completely different from each other, as all their attendant circumstances must be different, just as we see in the *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices and their ancillary rites the *prayājas*, and therefore, *samādhi* cannot be the meaning of *yoga*."

तन्न युज्यते । व्युत्पत्तिमात्राभिधित्सया 'तदेवार्थमात्रनिर्भासं स्वरूपशून्यमिव समाधिः' (पात. यो. सू. 3/3) इति निरूपितचरमाङ्गवाचकेन समाधिशब्देनाङ्गिनो योगस्याभेदविवक्षया व्यपदेशोपपत्तेः । न च व्युत्पत्तिबलादेव सर्वत्रशब्दः प्रवर्तते। तथात्वे गच्छतीति गौरिति व्युत्पत्तेस्तिष्ठन्गौर्न स्यात् । गच्छन्देवदत्तश्च गौः स्यात् ।

Tanna yujyate. Vyutpattimātrābhidhitsayā 'tadevārthamātrani-rbhāsaṁ svarūpaśūnyamiva samādhiḥ' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 3/3) iti nirūpitacaramāṅgavācakena samādhiśabdenāṅgino yogasyābhe-davivakṣayā vyapadeśopapatteḥ. Na ca vyutpattibalādeva sarvatraśabdaḥ pravartate. Tathātve gacchatīti gauriti vyutpattestiṣṭhangaurna syāt. Gacchandevadattaśca gauḥ syāt.

We however reply that this objection is incorrect; for although the term *samādhi* is used for etymological reasons[2] to express the ancillary part which is really defined (in iii.3) as "the contemplation which assumes the form of the object, and is apparently devoid of any nature of its own;" still the further use of this term to describe the principal state is justified by the author's wish to declare the ultimate oneness of the two states (as the inferior ultimately merges into the superior). Nor can you hold that etymology alone can decide where a word can be used; because if so, as the word *go*, "a bull," is derived by all grammarians from the root *gam*, "to go," we ought never to use the phrase "a standing bull" (as the two words would be contradictory), and the man Devadatta, when going, would properly be called *go*, "a bull;" and

1 *Scil,* "forbearance, religious observance, postures, suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and meditation (*samādhi*)."

2 *See* Bhoja, Comm. iii.3, *samyagādhīyate mano yatra sa samādhiḥ.*

Pragmatic Meaning of Yoga-Concentration

प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं च प्रागुक्तमेव–चित्तवृत्तिनिरोध इति । तदुक्तं–'योगश्चित्त-वृत्तिनिरोधः', (पात. यो. सू. 1/2) इति ।

Pravṛttinimittaṁ ca prāguktameva—cittavṛttinirodha iti. Taduktaṁ—'yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 1/2) iti.

moreover, the *Sūtra*, i.2, distinctly gives us a definite justification for employing the word in this sense when it declares that "concentration (*yoga*) is the suppression of the modification of the thinking principle." (The second or principal sense of *samādhi* will therefore be quite distinct from the first or inferior).

ननु वृत्तीनां निरोधश्चेद्योगोऽभिमतस्तासां ज्ञानत्वेनात्माश्रयतया तन्निरोधोऽपि प्रध्वंसपदवेदनीयस्तदाश्रयो भवेत् । प्रागभावप्रध्वंसयोः प्रतियोगिसमाना-श्रयत्वनियमात् । ततश्च–'उपयन्नपयन्धर्मो विकरोति हि धर्मिणम्' इति न्यायेनात्मनः कौटस्थ्यं विहन्येतेति चेत्–

Nanu vṛttīnāṁ nirodhaścedyogo'bhimatastāsāṁ jñānatvenātmā-śrayatayā tannirodho'pi pradhvaṁsapadavedanīyastadāśrayo bhavet. Prāgabhāvapradhvaṁsayoḥ pratiyogisamānāśrayatva-niyamāt. Tataśca—'upayannapayandharmo vikaroti hi dharmiṇaṃ' iti nyāyenātmanaḥ kauṭasthyaṁ vihanyeteti cet—

"But surely if *yoga* is held to be the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle, then as these modifications abide in the soul as themselves partaking of the nature of knowledge, their suppression, or in other words their 'destruction,' would also abide in the soul, since it is a principle in logic that the antecedent non-existence and destruction abide in the same subject as the counter-entity to these negations;[1] and consequently in accordance with the maxim, 'This newly produced character will affect the subject in

1 Thus, *e.g.*, the antecedent non-existence and the destruction of the pot are found in the two halves in which the pot itself (the counter entity to its own non-existence) resides by intimate relation (*samavāyasambandha*).

which it resides,' the absolute independence of the soul itself would be destroyed."

तदापि न घटते । निरोधप्रतियोगिभूतानां प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रास्मृतिस्वरूपाणां वृत्तीनामन्तः करणाद्यपरपर्यायचित्तधर्मत्वाङ्गीकारात् । कूटस्थनित्या चिच्छक्तिर-परिणामिनि विज्ञानधर्माश्रयो भवितुं नार्हत्येव ।

Tadāpi na ghaṭate. Nirodhapratiyogibhūtānāṁ pramāṇaviparyayavikalpanidrāsmṛtisvarūpāṇāṁ vṛttīnāmantaḥ karaṇādyaparaparyāyacittadharmatvāṅgīkārāt. Kūṭasthanityā cicchaktiraparināmini vijñānadharmāśrayo bhavituṁ nārhatyeva.

This, however, we do not allow; because we maintain that these various modifications which are to be hindered,[1] such as "right notion," "misconception," "fancy," "sleep," and "memory" (i.6), are attributes of the internal organ *(citta)*, since the power of pure intelligence, which is unchangeable, cannot become the site of this discriminative perception.

न च चितिशक्तेरपरिणामित्वमसिद्धमिति मन्तव्यम् । 'चितिशक्तिरपरिणामिनी सदा ज्ञातृत्वात्, न यदेवं न तदेवं यथा चित्तादि' इत्याद्यनुमानसम्भवात् ।

Na ca citiśakterapariṇāmitvamasiddhamiti mantavyam. 'Citiśaktirapariṇāminī sadā jñātṛtvāt, na yadevaṁ na tadevāṁ yathā cittādi' ityādyanumānasambhavāt.

Nor can you object that this unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul[2] has not been proved, since there is an argument to establish it; for the intelligent soul must be unchangeable from the fact that it always knows while that which is not always knowing is not unchangeable, as the internal organ, etc.

तथा यद्यसौ पुरुषः परिणामी स्यात्तदा परिणामस्य कादाचित्कत्वात्तासां चित्तवृत्तीनां सदा ज्ञातत्त्वं नोपपद्येत । चिद्रूपस्य पुरुषस्य सदैवाधिष्ठातृत्वेनावस्थितस्य यदन्तरङ्गं निर्मलं सत्त्वं तस्यापि सदैव स्थितत्वात् । येन येनार्थेनोपरक्तं भवति तस्य दृश्यस्य सदैव चिच्छायापत्त्या भानोपपत्त्या पुरुषस्य निःसङ्गत्वं सम्भवति । ततश्च सिद्धं तस्य सदा ज्ञातृत्वमिति न कदाचित्परिणामित्वशङ्कावतरति ।

1 I read *niroddhavyānāṃ* for *nirodhānāṃ*.
2 *Cit-śakti* and *citi-śakti*=soul.

Tathā yadyasau puruṣaḥ pariṇāmī syāttadā pariṇāmasya kādācitkatvāttāsāṁ cittavṛttīnāṁ sadā jñātatvaṁ nopapadyeta. Cidrūpasya puruṣasya sadaivādhiṣṭhātṛtvenāvasthitasya yadantaraṅgaṁ nirmalaṁ sattvaṁ tasyāpi sadaiva sthitatvāt. Yena yenārthenoparaktaṁ bhavati tasya dṛśyasya sadaiva cicchāyāpattyā bhānopapattyā puruṣasya niḥsaṅgatvaṁ sambhavati. Tataśca siddhaṁ tasya sadā jñātṛtvamiti na kadācitpariṇāmitvaśaṅkāvatarati.

And so again, if this soul were susceptible of change, then, as this change would be occasional, we could not predicate its always knowing these modifications. But the true view is, that while the intelligent soul always remains as the presiding witness, there is another essentially pure substance[1] which abides always the same; and as it is this which is affected by any given object, so it is this perceptible substance which is reflected as a shadow on the soul and so produces an impression;[2] and thus, Soul itself is preserved in its own proper independence, and it is maintained to be the always knowing, and no suspicion of change alights upon it.

चित्तं पुनर्येन विषयेणोपरक्तं भवति स विषयो ज्ञातः, येनोपरक्तं न भवति तदज्ञातमिति वस्तुनोऽयस्कान्तमणिकल्पस्य ज्ञानाज्ञानकारणभूतोपरागधर्मित्वादयः सधर्मकं चित्तं परिणामीत्युच्यते ।

Cittaṁ punaryena viṣayenoparaktaṁ bhavati sa viṣayo jñātaḥ, yenoparaktaṁ na bhavati tadajñātamiti vastuno'yaskāntamaṇikalpasya jñānājñānakāraṇabhūtoparāgadharmitvādayaḥ sadharmakaṁ cittaṁ pariṇāmītyucyate.

That object by which the understanding becomes affected is known; that object by which it is not affected is not known; for the understanding is called "susceptible of change," because it resembles the iron, as it is susceptible of being affected or not by the influence or want of influence of the object which resembles the magnet,—this influence or want of influence producing respectively knowledge or the want of knowledge.

1 The *sattva* of the *buddhi* or the internal organ.
2 This second substance, "mind" or "understanding" *(buddhi, citta)*, is like a looking-glass, which reflects the image of the object on a second looking-glass (*sc.* soul).

Understanding and the Senses not Interconnected with the Objects

ननु चित्तस्येन्द्रियाणां चाहंकारिकाणां सर्वगतत्त्वात् सर्वविषयैरस्ति सदा सम्बन्धः । तथा च सर्वेषां सर्वदा सर्वत्र ज्ञानं प्रसज्येतेति चेत्–न । सर्वगतत्त्वेऽपि चित्तं यत्र शरीरे वृत्तिमत्, तेन शरीरेण सह सम्बन्धो येषां विषयाणां, तेष्वेवास्य ज्ञानं भवति, नेतरेषु–इत्यतिप्रसङ्गाभावात् । अत एवायस्कान्तमणिकल्पा विषया अयःसधर्मकं चित्तमिन्द्रियप्रणालिकयाऽभिसम्बध्योपरञ्जयन्तीत्युक्तम् ।

Nanu cittasyendriyāṇāṁ cāhaṅkārikāṇāṁ sarvagatatvāt sarvaviṣayairasti sadā sambandhaḥ. Tathā ca sarveṣāṁ sarvadā sarvatra jñānaṁ prasajyeteti cet—na. Sarvagatattve'pi cittaṁ yatra śarīre vṛttimat, tena śarīreṇa saha sambandho yeṣāṁ viṣayāṇāṁ, teṣvevāsya jñānaṁ bhavati, netareṣu—ityatiprasaṅgābhāvāt. Ata evāyaskāntamaṇikalpā viṣayā ayaḥsadharmakaṁ cittamindriyapraṇālikayā'bhisambadhyoparañjayantītyuktam.

"But inasmuch as the understanding and the senses which spring from egoism are all-pervading, are they not always connected with all objects, and thus, would it not follow that there should be a knowledge everywhere and always of all things ?" We reply that even although we grant that they are all-pervading, it is only where a given understanding has certain modifications in a given body, and certain objects are in a connection with that body, that the knowledge of these objects only, and none other, is produced to that understanding; and therefore, as this limitation is absolute, we hold that objects are just like magnets, and affect the the understanding just as these do iron,—coming in contact with it through the channels of the senses.

तस्माच्चित्तस्य धर्मा वृत्तयो नात्मनः । तथा च श्रुतिः–'कामः संकल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाश्रद्धा धृतिरधृतिर्ह्रीर्धीर्भीरित्येतत्सर्वं मन एव' (बृ. 1/5/3) इति । चिच्छक्तेरपरिणामित्वं पञ्चशिखाचार्यैराख्यायि–अपरिणामिनी भोक्तृशक्ति रिति । पतञ्जलिनापि–'सदा ज्ञाताश्चित्त वृत्तयस्तत्प्रभोः पुरुषस्यापरिणामित्वात्' (पात. यो. सू. 4/18) इति । चित्तपरिणामित्वेऽनुमानमुच्यते–चित्तं परिणामि ज्ञाताज्ञातविषयत्वात् श्रोत्रादिवदिति ।

Tasmāccittasya dharmā vṛttayo nātmanaḥ. Tathā ca śrutiḥ—'kāmaḥ saṅkalpo vicikitsā śraddhāśraddhā dhṛtiradhṛtirhīrdhīrbhīrityetatsarvaṁ mana eva' (Bṛ. 1/5/3) iti.

Cicchakterapariṇāmitvaṁ pañcaśikhācāryairākhyāyi—apariṇāminī bhoktṛśaktiriti. Patañjalināpi—'sadā jñātāścitta vṛttayastatprabhoḥ puruṣasyāpariṇāmitvāt. (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 4/18) iti. Cittapariṇāmitve'numānamucyate—cittaṁ pariṇāmi jñātājñātaviṣayatvāt śrotrādivaditi.

Therefore, the "modifications" belong to the understanding, not to the soul; and so says the Śruti, "Desire, volition, doubt, faith, want to faith, firmness, want of firmness,—all this is only the mind." Moreover, the sage *Pañcaśikha* declared the unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul, "The power that enjoys is unchangeable;" and so Pātañjali also (iv.18), "The modifications of the understanding are always known,—this arises from the unchangeableness of the Ruling Soul." The following is the argument drawn out formally to establish the changeableness of the understanding. The understanding is susceptible of change because its various objects are now known and now not known, just like the organ of hearing and the other organs of sense.

Three Kinds of Changes, i.e. Change of Property, Aspect and of Condition

परिणामश्च त्रिविधः प्रसिद्धो धर्मलक्षणावस्थाभेदात् । धर्मिणश्चित्तस्य नीलाद्यालोचनं धर्मपरिणामः । यथा कनकस्य कटकमुकुटकेयूरादि । धर्मस्य वर्तमानत्वादिलक्षणपरिणामः । नीलाद्यालोचनस्य स्फुटत्वादिरवस्थापरिणामः । कटकादेस्तु नवपुराणत्वादिरवस्थापरिणामः । एवमन्यत्रापि यथासम्भवं परिणामत्रितयमूहनीयम् । तथा च प्रमाणादिवृत्तीनां चित्तधर्मत्वात्तन्निरोधोऽपि तदाश्रय एवेति न किञ्चिदनुपपन्नम् ।

Pariṇāmaśca trividhaḥ prasiddho dharmalakṣaṇāvasthābhedāt. Dharmiṇaścittasya nīlādyālocanaṁ dharmapariṇāmaḥ. Yathā kanakasya kaṭakamukuṭakeyūrādi. Dharmasya vartamānatvādilakṣaṇapariṇāmaḥ. Nīlādyālocanasya sphuṭatvādiravasthāpariṇāmaḥ. Kaṭakādestu navapurāṇatvādiravasthāpariṇāmaḥ. Evamanyatrāpi yathāsambhavaṁ pariṇāmatritayamūhanīyam. Tathā ca pramāṇādivṛttīnāṁ cittadharmatvāttannirodho'pi tadāśraya eveti na kiñcidanupapannam.

Now, this change is notoriously threefold, *i.e.*, a change of "property," of "aspect,"[1] and of "condition." When the subject, the un-

1 Vācaspati explains *lakṣaṇa* as *kālabheda*.

derstanding, perceives the colour "blue,"etc., there is a change of "property" just as when the substance "gold" becomes bracelet, a diadem, or an armlet; there is a change of "aspect" when the property becomes present, past, or future, and there is a change of "condition" when there is a manifestation or non-manifestation[1] of the perception, as of blue, etc.; or, in the case of gold, the (relative) newness or oldness (at two different moments) would be its change of condition. These three kinds of change must be traced out by the reader for himself in different other cases. And thus, we conclude that there is nothing inconsistent in our thesis that, since "right notion" and the other modifications are attributes of the understanding, their "suppression" will also have its site in the same organ.

Suppression of Mind's Modifications is not Yoga : An Objection

ननु वृत्तिनिरोधो योग इत्यङ्गीकारे सुषुप्त्यादौ क्षिप्तमूढादिचित्तवृत्तीनां निरोधसम्भवाद् योगत्वप्रसङ्गः । न चैतद्युज्यते । क्षिप्ताद्यवस्थासु क्लेशप्रहाणादेरसम्भवान्निः श्रेयसपरिपन्थित्वाच्च । तथा हि–क्षिप्तं नाम तेषु तेषु विषयेषु क्षिप्यमाणमस्थिरं चित्तमुच्यते । तमःसमुद्रे मग्नं निद्रावृत्तिभावितं मूढमिति गीयते । क्षिप्ताद्विशिष्टं चित्तं विक्षिप्तमिति गीयते ।

Nanu vṛttinirodho yoga ityaṅgīkāre suṣuptyādau kṣiptamūḍhādicittavṛttīnāṁ nirodhasambhavād yogatvaprasaṅgaḥ. Na caitadyujyate. Kṣiptādyavasthāsu kleśaprahāṇāderasambhavānniḥ śreyasaparipanthitvācca. Tathā hi—kṣiptaṁ nāma teṣu teṣu viṣayeṣu kṣipyamāṇamasthiraṁ cittamucyate. Tamaḥsamudre magnaṁ nidrāvṛttibhāvitaṁ mūḍhamiti gīyate. Kṣiptādviśiṣṭaṁ cittaṁ vikṣiptamiti gīyate.

(Our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection to what we have said above.) "But if we accept your definition that '*yoga* is the suppression of the modifications of the *citta*,' this will apply also to 'sound sleep,' since there too we may find the suppression (or suspension) of the modifications found in *kṣipta, vikṣipta,*

1 I take *ādi* as meaning *asphuṭatva*. The change of state takes place between the several moments or the *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma*. *Cf.* the Commentaries on iii. 13.

mūḍha,[1] etc.; but this would be wrong, because it is impossible for the 'afflictions' to be abolished so long as those states called *kṣipta*, etc., remain at all, and because they only hinder the attainment of the *summum bonum*. Let us examine this more closely. For the understanding is called *kṣipta, 'restless*,' when it is restless (with an excess of the quality *rajas*), as being tossed about amidst various objects which engage it. It is called *mūḍha*, 'blinded,' when it is possessed by the modification 'sleep' and is sunk in a sea of darkness (owing to an excess of the quality *tamas*). It is called *vikṣipta*, 'unrestless,' when it is different from the first state[2] (as filled with the quality *sattva*.

विशेषो नाम–चञ्चलं हि मनः कृष्ण प्रमाथि बलवद् दृढम् (गीता 6/34) इति न्यायेनास्थिरस्यापि मनसः कद्राचित्कसमुद्भूतविषयस्थैर्यसम्भवेन स्थैर्यम् । अस्थिरत्वं च स्वाभाविकं व्याध्याद्यनुशयजनितं वा । तदाह–'व्याधिस्त्यानसंशयप्रमादालस्याविरतिभ्रान्तिदर्शनालब्धभूमिकत्वानवस्थितत्त्वानि चित्तविक्षेपास्तेऽन्तरायाः ।' (पात. यो. सू. 1/30) इति ।

Viśeṣo nāma—cañcalaṁ hi manaḥ kṛṣṇa pramāthi balavad dṛḍhaṃ (Gītā 6/34) iti nyāyenāsthirasyāpi manasaḥ kadrācitkasamudbhūtaviṣayasthairyasambhavena sthairyaṃ. Asthiratvaṁ ca svābhāvikaṁ vyādhyādyanuśayajanitaṁ vā. Tadāha—'vyādhistyānasaṁśayapramādālasyāviratibhrāntidarśa-nālabdhabhūmikatvānavasthitattvāni cittavikṣepāste'ntarāyāḥ. (Pā. Yo. Sū.1/30) iti.

We must here, however, note a distinction; for, in accordance with the line of the *Bhagavad Gītā* (vi. 34), 'the mind, O Kṛṣṇā, is fickle, turbulent, violent, and obstinate,' the mind, though naturally restless, may occasionally become fixed by the transient fixedness of its objects; but restlessenss is innate to it, or it is produced in it by sickness, etc., or other consequences of former actions; as it is said (in the *Yoga Sūrtas*, i. 30), 'Sickness, languor, doubt, carelessness, laziness, addiction to objects, erroneous perception, failure to attain some stage, and instability,—these distractions of the mind are called 'obstacles'.

1 These are generally called the five states of the thinking principle, *cittabhūmayas* or *avasthās*. *Cf.* Commentary, i.2,18.

2 These three conditions respectively characterise men, demons, and gods.

तत्र दोषत्रयवैषम्यनिमित्तो ज्वरादिर्व्याधिः । चित्तस्याकर्मण्यत्वं स्त्यानम् । विरुद्धकोटिद्वयावगाहि ज्ञानं संशयः । समाधिसाधनानामभावनं प्रमादः । शरीरवाक्चित्तगुरुत्वादप्रवृत्तिरालस्यम् । विषयाभिलाषोऽविरतिः । अतस्मिंस्तद्-बुद्धिर्भ्रान्तिदर्शनम् । कुतश्चिन्निमित्तात्समाधिभूमेरलाभोऽलब्धभूमिकत्वम् । लब्धायामपि तस्यां चित्तस्याप्रतिष्ठाऽनवस्थितत्वमित्यर्थः ।

तत्मान्न वृत्ति निरोधो योगपक्षनिक्षेपमर्हतीति चेत्–

Tatra doṣatrayavaiṣamyanimitto jvarādirvyādhiḥ. Cittasyākarmaṇyatvaṁ styānaṃ. Viruddhakoṭidvayāvagāhi jñānaṁ saṁśayaḥ. Samādhisādhanānāmabhāvanaṁ pramādaḥ. Śarīravākcittagurutvādapravṛttirālasyaṃ. Viṣayābhilāṣo'viratiḥ. Atasmiṁstadbuddhirbhrāntidarśanaṃ. Kutaścinnimittātsamādhribhūmeralābho'labdhabhūmikatvaṃ. Labdhāyāmapi tasyāṃ cittasyapratiṣṭhā'navasthitatvamityarthaḥ.

Tatmānna vṛtti nirodho yogapakṣanikṣepamarhatīti cet—

Here 'sickness' means fever, etc., caused by the want of equilibrium between the three humours; 'languor' is the mind's want of activity; 'doubt' is a sort of notion which embraces two opposite alternatives; 'carelessness' is a negligence of using the means for producing meditation; 'laziness' is a want of exertion from heaviness of body, speech, or mind; 'addiction to objects' is an attachment to objects of sense; 'erroneous perception' is a mistaken notion of one thing for another; 'failure to attain some stage' is the failing for some reason or other to arrive at the state of abstract meditation; 'instablility' is the mind's failure to continue there, even when the state of abstract meditation has been reached. Therefore, we maintain that the suppression of the mind's modifications cannot be laid down as the definition of *yoga*.

Solution to the Objection Raised

मैवं वोचः । हेयभूतक्षिप्ताद्यवस्थात्रये वृत्तिनिरोधस्य योगत्वासम्भवेऽप्युपादेय-योरेकाग्रनिरुद्धावस्थयोर्वृत्तिनिरोधस्य योगत्वसम्भवात् । एकतानं चित्तमेकाग्र-मुच्यते । निरुद्धसकलवृत्तिकं संस्कारमात्रशेषं चित्तं निरुद्धमिति भण्यते ।

Maivaṁ vocaḥ. Heyabhūtakṣiptādyavasthātraye vṛttinirodhasya yogatvāsambhave'pyupādeyayorekāgraniruddhāvasthayorvṛttinirodhasya yogatvasambhavāt. Ekatānaṁ cittamekāgramucyate. Niruddhasakalavṛttikaṁ. saṁskāramātraśeṣaṁ cittaṁ niruddhamiti bhaṇyate.

We reply, that even although we allow that, so far as regards the three conditions of the mind called *kṣipta*, *mūḍha*, and *vikṣipta*, which (as being connected with the three qualities) are all to be avoided as faulty states, the suppression of the modifications in these conditions is itself something to be avoided (and so cannot be called *yoga*), this does not apply to the other two conditions called *ekāgra* and *niruddha*, which are to be pursued and attained; and therefore, the suppression of the modifications in these two praiseworthy conditions is rightly to be considered as *yoga*. Now by *ekāgra* we mean that state when the mind, entirely filled with the *sattva* quality, is devoted to the one object of meditation; and by *niruddha* we mean that state when all its developments are stopped, and only their latent impressions (or potentialities) remain.

Meditation and Its Kinds

स च समाधिर्द्विविधः–सम्प्रज्ञातासम्प्रज्ञातभेदात् । तत्रैकाग्रचेतसि यः प्रमाणादिवृत्तीनां बाह्यविषयाणां निरोधः स संप्रज्ञातसमाधिः । सम्यक् प्रज्ञायतेऽस्मिन् प्रकृतेर्विविक्ततया ध्येयमिति व्युत्पत्तेः । स चतुर्विधः सवितर्कादिभेदात् ।

Sa ca samādhirdvividhaḥ—samprājñātāsamprajñātabhedāt. Tatraikāgracetasi yaḥ pramāṇādivṛttīnāṁ bāhyaviṣayāṇāṁ nirodhaḥ sa saṁprajñātasamādhiḥ. Samyak prajñāyate'smin prakṛterviviktatayā dhyeyamiti vyutpatteḥ. Sa caturvidhaḥ savitarkādibhedāt.

Now this *samādhi*, "meditation" (in the highest sense), is twofold : "that in which there is distinct recognition" (*saṁprajñāta*) (*Yoga Sū.*, i. 17,18).[1] The former is defined as that meditation where the thought is intent on its own object, and all the "modifications," such as "right notion," etc., so far as they depend on external things, are suppressed, or, according to the etymology of the term, it is where the intellect[2] is thoroughly recognised (*samyak prajñāyate*) as distinct from Nature. It has a fourfold division, as *savitarka*, *savicāra*, *sānanda*, and *sāsmita*.

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1 Much of this is taken from Bhoja's Commentary, and I have borrowed Ballantyne's translation.

2 Can *citta* mean "soul" here?

समाधिर्नाम भावना । सा च भाव्यस्य विषयान्तरपरिहारेण चेतसि पुनः पुनर्निवेशनम् । भाव्यं च द्विविधम्–ईश्वरस्तत्त्वानि च । तान्यपि द्विविधानि जडाजडभेदात् । जडानि प्रकृतिमहदहंकारादीनि चतुर्विंशतिः । अजडः पुरुषः । तत्र तदा पृथिव्यादीनि स्थूलानि विषयत्वेनादाय पूर्वापरानुसन्धानेन शब्दार्थोल्लेखसम्भेदेन च भावना प्रवर्तते स समाधिः सवितर्कः । यदा तन्मात्रान्तःकरणलक्षणं सूक्ष्मं विषयमालम्ब्य देशाद्यवच्छेदेन भावना प्रवर्तते तदा सविचारः ।

Samādhirnāma bhāvanā. Sā ca bhāvyasya viṣayāntaraparihāreṇa cetasi punaḥ punarniveśanam. Bhāvyaṁ ca dvividham—īśvarastattvāni ca. Tānyapi dvividhāni jaḍājaḍabhedāt. Jaḍāni prakṛtimahadahaṅkārādīni caturviṁśatiḥ. Ajaḍaḥ puruṣaḥ. Tatra tadā pṛthivyādīni sthūlāni viṣayatvenādāya pūrvāparānusandhānena śabdārthollekhasambhedena ca bhāvanā pravartate sa samādhiḥ savitarkaḥ. Yadā tanmātrāntaḥkaraṇalakṣaṇaṁ sūkṣmaṁ viṣayamālambya deśādyavacchedena bhāvanā pravartate tadā savicāraḥ.

Now this "meditation" is a kind of "pondering" (*bhāvanā*), which is the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all other objects, that which is to be pondered. And that which is thus to be pondered is of two kinds, being either Īśvara or the twenty-five principles. And these principles also are of two kinds—senseless and not senseless. Twenty-four including nature, intellect, egoism, etc., are senseless; that which is not senseless is Soul. Now among these objects which are to be pondered, when, having taken as the object the gross elements, as earth, etc., pondering is pursued in the form of an investigation as to which is antecedent and which consequent,[1] or in the form of a union of the word, its meaning, and the idea which is to be produced (*cf.*i.42); then the meditation is called "argumentative" (*savitarka*).

यदा रजस्तमोलेशानुविद्धं चित्त भाव्यते तदा सुखप्रकाशमयस्य सत्त्वस्योद्रेकात्सानन्दः । यदा रजस्तमोलेशानभिभूतं शुद्धं सत्त्वमालम्बनीकृत्य या प्रवर्तते भावना तदा तस्यां सत्त्वस्य न्यग्भावाच्चितिशक्तेरुद्रेकाच्च सत्तामात्रावशेषत्वेन सास्मितः समाधिः । तदुक्तं पतञ्जलिना–वितर्कविचारानन्दास्मितारूपानुगमात्संप्रज्ञातः (पात. यो. सू. 1/17) इति ।

1 *I.e.*, as, *e.g.*, whether the senses produce the elements or the elements the senses, etc.

Yadā rajastamoleśānuviddhaṁ cittaṁ bhāvyate tadā sukhaprakāśamayasya sattvasyodrekātsānandaḥ. Yadā rajastamoleśanabhibūtaṁ śuddhaṁ sattvamālambanīkṛtya yā pravartate bhāvanā tadā tasyāṁ sattvasya nyagbhāvāccitiśakterudrekācca sattāmātrāvaṣeṣatvena sāsmitaḥ samādhiḥ. Taduktaṁ patañjalinā—vitarkavicārānandāsmitārūpānugamātsaṁprajñātaḥ. (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 1/17) iti.

When, having taken as its object something subtile, as the five subtile elements and the internal organ, pondering is pursued in relation to space, time, etc., then the meditation is called "deliberative" (*savicāra*). When the mind, commingled with some "passion" and "darkness," is pondered, then the meditation is called "beatific" (*sānanda*), because "goodness" is then predominant, which consists in the manifestation of joy.[1] When pondering is pursued, having as its object, the pure element of "goodness," unaffected by even a little of "passion" or "darkness," then that meditation is called "egoistical"(*sāsmita*), because here personal existence[2] only remains, since the intellectual faculty becomes now predominant, and the quality of "goodness" has become quite subordinate (as a mere stepping-stone to higher things).

सर्ववृत्तिविरोधे त्वसम्प्रज्ञातः समाधिः । ननु सर्ववृत्तिनिरोधो योग इत्युक्ते संप्रज्ञाते व्याप्तिर्न स्यात् । तत्र सत्त्वप्रधानायाः सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिलक्षणाया वृत्तेरनिरोधादिति चेत्–तदेतद्वार्तम् । क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयपरिपन्थिचित्तवृत्तिनिरोधो योग इत्यङ्गीकारात् ।

Sarvavṛttivirodhe tvasamprajñātaḥ samādhiḥ. Nanu sarvavṛttinirodho yoga ityukte saṁprajñāte vyāptirna syāt. Tatra sattvapradhānāyāḥ sattvapuruṣānyatākhyātilakṣaṇāyā vṛtteranirodhāditi cet—tadetadvārtam. Kleśakarmavipākāśayaparipanthicittavṛttinirodho yoga ityaṅgīkārāt.

But the "meditation, where distinct recognition is lost," consists in the suppression of all "modifications" whatever.

"But" (it may be asked) "was not 'concentration' defined as the suppression of all the modifications? How, then, can the 'meditation where there is distinct recognition' be included in it at

1 In p. 164, line 4 *infra*, read *sukhaprakāśamayasya*.

2 In p. 164, line 2 *infra*, read *sattāmātra* for *sattva*. Bhoja well distinguishes *asmitā* from *ahaṅkāra*.

all, since we still find active in it that modification of the mind, with the quality of goodness predominant, which views the soul and the quality of goodness as distinct from each other?" This, however, is untenable, because we maintain that concentration is the suppression of the "modifications" of the thinking power, as especially stopping the operation of the "afflictions," the "actions,"the "fructifications," and the "stock of deserts."[1]

Five Kinds of Afflictions

क्लेशाः पुनः पञ्चधा प्रसिद्धाः-अविद्यास्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्लेशाः (पात. यो. सू. 2/3) इति ।

Kleśāḥ punaḥ pañcadhā prasiddhāḥ—avidyāsmitārāgadveṣābhiniveśāḥ kleśāḥ (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 2/3) iti.

नन्वविद्येत्यत्र किमाश्रीयते ? पूर्वपदार्थप्राधान्यममक्षिकं वर्तत इतिवत् । उत्तरपदार्थप्राधान्यं वा राजपुरुष इतिवत् । अन्यपदार्थप्राधान्यं वा अमक्षिको देश इतिवत् ।

Nanvavidyetyatra kimāśrīyate ? Pūrvapadārthaprādhānyamamakṣikaṁ vartata itivat. Uttarapadārthaprādhānyaṁ vā rājapuruṣa itivat. Anyapadārthaprādhānyaṁ vā amaksiko deśa itivat.

The "afflictions" (*kleśa*) are well known as five, viz., ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence. "But here a question is at once raised, In what sense is the word *avidyā*, "ignorance," used here? Is it to be considered as an *avyayībhāva* compound, where the former portion is predominant, as in the word "aboveboard"?[2] or is it a *tatpuruṣa* (or *karmadhāraya*) compound, where the latter portion is predominant, as in the word "town-clerk"? Or is it a *bahuvrīhi* compound, where both portions are dependent on something external to the compound, as "blue-eyed" ?

तत्र न पूर्वः । पूर्वपदार्थप्रधानत्वेऽविद्यायां प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधोपपत्तौ क्लेशादिकारकत्वानुपपत्तेः । अविद्याशब्दस्य स्त्रीलिङ्गत्वाभावापत्तेश्च । न द्वितीयः । कस्यचिदभावेन विशिष्टाया विद्यायाः क्लेशादिपरिपन्थित्वेन तद्बीजत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

1 For these see *infra*, and *cf. Yoga Sū.*, ii. 3, 12, 13.

2 I have ventured to alter the examples, to suit the English translation.

Tatra na pūrvaḥ. Pūrvapadārthapradhānatve'vidyāyāṁ prasajyapratiṣedhopapattau kleśādikārakatvānupapatteḥ. Aviddyāśabdasya strīliṅgatvābhāvāpatteśca. Na dvitīyaḥ. Kasyacidabhāvena viṣiṣṭāyā vidyāyāḥ kleśādiparipanthitvena tadbījatvānupapatteḥ.

It cannot be the first; for if the former portion of the compound were predominant; then we should have the negation the emphatic part in *avidyā* (*i.e.*, it would be an instance of what is called the express negation, or *prasajya-pratiṣedha*);[1] and consequently, as *avidyā* would be thus emphatically a negation, it would be unable to produce positive results, as the "afflictions," etc., and the very form of the word should not be feminine, but neuter. It cannot be the second; for any knowledge, whatever thing's absence, it may be characterised by (*a*+*vidyā*), opposes the "afflictions," etc., and cannot therefore, be their source.

न तृतीयः । नञोऽस्त्यर्थानां बहुव्रीहिर्वा चोत्तरपदलोपश्चेति वृत्तिकारवचनानुसारेणाविद्यमाना विद्या यस्याः सा अविद्या बुद्धिरिति समासार्थसिद्धौ तस्या अविद्यायाः क्लेशादिबीजत्वानुपपत्तेः । विवेकख्यातिपूर्वकसर्ववृत्तिनिरोधसंपन्नायास्तस्याः तथात्वप्रसङ्गाच्च ।

Na tṛtīyaḥ. Naño'styarthānāṁ bahuvrīhirvā cottarapadalopaśceti vṛttikāravacanānusārenāvidyamānā vidyā yasyāḥ sā avidyā buddhiriti samāsārthasiddhau tasyā avidyāyāḥ kleśādibījatvānupapatteḥ. Vivekakhyātipūrvakasarvavṛttinirodhasaṁpannāyāstasyāḥ tathātvaprasaṅgācca.

Nor can it be the third; for then,—in accordance with the words of the author of the *Vṛtti*,[2] "there is a *bahuvrīhi* compound which is formed with some word meaning 'existence' used after 'not,' with

1 Where the negation is prominent it is called *prasajya-pratiṣedha,* but where it is not prominent, we have the *paryodāsa* negation. In the former, the negative is connected with the verb; in the latter it is generally compound with some other word, as, *e.g.*—

(a) "Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note."

(b) "Unwatched the garden bough shall sway."

The Former corresponds to the logician'satyantābhāva, the latter to anyonyābhāva or bheda.

2 *Cf.* The *vārttika* in *Siddhānta Kaum.*, i. 401.

the optional elision of this subsequent word"[1]—we must explain this supposed *bahuvrīhi* compound *avidyā* as follows : "That *buddhi* is to be characterised as *avidyā* (*sc.* an adjective), of which there is not a *vidyā* existing." But this explanation is untenable; for such an *avidyā* could not become the source of the "afflictions;"[2] and yet, on the other hand, it ought to be their source,[3] even though, it were associated with the suppression of all the "modifications,"[4] and were also accompanied by that discriminative knowledge of the soul and the quality of goodness (which is found in the *sāsmita* meditation).

उक्तं चास्मितादीनां क्लेशानामविद्यानिदानत्वम्–'अविद्या क्षेत्रमुत्तरेवां प्रसुप्ततनुविच्छिन्नोदाराणाम्' (पात. यो. सू. 2/4) इति । तत्र प्रसुप्तत्त्वं प्रबोधसहकार्यभावेनानभिव्यक्तिः । तनुत्वं प्रतिपक्षभावनया शिथिलीकरणम् । विच्छिन्नत्वं बलवता क्लेशेनाभिभवः । उदारत्वं सहकारिसन्निधिवशात्कार्यकारित्वम् ।

Uktaṁ cāsmitādīnāṁ kleśānāmavidyānidānatvaṃ—'avidyā kṣetramuttarevāṁ prasuptatanuvicchinnodārāṇāṃ' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 2/4) iti. Tatra prasuptattvaṁ prabodhasahakāryabhāvenānabhivyaktiḥ. Tanutvaṁ pratipakṣabhāvanayā śithilīkaraṇaṃ. Vicchinnatvaṁ balavatā kleśenābhibhavaḥ. Udāratvaṁ sahakārisannidhivasātkāryakāritvaṃ.

"Now it is said (in the *Yoga Sūtras*, ii. 4), "Ignorance is the field (or place of origin, *i.e.*, source) of the others, whether they be dormant, extenuated, intercepted, or simple." They are said to be "dormant" when they are not manifested for want of something to wake them up; they are called "extenuated" when through one's meditating on something that is opposed to them, they are rendered inert; they are called "intercepted" when they are overpowered by some other strong "affliction;" they are called "simple" when they produce their several effects in the direct vicinity of what co-operates with them.

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1 Thus *adhana* stands for *avidyamānadhana*, with *vidyamāna* omitted in the compound.

2 As its subject would confessedly be *buddhi*.

3 As it is *avidyā* after all.

4 In p. 165, lines 16,17, read (with my MS. of Vācaspati's Gloss), *sarvavṛtinirodhasampannāyā api tathātvaprasaṅgāt.*

तदुक्तं वाचस्पतिमिश्रेण व्यासभाष्यव्याख्यायाम्–

Taduktaṁ vācaspatimiśreṇa vyāsabhāṣyavyākhyāyāṃ—

This has been expressed by Vācaspati Miśra, in his Gloss on Vyāsa's Commentary, in the following memorial stanza :—

6. प्रसुप्तास्तत्त्वलीनानां तन्ववस्थाश्च योगिनाम् ।
विच्छिन्नोदाररूपाश्च क्लेशा विषयसङ्गिनाम् ।। (तत्त्ववै. 2/4) इति ।

Prasuptāstattvalīnānāṁ tanvavasthāśca yogināṃ,
Vicchinnodārarūpāśca kleśā viṣayasaṅgināṃ.
(Tattvavai. 2/4)iti.

"The dormant 'afflictions' are found in those souls which are absorbed in the *tattvas* (*i.e.*, not embodied, but existing in an interval of mundane destruction); the 'extenuated'[1] are found in *yogins*; but the 'intercepted' and the 'simple' in those who are in contact with worldly objects."

द्वन्द्ववत्स्वतन्त्रपदार्थद्वयानवगमादुभयपदार्थप्रधानत्वं नाशङ्कितम् । तस्मात्पक्षत्रयेऽपि क्लेषादिनिदानत्वमविद्यायाः प्रसिद्धं हीयेतेति चेत्–

Dvandvavatsvatantrapadārthadvayānavagamādubhayapadāthapradhānatvaṁ nāśaṅkitaṃ. Tasmātpakṣatraye'pi kleśādinidānatvamavidyāyāḥ prasiddhaṁ hīyeteti cet—

"No one proposes the fourth solution of the compound *avidyā* as a *dvandva* compound,[2] where both portions are equally predominant, because we cannot recognise here two equally independent subjects. Therefore, under any one of these three admissible alternatives[3] the common notion of ignorance as being the cause of the 'afflictions' would be overthrown."

Ignorance (Avidyā) is of Four Kinds

तदपि न शोभनं विभाति । पर्युदासशक्तिमाश्रित्याविद्याशब्देन विद्याविरुद्धस्य विपर्ययज्ञानस्याभिधानमिति वृद्धैरङ्गीकारात् तदाह–

Tadapi na śobhanaṁ vibhāti. Paryudāsaśaktimāśrityāvidyāśabdena vidyāviruddhasya viparyajñānasyābhidhānamiti vṛddhairaṅgīkārāt. Tadāha—

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1 I read *tanvavasthāśca* with the printed edition of Vācaspati's Gloss. If *tanudagdhāśca* is correct, it must mean *tanutvena dagdhāḥ*.

2 As in *rāmalakshmaṇau*, Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa.

3 I read *pakṣatraye* for *pakṣadvaye*.

(We do not, however, concede this objector's view), because we may have recourse to the other kind of negation called *paryudāsa* (where the affirmative part is emphatic), and maintain that *avidyā* means a contradictory (or *wrong*) kind of knowledge, the reverse of *vidyā*; and so it has been accepted by ancient writers. Thus, it has been said—

7. नामधात्वर्थयोगे तु नैव नञ् प्रतिषेधकः ।
वदत्यब्राह्मणाधर्मावन्यमात्रविरोधिनौ ॥ इति ।

Nāmadhātvarthayoge tu naiva nañ pratiṣedhakaḥ,
Vadatyabrāhmaṇādharmāvanyamātravirodhinau. iti.

"The particle implying 'negation' does not signify 'absence' (or 'non-existence') when connected with a noun or a root; thus the words *abrāhmaṇa* and *adharma* respectively signify, 'what is other than a Brāhmaṇa and 'what is contrary to justice.'"

8. वृद्धप्रयोगगम्यो हि शब्दार्थः सर्व एव नः ।
तेन यत्र प्रयुक्तो यो न तस्मादपनीयते ॥ इति ।

Vṛddhaprayogagamyo hi śabdārthaḥ sarva eva naḥ,
Tena yatra prayukto yo na tasmādapanīyate. iti.

And again—

"We are to learn further all the uses of words from the custom of the ancient writers; therefore a word must not be wrested from the use in which it has been already employed."

वाचस्पतिमिश्रैरप्युक्तं–लोकाधीनावधारणो हि शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धः । लोके चोत्तरपदार्थप्रधानस्यापि नञ उत्तरपदाभिधेयोपमर्दकस्य तद्विरुद्धतया तत्र तत्रोपलब्धेरिहापि तद्विरुद्धे प्रवृत्तिरिति ।

Vācaspatimiśrairapyuktaṁ—lokādhīnāvadhāraṇo hi śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ. Loke cottarapadārthapradhānasyāpi naña uttarapadābhidheyopamardakasya tadvirudvatayā tatra tatropalabdherihāpi tadviruddhe pravṛttiriti.

Vācaspati also says,[1] "The connection of words and their meanings depends on general consent for its certainty; and since we occasionally see that a *tatpuruṣa* negation, where the latter portion is properly predominant, may overpower the direct meaning of this

1 In his Comm. on *Sūt.*, ii. 5.

latter portion by its contradiction of it, we conclude that even here too (in *avidyā*) the real meaning is something contrary to *vidyā*" (i.e., the negative "non-knowledge" becomes ultimately the positive "ignorance"[1]).

एतदेवाभिप्रेत्योक्तम्–'अनित्याशुचिदुःखानात्मसु नित्यशुचिसुखात्मख्यातिरविद्या' (पा. यो. सू. 2/5) इति । अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिर्विपर्यय इत्युक्तं भवति । तद्यथा–अनित्ये घटादौ नित्यत्वाभिमानः । अशुचौ कायादौ शुचित्वप्रत्ययः ।

Etadevābhipretyoktam—'anityāśuciduḥkhānātmasu nityaśucisukhātmakhyātiravidyā' (Pā. Yo. Sū. 2/5) iti. Atasminstadbuddhirviparyaya ityuktaṁ bhavati. Tadyathā—anitye ghaṭādau nityatvābhimānaḥ. Aśucau kāyādau śucitvapratyayaḥ.

It is with a view to this that it is said in the *Yoga Aphorisms* (ii. 5), "Ignorance is the notion that the non-eternal, the impure, pain, and the non-soul are (severally) eternal, pure, pleasure, and soul." *Viparyaya*, "misconception," is defined as "the imagining of a thing in what is not that thing,"[2] (*i.e.*, in its opposite); as, for instance, the imagining the "eternal" in a "non-eternal" thing, *i.e.*, a jar, or the imagining the "pure" in the "impure" body[3] when it has been declared by a proverbial couplet[4]—

9. स्थानाद्बीजादुपष्टम्भान्निष्यन्दान्निधनादपि ।
कायमाधेयशौचत्वात्पण्डिता ह्यशुचिं विदुः ॥ इति ।

Sthānādbījādupaṣṭambhānniṣyandānnidhanādapi,
Kāyamādheyaśaucatvātpaṇḍitā hyaśuciṁ viduḥ. iti.

"The wise recognise the body as impure, from its original place (the womb),—from its primal seed,—from its composition (of humours, etc.),—from perspiration,—from death (as even a Brāhmaṇa's body defiles),—and from the fact that it has to be made pure by rites."

1 Thus *inimicus* in not a "friend," nor, on the other hand, a "non-friend," but something positive, an "enemy." So *agoṣpada* is said to mean "a forest."

2 *Cf. Yoga Sūt.*, i.8.

3 In p. 166, line 4 *infra*, read *kāyādau* for *kāryādau*.

4 This couplet is quoted by Vyāsa in his Comm. on *Yoga Sūtras*, ii. 5, and I have followed Vācaspati in his explanation of it; he calls it *vaiyāsakī gāthā*.

'परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्त्यविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः' (पात. यो. सू. 2/15) इति न्यायेन दुःखे स्रक्चन्दनवनितादौ सुखत्वारोपः । अनात्मनि देहादावात्मबुद्धिः । तदुक्तम्-

'Pariṇāmatāpasaṁskāraduḥkhairguṇavṛttyavirodhācca duḥkhameva sarvaṁ vivekinaḥ' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 2/15) iti nyāyena duḥkhe srakcandanavanitādau sukhatvāropaḥ. Anātmani dehādāvātmabuddhiḥ. Taduktam—

So, —in accordance with the principle anounced in the aphorism (ii.15), "To the discriminating everything is simply pain, through the pain which arises in the ultimate issue of eveything,[1] or through the anxiety to secure it (while it is enjoyed), or through the latent impressions which it leaves behind, and also from the mutual opposition of the influences of the three qualities" (in the form of pleasure, pain, and stupid indifference), —ignorance transfers the idea of "pleasure" to what is really "pain," as, *e.g.*, garlands, sandal-wood, women, etc.; and similarly, it conceives the "non-soul," *e.g.*, the body, etc., as the "soul." As it has been said—

10. अनात्मनि च देहादावात्मबुद्धिस्तु देहिनाम् ।
अविद्या तत्कृतो बन्धस्तन्नाशो मोक्षं उच्यते ॥ इति ।

Anātmani ca dehādāvātmabuddhistu dehinām,
Avidyā tatkṛto bandhastannāśo mokṣaṁ ucyate. iti.

"But ignorance is when living beings transfer the notion of 'soul' to the 'non-soul,' as the body; etc."

"This causes bondage; but in the abolition thereof is liberation."

Thus, this ignorance consists of four kinds.[2]

एवमियमविद्या चतुष्पदा भवति । नन्वेतेषु अविद्याविशेषेषु किंचिदनुगतं सामान्यलक्षणं वर्णनीयम् । अन्यथा विशेषस्यासिद्धेः तथा चोक्तं भट्टाचार्यैः-

Evamiyamavidyā catuṣpadā bhavati. Nanveteṣu avidyāviśeṣeṣu kiñcidanugataṁ sāmānyalakṣaṇaṁ varṇanīyam. Anyathā viśeṣasyāsiddheḥ. Tathā coktaṁ bhaṭṭācāryaiḥ—

"But (it may be objected) in these four special kinds of ignorance

1 Since, the continued enjoyment of an object only increases the desire for more, and its loss gives correspondent regret (*cf. Bhag. G.* xviii. 38).

2 Literally, "it has four feet."

should there not be given some general definition applying to them all, as otherwise their special characteristics cannot be established? For thus, it has been said by Bhaṭṭa Kumārila—

11. सामान्यलक्षणं मुक्त्वा विशेषस्यैव लक्षणम् ।
न शक्यं केवलं वक्तुमतोऽप्यस्य न वाच्यता ॥ इति ।

तदपि न वाच्यम् । अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिरिति सामान्यलक्षणाभिधानेन दत्तोत्तरत्वात् ।

Sāmānyalakṣaṇaṁ muktyā viśeṣasyaiva lakṣaṇam,
Na śakyaṁ kevalaṁ vaktumato'pyasya na vācyatā. iti.

Tadapi na vācyam. Atasmiṁsadbuddhiriti sāmānyalakṣaṇābhidhānena dattottaratvāt.

"Without some general definition, a more special definition cannot be given by itself; therefore, it must not be even mentioned here."

Definition of Egoism, Desire and Aversion

सत्त्वपुरुषयोरहमस्मीत्येकताभिमानोऽस्मिता । तदप्युक्तं-'दृग्दर्शनशक्त्योरेकात्मतेवास्मिता' (पात. यो. सू. 2/6) इति । सुखाभिज्ञस्य सुखानुस्मृतिपूर्वकः सुखसाधनेषु तृष्णारूपो गर्धो रागः । दुःखाभिज्ञस्य तदनुस्मृतिपुरस्सरं तत्साधनेषु निवृत्तिर्द्वेषः । तदुक्तं-सुखानुशयी रागः' (पात. यो. सू. 2/7), 'दुःखानुशयी द्वेषः' (पात. यो. सू. 2/8) इति ।

Sattvapuruṣayorahamasmītyekatābhimāno'smitā. Tadapyuktaṁ— 'dṛgdarśanaśaktyorekātmatevāsmitā' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 2/6) iti. Sukhābhijñasya sukhānusmṛtipūrvakaḥ sukhasādhaneśu tṛṣṇārūpo gardho rāgaḥ. Duḥkhābhijñasya tadanusmṛtipurassaraṁ tatsādhaneṣu nivṛttirdveṣaḥ. Taduktaṁ—'sukhānuśayī rāgaḥ' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 2/7), 'duḥkhānuśayī dveṣaḥ' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 2/8) iti.

This, however, must not be urged here, as it is sufficiently met by the general definition of misconception, already adduced above, as "the imagining of a thing in its opposite."

"Egoism" (*asmitā*) is the notion that the two separate things, the soul and the quality of purity,[1] are one and the same, as is said, (ii.6), "Egoism is the identifying of the seer with the power of sight." "Desire (*rāga*) is a longing, in the shape of a thirst, for the

1 Thus "sight," or the power of seeing, is modification of the quality of *sattva* unobstructed by *rajas* and *tamas*.

means of enjoyment, preceded by the remembrance of enjoyment, on the part of one who has known joy. Aversion" (*dveṣa*) is the feeling of blame felt towards the means of pain, similarly preceded by the remembrance of pain, on the part of one who has known it. This is expressed in the two aphorisms, "Desire is what dwells on pleasure;" "Aversion is what dwells on pain" (ii.7, 8).

The Word Dwelling (Anvśaya) may Have 'in' Suffix

किमत्रानुशयिशब्दे ताच्छील्यार्थे णिनिरिनिर्वा मत्वर्थीयोऽभिमतः? नाद्यः । 'सुप्यजातौ णिनिस्ताच्छील्ये' (पा. सू. 3/2/78) इत्यत्र सुपीति वर्तमाने पुनः सुब्ग्रहणस्योपसर्गनिवृत्यर्थत्वेन सोपसर्गाद्धातोर्णिनेरनुत्पत्तेः । यथाकथंचित् तदङ्गीकारेऽपि 'अचो ञ्णिति' (पाणि. सू. 7/2/115) इति वृद्धिप्रसक्तावतिशाय्यादिपदवत् अनुशायिपदस्य प्रयोगप्रसङ्गात् ।

Kimatrānuśayiśabde tācchīlyārthe ṇinirinirvā matvarthīyo'bhimataḥ ? Nādyaḥ. 'Supyajātau ṇinistācchīlye' (Pāṇini Sū. 3/2/78) ityatra supīti vartamāne punaḥ subgrahaṇasyopasarganivṛttyarthatvena sopasargāddhātorṇineranutpatteḥ. Yathākathañcit tadaṅgīkāre'pi 'aco ñṇiti' (Pāṇi. Sū. 7/2/115) iti vṛddhiprasaktāvatiśāyyyādipadavat anuśāyipadasya prayogaprasaṅgāt.

Here a grammatical question may be raised, "Are we to consider this word *anuśayin* ('dwelling') as formed by the *kṛt* affix *ṇini* in the sense of 'what is habitual', or the *taddhita* affix *ini* in the sense of *matup*? It cannot be the former, since the affix *ṇini* cannot be used after a root compounded with a preposition as *anuśī*; for, as the word *supi* has been exerting its influence in the following sūtras, this word must have been introduced a second time in the Sūtra iii. 2, 78, *supy ajātau ṇinis tācchīye*,[1] on purpose to exclude prepositions, as these have no case terminations; and even if we did strain a point to allow them, still it would follow by the Sūtra, vii. 2, 115, *aco ñṇiti*,[2] that the radical vowel must be subject to *vṛddhi*, and so the word must be *anuśāyin*, in accordance with the analogy of such words as *atiśāyin*, etc.

1 "Let the affix *ṇini* be used after a root in the sense of what is habitual, when the *upapada*, or subordinate word, is not a word meaning 'genus' and ends in a ease."

2 "Let *vṛddhi* be the substitute of a base ending in a vowel, when that which has an indicatory *ñ* or *ṇ* follows;" *ṇini* has an indicatory *ṇ*.

न द्वितीयः । 'एकाक्षरात्कृतो जातेः सप्तम्यां न च तौ स्मृतौ' इति तत्प्रतिषेधात् । अत्र चानुशयशब्दस्याजन्तत्वेन कृदन्तत्वात् । तस्मादनुशयिशब्दो दुरुपपाद इति चेत्–नैतद् भद्रम् । भावानवबोधात् । प्रायिकाभिप्रायमिदं वचनम् ।

Na dvitīyaḥ. 'Ekākṣarātkṛto jāteḥ saptamyāṁ na ca tau smṛtau' iti tatpratiṣedhāt. Atra cānuśayaśabdasyājantatvena kṛdantatvāt. Tasmādanuśayiśabdo durupapāda iti cet—Naitad bhadram. Bhāvānavabodhāt. Prāyikābhiprāyamidaṁ vacanam.

Nor is the latter view tenable (*i.e.*, that it is the *taddhita* affix *ini*[1]), since *ini* is forbidden by the technical verse – 'These two affixes[2] are not used after a monosyllable nor a *kṛit* formation, nor a word meaning 'genus,' nor with a word in the locative case;' and the word *anuśaya* is clearly a *kṛt* formation as it ends with the affix *ac*[3] (which brings it under this prohibition, and so renders it insusceptible of the affix *ini*). Consequently, the word *anuśayin* in the Yoga aphorism is one the formation of which it is very hard to justify."[4] This cavil, however, is not to be admitted; since the rule is only to be understood as applying generally, not absolutely, as it does not refer to something of essential importance.

अत एवोक्तं वृत्तिकारेण–इतिकरणो विवक्षार्थः सर्वत्राभिसम्बध्यते इति । तेन क्वचिद् भवति–कार्यी कार्यिकस्तण्डुली तण्डुलिकः इति । तथा च कृदन्ताज्जातेश्च प्रतिषेधस्य प्रायिकत्वम् । अनुशयशब्दस्य कृदन्ततया इनेरुपपत्तिरिति सिद्धम् ।

Ata evoktaṁ vṛttikāreṇa—itikaraṇo vivakṣārthaḥ sarvatrābhisambadhyate iti. Tena kvacid bhavati—kāryi kāryikastaṇḍulī taṇḍulikaḥ iti. Tathā ca kṛdantājjāteśca pratiṣedhasya prāyikatvaṃ. Anuśayaśabdasya kṛdantatayā inerupapattiriti siddhaṃ.

Hence, the author of the *Vṛtti* has said – "The word *iti*, as implying

1 *Sc. anuśaya+ini=anuśayin.*

2 *Ini* and *ṭhan*, which respectively leave *in* and *ika*; thus *daṇḍika*. The line is quoted by Boehtlingk, vol. ii. p. 217, on *Pāṇ*. V. 2, 115, and is explained in the *Kāśikā*, ad loc. The different prohibitions are illustrated by the examples :— (1) *svavān, khavān*; (2) *kārakavān;* (3) *vyāghravān, siṁhavān*; (4) *daṇḍavatī* (*i.e., daṇḍā asyām santi*).

3 By iii. 3, 56.

4 It is curious to see the great grammarian's favourite study obtruding itself here on such a slender pretext.

the idea of popular acceptation, is everywhere connected with the examples of this rule[1] (*i.e.*, it is not an absolute law)."

Therefore, sometimes the prohibited cases are found, as *kāryin*, *kāryika* (where the affixes are added after a *kṛt* formation), *taṇḍulin, taṇḍulika* (where they are added after a word meaning "genus"). Hence, the prohibition is only general, not absolute, after *kṛt* formations and words meaning "genus," and therefore, the use of the affix *ini* is justified, although the word *anuśaya* is formed by a *kṛt* affix. This doubt therefore, is settled.

What is Tenacity of Mundane Existence ?

पूर्वजन्मानुभूतमरणदु:खानुभववासनाबलात्सर्वस्य प्राणभृन्मात्रस्या कृमेरा च विदुषः संजायमानः शरीरविषयादेर्मम वियोगो मा भूदिति प्रत्यहं निमित्तं विना प्रवर्तमानो भयरूपोऽभिनिवेशः पञ्चमः क्लेशः । मा न भूवं हि भूयासमिति प्रार्थनायाः प्रत्यात्ममनुभवसिद्धत्वात् । तदाह–'स्वरसवाही विदुषोऽपि तथा रूढोऽभिनिवेशः' (पात. यो. सू. 2/9) इति । ते चाविद्यादयः पञ्च सांसारिकविविधदुःखोपहारहेतुत्वेन पुरुषं क्लिश्नन्तीति क्लेशाः प्रसिद्धाः ।

Pūrvajanmānubhūtamaraṇaduḥkhānubhavavāsanābalātsarvasya prāṇabhṛnmātrasyā kṛmerā ca viduṣaḥ sañjāyamānaḥ śarīraviṣayādermama viyogo mā bhūditi pratyahaṁ nimittaṁ vinā pravartamāno bhayarūpo'bhiniveśaḥ pañcamaḥ kleśaḥ. Mā na bhūvaṁ hi bhūyāsamiti prārthanāyāḥ pratyātmmanubhavasiddhatvāt. Tadāha—'svarasavāhī viduṣo'pi tathā rūḍho'bhiniveśaḥ' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 2/9) iti. Te cāvidyādayaḥ pañca sāṁsārikavividhaduḥkhopahārahetutvena puruṣaṁ kliśnantīti kleśāḥ prasiddhāḥ.

The fifth "affliction," called "tenacity of mundane existence" (*abhiniveśa*), is what prevails in the case of all living, beings, from the worm up to the philosopher springing up daily, without an immediate cause, in the form of a dread, "May I not be separated from the body, things sensible, etc.," through the force of the impression left by the experience of the pain of the deaths which were suffered in previous lives, this is proved by universal experience, since every individual has the wish, "May I not cease to be,"

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1 See the *Kāśikā* on *Pāṇ*. v. 2, 115. For *vivakṣārtha* (meaning "general currency"), compare Commentary on *Pāṇ*. ii. 2, 27. The edition in the Benares *Paṇḍit* reads *viṣayaniyamārtha*.

"May I be." This is declared in the aphorism, "Tenacity of mundane existence,flowing on through its own nature, is notorious even in the case of the philosopher" (ii.9). These five, "ignorance," etc., are well known as the "afflictions" (*kleśa*), since they afflict the soul, as bringing upon it various mundane troubles.

Definition of Works, Experience and Stock

कर्माणि विहितप्रतिषिद्धरूपाणि ज्योतिष्टोमब्रह्महत्यादीनि । विपाकाः कर्मफलानि जात्यायुर्भोगाः । आफलविपाकाच्चित्तभूमौ शेरत इत्याशयाः धर्माधर्मसंस्काराः । तत्परिपन्थिचित्तवृत्तिनिरोधो योगः । निरोधो नाभावमात्रमभिमतम् । तस्य तुच्छत्वेन भावरूपसाक्षात्कारजननक्षमत्वासम्भवात् । किन्तु तदाश्रयो मधुमतीमधुप्रतीका-विशोका-संस्कारशेषाव्यपदेश्यश्चित्तस्यावस्थाविशेषः । निरुध्यन्तेऽस्मिन्प्रमाणाद्याश्चित्तवृत्तम इति व्युत्पत्तेरूपपत्तेः ।

Karmāṇi vihitapratiṣiddharūpāṇi jyotiṣṭomabrahmahatyādīni. Vipākāḥ karmaphalāni jātyāyurbhogāḥ. Āphalavipākāccitta-bhūmau śerata ityāśayāḥ dharmādharmasaṁskārāḥ. Tatparipanthicittavṛttinirodho yogaḥ. Nirodho nābhāvamātramabhimatam. Tasya tucchatvena bhāvarūpasākṣātkārajananakṣamatvāsambhavāt. Kintu tadāśrayo madhumatīmadhupratīka-viśokā-saṁskāraśeṣāvyapadeṣyaścittasyāvasthāviśeṣaḥ. Nirudhyante'sminpramāṇādyāscittavṛttaya iti vyutpatterūpapatteḥ.

(We next describe the *karmāśaya* of ii. 12, the "stock of works" or "merits" in the mind.) "Works" (*karman*) consist of enjoined or forbidden actions, as the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, brāhmanicide, etc. "Stock" (*āśaya*) is the balance of the fruits of previous works, which lie stored up in the mind in the form of "mental deposits" of merit or demerit, until they ripen in the individual soul's own experience as "rank," "years," and "enjoyment" (ii.13).

Two Significant Measures of Concentration—The Exercise and The Dispassion

'अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां वृत्तिनिरोधः । तत्र स्थितौ यत्नोऽभ्यासः । (पात. यो. सू. 1/12-13) । वृत्तिरहितस्य चित्तस्य स्वरूपनिष्ठः प्रशान्तवाहितारूपः परिणामविशेषः स्थितिः । तं निमित्तीकृत्य यत्नः पुनः पुनस्तथात्वेन चेतसि निवेशनमभ्यासः । 'चर्मणि द्वीपिनं हन्ति' इतिवत् निमित्तार्थेय सप्तमीत्युक्तं भवति ।

'Abhyāsavairāgyābhyāṁ vṛttinorodhāḥ. Tatra sthitau yatno'bhyāsaḥ'. (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 1/12-13). Vṛttirahitasya cittasya svarūpaniṣṭhaḥ praśāntavāhitārūpaḥ pariṇāmaviśeṣaḥ sthitiḥ. Taṁ nimittīkṛtya yatnaḥ punaḥ punastathātvena cetasi niveśanamabhyāsaḥ. 'Carmaṇi dvīpinaṁ hanti' itivat nimittārtheya saptamītyuktaṁ bhavati.

Now "concentration" (*yoga*) consists (by i.2) in "the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle," which stops the operation of the "afflictions," etc.; and this "suppression is not considered to be merely the non-existence of the modifications (*i.e.*, a mere negation), because, if it were a mere negation, it could not produce positive impressions on the mind; but it is rather the site of this non-existence,[1]—a particular state of the thinking principle, called by the four names (which will be fully described hereafter), *madhumatī*, *madhupratīkā*, *viśokā*, and *saṁskāraśeṣatā*. The word *nirodha* thus corresponds to its etymological explanation as "that in which the modifications of the thinking principle, right notion misconception, etc., are suppressed (*nirudhyante*). This suppression of the modifications is produced by "exercise" and "dispassion" (i.12). "Exercise is the repeated effort that the internal organ shall remain in its proper state" (i. 13). This "remaining in its proper state" is a particular kind of development, whereby the thinking principle remains in its natural state, unaffected by those modifications which at different times assume the form of revealing, energising, and controlling.[2] "Exercise" is an effort directed to this, an endeavour again and again to reduce the internal organ to such a condition. The locative case, *sthitau*, in the aphorism is intended to express the object or aim, as in the well-known phrase, "He kills the elephant for its skin,"[3]

'दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यम्' (पात. यो. सू. 1/15) । ऐहिकपारत्रिकविषयादौ दोषदर्शनान्निरभिलाषस्य 'ममैते विषया वश्याः', 'नाहमेतेषां वश्यः' इति विमर्शो वैराग्यमित्युक्तं भवति ।

'Dṛṣṭānuśravikaviṣayavitṛṣṇasya vaśīkārasaṁjñā vairāgyam' (Pāta. Yo. Su. 1/15) aihikapāratrikaviṣayādau doṣadarśanānnirabhilāṣasya 'mamaite viṣayā vaśyāḥ,' 'nāhameteṣāṁ vaśyaḥ' iti vimarśo vairāgyamityuktaṁ bhavati.

"Dispassion is the consciousness of having overcome desire in him who thirsts after neither the objects that are seen nor those that are heard of in revelation" (i.15). "Dispassion is thus the reflection, "These objects are subject to me, not I to them," in one who feels no interest in the things of this world or the next, from perceiving the imperfections attached to them.

Practical Concentration as Precedent Condition to Attain Meditation

समाधिपरिपन्थिक्लेशतनूकरणार्थं च समाधिलाभार्थं प्रथमं क्रियायोगविधानपरेण योगिना भवितव्यम् । क्रियायोगसम्पादनेऽभ्यासवैराग्ययोः सम्भवात् । तदुक्तं भगवता–

Samādhiparipanthikleśatanūkaraṇārthaṁ ca samādhilābhārthaṁ prathamaṁ kriyāyogavidhānapareṇa yoginā bhavitavyaṃ. Kriyāyogasampādane'bhyāsavairāgyayoḥ sambhavāt. Taduktaṁ bhagavatā—

Now, in order to reduce the "afflictions" which hinder meditation and to attain meditation, the *yogin* must first direct his attention to practical concentration, and "exercise" and "dispassion" are of especial use in its attainment. This has been said by Kṛṣṇa in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (vi.3)—

12. आरुरुक्षोर्मुनेर्योगं कर्म कारणमुच्यते ।
योगारूढस्य तस्यैव शमः कारणमुच्यते ॥ (गीता 6/3) इति ।

Ārurukṣormuneryogaṁ karma kāraṇamucyate,
Yogārūḍhasya tasyaiva śamaḥ kāraṇamucyate. (Gītā 6/3) iti

"Action is the means to the sage who wishes to rise to *yoga*;"
"But to him who has risen to it, tranquillity is said to be the means."

क्रियायोगश्चोपदिष्टः पतञ्जलिना–'तपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि क्रियायोगः' (पात. यो. सू. 2/1) इति । तपःस्वरूपं निरूपितं याज्ञवल्क्येन–

Kriyāyogaścopadiṣṭaḥ patañjalinā—'tapaḥsvādhyāyeśvara-praṇidhānāni kriyāyogaḥ'. (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 2/1) iti. Tapaḥsvarūpaṁ nirūpitaṁ yājñavalkyena —

Pātañjali has thus defined the practical *yoga* : "Practical concen-

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1 *i.e.*, Thus *nirodha* is not *vṛtter abhāvaḥ*, but *abhāvasyāśryaḥ*.

2 I read in p. 168, last line, *prakasapravṛttiniyamarūpa*, from Bhoja's comment on i. 12.

3 See *Kāśikā*, ii. 3, 36.

tration is mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation to the Lord" (ii. 1). Yājñavalkya has described "mortification" –

13. विधिनोक्तेन मार्गेण कृच्छ्रचान्द्रायणादिभिः ।
शरीरशोषणं प्राहुस्तपसां तप उत्तमम् ।। इति ।

Vidhinoktena mārgeṇa kṛcchṛcāndrāyaṇādibhiḥ,
Śarīrasoṣaṇaṁ prāhustapasāṁ tapa uttamam. iti.

"By the way prescribed in sacred rule, by the difficult *cāndrāyaṇa* fast, etc."

"Thus, to dry up the body they called the highest of all mortifications."[1]

प्रणवगायत्रीप्रभृतीनां मन्त्राणामध्ययनं स्वाध्यायः ।

Praṇavagāyatrīprabhṛtīnāṁ mantrāṇāmadhyayanaṁ svādhyā-yaḥ.

"Recitation of texts" is the repetition of the syllable *Oṁ*, the *Gāyatrī*, etc.

Chanted or Non-chanted Mantras

ते च मन्त्रा द्विविधाः—वैदिकास्तान्त्रिकाश्च । वैदिकाश्च द्विविधाः-प्रगीताः अप्रगीताश्च । तत्र प्रगीताः सामानि । अप्रगीताश्च द्विविधाः- छन्दोबद्धास्तद्विलक्षणाश्च । तत्र प्रथमा ऋचः, द्वितीया यजूंषि । तदुक्तं जैमिनिना–'तेषामृग्यत्रार्थवशेन पादव्यवस्था । गीतिषु सामाख्या । शेषे यजुः शब्दः ।' (जै. सू. 2/1/33-35) इति ।

Te ca mantrā dvividhāḥ—Vaidikāstāntrikāśca. Vaidikāśca dvividhāḥ—pragītāḥ apragītāśca. Tatra pragītāḥ sāmāni. Apragītāśca dvividhāḥ—chandobaddhāstadvilakṣaṇāśca. Tatra prathamā ṛcaḥ, dvitīyā yajūṁṣi. Taduktaṁ jaimininā—'teṣāmṛgyatrārthavaśena pādavyavasthā. Gītiṣu sāmākhyā. Śeṣe yajuḥ śabdaḥ'. (Jai. Sū. 2/1/33-35) iti.

Now these *mantras* are of two kinds, *Vaidik* and *Tāntrik*. The *Vaidik* are also of two kinds, those chanted and those not chanted. Those chanted are the *sāmans*; those not chanted are either in *metre*, *i.e.*, the *ṛcās*, or in prose, *i.e.*, the *yajūṁṣi*, as has been said

1 This passage probably occurs in the *Yājñavalkyagītā* of Yogi-yājña-valkya. See Colebrooke's Essays (ed.2), vol. i, p. 145, note.

by Jaimini,[1] "Of these, that is a *ṛcās* in which by the force of the sense there is a definite division into pādas (or portions of a verse); the name *sāman* is applied to chanted portions; the word *yajus* is applied to the rest."

तन्त्रेषु कामिककारणप्रपञ्चाद्यागमेषु ये ये वर्णितास्ते तान्त्रिकाः । ते पुनर्मन्त्रास्त्रिविधाः—स्त्रीपुंनपुंसकभेदात् । तदाह—

Tantreṣu kāmikakāraṇaprapañcādyāgameṣu ye ye varṇitāste tānrikāḥ. Te punarmantrāstrividhāḥ—strīpuṁnapuṁsaka-bhedāt. Tadāha—

Those *mantras* are called *Tāntrik* which are set forth in sacred books that are directed to topics of voluntary devotion;[2] and these are again threefold, as female, male, and neuter; as it has been said –

14. स्त्रीपुंनपुंसकत्वेन त्रिविधा मन्त्रजातयः ।
स्त्रीमन्त्रा वह्निजायान्ता नमोऽन्ताः स्युर्नपुंसकाः ।।

Strīpuṁnapuṁsakatvena trividhā mantrajātayaḥ,
Strīmantrā vahnijāyāntā namo'ntāḥ syurnapuṁsakāḥ.

"The *mantras* are of three kinds, as female, male, and neuter;"

"The female are those which end in the wife of fire (*i.e.*, the exclamation *svāhā*); the neuter those which end in *namas*;"

15. शेषा पुमांसस्ते शस्ताः सिद्धा वश्यादिकर्मणि ।। इति ।

Śeṣā pumāṁsaste śastāḥ siddhā vaśyādikarmaṇi. iti.

"The rest are male, and considered the best. They are all powerful in mesmerising another's will, etc."

Ten Preliminary Ceremonies of Mantra

जननादिसंस्काराभावेऽपि निरस्तसमस्तदोषत्वेन सिद्धिहेतुत्वात् सिद्धत्वम् । स च संस्कारो दशविधः कथितः शारदातिलके—

Jananādisaṁskārābhāve'pi nirastasamastadoṣatvena siddhihe-tutvāt siddhatvam. Sa ca saṁskāro daśavidhaḥ kathitaḥ śāradātilake—

They are called "all-powerful" (*siddha*) because they counteract all

1 *Mīmāṁsā Sūtras*, ii. 1. 35-37.

2 The *tantras* are not properly concerned with what is *nitya* or *naimittika*; they are *kāmya*.

defects in their performance, and produce their effect even when the ordinary consecrating ceremonies, as bathing, etc., have been omitted.

Now, the peculiar "consecrating ceremonies" (*saṁskāra*) are ten, and they have been thus described in the *Śāradātilaka*—

16. मन्त्राणां दश कथ्यन्ते संस्काराः सिद्धिदायिनः ।
निर्दोषतां प्रयान्त्याशु ते मन्त्राः साधु संस्कृताः ॥

Mantrāṇāṁ daśa kathyante saṁskārāḥ siddhidāyinaḥ,
Nirdoṣatāṁ prayāntyāśu te mantrāḥ sādhu saṁskṛtāḥ.

"There are said to be ten preliminary ceremonies which give to *mantras* efficacy:"

"These mantras are thus made complete; they are thoroughly consecrated."

17. जननं जीवनं चैव ताडनं बोधनं तथा ।
अभिषेकोऽथ विमलीकरणाप्यायने पुनः ॥

Jananaṁ jīvanaṁ caiva tāḍanaṁ bodhanaṁ tathā,
Abhiṣeko'tha vimalīkaraṇāpyāyane punaḥ.

"The 'begetting,' the 'vivifying,' the 'smiting,' the 'awakening,'"

"The 'sprinkling,' the 'purifying,' the fattening ."

18. तर्पणं दीपनं गुप्तिर्दशैता मन्त्रसंस्क्रियाः ।
मन्त्राणां मातृकायन्त्रादुद्धारो जननं स्मृतम् ॥

Tarpaṇaṁ dīpanaṁ guptirdaśaitā mantrasaṁskriyā,
Mantrāṇāṁ mātṛkāyantrāduddhāro jananaṁ smṛtam.

"The 'satisfying,' the 'illumining,' the 'concealing,'— these are the ten consecrations of *mantras*."

"The 'begetting' (*janana*) is the extracting of the *mantra* from its vowels and consonants."

19. प्रणवान्तरितान्कृत्वा मन्त्रवर्णाञ्जपेत्सुधीः ।
मन्त्रार्णसंख्यया तद्धि जीवनं सम्प्रचक्षते ॥

Praṇavāntaritānkṛtvā mantravarṇāñjapetsudhīḥ,
Mantrārṇasaṅkhyayā taddhi jīvanaṁ sampracakṣate.

"The wise man should mutter the several letters of the *mantra*, each united to *Oṁ*,"

"According to the number of the letters. This they call the 'vivifying' (*jīvana*)."

20. मन्त्रवर्णान्समालिख्य ताडयेच्चन्दनाम्भसा ।
प्रत्येकं वायुबीजेन ताडनं तदुदाहृतम् ॥

Mantravarṇānsamālikhya tāḍayeccandanāmbhasā,
Pratyekaṁ vāyubījena tāḍanaṁ tadudāhṛtam.

"Having written the letters of the mantra, let him smite each with sandal-water,"

"Uttering at each the mystic 'seed' of air.[1] This is called the 'smiting' (*tāḍana*)."

21. विलिख्य मन्त्रवर्णास्तु प्रसूनैः करवीरजैः ।
मन्त्राक्षरेण संख्यातैर्हन्यात्तद्बोधनं स्मृतम् ॥

Vilikhya mantravarṇāstu prasūnaiḥ karavīrajaiḥ,
Mantrākṣareṇa saṅkhyātairhanyāttadbodhanaṁ smṛtam.

"Having written the letters of the *mantra*, let him strike them with oleander flowers."

"Each enumerated with a letter. This is called the 'awakening' (*bodhana*)."

22. स्वतन्त्रोक्तविधानेन मन्त्री मन्त्रार्णसंख्यया ।
अश्वत्थपल्लवैर्मन्त्रमभिषिञ्चेद्विशुद्धये ॥

Svatantroktavidhānena mantrī mantrārṇasaṅkhyayā,
Aśvatthapallavairmantramabhiṣiñcedviśuddhaye.

"Let the adept, according to the ritual prescribed in his own special *tantra*,"

"Sprinkle the letters, according to their number, with leaves of the Ficus religiosa. This is the sprinkling' (*abhiṣeka*)."

23. संचिन्त्य मनसा मन्त्रं ज्योतिर्मन्त्रेण निर्दहेत् ।
मन्त्रे मलत्रयं मन्त्री विमलीकरणं हि तत् ॥

Sañcintya manasā mantraṁ jyotirmantreṇa nirdahet,
Mantre malatrayaṁ mantrī vimalīkaraṇaṁ hi tat.

"Having meditated on the *mantra* in his mind, let him consume by the *jyoti-mantra*."

1 The *vīja* of air is the syllable *jaṃ*.

"The threefold impurity of the *mantra*. This is the 'purification' (*vimalī-karaṇa*)."

24. तारव्योमाग्निमनुयुग्ज्योतिर्मन्त्र उदाहृतः ।
कुशोदकेन जप्तेन प्रत्यर्णं प्रोक्षणं मनोः ॥

Tāravyomāgnimanuyugjyotirmantra udāhṛtaḥ,
Kuśodakena japtena pratyarṇaṁ prokṣaṇaṁ manoḥ.

"The utterance of the *jyotir-mantra*, together with *Oṁ*, and the *mantras* of *Vyoman* and *Agni*."

"And the sprinkling of every letter with water from a bunch of *kuśa* grass."

25. वारिबीजेन विधिवदेतदाप्यायनं मतम् ।
मन्त्रेण वारिणा मन्त्रे तर्पणं तर्पणं स्मृतम् ॥

Vāribījena vidhivadetadāpyāyanaṁ matam,
Mantreṇa vāriṇā mantre tarpaṇaṁ tarpaṇaṁ smṛtam.

"With the mystical seed of water[1] duly muttered,—this is held to be the 'fattening' (*āpyāyana*)."

"The satiating libation over the *mantra* with *mantra*-hallowed water is the 'satisfying' (*tarpaṇa*)."

26. तारमायारमायोगो मनोर्दीपनमुच्यते ।
जप्यमानस्य मन्त्रस्य गोपनं त्वप्रकाशनम् ॥

Tāramāyāramāyogo manordīpanamucyate,
Japyamānasya mantrasya gopanaṁ tvaprakāśanam.

'The joining of the *mantra* with *Om* and the 'seeds' of *Māyā*[2] and *Ramā*[3] is called its 'illumining' (*dīpana*)."

27. संस्कारा दशमन्त्राणां सर्वतन्त्रेषु गोपिताः ।
यत्कृत्वा सम्प्रदायेन मन्त्री वाञ्छितमश्नुते ॥

Saṁskārā daśamantrāṇāṁ sarvatantreṣu gopitāḥ,
Yatkṛtvā sampradāyena mantrī vāñchitamaśnute.

"The non-publication of the *mantra* which is being muttered—this is its 'concealing' (*gopana*)."

1 The *vīja* of water is the syllable *bam*.
2 *Hrīṁ*.
3 *Śrīṁ*.

"These ten consecrating ceremonies are kept close in all tantras;

"And the adept who practises them according to the tradition obtains his desire."

28. रुद्धकीलितविच्छिन्नसुप्तशप्तादयोऽपि च ।
मन्त्रदोषाः प्रणश्यन्ति संस्कारैरेभिरुत्तमैः ॥ इति ।
तदलमकाण्डताण्डवकल्पेन तन्त्ररहस्योद्घोषणेन ।

Ruddhakīlitavicchinnasuptaśaptādayo'pi ca,
Mantradoṣāḥ praṇaśyanti saṁskārairebhiruttamaiḥ. iti.
Tadalamakāṇḍatāṇḍavakalpena tantrarahasyodghoṣaṇena.

"And *ruddha, kīlita, vichinna, supta, śapta*, and the rest,"

"All these faults in the *mantra* rites are abolished by these excellent consecrations."

Resignation to the Lord and Practical Yoga

ईश्वरप्रणिधानं नामाभिहितानामनभिहितानां च सर्वासां क्रियाणां परमेश्वरे परमगुरौ फलानपेक्षया समर्पणम् । यत्रेदमुक्तम्–

Īśvarapraṇidhānaṁ nāmābhihitānāmanabhihitānāṁ ca sarvāsāṁ kriyānāṁ parameśvare paramagurau phalānapekṣayā samarpaṇam. Yatredamuktam—

But enough of this venturing to make public the *tantra* mysteries connected with *mantras*, which has suddenly led us astray like an unexpected *Bacchanalian* dance.[1]

The third form of practical *yoga*, "resignation to the Lord" (*īśvara-praṇidhāna*), is the consigning all one's works, whether mentioned or not, without regard to fruit, to the Supreme Lord, the Supremely Venerable. As it has been said—

29. कामतोऽकामतो वापि यत्करोमि शुभाशुभम् ।
तत्सर्वं त्वयि विन्यस्तं त्वत्प्रयुक्तः करोम्यहम् ॥ इति ।

Kāmato'kāmato vāpi yatkaromi śubhāśubham,
Tatsarvaṁ tvayi vinyastaṁ tvatprayuktaḥ karomyaham. iti.

"Whatever I do, good or bad, voluntary or involuntary,"

"That is all made over to thee; I act as impelled by thee."

1 *Tāṇḍava* is the frantic dance of the god Śiva and his votaries.

क्रियाफलसंन्यासोऽपि भक्तिविशेषापरपर्यायं प्रणिधानमेव । फलानभिसंधानेन कर्मकरणात् । तथा च गीयते गीतासु भगवता–

Kriyāphalasaṁnyāso'pi bhaktiviśeṣāparaparyāyaṁ praṇidhānameva. Phalānabhisandhānena karmakaraṇāt. Tathā ca gīyate gītāsu bhagavatā—

This self-resignation is also sometimes defined as "the surrender of the fruits of one's actions," and is thus a peculiar kind of faith, since most men act only with a selfish regard to the fruit. Thus, it is sung in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (ii.47)-

30. कर्मण्येवाधिकारस्ते मा फलेषु कदाचन ।
मा कर्मफलहेतुर्भूर्मा ते सङ्गोऽस्त्वकर्मणि ॥ (गी. 2/47) इति ।

Karmaṇyevādhikāraste mā phaleṣu kadācana,
Mā karmaphalaheturbhūrmā te saṅgo'stvakarmaṇi.
(Gītā 2/47) iti.

"Let thy sole concern be with action and never with the fruits;"
"Be not attracted by the fruit of the action, nor be thou attached to inaction."

फलाभिसंधेरुपघातकत्वमभिहितं भगवद्भिर्नीलकण्ठभारतीश्रीचरणैः–

Phalābhisandherupaghātakatvamabhihitaṁ bhagavadbhirnīlakaṇṭhabhāratīśrīcaraṇaiḥ—

The harmfulness of aiming at the fruit of an action has been declared by the venerable *Nīlakaṇṭha-bhāratī*—

31. अपि प्रयत्नसम्पन्नं कामेनोपहतं तपः ।
न तुष्टये महेशस्य श्वलीढमिव पायसम् ॥ इति ।

Api prayatnasampannaṁ kāmenopahataṁ tapaḥ,
Na tuṣṭaye maheśasya śvalīḍhamiva pāyasam. iti.

"Even a penance accomplished by great effort, but vitiated by desire,"
"Produces only disgust in the Great Lord, like milk which has been licked by a dog."

सा च तपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानात्मिका क्रिया योगसाधनत्वाद्योग इति शुद्धसारोपलक्षणावृत्त्याश्रयणेन निरूप्यते, यथायुर्घृतमिति ।

Sā ca tapaḥsvādhyāyeśvarapraṇidhānātmikā kriyā yogasādhanatvādyoga iti śuddhasāropalakṣaṇāvṛttyāśrayaṇena nirūpyate, yathāyurghṛtamiti.

Practice of Mortification, Recitation and Resignation are Components to Yoga

शुद्धसारोपलक्षणा नाम लक्षणाप्रभेदः । मुख्यार्थबाधतद्योगाभ्यामर्थान्तरप्रतिपादनं लक्षणा । सा द्विविधा–रूढिमूला प्रयोजनमूला च । तदुक्तं काव्यप्रकाशे–

Śuddhasāropalakṣaṇā nāma lakṣaṇāprabhedaḥ. Mukhyārthabādhatadyogābhyāmarthāntarapratipādanaṁ lakṣaṇā. Sā dvividhā—rūḍhimūlā prayojanamūlā ca. Taduktaṁ kāvyaprakāśe—

Now this prescribed practice of mortification, recitation, and resignation is itself called *yoga*, because it is a means for producing *yoga*, this being an instance of the function of words called "superimponent pure Indication," as in the well-known example, "Butter is longevity." "Indication" is the establishing of another meaning of a word from the *incompatibility* of another meaning of word from the incompatibility of its principal meaning with the rest of the sentence, and from the connection of this new meaning with the former; it is twofold, as founded on notoriety or on a motive. This has been declared in the *Kāvya-Prakāśa* (ii.9)–

32. मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्योगे रूढितोऽथ प्रयोजनात् ।
अन्योऽर्थो लक्ष्यते यत्सा लक्षणारोपिता क्रिया ॥
(का. प्र. 2/9) इति ।

Mukhyārthabādhe tadyoge rūḍhito'tha prayojanāt,
Anyo'rtho lakṣyate yatsā lakṣaṇāropitā kriyā.
(Kā. Pra. 2/9) iti.

"When, in consequence of the incompatibility of the principal meaning of a word, and yet in connection with it, another meaning is indicated through notoriety or a motive, this is 'Indication,' the super added function of the word."

यच्छब्देन लक्ष्यत इत्याख्याते गुणीभूतं प्रतिपादनमात्रं परामृश्यते । सा लक्षणेति प्रतिनिर्दिश्यमानापेक्षया तच्छब्दस्य स्त्रीलिङ्गत्वोपपत्तिः । तदुक्तं कैयटैः–निर्दिश्यमानप्रतिनिर्दिश्यमानयोरैक्यमापादयन्ति सर्वनामानि पर्यायेण । तत्तल्लिङ्गमुपाददत इति ।

क्रियाफलसंन्यासोऽपि भक्तिविशेषापरपर्यायं प्रणिधानमेव । फलानभिसंधानेन कर्मकरणात् । तथा च गीयते गीतासु भगवता–

Kriyāphalasaṁnyāso'pi bhaktiviśeṣāparaparyāyaṁ praṇidhānameva. Phalānabhisandhānena karmakaraṇāt. Tathā ca gīyate gītāsu bhagavatā—

This self-resignation is also sometimes defined as "the surrender of the fruits of one's actions," and is thus a peculiar kind of faith, since most men act only with a selfish regard to the fruit. Thus, it is sung in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (ii.47)-

30. कर्मण्येवाधिकारस्ते मा फलेषु कदाचन ।
मा कर्मफलहेतुर्भूर्मा ते सङ्गोऽस्त्वकर्मणि ॥ (गी. 2/47) इति ।

Karmaṇyevādhikāraste mā phaleṣu kadācana,
Mā karmaphalaheturbhūrmā te saṅgo'stvakarmaṇi.
(Gītā 2/47) iti.

"Let thy sole concern be with action and never with the fruits;"
"Be not attracted by the fruit of the action, nor be thou attached to inaction."

फलाभिसंधेरुपघातकत्वमभिहितं भगवद्भिर्नीलकण्ठभारतीश्रीचरणैः–

Phalābhisandherupaghātakatvamabhihitaṁ bhagavadbhirnīlakaṇṭhabhāratīśrīcaraṇaiḥ—

The harmfulness of aiming at the fruit of an action has been declared by the venerable *Nīlakaṇṭha-bhāratī—*

31. अपि प्रयत्नसम्पन्नं कामेनोपहतं तपः ।
न तुष्टये महेशस्य श्वलीढमिव पायसम् ॥ इति ।

Api prayatnasampannaṁ kāmenopahataṁ tapaḥ,
Na tuṣṭaye maheśasya śvalīḍhamiva pāyasam. iti.

"Even a penance accomplished by great effort, but vitiated by desire,"
"Produces only disgust in the Great Lord, like milk which has been licked by a dog."

सा च तपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानात्मिका क्रिया योगसाधनत्वाद्योग इति शुद्धसारोपलक्षणावृत्त्याश्रयणेन निरूप्यते, यथायुर्घृतमिति ।

Sā ca tapaḥsvādhyāyeśvarapraṇidhānātmikā kriyā yogasādhanatvādyoga iti śuddhasāropalakṣaṇāvṛttyāśrayaṇena nirūpyate, yathāyurghṛtamiti.

Practice of Mortification, Recitation and Resignation are Components to Yoga

शुद्धसारोपलक्षणा नाम लक्षणाप्रभेदः । मुख्यार्थबाधतद्योगाभ्यामर्थान्तरप्रतिपादनं लक्षणा । सा द्विविधा–रूढिमूला प्रयोजनमूला च । तदुक्तं काव्यप्रकाशे–

Śuddhasāropalakṣaṇā nāma lakṣaṇāprabhedaḥ. Mukhyārthabādhatadyogābhyāmarthāntarapratipādanaṁ lakṣaṇā. Sā dvividhā—rūḍhimūlā prayojanamūlā ca. Taduktaṁ kāvyaprakāśe—

Now this prescribed practice of mortification, recitation, and resignation is itself called *yoga*, because it is a means for producing *yoga*, this being an instance of the function of words called "superimponent pure Indication," as in the well-known example, "Butter is longevity." "Indication" is the establishing of another meaning of a word from the *incompatibility* of another meaning of word from the incompatibility of its principal meaning with the rest of the sentence, and from the connection of this new meaning with the former; it is twofold, as founded on notoriety or on a motive. This has been declared in the *Kāvya-Prakāśa* (ii.9)–

32. मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्योगे रूढितोऽथ प्रयोजनात् ।
अन्योऽर्थो लक्ष्यते यत्सा लक्षणारोपिता क्रिया ॥
(का. प्र. 2/9) इति ।

Mukhyārthabādhe tadyoge rūḍhito'tha prayojanāt,
Anyo'rtho lakṣyate yatsā lakṣaṇāropitā kriyā.
(Kā. Pra. 2/9) iti.

"When, in consequence of the incompatibility of the principal meaning of a word, and yet in connection with it, another meaning is indicated through notoriety or a motive, this is 'Indication,' the super added function of the word."

यच्छब्देन लक्ष्यत इत्याख्याते गुणीभूतं प्रतिपादनमात्रं परामृश्यते । सा लक्षणेति प्रतिनिर्दिश्यमानापेक्षया तच्छब्दस्य स्त्रीलिङ्गत्वोपपत्तिः । तदुक्तं कैयटैः–निर्दिश्यमानप्रतिनिर्दिश्यमानयोरैक्यमापादयन्ति सर्वनामानि पर्यायेण । तत्तलिङ्गमुपाददत इति ।

Yacchabdena lakṣyata ityākhyāte guṇībhūtaṁ pratipādana-mātraṁ parāmṛśyate. Sā lakṣaṇeti pratinirdiśyamānāpekṣayā tacchabdasya strīliṅgatvopapattiḥ. Taduktaṁ kaiyaṭaiḥ—Nirdiśyamānapratinirdiśyamānayoraikyamāpādayanti sarvanāmāni paryāyeṇa. Tattaliṅgamupādadata iti.

Now the word "this" (*i.e.*, *tat* in the neuter, which the neuter *yat* in the extract would have naturally led us to expect instead of the feminine *sā*) would have signified some neuter word, like "implying," which is involved as a subordinate part of the verb "is indicated." But *sā* is used in the feminine (by attraction to agree with *lakṣaṇā*), "this is indication," *i.e.*, the neuter "this" is put in the feminine through its dependence on the predicate. This has been explained by Kaiyaṭa "Of those pronouns which imply the identity of the subject and the predicate, the former takes the gender of the former, the latter of the latter.[1]

तत्र 'कर्मणि कुशलः' इत्यादि रूढिलक्षणाया उदाहरणम् । कुशांल्लातीति व्युत्पत्त्या दर्भादानकर्तरि यौगिकं कुशलपदं विवेचकत्वसारूप्यात्प्रवीणे प्रवर्तमानमनादिवृद्धव्यवहारपरम्परानुपातित्त्वेन अभिधानवत्प्रयोजनमनपेक्ष्य प्रवर्तते । तदाह–निरूढा लक्षणाः काश्चित्सामर्थ्यादभिधानवत् (त. वा.) इति ।

Tatra 'karmaṇi kuśalaḥ' ityādi rūḍhilakṣaṇāyā udāharaṇam. Kuśāṁllātīti vyutpattyā darbhādānakartari yaugikaṁ kuśalapadaṁ vivecakatvasārūpyātpravīṇe pravartamānamanādivṛddhavyavahāraparamparānupātitvena abhidhānavatprayojanamanapekṣya pravartate. Tadāh—Nirūḍhā lakṣaṇāḥ kāścitsāmarthyādabhidhānavat (Ta. Vā.) iti.

Now "expert (*kuśala*) in business" is an example of indication from notoriety; for the word *kuśala*, which is significant in its parts by being analysed etymologically as *kuśam+lāti*, "one who gathers *kuśa* grass for the sacrifice," is here employed to mean "expert" through the relation of a similarity in character, as both are persons of discernment; and this does not need a motive any more than Denotation does, since each is the using a word in its recognised conventional sense in accordance with the immemorial

1 Literally "they take severally in order the gender of one of the two." *Cf.* "*Thebae ipsoe quod Boeotioe caput est*," Livy, xlii. 44; "Animal hoc providum, acutum, plenum rationis et consilii, quem vocamus hominem," *Cic.*, *Legg*, i. 7.

tradition of the elders. Hence, it has been said—

> "Some instances of 'indication' are known by notoriety from their immediate significance, just as is the case in 'denotation' (the primary power of a word)"

तस्माद्रूढिलक्षणायाः प्रयोजनापेक्षा नास्ति । यद्यपि प्रयुक्तः शब्दः प्रथमं मुख्यार्थं प्रतिपादयति, तेनार्थेनार्थान्तरं लक्ष्यत इत्यर्थधर्मोऽयं लक्षणा, तथापि तत्प्रतिपादके शब्दे समारोपितः सञ्शब्दव्यापारः इति व्यपदिश्यते । एतदेवाभिप्रेत्योक्तं—लक्षणारोपिता क्रियेति ।

Tasmādrūḍhilakṣaṇāyāḥ prayojanāpekṣā nāsti. Yadyapi prayuktaḥ śabdaḥ prathamaṁ mukhyārthaṁ pratipādayati, tenārthenārthāntaraṁ lakṣyata ityarthadharmo'yaṁ lakṣaṇā, tathāpi tatpratipādake śabde samāropitaḥ sañśabdavyāpāraḥ iti vyapadisyate. Etadevābhipretyoktaṁ—Lakṣaṇāropitā kriyeti.

Therefore, indication based on notoriety has no regard to any motive. Although a word, when it is employed, first establishes its principal meaning, and then by that meaning a second meaning is subsequently indicated, and so indication belongs properly to the principal meaning and not to the word; still, since it is super added to the word which originally established the primary meaning, it is called (improperly by metonymy) a function of the word. It was a view to this that the author of the *Kāvya-Prakāśa* used the expression, "This is 'Indication,' the super added function of the word."

Indication Based on a Motive (Prayojana lakṣaṇā) and its Kinds

प्रयोजनलक्षणा तु षड्विधा–उपादानलक्षणा लक्षणलक्षणा । गौणसारोपा गौणसाध्यवसाना शुद्धसारोपा शुद्धसाध्यवसाना चेति । कुन्ताः प्रविसन्ति, मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति, गौर्वाहीकः, गौरयम्, आयुर्घृतम्, आयुरेवेदम्–इति यथाक्रममुदाहरणानि द्रष्टव्यानि ।

Prayojanalakṣaṇā tu ṣaḍvidhā—Upādānalakṣaṇā lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā gauṇasāropā gauṇasādhyavasānā śuddhasāropā śuddhasādhyavasānā ceti. Kuntāḥ pravisanti, mañcāḥ krośanti, gaurvāhīkaḥ, gaurayaṃ, āyurghṛtaṃ, āyurevedaṃ—iti yathākramamudāharaṇāni draṣṭavyāni.

But the indication based on a motive is of six kinds : 1. Inclusive

indication,[1] as "the lances enter" (where we really mean "men with the lances"); 2. Indicative indication, as "the benches shout" (where the spectators are meant without the benches); 3. Qualified[2] superimponent indication, as "the man of the Panjāb is an ox" (here the object is not swallowed up in the simile); 4. Qualified introsusceptive indication, as "that ox" (here the man is swallowed up in the simile); 5. Pure superimponent indication, as "*ghī* is life;" 6. Pure introsusceptive indication, as "verily this is life."

तदुक्तम्–

Taduktam—

This has been all explained in the *Kāvya-Prakāśa* (ii.10-12). But enough of this churning of the depths of rhetorical discussions.

33. स्वसिद्धये पराक्षेपः परार्थं स्वसमर्पणम् ।
उपादानं लक्षणं चेत्युक्ता शुद्धैव सा द्विधा ।।

Svasiddhaye parākṣepaḥ parārthaṁ svasamarpaṇam,
Upādānaṁ lakṣaṇaṁ cetyuktā śuddhaiva sā dvidhā.

34. सारोपाऽन्या तु यत्रोक्तौ विषयी विषयस्तथा ।
विषय्यन्तःकृतेऽन्यस्मिन्सा स्यात्साध्यवसानिका ।।

Sāropā'nyā tu yatroktau viṣayī viṣayastathā,
Viṣayyantaḥkṛte'nyasminsā syātsādhyavasānikā.

35. भेदाविमौ च सादृश्यात्सम्बन्धान्तरतस्तथा ।
गौणौ शुद्धौ च विज्ञेयौ लक्षणा तेन षड्विधा ।।

(का. प्र. 2/10-12) इति ।

Bhedāvimau ca sādṛśyātsambandhāntarstastathā,
Gauṇau śuddhau ca vijñeyau lakṣaṇā tena ṣaḍvidhā.

(Kā. Pra. 2/10-12) iti.

तदलं काव्यमीमांसामर्मनिर्मन्थनेन ।

Tadalaṁ kāvyamīmāṁsāmarmanirmanthanena.

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1 I have borrowed these terms from Ballantyne's translation of the *Sāhitya-darpaṇa*.

2 Qualified indication arises from likeness, as the man is like an ox from his stupidity; pure indication from any other relation, as cause and effect, etc., thus, butter is the cause of longevity.

Eight Ancillary to Yoga

स च योगो यमादिभेदवशादष्टाङ्ग इति निर्दिष्टः । तत्र यमा अहिंसादयः । तदाह पतञ्जलिः–'अहिंसासत्यास्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहा यमाः' (पात. यो. सू. 2/30) इति । नियमाः शौचादयः । तदप्याह–'शौचसन्तोषतपः स्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि नियमाः' (पात. यो. सू. 2/32) इति ।

Sa ca yogo yamādibhedavaśādaṣṭāṅga iti nirdiṣṭaḥ. Tatra yamā ahiṁsādayaḥ. Tadāha patañjaliḥ—'Ahiṁsāsatyāsteyabrahmacaryāparigrahā yamāḥ' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 2/30) iti. Niyamāḥ śaucādayaḥ. Tadapyāha—'Śaucasantoṣatapaḥ svādhyāyeśvarapraṇidhānāni niyamāḥ' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 2/32) iti.

This *yoga* has been declared to have eight things ancillary to it (*aṅga*); these are the forbearances, religious observances, postures, suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and meditation (ii.29). Pātañjali says, "Forbearance consists in not wishing to kill, veracity, not stealing, continence, not coveting" (ii.30). "Religious observances are purifications, contentment, mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation to the Lord" (ii. 32);

एते च यमनियमा विष्णुपुराणे दर्शिताः–

Ete ca yamaniyamā viṣṇupurāṇe darśitāḥ—

And these are described in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (vi.7,36-38)—

36. ब्रह्मचर्यमहिंसा च सत्यास्तेयापरिग्रहान् ।
सेवेत योगी निष्कामो योग्यतां स्वं मनो नयन् ।।

Brahmacaryamahiṁsāṁ ca satyāsteyāparigrahān,
Seveta yogī niṣkāmo yogyatāṁ svaṁ mano nayan.

"The sage who brings his mind into a fit state for attaining Brahman, practises, void of all desire,"
"Continence, abstinence from injury, truth, non-stealing, and non-coveting."

37. स्वाध्यायशौचसन्तोषतपांसि नियतात्मवान् ।
कुर्वीत ब्रह्मणि तथा परस्मिन्प्रवणं मनः ।।

Svādhyāyaśaucasantoṣatapāṁsi niyatātmavān,
Kurvīta brahmaṇi tathā parasminpravaṇaṁ manaḥ.

"Self-controlled, he should practise recitation of texts, purification, contentment and austerity,"

"And then he should make his mind intent on the Supreme Brahman."

38. एते यमाः सनियमाः पञ्च पञ्च प्रकीर्तिताः ।
विशिष्टफलदाः कामे निष्कामाणां विमुक्तिदाः ॥
(वि. पु. 6/7/36-38) इति ।

Ete yamāḥ saniyamāḥ pañca pañca prakīrtitāḥ,
Viśiṣṭaphaladāḥ kāme niṣkāmāṇāṁ vimuktidāḥ.
(Vi. Pu. 6/7/36-38) iti.

"These are respectively called the five 'forbearances' and the five 'religious observances;"

"They bestow excellent rewards when done through desire of reward, and eternal liberation to those void of desire."

Posture and its Kinds Including Regulation of Breath (Prāṇāyāma

स्थिरसुखमासनं (पात. यो. सू. 2/46) पद्मासन-भद्रासन-वीरासन-स्वस्तिकासन-दण्डकासन-सोपाश्रय-पर्यङ्ककौञ्चनिषदनोष्ट्रनिषदनसमसंस्थानभेदाद्दशविधम् ।

Sthirasukhamāsanaṁ (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 2/46) padmāsana-bhadrāsana-vīrāsana-svastikāsana-daṇḍakāsana-sopāśraya-paryaṅka-kauñcaniṣadanoṣṭrniṣadanasamasaṁsthānabhedāddaśavidham

"A 'posture' is what is steady and pleasant" (ii.46)' it is of ten kinds, as the *padma*, *bhadra*, *vīra*, *svāstika*, *daṇḍaka*, *sopāśraya*, *paryaṅka*, *kauñcaniṣadana*, *uṣṭraniṣadana*, *samasaṁsthāna*. *Yājñavalkya* has described each of them in the passage which commences—

39. पदाङ्गुष्ठौ निबध्नीयाद्धस्ताभ्यां व्युत्क्रमेण तु ।
ऊर्वोरुपरि विप्रेन्द्र कृत्वा पादतले उभे ॥
पद्मासनं भवेदेतत्सर्वेषामभिपूजितम् ।

Pādāṅguṣṭhau nibadhnīyāddhastābhyāṁ vyutkrameṇa tu,
Ūrvorupari viprendra kṛtvā pādatale ubhe,
Padmāsanaṁ bhavedetatsarveṣāmabhipūjitam.

"Let him hold fast his two great toes with his two hands, but in reverse order,"

"Having placed the soles of his feet, O chief of Brāhmaṇs, on his thighs;"

"This will be the *padma* posture, held in honour by all."

इत्यादिना याज्ञवल्क्यः पद्मासनादिस्वरूपं निरूपितवान् । तत्सर्वं तत एवावगन्तव्यम् ।

Ityādinā yājñavalkyaḥ padmāsanādisvarūpaṁ nirūpitavān. Tatsarvaṁ tata evāvagantavyam.

The descriptions of the others must be sought in that work—

तस्मिन्नासनस्थैर्ये सति प्राणायामः प्रतिष्ठितो भवति । स च श्वासप्रश्वासयोर्गतिविच्छेदस्वरूपः । तत्र श्वासो नाम बाह्यस्य वायोरन्तरानयनम् प्रश्वासः पुनः कोष्ठ्यस्य बहिर्निःसारणम् तयोरुभयोरपिसंचरणाभावः प्राणायामः।

Tasminnāsanasthairyai sati prāṇāyāmaḥ pratiṣṭhito bhavati. Sa ca śvāsapraśvāsayorgativicchedasvarūpaḥ. Tatra śvāso nāma bāhyasya vāyorantarānayanam praśvāsaḥ punaḥ koṣṭhyasya bahirniḥsāraṇam tayorubhayorapisañcaraṇābhāvaḥ prāṇāyāmaḥ.

When this steadiness of posture has been attained, "regulation of the breath" is practised, and this consists in "a cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" (ii.49). Inspiration is the drawing in of the external air; expiration is the expelling of the air within the body; and "regulation of the breath" is the cessation of activity in both movements.

ननु नेदं प्राणायामसामान्यलक्षणम् । तद्विशेषेषु रेचकपूरककुम्भकप्रकारेषु तदनुगतेरयोगादिति चेत्—नैष दोषः । सर्वत्रापि श्वासप्रश्वासगतिविच्छेद-सम्भवात् ।

Nanu nedaṁ praṇāyāmasāmānyalakṣaṇam. Tadviśeṣeṣu recakapūrakakumbhakaprakāreṣu tadanugaterayogāditi cet—Naiṣa doṣaḥ. Sarvatrāpi śvāsapraśvāsagativicchedasambhavāt.

"But (it may be objected) this cannot be accepted as a general definition of 'regulation of breath' since it fails to apply to the special kinds, as *recaka, pūraka,* and *kumbhaka.*" We reply that there is here no fault in the definition, since the "cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" is found in all these special kinds.

तथा हि–कोष्ठ्यस्य वायोर्बहिर्निःसरणं रेचकः प्राणायामो यः प्रश्वासत्वेन

प्रागुक्तः । बाह्यस्य वायोरन्तर्धारिणं पूरको यः श्वासरूपः । अन्तस्तम्भवृत्तिः कुम्भकः । यस्मिञ्जलमिव कुम्भे निश्चलतया प्राणाख्यो वायुरवस्थाप्यते । तत्र सर्वत्र श्वासप्रश्वासद्वयगतिविच्छेदोऽस्त्येवेति नास्ति शङ्कावकाशः । तदुक्तं– 'तस्मिन्सति श्वासप्रश्वासयोर्गतिविच्छेदः प्राणायामः' (पा. यो. सू. 2/49) इति।

Tathā hi—Koṣthyasya vāyorbahirniḥsaraṇaṁ recakaḥ prāṇāyāmo yaḥ praśvāsatvena prāguktaḥ. Bāhyasya vāyorantaradhāraṇaṁ pūrako yaḥ śvāsarūpaḥ. Antastambhavṛttiḥ kumbhakaḥ. Yasmiñjalamiva kumbhe niścalatayā prāṇākhyo vāyuravasthāpyate. Tatra sarvatra śvāsapraśvāsadvayagativicchedo'styeveti nāsti śaṅkāvakāśaḥ. Taduktaṁ—'tasminsati śvāsapraśvāsayorgativicchedaḥ prāṇāyāmaḥ' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 2/49) iti.

Thus *recaka*, which is the expulsion of the air within the body, is only that regulation of the breath, which has been mentioned before as "expiration;" and *pūraka*, which is the (regulated) retention of the external air within the body, is the "inspiration;" and *kumbhaka* is the internal suspension of breathing, when the vital air, called *prāṇa*, remains motionless like water in a jar (*kumbha*). Thus, the "cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" applies to all, and consequently the objector's doubt is needless.

Measurement of Inspiration and Expirations

स च वायुः सूर्योदयमारभ्य सार्धघटिकाद्वयं घटीयन्त्रस्थितघटभ्रमणमन्यायेन एकैकस्यां नाड्यां भवति । सत्यहर्निशं श्वासप्रश्वासयोः षट्शताधिकैकविंशतिसहस्राणि जायन्ते । अत एवोक्तं मन्त्रसमर्पणरहस्यवेदिभिरजपामन्त्रसमर्पणे–

Sa ca vāyuḥ sūryodayamārabhya sārdhaghaṭikādvayaṁ ghaṭīyantrasthitaghaṭabhraṇamanyāyena ekaikasyāṁ nāḍyāṁ bhavati. Satyaharniśaṁ śvāsapraśvāsayoḥ ṣaṭśatādhikaikaviṁśatisahasrāṇi jāyante. Ata evoktaṁ mantrasamarpaṇarahasyavedibhirajapāmantrasamarpaṇe.

Now this air, beginning from sunrise, remains two *ghaṭikās* and a half[1] in each artery[2] (*nāḍī*), like the revolving buckets on a water

1 *I.e.*, an hour, a *ghaṭikā* being twenty-four minutes.

2 The *nāḍīs* or tubular vessels are generally reckoned to be 101, with

wheel.[1] Thus, in the course of a day and night, there are produced 21,600 inspirations and expirations. Hence, it has been said by those who know the secret of transmitting the *mantras*, concerning the transmision of the *ajapāmantra*.[2]

40. षट्शतानि गणेशाय षट्सहस्रं स्वयंभुवे ।
विष्णवे षट्सहस्रं च षट्सहस्रं पिनाकिने ॥

Ṣaṭśatāni gaṇeśāya ṣaṭsahasraṁ svayaṁbhuve,
Viṣṇave ṣaṭsahasraṁ ca ṣaṭsahasraṁ pinākine.

"Six hundred to Gaṇeśa, six thousand to the self existent Brahman,"
"Six thousand to Viṣnu, six thousand to Śiva."

41. सहस्रमेकं गुरवे सहस्रं परमात्मने ।
सहस्रमात्मने चैवमर्पयामि कृतं जपम् ॥ इति ।

Sahasramekaṁ gurave sahasraṁ paramātmane,
Sahasramātmane caivamarpayāmi kṛtaṁ japaṃ. iti.

"One thousand to the Guru (*Bṛhaspati*), one thousand to the Supreme Soul,"
"And one thousand to the soul: thus, I make over the performed uttering."

तथा नाडीसंचारणदशायां वायोः संचरणे पृथिव्यादीनि तत्त्वानि वर्णविशेषवशात्पुरुषार्थाभिलाषुकैः पुरुषैरवगन्तव्यानि । तदुक्तमभियुक्तैः–

ten principal ones; others make sixteen principal *nāḍīs*. They seem taken afterwards in pairs.

1 Mādhava uses the same illustration in his commentary on the passage in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (iii. 29), where the relation of the vital airs, the seasons, and the *mantras* repeated with the offerings to the seasons, is discussed. "The seasons never stand still; following each other in order one by one, as spring, summer, the rains, autumn, the cold and the foggy seasons, each consisting of two months, and so constituting the year of twelve months, they continue revolving again and again like a water-wheel (*ghaṭīyantravat*); hence, the seasons never pause in their course."

2 This refers to a peculiar tenet of Hindu mysticism, that each involuntary inspiration and expiration constitutes as *mantra*, as their sound expresses the word *so'haṃ* (*i.e.*, *haṁsaḥ*), "I am he." This *mantra* is repeated 21,600 times in every twenty-four hours; it is called the *ajapāmantra, i.e.*, the *mantra* utttered without voluntary muttering.

Tathā nāḍīsañcāraṇadaśāyāṁ vāyoḥ sañcaraṇe pṛthivyādīni tattvāni varṇaviśeṣavaśātpuruṣārthābhilāṣukaiḥ puruṣairavagantavyāni. Taduktamabhiyuktaiḥ—

So, at the time of the passing of the air through the arteries, the elements, earth, etc., must be understood, according to their different colours, by those who wish to obtain the highest good. This has been thus explained by the wise—

42. सार्धं घटीद्वयं नाड्योरेकैकार्कोदयाद्वहेत् ।
अरघट्टघटीभ्रान्तिन्यायो नाड्योः पुनः पुनः ॥

Sārdhaṁ ghaṭīdvayaṁ nāḍyorekaikārkodayādvahet,
Araghaṭṭaghaṭībhrāntinyāyo nāḍyo punaḥ punaḥ.

"Let each artery convey the air two *ghaṭīs* and a half from sunrise."

"There is a continual resemblance of the two arteries[1] to the buckets on a revolving waterwheel."

43. शतानि तत्र जायन्ते निश्वासोच्छ्वासयोर्नव ।
खखषट्कद्विकैः संख्याहोरात्रे सकले पुनः ॥

Śatāni tatra jāyante niśvāsocchvāsayornava,
Khakhaṣaṭkadvikaiḥ saṁkhyāhorātre sakale punaḥ.

"Nine hundred inspirations and expirations of the air take place (in the hour),"

"And all combined produce the total of twenty-one thousand six hundred in a day and night."

44. षट्त्रिंशद्गुरुवर्णानां या वेला भणने भवेत् ।
सा वेला मरुतो नाड्यन्तरे संचरतो भवेत् ॥

Ṣaṭtriṁśadguruvarṇānāṁ yā velā bhaṇane bhavet,
Sā velā maruto nāḍyantare saṁcarato bhavet.

"The time that is spent in uttering thirty-six *guṇa* letters,[2]"

1 *I.e.*, that which conveys the inhaled and the exhaled breath.

2 I cannot explain this. We might read *guruvarṇanām* for *guṇavarṇānām* as the time spent in uttering a *guruvarṇa* is a *vipala*, sixty of which make a *pala*, and two and a half *palas* make a minute; but this seems inconsistent with the other numerical details. The whole passage may be compared with the opening of the fifth act of the *Mālatīmādhava*.

"That time elapses while the air passes along in the interval between two arteries."

45. प्रत्येकं पञ्च तत्त्वानि नाड्योश्च वहमानयोः ।
बहन्त्यहर्निशं तानि ज्ञातव्यानि यतात्मभिः ॥

Pratyekaṁ pañca tattvāni nāḍyośca vahamānayoḥ,
Bahantyaharniśaṁ tāni jñātavyāni yatātmabhiḥ.

"There are five elements in each of the two conducting arteries,"

"They bear it along day and night; these are to be known by the self-restrained."

46. ऊर्ध्वं वह्निरधस्तोयं तिरश्चीनः समीरणः ।
भूमिरर्धपुटे व्योम सर्वगं प्रवहेत्पुनः ॥

Ūrdhvaṁ vanhiradhastoyaṁ tiraścīnaḥ samīraṇaḥ,
Bhūmirardhapuṭe vyoma sarvagaṁ pravahetpunaḥ.

"Fire bears above, water below; air moves across;"

"Earth in the half-hollow; ether moves everywhere."

47. वायोर्वह्नेरपां पृथ्व्या व्योम्नस्तत्त्वं वहेत्क्रमात् ।
वहन्त्योरुभयोर्नाड्योर्ज्ञातव्योऽयं क्रमः सदा ॥

Vāyorvahnerapāṁ pṛthvyā vyomnastattvaṁ vahetkramāt,
Vahantyorubhayornāḍyorjñātavyo'yaṁ kramaḥ sadā.

"They bear along in order, air, fire, water, earth, either;

"This is to be known in its due order in the two conducting arteries".

48. पृथ्व्याः पलानि पंचाशच्चत्वारिंशत्तथाम्भसः ।
अग्नेस्त्रिशत्पुनर्वायोर्विंशतिर्नभसो दश ॥

Pṛthvyāḥ palāni pañcāśaccatvāriṁśattathāmbhasaḥ,
Agnestriṁśatpunarvāyorviṁśatirnabhaso daśa.

"The palas[1] of earth are fifty, of water forty,"

"Of fire thirty, of air twenty, of ether ten."

49. प्रवाहकालसंख्येयं हेतुस्तत्र प्रदर्श्यते ।
पृथ्वी पञ्चगुणा तोयं चतुर्गुणमथानलः ॥

1 Sixty *palas* make a *ghaṭikā* (50+40+30+20+10=150, *i.e.*, the *palas* in two and a half *ghaṭikās* or one hour).

Pravāhakālasaṅkhyeyaṁ hetustatra pradarśyate,
Pṛthvī pañcaguṇā toyaṁ caturguṇamathānalaḥ.

"This is the amount of time taken for the bearing; but the reason that the two arteries are so disturbed."

50. त्रिगुणो द्विगुणो वायुर्वियदेकगुणं भवेत् ।
गुणं प्रति दश पलान्युर्व्यां पञ्चाशदित्यतः ॥

Triguṇo dviguṇo vāyurviyadekaguṇaṁ bhavet,
Guṇaṁ prati daśa palānyurvyāṁ pañcāśadityataḥ.

"Is that earth has five properties,[1] water four,"

"Fire has three, air two, and ether one".

51. एकैकहानिस्तोयादेस्तथा पञ्चगुणाः क्षितेः ।
गन्धो रसश्च रूपं च स्पर्शः शब्दः क्रमादमी ॥

Ekaikahānistoyādestathā pañcaguṇāḥ kṣiteḥ,
Gandho rasaśca rūpaṁ ca sparśaḥ śabdaḥ kramādamī.

"There are ten *palas* for each property; hence earth has fifty *palas*,"

"And each, from water downwards, loses successively. Now, the five properties of earth,"

"Are odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and audibleness; and these decrease one by one".

52. तत्त्वाभ्यां भूजलाभ्यां स्याच्छान्तिः कार्ये फलोन्नतिः ।
दीप्तास्थिराव्यूहवृत्तिस्तेजोवाय्वम्बरेषु च ॥

Tattvābhyāṁ bhūjalābhyāṁ syācchāntiḥ kārye phalonnatiḥ,
Dīptāsthirāvyūhavṛttistejovāyvambareṣu ca.

"The two elements, earth and water, produce their fruit by the influence of 'quiet,'"

"But fire, air, and ether by the influence of 'brightness,' 'restlessness,' and 'immensity.'"[2]

53. पृथ्व्यप्तेजोमरुद्व्योमतत्त्वानां चिह्नमुच्यते ।
आद्येस्थैर्यं स्वचित्तस्य शैत्ये कामोद्भवो भजेत् ॥

1 *Cf.* Colebrooke's Essays, vol.i., p.256.
2 Literally "the being ever more."

Pṛthvyaptejomarudvyomatattvānāṁ cihnamucyate,
Ādyesthairyaṁ svacittasya śaitye kāmodbhavo bhajet.

"The characteristic signs of earth, water, fire, air, and ether are now declared;"

"Of the first steadfastness of mind; through the coldness of the second arises desire."

54. तृतीये कोपसन्तापौ चतुर्थे चञ्चलात्मता ।
पञ्चमे शून्यतैव स्यादथ वाधर्मवासना ॥

Tṛtīye kopasantāpau caturthe cañcalātmatā,
Pañcame śūnyataiva syādatha vādharmavāsanā.

"From the third anger and grief; from the fourth fickleness of mind;"

"From the fifth the absence of any object, or mental impressions of latent merit."

55. श्रुत्योरङ्गुष्ठकौ मध्याङ्गुल्यौ नासापुटद्वये ।
सृक्किण्योः प्रान्त्यकोपान्त्याङ्गुली शेषे दृगन्तयोः ॥

Śrutyoraṅguṣṭhakau madhyāṅgulyau nāsāpuṭadvaye,
Sṛkkaṇyoḥ prāntyakopāntyāṅgulī śeṣe dṛgantayoḥ.

"Let the devotee place his thumbs in his ears, and a middle finger in each nostril,"

"And the little finger and the one next to it in the corners of his mouth, and the two remaining fingers in the corners of his eyes,"

56. न्यस्यान्तःस्थपृथिव्यादितत्त्वज्ञानं भवेत्क्रमात् ।
पीतश्वेतारुणश्यामैर्बिन्दुभिर्निरुपाधि खम् ॥ इत्यादिना ।

Nyasyāntaḥsthapṛthivyāditattvajñānaṁ bhavetkramāt,
Pītaśvetāruṇaśyāmairbindubhirnirupādhi khaṁ.

ityādinā.

"Then there will arise in due order the knowledge of the earth and the other elements within him,"

"The first four by yellow, white, dark red, and dark blue spots,[1] – the ether has no symbol."

1 For these colours *cf. Chāndogya Up.*, viii. 6; *Maitrī Up.*, vi.30.

यथावद्वायुतत्त्वमवगम्य तन्नियमने विधीयमाने विवेकज्ञानावरणकर्मक्षयो भवति । तपो न परं प्राणायामादिति ।

Yathāvadvāyutattvamavagamya tanniyamane vidhiyamāne vivekajñānāvaraṇakarmakṣayo bhavati. Tapo na paraṁ prāṇāyāmāditi.

When the element air is thus, comprehended and its restraint is accomplished, the evil influence of works which concealed discriminating knowledge is destroyed (ii.52); hence, it has been said—

"There is no austerity superior to regulation of the breath."[1] And again—

57. दह्यन्ते ध्मायमानानां धातूनां हि यथा मलाः ।
प्राणायामैस्तु दह्यन्ते तद्वदिन्द्रियजा मलाः ।। इति च ।

Dahyante dhmāyamānānāṁ dhātūnāṁ hi yathā malāḥ,
Prāṇāyāmaistu dahyante tadvadindriyajā malāḥ. iti ca.

"As the dross of metals, when they are melted, is consumed,"

"So, the serpents of the senses are consumed by regulation of the breath."[2]

Meaning of Forbearance

तदेवं यमादिभिः संस्कृतमनस्कस्य योगिनः संयमाय प्रत्याहारः कर्तव्यः । चक्षुरादीनामिन्द्रियाणां प्रतिनियतरञ्जनीयकोपनीयमोहनीयप्रवणत्वप्रहाणेन अविकृतस्वरूपप्रवणचित्तानुकारः प्रत्याहारः । इन्द्रियाणि विषयेभ्यः प्रतीपमाह्रियन्तेऽस्मिन्निति व्युत्पत्तेः ।

Tadevaṁ yamādibhiḥ saṁskṛtamanaskasya yoginaḥ saṁyamāya pratyāhāraḥ kartavyaḥ. Cakṣurādīnāmindriyāṇāṁ pratiniyatarañjanīyakopanīyamohanīyapravaṇatvaprahāṇena avikṛtasvarūpapravaṇacittānukāraḥ pratyāhāraḥ. Indriyāṇi viṣayebhyaḥ pratīpamāhriyante'sminniti vyutpatteḥ.

Now in this way, having his mind purified by the "forbearances" and the other things subservient to concentration, the devotee is to

1 This is an anonymous quotation in Vyāsa's Comm.

3 This seems a variation of Śloka 7 of the *Amṛta-nāda Up.*, See Weber, *Indische Stud.*, ix. 26.

attain "self-mastery" (*saṁyama*)[1] and "restrain" (*pratyāhāra*). "Restraint" is the accommodation of the senses, as the eye, etc., to the nature of the mind,[2] which is intent on the soul's unaltered nature, while they abandon all concernment with their own several objects which might excite desire or anger or stupid indifference. This is expressed by the etymology of the word; the senses are drawn to it (*ā+hṛ*), away from them (*pratīpa*).

ननु तदा चित्तमभिनिविशते नेन्द्रियाणि । तेषां बाह्यविषयत्वेन सामर्थ्याभावात् । अतः कथं चित्तानुकारः । अद्धा । अत एव वस्तुतस्तस्यासम्भवमभिसन्धाय सादृश्यार्थमिवशब्दं चकार सूत्रकारः–'स्वविषयासम्प्रयोगे चित्तस्वरूपानुकार इवेन्द्रियाणां प्रत्याहारः' (पात. यो. सू. 2/54) इति । सादृश्यं च चित्तानुकारनिमित्तं विषयासम्प्रयोगः ।

Nanu tadā cittamabhiniviśate nendriyāṇi. Teṣāṁ bāhyaviṣayatvena sāmarthyābhāvāt. Ataḥ kathaṁ cittānukāraḥ. Addhā. Ata eva vastutastasyāsambhavamabhisandhāya sādṛśyārthamivaśabdaṁ cakāra sūtrakāraḥ—'svaviṣayāsamprayoge cittasvarūpānukāra ivendriyāṇāṁ pratyāhāraḥ' (Pātā. Yo. Sū. 2/54) iti. Sādṛśyaṁ ca cittānukāranimittaṁ viṣayāsamprayogaḥ.

"But is it not the mind which is then intent upon soul and not sense, since, these are only adapted for external objects, and therefore have no power for this supposed action? How, therefore, could they be accommodated to the nature of the mind?" What you say is quite true; and therefore, the author of the aphorisms, having an eye to their want of power for this, introduced the words "as it were," to express "resemblance." "Restraint is as it were, the accommodation of the senses to the nature of the mind in the absence of concernment with each one's own object" (ii. 54). Their absence of concernment with their several objects for the sake of being accommodated to the nature of the mind is this "resemblance" which we mean.

यदा चित्तं निरुध्यते तदा चक्षुरादीनां निरोधे प्रयत्नान्तरं नापेक्षणीयम् । यथा मधुकरराजं मधुमक्षिका अनुवर्तन्ते तथेन्द्रियाणि चित्तमिति । तदुक्तं विष्णुपुराणे–

1 This is defined in the *Yoga Sūt.*, iii. 4, as consisting of the united operation towards one object of contemplation, attention, and meditation.

2 *I.e.*, the internal organ (*citta*).

Yadā cittaṁ nirudhyate tadā cakṣurādīnāṁ nirodhe prayātnāntaraṁ nāpekṣaṇīyam. Yathā madhukararājaṁ madhumakṣikā anuvartante tathendriyāṇi cittamiti. Taduktaṁ viṣṇupurāṇe—

Since, when the mind is restrained, the eye, etc., are restrained, no fresh effort is to be expected from them and they follow the mind as bees follow their king. This has been declared in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (vi.7,43,44) –

58. शब्दादिष्वनुरक्तानि निगृह्याक्षाणि योगवित् ।
कुर्याच्चित्तानुकारीणि प्रत्याहारपरायणः ॥

Śabdādiṣvanuraktāni nigṛhyākṣāni yogavit,
Kuryāccittānukāriṇi pratyāhāraparāyaṇaḥ.

"The devotee, restraining his organs of sense, whichever tend to pursue external objects."

"Himself intent on restraint, make them conformable to the mind;"

59. वश्यता परमा तेन जायतेऽतिचलात्मनाम् ।
इन्द्रियाणामवश्यैस्तैर्न योगी योगसाधकः ॥
(वि. पु. 6/7/43-44) इति ।

Vaśyatā paramā tena jāyate'ticalātmanām,
Indriyāṇāmavaśyaistairna yogī yogasādhakaḥ.
(Vi. Pu. 6/7/43-44) iti.

"By this is effected the entire subjugation of the unsteady senses;"

"If they are not controlled, the *yogin* will not accomplish his yoga."[1]

Attention (Dhāraṇā) and Contemplation (Dhyāna)

नाभिचक्रहृदयपुण्डरीकनासाग्रादावाध्यात्मिके हिरण्यगर्भवासवप्रजापतिप्रभृतिके बाह्ये वा देशे चित्तस्य विषयान्तरपरिहारेण स्थिरीकरणं धारणा । तदाह–'देशबन्धश्चित्तस्य धारणा' (पा. यो. सू. 3/1) इति । पौराणिकाश्च–

1 This couplet is corrupt in the text. I follow the reading of the Bombay edition of the Purāṇa (only reading in line 3 *calātmanāṃ*).

Nābhicakrahṛdayapuṇḍarīkanāsāgrādāvādhyātmike hiraṇyagarbhavāsavaprajāpatiprabhṛtike bāhye vā deśe cittasya viṣayāntaraparihāreṇa sthirīkaraṇaṁ dhāraṇā. Tadāha—'Deśabandhaścittasya dhāraṇā' (Pā. Yo. Sū. 3/1) iti. Paurāṇikāśca—

"Attention (*dhāraṇā*)" is the fixing the mind by withdrawing it from all other objects, on some place, whether connected with the internal self, as the circle of the navel, the lotus of the heart, the top of the *suṣumṇā* artery, etc., or something external, as *Prajāpati, Vāsava, Hiraṇyagarbha*, etc. This is declared by the aphorism.

"'Attention' is the fixing the mind on a place" [iii.i]; and , too, say the followers of the Purāṇas—

60. प्राणायामेन पवनं प्रत्याहारेण चेन्द्रियम् ।
वशीकृत्य ततः कुर्याच्चित्तस्थानं शुभाश्रये ॥ (वि. पु. 6/7/45) इति ।

Prāṇāyāmena pavanaṁ pratyāhāreṇa cendriyam,
Vaśīkṛtya tataḥ kuryāccittasthānaṁ śubhāśraye.
(Vi. Pu. 6/7/45) iti.

"By regulation of breath having controlled the air, and by sestraint the senses."

"Let him next make the perfect asylum the dwelling place of his mind."[1]

तस्मिन्देशे ध्येयावलम्बनस्य प्रत्ययस्य विसदृशप्रत्ययप्रहाणेन प्रवाहो ध्यानम् । तदुक्तं–'तत्र प्रत्ययैकतानता ध्यानम्' (पात. यो. सू. 3/2) इति अन्यैरप्युक्तम् –

Tasmindeśe dhyeyāvalambanasya pratyayasya visadṛśapratyayaprahāṇena pravāho dhyānam. Taduktaṁ—'tatra pratyayaikatānatā dhyānam' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 3/2) iti anyairapyuktam—

The continual flow of thought in this place, resting on the object to be contemplated, and avoiding all incongruous thoughts, is "contemplation" (*dhyāna*); thus it is said, "A course of uniform thought there, is "contemplation" (iii. 2) Others also have said—

1 *Viṣṇu-pur.*, vi.7,45, with one or two variations, The "perfect asylum" is Brahman, formless or possessing form.

61. तद्रूपप्रत्ययैकाग्र्या सन्ततिश्चान्यनिःस्पृहा ।
तद्ध्यानं प्रथमैरङ्गैः षड्भिर्निष्पाद्यते नृप ।। (वि. पु. 6/7/89) इति ।

Tadrūpapratyayaikāgryā santatiścānyaniḥspṛhā,
Taddhyānaṁ prathamairaṅgaiḥ ṣaḍbhirniṣpādyate nṛpa.
(Vi. Pu. 6/7/89) iti.

"A continued succession of thoughts, intent on objects of that kind and desiring no other,"
"This is 'contemplation,'—it is thus effected by the first six of the ancillary things."

प्रसङ्गाच्चरममङ्गं प्रागेव प्रत्यपीपदाम ।

Prasaṅgāccaramamaṅgaṁ prāgeva pratyapīpadāma.

We incidentally, in elucidating something else, discussed the remaining eight ancillary thing, "meditation" (*samādhi*, see p. 463).

Perfections Accomplished by Virtue of Prolong Exercise of Yoga

तदनेन योगाङ्गानुष्ठानेनादरनैरन्तर्यदीर्घकालसेवितेन समाधिप्रतिपक्षक्लेशप्रक्षयेऽभ्यासवैराग्यवशान्मधुमत्यादिसिद्धलाभो भवति ।

Tadanena yogāṅgānuṣṭhānenādaranairantaryadīrghakālasevitena samādhipratipakṣakleśaprakṣaye'bhyāsavairāgyavaśānmadhumatyādisiddhilābho bhavati.

By this practice of the ancillary means of *yoga*, pursued for a long time with uninterrupted earnestness, the "afflictions" which hinder meditation are abolished, and through "exercise" and "dispassion", the devotee attains to the perfections designated by the names Madhumatī and the rest.

अथ किमेवमकस्मादस्माननतिविकटाभिरत्यन्ताप्रसिद्धाभिः कर्णाटगौडलाटभाषाभिर्भीषयते भवान् ? न हि वयं भवन्तं भीषयामहे । किं तु मधुमत्यादिपदार्थव्युत्पादनेन तोषयामः । ततश्चाकुतोभयेन भवता श्रूयतामवधानेन ।

Atha kimevamakasmadasmānativikatābhiratyantāprasiddhābhiḥ karṇāṭagauḍalāṭabhāṣābhirbhīṣayate bhavān ? Na hi vayaṁ bhavantaṁ bhīṣayāmahe. Kiṁ tu madhumatyādi padārthavyutpādanena toṣayāmaḥ. Tataścākutobhayena bhavatā śrūyatāmavadhānena.

"But why do you needlessly frighten us with unknown and monstrous words from the dialects of Karṇāṭa, Gauḍa,[1] and Lāṭa?"[2] We do not want to frighten you, but rather to gratify you by explaining the meaning of these strange words; therefore, let the reader who is so needlessly alarmed listen to us with attention.

Perfection of Meditation (Madhumatī Siddhi)

तत्र मधुमती नामाभ्यासवैराग्यादिवशादपास्तरजस्तमोलेशसुखप्रकाशमयसत्त्वभावनया अनवद्यवैशारद्यविद्योतनरूपऋतम्भरप्रज्ञाख्या समाधिसिद्धिः । तदुक्तम्–'ऋतम्भरा तत्र प्रज्ञा' (पात. यो. सू. 1/48) । ऋतं सत्यं बिभर्ति कदाचिदपि नविपर्ययेणाच्छाद्यते । तत्र स्थितौ दार्ढ्ये सति द्वितीयस्य योगिनः सा प्रज्ञा भवतीत्यर्थः ।

Tatra madumatī nāmābhyāsavairāgyādivaśādapāstarajastamoleśasukhaprakāśamayasattvabhāvanayā anavadyavaiśāradyavidyotanarūpartambharaprajñākhyā samādhisiddhiḥ. Taduktam—'ṛtambharā tatra prajñā' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 1/48). Ṛtaṁ satyaṁ bibharti kadācidapi naviparyayeṇācchādyate. Tatra sthitau dārḍhye sati dvitīyasya yoginaḥ sā prajñā bhavatītyarthaḥ.

(i) The *Madhumatī* perfection, this is the perfection of meditation, called "the knowledge which holds to the truth," consisting in the illumination of unsullied purity by means of the contemplation of "goodness," composed of the manifestation of joy, with every trace of "passion" or "darkness" abolished by "exercise," "dispassion," etc. Thus it is said in the aphorisms, "In that case, there is the knowledge which holds to the truth" (i.48). It holds "to the truth," i.e., to the real; it is never overshadowed by error. "In that case," i.e., when firmly established, there arises this knowledge to the second *yogin*.

चत्वारः खलु योगिनः प्रसिद्धाः प्राथमकल्पिको मधुभूमिकः प्रज्ञाज्योतिरतिक्रान्तभावनीयश्चेति । तत्राभ्यासी प्रवृत्तमात्रज्योतिः प्रथमः । न त्वनेन परचित्तादिगोचरज्ञानरूपं ज्योतिर्वशीकृतमित्युक्तं भवति । ऋतम्भरप्रज्ञो द्वितीयः । भूतेन्द्रियजयी तृतीयः । परवैराग्यसम्पन्नश्चतुर्थः ।

Catvāraḥ khalu yoginaḥ prasiddhāḥ prāthamakalpiko madhubhūmikaḥ prajñājyotiratikrāntabhāvanīyaśceti. Tatrā-

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1 The old name for the central part of Bengal.

2 A country comprising Khandesh and part of Gujarat; it is the *Vapikñ* of *Ptolemy*.

bhyāsī pravṛttamātrajyotiḥ prathamaḥ. Na tvanena paracittādigocarajñānarūpaṁ jyotirvaśīkṛtamityuktaṁ bhavati. Ṛtambharaprajño dvitīyaḥ. Bhūtendriyajayī tṛtīyaḥ. Paravairāgyasampannascaturthaḥ.

For the *yogins* or devotees to the practice of *yoga* are well known to be of four kinds, viz., 1. The *prāthamakalpika*, in whom the light has just entered,[1] but, as it has been said, "he has not won the light which consists in the power of knowing another's thoughts, etc.;" 2. The *madhubhūmika*, who possesses the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3. The *prañājyotis*, who has subdued the element and the senses; 4. The *atikrāntabhāvanīya*, who has attained the highest dispassion.

Madhupratīka, Viśoka and Saṁskāraśeṣa Perfections

मनोजवित्वादयो मधुप्रतीकसिद्धयः । तदुक्तं–'मनोजवित्वं विकरणभावः प्रधानजयश्च' (पात. यो. सू. 3/48) इति । मनोजवित्वं नाम कायस्य मनोवदनुत्तमो गतिलाभः । विकरणभावः कायनिरपेक्षाणामिन्द्रियाणामभिमतदेश-कालविषयापेक्षवृत्तिलाभः । प्रधानजयः प्रकृतिविकारेषु सर्वेषु वशित्वम् ।

Manojavitvādayo madhupratīkasiddhayaḥ. Taduktaṃ—'Manojavitvaṁ vikaraṇabhāvaḥ pradhānajayaśca' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 3/48) iti. Manojavitvaṁ nāma kāyasya manovadanuttamo gatilābhaḥ. Vikaraṇabhāvaḥ kāyanirapekṣānāmindriyāṇāmabhimatadeśakālaviṣayāpekṣavṛttilābhaḥ. Pradhānajayaḥ prakṛtivikāreṣu sarveṣu vaśitvaṃ.

(ii) The *Madhupratīka* perfections are swiftness like thought, etc. These are declared to be "swiftness like thought, the being without organs, and the conquest of nature" (iii. 49). "Swiftness like thought" is the attainment by the body of exceeding swiftness of motion, like thought; "the being without bodily organs[2]" is the attainment by the senses, irrespective of the body, of powers directed to objects in any desired place or time; "the conquest of nature" is the power of controlling all the manifestations of nature.

1 In p. 178, 1.2, *infra, read pravṛtta* for *pravṛtti*. *Cf. Yoga S.*, iii. 52 in Bhoja's Comm. (50 in Vyāsa's Comm.).

2 Read *vikaraṇabhāvaḥ*; Vācaspati explains it as "*videhānāṃ indriyāṇāṃ karaṇabhāvaḥ.*"

एताश्च सिद्धयः करणपञ्चकरूपजयात्तृतीयस्य योगिनः प्रादुर्भवन्ति । यथा मधुनः एकदेशोऽपि स्वदते तथा प्रत्येकमेव ताः सिद्धयः स्वदन्त इति मधुप्रतीकाः ।

Etāśca siddhayaḥ karaṇapañcakarūpajayāttṛtīyasya yoginaḥ prādurbhavanti. Yathā madhunaḥ ekadeśo'pi svadate tathā pratyekameva tāḥ siddhayaḥ svadanta iti madhupratīkāḥ.

These perfections appear to the full in the third kind of *yogin*, from the subjugation by him of the five senses and their essential conditions.[1] These perfections are severally sweet, each one by itself, as even a particle of honey is sweet, and therefore, the second state is called *Madhupratīkā* (i.e., that whose parts are sweet).

सर्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वादिरूपा विशोका सिद्धिः । तदाह– 'सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्याति-मात्रस्य सर्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वं सर्वत्रत्वं च' (पात. यो. सू. 3/49) इति । सर्वेषां व्यवसायाव्यवसायात्मकानां गुणपरिणामरूपाणां भावानां स्वामिवदाक्रमणं सर्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वम् । तेषामेव शान्तोदिताव्यपदेश्यधर्मित्वेन स्थितानां विवेकज्ञानं सर्वज्ञातृत्वम् । तदुक्तं–'विशोका वा ज्योतिष्मती' (पात. यो. सू. 1/36) इति ।

Sarvabhāvādhiṣṭhātṛtvādirūpā viśokā siddhiḥ. Tadāha—'sattvapuruṣānyatākhyātimātrasya sarvabhāvādhiṣṭhātṛtvaṁ sarvatratvaṁ ca' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 3/49) iti. Sarveṣāṁ vyavasāyāvyavasāyātmakānāṁ guṇapariṇāmarūpāṇāṁ bhāvānāṁ svāmivadākramaṇaṁ sarvabhāvādhiṣṭhātṛtvaṃ. Teṣāmeva śantoditāvyapadeśyadharmitvena sthitānāṁ vivekajñānaṁ sarvajñātṛtvaṃ. Taduktaṃ—'Viśokā vā jyotiṣmatī' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 1/36) iti.

(iii) The *Viśokā* perfection consists in the supremacy over all existences, etc. This is said in the aphorisms, "To him who possesses, to the exclusion of all other ideas, the discriminative knowledge of the quality of goodness and the soul, arises omniscience and the supremacy over all existences" (iii.50). The "supremacy over all existences" is the overcoming like a master all entities, as these are but the developments of the quality of "goodness" in the mind (the other qualities of "passion" and "darkness " being already abolished). And exist only in the form of energy and the objects to be

1 Vyāsa has *karaṇapañcakarupajaya*; Vācaspati explains *rūpa* by *grahaṇādi* (*cf.* iii.47).

energised upon.[1] The discriminative knowledge of them, as existing in the modes "subsided," "emerged," or "not to be named,"[2] is "omniscience." This is said in the aphorisms (i. 36), "Or a luminous immediate cognition, free from sorrow[3] (may produce steadiness of mind)."

सर्ववृत्तिप्रत्यस्तमये परं वैराग्यमाश्रितस्य जात्यादिबीजानां क्लेशानां निरोधसमर्थो निर्बीजः समाधिरसम्प्रज्ञातवेदनीयः संस्कारशेषताव्यपदेश्यश्चित्तस्यावस्थाविशेषः । तदुक्तं–'विरामप्रत्ययाभ्यासपूर्वः संस्कारशेषोऽन्यः' (पात. यो. सू. 1/18) इति । एवं च सर्वतो विरज्यमानस्य तस्य पुरुषधौरेयस्य क्लेशबीजानि निर्दग्धशालिबीजकल्पानि प्रसवसामर्थ्यविधुराणि मनसा सार्धं प्रत्यस्तं गच्छन्ति ।

Sarvavṛttipratyastamaye paraṁ vairāgyamāśritasya jātyādibījānāṁ kleśānāṁ nirodhasamartho nirbījaḥ samādhirasamprajñātavedanīyaḥ saṁskāraśeṣatāvyapadeśyaścittasyāvasthāviśeṣaḥ. Taduktaṃ—'Virāmapratyayābhyāsapūrvaḥ saṁskāraśeṣo'nyaḥ' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 1/18) iti. Evaṁ ca sarvato virajyamānasya tasya puruṣadhaureyasya kleśabījāni nirdagdhaśālibījakalpāni prasavasāmarthyavidhurāṇi manasā sārdhaṁ pratyastaṁ gacchanti.

(iv) The *Saṁskāraśeṣatā* state is also called *asaṁprajñāta*, *i.e.*, "that meditation in which distinct recognition of an object is lost;" it is that meditation "without a seed" (*i.e.*, without any object) which is able to stop the "afflictions" that produce fruits to be afterwards experienced in the shape of rank, length of life, and enjoyment; and this meditation belongs to him who in the cessation of all modifications of the internal organ, has reached the highest "dispassion." "The other kind of meditation (*i.e.*, that in which distinct recognition of an object is lost) is preceded by that exercise of thought which produces the entire cessation of modifications; it has nothing left but the latent impressions" (of thought after the departure of all objects) (i.e., *saṁskāraśeṣa*, i. 18). Thus, this foremost of *men*, being utterly passionless towards everything, finds that the seeds of the "afflictions," like burned rice-grains, are

1 I read in p. 179, 1. ii, *vyavasāyavyavaseyātmakānāṃ*, from *Vyāsa's* Comm.

2 *I.e.*, as past, present, or future.

3 *Viśokā*.

bereft of the power to germinate, and they are abolished together with the internal organ.

Attainment of Absolute Isolation (Kaivalya) to Primal Prakṛti and Soul Both

तदेतेषु प्रलीनेषु निरुपप्लवविवेकख्यातिपरिपाकवशात् कार्य कारणात्मकानां प्रधाने लयः, चितिशक्तिः स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठापुनर्बुद्धिसत्त्वाभिसम्बन्धविधुरा वा कैवल्यं लभत इति सिद्धम् । द्वयी च मुक्तिरुक्ता पतञ्जलिना–'पुरुषार्थशून्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसवः कैवल्यं स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तिः' (पात. यो. सू. 4/34) इति । न चास्मिन्सत्यपि कस्मान्न जायते जन्तुरिति वदितव्यम् । कारणाभावात्कार्याभाव इति प्रमाणसिद्धार्थे नियोगानुयोगयोरयोगात् ।

Tadeteṣu pralīneṣu nirupaplavavivekakhyātiparipākavaśāt kārya kāraṇātmakānāṁ pradhāne layaḥ, citiśāktiḥ svarūpapratiṣṭhāpunarbuddhisattvābhisambandhavidhurā vā kaivalyaṁ labhata iti siddhaṃ. Dvayī ca muktiruktā patañjalinā—'puruṣārthaśūnyānāṁ guṇānāṁ pratiprasavaḥ kaivalyaṁ svarūpapratiṣṭhā vā citiśaktiḥ' (Pāta. Yo. Sū. 4/34) iti. Na cāsminsatyapi kasmānna jāyate janturiti vaditavyaṃ. Kāraṇābhāvātkāryābhāva iti pramāṇasiddhārthe niyogānuyogayorayogāt.

When these are destroyed, there ensues, through the full maturity of his unclouded "discriminative knowledge," an absorption of all causes and effects into the primal *prakṛti*; and the soul, which is the power of pure intelligence, abiding in its own real nature, and escaped from all connection with the phenomenal understanding (*buddhi*), or with existence, reaches "absolute isolation" (*kaivalya*). Final liberation is described by Pātañjali as two perfections : "Absolute isolation is the repressive absorption[1] of the

1 This is explained by Vācaspati, "The latent impressions produced by the states of the internal organ called *vyutthāna* (when it is chiefly characterised by 'activity', or 'darkness,' iii.9) and *nirodha* (when it is chiefly characterised by the quality of 'goodness'), are absorbed in the internal organ itself; this in 'egoism' (*asmitā*); 'egoism' in the 'merely once resolvable' (*i.e., buddhi*); and *buddhi* into the '*irresolvable*' (*i.e., prakṛti*)". *Prakṛti* consists of the three 'qualities' in equilibrium; and the entire creation, consisting of causes and effects, is the development of these 'qualities' when one or another becomes predominant.

'qualities' which have consummated the ends of the soul, *i.e.*, enjoyment and liberation, or the abiding of the power of intelligence in its own nature"(iv.33). Nor should any one object, "Why, however, should not the individual be born again even though this should have been attained ?"

अपरथा कारणाभावेऽपि कार्यसम्भवे मणिवेधादयोऽन्धादिभ्यो भवेयुः । तथा चानुपपन्नार्थतायामाभाणको लौकिक उपपन्नार्थो भवेत् । तथा च श्रुतिः–'अन्धो मणिमविन्दत् । तमनङ्गुलिरावयत् । अग्रीवः प्रत्यमुञ्चत् । तमजिह्वा असश्चत' (तै. आ. 1/11/5) । अविन्ददविध्यत । आवयद् गृहीतवान् । प्रत्यमुञ्चत् पिनद्धवान् । असश्चताभ्यपूजयत्, स्तुतवानिति यावत् ।

Aparathā kāraṇābhāve'pi kāryasambhave maṇivedhādayo'ndhādibhyo bhaveyuḥ. Tathā cānupapannārthatāyāmābhāṇako laukika upapannārtho bhavet. Tathā ca śrutiḥ—'andho maṇimavindat. Tamanaṅgulirāvayat. Agrīvaḥ pratyamuñcat. Tamajihvā asaścata' (Tai. Ā. 1/11/5). Avindadavidhyata. Āvayadgṛhītavān. Pratyamuñcat pinaddhavān. Asaścatābhyapūjayat, stutavāniti yāvat.

For that is settled by the well-known principle that "with the cessation of the cause the effect ceases," and therefore, this objection is utterly irrelevant, as admitting neither inquiry nor decision; for otherwise, if the effect could arise even in the absence of the cause, we should have blind men finding jewels, and such like absurdities; and the popular proverb for the impossible would become a possibility. And so, too, says the *Śruti*, "A blind man found a jewel; one without fingers seized it; one without a neck put it on; and a dumb man praised it."[1]

Four Divisions of Yogaśāstra

एवं च चिकित्साशास्त्रवद् योगशास्त्रं चतुर्व्यूहम् । यथा चिकित्साशास्त्रं रोगो रोगहेतुरारोग्यं भेषजमिति, तथेदमपि संसारः संसारहेतुर्मोक्षो मोक्षोपाय इति । तत्र दुःखमयः संसारो हेयः । प्रधानपुरुषयोः संयोगो हेयभोगहेतुः । तस्यात्यन्तिकी

1 This curious passage occurs in the *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* i. ii, 5. Mādhava in his Comment. There explains it of the soul, and quotes the *Śvetāśv. Up.* iii. 19. Mādhava here takes *avindat* as "he pierced the jewel," but I have followed his correct explanation in the Comm.

निवृत्तिर्हानम् । तदुपायः सम्यग्दर्शनम् । एवमन्यदपि शास्त्रं यथासम्भवं चतुर्व्यूहमूहनीयमिति सर्वमवदातम् ॥

Evaṁ ca cikitsāśāstravad yogaśāstraṁ caturvyūhaṃ. Yathā cikitsāśāstraṁ rogo rogaheturārogyaṁ bheṣajamiti, tathedamapi saṁsāraḥ saṁsāraheturmokṣo mokṣopāya iti. Tatra duḥkhamayaḥ saṁsāro heyaḥ. Pradhānapuruṣayoḥ saṁyogo heyabhogahetuḥ. Tasyātyantikī nivṛttirhānaṃ. Tadupāyaḥ samyagdarśanaṃ. Evaṁanyadapi śāstraṁ yathāsambhavaṁ caturvyūhamūhanīyamiti sarvamavadātaṃ.

Thus we see that, like the authoritative treatises on medicine, the *Yoga śāstra* consists of four divisions; as those on medicine treat of disease, its cause, health, and medicine, so the *Yoga-śāstra* also treats of phenomenal existence, its cause, liberation, and its cause. This existence of ours, full of pain, is what is to be escaped from; the connection of nature and the soul is the cause of our having to experience this existence; the absolute abolition of this connection is the escape; and right insight is the cause thereof.[1] The same fourfold division is to be similarly traced as the case may be in other Śāstras also.Thus all has been made clear. The system of Śaṅkara, which comes next in succession, and which is the crest-gem of all systems, has been explained by us elsewhere; it is therefore left untouched here. [2]

E.B.C.

1 This is taken from Vācaspati's Comm. on *Yoga Śā.*ii. 15. *Cf.* the "four truths" of Buddhism.

2 This probably refers to the *Pañcadaśī*. A Calcutta Pandit told me that it referred to the *Prameya-vivaraṇa-saṅgraha* (*cf.* Dr. Burnell's preface to his edition of the *Devatādhyāya-brāhmaṇa*, p.x), but, if this is the same as the *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha*, it is by Bhāra-tītīrthavidyāraṇya (see Dr. Burnell's Cat. of Tanjore MSS., p. 88).

NOTE ON THE YOGA

There is an interesting description of the *Yogins* on the Mountain Raivataka in Māgha (iv. 55).

"There the votaries of meditation, well skilled in benevolence (*maitrī*) and those other purifiers of the mind,—having successfully abolished the 'afflictions' and obtained the 'meditation possessed of a seed,' and having reached that knowledge which recognises the essential difference between the quality, Goodness and the soul,—desire yet further to repress even this ultimate meditation."

It is curious to notice that *maitrī*, which plays such a prominent part in Buddhism, is counted in the *Yoga* as only a preliminary condition from which the votary is to take, as it were, his first start towards his final goal. It is called a *parikarman* (=*prasādhaka*) in Vyāsa's Comm. i. 33 (*cf.* iii.22), whence the term is borrowed by Māgha, Bhoja expressly says that this purifying process is an external one, and not an intimate portion of *yoga* itself; just as in arithmetic the operations of additions, etc., are valuable, not in themselves, but as aids in effecting the more important calculations which arise subsequently. The *Yoga* seems directly to allude to Buddhism in this marked depreciation of its cardinal virtue.

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे पातञ्जलदर्शम् ।

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CHAPTER 16

ŚĀṄKARA-DARŚANAṂ

Refutation of Pariṇāmavāda : Impossible to Prove Prakṛti by Anumāna

सोऽयं परिणामवादः प्रामाणिकगर्हणमर्हति । न ह्यचेतनं प्रधानं चेतनानधिष्ठितं प्रवर्तते । सुवर्णादौ रुचकाद्युपादाने हेमकारादिचेतनाधिष्ठानोपलम्भेन नित्यत्व-साधककृतकत्ववत्सुखदुःखमोहात्मनान्वितत्वादेः साधनस्य साध्यविपर्ययव्याप्ततया विरुद्धत्वात् ।

So'yaṁ pariṇāmavādaḥ prāmāṇikagarhaṇamarhati. Na hyacetanaṁ pradhānaṁ cetanānadhiṣṭhitaṁ pravartate. Suvarṇādau rucakādyupādāne hemakārādicetanādhiṣṭhānopalambhena nityatvasādhakakṛtakatvavatsukhaduḥkhamohātmanānvitatvādeḥ sādhanasya sādhyaviparyayavyāptatayā viruddhatvāt.

स्वरूपासिद्धत्वाच्च । आन्तराः खल्वमी सुखदुःखमोहा बाह्येभ्यश्चन्दनादिभ्यो विभिन्नप्रत्ययवेदनीयेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्ता अध्यक्षमीक्ष्यन्ते । यद्यमी सुखादिस्वभावा भवेयुस्तदा हेमन्तेऽपि चन्दनः सुखः स्यात् । न हि चन्दनः कदाचिदचन्दनः । तथा निदाघेष्वपि कुङ्कुमपङ्कः सुखो भवेत् न ह्यसौ कदाचिदकुङ्कुमपङ्क इति ।

Svarūpāsiddhatvācca. Āntarāḥ khalvamī sukhaduḥkhamohā bāhyebhyaścandanādibhyo vibhinnapratyayavedanīyebhyo vyatiriktā adhyakṣamīkṣyante. Yadyamī sukhādisvabhāvā bhaveyustadā hemante'pi candanaḥ sukhaḥ syāt. Na hi candanaḥ kadācidacandanaḥ.Tathā nidāgheṣvapi kuṅkumapaṅkaḥ sukho bhavet na hyasau kadācidakuṅkumapaṅka iti.

एवं कण्टकः क्रमेलकस्येव मनुष्यादीनामपि प्राणभृतां सुखः स्यात् । न ह्यसौ काँश्चित्प्रत्येव कण्टक इति । तस्माच्चन्दनकुङ्कुमादयो विशेषाः कालविशेषाद्यपेक्षया सुखादिहेतवो न तु सुखादिस्वभावा इति रमणीयम् । तस्माद्धेतुरसिद्ध इति सिद्धम् ।

Evaṁ kaṇṭakaḥ kramelakasyeva manuṣyādīnāmapi prāṇabhṛtāṁ sukhaḥ syāt. Na hysau kāṁścitpratyeva kaṇṭaka iti.

Tasmāccandanakuṅkumādayo viśeṣāḥ kālaviśeṣādyapekṣayā sukhādihetavo na tu sukhādisvabhāvā iti ramaṇīyam. Tasmāddheturasiddha iti siddhaṃ.

No Scriptural Proof for Causality of Prakṛti

नापि श्रुतिः प्रधानकारणत्वादेः प्रमाणम् । यतः—'यदग्ने रोहित ँ रूपं तेजसस्तद्रूपं यच्छुक्लं तदपां यत्कृष्णं तदन्नस्य' (छान्दोग्य. 6/4/1) इति च्छान्दोग्यशाखायां तेजोऽबन्नात्मिकायाः प्रकृतेर्लोहितशुक्लकृष्णरूपाणि समाम्नातानि तान्येवात्र प्रत्यभिज्ञायन्ते । तत्र श्रौतप्रत्यभिज्ञाः प्राबल्याल्लोहितादिशब्दानां मुख्यार्थसम्भवाच्च तेजोऽबन्नात्मिका जरायुजाण्डजस्वेदजोद्भिज्जचतुष्टयस्य भूतग्रामस्य प्रकृतिरवसीयते ।

Nāpi śrutiḥ pradhānakāraṇatvādeḥ pramāṇaṃ. Yataḥ—'yadagne rohitagvaṅrūpaṁ tejasastadrūpaṁ yacchuklaṁ tadapāṁ yatkṛṣṇaṁ tadannasya' (Chāndogya. 6/4/1) iti cchāndogyaśākhāyāṁ tejo'bannātmikāyāḥ prakṛterlohitaśuklakṛṣṇarūpāṇi samāmnātāni tānyevātra pratyabhijñāyante. Tatra śrautapratyabhijñāḥ prābalyāllohitādiśabdānāṁ mukhyārthasambhavācca tejo'bannātmikā jarāyujāṇḍajasvedajodbhijjacatuṣṭayasya bhūtagrāmasya prakṛtiravasīyate.

यद्यपि तेजोऽबन्नानां प्रकृतेर्जातत्वेन योगवृत्त्या न जायत इत्यजत्वं न सिध्यति, तथापि रूढिवृत्त्यावगतमजात्वमुक्तप्रकृतौ सुखावबोधायप्रकल्प्यते । यथा 'असावादित्यो देवमधु' (छान्दोग्य. 3/1/1) इत्यादि वाक्येनादित्यस्य मधुत्वं परिकल्प्यते, तथा तेजोऽबन्नात्मिका प्रकृतिरेवाजेति । अतोऽजामेकामित्यादिका श्रुतिरपि न प्रधानप्रतिपादिका ।

Yadyapi tejo'bannānāṁ prakṛterjātatvena yogavṛttyā na jāyata ityajatvaṁ na sidhyati, tathāpi rūḍhvṛttyāvagatamajātvamuktaprakṛtau sukhāvabodhāyaprakalpyate. Yathā 'asāvāditya devamadhu' (Chāndogya. 3/1/1) ityādivākyenādityasa madhutvaṁ parikalpyate, tathā tejo'bannātmikā prakṛtirevājeti. Ato'jāmekāmityādikā śrutirapi na pradhānapratipādikā.

यदवादि निदर्शनं पूर्ववादिना क्षीरादिकमचेतनं चेतनानधिष्ठितमेव वत्सविवृद्ध्यर्थं प्रवर्तत इति । नैतद्रमणीयम् । बुद्धिविशेषशालिनः परमेश्वरस्य तत्राप्यधिष्ठातृत्वाभ्युपगमात् । न च परमेश्वरस्य करुणया प्रवृत्त्यङ्गीकारे प्रागुक्तविकल्पावसरः । सृष्टेः प्राक् प्राणिनां दुःखसम्बन्धासम्भवेऽपि तन्निदानादृष्टसम्बन्धसम्भवेन तत्प्रहाणेच्छया प्रवृत्त्युपपत्तेः ।

Yadavādi nidarśanaṁ pūrvavādinā kṣīrādikamacetanaṁ cetatānadhiṣṭhitameva vatsavivṛddhyarthaṁ pravartata iti. Naitadramaṇīyaṃ. Buddhiviśeṣaśālinaḥ parameśvarasya tatrāpyadhiṣṭhātṛtvābhyupagamāt. Na ca parameśvarasya karuṇayā pravṛttyaṅgīkāre prāguktavikalpāvasaraḥ. Sṛṣṭeḥ prāk prāṇināṁ duḥkhasambandhāsambhave'pi tannidānādṛṣṭasambandhasambhavena tatprahāṇecchayā pravṛttyupapatteḥ.

किं च पुरुषार्थप्रयुक्ता प्रधानप्रवृत्तिरित्युक्तं तद्विवेक्तव्यम् । किं प्रधानं केवलं भोगार्थं प्रवर्तते किं वा केवलमोक्षार्थमाहोस्विदुभयार्थम् ? न तावदाद्यः कल्पोऽवकल्पते । अनाधेयातिशयस्य कूटस्थनित्यस्य पुरुषस्य तात्त्विकभोगासम्भवात् । अनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गाच्च । येन हि प्रयोजनेन प्रधानं प्रवर्तितं तदनेन विधातव्यम् । भोगेन चैतत्प्रवर्तितमिति तमेव विदध्यान्न मोक्षमिति ।

Kiṁ ca puruṣārthaprayuktā pradhānapravṛttirityuktaṁ tadviveктavyaṃ. Kiṁ pradhānaṁ kevalaṁ bhogārthaṁ pravartate kiṁ vā kevalamokṣārthamāhosvidubhayārthaṃ ? Na tāvadādyaḥ kalpo'vakalpate. Anādheyātiśayasya kūṭasthanityasya puruṣasya tāttvikabhogāsambhavāt. Anirmokṣaprasaṅgācca. Yena hi prayojanena pradhānaṁ pravartitaṁ tadanena vidhātavyaṃ. Bhogena caitatpravartitamiti tameva vidadhyānna mokṣamiti.

नापि द्वितीयः । चिद्धातोर्नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावतया कर्मानुभववासनानामसम्भवेन प्रधानप्रवृत्तेः प्रागपि मुक्ततया तदर्थं प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । शब्दाद्युपभोगार्थमप्रवृत्तत्वेन प्रधानस्य तदजनकत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च । नापि तृतीयः । प्रागुक्तदूषणलङ्घनालङ्घितत्वात् । प्रवृत्तिस्वभावायाः प्रकृतेरौदासीन्यायोगाच्च ।

Nāpi dvitīyaḥ. Ciddhātornityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvatayā karmānubhavavāsanānāmasambhavena pradhānapravṛtteḥ prāgapi muktatayā tadarthaṁ pravṛttyanupapatteḥ. Śabdādyupabhogārthamapravṛttatvena pradhānasya tadajanakatvaprasaṅgācca. Nāpi tṛtīyaḥ. Prāguktadūṣaṇalaṅghanālaṅghitatvāt. Pravṛttisvabhāvāyāḥ prakṛteraudāsīnyāyogācca.

ननु सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिः पुरुषार्थः । तस्यां जातायां सा निवर्तते कृतकार्यत्वादिति चेत्—तदसमञ्जसम् । अचेतनायाः प्रकृतेर्विचार्य कार्यकारित्वायोगात् । यथेयं कृतेऽपि शब्दाद्युपलम्भे तदर्थं पुनः प्रवर्तते एवमत्रापि पुनः प्रवर्तेत । स्वभावस्यानपायात् ।

Nanu sattvapuruṣānyatākhyātiḥ puruṣārthaḥ. Tasyāṁ jātāyāṁ sā nivartate kṛtakāryatvāditi cet—tadasamañjasaṃ. Acetanāyāḥ

prakṛtervicārya kāryakāritvāyogāt. Yatheyaṁ kṛte'pi śābdādyupalambhe tadarthaṁ punaḥ pravartate evamatrāpi punaḥ pravarteta. Svabhāvasyānapāyāt.

किं च सा प्रकृतिर्विवेकख्यातिवशादुच्छिद्यते न वा ? उच्छेदे सर्वस्य सम्प्रति संसारोऽस्तमियात् । अनुच्छेदे न कस्यचिन्मोक्षः ।

Kiṁ ca sā prakṛtirvivekakhyātivaśāducchidyate na vā ? Ucchede sarvasya samprati saṁsāro'stamiyāt. Anucchede na kasyacinmokṣaḥ.

ननु प्रधानाभेदेऽपि तत्तत्पुरुषविवेकख्यातिलक्षणाविद्यासदसत्त्वनिबन्धनौ बन्धमोक्षावुपपद्येयातामिति चेत्–हन्त तर्हि कृतं प्रकृत्या । अविद्यासदसद्भावाभ्यामेव तदुपपत्तेः ।

Nanu pradhānābhede'pi tattatpuruṣavivekakhyātilakṣaṇāvidyā-sadasattvanibandhanau bandhamokṣāvupapadyeyātāmiti cet—hanta tarhi kṛtaṁ prakṛtyā. Avidyāsadasadbhāvābhyāmeva tadupapatteḥ.

नन्वविद्यापक्षेऽप्येष दोषः प्रादुष्यादिति चेत्—तदेतत्प्रत्यवस्थानमस्थाने । न हि वयं प्रधानवदविद्यां सर्वेषु जीवेष्वेकामाचक्ष्महे येनैवमुपालंभ्येमहि । अपि त्वियं प्रतिजीवं भिद्यते । तेन यस्यव जीवस्य विद्योत्पद्यते तस्यैवाविद्या समुच्छिद्यते । नान्यस्य । भिन्नायतनयोर्विरोधाभावात् ।

Nanvavidyāpakṣe'pyeṣa doṣaḥ prāduṣyāditi cet—tadetatpratyavasthānamasthāne. Na hi vayaṁ pradhānavadavidyāṁ sarveṣu jīveṣvekāmācakṣmahe yenaivamupālaṁbhyemahi. Api tviyaṁ pratijīvaṁ bhidyate. Tena yasyava jīvasya vidyotpadyate tasyaivāvidyā samucchidyate. Nānyasya. Bhinnāyatanayorvirodhābhāvāt.

अतो न समस्तसंसारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गदोषः । तस्मात्परिणामः परित्यक्तव्यः । स्वीकर्तव्यश्च विवर्तवादः ।

Ato na samastasaṁsārocchedaprasaṅgadoṣaḥ. Tasmātpariṇāmaḥ parityaktavyaḥ. Svīkartavyaśca vivartavādaḥ.

ननु जीवजडयोः सारूप्याभावेन चिद्विवर्तत्वं प्रपञ्चस्य न सम्परिपद्यत इति प्रागवादिष्मेति चेत्—नैतत्साधु न हि सारूप्यनिबन्धनाः सर्वे विभ्रमा इति व्याप्तिरस्ति । असरूपादपि कामादेः कान्तालिङ्गनादिष्विव स्वप्नविभ्रमस्योपलम्भात् । किं च कादाचित्के विभ्रमे सारूप्यापेक्षा नानाद्यविद्यानिबन्धने प्रपञ्चे ।

Nanu jīvajaḍayoḥ sārūpyābhāvena cidvivartatvaṁ prapañcasya na samparipadyata iti prāgavādiṣmeti cet—naitatsādhu na hi sārjūpyanibandhanāḥ sarve vibhramā iti vyāptirasti. Asarūpādapi kāmādeḥ kāntāliṅganādiṣviva svapnavibhramasyopalambhāt. Kiṁ ca kādācitke vibhrame sārūpyāpekṣā nānādyavidyā- nibandhane prapañce.

तदवोचदाचार्यवाचस्पतिः—

Tadavocadācāryavācaspatiḥ—

1. **विवर्तस्तु प्रपञ्चोऽयं ब्रह्मणोऽपरिणामिनः ।**
अनादिवासनोद्भूतो न सारूप्यमपेक्षते ॥ इति ॥

Vivartastu prapañco'yaṁ brahmaṇo'pariṇāminaḥ,
Anādivāsanodbhūto na sārūpyamapekṣate. iti.

तदेतत्सर्वं वेदान्तशास्त्रपरिश्रमशालिनां सुगमं सुघटं च ।

Tadetatsarvaṁ vedāntaśāstrapariśramaśālināṁ sugamaṁ sughaṭaṁ ca.

Subject-Matter of the Vedānta Sūtras

तच्च वेदान्तशास्त्रं चतुर्लक्षणम् । भगवता बादरायणेन प्रणीतस्य वेदान्तशास्त्रस्य प्रत्यग्ब्रह्मैक्यं विषय इति शंकराचार्याः प्रत्यपीपदन् । तत्र प्रथमे समन्वयाध्याये सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां ब्रह्मणि तात्पर्येण पर्यवसानम् । द्वितीयेऽविरोधाध्याये सांख्यादितर्कविरोधनिराकरणम् । तृतीये साधनाध्याये ब्रह्म विद्यासाधनम् । चतुर्थे फलाध्याये विद्याफलम् ।

Tacca vedāntaśāstraṁ caturlakṣaṇaṃ. Bhagavatā bādarāyaṇena praṇītasya vidāntaśāstrasya pratyagbrahmaikyaṁ viṣaya iti śaṅkarācāryāḥ pratyapīpadan. Tatra prathame samanvayādhyāye sarveṣāṁ vedāntānāṁ brahmaṇi tātparyeṇa paryavasānaṃ. Dvitīye'virodhādhyāye sāṁkhyāditarkavi-rodhanirākaraṇaṃ. Tṛtīye sādhanādhyāye brahma vidyāsādhanaṃ. Caturthe phalādhyāye vidyāphalaṃ.

तत्र प्रत्यध्यायं पादचतुष्टयम् । तत्र प्रथमस्याध्यायस्य प्रथमे पादे स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गं वाक्यजातं मीमांस्यते । द्वितीयेऽस्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गमुपास्यविषयम् । तृतीये तादृशं ज्ञेयविषयम् । चतुर्थेऽव्यक्ताजापदादि सन्दिग्धं पदजातमिति ।

Tatra pratyadhyāyaṁ pādacatuṣṭayaṃ. Tatra prathamasyādh-yāyasya prathame pāde spaṣṭabrahmaliṅgaṁ vākyajātaṁ mīmāṁsyate. Dvitīye'spaṣṭabrahmaliṅgamupāsyaviṣayaṃ. Tṛtīye

tādṛśaṁ jñeyaviṣayam. Caturthe'vyaktājāpadādi sandigdhaṁ padajātamiti.

अविरोधस्य द्वितीयस्य प्रथमे सांख्ययोगकणादादिस्मृतिविरोधपरिहारः । द्वितीये सांख्यादिमतानां दुष्टत्वम् । तृतीये पञ्चमहाभूतश्रुतीनां जीवश्रुतीनां च परस्परविरोधपरिहारः । चतुर्थे लिङ्गशरीरश्रुतीनां विरोधपरिहारः ।

Avirodhasya dvitīyasya prathame sāṁkhyayogakaṇādādismṛtivirodhaparihāraḥ. Dvitīye sāṁkhyādimatānāṁ duṣṭatvam. Tṛtīye pañcamahābhūtaśrutīnāṁ jīvaśrutīnāṁ ca parasparavirodhaparihāraḥ. Caturthe liṅgaśarīraśrutīnāṁ virodhaparihāraḥ.

तृतीयस्य प्रथमे जीवस्य परलोकगमनागमनविचारपुरस्सरं वैराग्यम् । द्वितीये त्वंपदतत्पदार्थपरिशोधनम् । तृतीये सगुणविद्यासु गुणोपसंहारः । चतुर्थे निर्गुणब्रह्मविद्याया बहिरङ्गान्तरङ्गाश्रमयज्ञशमादिसाधनम् ।

Tṛtīyasya prathame jīvasya paralokagamanāgamanavicārapurassaraṁ vairāgyam. Dvitīye tvaṁpadatatpadārthapariśodhanam. Tṛtīye saguṇavidyāsu guṇopasaṁhāraḥ. Caturthe nirguṇabrahmavidyāyā bahiraṅgāntaraṅgāśramayajñaśamādisādhanam.

चतुर्थस्य प्रथमे ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारेण जीवतः पापपुण्यक्लेशवैधुर्यलक्षणा मुक्तिः । द्वितीये मरणोत्क्रमणप्रकारः । तृतीये सगुणब्रह्मोपासकस्योत्तरमार्गः । चतुर्थे निर्गुणसगुणब्रह्मविदो विदेहकैवल्यब्रह्मलोकावस्थानानि । तदित्थं ब्रह्मविचारशास्त्राध्यायपादार्थसंग्रहः ।

Caturthasya prathame brahmasākṣātkāreṇa jīvataḥ pāpapuṇyakleśavaidhuryalakṣaṇā muktiḥ. Dvitīye maraṇotkramaṇaprakāraḥ. Tṛtīye saguṇabrahmopāsakasyottaramārgaḥ. Caturthe nirguṇasaguṇabrahmavido videhakaivalyabrahmalokāvasthānāni. Taditthaṁ brahmavicāraśāstrādhyāyapādārthasaṁgrahaḥ.

Enquiry into Brahman : First Adhikaraṇa

तत्र प्रथममधिकरणमथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा (ब्र. सू. 1/1/1) इति ब्रह्ममीमांसारम्भोपपादनपरम् । अधिकरणं च पञ्चावयवं प्रसिद्धम् । ते च विषयादयः पञ्चावयवा निरूप्यन्ते । 'आत्मा वारे द्रष्टव्यः' (बृह. 2/4/5) इत्येतद्वाक्यं विषयः । ब्रह्मजिज्ञासितव्यं न वेति सन्देहः । जिज्ञास्यत्वव्यापकयोः सन्देहप्रयोजनयोः सम्भवासम्भवाभ्याम् ।

Tatra prathamamadhikaraṇamathāto brahmajijñāsā (Bra. Sū. 1/1/1) iti Brahmamīmāṁsārambhopapādanaparam. Adhikaraṇaṁ ca pañcāvayavaṁ prasiddham. Te ca viṣayādayaḥ pañcāvayavā nirūpyante. 'Ātmā vāre draṣṭavyaḥ' (Bṛha. 2/4/5) ityetadvākyaṁ viṣayaḥ. Brahmajijñāsitavyaṁ na veti sandehaḥ. Jijñāsyatvavyāpakayoḥ sandehaprayojanayoḥ sambhavāsambhavābhyām.

Enquiry into Ātman not Possible : Impossibility of Doubt

तत्र कस्येदं जिज्ञास्यत्वमवगम्यते ? अहमनुभवगम्यस्य श्रुतिगम्यस्य वा ? नाद्यः । सर्वजनीनेनाहमनुभवेन इदमास्पददेहादिभ्यो विवेकेनात्मनः स्पष्टं प्रतिभासमानत्वात्। ननु स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहमित्यादिदेहधर्मसामानाधिकरण्यानुभवात् अध्यस्तात्मभावदेहालम्बनोऽयमहंकार इति चेन्न । बाल्याद्यवस्थासु भिन्नपरिमाणतया बदरा मलकादिवत्परस्परभेदेन शरीरस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानानुपपत्तेः ।

Tatra kasyedaṁ jijñāsyatvamavagamyate? Ahamanubhavagamyasya śrutigamyasya vā ? Nādyaḥ. Sarvajanīnenāhamanubhavena idamāspadadehādibhyo vivekenātmanaḥ spaṣṭaṁ pratibhāsamānatvāt. Nanu sthūlo'haṁ kṛśo'hamityādidehadharmasāmānādhikaraṇyānubhavāt adhyastātmabhāvadehālambano'yamahaṁkāra iti cenna. Bālyādyavasthāsu bhinnaparimāṇatayā badarāmalakādivatparasparabhedena śarīrasya pratyabhijñā nānupapatteḥ.

अथोच्यते—यथा पीलुपाकपक्षे पिठरपाकपक्षे वा कालभेदेनैकस्मिन् वस्तुनि पाकजभेदो युज्यते तथैकस्मिञ्शरीराभिधे वस्तुनि कालभेदेन परिमाणभेदः । अत एव लौकिकाः शरीरमात्मनः सकाशादभिन्नं प्रतिपद्यमानाः प्रत्यभिजानते चेति । न तद्भद्रम् । मणिमन्त्रौषधाद्युपायभेदेन भूमिकाधानवत् नानाविधान्देहान् प्रतिपद्यमानस्याहमालम्बनस्य भिन्नस्यात्मनः शरीराद्भेदेन भासमानत्वात् ।

Athocyate—yathā pīlupākapakṣe piṭharapākapakṣe vā kālabhedenaikasmin vastuni pākajabhedo yujyate tathaikasmiñśarīrābhidhe vastuni kālabhedena parimāṇabhedaḥ. Ata eva laukikāḥ śarīramātmanaḥ sakāśādabinnaṁ pratipadyamānāḥ pratyabhijānate ceti. Na tadbhadram. Maṇimantrauṣadhādyupāyabhedena bhūmikādhānavat nānāvidhāndehān pratipadyumānasyāhamālambanasya bhinnasyātmanaḥ śarīrādbhedena bhāsamānatvāt.

अतएव चक्षुरादीनामप्यहमालम्बनत्वमशक्यशङ्कम् । 'नान्यदृष्टं स्मरत्यन्यः' (न्या. कुसु. 1/15) इति न्यायेन चक्षुरादौ नष्टेऽपि रूपादिप्रतिसन्धानानुपपत्तेः । नाप्यन्तःकरणस्याहमालम्बनत्वमास्थेयम् । अयमेव भेदो भेदहेतुर्वा

यद्विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः कारणभेदश्चेति न्यायेन कर्तृकरणभूतयोरात्मान्तःकरणयोस्तक्षवासिवत्सम्भेदासम्भवात् ।

Ataeva cakṣurādīnāmapyahamālambanatvamaśakyaśaṅkam. 'Nānyadṛṣṭaṁ smaratyanyaḥ' (Nyā. Kusu. 1/15) iti nyāyena cakṣurādau naṣṭe'pi rūpādipratisandhānānupapatteḥ. Nāpyantaḥkaraṇasyāhamālambanatvamāstheyam. Ayameva bhedo bhedaheturvā yadviruddhadarmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedaśceti nyāyena kartṛkaraṇabhūtayorātmāntaḥkaraṇayostakṣavāsivatsambhedāsambhavāt.

यद्यभेद एव नाद्रियते तर्हि 'स्थूलोऽहं, कृशोऽहं, कृष्णोऽहम्' इत्यादि संख्यानमुत्सन्नसंकथं स्यात् । न स्यात् । एवं लोके शास्त्रे चोभयथा शब्दप्रयोगदर्शने मुख्यार्थत्वानुपपत्तौ 'मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति' इत्यादिवदौपचारिकत्वेनोपपत्तेः ।

Yadyabheda eva nādriyate tarhi 'sthūlo'haṁ, kṛśo'haṁ, kṛṣṇo'ham' ityādi saṅkhyānamutsannasaṁkathaṁ syāt. Na syāt. Evaṁ loke śāstre cobhayathā śabdaprayogadarśane mukhyārthatvānupapattau 'mañcāḥ krośanti' ityādivadaupacārikatvenopapatteḥ.

न द्वितीयः । अहमनुभवगम्यस्यैव श्रुतिगम्यत्वात् । 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. 2/1/1) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यो हि ब्रह्मावगम्यते । ब्रह्मभावश्च 'अहमात्मा ब्रह्म' (बृ. 2/5/19), 'तत्त्वमसि' (छां. 6/8/7) इत्यादिश्रुतिष्वहंप्रत्ययगम्यस्यैव बोध्यते । तथा चेदमनुमानं समसूचि–विमतमजिज्ञास्यम्, असन्दिग्धत्वात्, करतलामलकवत् ।

Na dvitīyaḥ. Ahamanubhavagamyasyaiva śrutigamyatvāt. 'Satyaṁ jñānamanantaṁ brahma' (Taitt. Up. 2/1/1) ityādiśrutibhyo hi brahmāvagamyate. Brahmabhāvaśca 'Ahamātmā brahma' (Bṛ. Up. 2/5/19), 'Tattvamasi' (Chāṁ. Up. 6/8/7) ityādiśrutiṣvahaṁpratyayagamyasyaiva bodhyate. Tathā cedamanumānaṁ samasūci—vimatamajijñāsyaṁ, asandigdhatvāt, karatalāmalakavat.

Enquiry into Ātman Impossible : Lack of Purpose

तथा फलं न फलभावमीक्षते पुरुषैरर्थ्यत इति व्युत्पत्त्या निःशेषदुःखोपशमलक्षितं परमानन्दैकरसं च पुरुषार्थशब्दस्यार्थः सकलपुरुषधौरेयैः प्रेप्स्यते नैतत्सांसारिकं सुखजातम् । तस्यैहिकस्य पारलौकिकस्य च सातिशयतया च सदृशतया च प्रेक्षावद्भिरर्थ्यमानत्वानुपपत्तेः । यत्तत्परिपन्थि दुःखजातं तज्जिहास्यते । तच्चाविद्यापरपर्यायसंसार एव । कर्तृत्वादिसकलानर्थकरत्वादविद्यायाः ।

Tathā phalaṁ na phalabhāvamīkṣate puruṣairarthyata iti vyutpattyā niḥsesaduḥkhopaśamalakṣitaṁ paramānandaikarasaṁ ca puruṣārthaśabdasyārthaḥ sakalapuruṣadhaureyaiḥ prepsyate naitatsāṁsārikaṁ sukhajātaṃ. Tasyaihikasya pāralaukikasya ca sātiśayatayā ca sadṛśatayā ca prekṣāvadbhirarthyamānatvānupapatteḥ. Yattatparipanthi duḥkhajātaṁ tajjihāsyate. Taccāvidyāparaparyāyasaṁsāra eva. Kartṛtvādisakalānarthakaratvādavidyāyāḥ.

समित्येकीकरणे वर्तते । सम्भेदादौ तथा चोपलम्भात् । तथा चात्मानं देहेनैकीकृत्य स्वर्गनरकमार्गयोः सरति येन पुरुषः स संसारोऽविद्याशब्दार्थः । तन्निवृत्तिः फलं फलवतामभिमतम् । तथा कथितम्—

Samityekīkaraṇe vartate. Sambhedādau tathā copalambhāt. Tathā cātmānaṁ dehenaikīkṛtya svarganarakamārgayoḥ sarati yena puruṣaḥ sa saṁsāro'vidyāśabdārthaḥ. Tannivṛttiḥ phalaṁ phalavatāmabhimataṃ. Tathā kathitaṃ—

अविद्यास्तमयो मोक्षः सा च बन्ध उदाहृत । इति ।

Avidyāstamayo mokṣaḥ sā ca bandha udāhṛta. iti.

तच्च काशकुशावलम्बनकल्पम् । आत्मयाथात्म्यानुभवेन सह वर्तमानस्य संसारस्य रूपरसवद्विरोधाभावेन निवर्त्यनिवर्तकभावात् । ननु सहानुवर्तमानो बोधः संसारं मा बाधिष्ट । सहावर्तमानस्तु बोधः प्रकाशस्तमोवद्बाधिष्यत इति चेत्–तदेतद्रिक्तं वचः। अहमनुभवादन्यस्यात्मज्ञानस्य मूषिकविषाणायमानत्वात् ।

Tacca kāśakuśāvalambanakalpaṃ. Ātmayāthātmyānubhavena saha vartamānasya saṁsārasya rūparasavadvirodhābhāvena nivartyanivartakabhāvāt. Nanu sahānuvartamāno bodhaḥ saṁsāraṁ mā bādhiṣṭa. Sahāvartamānastu bodhaḥ prakāśastamovadvādhiṣyata iti cet—Tadetadriktaṁ vacaḥ. Ahamanubhavādanyasyātmajñānasya mūṣikaviṣāṇāyamānatvāt.

नन्वन्योऽयमनुभवः पामराणां मा स्म भवन्नाम । वेदान्तवचननिचयपर्यालोचनक्षमाणां परीक्षकाणां सम्भवत्येवेत्यपि न वक्तव्यम् । अबाधितानुभवविरोधेन वेदान्तवाक्यानां ग्रावप्लवनादिवाक्यकल्पत्वात् । न ह्यागमाः परःशतं घटं पटयितुमुत्सहन्ते ।

Nanvanyo'yamanubhavaḥ pāmarāṇāṁ mā sma bhavannāma. Vedāntavacananicayaparyālocanakṣamāṇāṁ parīkṣakāṇāṁ sambhavatyevetyapi na vaktavyaṃ. Abādhitānubhavavirodhena vedāntavākyānāṁ grāvaplavanādivākyakalpatvāt. Na hyāgamāḥ paraḥśataṁ ghaṭaṁ paṭayitumutsahante.

न चाध्ययनविधिव्याकोपः । गुरुमतानुसारेण हुंफडादिवाक्यवत् जपमात्रोपयोगित्वेनाचार्यमतानुसारेण वा 'यजमानः प्रस्तरः' (तै. ब्रा. 3/3/9) इत्यादिवाक्यवत् स्तावकत्वेन वेदान्तसिद्धान्तस्याध्येतव्यत्वसम्भवात् । तथा च प्रयोगः—विवादास्पदं ब्रह्म विचार्यपदं न भवत्यफलत्वात्काकदन्तवदिति ।

Na cādhyayanavidhivyākopaḥ. Gurumatānuśāreṇa huṁphaḍādivākyavat japamātropayogitvenācāryamatānusāreṇa vā 'yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ' (Taitt. Brāh. 3/3/9) ityādivākyavat stāvakatvena vedāntasiddhāntasyādhyetavyatvasambhavāt. Tathā ca prayogaḥ—vivādāspadaṁ brahma vicāryapadaṁ na bhavatyaphalatvātkākadantavaditi.

तदाहुराचार्याः—

Tadāhurācāryāḥ—

2. अहंधियात्मनः सिद्धेस्तयैव ब्रह्मभावतः ।
तज्ज्ञानान्मुक्त्यभावाच्च जिज्ञासा नावकल्पते ॥ इति ।

Ahaṁdhiyātmanaḥ siddhestayaiva brahmabhāvataḥ,
Tajjñānānmuktyabhāvācca jijñāsā nāvakalpate. iti.

न च भेदेनाध्यस्तदेहादिनिवृत्तिः फलमित्यफलत्वहेतुरसिद्ध इति वेदितव्यम् । भेदग्रहो हि व्यापकनिवृत्त्या व्याप्यनिवृत्तिरिति न्यायेन भेदाग्रहपरिपन्थिनं भेदसंस्कारमपेक्षते । अनाकलितकलधौतस्य शुक्तिशकले तत्समारोपानुपलम्भात् ।

Na ca bhedenādhyastadehādinivṛttiḥ phalamityaphalatvahe-turasiddha iti veditavyam. Bhedagraho hi vyāpakanivṛttyā vyāpyanivṛttiriti nyāyena bhedāgrahaparipanthinaṁ bhedasaṁskāramapekṣate. Anākalitakaladhautasya śuktiśakale tatsamāropānupalambhāt.

संस्कारश्च प्रमितिमाकाङ्क्षति । अननुभूते संस्कारानुदयात् । न च भ्रान्तिरूपोऽनुभवस्तत्करणमिति भणितव्यम् । भ्रान्तेरभ्रान्ति पूर्वकत्वेन क्वचित्प्रमितेरवश्याभ्युपगमयितव्यत्वात् । प्रयोगश्च—विमतावात्मानात्मानौ भेदेन प्रमितावभेदायोग्यत्वात् । तमःप्रकाशवत् ।

Saṁskāraśca pramitimākāñkṣati. Ananubhūte saṁskārānudayāt. Na ca bhrāntirūpo'nubhavastatkaraṇamiti bhaṇitavyam. Bhrānterabhrānti pūrvakatvena kvacitpramiteravaśyā-bhyupagamayitavyatvāt. Prayogaśca—vimatāvātmānātmānau bhedena pramitāvabhedāyogyatvāt. Tamaḥ prakāśavat.

न चात्मानात्मनोरभेदायोग्यत्वलक्षणो हेतुरसिद्ध इति शङ्कनीयम् ।

विकल्पासहत्वात्। तथा हि—अनात्मात्मपरिशेषः स्यादात्मानात्मपरिशेषो वा ? आद्ये मुक्तिदशायामिव परिदृश्यमानं जगदस्तमियात् । द्वितीये जगदान्ध्यं प्रसज्येत ।

Na cātmānātmanorabhedāyogyatvalakṣaṇo heturasiddha iti śaṅkanīyam. Vikalpāsahatvāt. Tathā hi— anātmātmapariśeṣaḥ syādātmānātmapariśeṣo vā ? Ādye muktidaśāyāmiva paridṛśyamānaṁ jagadastamiyāt. Dvitīye jagadāndhyaṁ prasajyeta.

तमःप्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावत्वाच्च दृग्दृश्ययोरात्मानात्मनोरभेदायोग्यत्वमवधेयम् । ततश्चार्थाध्यासानुपपत्तौ तत्पूर्वकस्य ज्ञानाध्यासस्यासम्भवेन ब्रह्मणो विचार्यत्वासम्भवाद्विचारात्मिका चतुर्लक्षणशारीरकमीमांसा नारम्भणीयेति पूर्वपक्षे प्राप्ते सिद्धान्तोऽभिधीयते—।

Tamaḥprakāśavadviruddhasvabhāvatvācca dṛgdṛśyayorātmānā-tmanorabhedāyogyatvamavadheyam. Tataścārthādhyāsānupapa-ttau tatpūrvakasya jñānādhyāsasyāsambhavena brahmaṇo vicāryatvāsambhavādvicārātmikā caturlakṣaṇaśārīrakamīmāṁsā nārambhaṇīyeti pūrvapakṣe prāpte siddhānto'bhidhīyate—.

Beginning of Brahma-Jijñāsā Possible : Uttarapakṣa

अहंपदाधिगम्यादन्यदात्मतत्त्वं नास्तीति न वक्तव्यम् । निरस्तसमस्तोपाधिकस्यात्मतत्त्वस्य श्रुत्यादिषु प्रसिद्धत्वात् । न च तेषामुपचरितार्थता । उपक्रमोपसंहारादिषड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गवत्तया तत्त्वं बोधयतामुपचरितार्थत्वानुपपत्तेः । लिङ्गषट्कं च पूर्वाचार्यैर्दर्शितम्—

Ahampadādhigamyādanyadātmatattvaṁ nāstīti na vaktavyam. Nirastasamastopādhikasyātmatattvasya śrutyādiṣu prasiddhatvāt. Na ca teṣāmupacaritārthatā. Upakramopasaṁ-hārādiṣaḍvidhatātparyaliṅgavattayā tattvaṁ bodhayatāmupa-caritārthatvānupapatteḥ. Liṅgaṣaṭkaṁ ca pūrvācāryairdarśi-tam—

3. उपक्रमोपसंहारावभ्यासोऽपूर्वता फलम् ।
अर्थवादोपपत्ती च लिङ्गं तात्पर्यनिर्णये ॥ इति ।

Upakramopasaṁhārāvabhyāso'pūrvatā phalam,
Arthavādopapattī ca liṅgaṁ tātparyanirṇaye. iti.

Instances of Introduction etc.:—Proving Ātman

तत्र 'सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्' (छां. 6/2/1) इत्युपक्रमः । 'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा, तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो' (छां. 6/8-16) इत्युपसंहारः ।

तयोर्ब्रह्मविषयत्वेन ऐकरूप्यमेकलिङ्गम् । असकृत् 'तत्त्वमसि' (छा. 6/8-16) इत्युक्तिरभ्यासः मानान्तरागम्यत्वमपूर्वत्वम् । एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं फलम् ।

Tatra 'sadeva saumyedamagra āsīt' (Chāṁ. Up. 6/2/1) ityupakramaḥ. 'Aitadātmyamidaṁ sarvaṁ tatsatyaṁ sa ātmā, tattvamasi śvetaketo' (Chāṁ. Up. 6/8-16) ityupasaṁhāraḥ. Tayorbrahmaviṣayatvena aikarūpyamekaliṅgam. Asakṛt 'tattvamasi' (Chāṁ. Up. 6/8-16) ityuktirabhyāsaḥ mānāntarāgamyatvamapūrvatvam. Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānaṁ phalam.

सृष्टिस्थितिप्रलयप्रवेशनियमनानि पञ्चार्थवादाः । मृदादिदृष्टान्ता उपपत्तयः । तस्मादेतैर्लिङ्गैर्वेदान्तानां नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावब्रह्मात्मपरत्वं निश्चेतव्यम् । तदित्थमौपनिषदस्यात्मतत्त्वस्याहमनुभवेऽनवभासमानत्वात्तस्यानुभवस्याध्यस्तात्मविषयत्वं सिद्धम् ।

Sṛṣṭisthitipralayapraveśaniyamanāni pañcārthavādāḥ. Mṛdādidṛṣṭāntā upapattayaḥ. Tasmādetairliṅgairvedāntānām nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvabrahmātmaparatvaṁ niścetavyam. Taditthamaupaniṣadasyātmatattvasyāhamanubhave'navabhāsamānatvāttasyānubhavasyādhyastātmaviṣayatvaṁ siddham.

Superimposition of Self-Examination of The Vaiśeṣika System

कणभक्षाक्षचरणादिकक्षीकृतस्यात्मनो भानाभावादहमनुभवस्याध्यस्तात्मविषयत्वमेषितव्यम् । न तावदहमनुभवः सर्वगतत्वमात्मनोऽवगमयितुमिष्टे । अहमिहास्मि सदने जानान इति प्रादेशिकत्वग्रहणात् । न चेदं देहस्य प्रादेशिकत्वं प्रतिभासत इति वेदितव्यम् । अहमित्युल्लेखायोगात् ।

Kaṇabhakṣākṣacaraṇādikakṣīkṛtasyātmano bhānābhāvādahamanubhavasyādhyastātmaviṣayatvameṣitavyam. Na tāvadahamanubhavaḥ sarvagatatvamātmano'vagamayitumiṣṭe. Ahamihāsmi sadane jānāna iti prādeśikatvagrahaṇāt. Na cedaṁ dehasya prādeśikatvaṁ pratibhāsata iti veditavyam. Ahamityullekhāyogāt.

ननु तथा राज्ञः सर्वप्रयोजनविधातरि भृत्ये 'ममात्मा भद्रसेनः' इत्युपचारः, तद्वदात्मवचनस्याहंशब्दस्य देह उपचार इति चेत्—मैवं वोचः । अचरितात्मभावस्य देहादेः स्वसमानाकृतिशिलापुत्रकादिवज्ज्ञातृत्वायोगात् । न च ज्ञातृत्वमप्युपचरितम्। प्रयोक्तुः स्वप्रतिपत्तिप्रकाशके प्रयोगे प्रतिपत्तृत्वोपचारानुपपत्तेः ।

Nanu tathā rājñaḥ sarvaprayojanavidhātari bhṛtye 'mamātmā bhadrasenaḥ' ityupacāraḥ, tadvadātmavacanasyāhaṁśabdasya deha upacāra iti cet—maivaṁ vocaḥ. Acaritātmabhāvasya dehādeḥ svasamānākṛtiśilāputrakādivajjñātṛtvāyogāt. Na ca jñātṛtvamapyupacaritam. Prayoktuḥ svapratipattiprakāśake prayoge pratipattṛtvopacārānupapatteḥ.

अथ देहधर्मः प्रादेशिकत्वमात्मन्युपचर्येत तदा देहात्मनोर्भेदेन भवितव्यम् । प्रसिद्धभेदे माणवके सिंहशब्दवत्साम्प्रतिकगौणत्वे तिरोहितभेदेन सार्षपादौ रसे तैलशब्दवन्निरूढगौणत्वे वा गौणमुख्ययोर्भेदाध्यवसायस्य नियतत्वात् ।

Atha dehadharmaḥ prādeśikatvamātmanyupacaryeta tadā dehātmanorbhedena bhavitavyam. Prasiddhabhede māṇavake siṁhaśabdavatsāmpratikagauṇatve tirohitabhedena sārṣapādau rase tailaśabdavannirūḍhagauṇatve vā gauṇamukhyayorbhedādhyavasāyasya niyatatvāt.

अथ मम शरीरमिति भेदभानसम्भवाद्गौणत्वं मन्येथाः, तदयुक्तम् । अहंशब्दार्थस्य देहादिभ्यो निष्कृष्यासाधारणधर्मवत्त्वेन प्रतिभासमानत्वाभावात् । अपरथा लोकायतिकमतं नोदयमासादयेत् । मम शरीरमित्युक्तिस्तु 'राहोः शिरः' इतिवदौपचारिकी ।

Atha mama śarīramiti bhedabhānasambhavādgauṇatvaṁ manyethāḥ, tadayuktam. Ahaṁśabdārthasya dehādibhyo niṣkṛṣyāsādhāraṇadharmavattvena pratibhāsamānatvābhāvāt. Aparathā lokāyatikamataṁ nodayamāsādayet. Mama śarīramityuktistu 'rāhoḥ śiraḥ' itivadaupacārikī.

मम शरीरमिति ब्रुवाणेनापि कस्त्वमिति पृष्टेन वक्षःस्थलन्यस्तहस्तेन शृङ्गग्राहिकयाऽयमहमिति प्रतिवचनस्य दीयमानत्वेन देहात्मप्रत्ययस्य सकलानुभवसिद्धत्वात् । तदुक्तम्—

Mama śarīramiti bruvāṇenāpi kastvamiti pṛṣṭena vakṣaḥsthalanyastahastena śṛṅgagrāhikayā'yamahamiti prativacanasya dīyamānatvena dehātmapratyayasya sakalānubhavasiddhatvāt. Taduktam—

4. देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत्प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः ।
लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं त्वात्मनिश्चयात् ।। इति ।

Dehātmapratyayo yadvatpramāṇatvena kalpitaḥ,
Laukikaṁ tadvadevedaṁ pramāṇaṁ tvātmaniścayāt. iti.

तथा च व्यापकस्य भेदभानस्य निवृत्तेर्व्याप्यस्य गौणत्वस्य निवृत्तिरिति निरवद्यम् ।

Tathā ca vyāpakasya bhedabhānasya nivṛttervyāpyasya gauṇatvasya nivṛttiriti niravadyam.

Proof of Superimposition of Ātman—Refutation of Difference

नन्वभिज्ञया भेदसिद्धिर्मा सम्भून्नाम । प्रत्यभिज्ञया तु सोऽहमित्येवंरूपया तत्सिद्धिः सम्भविष्यतीति चेत्—न । विकल्पासहत्वात् । किमियं प्रत्यभिज्ञा पामराणां स्यात् परीक्षकाणां वा ? नाद्यः । देहव्यतिरिक्तात्मैक्यमवगाहमानायाः प्रत्यभिज्ञाया अनुदयात् । प्रत्युत श्यामस्य लौहित्यवत्कारणविशेषादल्पस्यापि महापरिमाणत्वमविरुद्धमनुभवतां तद्देह एव तस्याः सम्भवाच्च ।

Nanvabhijñayā bhedasiddhirmā sambhūnnāma. Pratyabhijñayā tu so'hamityevaṁrūpayā tatsiddhiḥ sambhaviṣyatīti cet—na. Vikalpāsahatvāt. Kimiyaṁ pratyabhijñā pāmarāṇāṁ syāt parīkṣakāṇāṁ vā? Nādyaḥ. Dehavyatiriktātmaikyamavagāhamānāyāḥ pratyabhijñāyā anudayāt. Pratyuta śyāmasya lauhityavatkāraṇaviśeṣādalpasyāpi mahāparimāṇatvamaviruddhamanubhavatāṁ taddeha eva tasyāḥ sambhavācca.

न द्वितीयः । व्यवहारसमये पामरसाम्यानतिरेकात् । अपरोक्षभ्रमस्य परोक्षज्ञानविनाश्यत्वानुपपत्तेश्च । यदुक्तं भगवता भाष्यकारेण—'पश्वादिभिश्चाविशेषात्'—(ब्र. सू. 1/1/1 भा.) इति । भामतीकारैरप्युक्तं—शास्त्रचिन्तकाः स्वल्वेवं विचारयन्ति, न प्रतिपत्तार इति । तथा चात्मगोचरस्याध्यासात्मरूपत्वं सुस्थम् ।

Na dvitīyaḥ. Vyavahārasamaye pāmarasāmyānatirekāt. Aparokṣabhramasya parokṣajñānavināśyatvānupapatteśca. Yaduktaṁ bhagavatā bhāṣyakāreṇa—'paśvādibhiścāviśeṣāt'—(Brahmasūtra 1/1/1 Bhāṣya.) iti. Bhāmatīkārairapyuktaṁ—śāstracintakāḥ svalvevaṁ vicārayanti, na pratipattāra iti. Tathā cātmagocarasyādhyāsātmarūpatvaṁ sustham.

Jaina Opinion of of Jīva Refuted

न चार्हतमतानुसारेणाहंप्रत्ययप्रामाण्यायात्मनो देहपरिमाणत्वमङ्गीकरणीयमिति साम्प्रतम् । मध्यमपरिमाणस्य सावयवत्वेन देहादिवदनित्यत्वे कृतहानाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् । अथैतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षया 'अवयवसमुदायः आत्मा' इत्यभ्युपगम्येत तदा वक्तव्यम् । किं प्रत्येकमवयवानां चैतन्यं संघातस्य वा ?

Na cārhatamatānuśāreṇāhaṁpratyayaprāmāṇyāyātmano dehaparimāṇatvamaṅgīkaraṇīyamiti sāmpratam.

Madhyamaparimāṇasya sāvayavatvena dehādivadanityatve kṛtahānākṛtābhyāgamaprasaṅgāt. Athaitaddoṣaparijihīrṣayā 'avayavasamudāyaḥ ātmā' ityabhyupagamyeta tadā vaktavyaṃ. Kiṁ pratyekamavayavānāṁ caitanyaṁ saṁghātasya vā ?

नाद्यः । बहूनां चेतनानामहमहमिकया प्रधानभावमनुभवतामैकमत्याभावेन समसंमयं विरुद्धदिक्क्रियतया शरीरस्यापि विशरणनिष्क्रियत्वयोरन्यतरापातात् ।

Nādyaḥ. Bahūnāṁ cetanānāmahamahamikayā pradhānabhāvamanubhavatāmaikamatyābhāvena samasamayaṁ viruddhadikkriyatayā śarīrasyāpi viśaraṇaniṣkriyatvayoranyatarāpātāt.

द्वितीयेऽपि संघातापत्तिः किं शरीरोपाधिकी स्वाभाविकी यादृच्छिकी वा? नाद्यः । एकस्मिन्नवयवे छिन्ने चिदात्मनोऽप्यवयवश्छिन्न इत्यचेतनत्वापातात् । न द्वितीयः । अनेकेषमवयवानामन्योन्यसाहित्यनियम दर्शनात् । न तृतीयः संश्लेषवद्विश्लेषस्यापि यादृच्छिकत्वेन सुखेन वसतामकस्मादचेतनत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

Dvitīye'pi saṁghātāpattiḥ kiṁ śarīropādhikī svābhāvikī yādṛcchikī vā ? Nādyaḥ. Ekasminnavayave chinne cidātmano'pyavayavaśchinna ityacetanatvāpātāt. Na dvitīyaḥ. Anekeṣāmavayavānāmanyonyasāhityaniyama darśanāt. Na tṛtīyaḥ saṁśleṣavadviśleṣasyāpi yādṛcchikatvena sukhena vasatāmakasmādacetanatvaprasaṅgāt.

न चाणुपरिमाणत्वमात्मनः शङ्कनीयम् । 'स्थूलोऽहम्' 'दीर्घोऽहम्' इति प्रत्ययानुपपत्तेः ।

Na cāṇuparimāṇatvamātmanaḥ śaṅkanīyaṃ. 'Sthūlo'haṃ' 'dīrgho'haṃ' iti pratyayānupapatteḥ.

Refutation of Vijñānavādin Buddhists—Vijñāna Ātmā

न च विज्ञानात्मभाषिणां नैष दोषः । विशुद्धसावयवत्वाभावादिति गणनीयम् । यः सुषुप्तः सोऽहं जागर्मीति स्थिरगोचरस्याहमुल्लेखस्य क्षणभङ्गिविज्ञानगोचरत्वे अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिरूपमिथ्याध्यासस्य तदवस्थानात् ।

Na ca vijñānātmabhāṣiṇāṁ naiṣa doṣaḥ. Viśuddhasāvayavatvābhāvāditi gaṇanīyaṃ. Yaḥ suṣuptaḥ so'haṁ jāgarmīti sthiragocarasyāhamullekhasya kṣaṇabhaṅgivijñānagocaratve atasminstadbuddhirūpamithyādhyāsasya tadavasthānāt.

तदनेन कृशोऽहं कृष्णोऽहमित्यादीनां प्रख्यानानां बुद्ध्या सरूपताख्यानेनौपचारिकत्वं प्रत्याख्यातम् । तद्व्यापकभेदभानासम्भवस्य प्रागेव प्रपञ्चितत्वात् । तथा च प्रयोगः—विमतं शास्त्रं विषयप्रयोजनसहितम्, आविद्यकबन्धनिवर्तकत्वात्सुप्तोत्थितबोधवत् ।

Tadanena kṛśo'haṁ kṛṣṇo'hamityādīnāṁ prakhyānānāṁ buddhyā sarūpatākhyānenaupacārikatvaṁ pratyākhyātaṃ. Tadvyāpakabhedabhānāsambhavasya prāgeva prapañcitatvāt. Tathā ca prayogaḥ—vimataṁ śāstraṁ viṣayaprayojanasahitaṃ, āvidyakabandhanivartakatvātsuptotthitabodhavat.

यथा स्वप्नावस्थायां मायापरिकल्पितयोषादिकृतबन्धनिवर्तकस्य सुप्तोत्थितबोधस्य मन्दिरमध्ये सुखेन शय्यायामवतिष्ठमानो देहो विषयः । तस्य सुप्तबोधेनानिश्चयात् स्वप्नमायाविजृम्भितानर्थनिवृतिः प्रयोजनम् । एवं मननादिजन्यपरोक्षज्ञानद्वारेण आध्यासिककर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वाद्यनर्थनिषेधकस्य शास्त्रस्य सच्चिदानन्दैकरसं प्रत्यगात्मभूतं ब्रह्म विषयः । तस्याहमनुभवेनानिश्चयात् । अध्यासनिवृत्तिः प्रयोजनम् ।

Yathā svapnāvasthāyāṁ māyāparikalpitayoṣādikṛtabandhanivartakasya suptotthitabodhasya mandiramadhye sukhena śayyāyāmavatiṣṭhamāno deho viṣayaḥ. Tasya suptabodhenāniścayāt svapnamāyāvijṛmbhitānarthanivṛttiḥ prayojanaṃ. Evaṁ mananādijanyaparokṣajñānadvāreṇa ādhyāsikakartṛtvabhoktṛtvādyanarthaniṣedhakasya śāstrasya sacchidānandaikarasaṁ pratyagātmabhūtaṁ brahma viṣayaḥ. Tasyāhamanubhavenāniścayāt. Adhyāsanivṛttiḥ prayojanaṃ.

तथा चाफलत्वादिति हेतुरसिद्ध इति सिद्धम् । तदुक्तम्—

Tathā cāphalatvāditi heturasiddha iti siddhaṃ. Taduktaṃ—

5. श्रुतिगम्यात्मतत्त्वं तु नाहंबुद्ध्यावगम्यते ।
अपि खे कामतो मोहो नात्मन्यस्तविपर्यये ।। इति ।

Śrutigamyātmatattvaṁ tu nāhaṁbuddhyāvagamyate.
Api khe kāmato moho nātmanyastaviparyaye. iti.

इतोऽयमसन्दिग्धत्वादिति हेतुरप्यसिद्ध इति सिद्धम् ।

Ito'yamasandigdhatvāditi heturapyasiddha iti siddhaṃ.

Doubt about the Subject of Ātman

यद्यपि सर्वः प्राणी प्रत्यगात्मास्तित्वं प्रत्येत्यहस्मीति । न हि कश्चिदपि नाहमस्मीति विप्रतिपद्यते । प्रत्यगात्मैव ब्रह्म 'तत्त्वमसि' (छा. 6/8/7) इति सामानाधिकरण्यात्। तस्मादात्मतत्त्वमसन्दिग्धं सिद्धम् । तथापि धर्मं प्रति विप्रतिपन्ना बहुविधाा इति न्यायेन विशेषप्रतिपत्तिरुपपद्यत एव ।

Yadyapi sarvaḥ prāṇī pratyagātmāstitvaṁ pratyetyahasmīti. Na hi kaścidapi nāhamasmīti vipratipadyate. Pratyagātmaiva brahma 'tattvamasi' (Chāṁ. Up. 6/8/7) iti sāmānādhikaraṇyāt. Tasmādātmatattvamasandigdhaṁ siddhaṃ. Tathāpi dharmaṁ prati vipratipannā bahuvidhā iti nyāyena viśeṣapratipattirupapadyata eva.

तथा हि—चैतन्यविशिष्टं देहमात्मेति लोकायता मन्यन्ते । इन्द्रियाण्यात्मेत्यन्ते । अन्तःकरणमात्मेत्यपरे । क्षणभङ्गुरं सन्तन्यमानं विज्ञानमात्मेति बौद्धा बुध्यन्ते । देहपरिमाण आत्मेति जैना जिनाः प्रतिजानते । कर्तृत्वादिविशिष्टः परमेश्वराद्भिन्नो जीवात्मेति नैयायिकादयो वर्णयन्ति । द्रव्यबोधस्वभावमात्मेत्याचार्याः परिचक्षते ।

Tathā hi—caitanyaviśiṣṭaṁ dehamātmeti lokāyatā manyante. Indriyāṇyātmetyante. Antaḥkaraṇamātmetyapare. Kṣaṇabhaṅguraṁ santanyamānaṁ vijñānamātmeti bauddhā budhyante. Dehaparimāṇa ātmeti jainā jināḥ pratijānate. Kartṛtvādiviśiṣṭaḥ parameśvarādbhinno jīvātmeti naināyikādayo varṇayanti. Dravyabodhasvabhāvamātmetyācāryāḥ paricakṣate.

भोक्तैव केवलं न कर्त्तेति सांख्याः संगिरन्ते । चिद्रूपःकर्तृत्वादिरहितः परस्मादभिन्नः प्रत्यगात्मेत्यौपनिषदा भाषन्ते । एवं प्रसिद्धे धर्मिणि विशेषतो विप्रतिपत्तौ तद्विशेषसंशयो युज्यते । तथा च सन्देहसम्भवाज्जिज्ञास्यत्वं ब्रह्मणः सिद्धम् ।

Bhoktaiva kevalaṁ na kartteti sāṁkhyāḥ saṁgirante. Cidrūpaḥ kartṛtvādirahitaḥ parasmādabhinnaḥ pratyagātmetyaupaniṣadā bhāṣante. Evaṁ prasiddhe dharmiṇi viśeṣato vipratipattau tadviśeṣasaṁśayo yujyate. Tathā ca sandehasambhavājjijñāsyatvaṁ brahmaṇaḥ siddhaṃ.

तदित्थं ब्रह्मणो विचार्यत्वसम्भवेन तद्विचारात्मकं ब्रह्ममीमांसाशास्त्रमारम्भणीयमिति युक्तम् । 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' (ब्र. सू. 1/1/2) इत्यादि सर्वस्य शास्त्रस्यैतद्विचारापेक्षत्वात् शास्त्रप्रथमाध्यायसंगतमिदमधिकरणम् ।

Taditthaṁ brahmaṇo vicāryatvasambhavena tadvicārātmakaṁ brahmamīmāṁsāśāstramārambhaṇīyamiti yuktaṃ. 'Janmādyasya yataḥ' (Bra. Sū. 1/1/2) ityādi sarvasya śāstrasyaitadvicārāpekṣatvāt śāstraprathamādhyāyasaṁgatamidamadhikaraṇaṁ.

Āgama as the Means for Ascertaining Brahman

नन्वित्थंभूते ब्रह्मणि किं प्रमाणं प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमागमो वा ? न कदाचित्तत्र प्रत्यक्षं श्रूयते । अतीन्द्रियत्वात् । नाप्यनुमानम् । व्याप्तस्यलिङ्गस्याभावात् । नाप्यागमः । 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते' (तै. 2/1/1) इति श्रुत्यैवागमगम्यत्वनिषेधात् ।

उपमानादिकमशक्यशङ्कम् । नियतविषयत्वात् तस्माद् ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणं न सम्भवतीति चेत्—।

Nanvitthaṁbhūte brahmaṇi kiṁ pramāṇaṁ pratyakṣamanumā-namāgamo vā? Na kadācittatra pratyakṣaṁ śrūyate. Atīndriyatvāta. Nāpyanumānaṃ. Vyāptasya liṅgasyābhāvāt. Nāpyāgamaḥ. 'Yato vāco nivartante' (Tai. Up. 2/1/1) iti śrutyaivāgamagamyatvaniṣedhāt. Upamānādikamaśakyaśaṅkaṃ. Niyataviṣayatvāt tasmād brahmaṇi pramāṇaṁ na sambhavatīti cet—.

मैवं वोचः । प्रत्यक्षाद्यसम्भवेऽपि आगमस्य सत्त्वात् । 'यतो वचो निवर्तन्ते इति' वाग्गोचरत्वनिषेधात्कथमेतदिति चेत्—श्रुतिरेव निषेधति वेदान्तवेद्यत्वं ब्रह्मणः श्रुतिरेव विधत्ते । न हि वेदप्रतिपादितेऽर्थेऽनुपपन्ने वैदिकानां बुद्धिः खिद्यते । अपि तु तदुपपादनमार्गमेव विचारयति । तस्मादुभयमपि प्रतिपादनीयम् ।

Maivaṁ vocaḥ. Pratyakṣādyasambhave'pi āgamasya sattvāt. 'Yato vaco nivartante iti' vāggocaratvaniṣedhātkathametaditi cet—śrutireva niṣedhati vedāntavedyatvaṁ brahmaṇaḥ śrutireva vidhatte. Na hi vedapratipādite'rthe'nuppapanne vaidikānāṁ buddhiḥ khidyate. Api tu tadupapādanamārgameva vicārayati. Tasmādubhayamapi pratipādanīyaṃ.

विषयत्वनिषेधकानि वाक्यानि वाक्यजन्यवृत्तिव्यक्तस्फुरणलक्षणफलासम्भव-विवक्षया प्रवृत्तानि । विषयत्वबोधकानि तु वृत्तिजन्यावरणभङ्गलक्षणफल-सम्भवविवक्षया । तदुक्तं भगवद्भिः—

Viṣayatvaniṣedhakāni vākyāni vākyajanyavṛttivyaktasphuraṇala-kṣaṇaphalāsambhavavivakṣayā pravṛttāni. Viṣayatvabodhakāni tu vṛttijanyāvaraṇabhaṅgalakṣaṇaphalasambhavavivakṣayā. Taduktaṁ bhagavadbhiḥ—

6. अनाधेयफलत्वेन श्रुतेर्ब्रह्म न गोचरः ।
प्रमेयं प्रमितौ तु स्यादात्माकारसमर्पणात् ॥ इति ।

Anādheyaphalatvena śruterbrahma na gocaraḥ,
Prameyaṁ pramitau tu syādātmākārasamarpaṇāt.

7. न प्रकाश्यं प्रमाणेन प्रकाशो ब्रह्मणः स्वयम् ।
तज्जन्यावृत्तिभङ्गत्वात्प्रमेयमिति गीयते ॥ इति च ॥

Na prakāśyaṁ pramāṇena prakāśo brahmaṇaḥ svayaṃ,
Tajjanyāvṛttibhaṅgatvātprameyamiti gīyate. iti ca.

For Obtaining Definite Knowledge the Veda is not a Pramāṇa-Purvapakṣa

ननु स्यादेष मनोरथो यदि सिद्धेऽर्थे वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं सिध्येत् । संगतिग्रहणायत्तत्वात् प्रामाण्यनिश्चयस्य । संगतिग्रहणस्य च वृद्धव्यवहारायत्तत्वात्। वृद्धव्यवहारस्य च लोके कार्यैकनियतत्वात् । न ह्यस्ति सम्भवः शब्दानां कार्येऽर्थे संगतिग्रहः सिद्धार्थाभिधायकत्वं तत्र वा प्रामाण्यमिति ।

Nanu syādeṣa manoratho yadi siddhe'rthe vedasya prāmnyaṁ sidhyet. Saṁgatigrahaṇāyattatvāt prāmāṇyaniścayasya. Saṁgatigrahaṇasya ca vṛddhavyavahārāyattatvāt. Bṛddhavyavahārasya ca loke kāryaikaniyatatvāt. Na hyasti sambhavaḥ śabdānāṁ kārye'rthe saṁgatigrahaḥ siddhārthābhidhāyakatvaṁ tatra vā prāmāṇyamiti.

न हि तुरङ्गत्वे गृहीतसंगतिकं तुरङ्गपदं गोत्वमाचष्टे तत्र वा प्रामाण्यं भजते । तस्मात्कार्यगृहीतसंगतिकानां शब्दानां कार्य एव प्रामाण्यम् ।

Na hi turaṅgatve gṛhītasaṁgatikaṁ turaṅgapadaṁ gotvamācaṣṭe tatra vā prāmāṇyaṁ bhajate. Tasmātkāryagṛhītasaṁgatikānāṁ śabdānāṁ kārya eva prāmāṇyaṃ.

ननु मुखविकासादिलिङ्गाद् हर्षहेतुं प्रसिद्धार्थमनुमाय यत्र शब्दस्य संगतिग्रहो यथा पुत्रस्ते जात इत्यादिषु, तत्रावश्यं कार्यमन्तरेणैव शब्दस्य सिद्धेऽर्थे प्रामाण्यमाश्रीयत इति चेत्—न । पुत्रजन्मवदेव प्रियासुखप्रसवादेरनेकस्य हर्षहेतोरुपस्थीयमानत्वेन परिशेषावधारणानुपपत्तेः । पुत्रस्ते जात इत्यादिषु सिद्धार्थपरेषु प्रयोगेषु द्वारं द्वारमित्यादिवत्कार्याध्याहारेण प्रयोगोपपत्तेश्च ।

Nanu mukhavikāsādiliṅgād harṣahetuṁ prasiddhārthamanumā-ya yatra śabdasya saṁgatigraho yathā putraste jāta ityādiṣu, tatrāvaśyaṁ kāryamantareṇaiva śabdasya siddhe'rthe prāmāṇyamāśrīyata iti cet—na. Putrajanmavadeva priyāsukhaprasavāderanekasya harṣahetorupasthīyamānatvena pariśeṣāvadhāraṇānupapatteḥ. Putraste jāta ityādiṣu siddhārthapareṣu prayogeṣu dvāraṁ dvāramityādivatkāryā-dhyāhāreṇa prayogopapatteśca.

शास्त्रत्वप्रसिद्ध्या च न वेदान्तानां सिद्धार्थपरत्वम् । प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिपराणामेव वाक्यानां शास्त्रत्वप्रसिद्धेः । तदुक्तं भट्टाचार्यैः—

Śāstratvaprasiddhyā ca na vedāntānāṁ siddhārthaparatvaṃ. Pravṛttinivṛttiparāṇāmeva vākyānāṁ śāstratvaprasiddheḥ. Taduktaṁ bhaṭṭācāryaiḥ—

8. प्रवृत्तिर्वा निवृत्तिर्वा नित्येन कृतकेन वा ।
पुंसां येनोपदिश्येत तच्छास्त्रमभिधीयते ॥ इति ।

Pravṛttirvā nivṛttirvā nityena kṛtakena vā,
Puṁsāṁ yenopadiśyeta tacchāstramabhidhīyate. iti.

न चैतेषां स्वरूपपरत्वे प्रयोजनमस्ति । श्रुतवेदान्तार्थस्यापि पुंसः सांसारिकधर्माणामनिवृत्तेः । तस्माद्वेदान्तानामप्यात्मा ज्ञातव्य इति समाम्नातेन विधिनैकवाक्यतामाश्रित्य कार्यपरतैवाश्रयणीयेति सिद्धम् । ततश्च केवलसिद्धरूपे ब्रह्मणि वेदान्तानां प्रामाण्यं न सिध्यतीति चेत् ।

Na caiteṣāṁ svarūpaparatve prayojanamasti. Śrutavedāntārtha-syāpi puṁsaḥ sāṁsārikadharmāṇāmanivṛtteḥ. Tasmādvedāntā-nāmapyātmā jñātavya iti samāmnātena vidhinaikavākyatāmā-śritya kāryaparataivāśrayaṇīyeti siddham. Tataśca kevalasidha-rūpe brahmaṇi vedāntānāṁ prāmāṇyaṁ na sidhyatīti cet.

Meaning of Words from Established Meaning—Uttarapakṣa

अत्र प्रतिविधीयते । न तावत्सिद्धे व्युत्पत्त्यसिद्धिः । प्रागुन्नीतया नीत्या 'पुत्रस्ते जातः' इति वाक्यात्सिद्धपरादपि व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धेः । न च परिशेषावधारणानुपपत्तिः। प्रियासुखप्रसवादेरपि सम्भवादिति भणितव्यम् । पुत्रपदाङ्कितपटप्रदर्शनवत्प्रिया-सुखप्रसवादिसूचकाभावात् ।

Atra pratividhīyate. Na tāvatsiddhe vyutpattyasiddhiḥ. Pragunnītayā nītyā 'putraste jātaḥ' iti vākyātsiddhaparādapi vyutpattisiddheḥ. Na ca pariśeṣāvadhāraṇānupapattiḥ. Priyāsukhaprasavāderapi sambhavāditi bhaṇitavyam. Putrapadāṅkitapaṭapradarśanavatpriyāsukhaprasavādisūcakā-bhāvāt.

पुत्रजन्मैव तत्सूचकमिति चेत्—प्रथमप्रतीतपुत्रजन्मपरित्यागे कारणाभावात् । पुत्रजननस्यैवाधिकानन्दहेतुत्वाच्च ।

Putrajanmaiva tatsūcakamiti cet—prathamapratītaputrajanma-parityāge kāraṇābhāvāt. Putrajananasyaivādhikānanda-hetutvācca.

पुत्रोत्पत्तिविपत्तिभ्यां नापरं सुखदुःखयोः ।

Putrotpattivipattibhyāṁ nāparaṁ sukhaduḥkhayoḥ.

इति विद्यमानत्वात् । तथा चाचकथच्चित्सुखाचार्यः—

Iti vidyamānatvāt. Tathā cācakathaccitsukhācāryaḥ—

9. दृष्टचैत्रसुतोत्पत्तेस्तत्पदाङ्कितवाससा ।
वार्ताहारेण यातस्य परिशेषविनिश्चितेः ॥
(चित्सुखी, पृ. 88) इति ।

Dṛṣṭacaitrasutotpattestatpadāṅkitavāsasā,
Vārtāhāreṇa yātasya pariśeṣaviniściteḥ.
(Citsukhī, Pṛṣṭha 88) iti.

यदुक्तं 'सिद्धार्थपरेषु कार्याध्याहारः' इति तदयुक्तम् । मुख्यार्थविषयतया सिद्धेऽपि प्रयोगसिद्धावध्याहारानुपपत्तेः । यदुक्तं 'शास्त्रत्वप्रसिद्ध्या च न स्वरूपपरत्वम्' इति तदप्ययुक्तम् । हितशासनादपि शास्त्रत्वोपपत्तेः । न च प्रयोजनाभावः । श्रुतमतवेदान्तजन्याद्वितीयात्मविज्ञानाभ्यासेन संसारनिदानाविद्यानिवृत्त्युपलक्षित-ब्रह्मात्मतालक्षणपरमपुरुषार्थसिद्धिः ।

Yaduktaṁ 'siddhārthapareṣu kāryādhyāhāraḥ' iti tadayuktam. Mukhyārthaviṣayatayā siddhe'pi prayogasiddhāvadhyāhārā-nupapatteḥ. Yaduktaṁ 'śāstratvaprasiddhyā ca na svarūpaparatvam' iti tadapyayuktam. Hitaśāsanādapi śāstratvopapatteḥ. Na ca prayojanābhāvaḥ. Śrutamatavedāntaja-nyādvitīyātmavijñānābhyāsena saṁsāranidānāvidyānivṛttyupa-lakṣitabrahmātmatālakṣaṇaparamapuruṣārthasiddhiḥ.

न चात्र विधिः सम्भवति । विकल्पासहत्वात् । तथा हि—किं शाब्दज्ञानं विधेयं किं वा भावनात्मकमाहोस्वित्साक्षात्काररूपम् ?

Na cātra vidhiḥ sambhavati. Vikalpāsahatvāt. Tathā hi—kiṁ śābdajñānaṁ vidheyaṁ kiṁ vā bhāvanātmakamāhosvitsākṣā-tkārarūpam.

नाद्यः । विदितपदार्थसंगतिकस्याधीतशब्दन्यायतत्त्वस्यान्तरेणापि विधिं शब्दादेवोपपत्तेः । नापि द्वितीयः । भावनाया ज्ञानप्रकर्षहेतुभावस्यान्वय-व्यतिरेकसिद्धतया प्राप्तत्वेनाविधेयत्वात् । अप्राप्तप्रापकस्यैवं विधित्वाङ्गीकारात् ।

Nādyaḥ. Viditapadārthasaṁgatikasyādhītaśabdanyāyatattvasyā-ntareṇāpi vidhiṁ śabdādevopapatteḥ. Nāpi dvitīyaḥ. Bhāvanāyā jñānaprakarṣahetubhāvasyānvayavyatirekasiddhatayā prāptatve-nāvidheyatvāt. Aprāptaprāpakasyaivaṁ vidhitvāṅgīkārāt.

तृतीये साक्षात्कारः किं ब्रह्मस्वरूपः किं वाऽन्तःकरणपरिणामभेदः ? नाद्यः । तस्य नित्यत्वेनाविधेयत्वात् । नापि द्वितीयः । आनन्दसाक्षात्काररूपतया फलत्वेनाविधेयत्वात् ।

Tṛtīye sākṣātkāraḥ kiṁ brahmasvarūpaḥ kiṁ vā'ntaḥkaraṇapariṇāmabhedaḥ? Nādyaḥ. Tasya nityatvenāvidheyatvāt. Nāpi dvitīyaḥ. Ānandasākṣātkārarūpatayā phalatvenāvidheyatvāt.

तस्माज्ज्ञातव्य इत्यादीनामविधायकत्वात् 'अर्हे कृत्यतृचश्च' (पाणि. सू. 3/3/169) इति कृत्यप्रत्ययानामर्हार्थे विधानादर्हार्थतैव व्याख्येया । तथा च सर्वेषां वेदान्तवाक्यानामुपक्रमोपसंहारादिषड्विधतात्पर्योपेतत्वात् नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावब्रह्मात्मपरत्वमास्थेयम् ।

Tasmājjñātavya ityādīnāmavidhāyakatvāt 'arhe kṛtyatṛcaśca' (Pāṇi. Sū. 3/3/169) iti kṛtyapratyayānāmarhārthe vidhānādarhārthataiva vyākhyeyā. Tathā ca sarveṣāṁ vedāntavākyānāmupakramopasaṁhārādiṣaḍvidhatātparyopetatvāt nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvabrahmātmaparatvamāstheyam.

Explanation of Superimposition—Prapañca as Vivarta

निष्प्रदेशे परमाणौ प्रदेशवृत्तित्वेनाभिमतस्य संयोगस्य दुरुपपादनतया तन्निबन्धनस्य द्व्यणुकस्यासिद्धौ द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण आरम्भवादासम्भवाद चेतनायाः प्रकृतेर्महदादिरूपेण परिणामवादासम्भवाच्च, ख्यातिबाधान्यथानुपपत्त्यानिर्वचनीयः प्रपञ्चश्चिद्विवर्त इति सिद्धम् । स्वरूपापरित्यागेन रूपान्तरापत्तिर्विवर्त इति सत्यमिथ्याख्यावभास इति । अवभासोऽध्यास इति पर्यायः ।

Niṣpradeśe paramāṇau pradeśavṛttitvenābhimatasya saṁyogasya durupapādanatayā tannibandhanasya dvyaṇukasyāsiddhau dvyaṇukādikrameṇa ārambhavādāsambhavāda cetanāyāḥ prakṛtermahadādirūpeṇa pariṇāmavādāsambhavācca, khyātibādhānyathānupapattyānirvacanīyaḥ prapañcaściddvivarta iti siddham. Svarūpāparityāgena rūpāntarāpattirvivarta iti satyamithyākhyāvabhāsa iti. Avabhāso'dhyāsa iti paryāyaḥ.

Different Kinds of Superimposition

स चाध्यासो द्विविधः—अर्थाध्यासो ज्ञानाध्यासश्चेति । तदुक्तम्—

Sa cādhyāso dvividhaḥ—arthādyāso jñānādhyāsaśceti. Taduktam—

10. प्रमाणदोषसंस्कारजन्मान्यस्य परात्मता ।
तद्धीश्चाध्यास इति हि द्वयमिष्टं मनीषिभिः ॥ इति ।

Pramāṇadoṣasaṁskārajanmānyasya parātmatā,
Taddhīścādhyāsa iti hi dvayamiṣṭaṁ manīṣibhiḥ. iti.

पुनरपि द्विविधोऽध्यासः । निरुपाधिकसोपाधिकभेदात् । तदप्युक्तम्—

Punarapi dvividho'dhyāsaḥ. Nirupādhikasopādhikabhedāt. Tadapyuktam—

11. दोषेण कर्मणा वापि क्षोभिताज्ञानसम्भवः ।
तत्त्वविद्याविरोधी च भ्रमोऽयं निरुपाधिकः ॥

Doṣeṇa karmaṇā vāpi kṣobhitājñānasambhavaḥ,
Tattvavidyāvirodhī ca bhramo'yaṁ nirupādhikaḥ.

12. उपाधिसंनिधिप्राप्तक्षोभविद्याविजृम्भितम् ।
उपाध्यपगमापोह्यमाहुः सोपाधिकं भ्रमम् ॥ इति ।

Upādhisaṁnidhiprāptakṣobhavidyāvijṛmbhitam,
Upādhyapagamāpohyamāhuḥ sopādhikaṁ bhramam. iti.

तत्र स्वरूपेण कल्पिताहमाद्यध्यासो निरुपाधिकः । तदप्युक्तम्—

Tatra svarūpeṇa kalpitāhamādyadhyāso nirupādhikaḥ. Tadapyuktam—

13. नीलिमेव वियत्येषा भ्रन्त्या ब्रह्मणि संसृतिः ।
घटव्योमेव भोक्तायं भ्रान्तो भेदेन न स्वतः ॥ इति ।

Nīlimeva viyatyeṣā bhrāntyā brahmaṇi saṁsṛtiḥ,
Ghaṭavyomeva bhoktāyaṁ bhrānto bhedena na svataḥ. iti.

अत एव भाष्यकारः 'शुक्तिका रजतवदवभासत एकश्चन्द्रः सद्वितीयवदिति' निदर्शन द्वयमुदाजहार । शिष्टं शास्त्र एव स्पष्टमिति विस्तरभियोपरम्यते । एवं च दृग्दृश्यौ द्वावेव पदार्थाविति वेदान्तिनां सिद्धान्त इति सर्वमवदातम् ।

Ata eva bhāṣyakāraḥ 'śuktikā rajatavadavabhāsata ekaścandraḥ sadvitīyavaditi' nidarśana dvayamudājahāra. Śiṣṭaṁ śāstra eva spaṣṭamiti vistarabhiyoparamyate. Evaṁ ca dṛgdṛśyau dvāveva padārthāviti vedāntināṁ siddhānta iti sarvamavadātam.

Refutation of Superimposition by Mīmāṁsakas—Pūrvapakṣa in Detail

अत्र प्रभाकरः—शुक्तिका रजतवदवभासत इति दृष्टान्तो नेष्टः । रजतप्रत्ययस्य शुक्तिकालम्बनत्वानुपपत्तेः । तथा हि—इदं रजतमिति प्रतीतौ शुक्तेरालम्बनत्वं पुरोदेशसत्तामात्रेणावलम्ब्यते, कारणत्वेन, भासमानत्वेन वा ? नाद्यः । पुरोवर्तिनां लोष्टादीनामप्यालम्बनत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

Atra prabhākaraḥ—śuktikā rajatavadavabhāsata iti dṛṣṭānto neṣṭaḥ. Rajatapratyayasya śuktikālambanatvānupapatteḥ. Tathā hi—idaṁ rajatamiti pratītau śukterālambanatvaṁ purodeśa-

sattāmātreṇāvalambyate, kāraṇatvena, bhāsamānatvena vā? Nādyaḥ. Purovartināṁ loṣṭadīnāmapyālambanatvaprasaṅgāt.

अथ कलधौतबोधकरणसंस्कारोद्बोधकारणत्वेन तद्द्वारा रजतज्ञानकारणत्वादालम्बनत्वं मन्यसे, तदपि न संगच्छते । चक्षुरादीनामपि कारणत्वेन विषयत्वापातात् ।

Atha kaladhautabodhakaraṇasaṁskārodbodhakāraṇatvena taddvārā rajatajñānakāraṇatvādālambanatvaṁ manyase, tadapi na saṁgacchate. Cakṣurādīnāmapi kāraṇatvena viṣayatvāpātāt.

अथ भासमानतया विषयत्वमिष्यते, तदप्यश्लिष्टम् । रजतनिर्भासस्य शुक्तिकालम्बनत्वानुपपत्तेः । यस्मिन्विज्ञाने यदवभासते तत्तदालम्बनम् । अत्र च कलधौतानुभवः शुक्तिकालम्बनत्वकल्पनायां विरुध्यते ।

Atha bhāsamānatayā viṣayatvamiṣyate, tadapyaśliṣṭam. Rajatanirbhāsasya śuktikālambanatvānupapatteḥ. Yasminvijñāne yadavabhāsate tattadālambanam. Atra ca kaladhautānubhavaḥ śuktikālambanatvakalpanāyāṁ virudhyate.

तथा चाचकथन्न्यायवीथ्यां शालिकनाथः—

Tathā cācakathannyāyavīthyāṁ śālikanāthaḥ—

14. अत्र ब्रूमो य एवार्थो यस्यां संविदि भासते ।
वेद्यः स एव नान्यद्धि वेद्यावेद्यत्वलक्षणम् ॥

Atra brūmo ya evārtho yasyāṁ saṁvidi bhāsate,
Vedyaḥ sa eva nānyaddhi vedyāvedyatvalakṣaṇam.

15. इदं रजतमित्यत्र रजतं त्ववभासते ।
तदेव तेन वेद्यं स्यान्न तु शुक्तिरवेदनात् ॥

Idaṁ rajatamityatra rajataṁ tvavabhāsate,
Tadeva tena vedyaṁ syānna tu śuktiravedanāt.

16. तेनान्यस्यान्यथा भासः प्रतीत्यैव पराहतः ।
अन्यस्मिन्भासमाने हि न परं भासते यतः ॥
(प्रकरण प. 4/23–25) इति ।

Tenānyasyānyathā bhāsaḥ pratītyaiva parāhataḥ,
Anyasminbhāsamāne hi na paraṁ bhāsate yataḥ.
(Prakaraṇa pa. 4/23-25) iti.

Absence of Proof for Illusory Knowledge

किं च मिथ्याज्ञानोत्पत्तौ सामग्री न समस्ति । किं केवलानीन्द्रियादीनि दोषदूषितानि वा ? नाद्यः । तेषां समीचीनज्ञानजननसामर्थ्योपलम्भात् । अन्यथा समीचीनं

रजतज्ञानं न कदाचिदुदयमासादयेत् । न द्वितीयः । दोषाणामौत्सर्गिककार्यप्रसवशक्तिप्रतिबन्धमात्रप्रभावत्वात् ।

Kiṁ ca mithyājñānotpattau sāmagrī na samasti. Kiṁ kevalānīndriyādīni doṣadūṣitāni vā? Nādyaḥ. Teṣāṁ samīcīnajñānajananasāmarthyopalambhāt. Anyathā samīcīnaṁ rajatajñānaṁ na kadācidudayamāsādayet. Na dvitīyaḥ. Doṣāṇāmautsargikakāryaprasavaśaktipratibandhamātraprabhāvatvāt.

न हि दुष्टं कुटजबीजं वटाङ्कुरं जनयितुमीष्टे । न वा तैलकलुषितं शालिबीजमशाल्यङ्कुरजननायालम् । किं तु स्वकार्यं न करोति ।

Na hi duṣṭaṁ kuṭajabījaṁ vaṭāṅkuraṁ janayitumīṣṭe. Na vā tailakaluṣitaṁ śālibījamaśālyaṅkurajananāyālam. Kiṁ tu svakāryaṁ na karoti.

ननु दावदहनदग्धस्य वेत्रबीजस्य कदलीकाण्डजनकत्वं दृष्टमिति चेत्—तन्न स्थाने। दग्धस्यावेत्रबीजत्वेन दोषाणां विपरीतकार्यकारित्वं प्रत्युदाहरणात् ।

Nanu dāvadahanadagdhasya vetrabījasya kadalīkāṇḍajanakatvaṁ duṣṭamiti cet—tanna sthāne. Dagdhasyāvetrabījatvena doṣāṇāṁ viparītakāryakāritvaṁ pratyanudāharaṇāt.

न च भस्मकदोषदूषितस्य कौक्षेयस्याशुशुक्षणेः बह्वन्नपचनसामर्थ्यं दृष्टमित्येष्टव्यम्। अशितपीताद्याहारपरिणतौ जाठरस्य जातवेदसः शक्तत्वात् । तदुक्तम्—

Na ca bhasmakadoṣadūṣitasya haukṣeyasyāśuśukṣaṇeḥ bahvannapacanasāmarthyaṁ dṛṣṭamityeṣṭavyam. Aśitapītādyāhārapariṇatau jāṭharasya jātavedasaḥ śaktatvāt. Taduktam—

17. अयथार्थस्य बोधस्य नोत्पत्तावस्ति कारणम् ।
दोषाश्चेन्न हि दोषाणां कार्यशक्तिविघातता ॥

Ayathārthasya bodhasya notpattāvasti kāraṇam,
Doṣāścenna hi doṣāṇāṁ kāryaśaktivighātatā.

18. भस्मकादिषु कार्यस्य विघातादेव दोषता ।
अग्नेर्हि रसनिष्पत्तिः कार्यं जठरवर्तिनः ॥ (प्रकरण प. 4/73-74)इति ।

Bhasmakādiṣu kāryasya vighātādeva doṣatā,
Agnerhi rasaniṣpattiḥ kāryaṁ jaṭharavartinaḥ.
(Prakaraṇa Pa. 4/73-74) iti.

No Knowledge of the Meaning Of Asat

अपि चासत्यप्यर्थे ज्ञानप्रादुर्भावाभ्युपगमे समीचीनस्थलेऽपि ज्ञानानां

स्वगोचरव्यभिचारशङ्काऽङ्कुरसम्भवेन निरङ्कुशो व्यवहारो लुप्यते । तदाह—

Api cāsatyapyarthe jñānaprādurbhāvābhyupagame samīcīna-sthale'pi jñānānāṁ svagocaravyabhicāraśaṅkā'ṅkurasambhavena niraṅkuśo vyavahāro lupyate. Tadāha—

19. यदि चार्थं परित्यज्य काचिद् बुद्धिः प्रकाशते ।
व्यभिचारवति स्वार्थे कथं विश्वासकारणम् ।। (प्रक. प. 4/66) इति ।

Yadi cārtha parityajya kācid buddhiḥ prakāśate,
Vyabhicāravati svārthe kathaṁ viśvāsakāraṇam.
(Praka. Pa. 4/66) iti.

Analysis of Apprehension and Recollection

ननु रजतगोचरैकविशिष्टज्ञानानङ्गीकारे विशिष्टव्यवहारो न सिध्येत् । अतस्तत्सिद्धयेऽपि विपर्ययोऽङ्गीकार्य इति चेन्न । इदं रजतमिति ग्रहणस्मरणाभिधस्य बोधद्वयस्य व्यवहारकारणत्वाङ्गीकारात् । यद्येवमिदं शुक्तिकाशकलं तद्रजतमित्यतोऽपि विशिष्टव्यवहारः स्यादिति । तन्न ।

Nanu rajatagocaraikaviśiṣṭajñānānaṅgīkāre viśiṣṭavyavahāro na sidhyet. Atastatsiddhaye'pi viparyayo'ṅgīkārya iti cenna. Idaṁ rajatamiti grahaṇasmaraṇābhidhasya bodhadvayasya vyavahārakāraṇatvāṅgīkārāt. Yadyevamidaṁ śuktikāśakalaṁ tadrajatamityato'pi viśiṣṭavyavahāraḥ syāditi. Tanna.

तत्रेदमिति पुरोवर्तिद्रव्यमात्रग्रहणस्य दोषदूषितचक्षुर्जन्यत्वेनानाकलितशुक्तित्वादि-विशेषितस्य सामान्यमात्रग्रहणरूपत्वाद्, रजतमिति ज्ञानस्यासंनिहितविषयस्य संयोगलिङ्गाद्यप्रसूततया सदृशावबोधितसंस्कारमात्रप्रभवत्वेन परिशेषप्राप्त-स्मृतिभावस्य दोषहेतुकतया गृहीत–तत्तांशप्रमोषाद् ग्रहणमात्रत्वोपपत्तेः ।

Tatredamiti purovartidravyamātragrahaṇasya doṣadūṣitacakṣurjanyatvenānākalitaśuktitvādiviśeṣitasya sāmānyamātragrahaṇarūpatvād, rajatamiti jñānasyāsaṁnihitaviṣayasya saṁyogaliṅgādyaprasūtatayā sadṛśāvabodhitasaṁskāramātraprabhavatvena pariśeṣaprāptasmṛtibhāvasya doṣahetukatayā gṛhīta—tattāṁśapramośād grahaṇamātratvopapatteḥ.

तदप्युक्तम्—

Tadapyuktam—

20. नन्वत्र रजताभासः कथमेष घटिष्यते ।
उच्यते शुक्तिशकलं गृहीतं भेदवर्जितम् ।।

Nanvatra rajatābhāsaḥ kathameṣa ghaṭiṣyate,
Ucyate śuktiśakalaṁ gṛhītaṁ bhedavarjitam.

21. शुक्तिकाया विशेषा ये रजताद्भेदहेतवः ।
ते न ज्ञाता अभिभवाज्ज्ञाता सामान्यरूपता ।।

Śuktikāyā viśeṣā ye rajatādbhedahetavaḥ,
Te na jñātā abhibhavājjñātā sāmānyarūpatā.

22. अनन्तरं च रजतस्मृतिर्जाता तयाऽपि च ।
मनोदोषात्तदित्यंशपरामर्शविवर्जितम् ।।

Anantaraṁ ca rajatasmṛtirjātā tayā'pi ca,
Manodoṣāttadityaṁśaparāmarśavivarjitam.

23. रजतं विषयीकृत्य नैव शुक्तेर्विवेचितम् ।
स्मृत्यातो रजताभास उपपन्नो भविष्यति ।। (प्रकरण प. 4/26-29)

Rajataṁ viṣayīkṛtya naiva śuktervivecitam,
Smṛtyāto rajatābhāsa upapanno bhaviṣyati.
(Praka. Pa. 4/26-29)

24. न ह्यसंनिहितं तावत्प्रत्यक्षं रजतं भवेत् ।
लिङ्गाद्यभावाच्चान्यस्य प्रमाणस्य न गोचरः ।।

Na hyasaṁnihitaṁ tāvatpratyakṣaṁ rajataṁ bhavet,
Liṅgādyabhāvāccānyasya pramāṇasya na gocaraḥ.

25. परिशेषात्स्मृतिरिति निश्चयो जायते पुनः ।(प्रक. प. 4/31-32) इति ।

Pariśeṣātsmṛtiriti niścayo jāyate punaḥ.
(Praka. Pa. 4/31-32) iti.

Apprehension and Recollection in Indifference or Similarity

ननु किमिदमेकैकं व्यवहारकारणमुत संभूय ? न प्रथमः । देशभेदेन प्रवृत्तिसङ्गात् । न चरमः । प्रयत्नायौगपद्याज्ज्ञानायौगपद्यात्—(वै. सू. 3/2/3) इत्यादिना ज्ञानयौगपद्यनिषेधात् । अतो ज्ञानद्वयं हेतुरित्ययुक्तं वच इति चेत्—मैवं वोचः । अविनश्यतोः सहावस्थाननिषेधेऽपि विनश्यदविनश्यतोः सहावस्थानस्यानिषिद्धत्वेन निरन्तरोत्पन्नयोस्तदुपपत्तेः ।

Nanu kimidamekaikaṁ vyavahārakāraṇamuta saṁbhūya? Na prathamaḥ. Deśabhedena pravṛttisaṅgāt. Na caramaḥ. Prayatnāyaugapadyājjñānāyaugapadyāt—'(Vai. Sū. 3/2/3) ityādinā jñānayaugapadyaniṣedhāt. Ato jñānadvayaṁ heturityayuktaṁ vaca iti cet—maivaṁ vocaḥ. Avinaśyatoḥ

sahāvasthānaniṣedhe'pi vinaśyadavinaśyatoḥ sahāvasthānasyāniṣiddhatvena nirantarotpannayostadupapatteḥ.

ननु रजतज्ञानाद् रजतार्थी रजते प्रवर्ततां नाम । पौरस्त्ये वस्तुनि कथं प्रवृत्तिः स्यादिति चेत्—न । स्वरूपतो विषयतश्चागृहीतभेदयोः ग्रहणस्मरणयोः सन्निहितरजतगोचरज्ञानसारूप्येण वस्तुतः परस्परं विभिन्नयोरप्यभेदोचितसामानाधिकरण्यव्यपदेशहेतुत्वोपपत्तेः ।

Nanu rajatajñānād rajatārthī rajate pravartatāṁ nāma. Paurastye vastuni kathaṁpravṛttiḥ syāditi cet—na. Svarūpato viṣayataścāgṛhītabhedayoḥ grahaṇasmaraṇayoḥ sannihitarajatagocarajñānasārūpyeṇa vastutaḥ parasparaṁ vibhinnayorapyabhedocitasāmānādhikaraṇyavyapadeśahetutvopapatteḥ.

ग्रहणस्मरणयोः सन्निहितरजतगोचरं कथम् ? यथा चैतत्तथा निशम्यताम् । सन्निहितरजतगोचरं हि विज्ञानमिदमंशरजतांशयोरसंसर्गं नावगाहते । तयोः संसृष्टत्वेन असंसर्गस्यैवाभावात् । नापि स्वगतं भेदम् । एकज्ञानत्वात् । एवं ग्रहणस्मरणे अपि दोषवशाद्विद्यमानमपीदमंशरजतांशयोरसंसर्गं भेदं नावगाहेत इति । भेदाग्रहणमेव सारूप्यम् ।

Grahaṇasmaraṇayoḥ sannihitarajatagocaraṁ katham? Yathā caitattathā niśamyatām. Sannihitarajatagocaraṁ hi vijñānamidamaṁśarajatāṁśayorasaṁsargaṁ nāvagāhate. Tayoḥ saṁsṛṣṭatvena asaṁsargasyaivābhāvāt. Nāpi svagataṁ bhedam. Ekajñānatvāt. Evaṁ grahaṇasmaraṇe api doṣavaśādvidyamānamapīdamaṁśarajatāṁśayorasaṁsargaṁ bhedaṁ nāvagāheta iti. Bhedāgrahaṇameva sārūpyam.

तदुक्तं गुरुमतानुसारिभिः—

Taduktaṁ gurumatānusāribhiḥ—

26. ग्रहणस्मरणे चेमे विवेकानवभासिनी ।
सम्यग्रजतबोधाच्च भिन्ने यद्यपि तत्त्वतः ॥

Grahaṇasmaraṇe ceme vivekānavabhāsinī,
Samyagrajatabodhācca bhinne yadyapi tattvataḥ.

27. तथापि भिन्ने नाभाते भेदाग्रहसमत्वतः ।
सम्यग्रजतबोधस्तु समक्षैकार्थगोचरः ॥

Tathāpi bhinne nābhāte bhedāgrahasamatvataḥ,
Samyagrajatabodhastu samakṣaikārthagocaraḥ.

28. ततो भिन्ने अबुद्ध्वा च ग्रहणस्मरणे इमे ।
समानेनैव रूपेण केवलं मन्यते जनः ॥

Tato bhinne abuddhvā ca grahaṇasmaraṇe ime,
Samānenaiva rūpeṇa kevalaṁ manyate janaḥ.

29. अपरोक्षावभासेन समानार्थग्रहेण च ।
अवैलक्षण्यसंवित्तिरिति तावत्समर्थिता ॥

Aparokṣāvabhāsena samānārthagraheṇa ca,
Availakṣaṇyasaṁvittiriti tāvatsamarthitā.

30. व्यवहारोऽपि तत्तुल्यस्तत एव प्रवर्तते ॥ (प्रक. प. 4/33-37) इति ।

Vyavahāro'pi tattulyastata eva pravartate.
(Praka. Pa. 4/33-37) iti.

एवमगृहीतविवेकमापन्नसन्निहितरूप्यज्ञानसारूप्यं ग्रहणस्मरणद्वयमयथाव्यवहारहेतुरिति सिद्धम् ।

Evamagṛhītavivekamāpannasannihitarūpyajñānasārūpyaṁ grahaṇasmaraṇadvayamayathāvyavahāraheturiti siddham.

Approval of the Treatment of 'Pītaḥ Śaṅkhaḥ'

यद्येवमयथाव्यवहारो ग्रहणस्मरणजन्यस्तर्हि 'पीतः शङ्खः' इत्यादौ स न सिद्धः, तत्र तयोरभावादिति चेत्—न । अगृहीतविवेकयोः प्राप्तसमीचीनसंसर्गज्ञानसारूप्यत्वे ग्रहणयोरेव व्यवहारसंपादकत्वोपपत्तेः । नयनरश्मिवर्तिनः पित्तद्रव्यस्य पीतिमा दोषवशाद् द्रव्यरहितो गृह्यते । शङ्खोऽप्यकलितशुक्लगुणः स्वरूपतो गृह्यते । तदनयोर्गुणगुणिनोः संसर्गयोग्ययोरसंसर्गाग्रहसारूप्यात्पीततपनीयपिण्डप्रत्ययावैलक्षण्याद् व्यवहार उपपद्यते ।

Yadyevamayathāvyavahāro grahaṇasmaraṇajanyastarhi 'pītaḥ śaṅkhaḥ' ityādau sa na siddhaḥ, tatra tayorabhāvāditi cet—na. Agṛhītavivekayoḥ prāptasamīcīnasaṁsargajñānasārūpyatve grahaṇayoreva vyavahārasaṁpādakatvopapatteḥ. Nayanaraśmivartinaḥ pittadravyasya pītimā doṣavaśād dravyarahito gṛhyate. Śaṅkho'pyakalitaśuklaguṇaḥ svarūpato gṛhyate. Tadanayorguṇaguṇinoḥ saṁsargayogyayorasaṁsargāgrahasārūpyātpītatapanīyapiṇḍapratyayāvailakṣaṇyād vyavahāra upapadyate.

यथोक्तम्—

Yathoktam —

31. पीतशङ्खावबोधे हि पित्तस्येन्द्रियवर्तिनः ।
पीतिमा गृह्यते द्रव्यरहितो दोषतस्तथा ॥

Pītaśaṅkhāvabodhe hi pittasyendriyavartinaḥ,
Pītimā gṛhyate dravyarahito doṣatastathā.

32. शङ्खस्येन्द्रियदोषेण शुक्लिमा न च गृह्यते ।
केवलं द्रव्यमात्रं तु प्रथते रूपवर्जितम् ।।

Śaṅkhasyendriyadoṣeṇa śuklimā na ca gṛhyate,
Kevalaṁ dravyamātraṁ tu prathate rūpavarjitam.

33. गुणे द्रव्यव्यपेक्षे च द्रव्ये च गुणकाङ्क्षिणि ।
भासमाने तयोर्बुद्धिरसम्बन्धं न बुध्यते ।।

Guṇe dravyavyapekṣe ca dravye ca guṇakāṅikṣaṇi,
Bhāsamāne tayorbuddhirasambandhaṁ na budhyate.

34. सत्यपीतावभासेन समे भाते मती इमे ।
व्यवहारोऽपि तत्तुल्य एवमत्रापि युज्यते ।। (प्रक. प. 4/48-51) । इति

Satyapītāvabhāsena same bhāte mati ime,
Vyavahāro'pi tattulya evamatrāpi yujyate.
(Praka. Pa. 4/48-51) iti.

Proving 'Nedaṁ Rajataṃ'—Mīmāṁsaka view

नन्विदं रजतमिति भ्रान्तिज्ञानानभ्युपगमे रजतप्रसक्तेरसत्त्वान्नेदं रजतमिति निषेधः कथं कलधौताभावं बोधयतीति चेत्—नैष दोषः । भेदाग्रहप्रसञ्जितस्य शुक्तौ रजतव्यवहारस्य निषेधस्वीकारेण कल्पनालाघवसद्भावात् ।

Nanvidaṁ rajatamiti bhrāntijñānānabhyupagame rajataprasakterasattvānnedaṁ rajatamiti niṣedhaḥ kathaṁ kaladhautābhāvaṁ bodhayatīti cet—naiṣa doṣaḥ. Bhedāgrahaprasañjitasya śuktau rajatavyavahārasya niṣedhasvīkāreṇa kalpanālāghavasadbhāvāt.

तदुक्तं पञ्चिकाप्रकरणे—

Taduktaṁ pañcikāprakaraṇe—

35. मिथ्याभावोऽपि तत्तुल्यव्यवहारप्रवर्तनात् ।
रजतव्यवहारांशे विसंवादयतो नरात् ।।

Mithyābhāvo'pi tattulyavyavahārapravartanāt,
Rajatavyavahārāṁśe visaṁvādayato narāt.

36. बाधकप्रत्ययस्यापि बाधकत्वमतो मतम् ।
प्रसज्यमानरजतव्यवहारानवारणात् ।।
(प्रक. प. 4/38-39) इति ।

Bādhakapratyayasyāpi bādhakatvamato matam,
Prasajyamānarajatavyavahārānavāraṇāt.
(Praka. Pa. 4/38-39) iti.

तदनेन प्राचीनयोर्ज्ञानयोः सत्यत्वे कथा भ्रमत्वसिद्धिरिति शङ्का पराकृता । अयथाव्यवहारप्रवर्तकत्वेन तदुपपत्तेः ।

Tadanena prācīnayorjñānayoḥ satyatve kathā bhramatvasidhiriti śaṅkā parākṛtā. Ayathāvyavahārapravartakatvena tadupapatteḥ.

Refutation of Abhāva by Prabhākara View

किं च नेदं रजतमिति बाधकावबोधो नाभावमवगाहते । भावव्यतिरेकेणाभावस्य दुर्ग्रहणेत्वात् । यद्येवम्, अङ्ग नास्तीति प्रत्ययस्य किमालम्बनम् ? अपरथा माहाभानिकपक्षानुप्रवेश इति चेत्—मैवं भाषिष्ठाः ।

Kiṁ ca nedaṁ rajatamiti bādhakāvabodho nābhāvamavagāhate. Bhāvavyatirekeṇābhāvasya durgrahaṇetvāt. Yadyevaṃ, aṅga, nāstīti pratyayasya kimālambanaṃ? Aparathā māhābhānikapakṣānupraveśa iti cet—maivaṁ bhāṣiṣṭhāḥ.

अभावस्य धर्मिप्रतियोगिनिरूपणाधीननिरूप्यत्वेऽवश्याभ्युपगमनीये दृश्ये प्रतियोगिन्यदृश्ये वा स्मर्यमाणेऽधिकरणमात्रबुद्धेरेव 'नास्तीति' व्यवहारोपपत्तावतिरिक्ताभावकल्पनायां प्रमाणाभावात् ।

Abhāvasya dharmipratiyoginirūpaṇādhīnanirūpyatve'vaśyābhyupagamanīye dṛśye pratiyoginyadṛśye vā smaryamāṇe'dhikaraṇamātrabuddhereva 'nāstīti' vyavahāropapattāvatiriktābhāvakalpanāyāṁ pramāṇābhāvāt.

तदुक्तममृतकलायाम्—

Taduktamamṛtakalāyāṃ—

37. अत्रोच्यते द्वयी संविद्वस्तुनो भूतलादिनः ।
एका संसृष्टविषया तन्मात्रविषया परा ।।

Atrocyate dvayī saṁvidvastuno bhūtalādinaḥ,
Ekā saṁsṛṣṭaviṣayā tanmātraviṣayā parā.

38. तन्मात्रविषया वापि द्वयी साथ निगद्यते ।
प्रतियोगिन्यदृश्ये च दृश्ये च प्रतियोगिनि ।।

Tanmātraviṣayā vāpi dvayī sātha nigadyate,
Pratiyoginyadṛśye ca dṛśye ca pratiyogini.

39. तत्र तन्मात्रधीर्येयं स्मृते च प्रतियोगिनि ।
नास्तित्वं सैव भूभागे घटादिप्रतियोगिन: ॥

(प्रक. प. 6/37-39) इति ।

Tatra tanmātradhīryeyaṁ smṛte ca pratiyogini,
Nāstitvaṁ saiva bhūbhāge ghaṭādipratiyoginaḥ.

(Praka. Pa. 6/37-39) iti.

अत एव प्राभाकरमतानुसारिभि: प्रमाणपारायणे प्रत्यक्षादीनि पञ्चैव प्रमाणानि प्रपञ्चितानि । नन्वेवमभावस्याभावे नकारस्य वैयर्थ्यमापद्येत । अनुशासनविरोधश्चापतेदिति चेत्—तदेतद्वार्तम् । एकोनपञ्चाशद्वर्णानां मध्ये कस्यापि वर्णस्याभावार्थत्वादर्शनेन वर्णस्य सतो नकारस्य तदर्थत्वानुपपत्ते: ।

Ata eva prābhākaramatānusāribhiḥ pramāṇapārāyaṇe pratyakṣādīni pañcaiva pramāṇāni prapañcitāni. Nanvevamabhāvasyābhāve nakārasya vaiyarthyamāpadyeta. Anuśāsanavirodhaścāpatediti cet—tadetadvārtaṃ. Ekonapañcāśadvarṇānāṁ madhye kasyāpi varṇasyābhāvārthatvādarśanena varṇasya sato nakārasya tadarthatvānupapatteḥ.

न चैवमनुशासनविरोध: । तदन्य-तदभाव-तद्विरुद्धेष्वर्थेषु अनुशासनस्यैवमर्थ: स्यात् । तथा हि—चेतनानां मध्ये कश्चन कस्यचिन्मित्रं, कश्चन कस्यचिदुदासीन: तथैवाचेतनानामपि । तदन्यपदेन तदुदासीनो नकारार्थ: । विरुद्धपदेन शत्रुर्नकारार्थ:। तदभावपदेन मित्रं नकारार्थ: ।

Na caivamanuśāsanavirodhaḥ. Tadanya-tadabhāva-tadviruddheṣvartheṣu anuśāsanasyaivamarthaḥ syāt. Tathā hi—cetanānāṁ madhye kaścana kasyacinmitraṁ, kaścana kasyacidudāsīnaḥ tathaivācetanānāmapi. Tadanyapadena tadudāsīno nakārārthaḥ. Viruddhapadena śatrurnakārārthaḥ. Tadabhāvapadena mitraṁ nakārārthaḥ.

तथा चाब्राह्मणपद एवैतत्त्रयं प्रतीयते–शूद्र इत्युदासीनो, यवन इति शत्रु:, क्षत्रिय इति मित्रम् । एवं सर्वत्र नञ्प्रयोगस्थले द्रष्टव्यमिति न कश्चिदभावो भावव्यतिरिक्त: सम्भवति । तस्मादुक्तया रीत्या भ्रमप्रसिद्ध्या विवादाध्यासिता: प्रत्यया यथार्था:, प्रत्ययत्वात्, दण्डीति प्रत्ययवदिति सिद्धम् ।

Tathā cābrāhmaṇapada evaitattrayaṁ pratīyate—śūdra ityudāsīno, yavana iti śatruḥ, kṣatriya iti mitraṃ. Evaṁ sarvatra nañprayogasthale draṣṭavyamiti na kaścidabhāvo bhāvavyatiriktaḥ sambhavati. Tasmāduktayā rītyā bhramaprasiddhyā vivādādhyāsitāḥ pratyayā yathārthāḥ, pratyayatvāt, daṇḍīti pratyayavaditi siddhaṃ.

The 'Reality' of Illusory Knowledge—Śaṅkara's Answer

तदपरे न क्षमन्ते । इह खलु निखिलप्रेक्षावान् समीहिततत्साधनयोरन्यतरप्रवेदने प्रवर्तते । न च रजतमर्थयमानस्य शुक्तिकाशकलज्ञानं तद्रूपमनुभावयितुं प्रभवति । शुक्तिकाशकलस्य समीहिततत्साधनयोरन्यतरभावाभावात् । नापि रजतस्मरणं पुरोवर्तिनि प्रवृत्तिकारणम् । तस्यानुभवपारतन्त्र्यतयानुभवदेश एव प्रर्वतकत्वात् ।

Tadapare na kṣamante. Iha khalu nikhilaprekṣāvān samīhitatatsādhanayoranyatarapravedane pravartate. Na ca rajatamarthayamānasya śuktikāśakalajñānaṁ tadrūpamanubhāvayituṁ prabhavati. Śuktikāśakalasya samīhitatatsādhanayoranyatarabhāvābhāvāt. Nāpi rajatasmaraṇaṁ purovartini pravṛttikāraṇaṃ. Tasyānubhavapāratantryatayā'nubhavadeśa eva pravartakatvāt.

नापि भेदाग्रहो व्यवहारकारणम् । ग्रहणनिबन्धनत्वाच्चेतनव्यवहारस्य । ननु न वयमेकैकस्य कारणत्वं ब्रूमहे येनैवमुपालभ्येमहि । किं त्वगृहीतविवेकस्य ज्ञानद्वयस्य प्राप्तसमीचीनपुर:स्थितरजतज्ञानसारूप्यस्येत्यनुक्तोपालम्भोऽयमिति चेत्–तदप्ययुक्तम् । विकल्पासहत्वात् । तथा हि–समीचीनरजतावभाससारूप्यं भासमानं प्रवर्तकं सत्तामात्रेण वा ?

Nāpi bhedāgraho vyavahārakāraṇaṃ. Grahaṇanibandhanatvāccetanavyavahārasya. Nanu na vayamekaikasya kāraṇatvaṃ brūmahe yenaivamupālabhyemahi. Kiṁ tvagṛhītavivekasya jñānadvasya prāptasamīcīnapuraḥsthitarajatajñānasārūpyasyetyanuktopālambho'yamiti cet—tadapyayuktaṃ. Vikalpāsahatvāt. Tathā hi—samīcīnarajatāvabhāsasārūpyaṃ bhāsamānaṁ pravartakaṁ sattāmātreṇa vā?

आद्ये विकल्पे भेदाग्रहापरपर्यायस्य सारूप्यस्य समीचीनसन्निभे इमे ज्ञाने इति विशेषाकारेण गृह्यमाणस्य प्रवृत्तिकारणत्वं किं वानयोरेव स्वरूपतो विषयश्च मिथो भेदाग्रहो विद्यत इति सामान्याकारेण गृह्यमाणस्य सारूप्यस्य ?

Ādye vikalpe bhedāgrahāparaparyāyasya sārūpyasya samīcīnasannibhe ime jñāne iti viśeṣākāreṇa gṛhyamāṇasya pravṛttikāraṇatvaṁ kiṁ vānayoreva svarūpato viṣayaśca mitho bhedāgraho vidyata iti sāmānyākāreṇa gṛhyamāṇasya sārūpyasya?

नाद्यः । समीचीनज्ञानवत्तत्सन्निभज्ञानस्य तदुचितव्यवहारप्रवर्तकत्वानुपपत्तेः । न खलु गोसन्निभो गवय इत्यवभासोगवार्थिनं गवये प्रवर्तयति ।

Nādyaḥ. Samīcīnajñānavattatsannibhajñānasya taducitavyavahārapravartakatvānupapatteḥ. Na khalu gosannibho gavaya ityavabhāsogavārthinaṁ gavaye pravartayati.

न द्वितीयः । व्याहतत्वात् । न खल्वनाकलितभेदस्यानयोरिति, अनयोरिति ग्रहे भेदाग्रह इति च प्रतिपत्तिर्भवति । अतः परिशेषात्सत्तामात्रेण भेदाग्रहरूपस्य सारूप्यस्य व्यवहारकारणत्वमङ्गीकर्तव्यम् ।

Na dvitīyaḥ. Vyāhatatvāt. Na khalvanākalitabhedasyānayoriti, anyoriti grahe bhedāgraha iti ca pratipattirbhavati. Ataḥ pariśeṣātsattāmātreṇa bhedāgraharūpasya sārūpyasya vyavahārakāraṇatvamaṅgīkartavyaṃ.

एवमेवास्त्विति चेत्–तर्हि इदमिह संप्रधार्यम् । किमयं भेदाग्रहः समारोपोत्पादनक्रमेण व्यवहारकारणमस्तु, उतानुत्पादितारोप एव स्वयमिति । न च द्वितीयः पक्ष एव श्रेयान् । तावतैव व्यवहारोत्पत्तावारोपस्य गौरवदोषदुष्टत्वादिति मन्तव्यम् । विशिष्टव्यवहारस्य विशिष्टज्ञानपूर्वकत्वनियमेनाज्ञानपूर्वकत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

Evamevāstvati cet—tarhi idamiha saṁpradhāryaṃ. Kimayaṁ bhedāgrahaḥ samāropotpādanakrameṇa vyavahārakāraṇamastu, utānutpāditāropa eva svayamiti. Na ca dvitīyaḥ pakṣa eva śreyān. Tāvataiva vyavahārotpattāvāropasya gauravadoṣaduṣṭatvāditi mantavyaṃ. Viśiṣṭavyavahārasya viśiṣṭajñānapūrvakatvaniyamenājñānapūrvakatvānupapatteḥ.

Imposition of Silver on Pearl Oyster

नन्वयं व्यवहारो नाज्ञानपूर्वक इत्यनाकलितपराभिसन्धिः स्वसिद्धान्तसिद्धार्थाद् यदि कश्चिच्छङ्केत, स प्रतिवक्तव्यः ।

Nanvayaṁ vyavahāro nājñānapūrvaka ityanākalitaparābhisandhiḥ svasiddhāntasiddhārthād yadi kaścicchaṅketa, sa prativaktavyaḥ.

शुक्तिकाविषयस्य ग्रहणस्यासमीहितविषयत्वेन रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वासम्भवादन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां रजतज्ञानस्य समीहितविषयत्वेन प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वसम्भवाच्चेदमर्थाभिसम्भिन्नग्रहविविक्तस्यापि रजतस्मरणस्य कारणत्वं वक्तव्यम् ।

Śuktikāviṣayasya grahaṇasyāsamīhitaviṣayatvena rajatārthipravṛttihetutvāsambhavādanvayavyatirekābhyāṁ rajatajñānasya samīhitaviṣayatvena pravṛttihetutvasambhavāccedamarthābhisambhinnagrahaviviktasyāpi rajatasmaraṇasya kāraṇatvaṁ vaktavyaṃ.

तच्च वक्तुं न शक्यते । जानाति इच्छति ततः प्रवर्तत इति न्यायेन ज्ञानेच्छाप्रवृत्तीनां समानविषयत्वेन भाव्यम् । तथा चेदंकारास्पदाभिमुखप्रवृत्तस्य रजतार्थिनस्तदिच्छानिबन्धनम् । अन्यथा अन्यदिच्छन्नन्यद् व्यवहरतीति व्याहन्येत । तथा च यदीदंकारास्पदं रजतावभासगोचरतां नाचरेत्कथं रजतार्थी तदिच्छेत् । यद्यरजतत्वाग्रहणादिति ब्रूयात् रजतत्वाग्रहात्कस्मादयं नोपेक्षेतेति ।

Tacca vaktuṁ na śakyate. Jānāti icchati tataḥ pravartata iti nyāyena jñānecchāpravṛttīnāṁ samānaviṣayatvena bhāvyaṃ. Tathā cedaṁkārāspadābhimukhapravṛttasya rajatārthinastadicchānibandhanaṃ. Anyathā anyadicchannanyad vyavaharatīti vyāhanyeta. Tathā ca yadīdaṁkārāspadaṁ rajatāvabhāsagocaratāṁ nācaretkathaṁ rajatārthī tadicchet. Yadyarajatatvāgrahaṇāditi brūyāt rajatatvāgrahātkasmādayaṁ nopekṣeteti.

युगपत्तद्भव—भेदाग्रहाभेदाग्रह—निबन्धनाभ्यामुपादानोपेक्षाभ्यां पुरतः पृष्ठतश्चाकृष्यमाणः पुरुषो दोलायमानतया रूप्यारोपमन्तरेणोपादानपक्ष एव न व्यवस्थाप्यत इत्यनिच्छताऽप्यच्छमतिना समारोपः समाश्रयणीयः ।

Yugapattadbhava—bedāgrahābhedāgraha—nibandhanābhyāmupādānopekṣābhyāṁ purataḥ pṛṣṭhataścākṛṣyamāṇaḥ puruṣo dolāyamānatayā rūpyāropamantareṇopādānapakṣa eva na vyavasthāpyata ityanicchatā'pyacchamatinā samāropaḥ samāśrayaṇīyaḥ.

यथाह—भेदाग्रहादिदंकारास्पदे रजतत्वमारोप्य तज्जातीयस्योपकारहेतुभावमनुस्मृत्य तज्जातीयत्वेनास्यापि तदनुमाय तदर्थी प्रवर्तत इति प्रथम पक्षः प्रशस्यः ।

Yathāha—bhedāgrahādidaṁkārāspade rajatatvamāropya tajjātīyasyopakārahetubhāvamanusmṛtya tajjātīyatvenāsyāpi tadanumāya tadarthī pravartata iti prathamaḥ pakṣaḥ praśasyaḥ.

न च तटस्थरजतस्मरणपक्षेऽपि हेतोर्गृहीतत्वेनायं मार्गः समान इति वाच्यम् । रजतत्वस्य हेतोः पक्षधर्मत्वाभावात् । न च पक्षधर्मताया अभावेऽपि व्याप्तिबलाद्गमकत्वं शङ्क्यम् । व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मतावल्लिङ्गस्यैव गमकत्वाङ्गीकारात् ।

Na ca taṭastharajatasmaraṇapakṣe'pi hetorgṛhītatvenāyaṁ mārgaḥ samāna iti vācyaṃ. Rajatatvasya hetoḥ pakṣadharmatvābhāvāt. Na ca pakṣadharmatāyā abhāve'pi

vyāptibalādgamakatvaṁ śaṅkyam. Vyāptipakṣadharmatāvalliṅgasyaiva gamakatvāṅgīkārāt.

तदाहु:शबरस्वामिन:-ज्ञातसम्बन्धस्यैव पुंसो लिङ्गविशिष्टधर्म्येकदेशदर्शनाल्लिङ्गिविशिष्टधर्म्येकदेशबुद्धिरनुमानमिति । आचार्योऽप्यवोचत्—

Tadāhuḥśabarasvāminaḥ—jñātasambandhasyaiva puṁso liṅgaviśiṣṭadharmyekadeśadarśanālliṅgiviśiṣṭadharmyekadeśabuddhiranumānamiti. Ācāryo'pyavocat—

40. स एष चोभयात्मा यो गम्ये गमक इष्यते ।
असिद्धेनैकदेशेन गम्यासिद्धेर्न बोधक: ।। इति ।

Sa eṣa cobhayātmā yo gamye gamaka iṣyate,
Asiddhenaikadeśena gamyāsidherna bodhakaḥ. iti.

Solution of Doubt About The Imposition

ननु भवत्पक्षेऽपि पुर:स्थितस्येदमर्थस्य परमार्थतो रजतत्वं नास्तीति न रजतत्वं धर्म्येकदेश इति चेन्न । यक्षानुरूपो बलिरितिन्यायेनानुमित्याभासानुगुणस्यैकदेशस्य विद्यमानत्वात् । तथा च प्रयोग:—

Nanu bhavatpakṣe'pi puraḥsthitasyedamarthasya paramārthato rajatatvaṁ nāstīti na rajatatvaṁ dharmyekadeśa iti cenna. Yakṣānurūpo baliritinyāyenānumityābhāsānuguṇasyaikadeśasya vidyamānatvāt. Tathā ca prayogaḥ—

विवादाध्यासितं रजतज्ञानं पुरोवर्तिविषयं रजतार्थिनस्तत्र नियमेन प्रवर्तकत्वात् । यदुक्तसाधनं तदुक्तसाध्यम्, यथोभयवादिसम्मतं सत्यरजतज्ञानम् ।

Vivādādhyāsitaṁ rajatajñānaṁ purovartiviṣayaṁ rajatārthinastatra niyamena pravartakatvāt. Yaduktasādhanaṁ taduktasādhyam, yathobhayavādisammataṁ satyarajatajñānam.

विवादपदं शुक्तिशकलं रजतज्ञानविषयोऽव्यवधानेन रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिविषयत्वाद्रजतपदसमानाधिकरणपदान्तरवाच्यत्वाद्वा वस्तुरजतवत् ।

Vivādapadaṁ śuktiśakalaṁ rajatajñānaviṣayo'vyavadhānena rajatārthipravṛttiviṣayatvādrajatapadasamānādhikaraṇapadāntaravācyatvādvā vasturajatavat.

Reply to the Arguments of Mīmāṁsakas

यदुक्तं रजतज्ञानस्य शुक्तिकालम्बनत्वेऽनुभवविरोध इति तदप्ययुक्तम् । विकल्पासहत्वात् । तथा हि—तत्र किं रजताकारप्रतीतिं प्रति शुक्तेरालम्बनत्वेऽनुभवविरोध उद्भाव्यते इदमंशस्य वा? ।

Yaduktaṁ rajatajñānasya śuktikālambanatve'nubhavavirodha iti tadapyayuktam. Vikalpāsahatvāt. Tathā hi—tatra kiṁ rajatākārapratītiṁ prati śukterālambanatve'nubhavavirodha udbhāvyate idamaṁśasya vā ?

नाद्य: । अनङ्गीकारपराहतत्वात् । न द्वितीय: । इदन्तानियतदेशाधिकरणस्य चाकचिक्यविशिष्टस्य वस्तुतो रजतज्ञानालम्बनत्वमनवलम्बमानस्य भवत एवानुभवविरोधात् । इदं रजतमिति सामानाधिकरण्येन पुरोवर्तिन्यङ्गुलिनिर्देशपूर्वकमुपादानादिव्यवहारदर्शनाच्च ।

Nādyaḥ. Anaṅgīkāraparāhatatvāt. Na dvitīyaḥ. Idantāniyatadeśādhikaraṇasya cākacikyaviśiṣṭasya vastuto rajatajñānālambanatvamanavalambamānasya bhavata evānubhavavirodhāt. Idaṁ rajatamiti sāmānādhikaraṇyena purovartinyaṅgulinirdeśapūrvakamupādānādivyavahāradarśanācca.

यच्चोक्तम्—दोषाणामौत्सर्गिककार्यप्रसवशक्तिप्रतिबन्धकतया विपरीतकारित्वं नास्तीति । तदप्ययुक्तम् । दावदग्धवेत्रबीजादौ तथा दर्शनात् । न च दग्धस्य वेत्रबीजत्वं नास्तीति मन्तव्यम् । श्यामस्य घटस्य रक्ततामात्रेण घटत्वनिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् ।

Yaccoktam—doṣāṇāmautsargikakāryaprasavaśaktipratibandhakatayā viparītakāritvaṁ nāstīti. Tadapyayuktaṁ. Dāvadagdhavetrabījādau tathā darśanāt. Na ca dagdhasya vetrabījatvaṁ nāstīti mantavyam. Śyāmasya ghaṭasya raktatāmātreṇa ghaṭatvanivṛttiprasaṅgāt.

ननु घटोऽयं घटोऽयमित्यनुवृत्तयो: प्रत्ययप्रयोगयो: सद्भावाद् घटत्वस्य सद्भाव इति चेत्–न । अत्रापीदं वेत्रबीजमिति तयो: समानत्वात् ।

Nanu ghaṭo'yaṁ ghaṭo'yamityanuvṛttayoḥ pratyayaprayogayoḥ sadbhāvād ghaṭatvasya sadbhāva iti cet—na. Atrāpīdaṁ vetrabījamiti tayoḥ samānatvāt.

तथा भस्मकदोषदूषितस्य जाठराग्नेर्बह्वन्नपचनसामर्थ्यं दृश्यते । न च बह्वन्नपचनसामर्थ्यं जाठरस्यैव जातवेदसो न भस्मकव्याधेरिति वक्तुं युक्तम् । तस्य मन्दमल्पपचनसामर्थ्येऽपि सहसा महत्पचनस्य भस्मकव्याधिसाहायकमन्तरेणानुपपत्ते: । अन्यथा सर्वेषां तथापत्ते: ।

Tathā bhasmakadoṣadūṣitasya jāṭharāgnerbahvannapacanasāmarthyaṁ dṛśyate. Na ca bahvannapacanasāmarthyaṁ jāṭharasyaiva jātavedaso na bhasmakavyādheriti vaktuṁ yuktam. Tasya mandamalpapacanasāmarthye'pi sahasā mahatpacanasya

bhasmakavyādhisāhāyakamantareṇānupapatteḥ. Anyathā sarveṣāṁ tathāpatteḥ.

किं च ज्ञानानां यथार्थव्यवहारकारणत्वेऽपि दोषवशादयथार्थव्यवहारकारणत्वमङ्गीकुर्वाणो भवानेव पर्यनुयोज्यो भवति । तदुक्तं भाष्ये—'यश्चोभयोः समानो दोषो द्योतते तत्र कश्चोद्यो भवतीति' अत्राप्युक्तम्—

Kiṁ ca jñānānāṁ yathārthavyavhārakāraṇtve'pi doṣavaśādayathārthavyavahārakāraṇatvamaṅgīkurvāṇo bhavāneva paryanuyojyo bhavati. Taduktaṁ bhāṣye—'yaścobhayoḥ samāno doṣo dyotate tatra kaṣcodyo bhavatīti' atrāpyuktam—

41. यश्चोभयोः समो दोषः परिहारोऽपि वा समः ।
नैकः पर्यनुयोक्तव्यस्तादृगर्थविचारणे ॥ इति ।

Yaścobhayoḥ samo doṣaḥ parihāro'pi vā samaḥ,
Naikaḥ paryanuyoktavyastādṛgarthavicāraṇe. iti.

तथापि मामकस्यानुमानस्य किं दूषणं दत्तमासीत् ? यद्यनुमानदूषणं विना न परितुष्यति, हन्त, कालात्ययापदिष्टता । कृष्णवर्त्मानुष्णात्वानुमानवत् । एतावन्तं कालं यदिदं रजतमित्यभादसौ शुक्तिरिति प्रत्यक्षेण प्राचीनप्रत्ययस्यायथार्थत्वं प्रवेदयता यथार्थत्वानुमानस्यापहतविषयत्वाद् बाध्यत्वसम्भवात् ।

Tathāpi māmakasyānumānasya kiṁ dūṣaṇaṁ dattamāsīt? Yadyanumānadūṣaṇaṁ vinā na parituṣyati, hanta, kālātyayāpadiṣṭatā. Kṛṣṇavartmānuṣṇatvānumānavat. Etāvantaṁ kālaṁ yadidaṃ rajatamityabhādasau śuktiriti pratyakṣeṇa prācīnapratyayasyāyathārthatvaṁ pravedayatā yathārthatvānumānasyāpahṛtaviṣayatvād bādhyatvasambhavāt.

यच्चोक्तं स्वगोचरव्यभिचारे सर्वानाश्वासप्रसङ्ग इति । तदसाम्प्रतम् । संविदां क्वचित्संवादिव्यवहारजनकत्वेऽपि न सर्वत्र तच्छङ्कया प्रवृत्युच्छेद इति, तथा तावकेऽपि मते तथा मामकेऽयसौ पन्था न वारित इति समानयोगक्षेमत्वात् ।

Yaccoktaṁ svagocaravyabhicāre sarvānāśvāsaprasaṅga iti. Tadasāmpratam. Saṁvidāṁ kvacitsaṁvādivyavahārajanakatve'pi na sarvatra tacchaṅkayā pravṛttyuccheda iti, tathā tāvake'pi mate tathā māmake'pyasau panthā na vārita iti samānayogakṣematvāt.

तौतातितमतमवलम्ब्य विधिविवेकं व्याकुर्वाणैराचार्यवाचस्पतिमिश्रैर्बोधकत्वेन स्वतः प्रामाण्यं न व्यभिचारेणेति न्यायकणिकायां प्रत्यपादि । तस्मादविश्वासशङ्का अनवकाशं लभते ।

Tautātitamatamavalambya vidhivivekaṁ vyākurvāṇairācāryavācaspatimiśrairbodhakatvena svataḥ prāmāṇyaṁ na vyabhicāreṇeti nyāyakaṇikāyāṁ pratyapādi. Tasmādaviśvāsaśaṅkā anavakāśaṁ labhate.

Refutation of Nihilists—Concept of Illusion

ननु माध्यमिकमतावलम्बनेन रजतादिविभ्रमालम्बनमसदिति चेत्—तदुक्तम् । असतोऽपरोक्षप्रतिभासायोग्यत्वात् । तदुपादित्सया प्रवृत्यनुपपत्तेश्च ।

Nanu mādhyamikamatāvalambanena rajatādivibhramālambanamasaditi cet—taduktaṃ. Asato'parokṣapratibhāsāyogyatvāt. Tadupāditsayā pravṛttyanupapatteśca.

ननु विज्ञानमेव वासनादिस्वकारणासामर्थ्यासादितदृष्टान्तसिद्धस्वभावविशेषमसत्प्रकाशनसमर्थनमुपजातम् । असत्प्रकाशनशक्तिरविद्या संवृतिरिति पर्यायाः । तस्मादविद्यावशादसन्तो भान्तीति चेत्—तदपि वक्तुमशक्यम् ।

Nanu vijñānameva vāsanādisvakāraṇasāmarthyāsāditadṛṣṭāntasiddhasvabhāvaviśeṣamasatprakāśanasamarthanamupajātaṃ. Asatprakāśanaśaktiravidyā saṁvṛtiritiparyāyāḥ. Tasmādavidyāvaśādasanto bhrāntīti cet—tadapi vaktumaśakyaṃ.

शक्यस्य दुर्निरूप्यत्वात् । किमत्र शक्यं कार्यं ज्ञाप्यं वा ? नाद्यः । असतः कारणत्वानुपपत्तेः । न द्वितीयः । शक्यस्य कारणत्वेनाङ्गीकृतत्वात् । ज्ञानादन्यस्य ज्ञानस्यानुपलब्धेश्च । उपलब्धौ वा तस्यापि ज्ञाप्यत्वेन ज्ञापकान्तरापेक्षायामनवस्थाप्तेश्च ।

Śakyasya durnirūpyatvāt. Kimatra śakyaṁ kāryaṁ jñāpyaṁ vā ? Nadyaḥ. Asataḥ kāraṇatvānupapatteḥ. Na dvitīyaḥ. Śakyasya kāraṇatvenāṅgīkṛtatvāt. Jñānādanyasya jñānasyānupalabdheśca. Upalabdhau vā tasyāpi jñāpyatvena jñāpakāntarāpekṣāyāmanavasthāptteśca.

अथैतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षया विज्ञानं सद्रूपमेवासतः प्रकाशकमिति कक्षीक्रियत इति चेत्–अत्र देवानांप्रियः प्रष्टव्यः पुनः । असौ सदसतोः सम्बन्धो निरूप्यनिरूपकभावोऽविनाभावो वा ?

Athaitaddoṣaparijihīrśayā vijñānaṁ sadrūpamevāsataḥ prakāśakamiti kakṣīkriyata iti cet—atra devānāṁpriyaḥ praṣṭavyaḥ punaḥ. Asau sadasatoḥ sambandho nirūpyanirūpakabhāvo'vinābhāvo vā ?

नाद्यः । असत उपकाराधारत्वायोगेनानुपकृततया निरूप्यत्वानुपपत्तेः । न चरमः । धूमधूमध्वजयोरिव तदुत्पत्तिलक्षणस्य, शिंशपावृक्षयोरिव तादात्म्यलक्षणस्य वा,

अविनाभावनिदानस्य सदसतोरसम्भवात् । तस्माद्विज्ञानमेवासत्प्रकाशकम्– इत्यसद्वादिनामयमसत्प्रलाप इत्यारोप्यमाणं नासत् ।

Nādyaḥ. Asata upakārādhāratvāyogenānupakṛtatayā nirūpyatvānupapatteḥ. Na caramaḥ. Dhūmadhūmadhvajayoriva tadutpattilakṣaṇasya, śiṁśapāvṛkṣayoriva tādātmyalakṣaṇasya vā, avinābhāvanidānasya sadasatorasaṁbhavāt. Tasmādvijñānamevāsatprakāśakaṃ—ityasadvādināmayamasat-pralāpa ityāropyamāṇaṁ nāsat.

Refutation of Vijñānavādins—Concept of Illusion

ननु विज्ञानवादिनयानुसारेण प्रतीयमानं रजतं ज्ञानात्मकम् तत्र च युक्तिरभिधीयते—यद्यथानुभूयते तत्तथा । अन्यथात्वं तु बलबद्बाधकोपनिपातादास्थीयत इत्युभयवादिसम्मतोऽर्थः । तत्र च नेदं रजतमिति निषिद्धेदंभावं रजतमर्यादान्तरज्ञानरूपमवतिष्ठते । न चेदन्तया निषेधे सति अनिदन्तया च बहिरपि व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः कुलः संविदाकारतेतिवाच्यम् । व्यवहितस्यापरोक्षत्वानुपपत्तावपरोक्षस्य विज्ञानस्य कक्षीकर्त्तव्यत्वात् । तथा च प्रयोगःविवादपदं विज्ञानाकारः, सम्प्रयोगमन्तरेणापरोक्षत्वात्, विज्ञानवदिति ।

Nanu vijñānavādinayānuśāreṇa pratīyamānaṁ rajataṁ jñānātmakaṃ tatra ca yuktirabhidhīyate—yadyathānubhūyate tattathā. Anyathātvaṁ tu balabaddhakopanipātādāsthīyata ityubhayavādisammato'rthaḥ. Tatra ca nedaṁ rajatamiti-niṣiddhedaṁbhāvaṁ rajatamarthādāntarajñānarūpamavatiṣṭhate. Na cedantayā niṣedhe sati anidantayā ca bahirapi vyavasthopapatteḥ kutaḥ saṁvidākāratetivācyaṃ. Vyavahitasyāparokṣatvānupapattāvaparokṣasya vijñānasya kakṣīkarttavyatvāt. Tathā ca prayogaḥvivādapadaṁ vijñānākāraḥ, samprayogamantareṇāparokṣatvāt, vijñānavaditi.

तदनुपपन्नम् । विकल्पासहत्वात् । बाधकोऽवबोधः किं साक्षाज्ज्ञानाकारतां बोधयत्यर्थाद्वा ? नाद्यः । नेदं रजतमिति प्रत्ययस्य रजतविवेकमात्रगोचरस्य ज्ञानाभेदगोचरतायामनुभवविरोधात् ।

Tadanupapannaṃ. Vikalpāsahatvāt. Bādhako'vabodhaḥ kiṁ sākṣājjñānākāratāṁ bodhayatyarthādvā? Nādyaḥ. Nedaṁ rajatamiti pratyayasya rajatavivekamātragocarasya jñānābheda-gocaratāyāmanubhavavirodhāt.

नेदं रजतमिति रजतस्य पुरोवर्तित्वप्रतिषेधो ज्ञानाकारतां कल्पयतीति चेत्— तदेतद्वार्तम् । प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधात्मनो बाधकावबोधस्य तत्रैव सत्त्वात्प्रतिषेधोपपत्तेः । विज्ञानाकारत्वसाधनमप्यविज्ञानाकारे बहिष्ठे साक्षिप्रत्यक्षे भावरूपाज्ञाने वर्तत इति सव्यभिचारः ।

Nedaṁ rajatamiti rajatasya purovartitvapratiṣedau jñānākāratāṁ kalpayatīti cet—tadetadvārtaṃ. Prasaktapratiṣedhātmano bādhakābabodhasya tatraiva sattvātpratiṣedaupapatteḥ. Vijñānākāratvasādhanamapyavi-jñānākāre bahiṣṭhe sākṣipratyakṣe bhāvarūpājñāne vartata iti savyabhicāraḥ.

Refutation of Anyathākhyāti of Naiyāyikas

नन्वन्य आख्यातिवादिमतानुसारेण रजतस्य देशान्तरसत्त्वेन भाव्यम् । अन्यथा तस्य प्रतिषेधप्रतियोगित्वानुपपत्तेः । न हि कश्चित्प्रेक्षावाञ्शशविषाणं प्रतिषेद्धुं प्रभवति । तदुक्तम्—

Nanvanyaākhyātivādimatānusāreṇa rajatasya deśāntara-sattvena bhāvyaṃ. Anyathā tasya pratiṣedhapra-tiyogitvānupapatteḥ. Na hi kaścitprekṣāvāñśaśaviṣāṇaṁ pratiṣeddhuṁ prabhavati. Taduktaṃ—

41. व्यावर्त्याभाववत्तैव भाविकी हि विशेष्यता ।
अभावाविरहात्मत्वं वस्तुनः प्रतियोगिता ॥ (न्या. कु. 3/2) इति ।

Vyāvartyābhāvavattaiva bhāvikī hi viśeṣyatā,
Abhāvāvirahātmatvaṁ vastunaḥ pratiyogitā.

(Nyā. Ku. 3/2) iti.

तथा च तस्य देशान्तरसत्त्वमाश्रणीयमिति चेत्–तदपि न प्रमाणपद्धतिमध्यास्ते । असतः संसर्गस्येव कलधौतस्य निषेधप्रतियोगित्वोपपत्तेः ।

Tathā ca tasya deśāntarasattvamāsraṇīyamiti cet—tadapi na pramāṇapaddhatimadhyāste. Asataḥ saṁsargasyeva kaladhautasya niṣedhapratiyogitvopapatteḥ.

Unity of Knowledge in 'Idam Rajataṃ'—Doubt and Solution

नन्विदं रजतमिति ज्ञानमेकमनेकं वा ? न तावदाद्यः । अपसिद्धान्तापत्तेरसम्भवाच्च। तथा हि—शुक्तीदमंशेन्द्रियसम्प्रयोगादिदमाकारान्तः परिणामरूपमेकं ज्ञानं जायते । न च तत्र कलधौतं विषयभावमाकल्पयितुमुत्सहते । असम्प्रयुक्तत्वात्तस्य विषयत्वाङ्गीकारे सर्वज्ञत्वापत्तेः ।

Nanvidaṁ rajatamiti jñānamekamanekaṁ vā ? Na tāvadyādyaḥ. Apasiddhāntāpatterasambhavācca. Tathā hi—śuktīdamaṁ-śendriyasamprayogādidamākārāntaḥ pariṇāmarūpamekaṁ

jñānaṁ jāyate. Na ca tatra kaladhautaṁ viṣayabhāvamākalpayitumutsahate. Asamprayuktatvāttasya viṣayatvāṅgīkāre sarvajñatvāpatteḥ.

न च चक्षुरन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायितया तज्ज्ञानस्य तज्जन्यत्वं वाच्यम् । इदमंशज्ञानोत्पत्तौ तदुपक्षयोपपत्तेः । न चापि संस्काराद्रजतज्ञानस्य जन्म । स्मृतित्वापत्तेः । अथेन्द्रियदोषस्य तत्करणत्वम् । तदप्ययुक्तम् । स्वातन्त्र्येण तस्य ज्ञानहेतुत्वानुपपत्तेः । न हि ग्रहणस्मरणाभ्यामन्यः प्रकारः समस्ति । तस्मादिदमंशरजततादात्म्यविषयकमेकं विज्ञानं न घटते । नाप्यनेकम्, अख्यातिमतापत्तेरिति चेत्—

Na ca cakṣuranvayavyatirekānuvidhāyitayā tajjñānasya tajjanyatvaṁ vācyam. Idamaṁśajñānotpattau tadupakṣayopapatteḥ. Na cāpi saṁskārādrajatajñānasya janma. Smṛtitvāpatteḥ. Athendriyadoṣasya tatkaraṇatvam. Tadapyayukttam Svātantryeṇa tasya jñānahetutvānupapatteḥ. Na hi grahaṇasmaraṇābhyāmanyaḥ prakāraḥ samasti. Tasmādidamaṁśarajatatādātmya- viṣayakamekaṁ vijñānaṁ na ghaṭate. Nāpyanekam, akhyātimatāpatteriti cet—

उच्यते—प्रथमं दोषकलुषितेन चक्षुषेदन्तामात्रविषयान्तः—करणवृत्तिरुत्पद्यते । अनन्तरं तथा वृत्त्या चैतन्यावरणाभिभवे सति तच्चैतन्यमभिव्यज्यते । पश्चादिदमंशचैतन्यनिष्ठा अविद्या रागादिदोषकलुषिता कलधौताकारेण परिणमते। इदमाकारान्तःकरणपरिणामावच्छिन्नचैतन्यनिष्ठा कलधौतगोचरपरिणामसंस्कारसचिवा कलधौतज्ञानाभासाकारेण परिणमते ।

Ucyate—prathamaṁ doṣakaluṣitena cakṣuṣedantāmātraviṣayāntaḥ—karaṇavṛttirutpadyate. Anantaraṁ tathā vṛttyā caitanyāvaraṇābhibhave sati taccaitanyamabhivyajyate. Paścādidamaṁśacaitanyaniṣṭhā avidyā rāgādidoṣakaluṣitā kaladhautākāreṇa pariṇamate. Idamākārāntaḥkaraṇapariṇāmavacchinnacaitanyaniṣṭhā kaladhautagocarapariṇāmasaṁskārasacivā kaladhautajñānābhāsākāreṇa pariṇamate.

तौ च रजतवृत्तिपरिणामौ स्वाधिष्ठानेन साक्षिचैतन्येनाव्यवधानेन भास्येते । तथा च सवृत्तिकाया अविद्यायाः साक्षिभास्यत्वाभ्युपगमे वृत्त्यन्तरवेद्यत्वाभावान्नानवस्था ।

Tau ca rajatavṛttipariṇāmau svādhiṣṭhānena sākṣicaitanyenāvyavadhānena bhāsyete. Tathā ca savṛttikāyā avidyāyāḥ sākṣibhāsyatvābhyupagame vṛttyantaravedyatvābhāvānnānavasthā.

यद्यप्यन्तःकरणवृत्तिरविद्यावृत्तिश्चेति द्वे इमे ज्ञाने, तथापि विषयाधीनं फलम् । ज्ञातो घट इति विषयावच्छिन्नतया फलप्रतीतेः । तद्विषयश्च सत्यमिथ्याभूतयोरिदमंशरजतांशयोरन्योन्यात्मकतया एकत्वमापन्नः । तस्माद्विषयावच्छिन्नफलस्याप्येकत्वाज्ज्ञानैक्यमुपचर्यते ।

Yadyapyantaḥkaraṇavṛttiravidyāvṛttiśceti dve ime jñāne, tathāpi viṣayādhīnaṁ phalam. Jñāto ghaṭa iti viṣayāvacchinnatayā phalapratīteḥ. Tadviṣayaśca satyamithyābhūtayoridamaṁśarajatāṁśayoranyonyātmakatayā ekatvamāpannaḥ. Tasmādviṣayāvacchinnaphalasyāpyekatvājjñānaikyamupacaryate.

तदुक्तम्—

Taduktam—

43. शुक्तीदमंशचैतन्यस्थितविद्या विजृम्भते ।
रागादिदोषसंस्कारसचिवा रजतात्मना ॥

Śuktīdamaṁśacaitanyasthitavidyā vijṛmbhate,
Rāgādidoṣasaṁskārasacivā rajatātmanā.

44. इदमाकारवृत्त्यक्तचैतन्यस्था तथाविधा ।
विवर्तते तद्रजतज्ञानाभासात्मनाप्यसौ ॥

Idamākāravṛttyaktacaitanyasthā tathāvidhā,
Vivartate tadrajatajñānābhāsātmanāpyasau.

45. सत्यमिथ्यात्मनोरैक्यादेकस्तद्विषयो मतः ।
तदायत्तफलैकत्वाज्ज्ञानैक्यमुपचर्यते ॥ इति ।

Satyamithyātmanoraikyādekastadviṣayo mataḥ,
Tadāyattaphalaikatvājjñānaikyamupacaryate. iti.

पञ्चपादिकायामपि 'फलैक्याज्ज्ञानैक्यमुपचर्यते'—इत्याभिप्रायेण 'सा चैकमेव ज्ञानमेकफलं जनयति', इत्युक्तम् ।

Pañcapādikāyāmapi 'phalaikyājjñānaikyamupacaryate'—ityabhiprāyeṇa 'sā caikameva jñānamekaphalaṁ janayati', ityuktam.

Trio Reality and Anirvacanīya Khyāti

ननु शुक्तिकामस्तके भाव्यमानस्य कलधौतस्य तत्रैव सत्यत्वाभ्युपगमे नेदं रजतमिति निषेधः कथं प्रभवेदिति चेन्न । प्रातिभासिकसत्यत्वेऽपि व्यावहारिकसत्यत्वाभावेन प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ प्रतियोगित्वसम्भवात् । तदुक्तं पञ्चपादिकाविवरणे (पृ. 31)—त्रिविधं सत्त्वम् । परमार्थसत्त्वं ब्रह्मणः । अर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यं सत्त्वं मायोपाधिकमाकाशादेः । अविद्योपाधिकं सत्त्वं रजतादेरिति ।

Nanu śuktikāmastake bhāvyamānasya kaladhautasya tatraiva satyatvābhyupagame nedaṁ rajatamiti niṣedhaḥ kathaṁ prabhavediti cenna. Prātibhāsikasatyatve'pi vyāvahārikasatyatvābhāvena pratipannopādhau pratiyogitvasambhavāt. Taduktaṁ pañcapādikāvivaraṇe (Pṛṣṭha 31)—trividhaṁ sattvaṁ. Paramārthasattvaṁ brahmaṇaḥ. Arthakriyāsāmarthyaṁ sattvaṁ māyopādhikamākāśādeḥ. Avidyopādhikaṁ sattvaṁ rajatāderiti.

अन्यत्राप्युक्तम्—

Anyatrāpyuktam—

46. कालत्रये ज्ञातृकाले प्रतीतिसमये तथा ।
बाधाभावात्पदार्थानां सत्त्वत्रैविध्यमिष्यते ॥

Kālatraye jñātṛkāle pratītisamaye tathā,
Bādhābhāvātpadārthānāṁ sattvatraividhyamiṣyate.

47. तात्त्विकं ब्रह्मणः सत्त्वं व्योमादेर्व्यावहारिकम् ।
रूप्यादेरर्थजातस्य प्रातिभासिकमिष्यते ॥ इति ।

Tāttvikaṁ brahmaṇaḥ sattvaṁ vyomādervyāvahārikam,
Rūpyāderarthajātasya prātibhāsikamiṣyate. iti.

48. लौकिकेन प्रमाणेन यद्बाध्यं लौकिकेऽबधौ ।
तत्प्रातिभासिकं सत्त्वं बाध्यं सत्येव मातरि ॥

Laukikena pramāṇena yadbādhyaṁ laukike'badhau,
Tatprātibhāsikaṁ sattvaṁ bādhyaṁ satyeva mātari.

49. वैदिकेन प्रमाणेन यद्बाध्यं वैदिकेऽवधौ ।
तद्व्यावहारिकं सत्त्वं बाध्यं मात्रा सहैव तत् ॥ इति च ।

Vaidikena pramāṇena yadbādhyaṁ vaidike'vadhau,
Tadvyāvahārikaṁ sattvaṁ bādhyaṁ mātrā sahaiva tat. iti ca.

ततः ख्यातिबाधान्यथानुपपत्या भ्रान्तिगोचरस्य मायामयस्य रजतादेः सदसद्विलक्षणत्वलक्षणमनिर्वचनीयत्वं सिद्धम् । तदवोचच्चित्सुखाचार्यः—

Tataḥ khyātibādhānyathānupapatyā bhrāntigocarasya māyāmayasya rajatādeḥ sadasadvilakṣaṇatvalakṣaṇamanirvacanīyatvaṁ siddham. Tadavocaccitsukhācāryaḥ—

50. प्रत्येकं सदसत्त्वाभ्यां विचारपदवीं न यत् ।
गाहते तदनिर्वाच्यमाहुर्वेदान्तवादिनः ॥

(चित्सुखी, पृ. 79) इति ।

Pratyekaṁ sadasattvābhyāṁ vicārapadavīṁ na yat,
Gāhate tadanirvācyamāhurvedāntavādinaḥ.

(Citsukhī, Pṛṣṭha 79) iti.

Similarity in Māyā and Avidyā

ननु मायाविद्ययोः स्वाश्रयाव्यामोहहेतुत्व-तदभावाभ्यां भेदस्य जागरूकत्वेनाविद्यामयत्वे वक्तव्ये मायामयत्वोक्तिरारोप्यस्यायुक्तेति चेत्–तदयुक्तम्। अनिर्वचनीयत्वतत्त्वाभासप्रतिबन्धकत्वादिलक्षणजातस्य मायाविद्ययोः समानत्वात् ।

Nanu māyāvidyayoḥ svāśrayāvyāmohahetutva-tadabhāvābhyāṁ bhedasya jāgarūkatvenāvidyāmayatve vaktavye māyāmayatvoktirāropyasyāyukteti cet—tadayuktam. Anirvacanīyatvatattvābhāsapratibandhakatvādilakṣaṇajātasya māyāvidyayoḥ samānatvāt.

किं चाश्रयशब्देन द्रष्टोच्यते कर्ता वा ? नाद्यः । मन्त्रौषधादिनिमित्तमायादर्शिनस्तस्य व्यामोहदर्शनात् । न द्वितीयः । विष्णोः स्वाश्रितमायया रामावतारे मोहितत्वेन तत्र मायावित्वस्याप्रयोजकत्वात् । बाधनिश्चयमन्त्रादिप्रतीकारबोधयोरेव प्रयोजकत्वात् । अपरथा सङ्गवन्धवत्कर्तापि व्यामुह्येत ।

Kiṁ cāśrayaśabdena draṣṭocyate kartā vā? Nādyaḥ. Mantrauṣadhādinimittamāyādarśinastasya vyāmohadarśanāt. Na dvitīyaḥ. Viṣṇoḥ svāśritamāyayāvarāmāvatāre mohitatvena tatra māyāvitvasyāprayojakatvāt. Bādhaniścayamantrādipratīkārabodhayoreva prayojakatvāt. Aparathā saṅgvandhavatkartāpi vyāmuhyeta.

न चेच्छानुविधानाननुविधानाभ्यां तयोर्भेद इति भणितव्यम् । मायास्थले मणिमन्त्रौषधादिप्रयोगवदविद्यास्थलेऽपि द्विचन्द्रकेशोण्डुकादिविभ्रमनिमित्ताङ्गुल्यवष्टम्भादावपि स्वातन्त्र्योपलम्भात् । अत एव तत्र तत्र श्रुतिस्मृतिर्भाष्यादिषु मायाविद्ययोरभेदेन व्यवहारः सङ्गच्छते । क्वचिद्विक्षेपप्राधान्येनावरणप्राधान्येन च मायाविद्ययोर्भेदे तद्व्यवहारो न विरुध्यते । तदुक्तम्—

Na cecchānuvidhānānanuvidhānābhyāṁ tayorbheda iti bhaṇitavyam. Māyāsthale maṇimantrauṣadhādiprayogavadavidyāsthale'pi dvicandrakeśoṇḍukādivibhramanimittāṅgulyavaṣṭambhādāvapi svātantryopalambhāt. Ata eva tatra tatra śrutismṛtirbhāṣyādiṣu māyāvidyayorabhedena vyavahāraḥ saṅgacchate. Kvacidvikṣepaprādhānyenāvaraṇaprādhānyena ca māyāvidyorbhede tadvyavahāro na virudhyate. Taduktam—

51. माया विक्षिपदज्ञानमीशेच्छावशवर्ति वा ।
अविद्याच्छादयत्तत्त्वं स्वातन्त्र्यानुविधायि वा ॥ इति ।

Māyā vikṣipadajñānamīśecchāvaśavarti vā,
Avidyācchādayattattvaṁ svātantryānuvidhāyi vā. iti.

Proof For the Existence of Avidyā

नन्वविद्यासद्भावे किं प्रमाणम्? 'अहमज्ञो मामन्यं च न जानामिति' प्रत्यक्षप्रतिभास एव । ननु ज्ञानाभावविषयोऽयं नाभिप्रेतमर्थं गमयतीति चेत्—न तावदनुपलब्धिवादिनश्चोद्यमेतत् । परोक्षप्रतिभासहेतुत्वात्तस्याः । अयमपि परोक्षप्रतिभास एवेति चेत्—न तावल्लिङ्गशब्दानुपपद्यमानार्थजन्यः । ज्ञातकरणत्वात्तेषाम् । न चैतत्सामग्रीकाले ज्ञातमस्ति । अनुभूयते वा ।

Nanvavidyāsadbhāve kiṁ pramāṇam? 'Ahamajño māmanyaṁ ca na jānāmīti' pratyakṣapratibhāsa eva. Nanu jñānābhāvaviṣayo'yaṁ nābhipretamarthaṁ gamayatīti cet—na tāvadanupalabdhivādinaścodyametat. Parokṣapratibhāsahetutvāttasyāḥ. Ayamapi parokṣapratibhāsa eveti cet—na tāvalliṅgaśabdānupapadyamānārthajanyaḥ. Jñātakaraṇatvātteṣām. Na caitatsāmagrīkāle jñātamasti. Anubhūyate vā.

अनुपलब्ध्या जन्यत इति चेत्—न तावदियमज्ञाता कारणम् । प्रत्यक्षेतरस्य ज्ञातकरणत्वनियमात् । नापि ज्ञातैव कारणम् । अनुपलब्ध्यनवस्थानात् । न च यथा परेषामभावग्रहणे योग्यानुपलब्धिः सहकारिणी तथा नः करणमिति शङ्क्यम् । ज्ञानकरण इव सहाकारिणि ज्ञातत्वनियमाभावात् । अस्तु वा तथा ज्ञेयाभावग्रहणे करणम् । ज्ञानाभावग्रहणे करणं न भवत्येवेति वक्ष्यते ।

Anupalabdhyā janyata iti cet—na tāvadiyamajñātā kāraṇam. Pratyakṣetarasya jñātakaraṇatvaniyamāt. Nāpi jñātaiva kāraṇam. Anualabdhyanavasthpnāt. Na ca yathā pareṣāmabhāvagrahaṇe yogyānupalabdhiḥ sahakāriṇī tathā naḥ karaṇamiti śaṅkyam. Jñānakaraṇa iva sahakāriṇi jñātatvaniyamābhāvāt. Astu vā tathā jñeyābhāvagrahaṇe karaṇam. Jñānābhāvagrahaṇe karaṇaṁ na bhavatyeveti vakṣyate.

Refutation of Naiyāyika and the Direct Eperience of 'Ahamajña'

प्रत्यक्षाभाववादे तु प्रत्यक्षेण तावद्धर्मिप्रतियोगिज्ञानयोः सतोरात्मनि ज्ञानमात्राभावग्रहणे न ब्रूयात् । घटवति भूतले घटाभावस्येव ज्ञानमात्राभावस्य

ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात् । तयोरसतोस्तु सुतरामं । कारणाभावात् । अतोऽपि योग्यानुपलब्ध्या वा फललिङ्गाद्यभावेन वात्मनि ज्ञानमात्राभावग्रहणं दुर्लभमिति परमतेऽप्ययं न्यायः समानः । तदेवमात्मनि प्रत्यक्षेण वान्येन वा ज्ञानमात्राभावस्य ग्रहणशक्यमिति स्थितम् ।

Pratyakṣābhāvavāde tu prayakṣeṇa tāvaddharmipratiyogijñānayoḥ sattorātmanijñānamātrābhāvagrahaṇaṁ na brūyāt. Ghaṭavati bhūtale ghaṭābhāvasyeva jñānamātrābhāvasya grahītumaśakyatvāt. Tayorasatostu sutarām. Kāraṇābhāvāt. Ato'pi yogyānupalabdhyā vā phalaliṅgādyabhāvena vātmani jñānamātrābhāvagrahaṇaṁ durlabhamiti paramate'pyayaṁ nyāyaḥ samānaḥ. Tadevamātmani pratyakṣeṇa vānyena vā jñānamātrābhāvasya grahaṇamaśakyamiti sthitam.

ननु ज्ञानविशेषाभावः प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यताम् । न तावत्स्मरणाभावः । अभावग्रहणे प्रतियोगिस्मरणस्य कारणत्वात् । नाप्यनुभवाभावः । तस्यावर्जनीयत्वात् । नन्वात्मनि घटानुभवाभावः प्रत्यक्षविषयस्तर्हि 'अहमज्ञः' इति ज्ञानसामान्यवचनो जानातिर्ज्ञानविशेषेऽनुभवे लक्षणया वर्तनीयः । लक्षणा च सम्बन्धेऽनुपपत्तौ च सत्यां वर्तते ।

Nanu jñānaviśeśābhāvaḥ pratyakṣeṇa gṛhyatām. Na tāvatsmaraṇābhāvaḥ. Abhāvagrahaṇe pratiyogismaraṇasya kāraṇatvāt. Nāpyanubhāvābhāvaḥ. Tasyāvarjanīyitvāt. Nanvātmani ghaṭānubhavābhāvaḥ pratyakṣaviṣayastarhi 'ahamajñaḥ' iti jñānasāmānyavacano jānātirjñānaviśeṣe'nubhave lakṣaṇayā vartanīyaḥ. Lakṣaṇā ca sambandhe'nupapattau ca satyāṁ vartate.

सम्बन्धस्तावदनुभवत्वज्ञानत्वयोरेकव्यक्तिसमावेशो व्याप्यव्यापकभावो वा विद्यत एव । अनुपपत्तिं तु न पश्यामः । नन्वनुभवाभावे प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रमेयलाभस्तेनैव तस्यार्थवत्ता सिध्यति । सत्यम् । प्रयोजनमेतन्नानुपपत्तिः । अन्योन्याश्रयात् ।

Sambandhastāvadanubhavatvajñānatvayorekavyaktisamāveśo vyāpyavyāpakabhāvo vā vidyata eva. Anupapattiṁ tu na paśyāmaḥ. Nanvanubhavābhāve pratyakṣasya prameyalābhstenaiva tasyārthavattā sidhyati. Satyam. Prayojanametannānupapattiḥ. Anyonyāśrayāt.

नन्वहमज्ञ इत्यत्र नञ् आत्मनि ज्ञान मात्राभावं न ब्रूते । ज्ञानवति तस्मिन् तदभावात् । नाप्यनुभवाभावम् । ज्ञानोक्तेस्तदनभिधायकत्वात् । नैरर्थक्यं च न युक्तमित्यनयैवानुपपत्त्या लक्षणेति चेत्—उक्तलक्षणैवाविद्यां तदर्थोऽस्तु ।

Nanvahamajña ityatra nañ ātmani jñāna mātrābhāvaṁ na brūte. Jñānavati tasmin tadabhāvāt. Nāpyanubhavābhāvam. Jñānoktestadanabhidhāyakatvāt. Nairarthakyaṁ ca na yuktamityanayaivānupapattyā lakṣaṇeti cet— uktalakṣanaivāvidyā tadartho'stu.

सन्देह इति चेन्न । असमत्वात्कोटिद्वयस्य । अन्यत्र हि प्रतियोगिनिवृत्तिर्नञर्थः । अत्र तु प्रतियोगिव्याप्यनिवृत्तिरिति ।

Sandeha iti cenna. Asamatvātkoṭidvayasya. Anyatra hi pratiyoginivṛttirnañarthaḥ. Atra tu pratiyogivyāpyanivṛttiriti.

जानातिसमभिव्याहृतस्य नञः क्वचिदुक्तलक्षणाविद्याविषयत्वसिद्धिमन्तरेण न सन्देह इत्यवश्यम्भावेन सैव जानातिसमभिव्याहृतस्य नञः सर्वत्र तद्विषयत्वमवगमयति । विलुम्पति ज्ञानाभावकोट्यन्तरमिति क्व सन्देहावकाशः? तदेवं लक्षणाहेत्वभावेऽनुभवाभावोऽप्यात्मनि न प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत इति परिशेषादुक्तलक्षणा अविद्यैव 'अज्ञः' इति प्रतिभासस्य विषय इति स्थितम् ।

Jānātisamabhivyāhṛtasya nañaḥ kvaciduktalakṣaṇāvidyāviṣayatvatsiddhimantareṇa na sandeha ityavaśyambhāvena saiva jānātisamabhivyāhṛtasya nañaḥ sarvatra tadviṣayatvamavagamayati. Vilumpati jñānābhāvakoṭyantaramiti kva sandehāvakāśaḥ? Tadevaṁ lakṣaṇāhetvabhāve'nubhavābhāvo'pyātmani na pratyakṣeṇa gṛhyata iti pariśeṣāduktalakṣaṇā avidyaiva 'ajñaḥ' iti pratibhāsasya viṣaya iti sthitam.

Proving Ignorance by 'Ahamajña—Another' Way

अस्तु वा ज्ञानाभावप्रतिभासः । अयमभावश्च प्रतियोगी यत्र निषिध्यते न ततः तत्त्वान्तरमन्यदधिकरणभावात् । मा भूदन्यभावत्वमन्याभावत्वं तु स्यात् । ननु तदपि विरुद्धम् । सत्यं, सति भेदे । स च प्रमाणात् । तच्च सति प्रतियोग्यभावाधिकरणतस्तत्त्वान्तरे । ननु घटवति भूतले घटाभावमितिव्यवहृती स्यातामिति चेत्—मा भूतामेते प्रतियोगिना सहानुभूयमानेऽधिकरणे ।

Astu vā jñānābhāvapratibhāsaḥ. Ayamabhāvaśca pratiyogī yatra niṣidhyate na tataḥ tattvāntaramanyadadhikaraṇabhāvāt. Mā bhūdanyabhāvatvamanyābhāvatvaṁ tu syāt. Nanu tadapi viruddham. Satyaṁ, sati bhede. Sa ca pramāṇāt. Tacca sati pratiyogyabhāvādhikaraṇatastattvāntare. Nanu ghaṭavati bhūtale ghaṭābhāvamitivyavahṛtī syātāmiti cet—mā bhūtāmete pratiyoginā sahānubhūyamāne'dhikaraṇe.

प्रतियोगिस्मरणे सत्यनुभूयमानेऽधिकरणे तु स्याताम् । एवमप्युपपत्तौ न

तत्त्वान्तरविषयत्वं कल्प्यम् । काऽनुपपत्तिरिति चेद् बाधकाभावस्तावदुक्त एव । बाधकं तु कल्पनागौरवमेव । तथा हि—तत्त्वान्तरत्वं तावदेकं कल्प्यम् । तस्यापरोक्षत्वायेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षः कल्प्यः ।

Pratiyogismaraṇe satyanubhūyamāne'dhikaraṇe tu syātām. Evamapyupapattau na tattvāntaraviṣayatvaṁ kalpyam. Kā'nupapattiriti ced bādhakābhāvastāvadukta eva. Bādhakaṁ tu kalpanāgauravameva. Tathā hi—tattvāntaratvaṁ tāvadekaṁ kalpyam. Tasyāparokṣatvāyendriyasannikarṣaḥ kalpyaḥ.

स च संयोगादिर्न भवतीति संयुक्तविशेषणत्वादिः कल्प्य इत्यतो वरमुक्तलक्षणस्याधिकरणस्य व्यवहारविशयेऽङ्गीकारः । सति चैवं ज्ञानाभावेनापि प्रतियोगिस्मृतौ सत्यामनुभूयमानमधिकरणं ज्ञातैव । स च न केवलमन्तःकरणम् । जडत्वात् । नापि केवल आत्मैव । अपरिणामित्वाद् गुणत्वाच्च । अत उभयोरभेदाध्यासः । आत्माध्यासश्चोक्तलक्षणाविद्यात्मेति—आयातमविद्यायामेवाहमज्ञ इति प्रतिभासः प्रमाणमिति ।

Sa ca saṁyogānirna bhavatīti saṁyuktaviśeṣaṇatvādiḥ kalpya ityato varamuktalakṣaṇasyādhikaraṇasya vyavahāraviṣaye'ṅgīkāraḥ. Sati caivaṁ jñanābhāvenāpi pratiyogismṛtau satyāmanubhūyamānamadhikaraṇaṁ jñātaiva. Sa ca na kevalamantaḥkaraṇam. Jaḍatvāt. Nāpi kevala ātmaiva. Apariṇāmitvād guṇatvācca. Ata ubhayorabhedādhyāsaḥ. Ātmādhyāsaścoktalakṣaṇavidyātmeti—āyātamavidyāyāmevāhamajña iti pratibhāsaḥ pramāṇamiti.

Proving Ignorance (Avidyā) by Anumāna

अनुमानं च—विवादपदं प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तस्वविषयावरणस्वनिवर्त्यस्वदेशगतवस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वात् । अन्धकारे प्रथमोत्पन्नप्रदीपप्रभावदिति ।

Anumānaṁ ca—vivādapadaṁ pramāṇajñānaṁ svaprāgabhāvavyatiriktasvaviṣayāvaraṇasvanivartyasvadeśagatavastvantarapūrvakamaprakāśitārthaprakāśakatvāt. Andhakāre prathmotpannapradīpaprabhāvaditi.

वस्तुपूर्वकमित्युक्त आत्मवस्तुपूर्वकत्वेनार्थान्तरता । तदर्थं वस्त्वन्तरेति । तथापि । विषयभूते वस्त्वन्तरेऽर्थान्तरता । तदर्थं स्वदेशगतेति । अदृष्टादिकं प्रत्यादेष्टुं स्वनिवर्त्येति ।

Vastupūrvakamityukta ātmavastupūrvakatvenārthāntaratā. Tadarthaṁ vastvantareti. Tathāpi. Viṣayabhūte vastvantare'rthā-

ntaratā. Tadarthaṁ svadeśagateti. Adṛṣṭādikaṁ pratyādeṣṭuṁ svanivartyeti.

उत्तरज्ञाननिवर्त्यं प्रथमज्ञानं निवर्तयितुं स्वविषयावरणेति । प्रागभावं प्रतिक्षेप्तुं स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तेति । स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तपूर्वकमित्युक्ते विषयेणार्थान्तरता। तदर्थं विषयावरणेति । तादृशमन्धकारं व्यासेद्धुं स्वनिवर्त्येति । विषयगतामज्ञानतां निराकर्तुं स्वदेशगतेति । मिथ्याज्ञानमपोहितुं वस्त्वन्तरेति । धारावाहिकविज्ञाने व्यभिचारं व्यासेद्धुमप्रकाशितेति ।

Uttarajñānanivartyaṁ prathamajñānaṁ nivartayituṁ svaviṣayāvaraṇeti. Prāgabhāvaṁ pratikṣeptuṁ svaprāgabhāvavyatirikteti. Svaprāgabhāvavyatiriktapūrvakamityukte viṣayeṇārthāntaratā. Tadarthaṁ viṣayāvaraṇeti. Tādṛśamandhakāraṁ vyāseddhuṁ svanivartyeti. Viṣayagatāmajñānatāṁ nirākartuṁ svadeśagateti. Mithyājñānamapohituṁ vastvantareti. Dhārāvāhikavijñāne vyabhicāraṁ vyāseddhumaprakāśiteti.

मध्यवर्तिप्रदीपप्रभायां साध्यसाधनवैधुर्यप्रतिरोधाय प्रथमोत्पन्नविशेषणम् । सौरालोकव्याप्तदेशस्थप्रदीपप्रभाप्रतिक्षेपायान्धकारेति । न च ज्ञानसाधके प्रमाणे व्यभिचारः शङ्कनीयः । विप्रतिपन्नं प्रत्यसत्त्वनिवृत्तिमात्रस्य प्रमाणकृत्यत्वात् । तदुक्तं देवताधिकरणे कल्पतरुकारैः—अनुमानादिभिरसत्त्वनिवृत्तिक्रियत इति ।

Madhyavartipradīpaprabhāyāṁ sādhyasādhanavaidhuryapratirodhāya prathamotpannaviśeṣaṇam. Saurālokavyāptadeśasthapradīpaprabhāpratikṣepāyāndhakāreti. Na ca jñānasādhake pramāṇe vyabhicāraḥ śaṅkanīyaḥ. Vipratipannaṁ pratyasattvanivṛttimātrasya pramāṇakṛtyatvāt. Taduktaṁ devatādhikaraṇe kalpatarukāraiḥ—anumānādibhirasattvanivṛttikriyata iti.

ननु साधनविकलो दृष्टान्त इति चेन्न । प्रकाशशब्देन तमो विरोध्याकारस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । तदुक्तं विवरणविवरणे सहजसर्वज्ञविष्णुभट्टोपाध्यायैः—'न चात्र पक्षदृष्टान्तयोरेकप्रकाशरूपानन्वयः शङ्कनीयः । तमोविरोध्याकारो हि प्रकाशशब्दवाच्यः । तेनाकारेणैक्यमुभयत्रास्ति' इति ।

Nanu sādhanavikalo dṛṣṭānta iti cenna. Prakāśaśabdena tamo virodhyākārasya vivakṣitatvāt. Taduktaṁ vivaraṇavivaraṇe sahajasarvajñaviṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāyaiḥ—'na cātra pakṣadṛṣṭāntayorekaprakāśarūpānanvayaḥ śaṅkanīyaḥ. Tamovirodhyākāro hi prakāśaśabdavācyaḥ. Tenākāreṇaikyamubhayatrāsti' iti.

नरेन्द्रगिरिश्रीचरणैस्त्वित्थमुक्तम्—'अप्रकाशितप्रकाशव्यवहारहेतुत्वं हेत्वर्थः । तस्य चोभयत्रानुगतत्वान्नासिद्ध्यादिरिति ।'

Narendragiriśrīcaraṇaistvitthamuktam—'aprakāśitaprakāśavyavahārahetutvaṁ hetvarthaḥ. Tasya cobhayatrānugatatvānnāsiddhyādiriti'.

Proving Ignorance (Avidyā) by Śruti

श्रुतेश्च । 'भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः' (श्वे. 1/10) इत्यादिका श्रुतिः ।

Śruteśca. 'Bhūyaścānte viśvamāyānivṛttiḥ' (Śve. Up. 1/10) ityādikā śrutiḥ.

52. तरत्यविद्यां विततां हृदि यस्मिन्निवेशिते ।
योगी मायाममेयाय तस्मै विद्यात्मने नमः ।। इति च ।

Taratyavidyā vitatāṁ hṛdi yasminniveśite,
Yogī māyāmameyāya tasmai vidyātmane namaḥ. iti ca.

एतेनैतत्प्रत्युक्तं यदुक्तं भास्करेण क्षपणकचरणं प्रमाणशरणे, 'भेदाभेदवादिनां भावरूपमज्ञानं नास्ति किं तु ज्ञानाभाव' इति ।

Etenaitatpratyuktaṁ yaduktaṁ bhāskareṇe kṣapaṇakacaraṇaṁ pramāṇaśaraṇe, 'bhedābhedavādināṁ bhāvarūpamajñānaṁ nāsti kiṁ tu jñānābhāva' iti.

तथा च भास्करप्रणीतशारीरकमीमांसाभाष्यग्रन्थः । यदेव पररूपादर्शनं सैवाविद्येति । भावरूपाज्ञानानभ्युपगमे जीवेश्वरादिविभागानुपपत्तेः । न च भाविकः परमात्मनोंऽशो जीव इति वाच्यम् । 'निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निरवद्यं निरञ्जनम्' (श्वे. 6/19) इत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधात् ।

Tathā ca bhāskarapraṇītaśārīrakamīmāṁsābhāṣyagranthaḥ. Yadeva pararūpādarśanaṁ saivāvidyeti. Bhāvarūpājñānānabhyupagame jīveśvarādivibhāgānupapatteḥ. Na ca bhāvikaḥ paramātmanon'śo jīva iti vācyam. 'Niṣkalaṁ niṣkriyaṁ śāntaṁ niravadyaṁ nirañjanam (Śve. Up. 6/19) ityādiśrutivirodhāt.

Power of Māyā in Śākta Tenet

केचन शाक्ताः शक्तिं मायाशब्दार्थभूतां जगत्कारणत्वेनाङ्गीकृतां सत्यामभ्युपेत्य मातुलिङ्गगदाखेटविधारिणी महालक्ष्मीस्तस्याः प्रथमावतार इति वर्णयन्ति । सा च कालरात्रिः सरस्वतीति द्वे शक्ती उत्पाद्य ब्रह्माणं पुरुषं श्रियं च स्त्रियमुत्पादयामास । स्वयं मिथुनं जनयित्वा स्वसुते अप्याह—अहमिव युवामपि मिथुनमुत्पादयतमिति ।

Kecana śāktāḥ śaktiṁ māyāśabdārthabūtāṁ jagatkāraṇatvenāṅgīkṛtāṁ satyāmabhyupetya mātuliṅgagadā-

khetavidhāriṇī mahālakṣmīstasyāḥ prathamāvatāra iti varṇayanti. Sā ca kālarātriḥ sarasvatīti dve śaktī utpādya brahmāṇaṁ puruṣaṁ śriyaṁ ca striyamutpādayāmāsa. Svayaṁ mithunaṁ janayitvā svasute apyāha—ahamiva yuvāmapi mithunamutpādayatamiti.

ततः कालरात्रिर्महादेवं पुरुषं स्वरां स्त्रियं च जनयामास । सरस्वती च विष्णुं पुरुषं गौरीं च स्त्रियमुदपादयत् ।

Tataḥ kālarātrirmahādevaṁ puruṣaṁ svarāṁ striyaṁ ca janayāmāsa. Sarasvatī ca viṣṇuṁ puruṣaṁ gaurīṁ ca striyamudapādayat.

ततश्चादिर्विवाहमकरोदकारयच्च । एवं ब्रह्मणे स्वरां, विष्णवे श्रियं, शिवाय गौरीं दत्वा शक्तियुक्तानां तेषां सृष्टिस्थितिसंहाराख्यानि कर्माणि प्रत्यपादयदिति । तदेतन्मतं श्रुत्यादिमूलप्रमाणविधुरतया स्वोत्प्रेक्षामात्रपरिकल्पितमिति स्वरूपव्याक्रियैव निराक्रियेत्युपेक्षणीयम् । ततश्चानिर्वचनीयानाद्यविद्यालसितः प्रत्यगात्मनि प्रतीयमानः प्रमातृत्वादिप्रपञ्च इत्यलमतिप्रसङ्गेन ।

Tataścādirvivāhamakarodakārayacca. Evaṁ brahmaṇe svarāṁ, viṣṇave śriyaṁ, śivāya gaurīṁ datvā śaktiyuktānāṁ teṣāṁ sṛṣṭisthitisaṁhārākhyāni karmāṇi pratyapādayaditi. Tadetanmataṁ śrutyādimūlapramāṇavidhuratayā svotprekṣāmātraparikalpitamiti svarūpavyākriyaiva nirākriyetyupekṣaṇīyam. Tataścānirvacanīyānādyavidyālasitaḥ pratyagātmani pratīyamānaḥ pramātṛtvādiprapañca ityalamatiprasaṅgena.

World is a Projection of Ignorance (Avidyā)—Doubt and Solution

ननु किमर्थं प्रमातृत्वादीनामाविद्यकत्वं निगद्यते । ब्रह्मज्ञानेन निवर्तनाय जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावाय वा ? न प्रथमः । शास्त्रप्रामाण्यादेव सत्यस्यापि ज्ञानेन निवृत्तेरुपपत्तेः । उपलम्भाच्च । तथा हि—

Nanu kimarthaṁ pramātṛtvādīnāmāvidyakatvaṁ nigadyate. Brahmajñānena nivartanāya jīvasya brahmabhāvāya vā? Na prathamaḥ. Śāstraprāmāṇyādeva satyasyāpi jñānena nivṛtterupapatteḥ. Upalambhācca. Tathā hi—

> सेतुं दृष्ट्वा विमुच्येत ब्रह्महा ब्रह्महत्यया ।
>
> *Setuṁ dṛṣṭvā vimucyeta brahmahā brahmahatyayā.*

इत्यादिना पापं सनीस्रस्यते । विषयदोषदर्शनेन रागो दन्दह्यते । तार्क्ष्यध्यानेन विषं शम्यते । एवं कर्तृत्वादिबन्धः पारमार्थिकोऽपि तत्त्वज्ञानेन निवर्त्येत ।

Ityādinā pāpaṁ sanīsrasyate. Viṣayadoṣadarśanena rāgo dandahyate. Tārkṣyadhyānena viṣaṁ śamyate. Evaṁ kartṛtvādibandhaḥ pāramārthiko'pi tattvajñānena nivartyeta.

न चरमः । औपाधिकस्य जीवभावस्योपाधिनिवृत्त्या निवृत्तौ ब्रह्मभावसम्भवात् । तस्माद् बन्धस्याविद्यकत्ववाचोयुक्तिः सावद्येति चेत्—नैतदनवद्यम् । सत्यस्यात्मवज्ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वानुपपत्तेः । बन्धस्य मिथ्यात्वमन्तरेण शास्त्रप्रामाण्यादपि तदसिद्धेश्च । शास्त्रमपि—

Na caramaḥ. Aupādhikasya jīvabhāvasyopādhinivṛttyā nivṛttau brahmabhāvasambhavāt. Tasmād bandhasyāvidyakatvavācoyuktiḥ sāvadyeti cet—naitadanavadyam. Satyasyātmavajjñānanivartyatvānupapatteḥ. Bandhasya mithyātvamantareṇa śāstrāpramāṇyādapi tadasiddheśca. Śāstramapi—

> लोकावगतसामर्थ्यः शब्दो वेदेऽपि बोधकः ।
>
> *Lokāvagatasāmarthyaḥ śabdo vede'pi bodhakaḥ.*

इति न्यायेन लोकावलोकितां पदशक्तिं पदार्थयोग्यतां चोररीकृत्य प्रचरतीति ।

Iti nyāyena lokāvalokitāṁ padaśaktiṁ padārthayogyatāṁ corarīkṛtya pracarati.

अपरथा 'आदित्यो यूपः' (तै. ब्रा. 2/1/5) 'यजमानः प्रस्तरः' (तै. सं. 1/7/4) इत्यादिवाक्यस्तोमस्य यथाश्रुतेऽर्थे प्रामाण्यापत्तेः वैदिक्याः क्रियायाः समक्षक्षयितया पारत्रिकफलकरणत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या अपूर्वाङ्गीकरणानुपपत्तिश्च ।

Aparathā 'āditya yūpaḥ' (Tai. Brā. 2/1/5) 'yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ' (Tai. Saṁ. 1/7/4) ityādivākyastomasya yathāśrute'rthe prāmāṇyāpatteḥ vaidikyāḥ kriyāyāḥ samakṣakṣayitayā pāratrikaphalakaraṇatvānyathānupapattyā apūrvāṅgīkaraṇānupapatiśca.

लोके च शुक्तिव्यक्तितत्त्वाभिव्यक्तावपनीयमानस्यारोपितस्य मिथ्यात्वदृष्टौ तद्दृष्टान्तावष्टम्भेनात्मतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारविद्यापनोद्यस्याविद्यकस्य बन्धस्य मिथ्यात्वानुमानसम्भवात् । विमतं मिथ्या, अधिष्ठानतत्त्वज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वात्, शुक्तिकारूप्यवदिति ।

Loke ca śuktivyaktitattvābhivyaktāvapanīyamānasyāropitasya mithyātvadṛṣṭau taddṛṣṭāntāvaṣṭambhenātmatattvasākṣātkāravidyāpanodyasyāvidyakasya bandhasya mithyātvānumānasambhavāt. Vimataṁ mithyā, adhiṣṭhānatattvajñānanivartyatvāt, śuktikārūpyavaditi.

न च 'विमतं सत्यं भासमानत्वात्' इति प्रतिप्रयोगे समानबलतया बाधप्रतिरोधः

प्रतिरोधभियाऽन्यतरदोषत्वसम्भवादिति वदितव्यम् । मरुमरीचिकोदकादौ सव्यभिचारात् । अबाधितत्वेन विशेषणान्न दोष इति चेत्—मैवं भाषिष्ठाः । विशेषणासिद्धेः ।

Na ca 'vimataṁ satyaṁ bhāsamānatvāt' iti pratiprayoge samānabalatayā bādhapratirodhaḥ pratirodhabhiyā'nyatarادoṣatvasambhavāditi vaditavyam. Marumarīcikodakādau savyabhicārāt. Abādhitatvena viśeṣaṇānna iti cet—maivaṁ bhāṣiṣṭhāḥ. Viśeṣaṇāsiddheḥ.

तत्रेदं भवान्पृष्टो व्याचष्टाम् । कतिपयपुरुषकतिपयकाला बाधितत्वं हेतुविशेषणं क्रियते सर्वथा बालवैधुर्यम् वा? न प्रथमः ।

Tatredaṁ bhavānpṛṣṭo vyācaṣṭām. Katipayapuruṣakatipayakālā bādhitatvaṁ hetuviśeṣaṇaṁ kriyate sarvathā bālavaidhuryaṁ vā? Na prathamaḥ.

53. यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः ।
अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपाद्यते ॥

(वाक्यपदीय. 1/34)

Yatnenānumito'pyarthaḥ kuśalairanumātṛbhiḥ,
Abhiyuktatarairanyairanyathaivopapādyate.

इति न्यायेन त्रिचतुरप्रतिपत्तृप्रतिपादितस्यापि प्रतिपत्रन्तरेण प्रकारान्तरमुररीकृत्य प्रतिपादनात् ।

Iti nyāyena tricaturapratipattṛpratipāditasyāpi pratipattrantareṇa prakārāntaramurarīkṛtya pratipādanāt.

नापि चरमः । सर्वथा बाधवैधुर्यस्यासर्वज्ञदुर्ज्ञेयत्वात् । यद्येवं, हन्त, तर्हि ज्ञानात्मनोऽपि सत्यत्वं नावगम्यत इति चेत्—मैवं मंस्थाः । 'तत्सत्यं स आत्मा' (छां. 6/8/7) इत्यागमसंवादगतेः । न च प्रपञ्चेऽप्ययं न्याय इति मन्तव्यम् । तादृशस्यागमस्यानुपलम्भात् । प्रत्युताद्वितीयत्वं श्रावयन्त्याः श्रुतेः प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्व एव पक्षपातात् ।

Nāpi caramaḥ. Sarvathā bādhavaidhuryasyāsarvajñadurjñeyatvāt. Yadyevaṁ, hanta, tarhi jñānātmano'pi satyatvaṁ nāvagamyata iti cet—maivaṁ maṁsthāḥ. 'Tatsatyaṁ sa ātmā' (Chā. Up. 6/8/7) ityāgamasaṁvādagateḥ. Na ca prapañce'pyayaṁ nyāya iti mantavyam. Tādṛśasyāgamasyānupalambhāt. Pratyutādvitīyatvaṁ śrāvayantyāḥ śruteḥ prapañcamithyātva eva pakṣapātāt.

ननु कल्पनामात्रशरीरस्य पक्ष-सपक्ष-विपक्षादेः सर्वसुलभत्वेन जयपराजयव्यवस्थया कथं कथा प्रथेत? कात्र कथन्ता?

Nanu kalpanāmātraśarīrasya pakṣa-sapakṣa-vipakṣādeḥ sarvasulabhatvena jayaparājayavyavasthayā kathaṁ kathā pratheta? Kātra kathantā?

'एवं त्रिचतुरज्ञानजन्मनो नाधिका मतिः ।' (श्लो. वा. 1/1/2 सूत्रे) इति न्यायेन त्रिचतुरकक्ष्याविश्रान्तस्य तत्तदाभासलक्षणानालिङ्गितस्य दूषणभूषणादेस्तत्र कथाङ्गत्वाङ्गीकारात् ।

'Evaṁ tricaturajñānajanmano nādhikā matiḥ'. (Śloka. Vā. 1/1/2 sūtre) iti nyāyena tricaturakakṣyāviśrāntasya tattadābhāsalakṣaṇānāliṅgitasya dūṣaṇabhūṣaṇādestatra kathāṅgatvāṅgīkārāt.

अत एवोक्तं खण्डनकारेण—व्यावहारिकीं प्रमाणसत्तामादाय विचारारम्भः' (ख. ख. खा., पृ. 44) इति । न च भेदग्राहिभिः प्रमाणैरद्वैतश्रुतेर्जघन्यतेति शङ्क्यम् । ब्रह्मणि पारमार्थिकसत्यत्वेन तदावेदिकायास्तत्त्वावेदनलक्षणप्रामाण्यायाः श्रुतेर्व्यावहारिकप्रमाणभावानां प्रत्यक्षादीनां च विभिन्नविषयतया परस्परं बाध्यबाधकभावासम्भवात् ।

Ata evoktaṁ khaṇḍanakāreṇa—vyāvahārikīṁ pramāṇasattāmādāya vicārārambhaḥ' (Kha. Kha. Khā., Pṛṣṭha 44) iti. Na ca bhedagrāhibhiḥ pramāṇairadvaitaśruterjaghanyateti śaṅkyam. Brahmaṇi pāramārthikasatyatvena tadāvedikāyāstattvāvedanalakṣaṇaprāmāṇyāyāḥ śrutervyāvahārikapramāṇabhāvānāṁ pratyakṣādīnāṁ ca vibhinnaviṣayatayā parasparaṁ bādhyabādhakabhāvāsambhavāt.

तदप्युक्तं तेनैव—

Tadapyuktaṁ tenaiva—

54. तदद्वैतश्रुतेस्तावद् बाद्यः प्रत्यक्षतः क्षतः ।
नानुमानादि तं कर्तुं तवापि क्षमते मते ॥ (ख. 1/20)

Tadadvaitaśrutestāvad bādyaḥ pratyakṣataḥ kṣataḥ,
Nānumānādi taṁ kartuṁ tavāpi kṣamate mate. (Kha. 1/20)

55. धीधना बाधनायास्यास्तदा प्रज्ञां प्रयच्छथ ।
क्षेप्तुं चिन्तामणिं पाणिलब्धमब्धौ यदीच्छथ ॥ (ख. 1/24) इति ।

Dhīdhanā bādhanāyāsyāstadā prajñāṁ prayacchatha,
Kṣeptuṁ cintāmaṇiṁ pāṇilabdhamabdhau yadīcchatha.
(Kha. 1/24) iti.

तस्मात्तत्त्वज्ञानेन निवर्तनायास्य बन्धस्याज्ञानकल्पितत्वमङ्गीकर्तव्यम् । यत उक्तं—यतो ज्ञानमज्ञानस्य निवर्तकमिति ।

Tasmāttattvajñānena nivartanāyāsya bandhasyājñānakalpitatva-maṅgīkartavyam. Yata uktaṁ—yato jñānamajñānasya nivartakamiti.

Refutation of the Reality of Prapañca—NotFreedom from Truth

यदुक्तं—'सत्यस्यापि दुरितस्य सेतुदर्शनेन निवृत्तिरुपलभ्यत इति'—तदयुक्तम् । विहितक्रियानुष्ठानेन जनितस्य धर्मस्याधर्मनिवर्तकत्वध्रौव्यात् । 'धर्मेण पापमपनुदन्ति' (म. ना. 22/1) इति श्रुतेः । प्रमाणवस्तुपरतन्त्रशालिन्या दर्शनक्रियायाश्चोदितपुरुषप्रयत्नतन्त्रत्वाभावेन विधानासम्भवात् ।

Yaduktaṁ—'Satyasyāpi duritasya setudarśanena nivṛttirupalabhyata iti'—tadayuktam. Vihitakriyānuṣṭhānena janitasya dharmasyādharmanivartakatvadhrauvyāt. 'Dharmeṇa pāpamapanudanti' (Ma. Na. 22/1) iti śruteḥ. Pramāṇavastuparatantraśālinyā darśanakriyāyāścoditapuruṣa-prayatnatantratvābhāvena vidhānāsambhavāt.

ब्रह्महत्यां प्रमुच्येत तस्मिन्स्नात्वा महोदधौ ।

Brahmahatyāṁ pramucyeta tasminsnātvā mahodadhau.

इत्यादिस्मृतिविहितब्रह्मचर्याङ्गसहित-दूरतरदेशगमनसाध्यब्रह्महननिवृत्तिफलक-सेतुस्नानप्रशंसार्थत्वात् । यस्य हि दर्शनमात्रेणैव दुरितोपशमः किमुत स्नानेन? अन्यथा दूरगमनानर्थक्यं प्रसजेत् । तत्र खरादीनामप्यनर्थनिवृत्तिरापतेत् । अन्धस्य न स्याच्च ।

Ityādismṛtivihitabrahmacaryāṅgasahita-dūrataradeśagamanasā-dhyabrahmahananivṛttiphalakasetusnānapraśaṁsārthatvāt. Yasya hi darśanamātreṇaiva duritopaśamaḥ kimuta snānena? Anyathā dūragamanānarthakyaṁ prasajet. Tatra kharādīnāmapyanarthanivṛttirāpatet. Andhasya na syācca.

ननु—

Nanu—

56. अग्निचित्कपिला राजा सती भिक्षुर्महोदधिः ।
दृष्टमात्राः पुनन्त्येते तस्मात्पश्येत नित्यशः ॥

Agnicitkapilā rājā satī bhikṣurmahodadhiḥ,
Dṛṣṭamātrāḥ punantyete tasamātpaśyeta nityaśaḥ.

इति क्वचिद्दर्शनक्रियाया अपि विधानं दरीदृश्यत इति चेत्—मैवं वोचः । तत्राप्यनयैवानुपपत्त्या अग्निचिदाद्यर्घपरिचर्यादावेव तात्पर्यावधारणात् ।

Iti kvaciddarśanakriyāyā api vidhānaṁ darīdṛśyata iti cet—maivaṁ vocaḥ. Tatrāpyanayaivānupapattyā agnicidādyarghaparicaryādāveva tātparyāvadhāraṇāt.

यच्चोक्तं विषयदोषदर्शनात् रागो दन्दह्यत इति । तत्र विषयदोषदर्शनेन विरोधभूतानभिरतिसंज्ञकवैराग्यैकप्रादुर्भावाद्रागनिवृत्तौ तददर्शनमात्रमिति न व्यभिचारः ।

Yaccoktaṁ viṣayadoṣadarśanāt rāgo dandahyata iti. Tatra viṣayadoṣadarśanena virodhabūthānabhiratisaṁjñaka vairāgyaikaprādurbhāvādrāganivṛttau tadadarśanamātramiti na vyabhicāraḥ.

यदपि तार्क्ष्यध्यानादिना विषादि सत्यं विनश्यतीति । तन्न श्लिष्यते । तत्रापि मन्त्रप्रयोगादिक्रियाया एव विषाद्यपनोदकत्वात् । ध्यानस्य प्रमात्वाभावाच्च ।

Yadapi tārkṣyadhyānādinā viṣādi satyaṁ vinaśyatīti. Tanna ślisyate. Tatrāpi mantraprayogādikriyāyā eva viṣādyapanodakatvāt. Dhyānasya pramātvābhāvācca.

यदवादि—औपाधिकस्य जीवभावस्योपाधिनिवृत्त्यानिवृत्तौ ब्रह्मभावोपपत्तेर्न तदर्थमर्थवैतथ्यकथनमिति । तदपि काशकुशावलम्बनकल्पम् । विकल्पासहत्वात् । किमुपाधेः सत्यत्वमभिप्रेत्य मिथ्यात्वं वा? न प्रथमः । प्रमाणाभावात् । नापरः । इष्टापत्तेः । तस्मादाविद्यको भेद इति श्रुतावद्वितीयत्वोपपत्तयेऽभिधीयते, न तु व्यसनितया ।

Yadavādi—aupādhikasya jīvabhāvasyopādhinivṛttyānivṛttau brahmabhāvopapatterna tadarthamarthavaitathyakathanamiti. Tadapi kāśakuśāvalambanakalpam. Vikalpāsahatvāt. Kimupā-dheḥ satyatvamabhipretya mithyātvaṁ vā? Na prathamaḥ. Pramāṇābhāvāt. Nāparaḥ. Iṣṭāpatteḥ. Tasmādāvidyako bheda iti śrutāvadvitīyatvopapattaye'bhidhīyate, na tu vyasanitayā.

Cessation of Ignorance through Self-Knowledge—Instance of Rājaputra

यदि वस्तुतः सर्वोपद्रवरहितमात्मतत्त्वं तर्हि कथंकारं देहादिरूपं कारागारं कारंकारं पुनः पुनस्तत्र प्रविशति । तदतिफल्गु । अविद्याया अनादित्वेन दत्तोत्तरत्वात् । अतो निवृत्त्युपाय एवान्वेषणीयः प्रेक्षावता । न तु विस्मयः कर्तव्यः। ततश्च तत्त्वमस्यादिविद्यया तदविद्यानिवृत्तौ निरतिशयानन्दात्मलाभरूप-परमपुरुषार्थः सेत्स्यति । तथा चापस्तम्बस्मृतिः—आत्मलाभान्न परं विद्यत इति ।

Yadi vastutaḥ sarvopadravarahitamātmatattvaṁ tarhi kathaṁkāraṁ dehādirūpaṁ kārāgāraṁ kāraṁkāraṁ punaḥ punastatra praviśati. Tadatiphalgu. Avidyāyā anāditvena dattottaratvāt. Atho nivṛttyupāya evānveṣaṇīyaḥ prekṣāvatā. Na tu vismayaḥ kartavyaḥ. Tataśca tattvamasyādividyayā tadavidyānivṛttau niratiśayānandātmalābharūpaparamapuruṣārthaḥ setsyati. Tathā cāpastambasmṛtiḥ—ātmalābhānna paraṁ vidyata iti.

नन्वसौ नित्यलब्धः । न हि स्वयमेव स्वस्यालब्धो भवति । सत्यम् । किं त्वनादिमायासम्बन्धात्क्षीरोदकवत्समुदाचारवृत्तितां न लभते । तथा च यथा शबरादिभिर्बाल्यात्स्वसुतैः सह बर्धितो राजपुत्रस्तज्जातीयमात्मानमवगच्छन्बन्धुभिर्य एवं भूतो राजा स त्वमसीति बोधिते स्वरूपे लब्धस्वरूप एव भवति तथा वेश्यास्थानीययाऽनाद्यविद्यया स्वभावान्तरं नीत आत्मा मातृस्थानीयया तत्त्वमसीत्यादिकया श्रुत्या स्वभावं नीयते ।

Nanvasau nityalabdhaḥ. Na hi svayameva svasyālabdho bhavati. Satyam. Kiṁ tvanādimāyāsambandhākṣīrodakavatsamudācāravṛttitāṁ na labhate. Tathā ca yathā śabarādibhirbālyātsvasutaiḥ saha vardhito rājaputrastajjātīyamātmānamavagacchanbandhubhirya evaṁbhūto rājā sa tvamasīti bodhite svarūpe labdhasvarūpa iva bhavati tathā veśyāsthānīyayā'nādyavidyayā svabhāvāntaraṁ nīta ātmā mātṛsthānīyayā tattvamasītyādikayā śrutyā svabhāvaṁ nīyate.

एतदाहुस्त्रैविद्यवृद्धाः—

Etadāhustraividyavṛddhāḥ—

57. नीचानां वसतौ तदीयतनयैः सार्धं चिरं वर्धित-
स्तज्जातीयमवैति राजतनयः स्वात्मानमप्यञ्जसा ।
संवादे महादादिभिः सह वसँस्तद्वद्भवेत्पूरुषः
स्वात्मानं सुखदुःखजालकलितं मिथ्यैव धिङ्मन्यते ॥

Nīcānāṁ vasatau tadīyatanayaiḥ sārdhaṁ ciraṁ vardhita-
stajjātīyamavaiti rājatanayaḥ svātmānamapyañjasā.
Saṁvāde mahādādibhiḥ saha vasavañstadvadbhavetpūruṣaḥ,
svātmānaṁ sukhaduḥkhajālakalitaṁ mithyaiva dhiṅmanyate

58. दाता भोगकरः समग्रविभवो यः शासिता दुष्कृतां
राजा स त्वमसीति रक्षितृमुखाच्छ्रुत्वा यथावत्स तु ।
राजीभूय जयार्थमेव यतते तद्वत्पुमान्बोधितः ।
श्रुत्या तत्त्वमसीत्यपास्य दुरितं ब्रह्मैव सम्पद्यते ॥

Dātā bhogakaraḥ samagravibhavo yaḥ śāsitā duṣkṛtāṁ,
rājā sa tvamasīti rakṣitṛmukhācchrutvā yathāvatsa tu.
Rājībhūya jayārthameva yatate tadvatpumānbodhitaḥ,
śrutyā tattvamasītyapāsya duritaṁ brahmaiva sampadyate.

एतेनैतत्प्रत्युक्तं यदुक्तं परैः—'किं द्वयोस्तादात्म्यमेकस्य वा? नाद्यः । अद्वैतभङ्गप्रसङ्गात् । न द्वितीयः । असम्भवात्' इति । तत्र । अविद्यापरिकल्पितभेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वेन तत्त्वमस्यादितादात्म्यवादप्रामाण्योपपत्तेः । तौ च पर्यनुपयोगपरिहारावग्राहिषातां मनीषिभिः ।

Etenaitatpratyuktaṁ yaduktaṁ paraiḥ—'kiṁ dvayostādātmyamekasya vā ? Nādyaḥ. Advaitabhaṅgaprasaṅgāt. Na dvitīyaḥ. Asambhavāt' iti. Tatra. Avidyāparikalpitabhedanivṛttiparatvena tattvamasyāditādātmyavādaprāmāṇyopapatteḥ. Tau ca paryanupayogaparihārāvagrāhiṣātāṁ manīṣibhiḥ.

59. न द्वयोरस्ति तादात्म्यं च चैकस्याद्वयत्वतः ।
अप्रामाण्यं श्रुतेरवं नारोपध्वंसमात्रतः ॥ इति ।

Na dvayorasti tādātmyaṁ ca caikasyādvayatvataḥ,
Aprāmāṇyaṁ śruteravaṁ nāropadhvaṁsamātrataḥ. iti.

Summing Up The Ist Aphorism and Anubandha

ततश्च तत्त्वमसीति तत्त्वंपदार्थश्रवणमननभावनाबलभुवा साक्षात्कारेणानाद्यविद्यानिवृत्तौ सच्चिदानन्दैकरसब्रह्माविर्भावः सम्पत्स्यत इति ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञास्यत्वं प्रथमसूत्रोक्तं युक्तम् ।

Tataśca tattvamasīti tattvaṁpadārthaśravaṇamananabhāvanābalabhuvā sākṣātkāreṇānādyavidyānivṛttau sacchidānandaikarasabrahmāvirbhāvaḥ sampatsyata iti brahmaṇo jijñāsyatvaṁ prathamasūtroktaṁ yuktaṃ.

60. अज्ञातं विषयो ब्रह्म ज्ञातं तच्च प्रयोजनम् ।
मुमुक्षुरधिकारी स्यात्सम्बन्धः शक्तितः श्रुतेः ॥ इति ।

Ajñātaṁ viṣayo brahma jñātaṁ tacca prayojanaṃ,
Mumukṣuradhikārī syātsambandhaḥ śaktitaḥ śrute. iti.

Other Aphorisms of Catuḥsūtri—
Svarūpa and Taṭastha Lakṣaṇa

'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' (ब्र. सू. 1/1/2) इति द्वितीयसूत्रे ब्रह्म स्वरूपलक्षणतटस्थलक्षणाभ्यां न्यरूपि । तत्र स्वरूपान्तर्गतत्वे सति व्यावर्तकं

स्वरूपलक्षणं 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. 2/1/1) इत्यादिवेदान्तैः प्रतिपादितम् । तस्य सत्यज्ञानाद्यात्मकस्वरूपान्तर्गतत्वे सति व्यावर्तकत्वात् । तटस्थलक्षणं 'यतो वा इमानि' । (तै. 2/1) इत्यादीनि वाक्यानि निरूपयन्ति जगज्जन्मादि-कारणत्वेन । तदुक्तं विवरणे—

'Janmādyasya yataḥ' (Brah. Sū. 1/1/2) iti dvitīyasūtre brahma svarūpalakṣaṇataṭasthalakṣaṇābhyāṁ nyarūpi. Tatra svarūpāntargatatve sati vyāvartakaṁ svarūpalakṣaṇaṁ 'satyaṁ jñānamanantaṁ brahma' (Tai. Up. 2/1/1) ityādivedāntaiḥ pratipāditam. Tasya satyajñānādyātmakasvarūpāntargatatve sati vyāvartakatvāt. Taṭasthalakṣaṇaṁ 'yato vā imāni' (Tai. Up. 2/1) ityādīni vākyāni nirūpayanti jagajjanmādikāraṇatvena. Taduktaṁ vivaraṇe—

61. जगज्जन्मस्थितिध्वंसा यतः सिध्यन्ति कारणात् ।
तत्स्वरूपतटस्थाभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यां प्रदर्श्यते ।। इति ।

Jagajjanmasthitidhvaṁsā yataḥ sidhyanti kāraṇāt,
Tatsvarūpataṭasthābhyāṁ lakṣaṇābhyāṁ pradarśyate. iti.

'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्' (ब्र. सू. 1/1/3) इति तृतीयसूत्रे प्रथमवर्णकेन षष्ठीसमासमाश्रित्य सर्वज्ञत्वं प्रत्यपादि । द्वितीयवर्णकेन बहुव्रीहिसमासमभ्युपगम्य ब्रह्मणो वेदान्तप्रमाणत्वं प्रत्यज्ञायि ।

'Śāstrayonitvāt' (Brahmasūtra 1/1/3) iti tṛtīyasūtre prathamavarṇakena ṣaṣṭhisamāsamāśritya sarvajñatvaṁ pratyapādi. Dvitīyavarṇakena bahuvrīhisamāsamabhyupagamya brahmaṇo vedāntapramāṇatvaṁ pratyajñāyi.

'तत्तु समन्वयात्' (ब्र. सू. 1/1/4) इति चतुर्थे सूत्रे प्रथमवर्णकेन वेदान्तानां ब्रह्मणि तात्पर्यं प्रत्यपादि । द्वितीयवर्णकेन वेदान्तानां प्रतिपत्तिविधिशेषतया ब्रह्मप्रतिपादकत्वं प्रत्यक्षेऽपि । दिङ्मात्रमत्र प्रदर्शितम् । शिष्टं शास्त्र एव स्पस्टमिति सकलं समञ्जसम् ।

'Tattu samanvayāt' (Brahmasūtra 1/1/4) iti caturthe sūtre prathamavarṇakena vedāntānāṁ brahmaṇi tātparyaṁ pratyapādi. Dvitīyavarṇakena vedāntānāṁ pratipattividhi-śeṣatayā brahmapratipādakatvaṁ pratyakṣe'pi. Diṅmātramatra pradarśitam. Śiṣṭaṁ śastra eva spaṣṭamiti sakalaṁ samañjasam.

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे सकलदर्शन शिरोऽलङ्काररत्नं
श्रीमच्छाङ्करदर्शनं समाप्तम् ।।

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APPENDIX

On The Upādhi (pp. 9, 10. 242)

(As the *upādhi* or "condition" is a peculiarity of Hindu logic which is little known in Europe, I have added the following translation of the sections in the *Bhāṣā-pariccheda* and the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, which treat of it.)

cxxxvii *That which always accompanies the major term (Sādhya), but does not always accompany the middle (hetu), is called the condition (Upādhi); its examination is now set forth.*

Our author now proceeds to define the *upādhi* or condition[1], which is used to stop our acquiescence in a universal proposition as laid down by another person,—"That which always accompanies", etc. the meaning of this is that the so-called condition, while it invariably accompanies that which is accepted as the major term, does not thus invariably accompany that which our opponent puts forward as his middle term. (This in the false argument, "The mountain has smoke because it has fire, "we may advance "wet fuel", or rather "the being produced from wet fuel", as an *upādhi* since "wet fuel" is necessarily found wherever smoke is, but not always where fire is, as *e.g.* in a red-hot iron ball).

"But", the opponent may suggest, "if this were true, would it not

[1] The *Upādhi* is the "condition" which must be supplied to restrict a too general middle term. If the middle term, as thus restricted, is still found in the major term, the agrument is valid; if not, it fails. Thus, in "The mountain has smoke because it has fire (which rests on the false premiss that all fire is accompanied by smoke"), we must add "wet fuel" as the condition of "fire"; and if the mountain *has* wet fuel as well as fire, of course it will have smoke. Similarly, the alleged argument that "B is dark because he is Mitra's son" fails, if we can establish that the dark colour of her former offspring. A depended not on his being her son, but on her happening to have fed on vegetables instead of *ghee*. If we can prove that she still keeps to her old diet, of course our amended middle term still prove B to be dark, but not otherwise.

follow that : (a) in the case of the too wide middle term in the argument, "This (Second) son of Mitrā's, whom I have not seen, must be dark because he is Mitrā's son, we could not allege 'the being produced from feeding on vegetables'[1] as a 'condition, —inasmuch as it does not invariably accompany a dark colour, since a dark colour, does also reside in things like (unbaked) jars, etc., which have nothing to do with feeding no vegetables ? (b) Again, in the argument, 'The air must be perceptible to sense[2] because it is the site of touch, 'we could not allege the possessing proportionate form as a 'condition;' because perceptibility (to the internal sense) is found in the soul, etc., and yet soul, etc., have no form (and therefore the 'possessing proportionate form' does not invariably accompany perceptibility). (c) Again, in the argument, 'Destruction is itself perishable, because it is produced,' we could not allege as a 'condition' the being included in some positive category of existence'[3] (destruction being a form of non-existence, called "emergent", dvaṁśabhāva), inasmuch as perishability is found in antecedent non-existence, and this certainly cannot be said to be included in any positive category of existence."

We, however, deny this, and maintain that the true meaning of the definition is simply this,—that whatever fact or mark we take to determine definitely, in reference to the topic, the major term which our condition is invariable to accompany, that same fact or mark must be equally taken to determine the middle term which our said condition is not invariable to accompany. Thus, (a) the "being produced from feeding on vegetables" invariably accompanies "a dark colour," as determined by the fact that it is Mitrā's son, whose dark colour is discussed (and this very fact is the alleged middle term of the argument; but the pretended contradictory

[1] The Hindus think that a child's dark colour comes from the mother's living on vegetables, while its fair colour comes from living on *ghee*.

[2] By *Bhāṣā-pariccha*. śl. 25, the four elements, earth, water, air and fire, and *sparśavat*, but by śl. 27 of these air is neither *pratyakṣa* nor rūpavat.

[3] This condition would imply that we could only argue from this middle term "the being produced" in cases of positive existence, not non-existence.

instance of the dark jar is not in point, as this was not the topic discussed). (b) Again, "possessing proportionate form" invariable accompanies perceptibility as determined by the fact that the thing perceived is an external object; while it does not invariably accompany the alleged middle term "the being the site of touch", which is equally to be determined by the fact that the thing perceived is to be an external object.[1] (c) Again, in the argument " destruction is perishable from its being produced," the "being included in some positive category of existence" invariably accompanies the major term "perishable," when determined by the attribute of being produced. (And this is the middle term advanced; and therefore the alleged contradictory instance, "antecedent non-existence," is not in point, since nobody pretends that this is produced at all.)

But it is to be observed that *there* is nothing of this kind in valid middle terms, *i.e.*, there is nothing *there* which invariably accompanies the major term when determined by a certain fact or mark, does not so accompany the middle term when similarly determined. This is peculiar to the so-called condition. (Should the reader object that "in each of our previous examples there has been given a separate determining mark or attribute which was to be found in each of the cases included under each; how then, in the absence of some general rule, are we to find out what this determining mark is to be in any particular given case?" We reply that) in the case of any middle term which is too general; the required general rule consists in the constant presence of one or other of the following alternatives, viz, that the subjects thus to be included are either (i) the acknowledged site of the major term, and also the site of the condition,[2] or else (ii) the acknowledged site of the too gen-

[1] "Soul," of course, is not external; but our topic was not *soul* but air.

[2] As. *e.g.*, the mountain the Mitrā's first son in the two false arguments, "The mountain has smoke because it has fire" (when he fire-possessing red-hot iron ball has no smoke) and "Mitrā's first son A is dark because he is Mitrā's offspring" (when her second son B is fair). These two subjects possess the respective *sādhyas* or major terms "smoke" and "dark colour", and therefore are respectively the subjects where the conditions "wet fuel" and "the mother's feeding on vegetables" are to be respectively applied.

eral middle term, but excluding the said condition;[1] and it will be when the case is determined by the presence of one or other of these alternatives that the condition will be considered as "always accompanying the major term, and not always accompanying the middle term."[2]

cxxxviii. *All true conditions reside in the same subjects with their major terms,[3] and, their subjects being thus common, the (earing) middle term will be equally too general in regard to the condition and the major term.[4]*

cxxxix. *It is in order to prove faulty generality in a middle term that the condition has to be employed.*

The meaning of this is that it is in consequence of the middle term being found too general in regard to the condition, that we infer that it is too general in regard to the major term; and hence, the use of having a condition at all. (a) Thus, where the condition invariably accompanies an unlimited[5] major term, we infer that the middle term is too general in regard to the major term, from the very fact that it is too general in regard to the condition; as, for example, in the instance "the mountain has smoke because it has fire, where we infer that the "fire" is too general in regard to "smoke," since it is too general in regard to "wet fuel;" for there is a rule that what is too general for that which invariably accompanies must also be too general for that which is invariably accompanied.

[1] As, *e.g.*, the red-hot ball of iron and Mitrā's second son; as these, though possessing the respective middle terms "fire" and "the being Mitrā's offspring" do not possess the respective conditions "wet fuel" or "the mother's feeding on vegetables," nor consequently, the respective major terms (*sādhya*) "smoke" and "dark colour."

[2] This will exclude the objected case of "dark jars" in (a) as it falls under neither of these two alternatives; for, though they are the sites of the *sidhya* "dark colour," they do not admit the condition "the feeding on vegetables," nor the middle term "the being Mitrā's son."

[3] *i.e.*, wherever there is fire produced by wet fuel there is smoke. The condition and major term are "equipollent" in their extension.

[4] Where the *hetu* is found and not the *sādhya* (as in the red-hot ball of iron), there the *upādhi* also is not applicable.

[5] *i.e.*, one which requires no determining fact or mark, such as the three objected arguments required in section 137.

(b) But where we take some fact or mark to determine definitely the major term which the condition is invariably to accompany—there it is from the middle term's being found too general in regard to the condition in cases possessing this fact, or mark that we infer that the middle term is equally too general in regard to the major term. Thus in the argument, "B is dark because he is Mitrā's son," the middle term "the fact of being Mitrā's son" is too general in regard to the *sādhya*, "dark colour", because it is too general in regard to the *upādhi*, "feeding on vegetables," as seen in the case of Mitrā's second son (Mitrā's parentage being the assumed fact or mark, and Mitrā herself not having fed on vegetables previous to his birth.)

(But an objector might here interpose, "If your definition of a condition be correct, surely a pretended condition which fulfils your definition can always be found even in the case of a valid middle term. For instance, in the stock argument 'the mountain must have fire because it has smoke,' we may assume as our pretended condition 'the being always found elsewhere than in the mountain;' since this certainly does not always accompany the middle term, inasmuch as it is not found in the mountain itself where the smoke is acknowledged to be; and yet it apparently does 'always accompany the major term,' since in every other known case of fire we certainly find it, and as for the present case you must remember that the presence of fire in this mountain is the very point in dispute." To this I reply) you never may take such a condition as "the being always found elsewhere than in the subject or minor term" (unless this can be proved by some direct sense-evidence which precludes all dispute); because, in the first place, you cannot produce any argument to convince your antagonist that this condition does invariably accompany the major term (since he naturally maintains that present case is exactly one in point against you); and secondly, because it is self-contradictory (as the same nugatory condition may be equally employed to overthrow the contrary argument.

But if you can establish it by direct sense-evidence, then the "being always found elsewhere than in the subject" becomes a true condition, (and serves to render nugatory the false argument which a disputant tries to establish). Thus, in the illusory arument, "the fire

must be non-hot becuase it is artificial), we can have a valid condition in "the being always found elsewhere than in fire", since we can prove by sense-evidence that fire is hot,[1] (thus the *upādhi* here is a means of overthrowing the false argument).

Where the fact of its always accompanying the major term, etc., is disputed, there we have what is called a disputed condition.[2] But "the being found elsewhere than in the subject" can never be employed even as disputed condition, in accordance with the traditional rules of logical controversy.[3]

E.B.C.

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[1] The disputant says, "Fire must be non-hot because it is artificial," "Well," you rejoin, "Then it must only be an artificiality which is always found elsewhere than in fire— *i.e.*, one which will not answer your purpose in trying to prove your point." "Here the proposed *upādhi* "the being always found elsewhere than in fire" answers to the definition, as it does not always accompany the *hetu* "possessing artificiality," but it does always accompany the *sādhya* "non-hot", as fire is proved by sense-evidence to be hot.

[2] As in the argument, "the earth, etc., must have a maker because they have the nature of effects," where the Theist disputes the Atheistic condition "the being produced by one possessing a body." See. *Kusumāñjali*, v.2.

[3] In fact, it would abolish all disputation at the outset, as each party would produce a condition which from his own point of view would reduce his opponent to silence. In other words, a true condition must be consistent with *either* party's opinions.

APPENDIX II

Index (Authors and Works)

अक्षचरण 36, 462, 534
अक्षपाद 254
अघोरशिवाचार्य 239
(अथर्वसंहिता) 388
अनन्तवीर्य 114
अभिनवगुप्ताचार्य 267
अभियुक्त 110, 506
अर्हत 68, 77, 91
आग्नेयपुराण 178
आचार्य 118, 219, 274, 370, 444, 532, 539, 558
आदर्शकार 212
आनन्दतीर्थ 169, 200
आपस्तम्ब 579
आप्तनिश्चयालंकार 77
(ईशावास्योपनिषद्) 157
ईश्वरकृष्ण 425
(ईश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञाविमर्श) 267
उत्पलाचार्य 254
उदयनाचार्य 314, 337, 371, 379, 383
उदयाकरसूनु 256
उमास्वातिवाचकाचार्य 106
(ऋक्संहिता) 202, 363, 388, 399
कणभक्ष 36, 285, 462, 534
कपिल 425
कल्पतरुकार 572
(काठकोपनिषद्) 128, 135, 162, 449
कणाद 309
कात्यायन 398
कालिदास 449
काव्यप्रकाश 497
(काव्यप्रकाश) 501
काशिकावृत्ति 391
कैयट 404, 497
कौर्म 198
खण्डनकार 577
(खण्डनखण्डखाद्य) 577
गणकारिका 204, 205
गर्भश्रीकान्तमित्र 279
गरुडपुराण 196
गुरु 355, 532, 550
गोविन्दभगवत्पादाचार्य 270, 275
गौतम 406
चार्वाक 3, 20, 328
चित्सुखाचार्य 543, 566
(चित्सुखी) 129, 543, 566
छान्दोग्य 524
(छान्दोग्योपनिषद्) 128, 135, 137, 151, 160, 169, 190, 192, 193, 524, 530, 533, 538, 568
जिनदत्तसूरि 119
जैन 234, 327
जैमिनि 490
(जैमिनिसूत्र) 345, 346, 348, 458, 490
ज्ञान-रत्नावली 249
ज्ञानश्री 35
ज्ञानाधिकार 258
तत्त्वकौमुदी 426
तत्त्वप्रकाश 235, 237, 238, 246
तत्त्वमुक्तावली 141, 142, 147, 148

तत्त्वविवेक 169
तत्त्वविवेक 11
(तत्त्वसंग्रह) 239
तत्त्वार्थसंग्रहाधिकार 264
तत्त्वार्थसूत्र 87, 100, 102, 104, 107
तथागत 24, 58
(तन्त्रवार्तिक) 498
(तार्किकरक्षा) 194
(तैत्तिरीयब्राह्मण) 197, 353, 532, 575
(तैत्तिरीयसंहिता) 340, 575
(तैत्तिरीयारण्यक) 178, 350, 356, 520
तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद् 283, 530, 539, 582
तौतातित 77, 406, 560
धर्मकीर्ति 44
नकुलीश 212
नामलिङ्गानुशासन 446
नारायणकण्ठ 187
नारायणश्रुति 187
नीलकण्ठभारती 496
नैयायिक 301, 305, 374, 429, 538
न्यायकणिका 560
न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलि 314, 383
(न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलि) 22, 28, 315, 338
379, 529, 563
न्यायनिर्माणवेधा 194
न्यायभूषणकार 373
(न्यायसूत्र) 149, 194, 312, 314, 321
323, 406
पक्षिलस्वामी 320
पञ्चपादिका 565
पञ्चपादिकाविवरण 565
पञ्चशिख 445
पञ्चार्थभाष्यदीपिका 211
पञ्चिकाप्रकरण 552
पतञ्जलि 387, 404, 442
पद्मनन्दी 93
परमागमसार 87
परमश्रुति 189
परीक्षक 251
पाञ्चरात्ररहस्य 157
पाणिनि 355, 367, 417
(पाणिनिसूत्र) 355, 367, 388, 390, 398
406, 414, 452, 484, 544
(पातञ्जलमहाभाष्य) 387, 394, 398, 400
404, 453, 455
(पातञ्जलयोगसूत्र) 442, 443, 446, 463
464, 465, 468, 471, 475, 476, 478
481, 482, 483, 484, 486, 488, 489
490, 501, 504, 511, 513, 515, 516
517, 518, 519
पाशुपतशास्त्र 203, 204, 212, 219
पूर्णप्रज्ञ 201
पूर्वाचार्य 533
पौराणिक 513
प्रकरणविवरणपञ्चक 251
प्रकरणपञ्चिका 546, 547, 548, 549, 551
552, 554
प्रबोधसिद्धि 194
प्रभाकर 129, 305, 545, 554
प्रभाकरगुरु 385
प्रभाचन्द्र 76
प्रमाणवार्तिक 21
प्रमेयकमलमार्तण्ड 76
प्रशस्तपाद 37
(प्रश्नोपनिषद्) 135
फणिपति 456
बहुदैवत्य 236
बादरायण 527

बुद्ध 26, 57, 58
(बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्) 134, 140, 157, 160
161, 197, 449, 468, 528, 530
बृहस्पति 3, 7, 17
बोधिचित्तविवरण 63
बौद्ध 21, 26, 234
बौद्धनय 63
ब्रह्ममीमांसाविवरण 169
ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्ति 155
भगवद्गीता 433, 496
(भगवद्गीता) 149, 154, 162, 163, 181
186, 433, 447, 450, 471, 489
भगवान् 185, 489, 496, 540
भट्ट 129, 305
भट्टसर्वज्ञ 330
भट्टाचार्य 339, 385, 405, 482, 541
भर्तृहरि 410
(भागवत) 279
भामतीकार 536
भाल्लवेयश्रुति 187
भाष्यकार 399, 402, 415, 545
भाष्य 567
भास्कर 573, 574
भोजराज 231
मध्यमन्दिर 201
मनु 355
महानारायणोपनिषद् 578
महाभारततात्पर्यनिर्णय 177
(महाभारततात्पर्यनिर्णय) 201
महाभाष्य (दे. पात. महा.)
महावराहपुराण 186
महोपनिषद् 190
(माडूक्यकारिका) 182
माध्यमिक 40, 324, 561
मानमनोहर 371
मालतीमाधव 365
माहेश्वर 203, 222, 241, 268
मीमांसाश्लोकवार्तिक 405
(मूण्डकोपनिषद्) 148, 149, 156, 161
164, 181
याज्ञवल्क्य 461, 463, 490, 503
यामुनमुनि 164
योगदेव 87
रसहृदय 276, 277
(रसहृदय) 271
रसार्णव 269, 275, 280
रसेश्वरसिद्धान्त 271, 277
रामानुज 127, 169
रामेश्वर 284
राशीकरभाष्य 215
लङ्कावतार 42
लोकगाथा 3
लोकायत 3
वर्धमान 391
वसुगुप्ताचार्य 263
(वाक्यपदीय) 397, 401, 410, 412, 415
418, 419, 421, 576
वाक्यपदीय 404, 419
वागीश्वर 371
वाचकाचार्य 95
वाचस्पति 426, 479, 480, 527, 560
वाजप्यायन 416
वार्तिक 415
विज्ञानवादी 562
विद्यानन्द 107
विवरण 582
विवरणविवरण 572
विवेकविलास 64
विष्णुतत्त्वनिर्णय 173
(विष्णुतत्त्वनिर्णय) 199

विष्णुपुराण 188, 501, 512
(विष्णुपुराण) 136, 514
वीतरागस्तुति 73, 86, 119
वृत्तिकार 156, 485
वेङ्कटनाथ 147
वेदान्तवादनिपुण 420
वेदान्ती 305, 429
वेदार्थसंग्रह 142
वैभाषिक 61
(वैशेषिकसूत्र) 148, 285, 309, 549
व्याडि 417
व्यास 127, 463
व्यासभाष्य 463
व्यासभाष्यव्याख्या 479
(व्याससूत्र) 155, 165, 166, 167, 181, 196, 197, 200, 450, 455, 528, 539, 581, 582
शंकरकिंकर 336
शंकराचार्य 450, 527
शबरस्वामी 81
शाक्त 573
शारदातिलक 491
शालिकनाथ 546
शिवदृष्टि 253
(शिवसूत्र) 260
श्रीमत्करण 232, 249
श्रीमत्कालोत्तर 241
श्रीमत्पौष्कर 231
श्रीमत्सौरभेय 248
श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्र 228, 229, 234, 244, 246
(श्लोकवार्तिक) 362, 577
श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषद् 436
(श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषद्) 136, 148, 149, 279
सम्प्रदायवित् 218
सर्वज्ञ 275, 320 (भासर्वज्ञ)
सांख्य 234, 329, 374, 429
सांख्यकारिका 174, 423, 424, 427, 429, 433, 437, 441
सांख्यप्रवचन 442
सांख्याचार्य 431
साकारसिद्धि 278
सिद्धगुरु 227
सिद्धसेनवाक्यकार 73
सूत्रकार 215, 312, 314
सोमशम्भु 238
सोमानन्दनाथ 253, 258
सौगत 374, 429
सौत्रान्तिक 60
स्कन्दपुराण 197, 198
स्याद्वादमञ्जरी 118
स्याद्वादी 124
स्वरूपसम्बोधन 96
हरदत्ताचार्य 205
हरि 391, 400, 418
हेमचन्द्रसूरि 77
हेमचन्द्राचार्य 108
हेलाराज 401

(The Works in bracket have not been quoted by Mādhava directly)

❖

APPENDIX III

Index of Citations

अ	Chap.	Page
अ इत्युक्तो हरिः	5	182
अक्ताः शर्करा	12	353
अक्रमानन्द	8	258
अक्षतश्च लघुद्रावी	9	274
अग्निचित्कपिला	16	578
अग्निरुष्णो	1	17
अग्निहोत्रं त्रयो	1	7
अग्निहोत्रं त्रयो	1	17
अग्नेर्हि रस	16	547
अग्नेस्त्रिंशत्पुनः	15	508
अग्रीवः प्रत्यमुञ्चत्	15	520
अङ्कनं नाम	5	180
अङ्गनालिङ्गना	1	8
अचो ञ्णिति	15	484
अजामेकां	14	436
अजामेकां	16	524
अजो नित्यः	4	149
अजो ह्येको	14	436
अज्ञातं विषयो	16	581
अज्ञानस्याप्यमधर्मस्य	6	207
अज्ञानान्धस्य मे	5	179
अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशोऽयं	7	226
अणुरात्मा	4	149
अतत्त्वमिति	5	190
अतप्ततनूर्न	5	178
अतिदूरात्सामीप्यात्	5	174
अतो निरभिलप्यास्ते	2	42
अतोन्यो ग्रन्थ	5	199
अतोऽस्मि लोके	5	186
अत्र चत्वारि	1	9
अत्र ब्रूमो	16	546
अत्रायं पुरुषः	4	134
अत्रोच्यते द्वयी	16	553
अथ गौरित्यत्र	13	404
अथ तद्वचने	3	78
अथ पत्काषिणो	13	398
अथ योगानुशासनम्	15	442
अथ योगानुशासनम्	15	446
अथ यो वेदेदं	4	135
अथ शब्दस्त्वतः	5	196
अथ शब्दानुशासनम्	13	387
अथ शब्दानुशासनम्	15	455
अथातः पशु	6	204
अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा	12	345
अथातो धर्मं व्याख्यास्यामो	10	285
अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा	4	155
अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा	5	195
अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा	15	450
अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा	15	457
अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा	16	528
अथेत्ययमधिकारार्थः	15	455
अथैष ज्योतिः	15	455
अद्यापि न निवर्तन्ते	3	114
अधिकार्यानुगुण्येन	4	152
अध्यात्मयोगा	15	449
अध्येतव्यः	12	356
अध्रुवेण निमितेन	13	415
अनन्तरं च	16	549

	Chap.	Page
अनन्तश्चैव	7	237
अनन्यलभ्यः	5	199
अनर्योमलनम्	9	271
अनवच्छिन्नसद्भावं	7	234
अनवद्यमृतं	3	109
अनात्मनि च	15	482
अनादानमदत्तस्य	3	92
अनादिद्वेषिणो	5	177
अनादिनिधनं	13	401
अनादि भावरूपं	4	129
अनादिवासनो	16	527
अनादेरागमस्यार्थो	3	78
अनाधेयफलत्वेन	16	527
अनित्यः शब्दः	12	371
अनित्यत्वानु	12	371
अनित्या शुचि	15	481
अनुकूलेन तर्केण	11	337
अनुविद्य विजानाति	4	160
अनुस्नानर्निर्माल्य	6	215
अनृतेन हि	4	135
अनेकान्तं जगत्	4	123
अनेकान्तात्मकं	3	119
अनेकार्थाः स्मृताः	15	462
अन्तरायस्तथा	3	120
अन्तर्यामी जीवसंस्थो	4	152
अन्त्यं प्रत्यक्	4	147
अन्त्यावाच्यविवक्षायां	3	115
अन्धं तमः	4	157
अन्धो मणि	15	520
अन्यत्र वर्तमानस्य	2	38
अन्यथा नोपपद्येत	3	79
अन्यस्मिन्भास	16	546
अन्योन्यपक्ष	3	119
अन्योऽर्थो लक्ष्यते	15	497

	Chap.	Page
अन्वाहार्ये च	12	346
अपरिणामिनी	15	445
अपरिणामिनी	15	468
अपरोक्षावभासेन	16	551
अपहतपाप्मा	4	151
अपि खे कामतो	16	538
अपि प्रयत्न	15	496
अपृथक्त्वेपि	13	419
अपेक्षाबुद्धि	10	298
अपोद्धृत्यैव	13	401
अप्रकाशित	16	572
अप्रत्यक्षोप	2	44
अप्रामाण्यं श्रुते	16	581
अप्रामाण्यद्वया	12	381
अभावविरहा	16	563
अभिमानोऽहङ्कारः	14	425
अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैः	16	576
अभिषेकोऽथ	15	492
अभ्यासवैराग्या	15	488
अभ्रकस्तव	9	271
अयथार्थस्य	16	547
अरघट्टघटी	15	506
अर्चोपासनया	4	153
अर्थवादोपत्ती	16	533
अर्थवादोपपत्ती	5	200
अर्थानुपार्ज्य	2	64
अर्थान्यथात्व	12	384
अर्थेन घटयत्येनां	2	52
अर्थो ज्ञानाचितो	2	66
अर्हें कृत्यतृचश्च	16	544
अविद्यया मृत्युं	4	157
अविद्यां कर्म	4	158
अविद्या क्षेत्र	15	478
अविद्याच्छादय	16	568

	Chap.	Page
अविद्या तत्कृतो	15	482
अविद्यास्तमयो	16	531
अविद्यास्मिता	15	476
अविनाभावनियमो	2	21
अविभागोऽपि	2	47
अवेद्यवेदकाकारा	2	48
अवैलक्षण्यसंविति	16	551
अव्यापासाधनो यः	1	15
अशुभः पापस्य	3	103
अश्वत्थपल्लवैः	15	493
अश्वस्यात्र	1	20
अष्टकर्मक्षया	3	121
अष्ठवर्ष ब्राह्मणं	12	355
अष्टादशसंस्कारा	9	274
असंबद्धस्य चोत्पत्ति	14	431
असत्त्वान्नास्ति	14	431
असत्योपाधि	13	415
असदकरणात्	14	433
असर्वज्ञप्रणीतात्तु	3	79
असिद्धेनैक	16	558
असावादित्यो	16	524
अहंधियात्मनः	16	532
अहं स्थूलः	1	9
अहमात्मा ब्रह्म	16	530
अहिंसासत्या	15	501
अहिंसा सूनृता	3	91
आ		
आकारवांस्त्वं	7	231
आकारसहिता	2	66
आगमादेः प्रमाणत्वे	11	338
आगमेनानुमानेन	10	285
आतोनुपसर्गे कः	13	397
आत्मलाभान्न परं	16	579
आत्मात्मीयस्व	2	65

	Chap.	Page
आत्मा यद्रि भवेत	7	233
आत्मा वा अरे	4	160
आत्मा वा अरे	4	161
आत्मा वा अरे	16	528
आत्मासम्बन्धकाले	4	141
आत्मेत्येवोपासीत	4	160
आदावपेक्षा	10	297
आदाविन्द्रिय	10	296
आदित्यो यूप इति	5	189
आदित्यो यूपः	16	575
आद्यः समाप्तः	7	238
आद्यानुगृह्य		238
आद्यावाच्यविवक्षा	3	115
आद्ये स्थैर्यं	15	509
आद्यो ज्ञानदर्शना	3	106
आनन्तर्याधिकारे	5	196
आभासत्वे तु सेव	11	338
आयतनं विद्यानां	9	280
आराग्रमात्रः	4	149
आरुरुक्षोर्मुने	15	489
आर्द्रत्वं च घनत्वं	9	273
आर्यसत्याख्य	2	64
आलोच्य भाषणं	3	93
आविद्धकुला	3	113
आविर्भवन्ति	4	158
आवृत्तिपरि	13	410
आश्रयः सर्वधर्माणां	11	320
आसनादीनि संगृह्य	3	109
आसन्नं ब्रह्मणः	13	397
आस्रवः स्रोतसो	3	110
आस्रवः. स्रोतसो	3	121
आस्रवो भव	3	110
आह नित्यपरोक्षं	5	138
आहार शुद्धे	4	163

	Chap.	Page
आहिताग्निरपशब्दं	13	396
इ		
इतिकरणो	15	485
इति गुह्यतमम्	5	186
इति धनशरीर	9	270
इति पाणिनिसूत्राणां	13	392
इतीयमार्हती	3	110
इत्थं तथा घट	8	260
इदं ज्ञानमुपाश्रित्य	5	181
इदं प्रत्ययफलम्	2	57
इदं रजतमित्यत्र	16	546
इदं वस्तुबलायातं	2	42
इदमाकारवृत्यक्त	16	565
इदमाद्यं पद	13	422
इन्द्रियाणाम्	15	512
इमाः कुहेवाक	3	86
इयं सा मोक्ष	13	422
इह भोग्यभोग	7	227
ई		
ईशतत्पुरुषा	7	230
ईश्वरः पति	6	208
ईश्वरप्रेरितो	7	226
ईश्वरश्चिदचिच्चेति	4	127
ईश्वरश्चिदित	4	127
उ		
उक्तोपासनया	4	158
उच्यते शुक्ति	16	548
उत्कर्षे तु तद	5	186
उत्तमः पुरुष	5	185
उत्तरोत्तरमूर्तीना	4	158
उत्पत्तिस्थिति	5	197
उत्पादाद्वा तथा	2	58
उत्प्रेक्षेत हि	12	368
उत्सन्नकर्म	9	282
उपक्रमोपसंहारा	5	200
उपक्रमोपसंहारा	16	533
उपदेशस्य सत्यत्वं	3	80
उपदेशोऽपि बुद्धस्य	3	79
उपनीय तु यः	12	355
उपमानेन सर्वज्ञं	3	79
उपयन्नपयन्धर्मो	15	465
उपादानं लक्षणम्	15	500
उपादेयम् परं	3	94
उपादेयमुपा	3	94
उपाधिसन्निधि	16	545
उपाध्यपगमा	16	545
उपासकानुरोधेन	4	157
उपेक्ष्य साक्षात्	3	73
उभयपरिकर्मित	4	164
उभयप्राप्तौ	13	388
उभयात्मक	14	426
उरुक्रमस्य	5	178
ऊ		
ऊर्ध्ववह्नि	15	507
ऊर्ध्वशिनो	3	122
ऊर्वोरुपरि	15	503
ऋ		
ऋग्यजुःसामा	5	198
ऋचः सामानि	12	363
ऋतम्भरा तत्र	15	515
ए		
एक एव रुद्रो	11	340
एकः शब्दः स	13	398
एकदेशविशिष्टोऽर्थो	3	119
एकनेत्र	7	237
एकमेवेदं शास्त्रं	4	156
एकवारं प्रमाणेन	8	253
एकस्थानि	5	189

	Chap.	Page
एकाकिनी प्रतिज्ञा	2	24
एकाक्षरात्कृतो	15	485
एकादशकरण	14	425
एका संसृष्ट	16	553
एकैकहानि	15	508
एकोऽर्थः शब्दः	13	418
एकोऽसौ रस	9	280
एको ह्यनेकशक्ति	7	247
एतदाख्याहि	5	196
एतदात्म्यमिदं	16	533
एतद् बुद्ध्वा	5	186
एतया वा दरिद्राणां	8	254
एतेऽन्ये बहवः	9	272
एते यमाः स	15	502
एवं गुणाः समानाः	4	158
एवं जाग्रत्प्रपञ्चोऽपि	13	420
एवं त्रिचतुर	16	577
एवं ह्यहरहः	4	158
एवमर्थापत्तिरपि	3	80
एवमुक्तो नारदेन	5	196
एष चानन्त	8	260
एष प्रमाता	8	264
एष हि द्रष्टा	4	135
ओ		
ओङ्कारश्चाथ	15	453
औ		
औपशमिकक्षायिकौ	3	94
क		
कण्टकादिव्यथा	1	8
कण्ठं भित्वा	15	453
कथंचिदासाद्य	8	251
कथं तदुभयं	3	79
कफमूत्रमल	3	110
करणेन नास्ति	8	253
करामलकवत्	9	269
कर्तरि ज्ञातरि	8	257
कर्ता न तावदिह	3	86
कर्तास्ति कश्चित्	3	86
कर्तुः स्वातन्त्र्यं	7	227
कर्तृकर्मणोः कृति	13	390
कर्मणि च	13	389
कर्मण्यण्	13	397
कर्मण्येवाधि	15	496
कर्मयोगेण देवेशि	9	273
कर्मादिनिरपेक्षस्तु	6	218
कलादिभूमि	7	238
कल्पनापोढ	2	62
कल्पितश्चेन्निवर्तेत	5	184
कल्प्यस्तु विधि	12	348
कश्चार्थस्तु	5	196
कस्माद्भूयो	1	19
कांश्चिदनुगृह्य	7	242
कामः सङ्कल्पो	15	468
कामतोऽकामतो वापि	15	496
कायमाधेय	15	481
कामवाङ्मनः कर्मयोगः	3	103
कार्य किमत्र	3	86
कार्यकारणभावाद्वा	2	21
कार्यत्वादावयोः	7	228
कार्यस्यासम्भवी हेतुः	2	41
कालत्रये ज्ञातृकाले	16	566
काश्यादिसर्व	9	281
किं तु मोहवशात्	8	257
किण्वादिभ्यः समेतेभ्यः	1	9
कीर्तितं तदहिंसादि	3	91
कुणपः कामिनी	2	43
कुर्याच्चित्तानु	15	512
कुर्वीत ब्रह्माणि	15	502

	Chap.	Page
कुशोदकेन जप्तेन	14	494
कुसुमे बीजपूरादेः	3	70
कृतप्रणाशाकृत	3	73
कृत्तिः कमण्डलुः	2	67
कृत्रिमेण त्वसत्येन	3	78
केचिदविशेषेणैव	13	391
केदारादीनि	9	281
केनेदं चित्रितं	1	17
केवलं द्रव्यमात्रं	16	552
केवलां संविदम्	2	66
केषांचित्पुण्यदृशां	9	282
को ह्यन्यःपुण्डरीकाक्षात्	12	362
क्रमेणोभयवाञ्छायां	3	115
क्रामणवेधौ	9	275
क्रियते माधवार्येण	1	1
क्रियावानेष	4	163
क्रिया हि विकल्प्यते	4	123
क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशय	15	475
क्वचिद्भेदसंघाताभ्याम्	3	100
क्षणिकाः सर्वसंस्काराः	2	65
क्षरः सर्वाणि	5	185
क्षीणाष्टकर्मणो	3	121
क्षीयन्ते चास्य	4	161
क्षेप्तुं चिन्तामणिम्	16	577
ख		
खखषट्कद्विकैः	15	506
ग		
गच्छतामिह	1	18
गत्वा गत्वा निवर्तन्ते	3	114
गन्धो रसश्च	15	508
गम्भीरोत्तानभेदेन	2	63
गर्भद्रुतिबाह्यद्रुति	9	275
गलितानल्प	9	276
गाहते तदनिर्वाच्य	16	566

	Chap.	Page
गीतिषु सामाख्या	15	490
गुणं प्रति दश	15	508
गुणपर्यायवद्द्रव्यं	3	100
गुणबुद्धिर्द्रव्य	10	294
गुणे द्रव्यव्यपेक्षे	16	552
गुरुभक्तिः प्रसादश्च	6	207
गुरुर्जनो	6	206
गृहीतं गृहशब्देन	13	415
गृह्णीयान्निक्षिपेद्	3	109
गेहस्थकृत	1	18
गोविन्दभगवत्पादाचार्यो	9	272
गौणौ शुद्धौ च	15	501
ग्रहणस्मरणे	16	550
ग्राह्यं वस्तुप्रमाणं हि	2	62
ग्राह्यग्राहकवैधुर्यात्	2	45
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्ति	2	47
घ		
घटव्योमेव	16	545
घटादि जायते	8	262
घटीयन्त्रस्थितघटभ्रमण	15	504
घटोऽस्तीति न	3	117
घातयन्ति हि	5	176
च		
चक्रं बिभर्त्ति	5	178
चक्षुराद्युक्तविषयं	1	11
चञ्चलं हि मनः	15	471
चतुर्णामपि बौद्धानां	2	66
चतुर्भ्यः खलु	1	9
चतुष्प्रस्थानिका	2	66
चत्वारि शृङ्गाणि	13	399
चत्वारि शृङ्गाः त्रयो	13	399
चराणां स्थावराणां च	3	91
चर्मोपमश्चेत्	2	30
चर्वटिः कपिलो	9	272

	Chap.	Page
चिदचिद् द्वे परे	3	94
चिन्तां प्रकृति	12	354
चेतनालक्षणौ	3	121
चैतन्यं दृक्क्रिया	7	235
चैतन्यमात्मा	8	260
चोदनालक्षणो	12	346
चोदना हि भूतं	3	81
चोरापहायौ	5	190
च्युतेर्हानिः	6	207
छ		
छदांसि जज्ञिरे	13	363
ज		
जगच्च सृजतस्यस्य	11	339
जगच्चित्रं नमस्तस्मै	8	263
जगज्जन्मस्थिति	16	582
जगद्व्यापारवर्जम्	5	181
जननं जीवनम्	15	492
जनिकर्तुरिति	13	392
जन्तुरक्षार्थ	3	109
जन्माद्यस्य यतः	4	165
जन्माद्यस्य यतः	5	197
जन्माद्यस्य यतः	16	539
जन्माद्यस्य यतः	16	582
जन्मौषधिमन्त्रतपः	15	443
जप्यमानस्य मन्त्रस्य	15	494
जर्भरी तुर्फरी	1	19
जहाति पूर्वं	2	38
जातिमन्ये क्रिया	13	413
जातिरित्युच्यते	13	412
जात्याख्यायामेकस्मिन्	13	417
जायते तन्निसर्गेण	3	88
जिनो देवो	3	120
जीवं देवादिशब्दो	4	141
जीवभेदो मिथः	5	184

	Chap.	Page
जीवस्य परमैक्यं	5	189
जीवाजीवास्रव	3	102
जीवाजीवौ पुण्यपापयुतौ	3	114
जीवाजीवौ पुण्यपापे	3	121
जीवेश्वरभिदा चैव	5	184
ज्ञातसम्बन्धस्यैव पुंसः	16	558
ज्ञातृज्ञेयमिदं	9	278
ज्ञाते शिवत्वे	8	253
ज्ञाते सुवर्णे	8	253
ज्ञातो यद्यपरं	9	283
ज्ञानं क्रिया च	8	257
ज्ञानं तपोऽथ	3	205
ज्ञानं पूर्वापरीभूतं	3	96
ज्ञानदर्शनचारित्रा	3	120
ज्ञानमात्रे वृथा	6	219
ज्ञानस्याभेदिनो	2	50
ज्ञानाद्भिन्नो न	3	96
ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि पञ्चैव	2	64
ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो	12	385
त		
तं त्वौपनिषदं	5	197
तं देहवेघ	9	275
तज्जन्यावृति	16	540
तज्ज्ञानान्मुक्त्यभावाच्च	16	532
ततः कारणतः	6	218
ततः स्वाभाविकाः	4	158
ततश्च जीवनोपायो	1	19
ततो भिन्ने	16	551
ततो भूय इव	4	157
तत्कर्मणामनु	7	244
तत्तथ्यमपि	3	91
तत्तु समन्वयात्	4	167
तत्तु समन्वयात्	5	200
तत्तु समन्वयात्	16	582

	Chap.	Page
तत्त्वमसि	4	128
तत्त्वमसि	4	143
तत्त्वमसि	5	189
तत्त्वमसि	16	530
तत्त्वमसि	16	533
तत्त्वमसि	16	538
तत्त्वमसि	16	581
तत्त्वविद्याविरोधी च	16	545
तत्त्वाभ्यां भूजलाभ्यां	15	509
तत्त्वार्थ श्रद्धानं	3	87
तत्प्रातिभासिकं	16	566
तत्र ज्ञानं स्वतः	8	258
तत्र तन्मात्रधी	16	554
तत्र द्रव्यं दशावत्	4	148
तत्र पतिः शिव	7	245
तत्र प्रत्ययैकतानता	15	514
तत्र स्थितौ	15	488
तत्राद्यो मल	7	238
तत्राष्टौ मण्डलिनः	7	243
तत्सत्यं स आत्मा	16	576
तत्सर्व त्वयि	15	496
तत्स्यात्प्रवृत्ति	2	53
तत्स्यादालय	2	53
तत्स्वरूपतट	16	582
तथा कृतत्व्यवस्थेयं	2	48
तथा जीवेश्वरौ	5	190
तथापि भिन्ने	16	550
तथापि सूक्ष्म	5	191
तदज्ञानमिति	4	129
तदद्वैतश्रुतेस्तावत्	16	577
तदनन्तरमूर्ध्वं	3	112
तदयोगव्यवच्छेदः	11	315
तदर्चाविभव	4	157
तदर्थं लीलया	4	152

	Chap.	Page
तदायत्तफलैकत्वात्	16	565
तदा शिवमविज्ञाय	10	284
तदेव तेन वेद्यं	16	546
तदेव वासुदेवाख्यं	4	152
तदेवार्थमात्रनिर्भासं	15	464
तदैक्येन विना	8	258
तदैक्षत बहु स्याम्	4	137
तद्देशिनं च	2	38
तद्द्वारमपवर्गस्य	13	421
तद्धीश्चाध्यास	16	544
तद्वदनुग्रहणं	7	232
तदपुः पञ्चभिः	7	230
तद्वशा एव ते	5	192
तद्विधानविवक्षायां	3	115
तद्विष्णोः परमं	5	178
तद्व्यावहारिकं	16	566
तनुं रसमयीं	9	272
तन्नित्यं विभु	7	234
तन्निवृत्ताविति	7	249
तन्मात्रविषया	16	553
तपःस्वाध्यायेश्वर	15	442
तपःस्वाध्यायेश्वर	15	490
तप्याभेदग्राहिणी	15	444
तमद्भुतं बालक	9	279
तमस्यन्धे	5	177
तमृते भवेन्न	7	227
तमेव भ्रान्त	8	259
तरति शोक	4	128
तरत्यविद्याम्	16	573
तर्पणं दीपनम्	15	492
तल्लब्धिर्विवेक	4	163
तस्माच्छक्तिविभागेन	13	418
तस्माच्छान्तो	15	448
तस्मात्तं रक्षयेत्पिण्डं	9	269

	Chap.	Page
तस्मात्प्रमेया	2	52
तस्मात् सद्बोधकत्वेन	12	384
तस्मादचलतः	2	38
तस्मादपि षोडशकात्	14	428
तस्मादिदमनवद्यं	1	15
तस्माद् गुणेभ्यो	12	381
तस्मान्मात्रमिति	5	185
तस्मिन्नाधाय	9	282
तस्मिन्प्रसन्ने	5	188
तस्मिन्सति श्वास	15	504
तस्मिन्सतीद	8	261
तस्य प्रसाधन	9	274
तस्य भावस्त्वतलौ	13	414
तस्यैवार्थस्य	13	418
तां प्रातिपादिकार्थं च	13	412
तात्त्विकं ब्रह्मणः	16	566
तानि दृष्ट्वा तु	9	281
तारमायारमायोगो	15	494
तारव्योमाग्नि	15	494
तासामहं वरा	7	247
तिष्ठासोरेवमिच्छैव	8	260
तुषतण्डुल	7	247
तृतीयः सकलः	7	238
तृतीये कोप	15	509
ते न ज्ञाता	16	549
तेन प्रोक्तम्	12	367
तेन मायासहस्रं	4	136
तेन यत्र प्रयुक्तो	15	480
तेनान्यस्यान्यथा	16	546
ते विभक्त्यन्ताः	13	406
तेषां सतत	4	162
तेषामप्येक	2	45
तेषामृग्यत्रार्थवशेन	15	490
तैस्तै रप्युपयाचि	8	267

	Chap.	Page
त्याज्यं सुखं	1	3
त्रयो वेदस्य	1	19
त्रिगुणो द्विगुणो	15	508
त्रिधा प्रकल्पयन्	10	285
त्रिधा बद्धो	13	399
त्रिपदार्थं चतुष्पादं	7	222
त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टं	14	429
त्रिविधं सत्वं	16	565
त्वं पुरा सागरोत्पन्नो	5	179
त्वंशब्दश्चापरोक्षार्थं	5	188
द		
दक्षिणे तु करे	5	179
ददत्यखिल	5	176
ददामि बुद्धियोगं	4	162
दर्शनात्स्पर्शनात्तस्य	9	280
दह्यन्ते ध्यायमानानां	15	510
दाता भोगकरः	16	580
दिव्यौदरिक	3	92
दीक्षाकारि	6	204
दीपनगमन	9	275
दीप्तास्थिरा	15	509
दुःखं संसारिणः	2	65
दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्ति	11	321
दुःखमायतनं चैव	2	65
दुःखसमुदाय	2	57
दुःखानुशयी	15	483
दूरसूक्ष्मादि	12	367
दूरोत्सारित	1	1
दृग्दर्शनशक्त्यो	15	483
दृष्टचैत्रपसुतोत्पत्तेः	16	543
दृष्टमनुमानं	14	429
दृष्टमात्राः पुनन्त्येते	16	578
दृष्टानुश्रविक	15	489
दृष्टो न चैकदेशोस्ति	3	78

	Chap.	Page
देवाः केचिन्महेशाद्याः	9	272
देवासो येन	5	178
देवो मनुष्यो	4	141
देशना लोकनाथानां	2	63
देशबन्धश्चित्तस्य	15	443
देशबन्धश्चित्तस्य	15	513
देहः स्थौल्यादि	1	9
देहस्य नाशो	1	8
देहात्मप्रत्ययो	16	535
दोषाश्चेन्न हि	16	547
दोषेण कर्मणा	16	545
द्रव्यं कालः	6	207
द्रव्यबुद्धिश्च	10	298
द्रव्याद्रव्यप्रभेदात्	4	147
द्रव्याश्रया निर्गुणा	3	100
द्राक् त्यजेन्निन्दकं	9	281
द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ	5	185
द्वा सुपर्णा	4	148
द्वि चत्वारिंशता	3	109
द्वित्वत्वप्रमिति	10	296
द्वित्वाख्यगुण	10	298
द्वित्वे च पाकजोत्पत्तौ	10	295
द्वित्वोदयसमं	10	297
द्विधा कैश्चित्पदं	13	401
द्वैतं न विद्यत	5	184
ध		
धर्मश्चेव प्रमादश्च	6	207
धर्मस्य तदतद्रूप	5	194
धर्मानुवर्तनादेव	7	247
धर्मायतन	2	65
धमार्थकामाः	5	187
धर्मिणस्तद्विशिष्टत्व	5	194
धर्मेण पापमय	16	578
धीधना बाधना	16	577

	Chap.	Page
ध्रुवास्मृतिः	4	160
न		
न च तत्रार्थ	3	78
न च नाशं प्रयात्येष	5	184
न च विशेषणं	5	173
न चागमविधिः	3	78
न चात्र पक्ष	16	572
न चानुवदितुम्	3	78
न चान्यार्थप्रधानै	3	78
न जायते	4	149
न तद्वस्तु	2	62
न तुष्टये महेशस्य	15	496
न द्वयोरस्ति	16	581
नन्वत्र रजताभास	16	548
न प्रकाश्यं प्रमाणेन	16	540
न प्रकृतिर्न	14	428
नमितः सर्वदेवैश्च	5	179
न यत्प्रमाद	3	91
न याति न च	2	38
नयानशेषान्	3	119
न विज्ञातु	4	135
न शक्यं केवलं	15	483
न सतः कारणा	2	41
न स्वरूपैकता	5	189
न स्वर्गो नापवर्गो वा	1	17
न हि कश्चित्क्षणमपि	15	447
न हि विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेः	4	135
न ह्यसंनिहितम्	16	549
नाकमिष्टसुखं	13	398
नाजीवञ्ज्ञास्यति	9	278
नादैराहित	13	410
नानात्मानो	4	148
नानावर्णो भवेत्	9	273
नानुमानादि	16	577

	Chap.	Page
नान्यदृष्टं स्मरत्यन्यः	7	233
नान्यदृष्टं स्मरत्यन्यः	16	529
नान्योनुभाव्यो	2	45
नाप्नुवन्ति महात्मानः	4	154
नाप्येकैव विद्या	2	36
नामधात्वर्थ	15	480
नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन	4	162
नायमात्मा बल	4	164
नारायणं सदा	5	199
नारायणोऽसौ	5	187
नावेदविन्मनुते	5	197
नासतो विद्यते	14	433
नास्तित्वं सैव	16	554
नास्तीत्यपि न	3	177
निःसीमत्वेन ते	5	191
नित्यज्ञानाश्रयं	1	1
नित्यमनित्यभावात्	5	194
नित्यस्तस्मात्तदर्थाय	5	187
नित्यानित्यात्मकं	3	120
निपाताश्चोपसर्गाय	15	462
निरुपादान	8	263
निरूढा लक्षणाः	15	498
निर्जरा सम्मता	3	111
निर्दिश्यमानप्रति	15	498
निर्दुःखानन्द	5	191
निर्दोषतां प्रयान्त्याशु	15	492
निर्वाणस्य प्रदीपस्य	1	18
निश्चयात्साधयेदार्थं	5	198
निष्कर्षाकृत	4	142
निष्कलं निष्क्रियं	16	573
निष्कारणो धर्मः	13	393
नीचानां वसतौ	16	580
नीललोहित	13	412
नीलिमेव वियत्येषा	16	545

	Chap.	Page
नृपञ्चास्यमहं	9	279
नैकः पर्यनुयोक्तव्यः	16	560
नैकतापि विरुद्धानां	2	28
नैकस्मिन्नसम्भवात्	4	127
नैयायिकास्ते	12	374
नैव वर्णाश्रमादीनां	1	17
न्यस्यान्तःस्थपृथिव्यादि	15	510
न्यायानामेकनिष्ठानां	3	119
प		
पक्षी वृक्षो	4	141
पङ्गवन्धवदुभयोरपि	14	440
पञ्चकास्त्वष्ट	6	204
पञ्चनवद्व्य	3	107
पञ्चमेशून्यतैव	15	509
पञ्चविधं तत्कृत्यं	7	232
पञ्चार्थादन्यतो	6	219
पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि	2	65
पतिः साद्यः	6	212
पतिविद्ये तथा	7	249
पद्मासनं भवेदेतत्	15	503
पर आत्मा तदानीं	7	233
परमानन्दैकरसं	9	282
परस्परविरोधे हि	2	28
पराभिमता	6	204
परिच्छेदान्तरा	2	50
परिणामताप	15	482
परितः पूजनीयानि	2	64
परिपक्वमला	7	243
परिव्राट्कामुक	2	43
परिशेषात्स्मृतिः	16	548
परीक्ष्य लोका	4	156
परैरप्युपलक्ष्येत	8	258
पर्यटति कर्म	7	240
पर्यायांणा प्रयोगो	13	411

	Chap.	Page
पर्ययेणैव	13	411
पवित्रं सर्व	13	421
पशवस्त्रिविधाः	7	237
पशुत्वमूलं	6	205
पशुश्चेन्निहतो	1	18
पश्वादिभिश्चा	16	536
पादाङ्गुष्ठौ	15	503
पारं गतं	1	1
पारदो गदितो	9	269
पाशजालं समा	7	246
पाशान्ते शिव	7	234
पाशाश्चतुर्विधाः	7	246
पीतशङ्खावबोधे	16	551
पीतश्वेतारुण	15	510
पीतिमा गृह्यते	16	551
पुंसां येनोप	16	542
पुण्यस्य संवरे	3	121
पुत्रोत्पत्तिविपत्ति	16	542
पुनरावृत्तिरहितं	4	154
पुरःस्थिते प्रमेयाब्धौ	2	60
पुरुषः स	4	162
पुरुषविमोक्ष.	14	437
पुरुषस्य तथा	14	441
पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं	14	440
पुरुषार्थशून्यानां	15	519
पुर्यष्टकं नाम	7	239
पुर्यष्टकदेह	7	239
पूजनाद्रस	9	280
पूर्णप्रज्ञस्तृतीयः	5	201
पूर्वं लोहे	9	276
पूर्वं व्यत्यासित	7	244
पूर्वपूर्वोदित	4	158
पूर्वप्रयोगात्	3	113
पूर्वषामति	1	1

	Chap.	Page
पृथ्वी पञ्चगुणा	15	508
पृथ्व्यप्तेजो	15	509
पृथ्व्याः पलानि	15	508
प्रकरणविवरण	8	251
प्रकरणादसं	5	181
प्रकल्प्येत कथं	3	78
प्रकाशैक्यात्त	8	258
प्रकृतिः प्रकृष्ट	5	182
प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ	4	159
प्रकृतिर्वासनेत्येव	5	182
प्रकृतिस्थित्यनुभव	3	105
प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततः	14	428
प्रज्ञप्तिरूपो	5	183
प्रणवान्तरितः	15	493
प्रतिमादिकम्	4	152
प्रतियोगिन्य	16	553
प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं	3	90
प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं	2	66
प्रत्यभिज्ञा यदा	12	371
प्रत्येकं पञ्च	15	507
प्रत्येकं वायु	15	493
प्रत्येकं सदसत्त्वा	16	566
प्रथमं छन्दसा	13	397
प्रथमं परतः	12	374
प्रथमस्तु हनूमान्	5	201
प्रदीपः सर्व	11	320
प्रधानमल्ल	4	126
प्रपञ्चो यदि	5	182
प्रपत्तिश्चेति	6	206
प्रमाणत्वस्वतः	12	374
प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे	12	374
प्रमाणदोष	16	544
प्रमाणपदवीं	5	198
प्रमाणप्रमेय	11	312

	Chap.	Page
प्रमाणवत्त्वादायातः	3	69
प्रमाणान्तरवादे	9	278
प्रमाणान्तरसद्भावः	2	25
प्रमाणान्तरसामान्य	2	25
प्रमादाद्रस	9	281
प्रमेयं प्रमितौ	16	540
प्रयत्नायौगपद्य	16	549
प्रयोजनं तु यत्	12	370
प्रयोजनमनु	11	339
प्रलयाकलेषु	7	239
प्रवाहकाल	15	508
प्रवृत्तिर्वा निवृत्तिर्वा	16	542
प्रवेशः कर्मणां	3	121
प्रसज्यमानरजत	16	552
प्रसन्नात्मा हरि	4	158
प्रसुप्तास्तत्त्वलीनानां	15	479
प्राणायामेन पवनं	15	513
प्राणायामैस्तु	15	510
प्राप्यते येन	9	281
प्रारभ्यन्ते	5	196
प्रावृतीशो बलं	7	246
प्रासादस्योपरिस्थानां	1	18
प्राहुरेषाम	3	122
प्रियं पथ्यं वचस्तः	3	91
प्रिया वाचंयम	3	109
फ		
फलं तत्रैव	3	70
ब		
बद्धः खेचरतां	9	273
बद्धाञ्छेषा	7	244
बन्धमोक्षौ	5	197
बन्धहेत्वभाव	3	112
बन्धो निर्जर	3	121
बलभोगोप	3	120

	Chap.	Page
बलित्था तद्व	5	202
बाधकप्रत्यय	16	552
बाधाभावात्पदा	16	566
बाधिकैव श्रुतिः	15	460
बालः षोडश	9	277
बालस्य रक्षता	4	136
बालाग्रशत	4	149
बाह्याः प्राणा	3	92
बुद्धिपौरुषहीनानां जीविका	1	17
बुद्धिपौरुषहीनानां जीविके	1	7
बुद्धिर्मनस्त्व	7	241
बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि	14	426
बुद्ध्या विविच्य	2	42
बृहस्पतिरिन्द्राय	13	395
बौद्धानां सुगतो	2	64
ब्रह्मचर्यमहिंसा	15	501
ब्रह्मण्येव	15	463
ब्रह्म वेद	5	181
ब्रह्महत्यां प्रमुच्येत	16	578
ब्रह्मा शिवः	5	191
भ		
भक्तिलक्ष्मी	8	254
भण्डैस्तद्वत्	1	20
भस्मकादिषु	16	547
भस्मना त्रिषवणं	6	212
भस्मीभूतस्य	1	3
भस्मीभूतस्य	1	19
भागो जीवः	4	149
भारताध्ययनं	12	362
भारताध्ययनत्वे	12	362
भावनाभिर्भाविंतानि	3	92
भावनिच्छावशा	8	260
भावान्तरमभावो	4	130
भावान्तरादभावो	4	130

	Chap.	Page
भावो यथा तथा	12	379
भासमाने तयो	16	552
भिद्यते हृदय	4	161
भिद्यन्ते बहुधा	2	63
भिन्नकालं कथं	2	51
भिन्ना हि देश	2	63
भुङ्क्ते न केवली	3	122
भुवनानामुपा	4	150
भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः	14	426
भूमिरर्धपुटे	15	507
भूयश्चान्ते	16	573
भेदश्च भ्रान्ति	2	46
भेदाभेदवादिनां	16	573
भेदाविमौ च	15	501
भेदेन मन्द	5	191
भ्रू युगमध्य	9	282
म		
मङ्गलादीनि	15	452
मङ्गलानन्तरा	15	446
मतं हि ज्ञानि	5	184
मतिश्रुतावधि	3	89
मध्यमानां तु	15	460
मनोजवित्वं	15	516
मनोदोषात्त	16	549
मनोबुद्धिरिति	2	64
मनोवाक्काय	3	92
मन्त्रदोषा	15	495
मन्त्रवर्णान्समालिख्य	15	493
मन्त्रांश्च करो	7	238
मन्त्राचरेण	15	493
मन्त्राणां दश	15	492
मन्त्राणां मातृ	15	492
मन्त्रायुर्वेद	11	314
मन्त्रार्णसंख्य	15	493
मन्त्रेण वारिणा	15	494
मन्त्रे मलत्रयं	15	494
मम देहरसो	9	269
मम देहोऽयम्	1	8
मलमायाकर्म	7	238
मलयुक्तस्तत्रा	7	237
मलाद्यसम्भवा	7	230
महदाद्याः	14	424
महामायेत्यविद्येति	5	182
महाव्रतानि	3	92
महेश्वरो यथा	8	264
मांसानां खादनं	1	20
मा कर्मफल	15	496
मामुपेत्य पुनः	4	154
मायां तु प्रकृतिं	4	136
माया मात्र	5	182
माया विक्षिपदज्ञानं	16	568
मायेत्युक्ता	5	183
मार्गश्चेत्यस्य	2	65
मितिः सम्यक्परि	11	315
मिथश्च जड	5	184
मिथ्याज्ञानमधर्म	6	205
मिथ्यादर्शना	3	104
मिथ्याभावोऽपि	16	522
मुक्तात्मानश्च	6	203
मुक्तात्मानोऽपि शिवाः	7	235
मुक्तानां चाश्रयो	5	192
मुक्तास्तु शेषिणि	4	159
मुक्तास्ते रस	9	271
मुक्तौ सा च ज्ञाना	9	270
मुख्यं च सर्व	5	186
मुख्यार्थबाधे	15	497
मुनयो बाल	9	272
मुनिर्यदन्न	3	109

	Chap.	Page
मुमुक्षुरधि	16	581
मुहवैचित्ये	14	435
मूर्च्छितो हरति	9	273
मूलप्रकृति	14	423
मूलरामायणं	5	198
मृतानामपि	1	18
मृत्योः स मृत्यु	4	128
मेयं साधारणं	8	264
मैवारुवण्यो	5	180
य		
य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनो	4	140
य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्	4	151
य आत्मनीति	4	153
य एतं ब्रह्मलोकं	4	135
यः स्यात्प्रावरणा	9	283
यच्चानुकूल	5	199
यजमानः प्रस्तरः	16	532
यजमानः प्रस्तरः	16	575
यज्ज़रया	9	277
यतो वा इमानि	4	166
यतो वा इमानि	5	197
यतो वा इमानि	16	582
यतो वाचो	16	539
यत्कृत्वा संप्रदायेन	15	495
यत्नाद्यदुत्सृजेत्	3	110
यत्नेनानुमितो	16	576
यत्र द्रष्टा च	13	418
यत्राप्यतिशयो	12	367
यत्रासौ वर्तते	2	38
यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकं	2	36
यथाज्ञो जीव	5	190
यथाणिमा च	5	190
यथा नद्यः समु	5	190
यथानादिर्मल	7	248
यथा पक्षी च	5	190
यथा यथार्था	2	42
यथा लोहे	9	276
यथावस्थित	3	89
यथा सोम्यैकेन	5	192
यथास्थितार्थ	3	77
यथा स्वप्नप्रपञ्चोऽयं	13	420
यदग्ने रोहितम्	16	524
यदन्तर्ज्ञेय	2	50
यदसत्स्वपि	3	92
यदाचर्मव	10	284
यदा तदा न	2	48
यदाश्रित्यैव	4	157
यदि गच्छेत्परं	1	19
यदि चार्थ	16	548
यदेव पररूपा	16	573
यद्यनादि न	7	248
यमनियमा	15	463
यमर्थमधिकृत्य	8	254
यमेवैव वृणुते	4	162
यश्चोभयोः समो	16	560
यस्मात्क्षरमतीतो	5	186
यस्मिन्नेव हि	3	70
यस्य त्रीण्युदितानि	5	201
यस्य न स्खलिता	10	295
यस्य प्रसादा	5	187
यस्यानवयवः	13	406
यस्यैतानि न	9	273
य चैषां प्रति	8	258
यातविवेको	9	277
यावज्ञीवं सुखं	1	3
यावज्जीवेत्सुखं	1	19
यावन्तो यादृशाः	13	407
युगपत्तद्वि	3	115

	Chap.	Page
युज समाधौ	15	463
युजिर्योगे	15	461
ये चात्यक्तशरीराः	9	271
येन रूपेण	3	87
येनाङ्किता	5	178
येनैव जातं	1	1
योगः समाधिः	15	463
योगश्चित्तवृत्ति	15	442
योगश्चित्तवृत्ति	15	465
योगारूढस्य	15	489
योगिनामपि	8	262
योगी मायाममेयाय	16	573
योग्यं यन्न	9	277
योजयति	7	243
यो धर्मशीलो	12	361
यो मामेवम	5	186
योऽयं विज्ञान	4	135
यो यज्ज्ञाति	7	228
यो लोकत्रय	5	185
योऽवबोधस्त	3	89
र		
रक्षोहागम	13	398
रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा	14	441
रजतं विष	16	549
रजतव्यवहारा	16	552
रसं ह्येवायं	9	283
रसश्च पवन	9	273
रसाङ्कमेय	9	278
रसो वै सः	9	283
रागादिज्ञान	2	66
रागादिदोषसं	16	565
रागादीनां गणो	2	65
राजीभूय जयार्थ	16	581
रुचिर्जिनोक्त	3	88
रुद्धकीलित	15	495
रूप्यादेरर्थं	16	566
ल		
लक्षणं दृश्यते	9	273
लक्षणारोपिता	15	499
लक्ष्मीरक्षर	5	191
लब्धानन्त	3	121
लभ्यमाने फले	12	352
लाभा मला	6	204
लिङ्गाद्यभावा	16	549
लुञ्चिताः	3	122
लेशादृष्टिनिमि	11	315
लोकसिद्धो	1	8
लोकस्येष तथा	8	267
लोकातिवाहिते	3	109
लोकाधीनाव	15	480
लोकावगतसामर्थ्यः	16	575
लोहवेधस्त्वया	9	275
लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं	16	535
लौकिकव्यवहारेषु	13	391
लौकिकेन प्रमाणेन	16	566
व		
वत्सविवृद्धि	14	437
वदत्यब्राह्मणा	15	480
वर्णाः प्रज्ञात	13	407
वर्षातपाभ्यां	2	30
वशीकृत्य ततः	15	513
वश्यता परमा	15	512
वसुधाद्यस्तत्त्व	7	240
वस्तुनि ज्ञायते	4	130
वहन्त्यहर्निशं	15	507
वहन्त्योरुभ	15	507
वाक्पाणिपाद	14	426
वाक्येष्वनेका	3	116

	Chap.	Page
वाचारम्भणं	5	193
वाच्या सा सर्व	13	419
वायो रामवचो	5	201
वायोर्वह्ने	15	507
वारिबीजेन	15	494
वार्ताहरेण यातस्य	16	543
वासचर्या	6	206
वासुदेवः परं	4	150
वासुदेवः स्वभक्तेषु	4	152
विकल्पो वस्तु	2	62
विकारापगमे	13	419
विकारापगमो	13	419
विकृतौ व्यक्ति	7	248
विगलितसकल	9	282
विच्छिन्नोदार	15	479
विज्ञानं वेदना	2	65
विज्ञानं त्वपरा	3	90
विज्ञानघन	1	4
विज्ञानाकल	7	238
विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां	4	160
वितर्कविचारा	15	474
विद्यां चाविद्यां	4	157
विद्यादिज्ञापित्तैः	8	264
विधिनोक्तेन	15	490
विधेस्तु निय	12	352
विनापि विधि	12	348
विभक्तलक्षण	2	48
विभवोपासने	4	153
विमर्श एव	8	259
विरामप्रत्यय	15	518
विलिख्य मन्त्र	15	493
विवर्तते तद्व्रजत	16	565
विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन	13	401
विवर्तस्तु	16	527
विवादाध्यासितं	7	228
विशिष्टफलदाः	15	502
विशोका वा	15	517
विषय्यन्तः कृते	15	500
विष्णवे षट्	15	505
विष्णुं सर्वगुणैः	5	191
विष्णोः प्रज्ञप्ति	5	183
वीतरागजन्मा	4	149
वृत्तात्कर्माधि	4	155
वृद्धप्रयोग	15	480
वृद्धिरादैच्	15	453
वेत्ता नवगण	6	204
वेदनमुपासनम्	4	161
वेदमधीत्य	12	349
वेदमधीत्य	12	354
वेदस्याध्ययनं	12	362
वेदाध्ययन	12	362
वेदन्नो वैदि	13	393
वेद्यः स एव	16	546
वैदिकेषु तु	13	391
वैयाकरणा	13	404
वैलक्षण्यं तमो	5	191
व्यक्तयस्तासु	3	72
व्यक्ताव्यक्ता	6	206
व्यक्तिलभ्यं तु	12	370
व्यभिचारवति	16	548
व्यवहारोऽपि तत्तु	16	551
व्यवहारोऽपि तत्तु	16	552
व्याधिस्त्यान	15	471
व्यावर्त्तयितु	1	15
व्याावर्त्याभाव	16	563
व्यावहारिकीं	16	577
व्यूहश्चतुर्विधो	4	152
व्रीहीञ्जिहासति	1	6

श	Chap.	Page
शं नो देवी	13	388
शक्तस्य शक्य	14	433
शक्तिराधीयते	3	70
शक्तिरूपेण	7	248
शक्त्याविष्करणे	8	257
शङ्कस्येन्द्रिय	16	552
शतमष्टादश	7	243
शतानि तत्र	15	506
शब्दः स्पर्शस्तथा	7	241
शब्दब्रह्मणि	13	421
शब्दादिष्वनु	15	512
शब्देनित्ये सा	1	15
शब्दैस्तन्वंश	4	142
शरीरशोषणं	15	602
शान्त उपासीत	4	163
शान्तो दान्त	4	164
शास्त्रचिन्तकाः	16	536
शास्त्रपूर्वके	13	398
शास्त्रयोनित्वात्	4	166
शास्त्रयोनित्वात्	5	197
शास्त्रयोनित्वात्	16	582
शुक्तिकाया विशेषाः	16	549
शुक्तिका रजत	16	545
शुक्तिका रजत	16	545
शुक्तीदमंश	16	565
शुद्धेऽध्वनि शिवः	7	232
शुभः पुण्यस्य	3	103
शेषाः पुमांसः	15	491
शेषा भवन्ति	7	243
शेषे यजुःशब्दः	15	490
शैवागमेषु	7	245
शोको मिथ्या	3	120
शौचसंतोष	15	501
श्रीकण्ठःशत	7	243

	Chap.	Page
श्रीखण्डश्च	7	237
श्रीमत्सायण	1	1
श्रीशार्ङ्गपाणि	1	1
श्रुतिगम्यात्म	16	538
श्रुतिप्राप्ते	15	458
श्रुतिलिंग	15	458
श्रुतिसाहाय्या	5	198
श्रुतिस्मृतिसहा	5	198
श्रुत्योरंगुष्ठ	15	509
श्रेयः परं किं	9	280
श्वेताम्बराः	3	122
ष		
षट्केन युग	2	45
षट्त्रिंशद्गुरु	15	504
षट्शतानि	15	505
षड्दर्शने	9	269
षोडशकस्तु	14	427
स		
स आत्मा	5	169
स आस्रवः	3	103
स एव करुणा	4	157
स एव विमृश	8	259
स एष चोभ	16	558
संकर्षणो वासुदेवः	4	152
संघो रक्ताम्बर	2	67
संचिन्त्य मनसा	15	494
संपूज्य ब्राह्मणं	5	181
संपूर्णार्थविनिश्चायि	3	119
संप्रोक्ता नित्य	4	148
संबन्धिभेदात्	13	412
संमानन	12	355
संयोगो योग	15	461
संवादे महदा	16	580
संसारबीजभूतानां	3	111

	Chap.	Page
संसारस्य परं	9	268
संस्कारा दश	15	495
संस्थानैक्याद्य	4	142
सकषायत्वा	3	104
सच्चिन्नित्यनिजा	9	279
सजातीयाः	3	72
सत्कर्मपुद्गलाः	3	121
सत्त्वं तप्यं	15	444
सत्त्वपुरुषान्यता	15	517
सत्य आत्मा	5	180
सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं	16	530
सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं	16	582
सत्यं भिदा	5	180
सत्यं वस्तु तदा	13	415
सत्यः सो अस्य	5	180
सत्यपीतावभासेन	16	552
सत्यमिथ्यात्मनो	16	565
सत्यमेनमनु	5	180
सदागमैक	5	199
सदा ज्ञाता	15	468
सदा तद्भाव	4	163
सदा शिवात्म	8	258
सदेव सोम्येदमग्र	4	128
सदेव सोम्येदमग्र	16	533
सप्तभङ्गिनयाख्यं	3	114
सप्तभङ्गिनयापेक्षो	3	116
समस्तसंपत्	8	251
समाधावचला	15	450
समाधिः समता	15	463
समानं कुरुते	9	276
समानेनैव	16	551
स मार्ग इति	2	65
समाश्रिताद् ब्रह्म	5	188
समुच्चयेन	3	116

	Chap.	Page
सम्यगदर्शनज्ञान	3	87
सम्यग्रजतबोधस्तु	16	550
सम्यग्रजतबोधाच्च	16	550
स यथा शकुनिः	5	190
स यथा सैन्धव	4	134
स याति नाकं	5	178
सरोजहरणा	3	122
सरूपाणामेक	13	417
सर्गेऽपि नोप	5	181
सर्वकर्तृत्व	4	158
सर्वज्ञःसर्व	7	228
सर्वज्ञमव	3	79
सर्वज्ञसदृशं	3	79
सर्वज्ञोक्ततया	3	79
सर्वज्ञो जित	3	77
सर्वज्ञो दृश्य	3	78
सर्वतश्च यतो	7	235
सर्वथावद्य	3	91
सर्वभावेषु मूर्च्छाया	3	92
सर्वानश्नुवते	4	159
सर्वेषामिह	8	257
सव्येन शङ्खं	5	179
स सर्वव्यव	12	368
स स्वर्गः सर्वान्	12	348
सहस्रमात्मने	15	505
सहस्रमेकं	15	505
सहस्रशीर्षा	9	279
सहोपलम्भ	2	46
साक्षात्कारिणि	11	315
साङ्गं च सरहस्यं	12	355
सा चैकमेव	16	565
सात्त्विक एकादशकः	14	426
साधकस्य तु.	7	231
साध्यव्यापकता	11	337

	Chap.	Page
सा नित्या सा	13	412
साप्यपेक्षाविहीना	8	261
सामान्यलक्षणं	15	483
सारोपान्या तु	15	500
सार्धं घटीद्वयं	15	506
सा वेला मरुतो	15	506
सिद्धे शब्दार्थ	13	415
सुखानुशयी	15	483
सुदर्शनमहा	5	179
सुप्तिङन्तम्	13	406
सुप्तोऽयं मत्समो	9	269
सुप्यजातौ	15	484
सूक्ष्मे तदनु	4	153
सूत्रं वृत्ति	8	251
सूत्रेणैकेन	7	222
सृष्टिकार्ययोः	15	509
सेतुं दृष्ट्वा विमु	16	574
सेयमान्वीक्षिकी	11	320
सेवेत योगी	15	509
सोऽनादिमुक्त	7	235
सोऽपहतपाप्मा	4	151
सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन	[illegible]	192
सोऽयं परमो	11	[illegible]20
सोऽयं सन्यो	[illegible]	184
सौक्ष्म्यादव्यवधाना	5	174
सौत्रान्तिकेन	[illegible]	[illegible]
स्त्रीपुंनपुंसकत्वेषु	15	[illegible]
स्त्रीमन्त्रा वह्नि	15	491
स्थानाद्वीजा	15	481
स्थिरसुखम्	15	502
स्पर्शरसगन्ध	3	100
स्फटिकं विमलं	13	412
स्फुरितोऽप्यस्फुरित	9	276
स्फोटनं पुनः	9	274
स्मृता सकामा	3	111
स्मृत्यातो रज	16	549
स्यात्पुर्यष्टक	7	239
स्यादस्ति स्यात्	3	114
स्याद्वादः सर्वथै	3	116
स्याद्वादस्य	3	114
स्यान्नास्तीति	3	115
स्यान्निपातोऽर्थ	3	116
स्वतन्त्रं पर	5	170
स्वतन्त्रस्या	7	227
स्वतन्त्रोक्त	15	493
स्वतन्त्रो भगवान्	5	170
स्वपिता यजामानेन	1	18
स्वभक्तं वासुदेवोऽपि	4	154
स्वरसवाही	15	486
स्वरूपपररूपा	4	130
स्वर्गस्थिता	1	18
स्वविषयासं	15	511
स्वविषयसर्व	2	37
स्वसिद्धये परा	15	500
स्वातन्त्र्यपूर्ण	5	189
स्वातन्त्र्यशक्ति	5	191
स्वाध्यायशौच	15	502
स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः	12	350
स्वेदनमर्दन	9	275
ह		
हसितगीत	6	213
हास्यलोभभय	3	93
हिंसा रत्यरती	3	120
हिरण्यगर्भो	15	456
हेतुत्वमेव च	2	51
हेयं हि कर्तृ	3	94

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